

The Swedish Defence Commission's report on the development of the military defence

Excerpts

The Swedish Defence Commission agrees on the main conclusions of the report. In some areas, Members of the Riksdag Morgan Johansson (Social Democratic Party), Peter Hultqvist (Social Democratic Party), Hanna Gunnarsson (Left Party), Mikael Larsson (Centre Party) and Emma Berginger (Green Party) have presented opposing opinions.

1. Introduction

Sweden is facing a historic total defence bill decision.

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale and illegal invasion of Ukraine. This has fundamentally deteriorated the security situation for Europe, Sweden and the neighbourhood.

Against this background, Sweden and Finland applied for membership in NATO on 18 May 2022. Finland and Sweden became members of the defence alliance on 4 April 2023 and 7 March 2024 respectively.

Swedish NATO membership marks the biggest change in Swedish security policy in 200 years. Sweden has entered binding mutual defence guarantees in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance's collective defence commitment now forms a central part of Swedish security and defence policy. Together with other Allies, Sweden's commitment to collective defence guarantees is central to NATO's deterrence and the ability to maintain peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Sweden's and Finland's membership of NATO is also significant for the Nordic-Baltic region. As free and democratic Allies, we defend each other and strengthen our resilience together. This also strengthens the broader relationship between the Nordic-Baltic countries.

The operational capability of the Swedish Armed Forces' wartime organisation and the total defence is central to our credibility as part of NATO's collective defence and deterrence.

The total defence bill to be decided on by the Riksdag in autumn 2024 is historic in light of Sweden's membership of NATO. At the same time, it is the next step in the change in course for Swedish defence that began with the 2015 Defence Bill (Govt. Bill 2014/15:109, Committee Report 2014/15:FöU11, Riksdag Communication 2014/15:251) and continued with the 2020 Defence Bill (Govt. Bill. 2020/21:30 Committee Report 2020/21: SEC 2020/21:135). This meant a change in course from an international missions-based defence to a national defence against armed attack, combined with intensified defence cooperation with other countries with the aim of increasing the ability to operate together with others.

As an Ally, Sweden will maintain a strong national defence capability to contribute to both national and collective defence, in accordance with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Sweden's membership of NATO and participation in its joint operational planning means increased demands on military and civilian capabilities. Sweden's ability to support other Allies, including through Host Nation Support, is crucial for the Alliance to be able to operate in our part of Europe. By already enabling early action in peacetime, Sweden can contribute to strengthening collective defence and thus NATO's collective deterrence.

Total defence must be scaled to defend Sweden and Allies against an armed attack based on the collective defence within NATO. An armed attack against Sweden or our Allies cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be ruled out that military force or threats of such might be used against Sweden or our Allies.

A large-scale war is raging in Europe today. The Defence Commission underscores the tangible risk that the security situation will continue to deteriorate. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has been ongoing for more than ten years and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine is in its third year. Russia has mobilised its society and economy for a long-term war. The risk of escalation remains. An escalation could lead to attacks on other States, but also increased threats, or use, of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

In light of the deteriorated security situation and the requirements associated with NATO membership, the Commission has deemed that there is a need to enhance the military defence in terms of content, volume and pace compared to the 2020 Defence Bill. The capabilities of the military defence must be swiftly adapted to the requirements that follow from being an ally in NATO. Time must be an important factor in all political decisions and agency decisions in the coming years regarding personnel, materiel, infrastructure, etc.

There is an urgent need to build up the total defence. The Defence Commission emphasises that the deteriorated security situation calls for a different political ambition, a different leadership and a different approach than the current ones, which have developed and evolved in a completely different security situation. Technical innovations must be quickly translated into military capabilities. Administrative processes also need to be streamlined to simplify and speed up and increase the military capability.

The wartime organisation must be put at the centre of the planning. It must be the basis and starting point for the organisation of the Armed Forces. The readiness and capability of the wartime organisation must therefore be central to the activities of the Armed Forces in peacetime. This strengthens capability at all readiness levels. The current wartime organisation has shortcomings, and there is an urgent need to increase the operational capability of the military wartime units. The development of the wartime organisation must be accelerated in relation to current plans and proposals.

Sweden will, as far as possible, fulfil the requirements set by NATO's capability goals and the commitments under NATO's joint operational planning, while ensuring national defence needs are met.

This requires, for example, more officers and civilian personnel, conscripts in basic and unit training, squad leaders, soldiers and sailors, higher availability of equipment through re-acquisition, new acquisition and increased security of supply, improved infrastructure, clear unit turnover plans, refresher training and a functional and robust mobilisation system. Moreover, a well-developed capacity for Host Nation Support is needed.

The Defence Commission shares the Armed Forces' analysis and supports the proposals presented in its documents for future defence bill decisions (the Armed Forces' revised documents for future defence bill decisions, FM2023-23092:14 and the Armed Forces' budget documents for 2025, FM2023-24770:10). These proposals, including an increased focus on air defence and being able to be part of NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence, development of cyber defence and the space area, and capability for Host Nation Support, thus form the basis of the proposals the Commission is submitting.

In addition, the Commission proposes further measures to strengthen military capability, including measures to make three mechanized brigades and one infantry brigade operational by 2030 in all material aspects.

The Commission also proposes that a new field unit, a Norrland infantry regiment, be established and made operational by 2032 in all material aspects.

The Commission proposes that locally based territorial units be set up and manned by transferring conscripts from field units.

Furthermore, the Commission proposes introducing additional anti-aircraft capability to meet the threat from unmanned vehicles (drones). The Commission believes that it is urgent to increase anti-aircraft capability and therefore additional anti-aircraft capability should be considered in addition to what the Commission proposes.

The Commission proposes that limited long-range strike capability in the form of a smaller unit be introduced by 2030. The Commission considers that development towards a multiple rocket launcher battalion is urgent but requires further consideration.

The Commission states that the decision to procure four new Luleå-class surface combat vessels is a high priority. The vessels provide increased endurance and enhanced advanced air defence capability, and robust naval command and control capabilities. Given the long lead times for procurement, the Commission proposes immediately investigating the possibility of procuring other surface combat vessels, in addition to the Luleå class. The focus should be on delivery of these new vessels from the mid-2030s.

In order to enable continued submarine capability after 2035, the Commission believes that preliminary planning for a new generation of submarines should begin, with the aim of replacing the three Gotland-class submarines. In connection with this procurement, increasing the total number of submarines to six may come into consideration.

The Commission notes the Armed Forces' ongoing studies and concept work regarding the prerequisites for the future choice for the supply of fighter aircraft capability. The Commission believes that the Riksdag should decide on this matter and wants to emphasise the importance of transparent decision-making based on the long-term operational needs of the Armed Forces and Sweden's military geography.

The Commission further proposes regular refresher training for the wartime organisation's mobilisation units, an increase of the number of places in officer training, enhanced support for voluntary defence organisations and additional funding to increase the number of personnel in the Navy.

In addition to the ambitions contained in the documentation that the Armed Forces has presented as a basis for the forthcoming defence resolution, the Commission proposes extensive procurement of supplies such as ammunition and spare parts over the next ten years. However, the Commission finds that further procurement of supplies in addition to this is urgent and should be considered.

The Commission is of the opinion that defence acquisition should have a greater focus on establishing and ensuring predictable, robust and sustainable supply solutions. In the period up to 2030, authorities must also be able to take advantage of opportunities for rapid materiel supply. At the same time, methods and processes must be designed to support rapid introduction of new technology into military units.

The Commission emphasises that defence acquisition must be efficient, secure and sustainable in the long term based on the objective of ensuring that the military defence's need for materiel and materiel-related services is met in times of peace, crisis and war, both today and in the future. In the coming years, measures that enable a rapid increase in capability will need to be prioritised.

The Commission believes that it is in Sweden's interest to maintain a strong domestic defence industry. The State can achieve increased production capacity through long-term commitments and agreements with companies, individually or together with Allies. In addition, business models for defence acquisition may need to be developed.

In order to enable a functioning supply of materiel in wartime, the state must be able to ensure access to companies' know-how, skills and resources. Security of supply can be achieved through stockpiling, and additionally ensured through industry contracts and international agreements. In addition, agreements similar to strategic partnerships between the State and defence companies may need to be pursued on a multilateral or bilateral basis.

Ultimately, the population of Sweden provides the basis for total defence. Everyone has a role to play in the total defence. The population's willingness to defend, resilience and ability to handle a war situation are crucial for a credible total defence.

Conscription will continue to form the basis for the Armed Forces' future personnel supply. Swedish units with conscripts become part of NATO's collective defence in accordance with Articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Defence Commission assesses that an increased number of conscripts for basic training is needed. The Commission proposes that the Armed Forces should train at least 10 000 conscripts annually by 2030, and 12 000 conscripts annually by 2032. The Armed Forces should further analyse the conditions and possibilities to reach 14 000 conscripts annually by 2035.

It is crucial that Swedish combat forces can operate on the territory of other Allies in times of peace and in war. It is a prerequisite to be able to participate in the defence of the territory of Allies.

In its report *Kraftsamling*, the Commission presents its view on the direction of the total defence, including proposed objectives for the total defence, the military defence and the civil defence.

The civil defence is a prerequisite for the military defence to be able to fulfil its main task – to defend Sweden and its Allies against an armed attack. The Defence Commission finds that the civil defence must be built based on the requirements in a state of heightened alert and war. A strong civil defence dimensioned for war is important because total defence, as part of NATO's collective defence, contributes to NATO's overall deterrence capability and thus to peacekeeping and war deterrence.

In *Kraftsamling*, the Commission presents its view on organisation and management in the total defence. The Commission makes several proposals for the development of civil defence, including for economic defence, supply readiness, protection of the civilian population, psychological defence and the ability to provide civil support to Allies on Swedish territory. The Defence Commission also sets out its view on research, development and innovation as a basis for knowledge-based development of both the military and civil defence.

The Commission agrees on the need for financial additions to total defence. The Commission supports the financial planning framework forming the basis for the Armed Force's proposal for continued development of the military defence. In addition, the Commission proposes further measures to strengthen the capabilities of the military defence. In total, the additional allocations for military defence should increase over the period to reach SEK 52.8 billion for the year 2030. Based on NATO's definition, total military defence expenditure would amount to around 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2030.

For the civil defence, the Commission proposes that the combined civil framework should amount to at least SEK 15 billion per year from 2028. The Commission further proposes that the financial framework for civil defence be increased to a total level of at least SEK 15 billion per year from 2028.

The Commission's emphasis in this report is on proposals for measures with the aim of creating increased capability in the coming years. At the same time, the Commission wants to emphasise the importance of closely following the continued development of the Armed Forces and its war-time military organisation after 2030. The proposals in this report should be seen as steps towards long-term development, not as the end goals of such development.

A large-scale war is going on in Europe. It is crucial that the structure and dimensions of the military defence are geared towards a high-intensity, protracted war against a qualified adversary within the framework of the Alliance. This applies to everything from the design of the war organisation units to ensuring a robust personnel supply. Lessons from the war in Ukraine resulting from Russia's full-scale invasion should be promptly and continuously drawn on to influence the development of our national defence capability. The opportunity to take advantage of new technological innovations to benefit military capability must be harnessed, with implementation in the military units as quickly as possible.

The Defence Commission would like to emphasise that it is not the most likely course of events that is most important in relation to the task of dimensioning the total defence, but the course of events that would have serious consequences if they occurred.

At the same time, the broad and increasingly complex threats must also be met.

The Commission considers that military support to Ukraine is a central part of Swedish security and defence policy. Together with the growth of the Swedish total defence capability, the most important investment in our future stability and security is ensuring that Russia does not achieve its goals with its offensive war against Ukraine.

The Commission considers that the conditions for strong, predictable, and sustainable Swedish military support to Ukraine needs to be enhanced, and that long-term financial planning is needed for this support. The Commission considers that the level of ambition for Swedish military support should, based on Ukraine's needs, correspond to its security policy importance, continue to be comprehensive and extend over a period of several years.

The Commission considers that financing of the support through specific budget appropriations in the central government budget should be considered. The Commission emphasises that these appropriations must be outside the regular defence expenditure appropriations.

On 26 April 2023, the Commission submitted its 2023 interim report *Kontrollstation* (Ds 2023:12). The Commission's overall assessment was that the 2020 Total Defence Bill

regarding the military defence could not be fully implemented based on the direction and within the financial framework allocated in connection with the decision. The Commission determined that this must be considered in the proposal that it submits in the present report concerning the future direction and design of the military defence, and it has done so.

