CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION by W.D. Kay Department of Political Science 303 Meserve Hall Northeastern University Boston, MA 02115 617-373-4401 FAX 617-373-5311 [email protected] f f REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE I OMFoBrmNoA.p0p7r0o4v-e0d188 Public reporting burden for this collection ofinformation is estimated to avera_le 1hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching exist/n_ data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate orany other aspect oft_ls collection of informa,:tion, ncluding suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis H=ghway, Suite 12u4, Pmmgton, VA 22202-4302, and tothe Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Wash ngton, DC 20503, 1. AGENCYUSEONLY(Leaveb/ank) 2. REPORTDATE 3. REPORTTYPEANDDATESCOVERED 09/11/2000 Contractor Final Report 4. TITLEANDSUBTITLE 5. FUNDINGNUMBERS Contested Ground: The Historical Debate Over NASA's Mission NASW-96014 6. AUTHOR(S) W.D. Kay 7. PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES) 8,PERFORMINGORGANIZATION REPORTNUMBER Department of Political Science 303 Meserve Hall Northeastern University Boston, MA 02115 9. SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES) 10.SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCYREPORTNUMBER NASA History Division NASA Headquarters Code ZH N/A Washington, DC 20546 11.SUPPLEMENTARYNOTES N/A 12a.DISTRIBUTIONAVAILABILITYSTATEMENT 12b.DISTRII3UTIONCODE Unlimited Distribution, Publicly Available 13.ABSTRACT(Maximum200words) This book manuscript studies indepth the development and maturation of the NASA mission from the inception of the organization until the present. This study is involved in awide divergence of questions over roles and missions: the agency's R&D/operational activities, the decentralized/centralized approaches to management, the debate over methods of conducting business. A fundamental part of this work involves the analysis ofnot only how NASA has defined its role but how senior government leaders, the Congress, and society at large have viewed this matter. It is be especially useful in tracing the evolution of mission ideas in the space agency and, therefore, of great use to officials wrestling with this perennial issue. 14.SUBJECTTERMS 15.NUMBEROFPAGES space policy, congressional relations, interagency affairs, human space flight, international 587 cooperation 16,PRICECODE 17.SECURITYCLASSIFICATION 18.SECURITYCLASSIFICAI:'ION 19.SECURITYCLASSIFICATION 20.LIMITATIONOFABSTRACT OFREPORT OFTHISPAGE OFABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UL NSN7540-01-280-5500 StandardForm298(Rev.2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std 239-18 298-102 Table of Contents 1. What is NASA's Mission? 2. Analytical Framework 3. Prehistory: Space Policy Before Sputnik 4. NASA: Born out of Fright, 195%1961 5. Mission Advanced 6. Mission Accomplished... Now What? 7. Space Policy Redefined (Again) 8. Dollars, Not Dreams; Business, Not Government 9. Concluding Thoughts CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION PART I: INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 What is NASA's Mission? Since the opening of the space age nearly 50 years ago, the U.S. government has spent close to $1 trillion on space-related activities, t Although by no means the largest public expenditure over that period--it is easily dwarfed by national defense, social security, and countless other federal programs--it is still, by any measure, an enormous amount of money. It therefore seems perfectly reasonable to ask: what has the American taxpayer gotten in return for this rather large investment? Most space advocates, of course, will immediately point out all of the myriad benefits that flow from space-based research and development. They would note, for example, the advances and improvements in weather forecasting, communications, and navigation, and doubtless point out that the economic impact of these systems alone-- which have accounted for the creation of not only thousands of jobs, but of dozens of whole new industries as well--probably exceeds $1 trillion (it is certainly in the hundreds of billions). In addition, many would argue that satellite and rocket technologies have made a contribution to American national security that is beyond economic calculation. And these are just the direct applications. Although critics often scoff at the supposedly inflated claims made for the "spinoffs" of the space program, 2 there have in Chapter1:2 factbeenalargenumberofcommercialproducts,servicesantechnologiesin common usetodaythatwereoriginallydevelopedforspacemissions.It is,ofcourse,impossibleto determinewith anydegreeofprecisionthetotaldollarvalueoftheseindirectbenefits, buttheyarecertainlynotinsignificant.3 Noneofthesepoints,however,reallyaddressthequestiontheposedabove.After all,thereareveryfewpeopleseriouslyarguingthattheUnitedStatesshouldhaveno space program whatsoever. Most--if not all----of the controversy regarding U.S. space policy over the past half-century has revolved around the question of how to proceed: what should the U.S. be doing in space, and when? 4Indeed, the fact that space represents such an enormously valuable resource only serves to make the issue of the $1 trillion investment even more important. Given what is at stake, can the taxpayers really be assured that the very large sum entrusted to their government has always been spent in the most productive fashion possible? Inevitably, it is the operation and programs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that becomes the focus of questions like this. Although far from the only (or even, at times, the largest 5) federal agency engaged in space-related activities--the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Energy, among others, all have space projects of one kind or another--for more than forty years, NASA has stood as the most visible, and arguably the most important, public space organization in the U.S. Thus, it is NASA, more than any other agency or department, that has to deal wil_h the vexing question, "why?" During the early 1960s, opponents of Project Mercury wondered why there was such a rush to place a man in space. A few years later, skeptics were questioning the value Chapter1::3 oftheApollo moonprogram.Shortlyafterthat,NASA facedstiff oppositiononits proposalforareusablespaceshuttle,and,morerecentlyhashadtoconfront--for atimeon anannualbasis--opponentsoftheInternationalSpaceStation.Inaddition,therearesome cases,suchasthepost-ApolloproposalsforamissiontoMars,theNationalAerospace Plane,andPresidenBt ush'sSpaceExplorationInitiative,the"why" questionsultimately prevailed6. Formanycritics,however,theproblemisnotsomuchthevalueofanyspecific project,asit istheagency'soverallstrategyforexploringandusingspaceB. y farthe biggestdebatein thisregardconcernsNASA's commitmenttohumanspaceflight. Opponentsof sendingpeopleintospace--whotendtocomeprimarily,butnot exclusively,fromthescientificcommunity--havelongarguedthateverythingthat humanscandoin spacecanalmostalwaysbedonemoreeasily,morecheaply,andwith muchlesspersonarliskbyunmannedrocketsandautomatedprobes.Thefactthatthis argumenthasbeenragingunabatedfornearlyfifty years,doggingeverymajorproject fromMercurytotheInternationalSpaceStation,suggeststhatitwill notberesolved anytimesoon. Anothercontroversythatfirstemergedinthemid-1980sinvolvestheagency's roleinspace"operations."A numberofobserversp,articularlyeconomicandpolitical conservativesc,omplainthattheagencyistooinvolvedwith providing"spaceservices," whichareinconsistentwithNASA's "true" mission as an "R&D agency." Such activities, they argue, more properly belong in the private sector. This particular debate has evolved over the past two decades into a more general discussion about the role of government in space exploration overall. Chapter 1:4 All in all, it is difficult to think of another public agency that has, for virtually its entire history, been second-guessed as often as NASA. Of course, there has no doubt been a number of instances over the past four decades in which the criticism was fully warranted. Moreover, even if NASA had been operating perfectly (whatever that might mean), any public organization that spends billions of dollars every year must expect that it will, from time to time, displease someone. Finally, because it combines the elements of very large costs, high visibility, and extreme risk--few public programs experience failures on the scale of the Mars Polar Lander or the Challenger--spaceflight is very likely an area of public policy that will always invite controversy. 7 One of the major themes of this book, however, is that NASA's problem is far more basic than any of these explanations suggest. There is one fundamental question about the agency which, although it has existed literally since its founding in 1958, has seldom even been asked directly, let alone examined in any detail. Stated simply: at no point in NASA's history has there ever been a clear, specific statement of its actual purpose. What, in a word, do policymakers believe that the agency isfor? This book will examine the changing views of NASA's mission(s) held by government officials over the years. Drawing upon relevant concepts in political science and public administration, it will attempt to account for the shifts in space policy, by describing the political, economic, and technical factors that helped bring them about. Among the questions to be addressed are: what did policymakers envision when they created the agency in the first place? Why was there such strong (albeit not entirely unanimous) support for Project Apollo in the early 1960s, and why did it fade away in such a relatively short time? What caused NASA and the program to languish throughout Chapter1:5 mostofthe1970s,andwhydiditreemerge(afterafashion)inthe1980s?Finally,what istheagency'sroletoday? ORIGINAL INTENT VS. "WHAT'S IN IT FOR ME?" The most obvious place to begin looking for NASA's purpose would seem to be the legislation that created it, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. That document, unfortunately, provides very little in the way of a practical guide to the agency's activities. To begin with, the description of its responsibilities is, to put it mildly, somewhat broad: • The expansion of human knowledge of the phenomena in the atmosphere and space. • The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles. • The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments, equipment, supplies, and living organisms through space. • Conducting "long-range studies" of the potential benefits, opportunities, and problems of aeronautical and space activities. • The preservation of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology. • Providing relevant information to DOD and related agencies. • Cooperation with other nations in the peaceful pursuit of aeronautical and space activities. Chapter1:6 Cooperationandcoordinationwith otherpublicagenciestoavoid "unnecessaryduplicationofeffort,facilities,andequipment'.'8 Tomakemattersworse,thelawmakesnoefforttoassignanysortofprioritiesto thesetasks.Readliterally,forexample,it givesequalweighttothe"carrying"of •instrumentse, quipment,supplies,andliving organisms(whichpresumablyincludes humans)onspacevehicles.Finally,apartfromallowingtheagencytoenterintocontracts withindustryandeducationalinstitutions9andcallingforthe"widestpossiblepracticable andappropriatedisseminationofinformation''l° (whichappearstorefertocommercial applicationsaswell asscientificresearchfindings),thelegislationdoesnotseemto envisionanysignificantrolefortheprivatesectori,i Inshort,theSpaceAct,forallofits historicalimportance,reallydoesnothelpansweranyofthecurrentcontroversies concerningNASA anditsoperationsL. ikemostotherpiecesofauthorizinglegislation,it simplyprovidesthebroadcontoursin whichtheagencymustfunction. In actualpractice,theagency'slong-rangegoals,priorities,timetables,andeven tosomedegreeitsmethodofoperationare(aswithanymajorpublicorganization) shapedby anumberofcomplexfactors,includingthebureaucraticb, udgetary, legislative,electoral,andotherpoliticalprocessesoftheU.S.federalgovernment,aswell asthedemandsofawidevarietyofoutsideinterestgroups.12Inaddition,NASA's internalproceduresandrelationshipsi,tscoreorganizationavl alues,anditsviewof externalevents(whichincludesitsunderstandingofitspolitical,economic,andsocial environment),arealltheproductofarichanddiverseorganizationacl ulturethathas beenevolvingfornearlyacentury.13Finally,it issusceptibletoseriesof wholly Chapter1:7 impersonalforces,suchasthestateoftheeconomy,thepaceofscientificdiscoveryand technologicaldevelopment,and--increasingly--internationalevents.Makingmatters evenmorecomplicatedisthefactthattheseareallsubjecttosuddenand,forallpractical purposesu,npredictableshiftsthatcancomefromavarietyof sourcesp: oliticalchange following anelection,aneconomicdownturn,advancesinscienceandengineering, unexpectedevents(e.g.,theApollofire ortheChallenger accident), and many, many others. It is also important to note that policy-makers seldom support expensive programs like space exploration just for their own sake. Such support, rather, is based upon the belief that such programs somehow serve the public interest. 14Moreover, decisions on how much the U.S. should spend on space are not made in a vacuum. Every year, NASA must compete with a very, very large set of policies and programs for its funding, meaning that it must be able to persuade government officials that its mission (s) is/are more worthy than that of any number of other federal agencies. 15 Thus, a better way to approach the question of NASA's mission might be to begin with a list of all of the public benefits of space'related activities. These include (in no particular order): • Scientific research. It is difficult to think of an area of basic science that has not been affected by the development of space technologies. Astronomers in particular have benefited from planetary and deep-space probes, as well as automated observatories, like the Hubble telescope, that orbit above the earth's distorting atmosphere. Geologists, geophysicists, and hydrologists make Chapter1:8 extensiveuseofremote-sensingsatellites.Finally,it isalsopossibletoconduct usefulresearchinbiology,chemistry,andphysicsonboardorbitalfacilities.16 • Economic and commercial applications; "making life better here on earth." As suggested earlier, the advances in weather forecasting made possible by meteorological satellites have led to improvements in such areas as disaster preparedness and agricultural planning, just as the growing number of relay satellites has opened up a vast--and still expanding--global network of radio, television, telephone, and internet communications. Moreover, remote sensing satellites--which can be used to detect oil, gas, and mineral deposits, as well as to monitor pollution, deforestation, and other changes in the earth's environment--have opened up a whole host of new business opportunities. Last, but not least, many enthusiasts still hold out hope for space-based manufacturing, which could (in theory) lead to the creation of new metals, medicines, and other useful products. 17 • Intellectual stimulation and discovery; satisfying the "urge to explore." It is often said that human beings (and particularly Americans) have an innate desire to understand the unknown. According to this view, it is the mark of a "great nation" to expend some of its resources in meeting this challenge. Space advocates also like to point to the "changes in perspective" that can come from "conquering space," such as viewing the "whole earth" (i.e., a world without visible national boundaries) from orbit or the surface of the moon, or of finding life on other planets. _8 Chapter1:9 • National Defense (narrowly conceived). Obviously, rocket technology (in the form of guided missiles) hasdirect military application. In addition, the armed forces make extensive use of navigation, communication, and surveillance satellites. Thus, although weapons themselves are banned from space by an international treaty, military planners still regard it as a sort of strategic "high ground." • National Security (broadly conceived; "National Prestige"). Success in space, according to some advocates, is the most direct and dramatic demonstration of a country's talents and abilities (and, by implication, its power). Thus, even those space activities with no military application whatsoever can play a significant role in maintaining American "world leadership." What is remarkable about this list is how little it has changed over the last fifty years, despite significant developments in both the relevant technologies and world politics. Enthusiasts were extolling the virtues of communication and weather satellites long before such applications were even remotely feasible (in fact, the earliest articles on radio and television relay satellites appeared even before the end of World War II). Similarly, as late as the mid-1980s, long after the U.S. had "won" the "space race," supporters of the space station were painting a vivid picture of the Soviet station program in an obvious (and ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to appeal to American national pride. While the contents of the list may have stayed the same, the relative political saliency of the items--that is, the degree of importance attached to them by policymakers--has changed quite dramatically over the past half-century. Forty years ChapterI: 10 ago,fearsthatit waslosingits"prestige"asaworld powerwasenough--literallyby itself--to pushtheUnitedStatesintothemostambitious(andmostcostly)spaceventure in history.Justafewyearslater,however,suchconcernshadlargelyevaporatedT.he effortsofthestation'sproponentsnotwithstandingt,herehasnotbeenasinglemajor NASA programinitiatedsincethemid-1960sthatcanreallybesaidtohavebeen motivatedbyprestige.Clearly,then,thekeytounderstandingthechangingnatureofthe agency'smission--andtheprimaryapproachofthebook--will betodetermineexactly whichbenefitsofspacetechnologycanbesaidtobe"driving" theprogramatanygiven pointintime. THE PLAN OF THE BOOK Along with providing some new insight into the ups and downs of the U.S. space program, it is hoped that this book will provide a fresh view of a few other space-related subjects as well. First, as numerous historians have noted, there is a tendency in much of the current literature to over-emphasize the role of the American president in setting the course of the space program. 19Obviously, some presidents have played key roles in the history of the program, and at times--such as Kennedy with Project Apollo and Reagan with the space station program--have been the central, indeed, the pivotal decision- maker. The point, rather, is that most of the time that individual is only one actor within a much larger political system. For this reason, it is also important to take into account the actions of other governing institutions--most notably the U.S. Congress--in setting space policy. Thus, while the analysis by no means ignores the actions of presidents (in Chapter1:11 fact,researchwasconductedatfourpresidentiallibraries),everyeffort will bemadeto view spaceasagovernment--notjust apresidential--program. Second,theconceptsthatwill beusedheresuggestadifferentinterpretationof someofthemajorepisodesinspacehistory--includingtheU.S.responsetoSputnik, President Kennedy's lunar landing declaration, the decision to develop the space shuttle, and President Reagan's approval of the space station--than that found in some of the existing literature. 2° They also shed light on some issues--Kennedy's proposals for a joint U.S.-USSR moon flight, NASA's post-Apollo decline, and the reformulation of space policy in the 1980s--that have not received as much attention. Finally, the book attempts to place the history of the space program within the larger context of overall post-War U.S. research and development (R&D) policy. Although many scientists and engineers have traditionally viewed NASA as a sort of competitor, it can be shown that many of the same political, economic, and social forces that shaped the course of space policy had a nearly identical impact on most other publicly funded science and technology programs. Indeed, as will be discussed in the concluding chapter, the experiences of NASA after the Apollo era actually provide a sort of preview of many of the problems facing U.S. R&D policy today. The argument proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 concludes this introductory section by laying out several concepts, drawn from the literature in political science, public administration, and public policy studies, that will guide the remainder of the analysis. The three chapters of section 2 then apply these concepts to the early history of spaceflight in the U.S. (and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere), beginning with the earliest musings about space and the beginning of rocket research (chapter 3) and continuing through the end of the so- Chapter1:12 called"GoldenAge"of U.S. space policy (chapters 4 and 5). As will be seen, one of the major factors contributing to NASA's success in during this period is that was the first--and so far the only--time that a common agreement existed among the relevant stakeholders as to the nature of NASA's mission. The four chapters in section 3 examine NASA's struggle to find a new purpose following the Apollo moon landings. 21 Chapter 6 describes the "malaise" in U.S. space policy during the 1970s. Chapter 7 looks at the new direction the program began to take in the early 1980s, and chapter 8 follows its development through the end of the 1990s. Finally, chapter 9 assesses the status of NASA, the U.S. space program (or, as will be seen, programs), and American R&D policy in general entering the 21st century. Unfortunately, one thing that this analysis cannot do is answer the question posed at the beginning, that is, whether the taxpayers' $1 trillion investment in space has been wisely spent. That is not a matter that can be settled objectively. What the following chapters hopefully will do, however, is provide a better understanding of the political, economic, and technical factors guiding policymakers as they decided which space investments were worthwhile. Such an understanding, in turn, may help settle a critical, and much-debated issue: where does the space program--and NASA--go from here? NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1 I U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1998 Activities. Washington: NASA, 1999, Appendix E-lB. Figures are adjusted for inflation. Chapter1:13 z See, for example, Gregg Easterbrook, "Lost in Space." Washington Monthly (April 1987), pp. 48-54; and "The Spruce Goose of Outer Space." Washington Monthly (April 1980), pp. 32-48. In addition, the widely held belief that it was responsible for the creation of Teflon, Velcro, and Tang turns out to be only a myth. 3The controversy regarding spinoffs is not over whether they really exist, but whether they are a sufficient reason, in and of themselves, to spend billions of dollars on space projects. More recently, this issue has spread to the discussion of U.S. R&D policy generally. See John A. Alic, Lewis M. Branscomb, Harvey Brooks, and Ashton Carter, Beyond Spinoff." Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992; and David H. Guston, Between Science and Politics: Assuring the Integrity and Productivity of Research. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, particularly chapter 5. 4More recently, the debate has also concerned who should be doing it (see chapters 7 and 8). 5There have been periods over the past 50 years when the Department of Defense was actually the nation's largest space agency. In 1988, for example, Defense's space budget was almost double that of NASA's. See U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1998 Activities, Appendix E- lB. 6 Although not as visible as human spaceflight, NASA's (relatively) smaller automated space science programs--including the Hubble Space Telescope, the Galileo (Jupiter) and Cassini (Saturn) probes, and the Halley's comet intercept mission (which was eventually canceled)--have also come in for their share of criticism. Chapter1:14 7It is always possible, of course, that some new technical innovation (or, more likely, a series of innovations) could change this by lowering the costs and reducing the risks. 8National Aeronautics and Space Act, Public Law 85-568, Section 102 (c), 1-8. The full text of the Act can be found in Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown Volume L pp. 334- 345. 9ibid, Section 203 (b) (5). [0ibid, Section 203 (a) (3). _JThis omission was addressed in a 1984 amendment. See the discussion in chapter 7. 12An attempt to describe some of this complexity can be found in W. D. Kay, Can Democracies Fly in Space? The Challenge of Revitalizing the U.S. Space Program. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. J3This includes the organizational development of NASA's predecessor organizations, particularly the National Advisory Council on Aeronautics. See Howard E. McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space Program. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series in NASA History, 1993. 14 Or, perhaps more cynically, that it serves the political or personal interests of individual politicians. _5Indeed, given how the Congressional budget-writing process actually works, NASA frequently competing head-to-head with Such (seemingly unrelated) organizations as the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Veterans' Affairs. See Alexander J. Morin, Science and Politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993, chapter xx. Chapter1:15 16Whether such research is actually worth the current cost of getting into orbit is a matter of some dispute. 17There are even some who envision a time when all factories could be moved off the earth's surface, thereby eliminating industrial pollution forever. See, for example, G. Harry Stine, The Space Enterprise. New York: Ace Books, 1980. is See Arthur C. Clarke, The Promise of Space. New York: Harper and Row, 1968. A similar claim is often made by proponents of the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) program, who often speak of the "new attitude" they believe will follow from the discovery that "we are not alone." 19See, for example, Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, "Introduction" in Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, 1997, pp. 1-14. 20See, among many others, Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990; Edwin Diamond, "Sputnik." American Heritage 48:6 (October 1997), pp. 84-93; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993; Roger D. Launius, "Eisenhower, Sputnik, and the Creation of NASA: Technological Elites and the Public Policy Agenda." Prologue 28:2 (Summer 1996), pp. 127-143; John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970; Walter A. McDougall,... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. New York: Basic Books, 1985; John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" Science 232 (30 May 1986), pp. 1099-I 105; Howard E. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision: Incremental Chapter 1: 16 Politics and Technological Choice. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series on NASA History, 1990. 2JActually, as the chapter will show, the agency's problems actually began a few years before the first lunar mission. CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION SECTION I: INTRODUCTION Chapter 2 Analytical Framework At first glance, accounting for the origin and evolution of NASA's "mission"--or, indeed, that of any large, complex, big-budget, public organization--would appear to be an exceedingly difficult task. Fortunately, a number of concepts from the fields of political science, public administration, and public policy studies may make such an inquiry, if not easier, at least more systematic. Although only a few have been applied specifically to the space program, these ideas have proven useful in examining other U.S. science and technology programs, as well as other areas of public policy generally. Taken together, they should provide some insight into the origin and development of NASA's mission(s). PROBLEM DEFINITION Sociologist David Dery tells a story about a hotel manager who must deal with complaints from guests about long waits for the elevators. An engineering consultant has recommended either putting in additional elevators or installing equipment to make the Chapter2:2 existingonesmovefaster.Apsychologist,ontheotherhand,suggestsplacingmirrorsor somesortofinterestingorinformativeitemsalongthewallsnexttotheelevators.What shouldthemanagerdo?l Clearly,makingthe"correct"choicedependsuponwhatkind of difficulty--technical or psychological--the manager believes the hotel is facing. In other words, a crucial first step in addressing the complaints would be to define the problem the problem at hand. Chapter one noted that there is no shortage of objectives for a national space program: economic growth, technological development, defense, national prestige, scientific research, etc. Determining which of these have been (or, for that matter, ought to be) the primary focus of NASA's mission, however, invites a prior question rather similar to the hotel manager's: what is/are "the problem(s)" in space that policymakers expect NASA to address? This issue is by no means unique to space policy (nor, for that matter, to hotel management). All public issues of any degree of complexity cut across a number of established policy fields. Tobacco consumption is simultaneously an agricultural, trade, public health, and education issue, 2and has recently shown up in discussions of product liability, insurance, and workplace safety as well. A firm's decision to close down a plant or factory can be seen as a labor question, a local economic concern, or an element of a company's competitive strategy. 3 Coal mining is both an environmental and an energy issue, 4 and also raises serious questions regarding land use and occupational safety. Public officials almost never attempt to address each and every facet of such issues, and certainly not at the same time. Rather, they tend to focus their attention upon one or two particularly salient aspects. The "War on Drugs" of the 1980s defined drug Chapter2:3 usageasacrime,asopposedtoanillness,andthusemphasizedlawenforcemenotver--if nottotheexclusionof---clinicaltreatment5.The1974decisiontoauthorizeconstruction oftheAlaskaPipelinewasbaseduponconcernsoverthesupplyofenergy,ratherthan uponenvironmentalcriteria.6 Reachingaconsensusonproblemdefinitioncanbeadifficult andprotracted processforpublicofficials.Forexample,thereisstill considerabledisagreemenatmong policymakers,advocatesa,ndthepublicatlargeastowhetherhomelessnesisntheUnited Statesoughttobeviewedasaneconomic,housing,mentalhealth,orsomeothertypeof problem7. Similarly,duringtheinitial stagesoftheAIDSepidemicintheU.S.and Europe,someactivistsfeltthatthediseasehadbeenincorrectlylabeledasapurely scientificproblem,tobeaddressedprimarilybyvirologistsandothermedicalresearchers, ratherthanapublichealth/educationissue8. As these examples suggest, there is far more at stake in issue definition than semantics or symbolism. How policymakers ultimately choose to define a public problem determines a great deal about how--or even if--it will be addressed. Indeed, many of the most critical features of the policy-making process are shaped by the manner in which the problem itself is conceptualized. Problem Ownership Acceptance of a definition usually (but not always--see below) settles the question of problem ownership, that is, which agency or organization is to acquire jurisdiction over the policy area. Initially defining AIDS as virological problem made its assignment to the Centers for Disease Control (and secondarily to the National Institutes Chapter2:4 of Health)--as opposed to an agency like the Public Health Service, which is concerned with health education--virtually automatic. In much the same way, the categorization of illegal drugs as a law enforcement issue automatically made it a responsibility of the relevant agencies within the Department of Justice, rather than those at the Department of Health and Human Services. There are cases, of course, where the definition-ownership relationship runs in the opposite direction, that is, where an agency and its allies attempt to get a problem defined in a particular way precisely in order to gain (or retain) control over some project or program. When the Carter administration split the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare into the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services, a serious conflict arose over which one would inherit the politically popular Head Start program. For both Departments, the argument boiled down to a difference over whether Head Start should be considered a part of educational or of social welfare policy (in the end, HHS prevailed). 9 Similarly, the armed services sought to obtain total control over the U.S. atomic energy program in the years immediately following World War II by claiming that such research was primarily (if not exclusively) for the purpose of developing weaponry. Those who saw its use in power generation and other applications, however, fought to have the program placed under civilian control. It was the latter view that was embodied in the McMahon Act that created the Atomic Energy Commission.I° Screening Information Chapter 2:5 Defining an issue--in conjunction with assigning ownership over it--also plays an important role in helping policymakers screen out "irrelevant" information, or, more precisely, in deciding what information is relevant in the first place. This is most readily apparent when it comes to evaluating expertise, that is, choosing what to regard as relevant expertise. _ In Dery's hotel example, once the manager decides that the elevator problem is mechanical in nature, the psychologist's opinion is immediately rendered moot (and vice-versa). To take an actual policy case, critics of fetal tissue research, who usually are also opponents of legalized abortion, seldom pay attention to expert claims regarding the field's medical potential (e.g., as a treatment for Parkinson's disease). For them, such testimony has little bearing on the ethical issues or the possibility that it wiil encourage abortion. 12 It should be noted that this phenomenon is only partly related to the complaints that have sometimes been raised about the "politicization" of expertise.13 It is of course true that there have been a number of documented cases of public officials choosing to ignore advice from specialists--including scientists--that was not responsive to their political needs, as well as of specialists themselves shaping their advice to please their superiors. President Nixon, for example, is reported to have abolished the President's Science Advisory Committee because it did not support his position on such issues as missile defense*and the Supersonic Transport.I4 Similarly, prior to the late 1970s, and particularly before the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, the views of those organizations and groups--even those with legitimate scientific credentialsm Chapter2:6 questioningthesafetyofsuchplants,or the need for civilian nuclear power, were generally disregarded by government officials responsible for the technology.15 The phenomenon being described here, however, is a bit more straightforward, and does not rely upon any assumption of "expert neutrality." It is, rather, that the act of defining an issue and assigning it to a specific agency or organization also has the effect of establishing a sort of boundary around it that automatically categorizes certain sources of advice---even from recognized experts--as germane to the problem (as defined) or not. This, in turn occurs because in many cases problem definition shapes policymakers' perceptions of public issues at a very basic level. Put another way, definition is ultimately bound up with the manner in which govemment officials, activists, and even the public at large understands a problem's causes. Much of the conflict over the definition of homelessness in the U.S. stems from the fact that there is as yet no widespread agreement on why some people wind up living on the streets. The controversy over affirmative action arises (at least in part) out of disagreements over the impact of race in modem American society.16 Differing views on the causes of the 1992 Los Angeles riots--anger over the Rodney King verdict, persistent problems of poverty and racism, corrosive effects of federal welfare programs, decline of respect for the law, etc.--were reflected in the highly varied commentary on the event, and in the wide range of proposed remedies. 17 Of course, this screening mechanism applies not only to expert knowledge, but to virtually any type of information that could potentially come to a policy-maker's attention: media stories, communications from external groups or the general public, and, on occasion, even specific events. When discussing a sexual harassment complaint, for example, opponents of such laws and regulations (who tend to believe that complaints are Chapter2:7 seldomjustified) arefarmorelikely towanttoknowdetailsofthecomplainant's personallife--social andsexualhistory,potentialmotivations,thepossibilityoffinancial gain,etc.--thenarethosewhobelievethatharassmenitsalegitimatesocialproblem._8In muchthesameway,opponentsandsupportersofU.S.involvementintheVietnamWar eachfilteredinformationaboutthe1968Tetoffensivedifferently,with supportersofthe warmuchmorelikely tofocusupontheconditionoftheNorthVietnameseandViet Congforcesfollowingtheattack(generallyregardedasaseriousmilitary defeatforthe North)J9 Participation The definition of an issue serves another important gatekeeping function by determining which groups, organizations, and individuals--both in and out of government--will be admitted to the policy-making process. Establishing the Atomic Energy Commission as a civilian agency, and thereby defining the issue of nuclear power more broadly than the defense establishment had advocated, made the participation of non-military stakeholders, such as representatives of the power industry, far easier than it otherwise would have been (even so, it took many years). 2° Similarly, when Congress first passed the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act in 1947, the regulation of such products was almost exclusively a concern of those particular industries and the agricultural community. When the law came up for renewal 25 years later, however, the definition of the problem area had shifted significantly, from an agricultural to an environmental issue. One major a result of this Chapter2:8 transformationwasthatanentirelynewsetofpoliticalactorsbecamepartofthepolicy debate2.1 Asin thecaseofproblemownership,thereareanumberofcasesin which supporters(or,forthatmatter,opponentsw) ill seektodefine---orredefine--anissuein a particularsoastobringinnewparticipants,ormarginalizecurrentones.Byalteringthe frameworkofthepolicydebate,politicalactorscanseekoutnewsourcesof support(or opposition)2.2Thisappearstobewhathappenedf,orexample,in thecaseofindustrial biotechnology.Inmanyinitial publicdiscussions(whichweredominatedlargelyby environmentalistsorotheropponents)t,hecreationofneworganismsthroughgenetic manipulationwasdescribedalmostexclusivelyasapotentialecologicalhazard.Asa result,manytendedtoviewthetechnologywith somedegreeoftrepidation2. 3Overthe pastfewyears,however,itssupportershavesucceededinreframingthepoliticaldebate, movingit awayfromenvironmentaslafetyandmoreintotheareaofindustrial developmentT. his,inturn,introducedanentirelynewsetofinterestsandstakeholders, mostnotablystateandlocalofficialslookingfornewsourcesofeconomicgrowthandtax revenue.Beforelong,thetechnology'sopponentsfoundthemselvescompletely outnumberedandeffectivelyremovedfromthepolicydiscussion2.4 Issue Visibility and Prioritizing Although there are a few policy areas, such as national defense, that will always be among any government's top priorities, most issues rise and fall on the nation's policy agenda in an a seemingly random fashion. At one time or another, pundits and/or pollsters have labeled health care, gun control, abortion, the environment, or the federal Chapter 2:9 budget (among many, many other issues) as one of this country's "most important problems." Within a few months (or even a few weeks), however, another, completely different "critical issue" will have come along. 25 It is not at all uncommon for advocates of a particular cause to try to maximize their political support by defining their issue in a way that links it with some ongoing public priority (like defense). President Carter's efforts to connect his energy policies to U.S. national security through such phrases as "the moral equivalent of war," and "energy independence" from foreign suppliers of oil is a clear example of such a tactic. 26The recent efforts of groups representing persons with disabilities, 27or gays and lesbians, to have their concerns seen as a logical extension of the civil rights movement of the 1960s can be seen, at least in part, as a similar sort of strategy. Even issues that are not, on the face of it, pivotal concerns can move up on the policy agenda, if not in public prominence, if they can be successfully defined as constituting a "crisis" or "emergency. ''28 It is perhaps for this reason that so many issues are described in such a fashion by their supporters. 29As the next section will show, however, advocates acting on their own are usually not able to convince policymakers, or a significant segment of the public, that a given problem has reached the critical stage. More often than not, such a designation follows in the wake of some external event. The plight of the homeless, for example, became a much greater public concern following reports of several individuals freezing to death in xWashington, DC, during the winter of 19xx? ° Support for gun control legislation generally rises after some public tragedy involving firearms. 3_ Chapter2:10 IssueEvolution In the United States, significant policy change--including upon occasion even outright reversals--is by no means an uncommon event. Sometimes, such as the cancellation of Jimmy Carter's synthetic fuels program shortly after the Reagan administration took office, 32such changes are the result of some larger political or electoral change. In other cases, however, the causes are far more complex. For example, in 1987 Congress approved construction of the multi-billion dollar Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) project in Texas, a decision that was reaffirmed (albeit with increasing controversy) at budget time during each of the next five years. In 1993, however, Congress reversed itself, voting the SSC only enough funding to cover its shutdown costs. To be sure, part of the decline of the SSC's popularity can be accounted for by some of its former proponents literally changing their minds. It was, after all, seriously over budget (estimated costs had risen from $6 to $8 billion), and its leaders had been accused of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds. 33 Some political scientists, however, believe that the cancellation of the SSC was not just the result of a simple change of preferences among individual decisionmakers, but was instead caused by a fundamental shift in the terms of the debate. In other words, between 1987 and 1993 the SSC was redefined, transformed from a purely scientific project into a budget issue. Although the program itself had not changed, after 1990 it was increasingly being judged according to different criteria--its expense--than when it had been approved originally (at which time the discussion dealt almost exclusively with the science it would produce34). Not surprisingly, this led to a major realignment of its political support. 35 Chapter2:11 Althoughsuchcompletepolicyreversalsareprobablyratherrare,thereare numerouscaseswhereachangedissuedefinitionhasdramaticallyalteredthepolitics surroundinganongoingpublicprogram.RenewaloftheInsecticide,Fungicide,and RodenticideActreferredtoearlierprovedtobefarmoredifficult in 1972thanitsoriginal passagein 1947.Thiswasprimarilybecausepesticidemanufactureanduse,seenduring the 1940ssimplyasanagriculturalissue(andthusofrelativelynarrowconcern),had beenredefinedasanenvironmentacloncern,therebyopeningthelawtoscrutinybya completelydifferentsetoforganizationsi,nstitutions,andinterestgroups3.6 Yetanotherprogram,theDepartmentofEnergy'sefforttodevelopnuclearfusion energy(aprocessthat"fuses"togetherlight atoms,asopposedtothefissionprocess, which"splits" heavyatoms),foratimeactuallybenefitedfromredefinition.Becauseit seemedtopromisecleanandabundanetlectricity,itwasessentially"promoted"froma seriesof(relatively)smallresearchprojectsintoafull-scaleenergydevelopmenptrogram duringtheenergycrisisofthe1970s,resultinginasubstantialincreasein itsstatus, visibility, and,ofcourse,budget.Thechangeprovedtobeshort-lived,however,sincea decadelaterit wasredefinedyetagain,thistimeintoabudgetissue--somewhatlikethe SSC--andsubsequentlydowngraded3.7 Likethedesignationofa"crisis,"theevolutionofapublicissuecanbecausedby extemalevents,suchasnaturaldisastersa, ctionsbyaforeignpower,orsomeother unforeseenoccurrenceT. heconversionoftheAlaskaPipelinefromanenvironmentatlo anenergyissue,forexample,wasgreatlyfacilitatedbytheoilembargoof theearly 1970s3.8Similarly,theaccidentattheThreeMile Islandnuclearpowerplantin Pennsylvaniaclearlyaidedtheprocesswhichwasalreadysendingfissiontechnologyin Chapter2:12 theoppositedirection,thatis,fromanenergytoanenvironmental issue. 39The increase in the federal budget deficit during the 1980s was largely responsible for the transformation of the fusion energy program and the SSC (among other projects) into budgetary concerns. There are also cases in which the redefinition was intentional, the result of efforts on the part of policymakers or other so-called "issue entrepreneurs" seeking to change the pattern of political support on an issue. The case of biotechnology, in which supporters were able to transform what had been generally perceived as an environmental "problem" into an economic development "opportunity," represents a successful effort in this regard. Once again, however, there are clearly limits to an individual's or organization's abilities to bring this about. To begin with, the current "owners" of an issue will almost certainly resist any attempts to redefine it out of their domain, such as when HHS sought to retain the Head Start's designation as a welfare program. There are also numerous cases, such as Carter's "moral equivalent of war" appeal for energy conservation and research, where a substantial proportion of policymakers, as well as the public at large, regard the proposed redefinition skeptically. Multiple Definitions All too often, governments have been known to pursue initiatives that, particularly when viewed over the long run, turn out to be mutually exclusive. The general tendency among analysts is to regard such "contradictory" policies as a form of bureaucratic or managerial dysfunction, the product either of independent organizations pursuing their Chapter2:13 ownseparatepolicyagendaso,rofinsufficientattention--if notoutright carelessness m on the part of higher-level officials. 4° It is also possible, however, that the appearance of policy conflict is due to, not from any sort of personal or organizational error, but rather the presence of multiple--and perhaps competing--issue definitions. In cases where the relevant problem definitions have simply been assumed, rather than openly stated--which is usually what happens in government--outside observers and even other policymakers might well regard actions based upon a different set of definitions as being either erroneous, incomprehensible, or even corrupt. 41 In the case of nuclear power, groups that sought tighter regulations and greater controls to enhance public safety for many years felt that opposition from government agencies like the Atomic Energy Commission reflected the fact that they represented industry groups. A somewhat more benign explanation, however, was that the AEC originally saw its mandate as the promotion of civilian nuclear energy, not its regulation. In other words, the way the agency defined its mission was quite different from--if not diametrically opposed to--what the nuclear safety groups expected. 42 Issue Specificity Another source of confusion over policymakers' intentions is the fact that traditional policy labels such as "national defense" or "economic development" actually encompass a very wide range of activities. "Welfare" programs, for example, can consist of initiatives intended to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty (e.g., Aid to Families with Dependent Children), as well as "curative" programs as job training or special Chapter2:14 education(likeHead Start). 43 Thus, simply calling a particular policy a "welfare" program may not make it immediately clear which specific aspect of the poverty problem it is intended to address. Similarly, the term "agricultural policy" refers to government efforts to ensure the stability of particular markets (one of the justifications of price supports), encourage farm ownership (through low-interest loans), promote exports, or facilitate the production and diffusion of agricultural R&D. 44Thus, while it was suggested above that government programs toward tobacco could be defined as "agricultural" policies, that label by itself could mean a number of different things: subsidies paid to tobacco farmers, say, or perhaps the research efforts to find alternative uses for the crop. 45 Form Follows Function Although the stereotypical view of government bureaucracy is that all public agencies look alike, 46it has long been known that some types of organizational structures are better suited for some types of tasks than others. 47A highly centralized and formalized arrangement might work well for a military organization, but would probably not be suitable for a scientific laboratory. 48 Thus, the appropriate design for a government agency is (or at least ought to be) based upon the type of problem it is attempting to solve. The Social Security Administration, for example, has discovered that it cannot employ the same set of procedures in each of its benefit programs. The simple application of a rule, such as whether a claimant is of qualifying age, might be Chapter2:15 appropriatefortheOldAgeProgram,butnotincasesthatrequireagreatdealof judgment,suchasDisabilityInsurance4.9 Thisconnectionbetweenformandfunctionbecomesespeciallyimportantfor thosepolicyareaspossessingmultipleproblemdefinitions,orwherethe"official" definitionissubjecttochange.It iscertainlypossiblethatdifferentdefinitionsofthe samepolicyproblemcanonlybepursuedeffectivelybydifferenttypesof organizational structure.Astheabovediscussionmakesclear,AIDSasamedicalresearchissuerequires averydifferentapproachthanwhenitisdefinedasamatterofhealtheducation. Obviously,thiscanleadtoseriousproblemswhenanissue's"owner"discoversthatit is unabletodealeffectivelywithapolicy'snew"identity." Totakeonlyoneexample,theDepartmentofEnergyhasfacedamajor organizationalandmanageriaclhallengesincetheendoftheColdWar.5°Until 1995, approximatelyhalf(and,duringtheReaganAdministration,slightlymorethanhalf)of DOE'sbudgetwasdevotedtonuclearweaponsproductionandmaintenance5._ Unfortunately,aftermorethanfourdecadesofsuchactivity,anumberofdefense-related facilitiesnowoperatedbyDOE,suchasRockyFlatsinColoradoandHanfordin WashingtonState,haddevelopedseriousenvironmentalproblems.Mostof these stemmedfrominefficientandshort-termmethodsusedtodisposeofradioactiveandother hazardouswastes.In 1990,DOEestablishedanOfficeofEnvironmentalRestorationand WasteManagementc,hargedwith overseeingcleanupeffortsatallof theDepartments' defensesites5.2Asitsrolein overseeingtheU.S.nucleararsenabl ecamerelativelyless importantafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,53theeffectofthisnewlyemerging concernoverenvironmentalrestorationhadtheeffectoftransformingDOE'simage-- Chapter2:16 virtually overnight--from anessentiael lementinAmericannationaldefenseintothatof anunusuallyegregiousviolatorofthecountry'spollutionlaws.54Adaptingtothisnew mission--not tomentionthisnewimage--hasplacedagreatstrainuponthe organization5.5 Thisdiscussiont,hen,suggeststhatsomeofthekeyquestionsforunderstanding howNASA's missionchangesovertimeinclude: 1. Howaregovernmentofficialsdefiningspacepolicyatdifferentpointsin time?Dotheyseeit asanR&D issue(tobemanagedprimarilyby scientists), amatterof nationalsecurityanddefense(requiringhigh-levelscrutinyand support),orasaneconomicissuebestlefttotheprivatesector?Inshort,What doU.S.policymakersbelievetobethespace"problem?" 2. Howhavethepatternsofparticipationaroundthespaceprogramchangedover time?Whichsetsofinterestsseemtobegainingorlosingaccesstothe decision-makingprocess? 3. Whatsortsof"turf" battleshavedevelopedasaresultofchangingissue definitions?Whichindividualsororganizationsappeartobedrivingthese conflicts?Inotherwords,whateffectdoexternalandinternalpolitical, economic,social,andotherkindsofchangehaveonperceptionsofNASA and itsmission? GOALS Unfortunately, even knowing what kind of problem NASA is expected to address does not by itself provide much insight into how it selects specific projects. As the Chapter2:17 previouschapternoted,mostofthecriticismof U.S. space policy has been over individual programs (Apollo, the shuttle, space station, etc.). Thus, in addition to understanding how space policy has been defined at different points in time, it is also necessary to examine how NASA goes about choosing a "solution." This, in turn, means determining how the agency develops and modifies its long- and short-term goals. Multiple Goals Any organization, public or private, always has more goals and objectives than are laid out in their charters or authorizing legislation. At a minimum, these include recruiting qualified personnel (indeed, taxpayers have a right to expect that one of a public agency's "goals" is to hire the best employees that it can find), acquiring resources, maintaining an adequate working environment, improving operating efficiency, and so on. Although they are generally never presented as formal objectives, achieving these so- called "operative goals" is an essential part of reaching an organization's "official goals.'56 One of the more common complaints about public bureaucracies is that they too often act as though their only purpose is to achieve their operative goals--increase their size, maximize their budgets, etc.