On 19 June 2023, the Commission submitted its interim report on security policy, which provided an assessment of the security situation and the consequences for Swedish defence and security policy. This included an assessment of the consequences of and priorities linked to Swedish membership of NATO.

The Commission's report on civil defence *Kraftsamling* (Ds 2023:34) from the 19 December 2023 laid the foundations for the development of the total defence, i.e. for both the military and the civil defence, through a number of proposals and assessments concerning the orientation of total defence. These proposals and assessments are firm.

The Defence Commission's reports, *Kontrollstation 2023*, *Allvarstid*, *Kraftsamling* and the present report *Stärkt försvarsförmåga* must be seen as a whole.

The Commission's assessment of the security situation from the report *Allvarstid* remains valid. However, the Commission notes that the gravity of the security situation has further intensified since the report was presented in June 2023. At the same time, Sweden's and Finland's membership of and integration into NATO have helped to improve the security situation for Sweden and its neighbours.

The Commission notes that the assessment of the security situation is fraught with uncertainty factors, not least in regard to developments in Russia's war in Ukraine, Russia's confrontational stance towards EU and NATO countries, developments in the Middle East, tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and political developments in a number of countries that are of importance to Sweden. These factors, individual or combined, entail an increased risk for rapid further deterioration of the security situation, with serious consequences for Europe's and Sweden's security.

This tangible risk underscores the importance of accelerating the development of Sweden's total defence, and the military defence in particular.

The Commission further emphasises that the proposals it is now presenting, as well as a future defence bills, may need to be adjusted in consideration of both the uncertain security situation and Sweden's NATO membership and the associated demands on the military organisation, including the upcoming capability targets.

The Defence Commission therefore believes that the head of the Ministry of Defence should consider giving the Commission new instructions to follow the development of defence and security policy from late 2024.

Our country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be defended. We are prepared, ultimately by force of arms, to defend our country, our population, our democracy, our freedom, and our way of life.

2. Assessment of the security situation

On 19 June 2023, the Defence Commission submitted its security policy report *Allvarstid* (Ds 2023:19). The report outlines the Commission's assessment of the security environment and developments, and related consequences for Swedish defence and security policy. The Commission's assessment of the security situation from *Allvarstid* remains largely unchanged. However, in addition to the assessments in *Allvarstid*, the Commission would like to add the following.

The Commission notes that the gravity of the security situation has further intensified since *Allvarstid* was put forward in June 2023. At the same time, Sweden's and Finland's membership of NATO has contributed to improving the security situation for Sweden and its neighbours. Since June 2023, Finland's integration into NATO has progressed. On 7 March 2024, Sweden became a NATO Ally and began its integration into the Alliance. Sweden's and Finland's membership of NATO has a stabilising effect on security in northern Europe and strengthens Sweden's security.

The assessment of the security situation is fraught with uncertainty factors, not least in regard to developments in Russia's war in Ukraine, Russia's confrontational stance towards EU and NATO countries, developments in the Middle East, tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and political developments in a number of countries that are of importance to Sweden. These factors, individual or combined, entail an increased risk for a rapid further deterioration of the security situation, with serious consequences for Europe's and Sweden's security.

The Commission assesses that geopolitical tensions will continue to grow in the coming years. This brings a tangible risk of a further deteriorating security situation, which underscores the importance of accelerating the development of the Swedish total defence and the military defence in particular.

On the whole, since June 2023, the threat to Sweden has grown in other respects, such as reactions to Quran burnings and disinformation campaigns in which Sweden is singled out as a country hostile to Islam, have since June 2023 compounded the threat scenario. In August 2023, the Swedish Security Service raised the terror threat level from elevated to high. This decision was taken against the background of the assessment that Sweden had gone from being a legitimate target to a priority target for certain violent Islamist extremist groups. At the same time, the Security Service continues to underscore the threat from violent right-wing extremism. In parallel with this, Sweden has continued to be the subject of hybrid attacks, including several major cyberattacks, and security-threatening activities from foreign powers.

The Commission emphasises that the handling and the outcome of Russia's war against Ukraine, and its violations of international law and of the European security order will have consequences for both Russia and Ukraine, and the rest of Europe and the West for generations to come. This will also have consequences for global security and the balance of power.

The Commission's assessments from *Allvarstid* are still valid.

Russia's political objective of complete domination of Ukraine and its perception of being in a long-term conflict with the West, where Russia rhetorically declares itself to be at war with the West, still apply. So too does Russia's ambition to change the rules-based world order. It is therefore a conflict between an authoritarian, revisionist state whose actions are aggressive and imperialistic, and the free, open and democratic world. It is ultimately a conflict between which norms and principles that should be governing – between the rule of force and a rules-based world order.

Russia has adapted society and economy for a long-term war effort. The risk of escalation remains. Escalation could lead to attacks on other States, or the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, Russia is increasingly using hybrid attacks and other security-threatening activities against Sweden and its Allies, including cyberattacks, propaganda and instrumentalised migration flows. The Commission assesses that this type of security-threatening activity is likely to increase further.

Ukraine's ability to sustainably defend itself depends on the support it receives from outside. The Commission emphasises that strong, predictable and sustained support to Ukraine is our main opportunity to restrict Russia's strategic scope for action. The Commission emphasizes that Ukraine needs help to win both the war and the peace. Alongside further support measures, the Commission therefore stresses the importance of Ukraine's continued integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, in line with its own political objectives. In this context, the Commission notes the European Council decision of December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and with the Republic of Moldova, and its decision to grant the status of candidate country to Georgia.

The Commission reiterates the importance of a continued common policy to restrict Russia's strategic scope for action. This includes accountability, comprehensive sanctions, and political and economic isolation. Sweden and the EU must take further measures to become independent from, among other things, Russian energy.

The Commission again stresses the indispensable importance of the transatlantic link to European security. It is essential that Sweden maintains and develops the transatlantic link and bilateral ties with the United States, and that Europe takes greater responsibility for its own security.

American presidential and congressional elections will take place in November 2024. The Commission underscores that the foreign and security policy and the transatlantic commitments that the US chooses in the coming years will have great significance for Swedish and European security.

In this context, the Commission again reiterates the importance of increased European responsibility for its own security. As an Ally, Sweden will stand for reasonable burden sharing within NATO. This is also an investment in the transatlantic link.

The developments following the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, have led to a further deterioration of the security situation in the Middle East since the Commission's assessment in *Allvarstid*, with potential ramifications beyond the region. In response to the Hamas attack, Israel began extensive aerial bombing that transitioned into a ground offensive affecting the entire Gaza Strip. Six months later, the humanitarian situation in Gaza is alarming. The developments there have brought to the fore the question of a two-state solution as the only sustainable way to resolve the conflict between Israel and Palestine. As a result of the war, tensions throughout the region have steadily increased, with the risk of spillover effects and escalation.

In its prior reports *Allvarstid* and *Kraftsamling* (Ds 2023:34), the Commission describes the threat Russia constitutes, as well as its military capabilities. The Commission's assessments essentially remain valid. As the Commission indicated, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has worsened the security situation in Europe, Sweden and the neighbourhood – fundamentally and for a long time to come. At the same time, the military-strategic situation in northern Europe has changed due to Finland's and Sweden's NATO membership.

The development of new Russian military capability and the rebuilding of the capacity lost in Ukraine is ongoing. How long such a rebuild takes will vary depending on several factors, including developments in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, whether Russian requirements for modern materiel are maintained or lowered, and whether Russia succeeds in improving its access to advanced technology despite the sanctions. As long as Russian units and materiel are depleted, and parts of the Russian armed forces are tied up in Ukraine, Russia's ability to use military forces for other objectives and in other regions is partly limited.

In the short term, Russia's capacity to take military action in Sweden's neighbourhood is therefore somewhat limited, particularly with regard to ground forces. However, this assessment does not mean that Russia would lack the ability to take any military action in Sweden's neighbourhood.

The Commission notes that the reduced Russian military capability due to the war against Ukraine does not reduce the threat to Sweden in the medium or long term, which underscores the importance of substantially accelerating the build-up of Swedish military and civil defence capabilities.

3. Developments in military technology

The Defence Commission finds that Sweden, a high-tech country with a strong defence industry, must, through research and innovation, harness, and in certain areas lead, technological development in order to strengthen its defence capability. This includes the civilian sector.

Today's technological development is driven by both private and public actors. It is difficult to foresee how technological developments will affect society in the future. The boundaries between military and civilian technologies have blurred as technology traditionally intended for civilian applications is being used increasingly for military applications and vice versa.

The Defence Commission finds that it is difficult to determine whether, when and in what way a specific area of technology will affect society and military technological development. Developments within different areas of technology may also reinforce each other, and combinations of technologies may result in breakthroughs. Developments in different areas of technology may also cancel each other out. There is a continuous development of measures and countermeasures.

The Commission stresses that Sweden is ideally positioned to both keep abreast of and contribute to technological development. At the same time, it is not possible for a country of the size of Sweden to lead development in all, or even most, areas of technology through research and development. Through cooperation and partnerships with others, knowledge can still be obtained. However, Sweden must have its own research and development in critical technologies, i.e. areas where the knowledge is highly sensitive and thus cannot be obtained from outside Sweden or shared with others. This mainly concerns the fighter aircraft and underwater domains, and sensors, electronic warfare and crypto technologies.

Furthermore, general technological development is not focused on a specific goal and is not carried out within a single specific domain. Possibilities and applications are instead identified over time, which makes it difficult to predict the effects of technological development on society and on the defence. Hence, it is also about understanding if, when and in what way one area of technology can be combined with one or several others in military applications with the potential for making a big impact.

This requires research and development at national level in order to test concepts and ideas and to scan and identify interesting research and development globally.

Experience from Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine and from previous wars has shown that the pace of military technological development and the implementation of new technological solutions accelerate during war.

The Defence Commission stresses that technical knowledge does not equate to military capability. To harness technological advances and cope with changing requirements,

consequences and the resulting opportunities, requires methods, ways of working and processes so as to translate the knowledge into equipment, training, doctrines, tactics, and methods.

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of being able to quickly identify and adopt technological achievements and apply them to technical systems that contribute to new capabilities or can be used as countermeasures. This calls for technology scanning to identify important technological achievements in combination with resources that enable technological advances to be rapidly exploited. The Defence Commission considers that strategies for technology supply and established networks for research and innovation also play an important role in a state of heightened alert or war, and that processes should be developed to ensure this approach is pursued.

The Defence Commission assesses that rapid technological development has consequences for the supply of materiel and personnel, the development of doctrine, tactics and methods, and capability development in general.

General technological development offers opportunities to develop new types of weapons and other equipment, and use them in new ways. This raises new ethical, moral and legal issues. The lack of respect for the rules of international law demonstrated by several authoritarian states could lead to potentially very serious developments in new areas of technology. The possibility of reaching agreements with these states is often severely limited.

The Defence Commission considers that Sweden should continue to actively participate in the international work to develop norms and regulations for military use of new technology and new types of weapons. At the same time, the Commission notes that the willingness and the threshold to use certain types of technology or weapons differ between authoritarian states and democracies. This means that Sweden, in collaboration with its Allies, must understand and be able to defend itself against the entire spectrum of new technologies and their potential use and integration into the military capabilities of States such as Russia and China. This also applies to systems and weapons that we do not intend to develop ourselves.

Technological development for military applications is often resource-intensive and requires broad technical knowledge. No high-tech country, with the possible exception of the USA and China, currently has the knowledge and resources to be self-sufficient in all areas of technology. The number of international collaborations, both for technological development and for the development of military systems, is therefore increasing.

4. Observations from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine

The amount of information from the war is overwhelming in scope, but at the same time difficult to verify and filled with uncertainties. Conditions in Sweden and Ukraine differ in many ways. Nevertheless, Sweden should draw on the lessons from the war in Ukraine, especially the several clear trends that should serve as a basis for the further development of Swedish defence. The Defence Commission underscores the importance of putting experiences, conclusions and lessons learned into context based on Swedish conditions as a member of NATO.

Since the late 2022, the situation has developed into a war of attrition, where neither side has thus far succeeded in making significant gains through offensive ground operations, or in establishing air or sea supremacy. Combat actions beyond the direct line of confrontation take place mainly through deep strikes with ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as cyberattacks and special forces.

Observations from the war in Ukraine clearly show the value of prepared resistance, international cooperation and foreign support, but also show the effects and the importance of the ground domain in a war for territory aimed at political control.

The Defence Commission stated in its report *Alvarstid* that a large-scale war with a centre of gravity in the ground domain requires enormous resources. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, personnel, ammunition, materiel and supplies have been consumed on a scale not seen by the West in decades.

Russia's large-scale war in Ukraine highlights the importance of sufficient troop volumes to sustain long-term resistance, as well as the importance of logistics, capacity-building and well-functioning supply flows.

The Western defence industry is currently far from the necessary production capacity. Although the defence industry has begun to increase its production of weapons and ammunition, the capacity still falls short of Ukraine's support needs. In addition, several Western states need additional supplies to enhance their own military capabilities.

The war in Ukraine highlights what the space domain can provide in terms of management and intelligence needs. For example, transmission capacity and satellite images for intelligence have been identified as significant components. Qualified intelligence has been obtained with systems that mainly use the space domain, but also with systems in the air and cyber domains.

Even the sophisticated Western command and intelligence systems used in Ukraine have proven vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare. The war in Ukraine has shown that Russia's electronic warfare capability has continued to be a priority and that it is an effective tool for disruption and protection, and as part of the combat chain.

Despite Russia's electronic warfare capability and other countermeasures, access to the internet and mobile communications has not been completely eliminated. One reason could be that

Russian units themselves have benefitted from the Ukrainian mobile network. Access to the internet and mobile communication at the war front is generally as good as in major cities. Ukraine has built resilience through the integration of internet providers, along with protective measures for fixed IT and telecommunications infrastructure, and investments in extensive repair resources.

The war underscores the decisive importance of the ground domain for the course of the battle. Access to large numbers of combat units has proven to be a quality in itself. The ability to exercise sustained control over the ground domain, as well as the ability to rotate units at the front and replace losses, requires large war unit volumes.

Counter-mobility operations with a combination of mines and indirect fire have been extensive and have become a tangible element of the war. In particular, defence positions with extensive minefields and artillery support have proven very difficult for the units of both sides to force in their attempts to win and retake territory.

The war in Ukraine has also illustrated that older mines are still effective weapon systems. Therefore, mine clearance ability remains an important element of future warfare.

Near-real-time precision combat capabilities at long range through access to weapon systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and long-range artillery systems such as the Archer with the Excalibur shell have proven to be significant for Ukraine. These systems enable forces to rapidly and effectively combat tactically and operationally significant targets at a depth beyond the immediate front line.

While ground-based precision systems have proven valuable, observations from the war indicate that conventional artillery remains a very effective weapon.

After the initial Russian attack, it took three days before the Ukrainian air defence could start operating again. Despite initial Russian successes, as of spring 2024 neither side has managed to establish control of the airspace, which is a prerequisite for freedom of action in the ground and sea domains. Russian fighter aircraft are used to a minor extent. This is mostly due to the strong and resilient Ukrainian air defences and Russian operational doctrine.

Russia's use of long-range combat systems such as ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) has gone through several phases since the start of the full-scale invasion.

During the first three days of the invasion, the objective is believed to have been to degrade or destroy Ukrainian air defence capabilities by striking fixed radar stations, fixed air defences, command posts, air bases and ammunition depots. From June 2022, Russia changed tactics and chose to primarily attack fuel storage facilities, oil refineries and railway infrastructure. From autumn 2022 and throughout the winter, massive attacks were carried out against, among other things, Kyiv and the country's energy and water supply, with a particular focus on electricity production and grids.

Russia's war in Ukraine has involved a large use of various types of unmanned aerial vehicles, (UAV). UAVs are used for a variety of purposes and tasks at all levels and are available in a variety of sizes and performance classes.

The role of UAVs, like other long-range precision weapons, has shifted during the war, for example from combatting military objects to pure terror attacks against civilian infrastructure.

Simpler UAVs are relatively cheap and have thus been used widely. They have greatly improved the ability of lower-level units to gain an overview of, and fight on, the battlefield.

Russia's naval war is judged to have been primarily aimed at depriving Ukraine access to the Black Sea and thereby blocking its merchant shipping to affect the country's economy.

On 25 February 2022, Russia managed to occupy the island of Ostriv Zmyjiny, southwest of Odesa, from which Ukrainian shipping could be effectively controlled and attacked.

As a result, a major portion of Ukraine's export income disappeared and grain prices in the world market rose.

Early in 2022, Ukraine perceived a tangible threat of a Russian landing operation in the Odesa-Mykolaiv region. In response, it launched a coastal defence operation based on naval mines, land based anti-ship missiles and artillery. Several Russian warships were damaged by Ukrainian attacks, and in April 2022, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the cruiser *Moskva*, and the landing craft *Saratov* were sunk by Ukrainian land based anti-ship missiles. This was a turning point for the fighting in the Black Sea.

By the end of 2023, Ukraine's seaborne trade had recovered to levels corresponding to those before the full-scale invasion, having an immediate effect on the Ukrainian economy and thus the endurance of the defence of the country.

The Russian Black Sea Navy has suffered heavy losses, and it is estimated that at least 20 per cent of its warships have been sunk or otherwise put out of combat condition.

Despite losses and limited freedom of action, the Black Sea Navy remains a threat, and the missile strikes from the sea against Ukrainian ports of export and civilian infrastructure continue.

The situation in the Black Sea illustrates the dependence on seaborne trade for sustenance and national survival, and the need to protect it, especially as disruptions in the flow of trade can have negative global effects.

Observations from Ukraine show that a mainly land-based coastal defence supported by air force capabilities can contest an enemy's attempts at naval supremacy, while at the same time being unable to fight naval forces further out to sea without having functioning naval forces.

Observations also show the continued importance of sea mines, even of older types, and at the same time the need for rapid technological innovation. Ukraine's use of several rapidly developed generations of increasingly advanced unmanned surface vessels (USVs) is a clear example of the latter.

Russia has waged cyber warfare in several phases in connection with the full-scale invasion. The invasion was preceded by a massive number of sophisticated cyberattacks, which underlines the importance of systematic work on information and cyber security.

Ukraine's political leadership and authorities have already prioritised allocating resources to strengthen national cyber security and cyber defence capabilities for a decade. Ukraine was already subjected to Russian cyberattacks long before the full-scale invasion, and expects to continue to be exposed even after a possible cessation of hostilities.

Since the full-scale invasion, cooperation between government and private actors, including hackers, has been important because state resources are not enough. Ukraine has a well-developed IT industry employing more than 200 000 people. A significant percentage of these voluntarily joined the defence of the country from the very first day of the invasion. The use of volunteers in cyberwarfare demonstrates the flexibility Ukraine demonstrated during Russia's full-scale invasion and subsequent war.

The Defence Commission assesses that Ukraine today has robust competence in the cyber area and one of the world's most experienced cyber defences.

5. Sweden's military support to Ukraine

The Defence Commission considers that military support to Ukraine is a central part of Swedish security and defence policy. Together with the growth of the Swedish total defence capability, the most important investment in our future stability and security is to ensure that Russia does not achieve its goals with its offensive war against Ukraine.

Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, Sweden has substantially increased its support to Ukraine. In terms of military support, this includes Sweden's historic decision to donate defence materiel and provide increased financial support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, something it had not done for a country at war since providing support to Finland during the Second World War.

From 24 February 2022 to March 2024, Sweden adopted 15 military support packages with a total value of approximately SEK 30 billion. The Riksdag took these decisions by political consensus. The military support has evolved from simpler equipment such as helmets, food rations and bulletproof vests to advanced weapons systems such as anti-aircraft systems, anti-ship missiles, the Archer 155 mm self-propelled howitzer, the CV 90 infantry fighting vehicle, the CB 90 fast assault craft and the Leopard 2A5 SE main battle tank.

Moreover, the Armed Forces have trained Ukrainian soldiers in Sweden, and Sweden has contributed instructors to the military training efforts Interflex, Interforge and the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), as well as to the training of Ukrainian mine clearance personnel carried out in Lithuania, the Nordic-Lithuanian EOD Training Initiative (NLETI).

The Commission considers that the military support to Ukraine is now entering a new phase. The possibility of contributing existing materiel from the war organisation has diminished. As a result, the proportion of military support provided by other means will need to increase, wherein procurement, acquisition and production should be given greater scope. This includes support for developing Ukraine's defence industrial base and increasing cooperation between Swedish and Ukrainian defence industries.

The Commission notes that Ukraine's ability to sustainably defend itself is dependent on the support it receives from other countries. The Commission therefore once again stresses the crucial importance of strong, predictable and sustainable support to Ukraine in the coming years. This applies to all dimensions of support to Ukraine, in particular the continued military support. Strong, predictable and sustainable support for Ukraine contributes to defending the European security order, which also forms the basis for Sweden's security and is our best recourse to restrict Russia's scope for action in terms of aggression against other countries.

The support will continue to place high demands on forceful and concerted action from Sweden and Ukraine's other partner countries. If Ukraine is not given the support it needs to defend its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the consequences will be devastating for Swedish, transatlantic and global security.

Against this background, the Commission considers that the conditions for strong, predictable and sustainable Swedish military support to Ukraine must be improved. The support needs to be geared towards long-term financial planning, as well as increased transparency and higher credibility of Swedish pledges to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. At the same time, it is important that the support to Ukraine does not undermine Swedish defence capability in the long term.

The Commission notes that several like-minded countries, including Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and Estonia, have made decisions on multi-year support to Ukraine.

Long-term support signals persistence and thus has a great value in itself. It makes it easier for Ukraine to plan, provides predictability for Sweden and Swedish actors, and for other donors and investors. Moreover, it signals that Russia, contrary to the Russian narrative, does not have time on its side in the war.

Therefore, the Commission emphasises the need for long-term financial planning of Swedish military support to Ukraine. The Commission considers that the level of ambition for the

Swedish military support, based on Ukraine's needs, should correspond to its security policy importance, continue to be comprehensive and extend over a period of several years.

Financing of the support through specific appropriations in the central government budget should be considered, the Commission emphasises that these appropriations must be outside the regular defence expenditure appropriations.

Specific budget appropriations for military support to Ukraine would give the Riksdag the ability to decide on a long-term level of support and thus provide increased transparency and security for Sweden's contribution to Ukraine's defence capabilities. Long-term financial planning would further facilitate national planning of the support and identification of new opportunities, while at the same time provide opportunity for quick and flexible action.

The Commission's overall assessment is that this provides better conditions for the continued support of Ukraine's defence capability, while at the same time allowing for continued growth of Sweden's total defence capability.

The Commission stated in its report *Allvarstid* that Sweden's support to Ukraine must be sustainable and long-term, and include its reconstruction. The Commission therefore urges providing strong, predictable and sustainable support for Ukraine also after the war. This applies to military support and political, economic and humanitarian support.

6. Development of the Swedish Armed Forces

After the end of the Cold War, extensive disarmament of Sweden's total defence began. It was assumed that Russia's relatively good relations with Western Europe and the United States at the time would continue, along with integration of Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security structures.

The defence of Sweden against armed attack went from being the primary task of the Swedish Armed Forces to essentially being abandoned as a planning requirement, following the 2004 Defence Bill. This was also the basis for the assessment in the 2009 Defence Bill, which stated that an armed attack against Sweden was unlikely for the foreseeable future. The Armed Forces were thus reorganised so as to focus on international crisis management instead.

As a result of the security situation, the number of war units, regiments and flotillas were greatly reduced. The bulk of the munitions were divested or scrapped, comprehensive regional operational management dismantled, and maintenance, service and stockpiling transformed into centralised peacetime rational logistics. Some capabilities were phased out altogether, while others were reduced to a bare minimum. Refreshment training discontinued completely. Unit turnover and war unit planning ceased, and basic training based on conscription was put on hold. The capability for joint operations and combat in larger units was phased out. The total defence as a system was dismantled and civil defence was reshaped into crisis preparedness

focused on dealing with peacetime crises only. This has resulted in a difficult starting point for reinstituting the total defence.

The 2015 Defence Bill, which was adopted by broad political consensus, constituted a new shift in Swedish defence policy. This decision, which was taken against the background of a deteriorating security situation and Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, entailed a re-establishment of military activities on Gotland, reactivation of conscription and a shift in focus where defence against an armed attack would once again form a starting point for military defence. Then came the 2020 Defence Bill that, together with a number of subsequent decisions, has entailed the biggest increase in defence spending since the beginning of the 1950s.

As stated in the Defence Commission's report in 2023 (Ds 2023:12), the starting point for the 2020 Defence Bill was a war organisation that began to be strengthened through the 2015 Defence Bill.

The Commission finds that although Swedish defence has been successively strengthened, continued capability enhancement is necessary. Preparing the defence of Sweden – both nationally and within the Alliance – for a high-intensity and protracted war against a qualified adversary places completely different demands on the Riksdag, the Government, the Armed Forces and the entire total defence than has previously has been the case.