--as opposed to carrying out their intended functions. 57 How often this actually occurs is a matter of some dispute. 58Nevertheless, the point to be made here is that it is important to take note of all aspects of an organization's operation, not just its stated objectives. Chapter2:18 Constraints Second,it makesnosensetodiscussanorganization'sgoalswithoutalsotaking intoaccounttheconstraintsunderwhichit operatesI.nfact,NobelLaureateHerbert Simonhasarguedthatmeetingsometypesofconstraintsreallyoughttobeconsidered goalsinandofthemselves5.9Forexample,businessfirms thatsucceedinkeepingtheir operatingcostsbelowacertainlimit arebothsatisfyingaconstraintandachievingan objective. Aswasthecasewith operativegoals,thereisabeliefthatsomepublicbureaus becomeoverlyfixatedontheirconstraintsS. ociologistRobertMertonwroteofa phenomenoncalledobjectivedisplacementw, herebyanorganization'srules,procedures, budgets,andotherlimits, "displace"itsofficialgoals,andbecomede facto objectives. 6° According to Merton, this is much more likely to occur in organizations where the "real" goals are vague, unclear, or simply difficult to attain, but the constraints are relatively clear and concrete. 6_ Not all constraints are political or budgetary in nature. R&D organizations like NASA face the added problem of physical limits, scientific laws, and so on. DOE's fusion energy program saw its budget and status grow during the 1970s and early 80s primarily because policymakers believed that the technology could reach the commercialization stage by the end of the century (if not sooner). As it turned out, however, the scientific and technical problems associated with initiating and sustaining a fusion reaction were more difficult than physicists had anticipated. 62As will be seen, one of the major challenges for science- and technology-based organizations is balancing political demands with scientific and technical constraints. 63 Chapter2:19 Finally,thereistheproblemof"technicallock-in,"inwhichanorganizationfinds itselfconstrainedn, otbyoutsideforces,butbythe"trajectory"ofitsownpast decisions6.4Everyoneagreesthat"innovation,""changingwith thetimes,"and"adapting tonewcircumstances"arepositiveattributesforanyorganization(andespeciallyfora privatefirm). Failuretoinnovate,"keepup," or"adapt"isusuallyattributedtosuch commonfoiblesas"bureaucraticinertia"orpersonalstubbornnesosnthepartof leadership6.5It isalsosometimesseenasasymptomoforganizationadl ecline6. 6 Accordingtosomeeconomists(andagrowingnumberofbusinesswriters67)h,owever, someorganizationsmaybeunabletomakesignificantchangesintheirmannerof operatingsimplybecausetheyhavebecomesoheavilyinvestedin theirexisting technologicalinfrastructureT. hus,evenif theywishedtopursuenewmarkets,adoptnew technologies,ortrynewapproachesth,eymaylacktheresourcestodoso:theyare "lockedin" tothestatusquo.Ironically,amongprivatecompaniesit appearstobethe moresuccessfu(lwhichusuallymeansthelargerandmoreestablished)firmsthathave themostdifficulty adapting6.8 Anexcellentexampleof alocked-inpublicpolicyistheU.S.fusionenergy programmentionedearlier.Mostfusionresearchiscarriedoutonverylargemachines calledtokamakswhich,whenfirstintroducedinthe 1970s,seemedtoholdoutthemost promiseasapossiblecommercialdevice.Asaresult,dozensofsuchmachineshavebeen built world-wide,andmorearein theplanningstages.Criticsargue,however,thatthe greatexpenseofbuildingandoperatingtokamakshaspreventedDOEfromseriously investigatingothertechnologies6.9 Chapter2:20 Individual vs. Organizational Goals Just as an organization can have a number of objectives, stated and unstated, each person associated with it has their own individual goals as well. Hopefully, one of these will be to work toward fulfilling the organization's purpose. Nevertheless, it would naive to ignore the fact that even the most loyal employees have their own personal desires and ambitions with regard to promotion, personal finances, and so on. Obviously, organizations in which the goals conflict with members' personal ambitions may be in for serious problems. Many business leaders have therefore learned that their firms are much more likely to succeed if they are able to structure incentives so that the pursuit of individual goals simultaneously contributes to those of the organization. 7° For the most part, the literature on relationship between the goals of organizations and individuals assumes that the latter are organization members. Such a view fails to take into account the possible influence of important external actors, such as (for public agencies) the president, members of Congress, Cabinet officers, or other important officials. For example, it is clear that the objectives of an Executive agency like NASA must conform to the general political goals set by the president. If those goals include reducing federal spending or shrinking the size of government, agency programs will be affected accordingly. In addition, it does happen from time to time that a public bureau finds itself playing a role in the ambitions of a government official seeking some other political objective(s). These could include an attempt by a member of Congress to gain some logrolling or vote-trading advantage, to acquire favorable publicity, or increase his or her chances for election to higher office. This is certainly not limited to individuals in Chapter2:21 governmentA. nyexternalgroupmayseethatitis intheirinteresttosupportaparticular policyperspectiveF.oryears,physicistsusedfearsofSoviet_eienceandtechnologyto persuadepolicymakerstoapprovefundingforever-largerresearchfacilities,evenfor fieldsthathadnorealColdWarapplication(seechapter6).71 Thislastpointmaysoundabit cynical,suggestingpublicpolicyisdrivenby nothingmorethantheselfinterestofindividualpublicofficialsorexternalgroups.There isnodenying,ofcourse,thatpoliticalleadershaveattimesusedanissuefortheirown purposesin awaythatwasnotinthepublicinterest.Perhapsthemost(in)famoussuch casewasSenatorJosephMcCarthy'suseof domesticCommunismin the1950s. Fortunately,therearealsonumerousexampleswheretheconfluenceofpersonaland politicalobjectivesismorebenign,andevenlaudatory.SenatoEr stesKefauver's investigationsintoorganizedcrime(which,likeMcCarthy's,wereamongtheearliest Congressionahlearingstobetelevised)wereindisputablyinthepublicinterest,butalso hadtheeffect(almostcertainlyintentional)ofcatapultinghimintonationalprominence, andmakinghim foratimealeadingcontenderforthe1952Democraticpresidential nomination(hewasultimatelynominatedforVicePresident)7.2 Obviously,it istobehopedthatgovernmenot fficialswill actonbehalfofthe publicgood.Practicallyspeakingh, owever,it isclearthatthemotivationtodosowill be strongerwhensuchactioncarriespersonalbenefitsaswell.Fromananalytical standpoint,mattersbecomeparticularlyinterestingwhenanissueevolves(seethe discussionabove)insuchawaythattheseinducementsstarttodiverge. Chapter2:22 Thus,alongwith following thechangesin thedefinitionofspacepolicy,it isalso importanttounderstandinghowspaceprogramhasbeenaffectedbythechangingsetof goalsandobjectivessurroundingit: 1. Howhavethegoals--personal,political,ideological,etc.----opfarticipating publicofficials(aswell asexternalstakeholders7)3influenced the development of U.S. space policy in general, and of NASA in particular? 2. New presidential administrations--and, on occasion, newly elected Congresses---come into office with new policy goals, as well as a different approach to governing in general. To what extent have these changes affected the course of the U.S. space program? TM 3. What constraints--political, economic, technical, etc.--has NASA faced in trying to achieve its objectives? 4. To what extent are NASA decisions "path dependent?" That is, have decisions made at one point in time "locked in," or limited, the agency's future options? What is/are the source(s) of such "lock-ins?" What have officials, both inside and outside the agency, done about them? REORGANIZATION Whatever else might be said about it, government reorganization is clearly a popular activity. According to one author, practically every president in the 20 thcentury has undertaken a major effort to reorganize the administrative machinery of government. 75Along with these large-scale and highly publicized overhauls---of which the "reinvention" campaign of the Clinton administration is only the most recent--have Chapter2:23 beencountlesssmallerrestructuringsw, hereinnewagenciesarecreatedor existing ones significantly restructured in some fashion. 76 Reorganization can take place for a variety of reasons. 77The most obvious, albeit not the most common, is to provide the means for carrying out some new policy initiative. Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson found it necessary to establish a number of new agencies to implement their New Deal and Great Society programs. Along these same lines, bureaus may also be created in response to the rise of new issues----or new technologies. The Federal Communications Commission, Food and Drug Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission (not to mention NASA) are only a few among the many organizations established in this century to deal with the growing list of public concerns. More common is a reorganization intended to promote efficiency or policy effectiveness. TMThis is usually seen in cases where a number of smaller organizations that operate in the same general policy area are combined so as (in theory) to improve policy integration, lower overhead costs, and eliminate duplication and overlap. These were the reasons (at least reportedly) that President Nixon established the Environmental Protection Agency and that President Carter created the Department of Energy. This same reasoning is sometimes heard in proposals to establish a cabinet-level Department of Science. 79 Sometimes a chief executive, be it a president, governor, or mayor (or, for that matter, a CEO or corporate director) will "reshuffle" the organizations under them in order to "shake up" what they see as an "entrenched" bureaucracy. Reagan administration officials, for example, often complained that they were unable to.carry out their policies Chapter2:24 becauseofthe"resistance"and"inertia" ofthecareercivil servicetheyhadinherited frompreviousDemocraticadministrationss,°Onepotentialsolutiontosuchaproblemis tobreakupexistingorganizationst,herebyeliminatinganypreexistingroutinesor informalarrangementsA.lternatively,achiefexecutivemayattempttobypassa recalcitrantagencybycreatinganeworganizationtocarryouthisorherprograms8.1 Finally,somereorganizationsarecarriedoutforpurelysymbolicreasons. Elevatingthestatusofanorganizationby,say,movingit intotheCabinetissometimes seenasawayofdemonstratingprioritiesorestablishingtheimportanceofthepolicy area.Someauthorsargue,forexample,thatit wassuchsymbolismthatledPresident Carter to create the Department of Education 82and President Bush to establish the Department of Veteran's Affairs. 83In addition to symbolism, advocates often claim that the heightened stature will result in the issue receiving more attention and, ultimately, more resources. The evidence for this, however, is mixed at best. 84 An important point to make about reorganization is that it can be, from the point of view of the affected agencies, exceedingly disruptive. Indeed, one author has likened it to "major surgery. ''85 It is therefore advisable that it be undertaken only when the likely long-term benefits outweigh the short-run costs (which can include loss of morale and decreases in productivity). Organizational questions related to NASA's mission might therefore include: 1. Why was NASA created? Was the decision to establish an independent, civilian space organization motivated by policy concerns, a drive for Chapter 2:25 efficiency, or symbolism? What about subsequent reorganization and reform within the agency? To what extent have efforts to change the course of the space program been . accompanied by significant reorganization, either of NASA or elsewhere within the federal bureaucracy? CONCLUSIONS Taken together, these three concepts--problem definition, goals, and reorganization--provide a great deal of insight into the development of the U.S. space program in general, and of NASA's role in particular. The following chapters will show how the early struggle over American space policy (including the basic question of whether the country should even have a space program) grew out of an inability to form a consensus over a definition of space that would justify government involvement. By the late 1950s, after an international event turned space into a major political issue virtually overnight, a definition did emerge--one which was to have a profound effect on the course of the program--helped along in no small part by the personal and political goals of a number of elected officials. This definition, in turn, played a decisive role in shaping the organizational structure of U.S. space policy, particularly with regard to the creation of NASA. All of this was to set the program on a trajectory that would prove very difficult to alter later on: when the definition of space policy was changed (for the most Chapter2:26 part)duringthe1980s,itraisedseriousquestionsabouttheproperroleofthenation's spaceagency. Inorder to lay this argument out fully, however, it is necessary to go back and review some of the major events in space history that predate the establishment of NASA. Conventional accounts of the development of U.S. space policy tend to treat the launch of Sputnik in 1957 as a sort of watershed: it is the shock and surprise caused by the Soviet achievement that supposedly led directly to the creation of NASA, the start of the manned space program, and, eventually, Project Apollo. As the next chapter will show, however, matters are somewhat more complicated than this account suggests. To begin with, American reaction to Sputnik was to a large extent shaped by a unique combination of political factors. More important, many of the decisions made by government officials well before 1957 at the time actually helped set the stage for what was to follow. In short, NASA's "first mission" grew almost directly out of the origin of the "Space Age" itself. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2 1David Dery, Problem Definition in Policy Analysis. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1984, pp. 16-17. 2Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, "Attention, Boundary Effects, and Large-Scale Policy Change in Air Transportation Policy" in David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb (eds) The Politics of Problem Definition: Setting the Policy Agenda. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994, pp. 50-66. Chapter2:27 3JohnPortz,"PlantClosings,CommunityDefinitions,andtheLocalResponsei"nibid,pp. 32-49. 4DavidHowardDavis,Energy Politics, 4th edition. New York: St. Martin's, 1993, chapter 2. 5Caroline J. Acker, "Stigma or Legitimation? A Historical Examination of the Social Potentials of Addiction Disease Models." Journal of Psychoactive Drugs 25 (1993), pp. 193-205; Peter Reuter, "Hawks Ascendant: The Punitive Trend of American Drug Policy." Daedalus 121 (1995), pp. 15-52. 6 James M. Griffin and Henry B. Steele, Energy Economics and Policy, 2nd edition. Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1986, p. 168. 7David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, "Framing and Claiming the Homelessness Problem." New England Journal of Public Policy 8 (1992), pp. 49-65. 8David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, "Instrumental Versus Expressive Definitions of AIDS Policymaking," in Rochefort and Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition, pp. 159- 181. See also Sandra Panem, The AIDS Bureaucracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988; John Street, "Policy Advice in an Established Advice Structure: AIDS Advice Through the British Department of Health" in B. Guy Peters and Anthony Barker (eds) Advising West European Governments: Inquiries, Expertise, and Public Policy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993, pp. 151-164. 9 Beryl A. Radin and Willis D. Hawley, The Politics of Federal Reorganization: Creating the U.S. Department of Education. New York: Pergamon, 1988. Chapter2:28 l0Davis,Energy Politics, chapter 6. See also Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945-1975. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991; and David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume 2: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. 11See also Anthony Barker and B. Guy Peters, "Science and Government" in Anthony Barker and B. Guy Peters (eds) The Politics of Expert Advice: Creating, Using, and Manipulating Scientific Knowledge for Public Policy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993, pp. 1-16; Cheol H. Oh, "Explaining the Impact of Information on Problem Definition: An Integrated Model." Policy Studies Review 15:4 (Winter 1988), pp. 109-136. 12David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, "Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective" in Rochefort and Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition, p. 26. See also Laurie McGinley and Anne Fawcett, "Patients and Abortion Foes Clash on Stem-Cell Research." Wall Street Journal (21 June 1999), p. A28. 13For a brief overview, see Bruce Bimber, The Politics of Expertise in Congress: The Rise and Fall of the Office of Technology Assessment. Albany: State University of New York Press, chapter 2. 14An account of the episode can be found in Bruce L. R. Smith, The Advisors: Scientists and the Policy Process. Washington: Brookings, 1992, chapter 8, especially pp. 171-5. _5See, for example, Balogh, Chain Reaction. 16M. E. Hawkesworth, Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis. Albany: State University of New York press, 1988, chapter 5. Chapter2:29 17RochefortandCobb,"ProblemDefinition:AnEmergingPerspective." t8EllenFrankelPaul,"SexualHarassmenAt: DefiningMomentandItsRepercussionsin" RochefortandCobb,The Politics of Problem Definition, pp. 67-97. 19See Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History. New York: Vintage Press, 1983; Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. New York: Yale University Press, 1983; Robert R. Tomes, Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954-1975. New York: New York University Press, 1998; Anthony O. Edwards, The War in Vietnam. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. 20See note 12. 21Christopher J. Bosso, Pesticides and Politics: The Life Cycle of a Public Issue. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987. 22William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. See also his "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." American Political Science Review 74:2 (June 1980), pp. 432-446. 23Amal Kawar, "Issue Definition, Democratic Participation, and Genetic Engineering." Policy Studies Journal 17:4 (Summer 1989), pp. 719-744. See also Patrick W. Hamlett, Understanding Technological Politics: A Decision-Making Approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1991, chapter 10; Sheldon Krimsky and Roger Wrubel, Agricultural BiotechnoIogy and the Environment: Science, Policy, and Social Issues. Urbana, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Chapter2:30 24L.ChristopherPlein,"PopularizingBiotechnology:TheInfluenceofIssueDefinition." Science, Technology, and Human Values 16:4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 474-490. 25One of the first attempts by a political scientist to search for a pattern to these changes was John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. See also the discussion in the next section. 26Davis, Energy Politics. 27Fred Pelka, The ABC-CLIO Companion to the Disability Rights Movement. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997. 28John Portz, "Problem Definitions and Policy Agendas: Shaping the Educational Agenda in Boston." Policy Studies Journal 24:3 (1996), pp. 371-386. 29Rochefort and Cobb, "Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective," pp. 21-22. 3oRochefort and Cobb, "Framing and Claiming the Homelessness Problem." 31Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995. 32See Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, "Synthetic Fuels from Coal" in Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, The Technology Pork Barrel. Washington: Brookings, 1991, pp. 259-321. It should be noted that the program had also encountered significant technical and economic problems. 33For a brief general history of the SSC program, see David Ritson, "Demise of the Texas Supercollider." Nature 366 (16 December 1993), pp. 607-610. Descriptions of its financial and administrative troubles, see Malcolm W. Browne, "Supercollider's Rising Cost Provokes Opposition." New York Times (29 May 1990), pp. C1, C6; Christopher Anderson, "University Consortium Faulted On Management, Accounting." Science 261 (9 July 1993), Chapter2:31 p.157and"DOEPullsPlugonSSCContractor."Science 261 (12 August 1993), pp. 822- 823. For DOE's and the physics community's views on the project, see U. S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, Division of High Energy Physics, High Energy Physics Advisory Panel's Subpanel on Vision for the Future of High Energy Physics. Washington: DOE, 1994. 34Sheldon L. Glashow and Leon M. Lederman, "The SSC: A Machine for the Nineties." Physics Today (March 1985), pp. 28-37; James W. Cronin, "The Case for the Super Collider." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 1986), pp. 8-11; Colin Norman, "...But They Endorse the Supercollider." Science 232 (9 May 1986), p. 705; Mark Crawford, "Reagan Okays the Supercollider." Science 235 (6 February 1987), p. 625. 35See Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, especially chapter 4. For a slightly different account of the SSC's redefinition (from a domestic to an international program), see W. D. Kay, "Particle Physics and the Superconducting Super Collider: The Collaboration that Wasn't" in Vicki L. Golich and W. D. Kay (eds), International Collaboration in Science and Technology Among Advanced Industrial Societies. London: Routledge (forthcoming). 36 BOSSO, Pesticides and Politics. 37W. D. Kay, "Congressional Decision-Making and Long-Term Technological Development: The Case of Nuclear Fusion" in Gary Bryner (ed), Science, Technology, and Politics: Policy Analysis in Congress. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 87-106. 38Griffin and Steele, Energy Economics and Policy, p. 168. Chapter2:32 39U.S.CongressO, fficeofTechnologyAssessmenNt,uclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty. Washington: OTA, 1984, chapter 8. 40See, for example, Graham T. Allison, The Illusion of Choice: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, pp. 79-81, 97; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974. 41W. D. Kay, "John F. Kennedy and the Two Faces of the U.S. Space Program, 1961- 1963." Presidential Studies Quarterly 28:3 (Summer 1998), pp. 573-586. 42Balogh, Chain Reaction. 43See Charles S. Bullock 11I,James E. Anderson, and David W: Brady, public Policy in the Eighties. Monterrey, CA: Brooks-Cole, 1983, chapter 5. 44William P. Browne, Cultivating Congress: Constituents, Issues, and Interests in Agricultural Policymaking. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995. See also Louis Ferleger and William Lazonick, "The Managerial Revolution and the Developmental State: The Case of U.S. Agriculture." Business and Economic History 22:2 (Winter 1993), pp. 67-98. 45Discussions of the latter can be found in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Plants: The Potentials for Extracting Protein, Medicines, and Other Useful Chemicals--Workshop Proceedings. Washington: OTA, 1983. 46Charles T. Goodsell, The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic, 3rd edition. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1985, chapter 3 Chapter2:33 47SeeHenryMintzberg,The Structure of Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall, 1979; Henry Mintzberg Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981. 48j. D. Thompson, Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. 49Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaticratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. 5oU. S. Congress, General Accounting Office, The Department of Energy: A Framework for Restructuring DOE and its Missions. Washington: GAO, 1995. Of course, DOE is hardly alone in this. See chapter 9. 51U. S. Department of Energy, Department of Energy 1977-1994: A Summary History. Washington: DOE, Energy History Series, 1994, Appendix 5-A. 52ibid, p. 74; See also U. S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Environment, Safety, and Health: Status of DOE's Reorganization of its Safety Oversight Function. Washington: GAO, 1990. 53The FY 1995 budget for Defense Programs was less than thirty percent of DOE's total, the lowest level in the Department's History. See U. S. Department of Energy, Department of Energy 1977-1994, Appendix 5-A. 54See "Summit Focuses on Vision to Guide Rocky Flats Cleanup." DOE This Month 18:4 (April 1995), p. 14; "Cleanup Accelerated at Hanford Defense Plants." DOE This Month 18:2 (February 1995), p. 5. See also Dianne Rahm, "Coming into Environmental Compliance: DOE and the Nuclear Weapons Complex." Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, 2-5 September 1999. Chapter2:34 55U.S.CongressG, eneraAl ccountingOffice,The Department of Energy: A Framework for Restructuring DOE and its Missions; Rahm, "Coming into Environmental Compliance." 56Charles Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations." American Sociological Review 26 (December 1961), pp. 854-866. See also Lawrence B. Mohr, "The Concept of Organizational Goal." American Political Science Review 67 (1973), pp. 470- 481. (where the terms are "official" and "reflexive" goals). 57Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. For a discussion of this idea as it relates to NASA, see Howard E McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space Program. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, as well as the earlier articles "The Decay of NASA's Technical Culture." Space Policy (November 1989): 301-310 and "Organizational Decline: NASA and the Life Cycle of Bureaus." Public Administration Review 51:4 (July-August 1991): 308-315. 58For a reply to Downs, see Goodsell, The Case for Bureaucracy, chapter 6. For a reply to McCurdy, see Kay, Can Democracies Fly in Space ?, chapter 3. 59Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior." A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization. 3rd edition. New York: Free Press, 1976, chapter 12. 60Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957. 