The Commission considers that membership of NATO does not supplant the need to strengthen national defence capability. This national capability also forms the basis of collective defence.

7. Demands on the military defence

The Defence Commission emphasises that an armed attack against Sweden or our Allies cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be ruled out that military means of force or threats of such might be used against Sweden or our Allies.

A strong Swedish total defence with a credible warfare capability is a deterrent to war and thus peacekeeping, and contributes to NATO's overall deterrence.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the deteriorating security situation and Sweden's NATO membership have brought greater demands on the Swedish defence to urgently develop and provide capable war units. Military units must have preparedness, combat capability and endurance. The Commission considers that the military defence should, as part of NATO's collective defence, be part of NATO's collective deterrence capability and thus contribute to peacekeeping.

As a NATO member, Sweden has committed to the entirety of the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Sweden must provide support without delay in the event of an armed attack against one of NATO's member states.

A central part of NATO's deterrence and thus the preservation of peace in the Euro-Atlantic area and Sweden's security is the continue faith of Sweden, together with the other Allies, in the collective defence commitments.

The Commission considers that the starting point for designing the military defence must also follow from the Alliance's strategic concept, political guidelines, the level of ambition in its capability planning process and, above all, its operational planning.

The Commission considers that effective mobilisation requires that all personnel required in the military defence at high alert be stationed for war. It also presupposes that the materiel war units is war-positioned and stored, particularly in the relevant mobilisation area, and that sufficient ammunition and supplies are available to solve war tasks immediately after mobilisation.

Mobilisation must be possible even during ongoing attacks. The Commission finds that the Armed Forces needs to continue to identify and implement measures to strengthen the mobilisation organisation, for example by developing tasks, mandates and resources.

The combined military defence capability is based on the military units' ability to solve their tasks in war, their war capability and the Armed Forces' ability to use these military units within the framework of the combined total defence to defend Sweden and contribute to the defence of Allies. Based on aspects such as operational planning, the overall operational capability of the war organisation can be assessed.

The Commission emphasises that the military units must be manned, equipped and trained together to solve their tasks. All war units must focus on tasks under high alert and during war.

8. Wartime organisation

The Defence Commission considers that the focus of the wartime organisation in the 2020 defence resolution should remain unchanged. This direction thus also forms the basis also for the forthcoming defence resolution.

However, the serious security situation and the requirements arising from NATO membership make it necessary to raise the level of ambition in the military defence in terms of content, volume and pace of development in comparison with the 2020 defence resolution, in some cases, in comparison with the documentation presented by the Armed Forces as a basis for the next defence resolution.

The Commission emphasises that the starting point for the development of the wartime organisation must be the most important task of the military defence; to be able to respond to an armed attack against Sweden or our allies with available resources within the framework of NATO and after a decision on heightened alert.

The Commission further emphasises that the proposals it now presents, as well as a future defence resolution, may need to be adjusted in light of the uncertain security situation, as well as Sweden's NATO membership and the associated requirements on the wartime organisation. The Commission suggests elaborating on proposals for such adjustments in a forthcoming Commission report.

In addition to the ambitions in the documentation presented by the Armed Forces as a basis for the forthcoming defence resolution, the Commission proposes extensive procurement of supplies, such as ammunition and spare parts, over the next ten years. That being said, the Commission considers further supplies in addition to this to be an urgent need that should be considered.

Work within NATO to strengthen the defence of Allied territory in Europe continues. This work will, among other things, entail a significantly greater need for units and capabilities for defence within NATO's area of operations and reduced ambitions as regards units and capabilities that are deployable for operations outside this area.

In the short term, NATO's operational planning requires useful units that are manned, equipped and trained as a cohesive force to be able to fight a qualified adversary. This is considered to be more important than developing units in the longer term with, for example, ideal materiel content.

The Commission emphasises that the documentation the Armed Forces has presented is designed to fit within the economic framework set out in the Government's assignment to the Armed Forces to submit revised documentation for the forthcoming defence resolution (Fö2022/01063 et al., 6/1/2023). The basis for this framework was the agreement that all parties in the Riksdag supported on 16 March 2022.

The Commission finds that the developments in security policy and macroeconomics, lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, increased demand for defence equipment, support for Ukraine, additional readiness measures and accession to NATO affect the implementation of the 2020 defence resolution. Moreover, status of the defence equipment has been worse than had been assumed in some cases.

The Commission notes that the political settlement of 16 March 2022 cannot fully compensate the Armed Forces for the consequences the above has had on the direction of the development of the wartime organisation as set out in the 2020 defence resolution. In addition, there is a need for heightened ambition relative to the 2020 defence resolution in light of the further deterioration in the security situation and Sweden's NATO membership. This heightened

ambition includes both new and expanded abilities. The Commission shares the Armed Forces' analysis and supports the proposals presented in its documentation. These proposals thus form the basis of the proposals presented by the Commission. The Commission also proposes additional measures to strengthen military capability.

The Commission proposes that three mechanised brigades should be in place by 2030. The units and the equipment within those brigades may vary. Two of the mechanised brigades would be reinforced with an infantry battalion, thus ensuring four manoeuvre battalions within these brigades in accordance with NATO requirements. One mechanised brigade would be organised with three manoeuvre battalions. The reduced infantry brigade would be reinforced with an infantry battalion and thus reorganised into an infantry brigade. It should in all material aspects be operational as an infantry brigade by 2030 at the latest.

The Commission proposes that funds be added to further the development of the brigades' supporting units.

The two artillery battalions at divisional level that were previously decided upon will be introduced into the wartime organisation in 2025 and should be operational by 2032 in all material respects, according to the documentation from the Armed Forces.

Intelligence, engineering, and logistics units are required at divisional level as well, as the Armed Forces has also identified. These units should be developed in line with the Armed Forces' documentation.

The anti-aircraft capability is being enhanced in accordance with the Armed Forces' proposals through continued development and delivery to the anti-aircraft battalions and by achieving full capability with anti-aircraft system 103 in all material aspects. Development of the two anti-aircraft battalions continues through increased integration into the air defence, procurement of communications and command systems, and new sensors.

Furthermore, the procurement of brigade-level anti-aircraft capability for two mechanised brigades and the battle group on Gotland has begun, which strengthens the ability to fight modern combat aircraft and cruise missiles.

There is a need for additional anti-aircraft units and anti-aircraft systems to be able to protect the Armed Forces' units against various types of unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, etc. The Commission therefore proposes that additional anti-aircraft capability be procured in the form of anti-aircraft guns, simple short-range anti-aircraft missiles or systems with other forms of functionality, etc. The Commission considers that anti-aircraft capability must urgently be enhanced, and therefore further anti-aircraft capability should be considered in addition to what the Commission proposes.

The Commission proposes introducing limited long-range strike capability in the form of a smaller unit by 2030. The Commission considers that development towards a multiple-rocket battalion is urgent but must require further consideration.

The Commission proposes that an independent Norrland infantry regiment (i.e. a field unit mainly staffed with conscripts) be added to the war organisation in 2025 and become operational by 2032 in all material aspects. It should be organised primarily into three infantry battalions together with logistics and command and control. This should not be confused with the establishment of a new training organisation within the peacetime organisation. The regiment's primary task should be to defend and delay, and to protect important areas. The infantry regiment's focus would be on combat in a subarctic environment. Eventually developing the Norrland infantry regiment into a brigade should be considered.

Two of the mechanised brigades and the infantry brigade would each be reinforced with an infantry battalion from those previously decided upon and those proposed here by the Commission.

All in all, this means that the Commission proposes establishing two more infantry battalions. Of these new infantry battalions and the four infantry battalions added in the 2020 defence resolution, three would be allocated to the Norrland infantry regiment and three to the brigades. As a result only one independent infantry battalion would remain. It would be intended for Gotland.

The Commission proposes that locally based territorial units be set up in the form of infantry, units for maintaining military communications and logistics, etc. which should be able to solve tasks within a military region and which be staffed by transferring conscripts from the field units. These units would create the conditions for the Armed Forces' field units to operate by supporting mobilisation and contributing to freedom of action for tactical commanders. The units would have the ability to defend and protect military objects, base areas and vital societal functions at an early stage.

In addition to units for defence and protection, the territorial units could also consist of, for example, units that are able to lay the Swedish Transport Administration's reserve bridges or regional logistics units.

The Commission considers that from a NATO perspective, the Swedish territorial command of ground forces must be cohesive in terms of regional command as well as command of higher tactical units. The commander of a military region must therefore be able to lead operations with assigned units and be prepared to lead other units as well. This responsibility also includes leading military regional level cooperation with the civilian parts of the total defence.

The commander of a military region should continue to lead land-territorial activities and regional operations under the operational command.

Training of staffs and units in the land domain must be cohesive in order to develop the collective ability in a rational manner, as far as possible. The Commission therefore proposes that the military regions be transferred to the peacetime organisation of the Army. This would strengthen the ability to lead and coordinate education, training, and exercises.

The Commission considers that the Navy should be designed for armed combat at the same time as tasks relating to territorial integrity are developed. Naval units, along with Air Force fighter divisions and Air Force helicopter squadron with maritime tasks, are critical to operational capability at sea. The ability to establish control of the seas together with Allies in order to keep sea lines of communication open is essential. As an Ally and part of NATO's operational planning, the importance of being able to protect troop and logistics transports to Finland and the Baltic countries increases.

The Commission underscores that the Navy has special expertise operating in the operational environment that constitutes Sweden's neighbourhood. Sweden can thus shoulder a responsibility and participate with its unique capabilities in NATO's joint naval activities for deterrence and defence in the Baltic Sea region.

The Commission notes with concern the lack of personnel in the Navy. This is today one of the biggest limitations to operational capability. In order to increase the Navy's capability and availability, the Commission considers that the number of employees should be increased and that further efforts should be made to increase availability of personnel.

Through the modification of the five Visby class corvettes decided upon for the mid-term, they will be armed with anti-aircraft missile systems and improved sensors intended for air, surface and underwater reconnaissance. Improved electronic warfare capability is also an essential part of the capability-enhancing measures.

The Commission states that the decision to procure four new Luleå-class surface combat vessels is a high priority. The ships provide increased endurance and enhanced advanced air defence capability, robust naval command and control capabilities. The expanded air defence capability, which will be integrated with the Air Force's command and air surveillance system, means that the ships will be a powerful reinforcement of Sweden's combined air defence capability and a relevant contribution to the NATO' IAMD.

Given the long lead times for procurement, the Commission proposes immediately investigating the possibility of procuring further surface combat ships, in addition to the Luleå class. The focus should be for these new ships to be delivered from the mid-2030s. The Commission stresses that in order to limit the project's time and risk, it should be carried out through acquisition of an already fully developed class of ships with limited adaptations.

The Commission considers that it should be possible to keep the fairway to at least one major port on the west coast free of mines. The Commission notes that modification of Spårö-class mine clearance vessels will be completed by 2030. The same applies to the lifetime extension

of Koster-class mine clearance vessels. In addition, demining capability is being strengthened through the acquisition of unmanned, autonomous and remote-controlled, underwater vehicles.

The Commission considers that naval mine-laying capability should continue to be developed. Procurement of new torpedo mines for the submarines must begin, as this would significantly strengthen mine-laying capability.

The heavy land-based anti-ship missile is an important system to influence an adversary's freedom of action in the Baltic Sea area at an early stage. The Commission considers that coastal missile capability should be expanded and organised into two units to increase both availability and endurance, in accordance with the Armed Forces' proposal.

Underwater capability is vital to the Armed Forces' overall ability to carry out operations in the neighbourhood, and ultimately to deter war. The Commission further notes that submarines constitute an important Swedish contribution to NATO for intelligence-gathering in and control of the Baltic Sea area.

The Commission proposes that the current organisation of the submarines be maintained, in accordance with the Armed Forces' proposal. The submarine division should include five submarines.

Delivery of two Blekinge class submarines will take place around 2030, and they will then replace the Södermanland class.

In order to enable continued submarine capability after 2035, the Commission considers that preliminary planning for a new generation of submarines should begin. This submarine system should replace the three Gotland-class submarines starting around 2038. In connection with this acquisition, ordering four new submarines and thereby increase the total number of submarines to six submarines may also come into consideration.

In line with the Armed Forces, the Commission considers that the development of the two sea-mobile amphibious marine battalions should continue. The Commission also finds that a third sea-mobile amphibious marine battalion should be considered after 2030.

Like the Armed Forces, the Commission has assessed that marine logistics capability is strengthened through the establishment of the Navy's bases in the three garrison towns of Haninge, Gothenburg and Karlskrona. The two newly established marine base battalions on the east and south coast will continue to develop in accordance with Armed Forces planning.

The Air Force must be designed and geared towards being able to face an armed attack against Sweden or our Allies. At the same time, the ability to uphold territorial integrity must be maintained.

The Air Force, together with air defences capabilities from the Army and Navy, must control the airspace and protect against enemy aircraft and long-range weapons, provide mobility in the form of transport aircraft and helicopters, be responsible for intelligence-gathering with various airborne and ground-based reconnaissance and intelligence platforms, and have the ability to carry out attacks against targets on sea or land.

The air defence forces, that is the Air Force together with air defence resources in the Army and the Navy should be developed towards an operational concept based partly on NATO's air defence capability and partly on strengthened Nordic cooperation. Through space situational awareness, Sweden's own and Allied early warning systems and opportunities for protective measures are strengthened. Space-based collection contributes to this situational awareness as well as to other intelligence collection.

Within the framework of NATO, the combined combat air force resources form an important part of the conventional capability within the framework of NATO's combined deterrence, not least through the ability to be quickly transferred to the place where they are needed.

The Commission considers that the Air Force should continue to operate six fighter divisions. When the introduction of the JAS 39 E combat aircraft system has been completed, three divisions will consist of JAS 39 C/D and three divisions will consist of JAS 39 E.

The Commission notes the Armed Forces' ongoing studies and concept work regarding the prerequisites for the future choice for the supply solution for fighter aircraft after the JAS 39 Gripen combat aircraft system. The Commission wishes to emphasise the importance of a transparent basis for decision-making based on the Armed Forces' long-term operational needs.

The capability to be part of the NATO IAMD should be developed until full integration has been achieved, in all material aspects.

Among other things, the air force is supplied with additional air-to-air missiles and long-range strike capability in the form of cruise missiles.

Sensors are vital to early warning, fighter control, air and maritime surveillance and air raid alerts. From 2026 to 2028, a radar system with a particularly long range will be delivered to the Armed Forces. The radar system will be able to track ballistic missiles and be a complement to the 103 Patriot anti-aircraft system. The work to replace the other parts of the sensor system was initiated in 2019.

The new radar early warning and control aircraft S-106 (Global Eye) will replace the ASC 890 in the period 2028-2030, which will strengthen radar coverage, improves fighter control, increase the possibility of early warning and improve situational awareness and the capability for command and control in the air, sea and ground domains.

The Commission wishes to emphasise the importance of the ambitions regarding fighter control being related to the collective capability in NATO. Participation in the NATO IAMD enables the national capabilities of other Allies to be integrated with the Swedish resources. Integration will also take place with NATO's air surveillance and fighter control capabilities, including the Alliance's jointly owned AWACS planes (Airborne Warning And Control System). Sweden will contribute to NATO's air surveillance and fighter control capabilities.

The Commission emphasises that the ability to spread nationally and within the Alliance, within and between military air bases and to civilian airfields contributes to increased protection and strengthens the conditions for survival in the event of an armed attack. A functioning organisation of bases is also important for the ability to receive Allied air resources.

In line with the Armed Forces' proposals, the Commission also considers that the air wings must maintain the ability to establish five main bases and continue the development of mobile units for the service and turn-around of fighter aircraft.

The helicopter wing will continue to consist of four helicopter squadrons, where three squadrons are focused on capability in the ground domain – one of which primarily supports the Special Forces – and the fourth is focused on naval operational capability. Each helicopter squadron must have its own base resources for autonomous operations with increased mobility and endurance.

In accordance with the Armed Forces' proposals, procurement of a new ship-based helicopter for naval operations will take place for the new the Luleå-class ships. The new helicopter system should be delivered by 2035 as an integrated and operational part of the ships' combined capabilities.

The air transport squadron is equipped with six TP84 (C-130 Hercules) transport aircraft. These aircraft are all more than 40 years old and need to be replaced. Like the Armed Forces, the Commission notes that the replacement needs to take place in the near term to avoid the risk of a capability gap and thus replacement of the system needs to begin before 2030. Maintaining national tactical transport aviation capability is vital and this need increases with Sweden as an Ally. The Government's need for additional air transport in a state of heightened alert should primarily be met through agreements with relevant actors (business planning) in a developed system with companies identified as important in war.

The Commission considers that good space situational awareness strengthens Sweden's own and Allied early warning systems and opportunities for protective measures. Space-based collection capability adds to the situational awareness and intelligence for long-range strike capabilities, etc.

The Air Force should therefore develop the ability to produce and distribute space situational awareness together with other relevant functions in the Armed Forces to meet the needs of the entire Armed Forces. This increases the possibilities of taking protective measures against

space-based reconnaissance and provides conditions for protecting Sweden's own combat forces. Within the framework of NATO membership, and to a certain extent EU membership, it is important to identify where access these capabilities can best be fulfilled. This can often be through an Ally providing the capability or through other international cooperation.

Like the Armed Forces, the Commission considers that the Home Guard units need to be supplied with additional adequate modern equipment to be able to fulfil its tasks. The Commission emphasises that voluntary involvement in the Home Guard should be encouraged, with the aim of ensuring the Home Guard's long-term supply of personnel.

The Armed Forces has proposed in its documentation for the 2024 defence resolution that the Home Guard should gradually expand to 26 000 personnel by 2030 and then increase further to 27 000 personnel. The Commission supports this development. The Home Guard's military organisation will continue to consist of 40 Home Guard battalions.

Home Guard units must have the ability to face qualified adversaries, where indirect fire may be necessary to solve the task, also in the future.

The Commission considers that the strengthening and development of the Special Forces proposed in the Armed Forces' documentation for the forthcoming defence resolution is relevant and in line with the requirements of the security situation and NATO membership.

The Commission underscores the importance of continuing to develop Special Forces capabilities, in war and within the framework of joint NATO operations, and that the Special Forces are strengthened by, among other things, the evolution of the Armed Forces' ranger units in order to meet the new endurance requirements. The deteriorating security situation combined with accession to NATO entails a need for development and strengthening.

The capability for strategic, operational, and tactical mobility of the Special Forces remains important to maintaining freedom of action both nationally and internationally. These resources must also continue to be developed in order to be able to fight a qualified adversary.

An appropriate logistics function is a prerequisite for the Armed Forces to be able to operate both nationally and within NATO in times of peace, crisis and war. The Commission emphasises the importance of striking a balance between fighting units and support, and designing the entire logistics chain to meet the demands of war.

A cohesive logistics function is a prerequisite for being able to effectively receive Allied forces on Swedish territory. Like the Armed Forces, the Commission considers that the logistics function must be developed in order for Sweden to be able to offer a base and staging area for Allied units.

Actions need to be taken so that the proposed further expansion of logistics (such as rear stockpiles) progresses as the war organisation grows. Measures to ensure the ability to receive

Allied units on Swedish territory and prepositioned equipment need to be integrated into the process of developing the logistics concept.

In addition to the ambitions in the Armed Forces' proposals for the future defence resolution, the Commission proposes additional acquisition of supplies such as ammunition and spare parts for the next 10 years. This procurement will ensure increased availability of vital equipment. In addition to this comes the necessary infrastructure required for storage and turnover of supplies.

In line with the Armed Forces' documentation, the Commission considers that the development of field hospital battalions should begin during the period. One battalion must in all material aspects be operational by 2030 and the other two after 2030. Two existing field hospital companies are maintained.

The Commission considers that a functioning and coherent command and control system in the Armed Forces is crucial to be able to use the military units effectively. The Commission stresses the importance of the operational level command functions being sufficiently robust and secure to ensure the military defence's need for command and control in war, as well as its need for cooperation with the civilian parts of the total defence.

The number of operational-level communications battalions is being increased in accordance with the Armed Forces' proposals to ensure redundancy even in war. The Commission underscores the importance of this increase in capability, not least for Sweden's ability to become part of the NATO IAMD and the interoperability with the Federated Mission Networking (FMN), which is the prerequisite for carrying out operations within the Alliance.

Electronic warfare units support the Armed Forces' command, manoeuvre and intelligence capabilities through collection and by striking against the adversary's command system and disrupting the adversary's communications. The electronic warfare battalion is currently organised with units focused on needs at brigade and divisional level, as well as at operational level.

The Armed Forces' documentation for the upcoming defence resolution outlines the basis for harnessing on the benefit of digitalisation. This development aims to meet the Armed Forces' needs for information management and modern IT infrastructure to be able to handle large amounts of information. Initially, this is being done by addressing current deficiencies in the common IT infrastructure.

The Armed Forces' cyber defence contributes to the total defence by being able to deter, detect and deny an adversary in or through the cyber domain and at all levels of conflict from affecting the ability of the military defence to mobilise, meet an armed attack, maintain territorial integrity or protect Sweden's sovereignty.

This capability is being further strengthened in accordance with the Armed Forces' proposal through the organisation of the Armed Forces' cyber defence system and the strengthening of the ability to carry out defensive and offensive operations in and outside of the Armed Forces' systems and platforms. The cyber defence is being progressively expanded in comparison with the 2020 defence resolution by establishing additional cyber defence units and organising them into a cyber defence division.

With the expansion of the Armed Forces and Sweden's NATO membership, the demand for military music for ceremonies, etc. will increase. At the same time, the Commission notes that there is no military music corps in the northern part of the country, a part of the country that will be clearly impacted by an increasing presence of Allies and NATO. The Commission proposes considering the addition of a conscripted defence music corps in Norrland.

9. Peacetime organisation

The peacetime organisation of the Armed Forces is organised and divided into regiments, air force bases, naval bases, training colleges etc. The purpose of the peacetime organisation is to develop and maintain wartime military units. However, the peacetime organisation's mandate is not only to train conscripts and form wartime units. During peacetime, the organisation also maintains the basic readiness of various units and is responsible for mobilisation preparations. During high alert, the Armed Forces assume their wartime organisation. The peacetime organisational units then form military bases. The military bases are also important for providing practical support to Allied forces on Swedish territory. In addition to personnel and equipment, a functioning peacetime organisation requires access to land and facilities for training and exercises, firing ranges, airstrips, quays and other infrastructure.

In accordance with the 2020 Defence Bill adopted by the Riksdag for 2021–2025, a build-up and expansion of operations is underway in several locations. The Commission considers that the task of quickly organising, training and equipping an expanded wartime organisation places great demands on the peacetime organisation's production capacity. Among the new units decided upon in 2020, Norrland Dragoon Regiment (K 4), Älvsborg Marine Regiment (Amf 4), Uppland Wing (F 16) are fully established as independent organisational units. The Dalarna Regiment (I 13) was re-established in September 2021 and is planned to be at full capacity after 2030, according to the Armed Forces. The Västernorrland Regiment including the Jämtland Ranger Corps (I 21) was re-established in January 2022 and is planned to be at full capacity in 2030. The Bergslagen Artillery Regiment (A 9) is also planned to be at full capacity in 2030. The Commission emphasises that the objective of the peacetime organisation from the 2020 Defence Bill is unchanged. The organisational units that are not yet fully developed must be urgently put in place. Since the 2020 Defence Bill, developments in the global security situation have made any delays in implementation unacceptable. Full capacity must be achieved by 2030 for all units.

The Commission notes that the Armed Forces maintains the previously submitted proposal that the National Staff of the Home Guard should be organised as a separate organisational unit. However, the Commission considers that organising the National Staff of the Home Guard as a separate organisational unit is not appropriate, and that the National Staff should remain in its current organisational structure.

The Commission also notes that an expanded wartime organisation, an increased number of conscripts and an increased number of volunteers place greater demands on infrastructure in terms of accommodation, training facilities and training areas both at the Armed Forces' own facilities and at the volunteer movement's training grounds.

10. Armed Forces' supply of personnel

The Armed Forces' activities depend on its personnel. A cohesive and effective system for the supply of personnel is therefore fundamental for building and maintaining useful war units, i.e. for the Armed Forces' ability to operate in times of peace, crisis and war.

The Armed Forces' supply of personnel is based on the duty to contribute to the total defence, including military conscription, employment and contracts. Basic and unit training with conscription is the main way into service as military personnel in the Armed Forces, regardless of whether it is as a conscript, employee or through contract. The Armed Forces also have civilian personnel and voluntary personnel under contract.

The Defence Commission has assessed that an increase in the number of conscripts who annually undergo basic and unit training is necessary to ensure the needs of conscript personnel with current and relevant training for the military units in the proposed military organisation. It is also necessary to ensure increased recruitment of all employed personnel categories, not least officers. Furthermore, an increased volume of conscripts in basic and unit training provides increased opportunities for the Home Guard to recruit personnel who have completed basic and unit training. Like the Armed Forces, the Commission proposes that by 2030 at least 10 000 conscripts should receive basic and unit training annually. The Defence Commission further proposes that by the year 2032 12 000 conscripts should receive basic and unit training annually. Moreover, the Commission believes that increasing the number of conscripts completing basic training to 14 000 by 2035 should be considered.