61Downs, Inside Bureaucracy; see also Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957; Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979, particularly Part I. Chapter2:35 62Seenote37,aswell asU.S.CongressO, fficeofTechnologyAssessmentS,tarpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy. Washington: OTA, 1987. 63W. D. Kay, "Policy-Making vs. Technology-Making: The Political Problems of Space R&D," paper presented at the International Astronautical Federation Congress, Beijing, China, 1996; and "Does Hardware Vote? or Can Democracies Develop Expensive Large- Scale Technology?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 1995. 64Eleanor Ehmberg and Stefan Jaconsson, "Technological Discontinuities and Incumbents' Performance: An Analytical Framework" in Charles Edquist (ed) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations. London: Pinter, 1997, pp. 318- 341; Bo Carlsson and Staffon Jacobsson, "Diversity Creation and Technical Systems: A Technology Policy Perspective" in ibid, pp. 266-294; W. Brian Arthur, "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events." Economic Journal 99:1 (March 1989), pp. 116-131. 65Goodsell, The Case for Bureaucracy. 66Robert M. Wiseman and Philip Bromiley, "Toward a Model of Risk in Declining Organizations: An Empirical Examination of Risk, Performance, and Decline." Organization Science 7:5 (September-October 1996), pp. 524-541 67See, for example, Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997. 68ibid. Chapter2:36 69U.S.CongressO, fficeofTechnologyAssessmentT,he Fusion Energy Program: The Role of TPX and Alternative Concepts (Background paper). Washington: OTA, 1995. 70See, for example, Deborah F. Crown and Joseph G. Rosse, "Yours, Mine, and Ours: Facilitating Group Productivity Through the Integration of Individual and Group Goals." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 64:2 (November 1995), pp. 138- 150. 71See Kevles The Physicists; Adrienne Kolb and Lillian Hoddeson, "The Mirage of the "World Accelerator for World Peace and the Origins of the SSC, 1953-1983." HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 24 (1993), pp. xxx-xxx. 7z Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975, p. 13. 73Some care must be taken here, since in many cases there may not be any direct information on the personal goals of individual decisionmakers. Sometimes, however, it is possible to make reasonable inferences on the basis of what is known about that person. 74 As will be seen (particularly in chapters 7 and 8), such political shifts can have an impact even when they do not mention space specifically. 75Lester M. Salamon, "The Question of Goals" in Peter Szanton (ed), Federal Reorganization: What Have We Learned? Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1981, p. 80. 76Charles T. Goodsell, The Case for Bureaucracy, chapter 7. 77For a general discussion of reorganization, see Szanton, Federal Reorganization; B. Guy Peters, "Government Reorganization: A Theoretical Analysis." International Political Science Review 13:2 (1992): 199-217. Chapter2:37 78PeterSzanton,"SoYouWanttoReorganizetheGovernment?"in SzantonF,ederal Reorganization, pp. 1-24. See also James Conant, "Reorganization and the Bottom Line." Public Administration Review 46:1 (January/February 1986): 48-56; George W. Downs and Patrick D. Larkey, The Search for Government Efficiency: From Hubris to Helplessness. New York: Random House, 1986, especially pp. 184-190. Andrew Lawler, "Agency Merger Plan Faces High Hurdles." Science 267 (31 March 79 1995), p. 1900; "Department of Science Still Evolving." Science 268 (14 April 1995), p. 191; Robert M. White, "Rekindling the Flame." Technology Rev&w 98:4 (May/June 1995), p. 69; David Hanson, "Congress Opens Science Department Hearings." Chemical and Engineering News (10 July 1995), p. 22. 80Goodsell, The Case for Bureaucracy, chapter 7. 81Another variation of this phenomenon is a political leader attempting to place a particular individual in charge of a specific project. It has been suggested, for example, that Lyndon Johnson sought to transfer part of the Federal Aviation Administration's programs to the Department of Defense solely for the purpose of placing development of the Supersonic Transport under Robert McNamara's direction. See Szanton, "So You Want to Reorganize the Government?" 82Radin and Hawley, The Politics of Federal Reorganization. 83Szanton, "So You Want to Reorganize the Government?" 84Radin and Hawley, The Politics of Federal Reorganization. See also Szanton, "So You Want to Reorganize the Government?" Chapter2:38 85See,forexample,CharlesEdquistandBj6mJohnson",InstitutionsandOrganizationsin SystemsofInnovation"inCharlesEdquist(ed)Systems oflnnovation, pp. 41-63. CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION PART Ih FIRST MISSION Chapter 3 Prehistory: Space Policy Before Sputnik Anyone reviewing the historical writing on space exploration might fairly conclude that it is one of those rare human enterprises that has two beginnings. Many (perhaps most) books and articles trace the origins of modem spaceflight to the theoretical treatises and engineering work of Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Robert Goddard, Herman Oberth (and later Wernher yon Braun), and others. These accounts treat the story of the space age as basically a history of research and development. As such, it is synonymous with---if not an actual subfield of--the much larger literature inthe history of science and technology. Other authors, however, see the birth of space travel not just as the development of hardware or the formulation of scientific principles, but rather as the creation and dissemination of an idea. According to this view, the real beginning of spaceflight is to be found in fiction: Edward Everett Hale's "The Brick Moon" (1869) 2,Jules Veme's From the Earth to the Moon (1865), H.G. Wells' First Men in the Moon (1897), etc. These and other novels and short stories played a major role in opening the space age, by "inspiring" scientists and engineers in their youth, and later by "popularizing" the notion of space travel. 3 Chapter3:2 Despitetheirobviousdifferencesb,othofthesepathstospacehavetwoimportant featuresincommon.Tobeginwith,theybothconveyacertainamountofinnocencei,f not naivete,particularlywhencomparedwiththeeventstocome.Everyoneinvolved--in both factandfiction--alwaysseemtobeactingontheverybestofintentions.Spacetravelersin storiesareusuallydepictedeitherasscientistsengagedinasearchfornewknowledgeo,ras ordinarypeopleseekingadventureT.hisperspectivewascarriedoverintothefirstscience fictionfilms,suchastheFrenchLe Voyage clans Ia lune (1902, loosely based upon the Verne novel), the American Just Imagine (1930), and the British Things to Come (1936, based upon the novel by H. G. Wells). 4 In the real world, men like Tsiolkovsky and Goddard appear to have been motivated primarily (although not exclusively) by the ideals of scientific investigation and discovery. Tsiolkovsky's theoretical work, for example, was both rigorous and thorough (his achievements were particularly impressive in view of the fact that he was largely self- taught). Goddard, a trained physicist, was the first to equip a rocket with instruments for recording data about conditions at high altitudes, his is not to say that they--and others-- were not also attracted by the romance of space travel. Goddard decided in his youth to go into rocketry after reading Jules Verne. Tsiolkovsky himself wrote science fiction stories, and to the end of his life maintained a bold vision of humanity's future in space. In a 1935 broadcast, a few months before his death, he spoke of "[h]eroes and bold spirits [who] will pioneer first space route: Earth-orbit of Moon, Earth-orbit of Mars, and still further: Moscow-Moon, Kaluga [his home village]-Mars. ''5 The coupling of serious science with a sense of wonder was continued by the various rocket and space societies that began forming in the U.S. and Europe during the Chapter3:3 1920sand1930sT. obesure,thesegroupsweredevotedtoseriousengineeringresearcht:he buildingandtestingofvariousrocketcomponentsth, epublicationofarticlesandpapers dealingwiththetheoreticapl roblemsofspaceflightE. venso,theirnames--theAmerican InterplanetarySociety(laterchangedtotheAmericanRocketSociety),theBritish InterplanetarySociety,andtheGermanSocietyforSpaceshipTravel--suggestthatthe memberst'hinkingwasfaraheadoftheirsmallmodelrockets. TheGermansociety(knownbyitsinitialsVfR) wasoneofthelargestofthese organizationsa,ndwouldprovetobeoneofthemoreinfluential.Inadditiontoits impressivetechnicalachievements--inearly1931itsuccessfullylaunchedaliquid-fueled rockettoanaltitudeof2,000feet--theVfRprovidedvaluableexperiencei,npublic relationsaswellasengineeringf,ortheyoungWemhervonBraun.It wouldalsolaterserve asthecoreofwhatwouldbecomeknownastheGermanrocketteam(seebelow).6 Thesecondcharacteristicofearlyspaceactivity--and,inlightofsubsequenetvents, perhapsthemorenotable--isthealmosttotalabsenceofanysortofgovernment involvement.Sciencefictionwritersofthe19a'and early 20thcenturies, even at their most creative, never even came close to envisioning anything like NASA, or indeed any other public agency. Usually, these imagined trips into outer space were financed by wealthy individuals or private organizations (such as the Baltimore Gun Club in Verne's From the Earth to Moon), 7or else were made possible by some fantastic discovery or revolutionary technology (e.g., Wells' "cavorite" in The First Men in the MoonS), that made external support unnecessary. 9 Although there was a small amount of public funding for actual rocket research-- Goddard received $5,000 from the Smithsonian Institution in 1916, and the National Chapter3:4 AcademyofSciencesprovidedsomesupporttoarocketdevelopmentteamattheCalifomia InstituteofTechnologybeginninginthelate1930sI°--theinitialworkinthisfieldremained almostexclusivelyinprivatehands.Thespacesocietiesraisedmoneyfromavarietyof sourcess,omewhaltiketoday'snon-profitorganizationsb,ut,instarkcontrasttotheir descendenthsalfacenturylater,donotseemtohaveengagedinanysortoflobbying activitiesI.I ThemajorexceptionherewasHermannOberth,whoactivelycourtedGerman publicandmilitaryofficials.Themostnotablesuchencountetrookplacein 1929,witha youngofficernamedWalterDornbergerw, howouldlaterheaduptheGermanmilitary rocketprogram. Oberth'ssuccesseasside,it ishighlyunlikelythatanygovernmen(tatleastoutside Germany)wouldhaveseriouslyconsideredarequestforlarge-scalefundingforrocketand spaceresearchduringthisperiod.Certainly,publicinstitutionshaveuponoccasion sponsoredepicadventureasndgreatexpeditionss,uchasthevoyageofLewisandClarkein theUnitedStatesI.naddition,bytheearly1930s,theU.S.hadbeensupportingscientific researchandtechnologicadlevelopmentm, ostnotablyinagricultureandmedicine,forsome time,andhadrecentlybegunprovidingsupporttocivil aviationthroughtheNational AdvisoryCommitteeonAeronautics(whichwouldlaterformthecoreofNASA)._2Such venturesh, owever,hadneverbeenundertakensimplyfortheirownsake,butratherbecause theywereregardedbyofficialsasdirectlycontributingtosomepublicgoal. It isdifficulttoseehowrockettechnologya,sitexistedatthattime,couldhavemet thiscriteria.Rocketrywasverymuchintheformativestagea,ndgenerallyunreliable(most oftheearlytestlaunchesi,nfact,werefailures).Evenif itcouldhavebeenconstruedas servinganyconceivablepublicpurposei,nitiatingamajorprogramtodeveloparocket Chapter3:5 capableofsendingeventhesmallestobjectanyappreciabledistance(letaloneasatelliteor ahumanbeingintospacew) ouldhavebeenaperilous,uncertain,andhighlyexpensive propositionforanygovernmentM. oreover,anysucheffortwouldalmostcertainlyhave encounteresderiouspoliticalopposition,particularlyfromthegenerapl ublic.Goddard's Smithsoniangrant,forexamplew, asopenlyridiculedinthepagesoftheNew York Times, and the National Academy of Sciences funding for the Caltech program was reportedly made with great reluctance.l 3Considering also that by 1930, most of the Western world had been plunged into the Great Depression, public officials would have had an extremely difficult time justifying large expenditures for something like rocketry and space travel. In short, prior to World War II, governments had little incentive to invest more than a token amount in rocket development. From the point of view of most policymakers, it was--to use a concept presented in chapter 2--an undefined technology, and was therefore, for all practical purposes, invisible. It would not remain so for much longer. FIRST DEFINITION AND THE LOSS OF INNOCENCE The second World War changed forever the status and the nature of rocket research and, ultimately, of space exploration. Almost all the nations participating in that conflict made some use of rocket technology, either as field weapons (really just another form of artillery) or as part of the propulsion system in combat aircraft. Thus, for the first time governments saw a compelling reason to invest in rocket research and development. Chapter3:6 Giventheeffortsof men like Hermann Oberth (who clearly stands as one of the space age's first "issue entrepreneurs"), it is hardly surprising that in was in Germany that the rocket achieved its greatest--and most horrifying--success. In 1932, Walter Domberger was appointed to head the German military rocket program. A staunch enthusiast for rocket research ever since his meeting with Oberth three years earlier, Domberger immediately recruited Wernher von Braun (who was only 20 years old at the time) as his technical director, and soon brought along much of the rest of the VfR membership as well. It was from their base at Peenemtinde, a peninsula near the Baltic Sea, that the German rocket team developed the V-2, the world's first true ballistic missile. Despite the fact that their work involved building weapons of mass destruction for the Nazi regime, _4the higher-ranking members of the rocket team always maintained--at least after their immigration to the United States--that their primary interest was actually unchanged from the days of the VfR, that is, in developing the technology for space travel. Working for the military, they would later say, was simply a way of acquiring the necessary resources: We didn't want to build weapons; we wanted to go into space. Building weapons was a stepping stone. What else was there to do, but join the War Department? Elsewhere there was no money. 15 Von Braun himself echoed this sentiment during an interview in the 1950s: We needed money for our experiments, and since the [German] army was ready to give help, we did not worry overmuch about the consequences in the distant future. Chapter3:7 Besides,in 1932theideaofanotherwarwasabsurdT. he Naziswerenottheninpower.Therewasnoreasonformoral scruplesovertheusetowhichourresearchemsightbeputin thefuture.Wewereinterestedinonlyonething--the explorationofspaceO. urmainconcernwashowtogetthe mostoutoftheGoldenCalf.16 Indeed,someoftheviewsoftherocketteam(atleast,asexpressedyearsafterthe war)retainthevisionarydreamingaboutspacethatwassoprevalenitnthe1920sand30s. Inspeakingofwhathecalledthe"extraterrestriailnoperative,"forexampleo,neofvon Braun'scolleaguesatPeenemiandweaspositivelyrhapsodic: Perhapsa,sweplacetheextraterrestriadlomainintothe serviceofallpeople,wemaybepermittedtohopeforthe greatesbtenefitofall:thattheugly,thebigoted,thehateful, thecheapnesosfopportunismandallelsethatissmall, narrow,contemptibleandrepulsivebecomesmoreapparent andfarlesstolerablefromthevantagepointofthestarsthanit everwasfromtheperspectiveofthemudhole)7 Suchrhetoricwasevenechoed--uptoapoint--by GeneraDl ornbergert,hemilitary commandeorftheprogram.At thecelebrationheldontheeveningofthefirstsuccessfuVl- 2test,hedeclaredthat: ...for thefirsttime...wehaveusedspaceasabridgebetween twopointsonearth;wehaveprovedrocketpropulsion practicableforspacetravel.Toland,tosea,and[to]airmay Chapter3:8 nowbeaddedinfiniteemptyspaceasanareaoffuture intercontinentatlraffic._8 Whilethesincerity(nottomentionthemorality)oftherocketteammembers' professedpoliticaldisintereshtasbeenthesubjectofmuchdebateanddiscussion_,9thereis nodoubtwhatsoevearbouthowtheGermangovemmendtefinedtheirmissileprogram. Dornbergerf,orexamplec,oncludedhistributetotherocket'sfirstsucceswsiththe reminderthat"[s]olongasthewarlasts,ourmosturgenttaskcanonlybetherapid perfectingoftherocketasaweapon."Adolf Hitler,whohadinitiallybeenskepticalofthe V-2's militarypotential,waspersuadebdyafilm ofthefirstlaunch(andabriefingfroma highlyenthusiasticvonBraun)togivetheprogramtoppriority.Bytheendofthewar,more than6,000V-2shadbeenproducedn,earlyhalfofwhichwerelaunchedattargetsin EnglandandcontinentaEl urope2.°InMarch1944,HeinrichHimmlerwentsofarastohave vonBraunarrestedfortreasonc,hargingthathewasmoreconcernedwithspacetravelthan withGermany'ssurvival(hewasultimatelyreleased2).1 AssumingthattheclaimsofVonBraunandtheothersweregenuineP, eenemtinde representsahistoricturningpointinthehistoryofspaceexploration.Forthefirst(butbyno meansthelast)time,agroupof "truebelievers,"seekingfinancialandpoliticalsupportfor theirvisionofspaceflighth,adacquiescetdo--if notactivelyencouraged--aredefinitionof spacetechnologythatservedagovernment'sshort-runobjectives. Thedesiretocontinuetheirworkregardlessofwhowaspayingforit(orwhy)also appearstohavebeenafactorinRocketTeam'sdecisiond, uringthefinaldaysofthewar,to moveasmanyoftheirpapersandasmuchoftheirequipmenatspossiblefurtherwest (PeenemtindweasdirectlyinthepathoftheSovietadvancei)nordertosurrendetrothe Chapter3:9 AmericansA. U.S.Army intelligencereport,basedupontheinitialinterrogationsofthe capturedspecialistsn,otedtheirbeliefthat"thiscountry[theU.S.]wastheonemostableto providetheresourcersequiredforinterplanetarytravel.''= RelocatedtotheUnitedStatesy,onBraunandhisteambeganbuildingandtesting missilesfortheU.S.Army,firstatWhiteSandsa, nd,in 1950,attheRedstoneArsenal outsideofHuntsville,Alabama.RenamedtheGeorgeC.MarshallSpaceFlightCenterin 1960,thisfacilitywastobecomeoneofthekeyorganizationsintheU.S.spaceprogram. GiventhataformerGermanmilitaryprogramwasnowinthehandsoftheU.S. defenseestablishmenitt,ishardlysurprisingthatresearchintorocketrycontinuedtobe definedasamilitaryissue,andthatpolicyownershipremainedexclusivelywiththearmed servicesS. oontheArmy,Navy,andthenewlycreatedAir Forcewereeachattemptingto buildmissilesoftheirown.Unfortunatelyt,hisresultedinahighdegreeofduplication,and therivalrybetweentheservicesfrequentlygotinthewayoftechnicalprogressE.fforts duringthelate1940stomergemissileR&D intoaunifiedprogram,eventothepointof buildingasingletestrange,sankina morassofsuspicionandinfighting2. 3 An evengreaterdifficultyfortherocketprogram,however,wasofficialskepticism aboutitsmilitaryutility (which,giventheprevailingpolicydefinition,meantitsutility, period).TheV-2,themostpowerfulrockettheninexistenceh,adhaddifficultyhitting targetsonlyafewhundredmilesaway.TobeaneffectiveweaponfortheU.S.,amissile wouldhavetocapableofaccuratelyreachingfarmoredistanttargetsI.nshort,theAmerican militaryrequiredaninter-continental ballistic missile. The technical challenges of such a device were, to say the least, formidable. Since at least part of its flight path would carry it outside the atmosphere, an ICBM would need to be built from materials capable of Chapter3:10 withstandingtheheatfromreentry.Itsguidancesystemwouldhavetobefarmore sophisticatedthananythathadbeenbuiltuptothattime.Finally,militaryplannersexpected thatanICBMwouldcarryanuclearwarheadT.heatomicbombsusedagainstJapan, however,hadweighedfivetonseach,wellbeyondthecapabilityofanymissilethenunder developmen2t.4 ThesefactsledmanyprominentscientistsandengineerstoconcludethatanICBM v_astechnicallyinfeasible.InDecember1945,forexample,VannevarBush,whohadplayed amajorroleintheManhattanProjectandwastheprincipalarchitecot fAmericanpost-war sciencepolicy,toldaSenatecommitteethat Therehasbeenagreatdealsaidabouta3,000-milehigh- anglerocket.Inmyopinion,suchathingisimpossibleand will remainimpossibleformanyyears.Thepeoplewhohave beenwritingthesethingsthatannoymehavebeentalking abouta3,000-milehigh-anglerocketshotfromonecontinent toanothercarryinganatomicbomb,andsodirected[bya guidancesystem]astobeapreciseweaponwhichwould landonacertaintargetsuchasthiscity[ofWashington]I. saytechnicallythatIdon'tthinkanybodyintheworldknows howtodosuchathingand! feelconfidentthatitwill notbe doneforaverylongperiodoftimetocome.I thinkwecan leavethatoutofourthinking.I wishtheAmericanpeople wouldleaveitoutoftheirthinking.25 Themilitaryrocketprogram'smostseriousproblem,however,wasonewhich frequentlyconfrontsemergingtechnologiest:herewasnopotentialmissionforsucha devicethatcouldnotalreadybecarriedout,farmoreefficientlyandwithlesscost,by Chapter3:11 existinghardwareT. heU.S.bomberfleet,particularlywiththedevelopmenotfin-flight refuelingandtheestablishmenotfoverseasairbasesw, asfullycapableofdeliveringbombs ofanysize---conventionaolrnuclear--practicallyanywhereonearth. Inspiteofalloftheseobstaclesr,ocketresearchdidmoveaheada,lbeitmoreslowly thansomewouldhavepreferred.Thiswasdue,inpart,tosignificantimprovementsinthe relevanttechnologiesm: orepowerfulenginess,trongermaterialsa,ndmoresophisticated computingequipmen2t.6Theother--andperhapsmoreimportant--factorwaspolitical.In 1952,Americanselectedanewpresidento,newhowouldtakeasomewhadtifferentviewof rocketryanditspotentialbenefits. A SECRET (AND A NOT-SO-SECRET) REDEFINITION By the early 1950s, it had become clear that missile technology would soon reach the point where it would be possible not only to deliver a payload from one continent to another, but to place a satellite into earth orbit. Such a capability could potentially be put to a number of uses. As early as 1945, the British author Arthur C. Clarke had discussed the possibility of using orbital platforms as a relay for radio and television signals. 27A 1954 report to the National Science Foundation by the American Rocket Society described in some detail how satellites could contribute to scientific research, long-range weather forecasting, and improvements in communication and navigation. 28 Once again, however, it was the needs of the defense community that persuaded the federal government to pursue satellite research. It is useful at this point to recall the Chapter3:12 discussionofissuespecificityfromchapter2.Tosaythatrocketscould serve no useful role in "national defense" ignores the fact that this term actually covers a broad range of activities. In addition to the development and procurement of weaponry, it can also refer to the recruitment, training, and management of military personnel, the development of strategies and tactics, and the acquisition of intelligence and reconnaissance data. Thus, the fact that rockets could not serve as an effective weapon (which was becoming less true with each passing year) did not preclude their contributing to U.S. national security in some other way. Like many Americans who had felt the shock and dismay of the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor, President Eisenhower was keenly aware of the possibility of a sudden attack on the United States. 29Such concerns were heightened by a 1955 report from a special panel of the Office of Defense Mobilization. Chaired by James Killian, 3°the main finding of the panel was that while the U.S. had an "offensive advantage" over the Soviet Union, it was still vulnerable to surprise attack, a situation that could actually lead the Soviets to launch a preemptive military strike. One of the most important ways of preventing this, the report concluded, was through more effective intelligence-gatheringf _ It is therefore hardly surprising that the Eisenhower Administration began, through a variety of means, to try to learn as much about Soviet capabilities and intentions as possible. At the 1955 Geneva Summit, the president proposed his famous "Open Skies" policy, which would permit the U.S. and the USSR to conduct aerial surveillance of each other's territory. 32Soviet rejection of the proposal led him to approve secret (and illegal under international law) reconnaissance missions over the USSR, first by high-altitude balloons Chapter3:13 outfittedwithautomaticcameras(knownbythecodenameGENETRIX),andlaterbythe U-2spyplane. Neitheroftheseapproachesh,owever,wasfully satisfactoryT.heballoons,which wereentirelydependenutponprevailingwinds,werelargelyineffective:only44ofthe morethan500launchedwereeverrecovereda,ndseveracl amedown(orwereshotdown) overSovietandChineseterritory.33TheU-2could,of course, go anywhere a pilot took it, but since this meant placing American personnel at risk (not to mention the fact that the flights were a blatant violation of Soviet air space), Eisenhower was nevercompletely comfortable with the plane. Those familiar with the technology involved, however, believed that satellites could overcome all of these difficulties. As early as 1946, a RAND Corporation study had noted that a "satellite offers an observation aircraft which cannot be brought down by an enemy who has not mastered similar techniques. ''34 In a 1952 article for Collier's magazine (see below), Wemher yon Braun wrote that "the telescopic eyes and cameras" of a space station would make it impossible for a Country to hide warlike preparations for any length of time. 35 Although he was writing about a manned facility (clearly an infeasible option in the mid- 1950s), the principle was basically the same as that outlined in the RAND study. An automated "spy" satellite, taking pictures from earth orbit, would be far less vulnerable than the observation balloons Or the U-2, and would not expose any Americans to danger. 36Thus, for the first time a space-based technology was able to provide a high-priority 37government service better than any existing alternative. 38In March 1955, one month after the Killian report was issued, the administration approved a top-secret "strategic reconnaissance satellite" program, initially designated as the WS-117L. 39 Chapter 3:14 Defining space R&D as an intelligence project, however, meant that Eisenhower officials would treat it far differently than they would have a basic science (or even a weapons development) program. In fact, although there was no way to know this at the time, the military intelligence definition of space policy was to have a profound impact on not just the WS-117L, but the entire future course of the U.S. space program as well. Science, Secrecy, and Misdirection One of the more distinctive--and obvious--features of government intelligence programs is the need for strict security. This usually means, at a minimum, restricting access to information, as was done for the Manhattan Project and the U-2 program. Very few officials, even within the Eisenhower administration, had any knowledge that a spy satellite was under development. In fact, with the exception of an off-the-cuff remark by President Johnson in 1967, 40the U.S. did not officially acknowledge that it had such a capability until the mid- 1970s. 41 Keeping a space project secret, however, presented special problems. Throughout the 1950s, public interest in spaceflight was being fanned by a number of events. Like his mentor Hermann Oberth 20 years earlier, Wernher von Braun had been spending much of his time since coming to America trying to build up public enthusiasm--and political support--for space exploration. He wrote a series of articles for Collier's magazine about rockets, space stations, and human flights to the moon and Mars, all of which managed to ask, in one way or another, "what are we waiting for?" He also collaborated with Walt Disney on three one-hour television episodes devoted to space exploration, and (together with science writer Willy Ley) designed a scale model of an "atomic rocket" for the Chapter3:15 DisneylandthemeparkinCalifomia4. 