When the conscripts are discharged from field units (or equivalent units in the Navy and the Air Force), which is normally the case after about four to eight years after completing basic training, they can be transferred to the territorial units that the Defence Commission proposes to be established or to the Armed Forces personnel reserve. Together with those who have been discharged from territorial units or who are in the personnel reserve, those who have not been transferred make up the recruitment base for the Home Guard, voluntary defence organisations and parts of the civil defence.

The conscripts are ambassadors in society for the total defence in general and for the Armed Forces in particular and are thus an important part of maintaining and developing popular support and the will to defend. The conscripts also make up the recruitment base for employment in the Armed Forces. It is therefore vital for the continued growth of the military defence that the conscripts perceive their training and other service as mainly meaningful, efficient and of a high standard, and the Armed Forces as a well-functioning organisation.

The Defence Commission believes that at least half of the cohort should be mustered. This will ensure a sufficiently good selection to choose from for basic and unit training and a training reserve. At the same time, it is also a way of emphasising that the defence is the responsibility of the entire population.

Individuals must, as far as possible, be selected for positions that correspond to their assessed abilities at the time of mustering. Adequate requirement profiles and selection based on these requirements broaden the selection of individuals who are available for conscription and at the same time contribute to the selected conscripts being more representative of society as a whole.

The Defence Commission notes that a large percentage drop out of the mustering process because they have indicated some form of illness, injury, hypersensitivity or mental ill-health in their mustering forms. As it is a matter of legal duty, the Commission believes that in future a doctor's certificate should be required when referring to such health problems.

In the coming years, additional full-time and reserve officers will be required due to many retirements and the growth of the Armed Forces. More officers are needed at all levels, and this includes more non-commissioned officers (NCOs, or *specialistofficerare* in Swedish). The number of officers is defined by the needs of both the peacetime and wartime organisation. The number of full-time and reserve officers in training must therefore be increased.

In order to reach the recruitment targets for officers, the Defence Commission believes that development needs to continue to shift towards more pathways into the profession. Furthermore, the number of individuals admitted to reserve officer training should increase, while the possibility of changing from reserve officer to professional officer should be facilitated. This would enable a faster increase in the number of professional officers. Those officers who do not have an academic degree at the time of such a transition can then pursue one later as a condition for promotion to higher ranks.

Reserve officers are a vital category of personnel for the manning of military units. They enable a larger wartime organisation than would have been possible with professional officers alone. In addition to serving during the periods they are needed, including in the peacetime organisation's training and educational activities, once they are established in their civilian professional life they can also contribute civilian competence to the Armed Forces and act as ambassadors for the Armed Forces in both the public and private sectors.

It is the assessment of the Commission that the Armed Forces needs to expand the admission of reserve officer aspirants in comparison with what appears in the Armed Forces' documentation.

Moreover, the Armed Forces should make it easier to combine studies at universities and colleges with reserve officer training. The Commission thus advocates a developed form of divided reserve officer training in addition to the ordinary reserve officer training. This would mean the possibility of undergoing officer training in parallel with studies at universities and colleges, similar to the systems that exist in countries such as the US and the United Kingdom.

Voluntary personnel who serve under Home Guard contracts or personnel who have contracts according to the Ordinance on voluntary defence activities (1994:524) will also continue to be an important part of the personnel supply, above all to man the Home Guard. The Home Guard will continue to form a large part of the wartime organisation and is thus an important part of Sweden's defence capability.

The Armed Forces employs a large number of civilians in a number of different positions, and there is a range of skills in the civilian labour market that the Armed Forces need. Moreover, recruiting the right civilian skills can free up military personnel.

At the same time, the Commission emphasises that the Armed Forces is a military organisation where areas such as human resources and communication services must be driven by the logic and needs of the military organisation. This means that military competence is also required in these functions.

The Defence Commission underscore the importance of offering civilian employees career paths, competence development and opportunities for development within the organisation. It is important to work to retain personnel of this category in the Armed Forces.

For the conscript units, regular refresher training is required for the units to maintain their capability. This is important to make the units capable for war and therefore credible, not least with Sweden being an Ally in NATO.

Sweden has chosen conscription as the main way to man military units. As an Ally, the question of how mobilisation units, i.e. those mainly staffed with conscripts, can be used in NATO operations is therefore important.

The Defence Commission notes that the use of conscripts in NATO operations outside Sweden is a complex issue. The conditions for whether and how units manned wholly or partly with conscripts could be used in NATO operations throughout the scale of conflict and thus how they could be an integral part of the collective defence, including joint operational planning, need to be further clarified. The Commission underscores the importance of reaching as broad a political consensus as possible on these issues and the involvement of the parties in the Riksdag as the work progresses, for example through a parliamentary reference group.

The Defence Commission considers that the foundations for equal opportunities in the defence are already laid at the time of mustering. By calling a large number of individuals to muster, the most suitable can be selected, regardless of factors such as gender, sexual orientation or ethnic background. With requirements that are well-balanced relative to tasks and roles, more opportunities can also open up for both men and women.

The Defence Commission finds that the veteran policy should aim to provide all personnel who serve in both international and domestic operations, and their relatives, support that is proportionate to the risks and stresses to which they are exposed and the sacrifices they have to make. Veterans deserve society's appreciation and support.

The Defence Commission also notes that there are relatively few veterans who suffer from physical or mental problems as a result of their service. However, those affected need access to help and support. The Defence Commission considers that the group that paid the second-highest price for their contribution – those wounded and injured – should be given coordinated support.

The Defence Commission notes that the deteriorating security situation entails increasingly complex national operations, while NATO membership will place demands on multinational operations for deterrence and defence as well as operations to meet armed attacks against Allies. The Defence Commission considers that the concept of veteran should be expanded to also include personnel who have participated in these types of national and multinational operations. Finally, the Commission underscores the need for a veterans policy that also applies to those who have carried out civilian operations.

11. Voluntary defence organisations

The 18 voluntary defence organisations, with their roughly 350 000 members, have an important role for the collective total defence capability and popular support. They contribute to a broad commitment and participation in total defence and thus to strengthening the will to defend. The voluntary defence organisations are responsible for various specialist competencies in the military and civil defence. This includes healthcare, transport and logistics, emergency services, civil protection, cyber and telecommunications and radio communications.

The Commission considers that the voluntary defence organisations play a special role in increasing knowledge about and participation in total defence among the population, including knowledge about self-preparedness.

For the voluntary defence organisations to be able to exercise and train, individuals must be granted leave from their work to be able to participate in a training or to be able to train others as an instructor. The Total Defence Service Act (1994:1809) contains provisions on employment protection for persons liable for compulsory military service. Individuals who serve in a military organisation within the total defence on a voluntary basis have the same protection according to the employment protection act (1994:2076) in certain service within

the total defence. The Commission considers that the government should review the regulations so that instructors tasked with training others have equivalent employment protection.

The Commission stresses the importance of continued work regarding the Armed Forces' proposal. This includes the urgent introduction of a simplified funding model for the voluntary organisations. The Commission also emphasises that the funding of the voluntary defence organisations needs to increase in line with the growth within the rest of the total defence.

12. Military defence intelligence

A strong national ability to analyse the security environment is a prerequisite for Sweden's ability to pursue independent foreign, security and defence policy. Providing information and defence intelligence to the government is a prerequisite for the Government's ability to analyse, anticipate and make decisions.

This ability is necessary so that Sweden does not have to rely on other States' intelligence and can independently assess information that other countries share. Defence intelligence within NATO is a national capability.

Relevant defence intelligence that reaches the right recipient at the right time is therefore a prerequisite for the ability to evaluate and manage security developments in our neighbourhood and in other relevant parts of the world.

The Defence Commission notes that all authorities responsible for defence intelligence operations have received additional resources over the past several years and that technological development is and will continue to be resource-intensive.

The Commission notes that an intelligence investigation and a review of the law on signals intelligence in defence intelligence operations are underway.

13. Cyber defence

Cyber defence is an integral part of military defence and an essential part of modern warfare. Cyber security is a broad concept that includes everything from the individual's responsibility to society's digital systems.

The Defence Commission considers that the ability to carry out defensive and offensive cyber operations and the ability to detect, identify and ward off cyber threats against Swedish interests are of central importance for the entire total defence. Offensive cyber operations capability and its impact can provide a deterrent and threshold-raising effect.

Cyber-attacks can complement political, diplomatic, economic, military and other means before or during a conflict and threaten a State's freedom of action and ultimately its sovereignty.

Cyber operations are as obvious a part of warfare today as land, sea, air and space operations. Within NATO today, cyber is a domain of operations on equal footing with sea, land, air and space. NATO has stated that under certain conditions cyber-attacks can be equated with an armed attack and lead to Article 5 on collective defence being invoked.

Russia has signalled that a cyber-attack targeting critical military or state targets, resulting in the undermining of Russian nuclear response capabilities, could constitute grounds for Russian use of nuclear weapons.

As a result of rapid technological development, the Commission considers that continuous research and development is necessary to contribute to maintaining and developing cyber defence capabilities. The Commission also emphasises the need to develop competence in cyber defence bilaterally and multilaterally with Allies in NATO and Member States of the EU.

14. Defence acquisition and security of supply

The Defence Commission considers that defence acquisition should be focused to a greater extent on establishing and ensuring predictable, robust and sustainable supply solutions. In the period up to 2030, the authorities must also be able to harness opportunities for rapid materiel supply. At the same time, methods and processes must be designed in a way that supports the rapid introduction of new technology in military units.

The Commission emphasises that defence acquisition must be efficient, secure and sustainable in the long term based on the objective of fulfilling the military defence's need for materiel and materiel-related services in peace, crisis and war, both today and in the future. The Commission emphasises that materiel supply also needs to be coordinated with the development of defence infrastructure for this to be possible.

The management of defence acquisition needs to take account of the experiences from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the consequences of Sweden's membership of NATO and the urgent need to build up the capabilities of military units.

Defence acquisition must meet the needs of the military defence both today and in the future. However, the Commission assesses that the need for an increase in volume and capability for the wartime organisation means that measures that enable a rapid increase in capability need to be prioritised in the coming years. In many cases, this needs to be accomplished by upgrading existing equipment.

The Commission also emphasises that security of supply in wartime regarding ammunition, spare parts, replacement units, etc. is necessary for the military defence to be credible. The Commission has proposed the reintroduction of a system equivalent to the previous *k-företag* system to ensure the continued operation of companies vital to defence in wartime. A secure supply must be guaranteed for at least three months. This can be achieved through stockpiling within the central government or by corporations. During that time, production must be

adapted to wartime conditions, whereafter, security of supply can be ensured through industry contracts and international agreements.

The Commission considers that existing weapons systems and other military equipment, especially in the land domain, should not be phased out if they can be used for war or training purposes. All usable materiel needs to remain within the Armed Forces to enable the necessary capability growth, or the materiel should be tested for other needs, such as support for Ukraine.

The Commission considers that it is in Sweden's interests to maintain a strong domestic defence industry.

The Commission notes that existing production capacity in many parts of the defence materiel market falls significantly short of the needs of Sweden and its Allies. The central government therefore needs to be able to make long-term commitments and agreements with companies, individually or together with Allies, to create sufficient stability and production volume. This enables companies to invest in increased production capacity. In addition, business models for defence acquisition may need to be developed to address the need for increased production capacity.

The Commission considers that the division of responsibilities implemented from 2018 between the Armed Forces and the Defence Materiel Administration has entailed an adjustment that favours a transparent materiel supply and the opportunity for the Riksdag and the Government to follow up on the activities. At the same time, cooperation between the Armed Forces and the Defence Materiel Administration, together with the Swedish Fortifications Agency, should continue to be developed. The Commission proposes that the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis be tasked with carrying out an analysis aimed at supporting the continued development of defence acquisition within the framework of the current division of responsibilities.

The Commission considers that the establishment of a coherent process for planning, decision-making and follow-up of defence acquisition has significantly improved the Riksdag's and the Government's insight into and control of materiel supply.

The Commission emphasises the importance of continued development of defence acquisition based on the conditions that apply today so as to meet the requirements for rapid capability growth and support the development of new technology.