2Besidesmakingspaceflighti,npoliticalscientist HowardMcCurdy'swords,"seemreal"tomillionsofAmericansv,onBraunwasseekingto putpressureontheU.S.governmenttostepupitsfledglingspaceprograms. Meanwhile,farmoresignificanteventswereunfoldingwithinthescientific community.Afewyearsearlier,theInternationaCl ouncilofScientificUnionshadhelped setupwhatwouldbecomeknownastheInternationaGl eophysicaYlear.Itspurposewasto bringtogetherscientistsfromaroundtheworld(morethan60countriesultimately participatedt)oconductanintensivescientificinvestigationoftheearth,includingitspoles, oceansd,eepinterior,and--significantly--theregionofnearbyspace4.3Manyscientistsand engineers(includingvonBraun)beganlobbyingthefederalgovernmenftorpermission(as well asfunding)todevelopandlaunchascientificsatelliteaspartofU.S.participationin IGY: 4 Theadministrationsoonrealizedthat,givenallofthisactivity,simplykeepingsilent aboutsatelliteresearchwouldsurelyarousesuspicionp, articularlyonthepartoftheSoviet Union.45Eisenhowerofficialsthereforedecidedtoemployastrategyofmisdirection:there wouldbeasecondp,ublic satellite program, dedicated exclusively to scientific research, that would become the focus of American (and, hopefully, world) attention. Space historians have known since the mid-1980s (when many of the relevant documents began to be declassified), that this is how the civil component of the U.S. space program began: not in the name of scientific discovery or of conquering a "new frontier," but as an adjunct to---and a cover for--the Eisenhower Administration's top priority in space, the spy satellite. 46One author has put the matter quite bluntly: Chapter3: 16 ...DwightD.Eisenhowerf,romthefirsttimehegaveserious considerationtotheconceptuntilthedayheleftofficeinJanuary 1961,viewedsatellitereconnaissancaesapreciouscommodity thathehadtoprotectwith"bodyguards"ofcoverstoriesh,alf- truths,misdirectionsa,nddiversionsM. uchoftheAmerican civilianspaceprogram,forinstance,appearstohavebeena visible,publicmeansofdivertingattentionfromthesecurity- relatedprogramsthatEisenhowervalued.Evenothermilitary programsthemselvesshieldedhistoppriority:thereconnaissance satelliteprogram4.7 Asithappenedth, eIGYproposalsuitedtheadministration'sneedsperfectly:a highlyvisible,international event, conducted solely for the advancement of science. Accordingly, on July 29, 1955, the White House announced that President Eisenhower had approved plans for a series of "small unmanned earth-circling satellites" to be launched during the International Geophysical year. In view of what is now known about the administration's motives, the language of the official announcement comes off as rather heavy-handed: The President expressed personal gratification that the American program will provide scientists from all nations with this important and unique opportunity for the advancement of science. 48 Using the IGY as a cover had one added--and, for Eisenhower officials, a terribly important--benefit. Since no nation had ever placed a satellite into orbit before, the issue of territorial rights in space had never even been discussed, much less resolved though Chapter3:17 internationaal greemenAt.stheirreactiontothe"openskies"proposal(andlatertotheU-2 overflights)makesclear,theUSSRwasadamantlyopposedtoanyactivitythatitregarded asencroachinguponitsterritorialsovereigntyS. omeU.S.officialsfearedthatif theworld's firstsatellitecouldevenberemotelyperceivedasrepresentinganysortofmilitarythreat,the SovietUnionwouldseektoasserstomeformofsovereigntyclaimoveritsorbitalspace. Sucharestrictionwould,tosaytheleast,seriouslyunderminethereconnaissancseatellite program. If, ontheotherhand,thefirstobjectinspacewasmerelyascientificinstrument-- betterstill,ifit waspartofaninternationapl rogram--suchareactionwasmuchlesslikely. A satellitelaunchedundertheauspicesoftheInternationaGl eophysicaYlearcould thereforehelpestablishanimportantlegalprecedengtoverningfuturespaceactivities.A classified1955NationalSecurityCouncilreport,labeledNSC5520,notedthat"[t]heIGY providesanexcellentopportunitytomeshascientificsatelliteprogramwiththecooperative world-widegeophysicaolbservationaplrogram"soasto,amongotherthings,"providea testfortheprincipleof'FreedomofSpace.'"Thereportadvisedthatthe"U.S.should emphasizethepeacefulpurposesofthelaunchingofsuchasatellite,"andcautionedthatthe launchshouldnot"involveanyactionswhichimplyarequiremenftorpriorconsenbtyany nationoverwhichthesatellitemightpassinitsorbit.''49 Tobesure,suchasatellitewouldbeconducting"realscience."NSC5520,for examplel,istsanumberoflegitimatescientificobjectivesforsuchadevice,suchas providingmoreaccuratedataonthedensityandpressureoftheupperatmosphereand informationontheioncontentoftheionosphere5.°Theadministrationh,owever,appearsto haveregardedthisaslittlemorethanabonus.Discussionofthe"freedomofspace"issuein Chapter3:18 thedocumenftarexceedsthatdevotedtothescienceinvolved5._It is also highly questionable whether the frugal Eisenhower would have approved the project on the basis of its scientific merits alone, particularly after the costs soared from an estimated $20 million (according to NSC 5520) to nearly $110 million (more than twice the budget of the entire National Science Foundation) by mid-1957. 52Clearly, this was no ordinary, run-of-the-mill basic science program. In other words, it was not just the WS-117L that was covered by the intelligence definition of space policy. Although presented to the wodd as a civilian, scientific enterprise, the IGY satellite was regarded by the White House primarily as part (albeit an important one) of its space reconnaissance program. This, in turn, meant that (unknown to virtually all of its participants) decisions on the civilian program's development were to be evaluated largely, if not exclusively, according to how they would affect the "main" project, the WS-117L. This fact 53sheds a great deal of light upon Eisenhower's approach to the early U.S. space program, which, as will be seen below and in the next chapter, was soon to come in for some very heavy criticism. Participation For years after the U.S. had "lost" the "race" to launch the first satellite to the Soviet Union--and particularly following the American launch failure a few months later (see next chapter)--the Eisenhower administration would be roundly condemned for (among other things) not selecting Wernher von Braun to head the IGY program. Subsequent historical discussions would take it for granted that the selection of Naval Research Laboratory was simply wrong (if not an outright "disaster"), a result of politics and inter-service bickering. 54 Even Homer Stewart (from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory), the chair of the committee that Chapter3:19 madetheselectionc,alledit"arealboner'.'55Understandinghowtheadministrationdefined spacepolicy(suchasit was),however,makesitclearthatthedecision--althoughcertainly opentoquestion---didfollow acertainlogic. Inthesummerof 1955,Assistant Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles established an advisory committee (chaired by Stewart) to recommend which of the many satellite proposals to select for the IGY. 56There were two major contenders: Project Orbiter, from von Braun's team in Huntsville, which would use a modified version of the Army's Redstone rocket for a launch vehicle; and Project Vanguard, from the Naval Research Laboratory, 57which would launch with an upgraded Viking sounding rocket. 58 The NRL proposal boasted a more sophisticated satellite and better tracking facilities, but a number of other factors seemed to favor the Huntsville group. The Viking was still in the experimental stage, far behind the Redstone in development, meaning that von Braun stood a far better chance of launching sooner (in fact, he would later tell the U.S. Senate that he could have had a satellite in orbit as early as t956, a full year before Sputnik59). In addition, the Army team, which consisted of a number of German scientists and engineers from Peenemtinde, had more experience than did the Navy group. Finally, thanks to his relentless advocacy of space in the popular media, von Braun himself had become America's most well-known (and most effective) spokesman on behalf of space issues. It is important to remember, however, that in 1955 the administration's top priority was the spy satellite. The primary purpose of the civilian satellite was not just to conduct scientific research, but rather to convey a benign, non-threatening image of the U.S. program, and to help establish a principle of "freedom in space." The civil project would Chapter3:20 thereforehavetoberunbyanorganizationasfarremovedfromtheactivemilitaryas possibleT. his(stillsecret)requiremenetffectivelydoomedProjectOrbiter.Notonlywas yonBraunworkingdirectlyfortheU.S.Army,buttheRedstonerocketheproposedtouse asalaunchvehiclewasalsoslatedtoserveasthenation'sfirstICBM. TheNRLwas,ofcoursea, Navyfacility,andhadbeenfromtimetotimedirectly involvedwiththedevelopmenotfmilitarytechnologies(ithad,forexamplec,onducted someoftheearliestexperimentsinnuclearpropulsion6°)E.venso,itdidconducta great deal of basic scientific research, and the Viking rocket it was developing had no military application whatsoever. Thus, the administration stood a much better chance of achieving its larger foreign policy goals with Vanguard than with Orbiter. Von Braun (and others) may have been "appalled" at the decision, 61but it did conform perfectly to the prevailing, if largely unknown, policy definition. Relevant Information As with its selection of the NRL, the administration would also later be criticized for the (allegedly) slow pace of the satellite program, and particularly for "ignoring" evidence that the Soviets were on the verge of a launch of their own. For more than four years prior to the launch of Sputnik I in 1957, the Eisenhower Administration had received repeated warnings about the USSR satellite program. A 1953 report (originally requested by President Truman) by physicist Aristid V. Grosse was one of the first official documents to sound the alarm: If the Soviet Union should accomplish this [orbiting a satellite] ahead of us it would be a serious blow to the Chapter 3:21 technicalandengineeringprestigeof America the world over. It would be used by Soviet propaganda for all it is worth. 62 The "blow to U.S. prestige" phrase also appears in von Braun's 1955 satellite proposal, although he did not mention the USSR by name (referring instead to "some other nation" that might reach space first). 63 Similar warnings were even sounded within the Eisenhower administration. The NSC 5520 document actually goes into considerable detail about the consequences of the Soviet Union becoming the first nation in space: Considerable prestige and psychological benefits will accrue to the nation which first is successful in launching a satellite. The inference of such a demonstration of advanced technology and its unmistakable relationship to inter- continental ballistic missile technology might have important repercussions on the political determination of free world countries to resist Communist threats, especially if the USSR were to be the first to establish a satellite. 64 This view was endorsed by a memorandum attached to the NSC report by presidential assistant Nelson Rockefeller. In fact, Rockefeller may well have been-- probably unwittingly--the first public official to speak of a "space race": the costly consequences of allowing the Russian initiatives to outrun ours through an achievement that will symbolize scientific and technological advancement to peoples Chapter3:22 everywhereT.hestakeofprestigethatisinvolvedmakesthis aracethatwecannotafford to lose. 65 In July 1957, three months before the Russian launch, CIA Director Allen Dulles informed Donald Quarles, the Deputy Director of Defense, that the President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences had bragged that "literally in the next few months, the earth will get its second satellite." Dulles' memo also presented the intelligence community's assessment that "for psychological and prestige factors, the USSR would endeavor to be first in launching a satellite. ''66 Finally, the Soviet missile and launch facilities in Central Asia had been under surveillance by U-2 spy planes since 1956. These missions had given U.S. officials fairly reliable data about the status of the Russian satellite program (as well its progress toward developing a working ICBM), including a number of photographs of the SS-6 rocket, the booster that would launch the first Sputnik. 67In short, as almost all historians now agree, Eisenhower may have been shocked at the public reaction to Sputnik (see next chapter), but he was not particularly surprised by the launch itself. 68 As already noted, many critics charged that the administration had "ignored" Soviet space activities. Later assessments of 1950s space policy, which are generally more favorable to the president, are often still at least mildly critical of his "failure to appreciate" the psychological impact of the Soviet achievement, a view which even extends to some senior Eisenhower officials, such as James Killian and Richard Nixon. 69 One author states categorically that the administration's neglect was "almost surely generational.'7° Chapter3:23 ViewingtheU.S.satelliteprogramintermsofhowitwasdefinedbyofficialsat thetime,however,helpstoplacethesepresumed"failings" inasomewhatlargercontext. Chapter2notedthatthemannerinwhichapublicissueisdefineddetermineswhich sourcesandtypesof informationpolicymakerswill regardasrelevant.Facts, observationsp,redictions,andsoonthatfall outsidetheaccepteddefinition--evenif they areaccurate--tendtobeignored.Ofcourse,thelineseparatingwhatisrelevantand irrelevantmaynotalwaysbeperfectlyclear.It iscertainlypossibletoimaginecasesin which"marginal"informationisintroducedintoofficials' deliberations,even acknowledgedanddiscussedb,utultimatelyplaysnosubstantiveroleinthefinal decision. Thisseemstohavebeenthecasewiththe"racing"aspectsoftheU.S.satellite program,Thesolepurposeofthemilitary portionoftheprojectwastodevelopand deployaworkingsurveillancesatellitesystem.Theprimarygoalofthescientific programwastoaidthemilitary programbyhelpingtoestablishaninternationallegal principle.Thequestionofwhichcountrywas"first intospace"hadverylittle bearingon eitheroftheseobjectives,exceptinsofarasthecountryinvolvedlaunchedthe"right"- i.e.,non-threatening--kindofsatellite.Unfortunately,thisattitudewasrestrictedtothose few officialswhohadfull informationabouttheU.S.program,andwerethusprivy tothe "official" definition.ThevastmajorityofAmericanswerecompletelyunawareoftheir government'sstrategy,andwouldquicklydevelopaverydifferentviewastowhatwas happeningin space. Chapter3:24 CONCLUSION Assessments of Eisenhower's presidency in general--and his space policies in particular--have changed substantially over the years. As will be seen in more detail in the next chapter, political opponents at the time charged that the president was "disengaged" and "out of touch," or with being more interested in saving money than in defending the country. More recent accounts of the Eisenhower years, however, tend to be somewhat more charitable, 71particularly with regard to his handling of Sputnik. Although, as stated earlier, he is still widely regarded as having been "wrong" not to anticipate the psychological fallout of the Soviet satellite, 72the president is now generally seen as having been "right" in telling the nation not to panic, and in trusting that America's overall scientific, industrial, and economic establishment was far superior to that of the USSR. The problem definition perspective, however, presents yet another view of these events. As was also noted earlier, the president's apparent inattention to the psychological aspects of Sputnik was a result of the way he and his advisors were conceptualizing the space "problem." Future chapters will show that this would not be the last time such a thing occurred. Nevertheless, and even granting the strategic value of reconnaissance satellites, there is some reason to question the president's selection of this particular definition in the first place. Although he would eventually concede the practical benefits of space in communications and weather prediction (and was quick to extol their virtues when the U.S. program began to produce in these areas73), he apparently did not see them during the 1955-7 period. Instead, he seemed to have regarded the money devoted to the space programs--equated with spending on scientific research and the military--as a sort Chapter3:25 of"necessaryevil" ratherthanasaninvestmentinapotentiallyvaluablesetof technologies. Thus,whileEisenhowermaydeservecreditfor "beingrightaboutSputnik," he can still be faulted for failing to appreciate the more general benefits of space technology. In other words, it can be said that the president made the mistake of defining the space policy "problem" much too narrowly. It was a mistake that would ultimately prove very costly for him personally, and for the country. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3 For an account of early rocket research, see Roger Launius, "Prelude to the Space Age" in John M. Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume I: Organizing for Exploration. Washington: NASA, 1995, pp. 1-21; Howard E. McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997, chapter 1;Eugene M. Emme (ed), The History of Rocket Technology. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964; David Baker, The Rocket: The History and Development of Rocket and Missile Technology. New York: Crown Books, 1978; Frank H. Winter, Rockets into Space. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. z For more on the authors and the works themselves, see John Clute and Peter Nichols, The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. The Hale story is reprinted in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume L pp. 23-55. Chapter3:26 3See(amongmanyothers)RichardHutton,The Cosmic Chase. New York: Mentor, 1981, chapter 2; Tom Crouch, '"To Fly to the Moon': Cosmic Voyaging in Fact and Fiction from Lucian to Sputnik" in Eugene M. Emme (ed), Science Fiction and Space Futures, Past and Present. San Diego: Univelt, 1982, pp. 7-26; Roger D. Launius, "Prelude to the Space Age"; and NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 1994, chapter 1; McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination, chapter 1. Recently, science fiction publishers have sought to use this link to "real world" spaceflight as a marketing technique. The cover of a reissued edition of Robert A. Heinlein's classic juvenile novel Rocket Ship Galileo (originally published in 1947), for example, proclaims that it was "the classic moon-flight novel that inspired modern astronautics." 4Frederick I. Ordway III, "Evolution of Space Fiction in Film" in Roger D. Launis (ed) History of Rocketry and Astronautics: AAS History Series, vol. 11. San Diego: American Astronautical Society, 1994, pp. 13-29. It should be noted that some of the film characters of this period were in search of personal gain. The inventor of a spaceship in the Fritz Lang classic Frau im Mond (1929), for example, hoped to find gold on the moon. In addition, while the scientist who builds a spaceship to travel to Mars in Just Imagine wants only to travel where "mankind has never been," the pilot of the ship is primarily interested in becoming "distinguished" enough to marry his true love. 5Quoted in A. A. Kosmodemjansky, "Konstantin Eduardovich Tsiolkovsky and the Present Times" in Roger D. Launis (ed) History of Rocketry and Astronautics: AAS History Series, voI. 11. San Diego: American Astronautical Society, 1994, p. 173. Goddard may well have shared these sentiments, but after the public ridicule that greeted Chapter3:27 hisearlywork(includingascathingcommentaryin theNew York Times), would have never expressed them publicly. 6Launius, "Prelude to the Space Age"; McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination, chapter x. See also Frank H. Winter, Prelude to the Space Age: The Rocket Societies, 1924-1940. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983. 7Jules Verne, From the Earth to the Moon in Five Complete Novels. New York: Gramercy Books, 1983, pp. 391-477. 8H. G. Wells, The First Men in the Moon in The Complete Science Fiction Treasury ofH. G. Wells. New York: Avenel Books, 1978, pp. 391-528. 9In fact, this feature of space travel stories continued almost into the 1950s. In Heinlein's Rocket Ship Galileo, a group of boys help an intrepid and resourceful inventor build a "cheap" single-stage spacecraft (out of a converted "mail rocket") that uses "super-heated zinc" (mercury would have been too expensive). There was, however, one exception to the non-government norm in science fiction. In 1946, a writer named Philip Klass (using the pen name William Tenn) published a story, "Alexander the Bait" in Astounding Science Fiction, which portrayed a "moon race" between space programs sponsored by governments (the Canadians win !). See William Tenn, "Alexander the Bait" reprinted in William Tenn, The Square Root of Man. New York: Del Ray, 1968, pp. 13-31 _0This partnership would eventually lead to the establishment of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in 1943. See Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program: A History of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982. Chapter3:28 _1An interestingcomparisoncanbemadeinthisregardbetweenrocketresearch andotherscientificfields.ThephysicistErnestLawrence(theinventorofthecyclotron), forexample,wasrelentlessinhispursuitof monetarysupportfromanysource.At one point,hewasabletosecureagrantfromtheNational Institute of Health, claiming-- correctly, as it turned out--that the radiation from his device could be used in treating some forms of cancer (he had determined this through experiments on his mother, which, fortunately had been overseen by his brother, a physician). See Herbert Childs, An American Genius: The Life of Ernest Orlando Lawrence. New York: Dutton, 1968; and Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modem America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 12Louis Ferleger and William Lazonick, "The Managerial Revolution and the Developmental State: The Case of U.S. Agriculture." Business and Economic History 22:2 (Winter 1993), pp. 67-98; W. D. Kay, Vicki L. Golich and Thomas E. Pinelli, "U.S. Science and Technology Policy and the Production of Federally Funded Aeronautical Research and Technology" in Thomas E. Pinelli (ed), Knowledge Diffusion in the U.S. Aircraft Industry: Perspectives, Findings, and Improvement. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1997, pp. 85-132. 13See Launius, "Prelude to the Space Age," pp. 7 and 10; and Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program. _4Not to mention the fact that much of the work on the V-2 was carried out by slave labor. Indeed, the issue of the rocket team's (particularly von Braun's) complicity in war crimes--and the possibility that American military officials covered up the fact in order to get him into the U.S.--was never fully resolved during this lifetime. See Dennis Chapter3:29 Piszkiewicz,Wernher von Braun: The Man who Sold the Moon. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, particularly chapters 1-3; and T. A. Heppenheimer, Countdown: A History of Spaceflight. New York: John Wiley, 1997, pp. 26-27. 15Quoted in Frederick I. Ordway and Mitchell R. Shapre, The Rocket Team. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979, p. 30. 16Quoted in Piszkiewicz, Wernher yon Braun, p. 27. 17Kraft Ehricke, "Extraterrestrial Imperative," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1971), p. 26 18Quoted in Piszkiewicz, Wernher von Braun, p. 33. 19See the discussion in ibid (passim); Wayne Biddle, "Science, Morality, and the V-2." New York Times (2 October 1992), p. A31; Launius, "Prelude to the Space Age," p. 12. 20It should be noted, however, that the V-2 actually was a rather inferior weapon. The guidance system, although far above anything developed to that point, was not especially accurate, and a large number of the missiles never reached their intended targets. Thus, their primary contribution to the German war effort was as a weapon of terror. See Walter Domberger, V-2: The Nazi Rocket Weapon. New York: Viking Press, 1954; and Michael Neufeld, "Hitler, the V-2, and the Battle for Priority." Journal of Military History (July 1993), pp. 511-538. 21Hutton, The Cosmic Chase, p. 24. 22Quoted in William Sims Bainbridge, The Spaceflight Revolution: A Sociological Study. New York: John Wiley, 1976, p. 67. Chapter3:30 z3Described in G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the America n Century. New York: Free Press, 1997, p. 318. z4See Heppenheimer, Countdown, p. 47. 25The quote is from Zachary, Endless Frontier, p. 316, which also suggests (p. 318) that Bush's objections may have come as much from personal obstinance as from technical reasoning. 26Not to mention smaller and lighter nuclear weapons. z7Arthur C. Clarke, "Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World- Wide Radio Coverage?" Wireless Worm (October 1945), pp. 305-308. 28ARS Space Flight Committee, "On the Utility of an Artificial Unmanned Earth Satellite: A Proposal to the National Science Foundation." Jet Propulsion 25 (February 1955), pp. 71-78, reprinted in Exploring the Unknown, Volume L pp. 281-294. 29For a discussion of how Pearl Harbor affected the U.S. intelligence community, see Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, "Introduction" in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds) Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998, especially pp. 2-3. 30Who would later serve as Eisenhower's--and the nation's--first presidential science advisor. 3_The Killian Report, "Meeting the Threat of a Surprise Attack," is discussed in James R. Killian, Jr., Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Cambridge, MA: M1T Press, 1997, pp. 72-79. See al_o Dwayne A. Day, "A Strategy For Space: Donald Quarles, the CIA, and the US Scientific Satellite Program." Spaceflight 38 (September 1996), pp. 308-312; and Chapter3:31 "A StrategyforReconnaissanceD:wightD.EisenhowerandFreedomof Space"inDay, et.al.,Eye in the Sky, pp. 119-142. 32See R. Cargill Hall, "Postwar Strategic Reconnaissance and the Genesis of CORONA" in Day, et al., Eye in the Sky, pp. 86-118; and "Origins of U.S. Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space" in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 213-229; Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975, pp. 96-97. 33Hall, "Postwar Strategic Reconnaissance and the Genesis of CORONA"; See also, Tom D. Crouch, The Eagle Aloft: Two Centuries of the Balloon in America. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983, especially pp. 644-649. 34Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., "Preliminary Designs of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship," Report No. SM-11827, 2 May 1946, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 236-244. See also J. E. Pdpp, R. M. Salter, and W. S. Wernher, et. al., "The Utility for a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance," Rand report R-217, April 1951, in ibid, pp. 245-261. 35Quoted in McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination, p. 67. 36Naturally, both the U.S. and the USSR began during the 1960s to develop anti- satellite weapons; see the discussion in chapter 7. 37One must be careful, however, not to take such a claim to far. A staunch fiscal conservative, Eisenhower was highly suspicious of what he regarded as large, costly government programs. Thus, although the satellite program was accorded a far higher priority than it had before--and higher than if it had been regarded primarily as simply a scientific program--it was still considered less important than other high-tech military Chapter3:32 programs(suchastheICBM), andhadtooperateunderstrictspendinglimits. See Logsdon,"OriginsofU.S.SpacePolicy,"p.224. 38Infact,thefirstmissionofthefirstsuccessfuslpysatellite(partofthe CORONAprogram),returnedmoredatathanalltheU-2flightscombined.SeeAlbertD. Wheelon,"CORONA:A TriumphofAmericanTechnology"inDay,etal.,Eye in the Sky, pp. 29-47; and Dwayne A. Day, "The Development and Improvement of the CORONA Satellite" in ibid., pp. 48-85 39It would later be renamed Project Corona. 40See William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security. New York: Random House, 1987, p. vii. See also the discussion in Day, et al., "Introduction," note 1. 41Ill addition, the documents related to the program were not declassified until the 1990s. See Day, et al, "Introduction." 42McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination, chapter 2. 43For more on IGY, see R. G. Fleagle, "From the International Geophysical Year to Global Change." Reviews of Geophysics 30 (1992), pp. xxx-xxx; Heppenheimer, Countdown, pp. 92-93. 44Wernher yon Braun, "A Minimum Satellite Vehicle: Based on components available from missile developments of the Army Ordinance Corps," 15 September 1954, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume L pp. 274-281; ARS Space Flight Committee, "On the Utility of an Artificial Unmanned Earth Satellite"; S. F. Singer, "Studies of a Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE)," Chapter3:33 Astronautica Acta I (1955), pp. 171-184, reprinted in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume I, pp. 314-324. 45In fact, this would not be the first time that official silence would appear conspicuous. During World War II, the sudden disappearance of any references to nuclear fission in popular books and magazines led some (although apparently not anyone in Germany or Japan) to suspect that the U.S. must have been working on an atomic bomb. See Herbert N. Forestel, Secret Science: Federal Control of Science and Technology. 46See, for example, R. Cargill Hall, "Origins of U.S. Space Policy"; Walter A. McDougall,... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. New York: Basic Books, 1985; Dwayne A. Day, "A Strategy For Space: Donald Quarles, the CIA, and the US Scientific Satellite Program." Spaceflight 38 (September 1996), pp. 308- 312; and "A Strategy for Reconnaissance: Dwight D. Eisenhower and Freedom of Space" in Day, et al., Eye in the Sky, pp. 119-142. 47Day, "A Strategy for Reconnaissance," pp. 119-120. 48White House press release, 29 July 1955, NHO, also in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume I, pp. 200-201. 49U.S. National Security Council, Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program: General Considerations, NSC 5520 (20 May 1955), copy in the NASA History Office (hereafter NHO), also in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume /, pp. 308-313. 5oNSC 5520, Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program, Annex A, "Technical Annex." This section of the report also notes, however, that these Chapter3:34 scientificobservations could also have great military value. Additional knowledge about movement through the upper atmosphere, for example, would help contribute to the ICBM program, as well as to the development of anti-missile countermeasures. 5_The document also contains numerous warnings that the IGY satellite not interfering with "other programs" (unnamed, but presumably referring to efforts like the WS- 117L). 52Memorandum from Percival Brundage, Director, Bureau of the Budget, to the President, "Project Vanguard," 30 April 1957, in John M. Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume 2: External Relationships. Washington: NASA, 1996, pp. 277-280. Significantly, this memo also indicates that a significant amount of money (over $2 million) was contributed to this "scientific" program by the Central Intelligence Agency. 53Which, as noted earlier, has only been fully understood within the past decade or so. 54See, for example, Charles Lindbergh's "Foreword" to Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History. Washington: NASA, 1970; Richard Hutton, The Cosmic Chase. New York: Mentor, 1981, chapter 3; the "disaster" characterization comes from McDougall,... the Heavens and the Earth, p. 122. 55David Halberstam, The Fifties. New York: Villard, 1993, p. 623. 56For more details about the selection process, see Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard." A History. Washington: NASA, 1970, especially pp. 41-55; and McDougall .... the Heavens and the Earth, chapter 5. 57Which would eventually become the Goddard Space Center. Chapter3:35 58The Air Force did submit what has been characterized as a "half-hearted" proposal, which does not seem to have been a serious contender. See Dwayne A. Day, "Invitation to Struggle: The History of Civilian-Military Relations in Space" in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 2, p. 342. 59This claim was almost certainly correct: the von Braun team successfully launched the first U.S. satellite, Explorer I, just 90 days after receiving approval. 60A more complete discussion can be found in Harvey M. Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. 61Halberstam, The Fift&s, p. 623. 62A.V. Grosse to Donald A. Quarles, "A Report on the Present Status of the Satellite Problem," 25 August 1953 in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume L p. 268. 63 von Braun, "A Minimum Satellite Vehicle." 64NSC 5520, Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program. 65Memorandum from Nelson A. Rockefeller to James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 17 May 1955, NSC 5520, Annex B (see Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume I, pp. 312-313). 66See, for example, the letter from Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, to Donald Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 5 July 1957, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume L p. 329. Evidently, Alexander Nesmsyanov, President of the Soviet Academy, was not at all reticent about commenting on his country's satellite program. Science magazine had reported one month earlier that he had been quoted in Pravda as stating that the USSR had essentially solved all of the technical problems related Chapter3:36 toanartificialearthsatellite.SeeJamesR.Killian,Jr.,Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, p. 2. 67William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security. New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 90-92. Apparently, the one aspect of the Soviet program that U.S. intelligence got wrong was the power of its rockets. Eisenhower later admitted to being genuinely surprised by the weight of Sputnik I (184 pounds). See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1965, p. 205. 68Burrows, Deep Black; Hall, "Origins of U.S. Space Policy"; David Callahan and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Reluctant Racer: Eisenhower and U.S. Space Policy" in Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (eds) Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1997, pp. 15-50. 69Killian, Jr., Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 10; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980, pp. 428-429. 70Halberstam, The Fifties, p. 624. 71For a review of this literature, see Steven Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship." Diplomatic History 17 (Winter 1993), pp. 97-115; and Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, The President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, chapter 27. 72For the most recent statement of this charge, see Edwin Diamond, "Sputnik." American Heritage 48:6 (October 1997), pp. 84-93. 73As he did, for example, in "The President's News Conference of January 26, 1960," Public Papers of the President: Dwight David Eisenhower, 1960, p. 127. Chapter3:37 CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION PART Ih FIRST MISSION Chapter 4 NASA: Born out of Fright 1957-1961 The twin definitions of space policy into which the Eisenhower administration had settled were utterly demolished by a dramatic series of events in late 1957 and early 1958. As some had warned (see last chapter), on October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union became the world's first space-faring nation with the successful launch of Sputnik I into earth orbit. This historic achievement was followed less than a month later by Sputnik II, which carried a living creature--a dog named Laika--into space for the first time. In addition to being space "firsts," these two satellites, weighing 184 and 1120 pounds respectively, I were far heavier than the 4 pound payload of the Navy's struggling Vanguard program. Thus, it appeared to many Americans at the time that the USSR was "ahead" not just on a timetable, but in the development of rocket technology itself, 2a belief that was only reinforced by the early problems of the (public) U.S. satellite program throughout 1957-8. These, however, were not the events--impressive and historic achievements though they were--that served to undermine the Eisenhower space policy. It was, rather, the political activity (or, as some have seen it, the lack of activity) that followed in the wake of the Soviet space exploits that--to use the vocabulary introduced in chapter 2--redefined Chapter4:2 theAmericanspaceprogram.Thischapterwill showhowtheU.S.reactionstotheSputniks and their descendants brought about a fundamental shift in space policy, and trace the consequences of that shift, the effects of which are still felt today. BACKGROUND Following up on the success of the Sputniks, the Soviet Union continued to stun observers with its even more ambitious Luna series. In January 1958, Luna I flew within 3000 miles of the moon, becoming the first human-made object to orbit the sun. On September 14, 1959 Luna H (carrying the Soviet flag) hit the moon 270 from its visible center, and the following month Luna III orbited the moon, sending back the first photos of the lunar farside. 3 Meanwhile, the U.S. program (at least the part that was known to the general public) was literally having trouble getting off the ground. On December 6, 1957, the entire country saw the much-delayed Vanguard--its true purpose now superfluous--blew up on live television during a test launch. 4 The first successful American satellite would not come until January 31, 1958, with the launch of Explorer 1, developed, ironically enough, by Wemher Von Braun and his team in Alabama. 5By the standards being set by the USSR, however, Explorer was not particularly impressive: it weighed only around 23 pounds, many times smaller than Soviet payloads. In short, even the first U.S. success seemed to underscore how far ahead the Russians were. Beginning with the announcement of the first Sputnik, President Eisenhower made a concerted effort to reassure the American public that despite their apparent "lead," the Chapter4:3 U.S.spaceprogram--aswellasAmericanscienceandtechnologyingeneral--wasona parwith,if notaheadof,thatoftheUSSR.Athisfirstpressconferenceafterthelaunch(on October9),EisenhowearssertedthattheU.S.andtheSovietUnionwerenotina"space race,"andthatRussianachievementisnthefielddidnotraisehisapprehensionasbout nationalsecurity"oneiota.''6Thefollowingmonth,hemadetwonationallytelevised speecheisnthespaceofasingleweekonthetopicofscienceandU.S.security7,which wereintendedinpartto"putthewholeaffairinperspectiv'e'8byreviewingU.S.military strengthandpresenting"a smallsampleofourscientistsa' ccomplishments("suchasan experimentanloseconesent"hundredsofmilestoouterspace[sic]andback")toshowthat thatAmericanstrength"is notstatic,butisconstantlymovingforwardwithtechnological improvemen't'.9Healsousedtheseoccasionstoannouncechangesliketheappointmenotf aPresidentiaSl cienceAdvisor(seebelow). Nodoubt,thepresidenet xpectedthatthesestatementsandpolicychangeswould putthemattertorest.Afterall,astheformerSupremeCommandeorfthewaragainsNt azi Germanyh,ecouldbecountedontoassescsorrectlyU.S.militarystrengthcomparedto thatofanypotentialadversaryM. oreover,asonewhohadbeenforcedtocontendwiththe destructivepowerofGermanrockets,hisappraisaolfSovietcapabilitiesinthisareawould, undermostcircumstancesh,avecardedagreatdealofweight,l° Finally,althoughwellinto hissecondterm,Eisenhowerhimselfremainedhighlypopular,andhadmaintaineda rapportwiththepublicthat,inthewordsofonebiographeru,suallycameacrossas"so comforting,sograndfatherlys,ocalm. TM Internal administration documents also make it quite clear that the president felt no particular anxiety about Sputnik, nor did he see any need for major changes in U.S. Chapter4:4 policy.At ameetingwith DefenseDepartmentofficialsonOctober8(fourdaysafterthe launch),Eisenhowernotedthat"tomakeasuddenshiftinourapproachnowwouldbeto belietheattitudewehavehadallalong.''lz Similarly,recentlydeclassifiedminutesof thefirstNationalSecurityCouncilmeetingafterSputnik, on October 10, 1957, record that the president himself was anticipating that top aides would soon be obliged to talk to the press, testify before Congress, "and the like," and that ...in the circumstances, he [the president] could imagine nothing more important than that anybody so involved should stand firmly by the existing earth satellite program which was, after all, adopted by the Council after due deliberation as a reasonable program. In short, we should answer inquiries by stating that we have a plan--a good plan--and that we are going to stick with it._3 On this particular issue, however, Eisenhower's displays of confidence did not have the desired effect. Instead of reassuring the public, his press conferences and speeches came off as, at best, defensive, and, at worst, in the words of Walter Lippmann, like "a tired old man who had lost touch with the springs of our national vitality. ''14 The "not one iota" comment in particular seemed to represent the attitude of one who simply did not understand what all the fuss was about. A Herblock cartoon from early 1958, for example, shows the President hiding from a Russian satellite in bed, with a sign reading, "Do Not Disturb One Iota. ''15 A 1957 Life magazine article, "Arguing the Case for Being Panicky," compared the administration's attempts to calm the public to the boasts of "Persian captains just before Alexander the Great massacred them," or the British army at Trenton during the Chapter4:5 RevolutionaryWar.16Ineffect,thepresident'sefforts,farfromcalmingtheAmerican people,actuallymademattersworse:notonlydidalargesegmenotfthegenerapl ublicstill believethattheywerefacingimminentperilfromSovietrockets,butnowmanyfeltthat therewasalackofleadershipontheissueaswell. Certainly,theseeffortswerenothelpedbysometopadministrationofficials. SecretaryofDefenseCharlesWilson(whowasintheprocessofleavingofficeatthetime ofSputnik 1) once referred to the satellite program as an effort to "get a damn orange up in the air, ''17 derided Sputnik as a "neat scientific trick," and dismissed any notion of danger from Soviet rockets by saying "nobody is going to drop anything down on you from a satellite while you're asleep, so don't worry about it." Chief of Staff Sherman Adams, who later claimed that he was following the President's desire for "calm poise," ridiculed the notion of an "outer space basketball game. ''_8 These and other statements only reinforced the view that the administration was made up of elderly men who were out of touch with the new world of rockets and missiles. _9 Not surprisingly, Democratic officials eagerly (although usually not directly) sought to encourage this view (see below). What is somewhat more unexpected, however, is the extent to which this perception was held by many prominent Republicans as well. In his memoirs, for example, Richard Nixon, then Eisenhower's Vice President, expressed some frustration with what he felt was the president's and Chief of Staff Sherman Adams' failure to grasp the importance of space technology. 2°In fact, some authors have gone so far as to suggest that a sort "generation gap" had emerged within the administration, with the "younger men," such as Nixon and U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, were better able to understand Sputnik's significance. 2j Chapter4:6 Formosthistorianst,heEisenhoweardministration'sresponsetotheearlySoviet spacefeatsrepresenttshe key turning point in the history of the U.S. space program. According to virtually every study, survey, and historical account--all of which vary widely in their overall assessment of Eisenhower, it was the president's inability to allay the public's anxieties about Sputnik that set in motion the whole chain of events that ultimately led up to the establishment of NASA. A 1990 history of the House Science and Astronautics Committee speaks of how "Congress seized the initiative [in setting space policy in 1958]" because the executive branch had "sounded an uncertain trumpet." It also notes that "[w]hile Members of Congress were calling for action.., the public was getting frustrated and infuriated by the 'Papa-Knows-Best' advice [from the Administration]." The study (which was published by the Committee itself, and therefore may be presumed to represent the "official" account) characterizes the Eisenhower Administration as "timid" and Congress as "forcefully articulate, ''z2 and argues that the president submitted the National Aeronautics and Space Act (the legislation that created NASA) only because he knew that the Congress was about to come forward with proposals of its own. 23 For their part, those with a less negative view of the administration claim that the NASA proposal represented one of the president's more adroit political moves. According to this view, faced with politically-motivated accusations and fear-mongering calls for action, not to mention the largely overblown and irrational reaction to Sputnik on the part of the general public, Eisenhower introduced legislation designed to head off what he feared would be "wilder" and more expensive proposals from other policymakers. 24While this account is somewhat more favorable in its treatment of the president, it nevertheless concludes that the new policies and government reorganization that emerged in late 1957 Chapter4:7 andearly1958weretheresultofamajorshiftintheU.S.politicalenvironmentI.t is thereforeimportanttounderstandhowandwhythatshifttookplace. THE SPUTNIK DIFFERENCE: EXTERNAL The impact of Sputnik has its roots in a number of "background" factors: the state of the Cold War, the nature of space flight, and most Americans' general beliefs about the power of science and technology (at least at that time). Any one of these factors could account for some of the part of the public's reaction. As it happens, however, Sputnik touched upon all of them at the same time. Some of these concerns have been discussed extensively elsewhere. For example, almost all histories of the period point out that the American public of the 1950s had developed an unusually strong sense of complacency. Although the decade certainly had its share of economic and social problems, including persistent pockets of poverty, continuing racial discrimination, and occasional economic instability, "never had Americans--never had any people--been so generally and spectacularly prosperous. ''25 Thus, most of the country took it for granted that, in addition to being the richest, freest, and most powerful people on earth, they were the best educated and most technologically advanced as well96 Sputnik abruptly called all of these assumptions into question. Likewise, many authors have noted that amajor element in the American reaction to Sputnik was the fact that Russia, and not their own country, had officially opened the Space Age. The event itself was seen everywhere as an act of enormous historic significance in its own fight, the fulfillment of one of humanity's most long-held aspirationsF It touched upon what Eisenhower Science Advisor James R. Killian has Chapter 4:8 called "atavistic, subtle emotions about cosmic mysteries," an "instinctive, human response to astronomical phenomena that transcend man's natural ken. ''2s At least author has suggested that these responses bordered on out-and-out superstition, a throwback to a more primitive time. 29That such a feat had been accomplished--and such deeply rooted feelings inspired--by their primary rival (and that the first, and much smaller, U.S. attempt failed so ignominiously) was a source of humiliation and shame, as well as alarm, for many Americans. For the Soviet government, the idea of opening a new era in human history fit in very well with their long-standing efforts to portray themselves as an "advanced," "revolutionary" society. Beginning with Sputnik I, the Soviet media, public statements by Russian scientists, and the pronouncements of the leadership--particularly Khrushchev-- pointed to their space achievements, and especially the fact that they were "ahead" of the U.S., as proof of the superiority of the socialist economic and political system. The official announcement of the first Sputnik, for example, concluded that "our contemporaries will witness how the freed and conscientious labor of the people of the new socialist society makes the most daring dreams of mankind a reality. ''3° A history textbook published in the USSR in 1960 cited Sputniks L II, and III, and the Luna series as "convincing proof of the great superiority of socialism over capitalism, the natural result of the development of socialist society. TM Another writer claimed that the satellites were the hallmark of a new, socialist era, much as the steam engine had signaled the "maturity of capitalism. ''32 American officials and commentators were particularly concerned that the image the Russians sought to convey--a progressive, future-oriented society that transformed itself from a relatively backward country into the world's first space power in just forty Chapter 4:9 years--would prove especially alluring to developing countries. Although there is no evidence that the Soviet space program ever played any role in causing a nation "go communist," this fear was very real for many Americans, and was frequently raised over the next decade as ajustification for an expanded space program. Soviet advances in space also raised a number of legitimate (if not entirely realistic) strategic concerns. First and foremost among these was the dramatic evidence that the USSR did indeed posses (as it had claimed a few days before the Sputnik launch) a rocket powerful enough to serve as an intercontinental ballistic missile. For the first time in its history, the United States was no longer protected from a direct military attack by its oceans. This new sense of vulnerability left many Americans deeply shaken. There are, however, a number of elements in the U.S. reaction to Sputnik that have not been examined in any depth. The first, and perhaps most important, is the unique nature of the Cold War itself. When fighting a conventional (i.e., a "hot") war, a country naturally makes use .of all of its resources: industrial capacity, research and development establishment, the talents of its population, etc. These assets, however, are usually placed in the service of--and are subordinate to--a single institution, the military. What was different about the Cold War was that virtually every political, economic, social, and cultural institution in the U.S. was itself seen to be in direct "competition" with its counterpart in the USSR. In other words, it was a "war" that was "fought" on a multitude "battlefields"--political, economic, ideological, cultural--simultaneously: What Sputnik did, in... suggesting Soviet scientific superiority, was to alter the nature of the Cold War. Where it Chapter4:10 hadpreviouslybeenamilitaryandapoliticalstrugglein whichtheUnitedStatesneedonlylendaidandcomforttoits alliesinthefrontlines,theColdWarnowbecametotal,a competitionfortheloyaltyandtrustofallpeoplesfoughtout in allareasofsocialachievementin, whichsciencetextbooks andracialharmonywereasmuchtoolsofforeignpolicyas missilesandspies3.3 Eisenhowerhimselfsummedupthesituationratherneatlyinhis1958StateoftheUnion Message: ...whatmakestheSovietthreatuniqueinhistoryisitsall- inclusivenessE.veryareaofhumanactivityispressedinto serviceasaweaponofexpansionT.rade,economic developmentm, ilitarypower,arts,sciencee,ducationt,he wholeworldofideas--alal reharnessetdothissamechariot ofexpansion3.4 A similar point was made a few months later by Congressman Overton Brooks during floor debate on the National Aeronautics and Space Act: The cold war.., is entering a new phase--or at least a new dimension is being added to it. The major arena in the new, if deceptively peaceful, form of Soviet competition is that of science and technology. ...there is in these times a complete blurring between military and civilian consideration. The conflict between nations is a conflict of the total peoples of those nations, not merely of their armies or their capacity for production. 35 Chapter4:11 Inshort,theColdWarwasa"conflict"betweenentiresystems, with each side seeking to "demonstrate" that some aspect of its educational system, its economy, its artistic establishment--and by implication, its society overall--was superior to that of its opponent. Similarly, an adversary's defect in any of these (or countless other) areas was also flaunted widely because of what it "said" about that country. Both sides considered these portrayals to be especially important for the developing nations of the Third World, which, its was believed, were seeking a "role model" in one of the superpowers. It is therefore hardly surprising that throughout the Cold War period many different types of actions and events--particularly those that invited a direct comparison between the two countries, or which lent themselves to the ongoing propaganda campaign---often acquired a significance well beyond the intrinsic value of the activity itself. Only under such conditions, for example, could a classical musician---even one as talented as Van Clibum--be labeled a "hero" in the American popular press, 36or have his victory in an international music competition (in this case the 1958 Tchaikovsky Competition in Moscow) make front page headlines. 