The Commission considers that, prior to making decisions on procurements, the central government should identify and evaluate the overall risk, taking into account all relevant aspects, in a way that makes it possible to choose a level of risk that is acceptable in relation to need and potential benefit. The Commission also considers it equally important that the implementation of materiel supply is followed up. The Commission therefore proposes that the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis, with the support of the Armed Forces and the

Defence Materiel Administration, be commissioned to draw up a proposal for a method of follow-up for the defence acquisition system.

The Commission considers that the costs of achieving a sustainable and robust security of supply should be included in the cost calculations prior to decisions on procurement. The Commission considers that major materiel investments should be subject to in-depth follow-up in terms of time, result, cost and overall risk exposure. The Commission proposes that in-depth follow-up should be carried out for the ten or so most important materiel investments.

The Commission also considers that, prior to decisions on major materiel procurements involving a high degree of uncertainty or risk, the authorities should carry out an independent review of the basis for decisions before the Armed Forces requests the Government's authorisation to carry out the procurement.

The Commission proposes that the Riksdag's steering of materiel acquisitions of special scope and importance be developed. The financial management of such particularly large materiel acquisitions needs to be clarified in relation to defence acquisition in general.

The Commission considers that clarified financial management can be based on the previous acquisition framework report for the JAS 39 Gripen and include current fighter aircraft and underwater areas, and future materiel acquisitions of a similar nature, such as a new surface combatant.

With regard to the issue of a supply solution for future fighter aircraft capability, the Commission emphasises the importance of a transparent basis for decision-making based on the Armed Forces' long-term operational needs and Sweden's military geography. The Commission considers that a decision on new fighter aircraft should be taken by the Riksdag through separate order. The Commission notes that similar concept work is intended to begin on the issue of a long-term supply solution in the underwater area.

The Commission has taken note of the proposal from the public inquiry on defence acquisition (SOU 2022:24) that the concept of essential security interests be replaced by the concept of strategic materiel areas. The Commission considers that in certain materiel areas there is a particular need to ensure the central government's access to expertise and capacity over time. Such areas can be designated by the central government as strategic materiel areas. The Commission notes that it is possible to have additional strategic materiel areas such as ammunition, in addition to the existing fighter aircraft area, the underwater area and the parts of the command and control area concerning critical technologies.

The Commission considers it important that defence acquisition is developed so that it can meet the wartime organisation's need for materiel and services during war. Development to ensure resilience and security of supply in war is of central importance.

In order to enable a functioning supply of materiel in wartime, the central government must be able to ensure access to companies' know-how, skills and resources. In addition, agreements similar to strategic partnerships between the central government and defence companies may need to be pursued on a bilateral or multilateral basis

The Commission considers that the question of whether the Defence Materiel Administration, the Swedish Defence Research Agency and the Swedish Fortifications Agency should become emergency preparedness authorities should be determined in conjunction with proposals from the public inquiry on the security of supply of the business sector (SOU 2024:19).

In line with the public inquiry on defence acquisition, the Commission considers that a sustainable supply of goods should be ensured primarily through stockpiling and supply through the central government's own resources, and secondarily through contracts and agreements. Government disposal rights should primarily be used as a method to meet emerging or immediate needs.

The Commission also agrees with the inquiry's assessment that international cooperation for security of supply should be used as a complement to other measures and should primarily be sought with countries with which Sweden has a close relationship and with countries in Sweden's geographical proximity. The inquiry also stated that a functioning defence acquisition in war presupposes that planning and preparations have been carried out in peacetime. Early and rapid decision-making and prioritisation contribute to a swift adaptation of materiel supply. The Commission also shares this view.

The Commission takes note of the Government's decision of June 2023 to the effect that access to calibre-bound ammunition at all levels of preparedness is regarded as an essential security interest. The Commission would like to emphasise the importance for Sweden of having access to ammunition in times of crisis and war. Efforts to ensure that the essential safety interest can be fulfilled need to be pursued with continued vigour.

Based on the Armed Forces' need for materiel, the Commission considers that Sweden should be an active participant in NATO's various forums concerning materiel supply. The Commission emphasises the importance of a high level of Swedish participation in the various EU initiatives in the area of defence and that Sweden pushes for a direction of the EU's defence industrial policy that favours Swedish interests.

15. International defence cooperation

NATO is Sweden's most important defence policy arena. As an Ally, Sweden is part of NATO's collective security. The collective defence commitment in NATO thus forms a central part of Swedish security and defence policy.

Bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements between Allies complement their commitments to NATO. These bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements are an

important prerequisite for an individual Ally to be able to use its capabilities and carry out operations in peace, crisis and war.

The Defence Commission emphasises that Swedish NATO membership opens up opportunities to further intensify international bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation, not least with the countries in our immediate neighbourhood. At the same time, Sweden is prepared to contribute to NATO's security in the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole.

Cooperation with Allies such as our Nordic and Baltic neighbours, the US, and the United Kingdom is of particular importance for Sweden's security. The Defence Commission also considers that Sweden should work to further intensify cooperation with France, Germany and Poland, primarily with the aim of increasing collective deterrence in our immediate neighbourhood.

Sweden will continue to build security together with others, as a loyal member of NATO and the EU. Sweden should actively work for the continued development of the cooperation on security and defence policy within the EU as a complement to NATO but also to develop capability for EU-led operations.

The Defence Commission emphasises that Nordic cooperation on defence policy should progress towards a greater degree of integration and cooperation. A strong Nordic group in NATO strengthens the Alliance.

The Nordic countries' security and defence policy cooperation is based on geographical proximity, common values, aligning foreign and security policy interests, and interconnected defence policy realities and choices. With Sweden and Finland also being Allies, Nordic defence cooperation is now a cooperation between Allies. It creates the conditions for even deeper and closer Nordic cooperation on security and defence policy, which includes joint operational planning and cross-border operational activities in peace, crisis and war.

Sweden's defence cooperation with Finland remains a centre of gravity in Swedish defence and security policy. This defence cooperation is based on common geostrategic interests and includes joint operational planning, now within the framework of NATO's regional planning.

It is important that Sweden and Finland, within the framework of each country's NATO membership, continue to maintain and develop this cooperation. Due to its geographical location, Sweden is of great importance to the Alliance's ability to defend Finland. Finland is a front-line state against Russia.

The enhanced cooperation on defence policy between Sweden and Finland can serve as a starting point for deeper Nordic cooperation.

Sweden's NATO membership means improved conditions for intensified cooperation with the Baltic states and that the needs for such cooperation increase. Due to its geographical location,

Sweden is of great importance to the Alliance's ability to defend Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Gotland is particularly important in this context, and the Commission therefore considers that the possibility of an expanded military presence of Allies on Gotland as a complement to the Swedish battle group should be investigated. This could involve rotating ground units, including anti-aircraft units, but air units can also be relevant.

Germany and Poland, with their geographical locations and Baltic Sea coasts, are strategically important for Sweden, while the use of Swedish territory could aid in the defence of Poland and Germany. Likewise, basing Polish and German forces in Sweden could increase NATO's ability to defend the Baltic states. Sweden's cooperation with Germany and Poland has not yet reached the same scope and depth as its defence cooperation with some other countries. Operational realities in the Baltic Sea region underscore the need for deeper cooperation.

The United Kingdom and France have some of the most capable defence forces in NATO and contribute to nuclear deterrence. They are important partners for Sweden.

Sweden's cooperation with the United Kingdom is particularly important for security in the Baltic Sea region. The United Kingdom has a geostrategic interest in Northern Europe, as can be seen in its prioritisation of cooperation within the framework of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force and the country's strategy for the High North.

Sweden has a defence cooperation with France. This includes international missions, exercises, and cooperation on defence equipment, air surveillance and air defence.

The US is Sweden's most important security and defence policy partner, bilaterally and within NATO. Through its engagement and military presence, the US is a cornerstone of Europe's security. Sweden's bilateral defence relationship with the US is very important to Sweden in terms of depth and breadth in policy, capability development, capability building and joint operations. Defence industrial cooperation between the two countries is extensive and important. Sweden's membership of NATO also improves the conditions for further intensifying defence cooperation with the US outside of NATO.

Through the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that Sweden and the US signed on 5 December 2023, the bilateral defence policy cooperation can be further intensified. The DCA is necessary for continuous operational defence cooperation, as it sets out the conditions for American forces in Sweden. The DCA is stabilising, raises the threshold for attacks against Sweden and is important for defence in northern Europe. It also strengthens the security of our Nordic and Baltic neighbouring countries. The DCA itself signals the US's security and defence policy commitment to Sweden.

The Defence Commission reiterates the indisputable importance of the transatlantic link for European security, as well as the importance of Sweden maintaining and further developing the transatlantic link and the bilateral relationship with the US. The basis for Sweden's defence policy cooperation with the United States is strong common interests in areas such as the Baltic

Sea and the Arctic region, and the ability of the US to quickly reinforce and act in Sweden's territory and immediate neighbourhood to deter and, if necessary, meet an armed attack.

The EU is Sweden's most important foreign policy arena and also has financial, legislative and political instruments within security and defence policy. In the deteriorating security situation, the EU's importance for Sweden has grown, and at the same time its vital role in the transatlantic community has been reinforced and the strength of the security policy tools available to the EU has been demonstrated.

A clear division of labour and deeper cooperation between the EU and NATO are crucial. This is also in line with Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, which stipulates that EU cooperation on defence must be compatible with the commitments within NATO and that NATO will be the basis for the collective defence of its members also in the future.

The Defence Commission considers that security and defence policy cooperation within the EU should continue to be prioritised and that Sweden should be involved in and influence the direction of future cooperation. In security and defence policy cooperation, a clear division of responsibility vis-à-vis NATO must be pursued with the aim of creating mutually reinforcing capabilities and structures.

The Defence Commission considers that relationships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region is becoming increasingly important as the security there and the security in Europe are increasingly interconnected. Cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Australia, all of which are high-tech countries, gives Sweden better opportunities to develop and gain access to new technology that contributes to defence innovation.

16. International missions and operations

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of Sweden's continued involvement and participation in international civil and military missions and operations for crisis management and peace support. In this way, Sweden contributes to safeguarding a rules-based international order based on the UN Charter.

Sweden's involvement in international missions and operations should be seen as an instrument for and an integral part of our foreign and security policy. The main objective of this is to promote international peace and security. Through a solidarity-based approach, Sweden contributes to managing threats to global security.

In its report *Allvarstid*, the Commission stated that Swedish participation in international missions and operations has contributed to stability, peace and security, and at the same time strengthened the competence of Sweden's defence. The Commission further stated that participation in international missions and operations contributes to strengthening Swedish and global security, and that it is an important security policy instrument.

NATO is Sweden's foremost defence policy arena. As Ally, Sweden will contribute over time to the security of NATO as a whole in accordance with the Alliance's 360-degree perspective by participating extensively to NATO's missions, activities and operations, and contributing to NATO's fight against terrorism. At the same time, Sweden has an interest in the further development of UN peacekeeping, and strengthening the EU as a global security actor.

Swedish participation in international military missions and operations is based on a broad, integrated analysis, including foreign, security and defence policy considerations. Participation in international military missions and operations continues to be an integral part of Sweden's solidarity-based Alliance policy and contributes to international peace and security.

The Commission therefore emphasises the importance of Sweden, in parallel with its role as a NATO Ally, maintaining its active involvement and participation in international operations, civil and military, within the framework of international organisations such as the UN, the EU, the OSCE and, where appropriate, in other coalitions of countries.

At the same time, the Commission states that contributions to international missions and operations must be balanced against the continued strengthening of Sweden's national capability as well as Swedish contribution to NATO's key purpose of ensuring the collective defence of the Alliance. As the Commission emphasised in its report *Allvarstid*, Sweden's geostrategic position and security policy interests should serve as starting points for shaping Sweden's role as an Ally. This should include a joint regional assumption of responsibility that is primarily based on the Baltic Sea area, the North Sea and the Cap of the North, with the special expertise required for operating in these environments.

Sweden, alongside other democratic countries, should actively contribute to the development of UN peacekeeping capacity to better meet existing and emerging needs. Ensuring that UN peacekeeping operations have robust mandates and relevant capabilities, based on the increasing complexity in which they operate, is a central area of development where Sweden can contribute.

Through the EU's crisis management missions and operations, it contributes to education, training and advice to third countries' national security sectors. The EU's military and civilian crisis management missions and operations are a concrete expression of its willingness and ability to contribute to peace and security. The EU currently has more than 20 ongoing civil and military missions and operations on three continents. Sweden has contributed to the majority of the EU's military missions and operations and is one of the largest contributors to its civilian missions and operations.

Civilian and military crisis prevention and management is one of NATO's three core tasks. In February 2023, NATO established a new political direction, with stronger focus on territorial defence within the framework of the collective defence, in accordance with the NATO Strategic Concept adopted in June 2022. Previous focus on efforts outside the territory of NATO countries now has a lower priority.

As an Ally, Sweden will contribute over time to the security of NATO as a whole in accordance with the Alliance's 360-degree perspective by participating extensively to NATO's missions, activities and operations, and contributing to NATO's fight against terrorism. At the same time, Sweden has an interest in the further development of UN peacekeeping, and strengthening the EU as a global security actor.

At the same time, the Commission notes, as in its report *Värnkraft* from 2019, that Swedish participation in international military missions and operations can be resource-intensive and therefore entails the need to prioritise for the Armed Forces and for other actors involved. This applies especially for certain military units and abilities. Participation could thus have consequences for the Armed Forces' ability to defend Sweden and its Allies against armed attacks.

The Commission therefore emphasises that contributions to international missions and operations need to be balanced against the strengthening of the national capability and Sweden's role in the Alliance regarding the collective defence, not least in our own neighbourhood. There is thus a need to balance resources in terms of contributions to international missions and operations, Sweden's contribution to NATO's key purpose of ensuring the Alliance's collective defence, the further growth of the force structure of the Armed Forces and national preparedness needs.

The Commission emphasises that the commitment to NATO's 360-degree perspective can also be fulfilled through efforts outside of NATO. Likewise, it should also be possible to consider participation in missions and operations outside of NATO's auspices as contributions to the burden-sharing between Allies.

17. Control and follow-up of the total defence sector

Sweden has in recent years invested significant resources in both military defence and civil defence and will continue to do so in the coming years. The total budget for the expenditure area 6 Defence and contingency measures has increased from SEK 48 billion in 2015 to SEK 126 billion in 2024. Additional funds have also been appropriated for civil defence in other expenditure areas. This places great demands on the Government's control and follow-up.

It also places great demands on the Armed Forces and other agencies within the total defence sector to create effective structures for internal governance, control, planning and reporting of results, finances and operations. The requirements are compounded by the deteriorating global security situation, the need to effectively build up defence capabilities in a short period of time, including the changes brought about by the NATO membership, and the high cost trend in the defence materiel market.

Following a proposal from the Commission in *Värnkraft* (Ds 2019:8), the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis was established in January 2023. The Agency's task is to follow up,

analyse and evaluate operations within the total defence sector and to assist the Government with qualified knowledge. This gives the Government an important tool to follow up and evaluate the combined capability in total defence and ensure efficient use of tax funds.

The Commission considers that the management of the military defence should be further developed in order to improve conditions for growth at a faster pace and to make sure that financial resources are converted into increased capabilities. Current rules and regulations, e.g. for financial management of agencies and for the state's property management in the defence area, should be reviewed to create conditions for agencies to implement political decisions on growth and strengthening of defence capability. The review should also take account of the need for amended governance and funding in situations of heightened preparedness.

Based on the Riksdag's decision on the overall objectives for the military defence, the Government determines targets for the Armed Forces' operational capability. The operational capability of the Armed Forces is, above all, the combined ability of the wartime military units to solve their tasks in order to defend Sweden and its Allies against armed attack. Although the targets must be strategic and based in operational capability, the Commission underscores the importance of the Government's ability to continuously monitor the situation in the wartime military organisation, e.g. in terms of maintenance, staffing, materiel supply and turnover of units and, ultimately, the combat capability of the units. From a NATO perspective, this aspect will be even more relevant. Within the framework of NATO's Defence Planning Process, Allies' defence policies and plans are reviewed and evaluated. A review (Defence Planning Capability Survey) carried out every two years gathers and compiles information on the Allies' national lists of military units and their individual capabilities.

Civil defence is the combined effect of all civil actors who contribute to the capability of total defence. In peacetime, civil defence activities include measures that authorities, municipalities and regions, the business sector, labour market organisations, voluntary organisations, religious communities and civil society take to prepare Sweden for war. In war, activities must be focused on supporting the combined war effort of the total defence. Civil defence thus covers large parts of society.

A new civil preparedness structure introduced in 2022 constitutes a framework for civil defence. Many government agencies whose operations are of particular importance for crisis preparedness and total defence are designated as emergency preparedness agencies, most of which are included in one of the ten identified preparedness sectors. Each preparedness sector is led by an agency whose responsibility is to coordinating measures before and during peacetime crisis situations and in case of heightened preparedness. The Commission also submitted several proposals in its report *Kraftsamling* to further develop and strengthen civil defence, which included more clearly defining economic defence and establishing a system of companies vital to defence. In addition, a model for Swedish security of supply was proposed by a government inquiry to strengthen Sweden's security of supply (SOU 2023:50), which is a

central part of civil defence. These changes in combination with the large number of actors and diverse composition of the civil defence make the control and follow-up of civil defence activities a challenge.

In its report *Kraftsamling*, the Commission proposed a financial planning framework for special measures within the civil defence. In order to establish integrated governance and monitoring of civil defence, the financial framework should be combined with a coherent planning process for prioritisation and direction at national level. The Government should prioritise and decide on actions and levels of ambition based on proposals from The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. The Commission underscores the importance of continuing the work on developing effective management, control measures and follow-up of the civil defence.

18. Funding for military and civil defence

The 2020 Defence Bill (Govt Bill 2020/21:30 Committee Report 2020/21:FöU4, Riksdag Communication 2020/21:135) states that in the Budget Bill for 2024 the Government must propose to the Riksdag how a financial planning framework for the period 2026–2030 should be handled. According to the Government's instructions to the Defence Commission of 12 December 2022 (Fö2022/00125), the Commission must submit proposals on the planning framework before this Budget Bill. The instructions further state that the Commission must submit proposals for the direction and formation of the total defence up to and including 2030 and in this context also consider the period up to and including 2035.

In accordance with the instructions, the Commission's proposal regarding the direction of the military defence takes its starting point in the 2020 Defence Bill, as well as analyses and assessments presented in this and previous Commission reports.

The proposals for directions involve increases in ambition for the military defence. The emphasis of the proposals is on measures aimed at creating increased capability in the coming years, while at the same time they should be seen as steps in long-term development towards a stronger defence.

The political agreement of March 2022 on financial investments to increase Sweden's defence capability indicates that appropriations for military defence must increase to reach two per cent of GDP as soon as it is practically possible. The Government has assessed that it is possible to reach that level in 2028. This will however require significant increases in defence appropriations.

On 1 June 2023, the Government tasked the Armed Forces with submitting a revised report supporting future defence bill decisions. The report should include proposals regarding the continued development of the military defence until 2035, with a focus on 2025–2030. The Government's instructions included a financial planning framework for the years 2024–2035 regarding budget appropriations 1:1–1:13. The planning framework corresponds to the

political agreement of March 2022 targeting two per cent of GDP starting with the budget year 2028. In order to reach the level of the planning framework, the Riksdag is must approve significant additions to the defence appropriations.

In its report (FM2023-23092:14), the Armed Forces presented a comprehensive proposal on the continued development of the military defence given the specified financial planning framework.

The Commission has based its analyses and proposals for the military defence on the proposals from this report and Armed Forces' budget document for 2025. The Commission supports the proposals for direction presented by the Armed Forces.

In addition to the Armed Forces' report, the Commission makes further proposals for measures that strengthen the capabilities of the military defence. As support for the calculation of financial consequences of these additional proposals, the Commission has taken part of an additional document from the Armed Forces (FM2023-23092:33 (H)), which includes financial calculations and feasibility analyses of the Commission's suggestions. The Armed Forces' document identifies some uncertainties regarding both financial assessment and feasibility. The Commission has tried to take those uncertainties into account when calculating the financial effects of the proposals.

The Commission's proposal, including the Armed Forces' reported proposal, means that the allocations for the military defence, budget appropriations 1:1-1:13 under expenditure area 6, need to be supplemented with funds for 2025–2030 according to the tables below.

Table 1 Financial planning framework for military defence, June 2023

SEK billion, current prices

	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Financial planning framework	129.7	131.6	140.3	156.4	158.0	164.3

Table 2 Proposed additional allocations for military defence 2025–2030

SEK billion, current prices

	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Proposed allocations	6.6	10.0	21.8	37.3	45.3	52.8
<i>- share consisting of additional allocations to reach the planning framework</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>3.4</i>	<i>11.8</i>	<i>24.0</i>	<i>28.8</i>	<i>32.8</i>
<i>- share consisting of additional allocations above the planning framework</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>6.6</i>	<i>10.0</i>	<i>13.3</i>	<i>16.5</i>	<i>20.0</i>

Additions will be subject to price level conversion the following year.

Table 3 Proposed additional allocations for military defence 2025–2030 calculated as fixed prices

SEK billion, fixed prices (2024)

	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Proposed allocations	6.4	9.7	20.7	35.0	42.1	48.7
- share consisting of additional allocations to reach the planning framework	3.2	3.3	11.2	22.4	26.7	30.2
- share consisting of additional allocations above the planning framework	3.2	6.4	9.5	12.6	15.4	18.5

Additions will be subject to price level conversion the following year.

Table 4 Planned new level for after additional allocations for budget appropriations 1:1–1:13 under expenditure area 6

SEK billion, current prices

	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Financial planning framework	135	142	153	171	175	185

The estimated new level is a snapshot based on the currently valid forecast for price level and wage conversion.

For the period 2031 to 2035, the Commission proposes that the allocations needed to implement the Commission's proposals, in addition to the financial planning framework forming the basis of the Armed Forces' report, be extended at the 2030 level.

The proposals presuppose a corresponding decision on allocation of funds by the Government in a future bill and subsequent decisions by the Riksdag.

Overall, the Commission's proposals amount to a total military defence expenditure, based on NATO's definition, of around 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2030.

The military support provided to Ukraine thus far has been both extensive and urgent. The Commission emphasises that the principle that a decision to provide military support to Ukraine must be accompanied by a decision of compensation and re-acquisition for the Swedish military defence must remain in place. The Commission wishes to underscore that material donated to Ukraine must be replaced as soon as possible in equivalent numbers and with the required capability needed to fulfil the military organisation that was decided upon.

In its report *Kraftsamling*, the Commission submitted a series of proposals regarding civil defence and gave proposals for a new funding structure for civil defence.

In December 2023, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency was tasked by the Government (Fö2023/01997) to make an overall assessment of the feasibility and consequences of the proposals submitted by the Commission in its report *Kraftsamling*, and to do so considering the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's proposals in its report *Framåtanda* submitted in October 2023.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency reported its assessments and proposals in April 2024. Within the framework of its report, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency

cooperated with many actors, and taken into account information submitted to the Government by the Armed Forces, agencies responsible for specific sectors and the county administrative boards responsible for civil defence areas among others. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency states that the proposals presented by the Commission in its report *Kraftsamling* represent a greatly increased level of ambition in relation to the level under the current Defence Bill. This would generate estimated total resource requirements of at least SEK 20 billion annually from 2028. Many of the proposed actions cannot be commence, or will not be possible to scale up, until the second half of the upcoming defence budget period, as in many cases certain basic conditions first need to be fulfilled.

The Commission considers that it is urgent to strengthen civil defence based on the Commission's assessments in its report *Kraftsamling*. At the same time, the Commission notes that the build-up of the civil defence is taking place from a low level and will require extensive preparatory work, and that estimates include uncertainties. It is therefore reasonable that the total financial framework for civil defence develops at a slightly lower rate than that proposed by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency.

The currently planned total budget appropriations for civil defence in 2025 amount to SEK 6.5 billion. The Commission proposes that the financial framework for civil defence be increased according to table 18.5 so that the new financial framework amounts to a total level of at least SEK 15 billion from 2028.

Table 5 Financial planning framework for civil defence

SEK billion, current prices

	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Current planning	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
Proposed additions	2.0	3.5	6.5	>8.5	>8.5	>8.5
Proposed new planning framework	8.5	10.0	13.0	>15.0	>15.0	>15.0

The trajectory of the civil framework beyond 2028 may change due to the development of the security situation and a renewed overall assessment of the goal and pace of the build-up of the security of supply.

The Commission's proposal involves large increases in funding over a long period of time for both military and civil defence. This comes on top of considerable increases already decided upon. The Commission does not have the mandate to assess how the proposals for additions are to be financed. It is ultimately up to the Government, within the framework of a State Budget and in connection with the Defence Bill to follow up with proposals for financing the Commission's proposals. Given the large increases in funding that the proposals entail, it would be beneficial to come as close as possible to a consensus on the financing of the increases. The Commission proposes that work commence on identifying financing alternatives that the political parties supporting the report can agree on.