37Similar sentiments were expressed years later at the 1980 Winter Olympics when, at the height of the Iranian hostage crisis and the early stages of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. hockey team beat the USSR in the final game. Americans briefly took a greater interest in chess after Bobby Fisher defeated the Soviet champion, Boris Spassky, in 1971 in Reykjav_. It should also be noted that the importance of these and many such other events has very little, if anything, to do with any practical applications or material benefits. Even the most ardent supporters of Clibum, Fisher, or the U.S. Olympic team would be hard-pressed Chapter4:12 todescribeexactlyhow their victories advanced U.S. interests in any concrete or measurable way. Nevertheless, "winning" at these activities seemed very important-- indeed, historic--at the time. This view would later infuriate critics of the "moon race" of the 1960s, and while the circumstances may have been very different--no one would have advocated a billion dollar program to train classical pianists--the impulse for winning a largely symbolic race clearly had its roots in Cold War competition of the 1950s. Although much has been said of the fear inspired by Soviet ICBMs, there has been relatively little discussion of the general attitudes of most Americans toward science and technology in the 1950s. The rapid pace of scientific discoveries and technological advances beginning in the latter half of the 19th century had fostered in most Americans an almost mystical belief in the power of science and technology. 38 Time and again--indeed, within the living memory of many U.S. citizens of 1957--new technologies (developed increasingly, it had seemed, in the United States) had produced drastic changes in the way people lived, worked, and (unfortunately) fought wars. A commonly used plot device in novels, stories, and movies (particularly in works of science fiction) is the hero who overcomes hopeless odds (often at the last possible moment) by making use of some unexpected new weapon, technique, or device. The Sputniks, combined with the Vanguard failure, may have frightened many Americans into believing that the "magic wand" now belonged to the other side: the Soviet Union had access to a revolutionary, exotic, and potentially very powerful new technology that was not yet available to the U.S. If most of the public, like the Eisenhower Administration, dismissed Khrushchev's claim that Sputnik had made the Chapter4:13 entireAmericanbomberfleetobsolete3,9thetauntneverthelesms ayhavetouchedupon adeep-seatefdearabouttheability ofnewtechnologiestodojustthat. Thus,althoughthepresidenat ndhisadvisorshadexplicitlyrejectedtheideaofa "race"withtheUSSR,manyAmericans(includingalargenumberofpublicofficials outsidetheadministrationw) ereconcernedenoughabouttheapparenSt ovietmasteryof thisnewtechnologytocallfortheU.S.to"comefrombehind"inorderto"dominate,""be firstin," or"betheleaderof" spaceflightF.ormostofthenextdecadei,twouldbecome difficulttofindanydiscussionoftheU.S.spaceprogramthatdidnot--at leastimplicitly-- drawsomecomparisonwiththeSovietUnion.EvenPresidenEt isenhower--whowould continuetosaythatsuch"competition"was"meaningless"4°--woulbdeforced,when askeddirectly,touse"racing"metaphorssuchasin,"ourscientistsandserviceshavedone anextraordinarjyobincatching up as fast as they can. ''41 This type of rhetoric would become increasingly common in the years ahead. THE SPUTNIK DIFFERENCE: INTERNAL (THE POWER OF DEFINITIONS) The preceding chapter noted that even authors who seem generally supportive of the Administration's approach to space sometimes fault Eisenhower for "not fully appreciating" the psychological impact of the Soviet satellite, 4zor the propaganda value of "being first" in space. Once again, such claims, at least as they are usually stated, suggest a personal failing on the part of the president. An alternative, and potentially more powerful, explanation can be found by returning to the earlier discussion of problem definitions. Chapter4:14 By 1957,theEisenhoweradministrationnotonlyhadafullydevelopedsatellite programunderway(albeitbehindschedule)b,ut----drawinugpontheconceptsfromchapter two---itseemsfairtosaythatithadawell-articulateddefinitionofspacepolicyinplaceas well.Astheadministrationsawit,the"problem"inspacewas(1)designing reconnaissancveehicles,and(2)establishingtheproperprecedentasndinterpretationsin internationallawthatwouldpermittheiruse. Moreover,asalsoseeninthelastchaptert,hisdefinitionofspacepolicydidnot(at leastuntillate1957)attachanyparticularimportancetobeingthe"first" nationintospace. It isnotsurprising,thereforet,hatEisenhower'sprimary--indeed,only---concernupon hearingofSputnik was its possible military potential, or if it indicated that the USSR was ahead of the U.S. in developing satellite surveillance technology. At the October 11 NSC meeting referred to earlier, the only question asked by the president personally was about whether Sputnik was capable of taking photographs. 43It should be noted that this was the only occasion, public or private, in which he expressed any apprehension over Soviet space capabilities (and even then it was not much). Meeting with DOD officials three days earlier, Eisenhower inquired into the status of the Air Force reconnaissance program, but asked very few questions about the Russian satellite. 44Indeed, the military intelligence definition of space policy was so deeply entrenched within the administration that Air Force Secretary Donald Quarles actually argued in both meetings that the USSR had "done us a good turn, unintentionally" by establishing the concept of freedom of international space. In short, the administration had conceptualized space policy in such a way that "responding" to Sputnik, if it had even occurred to any of the participants at all, would have seemed unnecessary and illogical. Chapter4:15 Inaddition,thefactthatanintelligence-gatherinpgrogramnecessariliynvolves veryfewpeoplemeantthatwhilesomeadministrationofficials and government scientists were aware of the Russian government's space program, the news of Sputnik caught the vast bulk of government officials (especially members of Congress), and virtually all of general public, completely by surprise. Having not been privy to (or even aware of) the president's definition, they had been left to interpret these events on their own. As might be expected, given the fears and concerns described above, most chose to define what was for them a new issue as a matter of national security. This, in turn, had the effect of not only broadening the space program's political base, but also of elevating its political status. To those coming to the issue for the first time, the Eisenhower program--only a portion of which was publicly known--looked paltry and underfunded. The 1955 decision not to assign the satellite project to Von Braun's team at Huntsville seemed particularly inexplicable (especially after their Explorer beat Vanguard into orbit by two months despite the latter's long head start). These new entrants into U.S. space policymaking, however, actually represent a variety of interests and ambitions. As chapter two pointed out, individuals, organizations, and institutions can all pursue a number of goals simultaneously. Thus, it is useful to examine the priorities (besides making the U.S. "first" in space) and incentives of some of these participants in detail. Scientific and Technical Interests The preceding chapter noted that many scientific agencies and institutions had been calling for a greater U.S. commitment to space. Rising public and official concern Chapter4:16 overSputnik gave these groups another chance to press their case, under circumstances that were, from their point of view, far more favorable. One of the foremost of these advocates was Wernher Von Braun. His earlier warnings about national prestige and the possible military advantages to be gained from space 45now found a new, more attentive audience. Upon hearing about the Soviet launch, Von Braun began another major effort to get approval for a satellite launch using the Redstone. Von Braun was by no means the only engineer making such appeals, nor was rocketry the only field to benefit from Sputnik-inspired anxiety. For U.S. scientists, the late 1950s began what a former Chairman of the House Science Committee has called the "free ride on the Cold War. ''46 NSF Director Alan Waterman, for example, dropped a none-too- subtle hint at a House Appropriations Subcommittee in 1959 when he remarked that "all our scientists who go to Russia come back saying that the government is providing them [Soviet scientists] with the very best facilities. ''47 Drawing alarming comparisons with the USSR became commonplace in virtually all scientific fields. The original spur behind the American program to develop nuclear fusion energy was the fear that the Soviets might reach it first. 4sSimilarly, up until the late 1980s, high energy physicists generally 49could count on political support for ever-larger particle accelerators by pointing to Soviet efforts in the field. 5° Thus, Sputnik established the primary political strategy that would be followed by large numbers of American scientists, in some cases literally up until the collapse of the USSR. In one of the pioneering books on U.S. science policy, former Science magazine editor Daniel S. Greenberg concluded: Chapter4:17 Wavingtheredflagtostimulatetheappropriationsoffunds forresearchandeducationcomprisesoneoftheless admirablepartsofthepostwarrelationshipbetweenscience andgovernmentT.hepracticecanbeexplainedi,f not justified,onthegroundsthat,byandlarge,Congressandthe Executiveweremoreinclinedtorespondthantoinnovate, andthataRedscarewastheonlyavailab!edevicewith whichsciencecouldgetthegovernment'sattention5._ TheDemocraticParty Although they had recaptured control of Congress from the Republicans in 1954, the Democratic Party had lost both the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections by very wide margins (and had just barely held the White House in 1948). Throughout much of the late 1940s and early 1950s, Democrats faced two major problems. First, the GOP had generally been successful in painting the Democrats as "soft" on Communism and "weak" on national defense. 52Second, the party had a great deal of difficulty keeping its various factions united, particularly as conflicts over racial segregation intensified during the mid- to late 1950s. Not surprisingly, then, they had been unable to make a dent in the President's popularity, which in some polls had been running at nearly 80 percent. 53 Sputnik seemed to provide a golden opportunity. For the first time in nearly a decade, Democrats could now charge Republicans with "failing to meet the Communist challenge." As a new issue that transcended factional divisions, it could serve as a sort of unifying force. It gave the party a way to criticize Eisenhower that did not look petty or partisan, particularly after the Vanguard launch failure (as suggested earlier, the Democrats were unwittingly aided in this effort by the statements of some of the Chapter 4:18 president's own advisors). Finally, because it turned space into a major security issue, it provided the means for the Democratic-controlled Congress, where most of the party's most prominent members served, to become involved in criticizing--and settingI policy. The U.S. Congress As a general rule, Representatives and Senators do not concem themselves with the day-to-day operations of basic research projects, and most military reconnaissance activity is conducted in near, if not total, secrecy. Thus, neither of the administration's initial, pre-Sputnik definitions of space policy lent themselves readily to any sort of Congressional involvement. On the other hand, a program seen as having implications for the country's very survival would naturally be of great concem to all members of Congress. It is therefore hardly surprising (particularly when combined with the political opportunities described above)that redefining the space program as a matter of immediate national urgency would lead to a greatly expanded role for the legislative branch. Both houses of Congress lost little time in creating new committees devoted to space and related activities. The House Committee on Science and Astronautics was established on July 21, 1958, and the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences was created on July 24 (it was abolished in a Senate committee reorganization in 1977, and its functions transferred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation). 54The House committee in particular developed a reputation for being Chapter4:19 especiallyaggressiveonspacematters,andwouldattimesprovetobesomethingof a headacheforthepresidentandNASA. Lyndon Baines Johnson These last two institutions, the Democratic Party and the U.S. Congress come together in one politician, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson. As a politician who had first come to Washington during the New Deal, Johnson would not have been as concerned as was Eisenhower about government growth, particularly when it came to dealing with a major public problem. That Johnson saw the Sputniks as such a problem (if not an opportunity--see below) there is no doubt. In his memoirs, he wrote of Sputniks I and H producing feelings of shock, apprehension, bewilderment, and a sense of "frustration, bordering on desperation." The fears are familiar: the Soviets might be "ahead" technologically, American prestige had taken a severe blow, Third World nations might begin to see the USSR as the "wave of the future. ''55 Johnson wasted no time in acting on these feelings. On the evening of October 4, he called a number his Senate colleagues, as well as the staff of the Subcommittee on Preparedness (of which he was Chair) from his ranch in Texas. 56 Clearly, it was not lost on the Senator that was much to be gained--both to the Democratic Party and to himself personally--from keeping the Sputniks in the public eye. A memo on political strategy from long-time Johnson aide George Reedy, dated October 17 (i.e., less than two weeks after Sputnik 1), noted that the Russian satellite was the perfect issue for the Democrats. It called the country's current leadership into question, it involved "not only" national defense, but also a whole range of scientific achievements (including Chapter4:20 thepossibleconquestoftheuniverseitself[sic])," and, best of all, it could be handled in a "completely and sincerely non-political" fashion: "[i]f the issue has merit, the politics will take care of themselves." For Johnson personally, Reedy noted in a cover letter that the issue, "if properly handled," would not only "blast the Republicans out of the water, [and] unify the Democratic Party," but would also "elect you President. ''57 The Reedy memo, especially the "elect you President" phrase, has been cited by some authors as evidence that Johnson's (and, by implication, that of all Democrats) efforts on behalf of the space program were largely, if not exclusively, motivated by partisan political interest. 58That particular document, however, is not in and of itself conclusive. After all, the concerns expressed were not very far out of line with those of the public at large. Moreover, most participants were making a strong effort at least to appear non- political. The memo itself states that "any effort to inject politics into such an inquiry [of the missile and satellite program] would merely lead to a "you're another' type of shouting match.... ''59 In addition, in a meeting on October 9, President Eisenhower warned Johnson that if the Democrats tried to turn the space program into a partisan matter, he would blame the Truman Administration for failing to commit any funds to the U.S. missile program before 1950 (and only small amounts after that). 6° The fact that the Sputniks and the Vanguard failure had both occurred on Eisenhower's watch probably made any effort to place blame on an Administration that had left office six years earlier a hollow one. Nevertheless, Johnson and others went to great lengths to stress that their concerns were non-partisan. During his opening statement at the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings on November 25, he noted that Chapter 4:21 Ourgoalistofindout what is to be done. We will not reach that goal by wandering up any blind alleys of partisanship .... There were no Republicans or Democrats in this country on the day after Pearl Harbor .... There were just Americans anxious to roll up their sleeves, to close ranks, and to wade into the enemy. 61 Of course, from the Democrats' point of view, the beauty of the Sputnik issue was that it was not necessary to raise politics or partisanship: simply keeping the issue before the public--and keeping that public in a jittery mood--was enough. In the conclusion to his memo, for example, after calling once again for an inquiry "definitely without partisanship," Reedy notes that There is, of course, a partisan advantage to turning the attention of the American people to such an issue. But it is an advantage that would accrue to the American people as well. This may be one of those moments in history when good politics and statesmanship are as close to each other as a hand in a glove. 62 This is by no means to suggest, however, that Johnson had no political or personal aims. It is clear--from evidence in addition to the Reedy memo---that he and his staff recognized early on the potential of Sputnik to unify the often contentious Democratic Party (and do so in a way that benefited the Senator personally). A memorandum from another staffer, James Rowe, dated 15 November (less than two weeks before the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings), urged Johnson to: Chapter4:22 ...telephoneafairly largenumberofpeoplein the DemocraticPartyaskingfortheirviewsonwhatyou shoulddo.I donotthinkthatit reallymattersverymuch whattheytellyou--althoughitis alwayspossiblesomeone mightcomeupwith agoodidea--butI dothinktheywill bepleasedandcooperativeif youconsultthembeforehand. I woldcertainlySuggesHt arryTruman,Adlai Stevenson, AverellHarriman,andothers.Personally,I wouldtakethe DemocraticAdvisoryCommitteelistandgorightthrough it, evenincludingsomeofthemoreobscurenational committeemen....63 WithregardtoJohnson'sownambitions,itdidattimesappearasthoughhewas racingagainsthisDemocraticcolleaguesasmuchastheRussiansF. orexample,in preparationfortheSenatehearingsontheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAct(see below),scheduledtobeginonApril 16,1958,Johnsonaidesbecameveryconcerned whenHouseMajorityLeaderJohnMcCormickannouncedplanstobeginhis hearings one day earlier, on April 15, with Von Braun as his first witness. "The implications of this are clear," wrote the aide, "McCormick is seizing the ball and is going to run with it. I should think that the Senator would not be overjoyed by this. ''64 Perhaps even more telling is a speech delivered to the Democratic Conference on January 7, 1958, in which the Senator made a few rather odd claims about what the Soviet lead in space might mean: Control of space means control of the world, far more certainly, far more totally than any control that has ever or Chapter4:23 couldeverbeachievedbyweaponso, rbytroopsof occupation. Fromspacet,hemastersofinfinitywouldhavethepowerto controltheearth'sweather,tocausedrouth[sic]andflood,to changethetidesandraisethelevelsofthesea,todivertthe gulfstreamandchangetemperateclimatestofrigid.65 TomakethesesortofclaimsimmediatelyafterSputnik would have been one thing; as noted earlier, general knowledge about rocketry and astronautics was relatively low at the time. This speech, however, took place after nearly two months of hearings, with, in the Senator's words, "34 witnesses, 3,000 pages of transcript, 150 to 200 staff interviews with individuals concerned with our missile and satellite programs, and searching questionnaires sent to industrial organizations, leading scientists and engineers, and leading educators. ''66 The only possible explanation for such hyperbole is the fact that Johnson's personal ambitions required a certain measure of public apprehension. As future chapters will show, this would not be the last time that he would attempt to use the space program in this fashion. THE FOUNDING OF NASA As chapter two suggested, a major political upheaval or an important new policy initiative can both spark a move for government reorganization. As this discussion has suggested, the events surrounding the Sputniks provided both. Following in the wake of the Soviet satellites were many, many proposals for major administrative and Chapter4:24 organizationaclhange,arguablythemostextensiveevertotakeplaceintheU.S.during peacetimeO. bviously,thecreationof NASA was one of the more important and far- reaching of these. 67In order to appreciate fully the atmosphere into which the U.S. first space agency was born, however, as well as to understand better the nature of its original mission, it is necessary to 100k at the whole range of Sputnik-inspired reorganization: • Advocates had been trying for years to obtain federal funding for education, particularly in the sciences. Only Sputnik was able to overcome the reluctance of some members of Congress to move in this direction. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 brought the federal govemment into the public education forum to a far greater degree than ever before. 68 • In the Executive Branch, President Eisenhower established a President's Science Advisory Council (PSAC). An organization of this type had actually been created some years before, but was attached to the military. Eisenhower's move served to place scientific expertise--and scientists' interests---directly within the White House itself. He appointed James Killian as the first Presidential Science Advisor. 69 • On February 8, the Secretary of Defense, acting on instructions from Eisenhower, announced the creation within DOD of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to direct its rocket and space programs. It would later be renamed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and acquire responsibility for all long-range defense-related R&D. 7° Chapter4:25 • Federalspendingonresearchanddevelopmentincreasedmarkedlyinthewakeof Sputnik. At the National Science Foundation, for example, outlays for research and related activities more than doubled, rising from $44.4 million in FY 1956 to $102.1 million in FY 1958. 71Between 1955 and 1960, total federal spending on R&D rose from $2.6 to $7.4 billion for non-defense agencies, and from $9.6 to $23.0 billion for DOD. 72 • As noted earlier, both Houses of Congress set up new committees devoted to space. For the House of Representatives, this was the first new standing committee created since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 reduced the number of committees from 48 to 19, and the first committee devoted to a new subject since 1892. 73 • Many other changes were proposed, but not approved. These included a joint Congressional committee along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, TMa Cabinet-level Department of Department of Science, 75and even a Department of Space. Some policymakers called for Eisenhower to appoint a "Missile Czar" to coordinate all U.S. space and missile development activities. 76 NASA's basic structure of the agency was established by a PSAC panel convened on Eisenhower's order in February 1958. This group considered a variety of organizational strategies--and listened to requests and demands from a myriad of competing interests--for managing the nation's space policy. These included turning the program over to ARPA, the Atomic Energy Commission, a totally new agency, and a reconstituted NACA. In March, the PSAC panel endorsed this last altemative, and on Chapter4:26 April 4,1958,thePresidentsenttheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceActtothe CongressA. fter muchdiscussion,debate,andamendmen(tseebelow),itwaspassedby bothHousesonJuly8andsignedbyEisenhoweronJuly29.NASA officially wentinto operationonOctober1,1958. Neverthelessi,n viewofallofthereorganizationdescribedabove,establishing NASAreallyoughttobeseenasjust onemoreelement--albeitacentralone---ofa muchlarger,ongoingprocessT. helevelandintensityoftheactivityinthemonths followingtheSputniks and Vanguard resemble nothing so much as a general mobilization. An exceedingly large share of American material and intellectual resources were now engaged in assuring that the country would remain (or, as some saw it, become once again) "first" in education, science and technology, and (at the time, most important) space. That this was to be the paramount NASA mission is made abundantly clear by Congressional debate of the Space Act itself. True to form, President Eisenhower's letter of transmittal mentions the Soviets only in passing, with the simple observation that both countries have "placed in orbit a number of earth satellites," and even that statement is weakened in the next sentence, where he notes that "it is now within the means of any technologically advanced nation to embark upon.., programs for exploring outer space." The only other reference to international competition is to quote the "preservation of the role of the United States as a leader" clause from the Act as one of the responsibilities of 77 the proposed space agency. Upon reaching Congress, however, the terms of debate shifted radically. In his opening statement as the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration Chapter4:27 beganhearingsontheSpaceActonApril 15,1958,ChairmanandHouseMajorityLeader (andfutureSpeakeroftheHouse)JohnW.McCormackdeclared: Theimmediateproblemisobvious.Weseeanothernationof greatpotentiality,militantandcompetitive,whichhas alreadymadethefirstadvancesinthemasteryofouterspace. Wecannotstandbyandwatchthisnationmakethatmastery complete7.8 OntheSenateside,LyndonJohnsonc,hairingtheSelectCommitteeonSpaceand Astronauticss,et(asalways)anevenmoredisturbingtone: Whatwedonowmayverywelldecide,inalargesensew, hat ournationistobe20yearsand50yearsand100yearsfrom nowand,ofnolesserimportanceo,urdecisionstodaycan havethegreatesitnfluenceuponwhethertheworldmoves towardamillenniumofpeaceorplungesrecklesslytoward Armageddon .79 When the Space Act reached the floor of the Congress in early June, such rhetoric continued. In his statement introducing the bill, McCormick began by noting that "[i]t is amazing what can be done in what is called outer space and what they know can be done in 5, 10, 15, or 20 years from now," but moved in his next sentence into the language of the Cold War (albeit in a convoluted way): Involved in that might be the very survival of our Nation. For example, another country that was a potential enemy of Chapter 4:28 ours or an enemy of a government of laws and not of men, in other words an enemy of the free world, a potential enemy, if it was able to get a decided advantage, that advantage might result in the destruction of the entire world or in the subjugation of the entire world to that particular nation. 8° Although he did describe some of the other specific benefits of space research-- the creation of new industries and employment opportunities, new technologies in weather forecasting, transportation, communications, and so onS_--he quickly returned to the point that: The urgency of this legislation can hardly be exaggerated. It is highlighted by the series of surprising developments the Soviet Union has already accomplished in astronautics. The United States must leapfrog these Soviet accomplishments .82 This pattern would become familiar throughout the debate over the creation of NASA: proponents arguing that the primary issue was national security (if not "national survival"), but that there were "also" other advantages to be gained from developing American space capabilities. Gordon Mcdonough of California, for example, in noting that NASA's initial budget was to be approximately $100 million, stated that: These costs.., are not small sums, and we must be fully aware that we are entering into a program--and an international competition----of great magnitude .... The costs are fully justified in any event, for reasons of national Chapter 4:29 survival.But,in addition,therewill unquestionablyflow fromthiseffortinestimableeconomicbenefits.Manyof thesecannotnowbeforeseena,nymorethan Columbus or his contemporaries could have, in 1492, estimated the world benefits that would flow from his discovery of America. 83 Similarly, Lee Metcalf of Montana stated: My discussion of the race with the Soviet Union to perfect space exploration devices has been couched essentially in terms of national survival. This is a factor which the Members should not overlook when they come to authorize this new agency and later to approve appropriations for it. I do not want to end my remarks on this note, however. It is entirely consistent for me to report to you that the real hopes of the space age lie in the field of peace and human betterment. 84 NASA's paramount role as a defender of national security was further underscored by Senate modifications to the Space Act. Lyndon Johnson proposed an amendment creating a within the Executive Office of the President a National Aeronautics and Space Council which would "coordinate" all of the nation's space activities, military and civilian, at the highest level of government. 85Members of the Council were to include the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the NASA Administrator. Chapter4:30 AsmightbeexpectedP,residenEt isenhowercontinuedtoresistthisapproachto spacepolicy.HeopposedtheSpaceCouncilproposal,forexampleb,ecausehethought (significantly)thatitwouldgrowintoanotherNationalSecurityCouncil8, 6andthatspace would"neverbethatimportant'.'87TheseobjectionsheldupfinalapprovaloftheSpace ActuntilheandJohnsonwereabletoworkoutacompromisewherebythepresident himselfwouldchairtheCouncil,therebykeepingitunderhisdirectionandcontrol. Inaddition,evenasMembersofCongresswerespeakingof"racing","catchingup with", and"beating"theUSSR,Eisenhowecrontinuedtoassertthatnosuch"competition" existed.HisstatemenutponsigningtheSpaceActmadenomentionoftheSoviets,and withonlyavaguereferenceto"furtherequippingtheUnitedStatesforleadershipinthe spaceage'.'88Duringthemeetingatwhichhewasofferedthejobofbecomingthefirst NASAAdministrator,T. KeithGlennanrecalledthatthepresidendt idnotrefertoRussian spaceactivityatall,butsimplysaidthathewanteda"sensiblew, ell-paced"space program8.9Indeed,totheendofhistermhemaintainedhisstanceagainstthespacerace, andwouldlaterexpresshisstrongdisapprovaolftheexpansionoftheprogramconducted byhissuccessor9s°. By 1958,however,thenewdefinitionofspacepolicy hadbeenfirmly establisheda,nd,withtheexceptionofEisenhowerhimself,administrationofficialshad little choice--particularlywhendealingwithCongressor attemptingtoreassurethe public--but toacceptit. AlthoughGlennanwouldconfidetohisprivatediarythat"we arenotgoingtoattempttocompetewiththeRussiansonashot-for-shotbasisin attemptstoachievespacespectacular T s M , in public settings (especially Congressional hearings) he often made use of the more "fashionable" rhetoric. Chapter4:31 AppearingatauthorizationhearingsbeforetheScienceandAstronautics Committeein 1959,forexample,Glennangavea"many-sidedanswer"tothequestion of"howwejustify theexpenditureofmillionsofdollarstoexploretheunknown."He listed(inorder)expandingscientificknowledge,applications,thecreationofnew industries,andunderstandingtheunknown."But," hethensaid,"thereisstill another andoverriding reason for our program of space exploration": I believe it is becoming increasingly obvious to the world that Russia's space activities are devoted, as are most of their activities as a nation, in large part to the furthering of communism's unswerving designs upon mankind. ...we know that the Soviet Union is in this business and that their successes thus far have been impressive. I cannot believe that they will withdraw from a race in which they hold even a slight lead. Have we any choice, as leader of the free world, but to press forward with diligence on a well- planned program for the exploration of this new environment? 92 In much the same vein, the Introduction to Outer Space, a document produced by the same PSAC panel that recommended the creation of NASA, and intended to aquatint the general public with some of the basic principles (as well as the opportunities) of space exploration, listed the primary justifications of the program as (in order): 1. "The compelling urge of man to explore and discover." 2. "National defense" Chapter 4:32 To "enhance the prestige of the United States among people of the world and create . added confidence in our scientific, technological, industrial, and military strength," 4. Scientific observation. 93 Interestingly, the possible economic benefits of space were not mentioned. Along these same lines, the first post-Sputnik statement on U.S. space policy, written in August 1958 (and originally classified) opens with the observation that: The USSR has surpassed the United States and the Free World in scientific and technological accomplishment in outer space, which have captured the imagination and admiration of the world. The USSR, if it maintains its present superiority in the exploration of outer space, will be able to use that superiority as a means of undermining the prestige and leadership of the United States and of threatening U.S. security. 94 It lists U.S. objectives in space as being the [d]evelopment and exploitation of U.S. outer space capabilities as needed to achieve U.S. scientific, military and political purposes, and to establish the U.S. as a recognized leader in this field. 95 What these "scientific, military, and political purposes" might entail is stated explicitly in an earlier draft of the policy statement: Chapter4:33 A degreeofcompetenceandalevelofachievemenitn outerspacebasicandappliedresearchandexploration whichis atleastonaparwiththatof anyothernation.... Applicationsofouterspacetechnology,researchand explorationtoachieveamilitary capabilityin outerspace sufficienttoassureover-all[sic]superiorityofU.S. offensiveanddefensivesystemsrelativetothoseofthe USSR.... WorldrecognitionoftheUnitedStatesas,attheleast,the equalofanyother nation in over-all outer space activity and as the leading advocate of the peaceful exploration of outer space. 96 In short, the transformation of space policy was now complete. The president's misgivings notwithstanding, NASA's mission--to take charge of the Cold War in space-- was firmly in place. The next step would be to develop specific programs, the "weapons" with which that "war" was to be fought. THE MISSION MADE FLESH (LITERALLY) How this new definition of space policy was to work in practice can be seen most clearly in the first major post-Sputnik program, Project Mercury. To be sure, the stated goals of the man-in-space program 97did contain some legitimate scientific objectives, such as investigating "man's performance capabilities and ability to survive in a true space environment. ''98 Nevertheless, there is an abundance of evidence attesting to the true Chapter4:34 purposeofMercury:having"lost"theracewiththeUSSRtoorbitthefirstsatellite,most participantsinspacepolicymaking(oldandnew)hadnowsettheirsightson"beating"the Sovietstothenext"milestone"inspacecompetition. Beginninginearly1958,theAir Force,Army,Navy,andNACA hadeachprepared theirman-in-spacperoposalsa,lmostallofwhichhadincommonthefactthattheycould (intheory)becarriedoutinarelativelyshortamountoftime.Indeed,mostproposals seemedquiteunapologeticaboutit(theAir Forceevenwentsofarastodesignateoneof theirproposals"ManinSpaceSoonest"99E).achreliedheavilyonoff-the-shelf technologiesr,equiredverylittle inthewayofnewtechnologicadlevelopmenta,ndwereto fly ontheonlylarge(relativelyspeakingU) .S.boosterrocketavailable,theRedstone. Glennan'sowndescriptionofProjectMercurywasthatitwould"extendthestateoftheart aslittleasnecessary. ''l°° The justification for such an approach--which was given a "highest national priority" procurement rating (a so-called "DX rating") in late 19581°l--were stated explicitly on a number of occasions, by a variety of officials. The Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee report declares that Meaningful appraisal of this Nation's man-in-space program must invariably be done in context with similar efforts underway in the USSR. The psychological impact of a Soviet "first" in this area could have tremendous effect on world opinion and play an important role in the "cold war. ''I°2 The same theme was sounded in the report of an ad-hoc panel on "man in space" assembled by Science Advisor George Kisatowsky (who replaced Killian in 1959) at Chapter4:35 Eisenhower'sdirection.Althoughitnotesthescientificbenefitsofspaceexploration,as wellthe"challenge"involved,itultimatelyclaimsthat At presentthe most compelling reason for our effort has been the international political situation which demands that we demonstrate our technological capabilities if we are to maintain our position of leadership._°3 Finally, in the Eisenhower Administration's last official statement on space, originally circulated with a National Security Council designation, but formally released as a National Aeronautics and Space Council document (which, incidentally, contains a lengthy appendix on USSR space program): To the layman, manned flight and exploration will represent the true conquest of outer space. No unmanned experiment can substitute for manned exploration in its psychological effect on the peoples of the world._°4 In other words, most officials--including some within the administration believed that if the U.S. were to succeed in placing a man in space first, it would, in effect, negate the accomplishments of the Soviet Sputniks, since these did not represent the "true conquest of space." There was, of course, some opposition to this use of the nation's space resources. Prominent scientists like Vannevar Bush (who, it will be recalled from the last chapter, had argued against the early U.S. missile program) and even Killian and Kisatowsky, who were in accord with Eisenhower's limited support for Mercury, 1°5warned against placing too much emphasis on man-in-space. _°6This period also marks the beginning of the Chapter4:36 longstandinganddeepdisagreemenbtetweensupportersof manned space flight and the space science community (see chapter 1). _07The antagonism would soon grow even stronger in the years ahead. In fact, they would lead Jerome Weisner, who would become President Kennedy's Science Advisor to recommend in 1961 (in a report prepared for the presidential transition) that Project Mercury be de-emphasized.l°8 Such misgivings, however, could not diminish the very high visibility of Project Mercury, nor the Congress' and the general public's perception of its importance. NASA's announcement of the selection of the first Mercury astronauts on April 8, 1959 turned seven test pilots into celebrities and national heroes literally overnight._°9 Clearly, the claims concerning manned space flight's "psychological impact" were proving to be correct, a fact that would later come back to haunt U.S. space planners. A CHANGE IN THE WIND? Although American interest in--and anxieties about--space remained relatively high, it appears that the political forces driving U.S. space policy expansion were beginning to ebb somewhat by the end of the 1950s. To begin with, the United States began to make its own inroads into space. Between 1958 and 1961, it successfully placed 30 spacecraft into earth orbit (albeit with 29 failures) and had sent two beyond into interplanetary space (with 10 failures), t_0While it could not yet match Soviet launching capacity in terms of thrust or payload weight, it could claim a number of solid achievements in space science and applications. Explorer I, the first U.S. satellite, discovered the Van Allen radiation belts surrounding the earth. Other such successes included the Echo I communications satellite Chapter4:37 andtheTiros weather satellite, both launched in 1960. Indeed, some observers went so far as to claim that, in terms of actual results and material retums (i.e., matters that "really counted"), the U.S. was actually "ahead" of the USSR. TM Moreover, by ihe end of the decade the launching of satellites had become a familiar enough event (although by no means routine) that some of the deeper fears associated with the Sputniks had begun to decline. Indeed, it has been suggested that the "diminishing returns" from so-called "space spectaculars" caused Khrushchev to push Soviet space technicians too hard, resulting in the launch disaster described above. _lz In short, some of the more "primeval" feelings associated with spaceflight inspired when it was brand new were now wearing off. Indeed, the tensions had receded to the point where Eisenhower was able, in his final budget submission in January 1961, to recommend a NASA appropriation of $190 million less than the agency had requested. Even more surprising was that most of the decrease was to come out of the budget for manned space flight, including Project Mercury. 113A substantial portion of this funding, however, was restored in March by the new Kennedy Administration (although, as the next chapter will discuss, there was to be some controversy over the manner in which this was done). This easing of American fears almost certainly accounts for the fact that space played almost no role in the 1960 election. TM To be sure, the status of the U.S. program was mentioned from time to time. The Democratic Party platform, for example, noted that the Republicans had allowed the Russians to "forge ahead" in space.IX5 Likewise, the Kennedy campaign's position paper on space stated that "the [Eisenhower] Administration's initial attempts to go into space on a budgetary shoestring have made it Chapter4:38 difficult tocompete....,,116andKennedyhimselfwouldnoteinhiscampaignspeeches that"ourpositioninouterspacecomparedtothecommunistposition[isnot]asstrong asit wassomeyearsago'.'1_7Thesestatementsh,owever,appeartohavebeensimply partoftheoverallDemocraticstrategytoportrayEisenhowerasold,tired,and"out of touch,"ratherthantousespaceflightitselfasanissue. Forthefirstfewmonthsofhisterm,itappearedthatPresidentKennedylargely sharedhispredecessor'vsiewthatspaceshouldnotbeguidedbyU.S.-Sovietrivalry. Theirspecificapproachesinthisregard,however,differedconsiderably.Whereas EisenhowersimplywantedAmericanspacepolicytoproceedonitsowncoursewithout regardtowhattheUSSRchosetodo,thenewpresidentactivelysoughttopromote superpowercooperation in space. His Inaugural Address, for example, called for the US and the USSR to "explore the stars together, ''__8and his first State of the Union Message, challenged the two countries to work jointly toward trying to "evoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. ''_19 Internal documents strongly suggest that the new president fully intended to put these sentiments into practice. He directed his Science Advisor Jerome Wiesner to convene a group of specialists to develop concrete proposals for joint space projects. A draft report from that panel, dated April 4, 1961, stated explicitly that The objectives are to confirm concretely the US preference for a cooperative rather than a competitive approach to space exploration, to contribute to reduction of cold war tensions by demonstrating the possibility of cooperative enterprise between the US and the USSR in a field of major public concern, and to achieve the substantive advantages Chapter4:39 ofcooperationthatinmajorprojectswouldimposemoreof astrainoneconomicandmanpowerresourcesif carriedout unilaterally._20 Whetheror nottheseeffortsrepresentedasinceredesiretocollaborate--some authorshavesuggestedthattheyweresimplyaneffortonKennedy'sparttoappear "statesmanlike"ortoputtheSovietsinabadlightl21--therewasdefinitelyalimit on howfarsuchinitiativescouldhavebeenpursued.EventhoughtheColdWarpressures ofspacehadabatedsomewhat,thebasicdefinition of space policy as the focus of U.S.- Soviet rivalry was still in place, and there was little chance that the president could move too far away from it. Indeed, Kennedy did speak frequently of space competition, sometimes even mixing such references in with his statements on cooperation. The campaign position paper referred to above, for example, opened with a lengthy comparison of the two countries' programs. In an article written during the 1960 campaign, he adopted a tone strikingly similar to that heard during the debate on the Space Act (see pp. xx-xx): Control of Space will be decided in the next decade. If the Soviets control space they can control earth, as in past centuries the nation that controlled the seas dominated the continents .... [W]e cannot run second in this vital race. To insure peace and freedom, we must be first. 122 Such rhetoric continued after he took office. In fact, almost all of his public statements on the subject--with the notable exception of his appeals for cooperation--were laced with images of "racing", "winning", and competition. 123 Chapter4:40 InasmuchasKennedy'sstatementosn the subject are contradictory (as well as at odds with internal Administration documents), it cannot be known for sure how he really felt about the space program prior to April 1961. In fact, at least one observer felt that, of all issues, he probably "knew and understood least about space. ''124 Irrespective of whatever personal feelings the incoming president had on the matter, however, it is clear that many other central officials held to the view of space policy as Cold War competition. Thus, as had happened with the Eisenhower White House, this particular conceptualization of space exploration came to dominate most Kennedy Administration discussions of policy. To take only the most prominent example, in marked contrast to Glennan, James Webb, the new NASA Administrator, frequently raised the specter of Soviet space supremacy, particularly in discussions with the president.125 At their first meeting (on March 21, 1961), Webb's presentation opened with a reference to "closing the gap caused by Russian successes," and concludes that "[w]e cannot regain the prestige we have lost without improving our present inferior booster capability, and doing it before the Russians make a major break through [sic]. ''126 For his part, Kennedy appeared fairly cautious. Although he did restore much of NASA's FY 1962 funding, the new figure was still forty percent below the agency's request. Moreover, it is clear that the president was unsure how to proceed regarding the man-in-space program. Some have speculated that he wished to take an more in-depth look at manned flight beyond Mercury, and was waiting for Vice President Johnson to take over as Chair of the National Aeronautics and Space Council to study the matter.127 Thus, as of April 1961, the Kennedy Administration appeared to have a variety of philosophies with regard to space policy. How he would have chosen among them, Chapter4:41 however,will neverbeknown.Ashappenedin 1957,externaleventswereonceagain abouttointervene. CONCLUSION Fewcasesdemonstratetheutility oftheconceptspresentedinchaptertwobetter thanthedevelopmentofU.S.spacepolicyinthelate1950s.Theanalysispresentedhere hasshownthat,despitethesteadygrowth,evolution,and(onehopes)maturationduring itsearlyyears,thefundamentalnatureofNASA--indeed oftheentirespaceprogram-- wasfirmly establishedandsetinplaceinjust ninemonths.Betweentheannouncement ofSputnik I in October 1957 and Eisenhower's signing of the National Aeronautics and Space Act the following July, the U.S. federal government's role in exploring space had been totally redefined. Despite the efforts of President Eisenhower and his senior officials to prevent it, and later of President Kennedy (perhaps) to change it, by the time NASA went into operation in October 1958, a preponderance of the nation's political leaders, and a large portion of the general public, regarded the space program predominantly in terms not just of national prestige, but of national security. All of its potential uses notwithstanding, no other way of viewing space could ever have brought about such vast and sweeping changes in government organization and policy-making. None of space technology's other benefits--not communications nor weather forecasting nor as an aid to navigation, important though these applications may be--would ever have been sufficient to justify placing a Space Council in a potentially commanding position in the Executive Branch. 128It is impossible to imagine how space Chapter4:42 exploration'sscientific,economic,orsocialcontributionsbythemselveswouldhaveleda Congressmainn 1958todeclare,withoutatraceofirony,thatthedirectorofNASA"is destinedtobeoneofthemostinfluentialmeninthiscountry'.'129Theseandothersuch eventsweredueexclusivelytowhatwasperceivedtobethespaceprogram's--and NASA's--role indefendingthecountry,specificallythatof"meetingtheSoviet challenge." Aschaptertwoalsonoted,howapolicyisdefined(orredefined)largelydetermines themannerinwhichitiscarriedout.Withregardtospacet,hemostobviousimpact--and theonewhichwastohavethemostlastingeffect--wasintheorganizationofNASAitself. UnderEisenhower'soriginal"scienceandsurveillanced"efinition,theprogramscouldbe (and,inthecaseofmilitaryreconnaissancwe,ererequiredtobe)keptsmallandclosed. However,oncespacepolicywasseenasanintegralpartofnationalsurvival--in effect,a sortofsurrogateforthemilitary--housingitinalarge,centralizedbureaucratic organizationwasinevitable.Eisenhowemr ayhavetoldGlennanthathewanteda "sensible"spaceprogram(and,forthispresident",sensible"meantsmall),andmayhave soughttoslowitsgrowthbycuttingitsbudgejtustbeforeleaving office, 13° but as long as the majority in Congress believed that NASA held the key to "national survival," its continued growth was assured. In addition, the high priority assigned to its mission, along with its heightened visibility, provided NASA with a secure and reliable base of political support. For an agency charged with developing and operating new and untried (not to mention expensive) technologies, such backing was essential, particularly during its earliest years. TM Chapter 4:43 Understanding how problem definition affects policymakers' approached to public issues also provides some additional ammunition to an ongoing debate in space history. Some writers--particularly those who regard Project Apollo as an expensive mistake--have speculated about what might have happened if the USSR had not "beaten" the U.S. into orbit in 1957. What if, for example, Von Braun had been allowed to launch his satellite in 1956, or Vanguard had come before Sputnik? Most believe that the American space program of the 1960s and beyond would have been much more "sound" and "logical" had it not been forced into Cold War-fueled "race. ''132 It does seem apparent that the sort of political opportunities described in this chapter would not have been present had there been no "Sputniks crisis," and thus no "rush" to "catch" the Soviets. There would almost certainly have been no Apollo acceleration (see next chapter) and perhaps no NASA. Simply knowing what would not have happened, however, says little about what would have. Given that, as seen in the last chapter, Eisenhower defined space primarily (if not exclusively) as a military intelligence issue, and that even the scientific satellite project had been approved largely because of its value to the intelligence program, it is far from clear that the administration would have gone forward with any new space initiatives, particularly after Vanguard's cost overruns. On the other hand, Eisenhower's later statements to the effect that U.S. faced "not a temporary emergency.., but a long-term responsibility ''_33 comes across today, particularly in light of NASA's experiences in the years after Apollo (see chapter 6), as quite perceptive. Moreover, as perhaps the only man in Washington at the time who did Chapter4:44 notacceptthenewdefinitionofspacepolicy,Eisenhowerdidservetomoderate--at leastatthepolicy-makinglevel--someofthepanicresultingfromtheSputniks. For better or worse, four years later, when the next "space panic" would find another occupant in the White House, the results would be very different. In addition, it is clear that the early history of NASA and the space program was very much driven by the political and personal goals of each of the principal participants. Scientists in virtually all fields saw Sputnik as an opportunity to obtain more funding for their research. Members of Congress (particularly Democrats) saw it as a chance to enhance their political status and power. Lyndon Johnson saw it as a potential stepping stone to the Presidency. Once again, it should be stressed that this general observation is not intended to be cynical. Rather, the point is that U.S. space policy during this time was being shaped by a number of powerful forces and inducements. Finally, the creation of NASA reflects practically every type of reorganization strategy laid out in chapter two. It was, first and foremost, a means for carrying out new policy initiatives. In bringing together the disparate (and at times competing) space programs described in the preceding chapter, it served the goals of policy integration and coordination. As Congressional debate makes clear, the establishment of NASA (and, to a lesser degree, the National Aeronautics and Space Council) also played an important symbolic role, "demonstrating" to the Soviet Union, the West European allies, non- aligned nations, and the public at large American "determination" and "resolve." Each of these elements would continue, in one way or another, to play a role in the agency's development for the next several years. Chapter4:45 Inshort,NASA was,onavarietyof levels, a political creation, designed and animated by an unusually large number of participants, each with their own goals and objectives. As the next chapter will show, for the next few years, most of the political forces acting upon the agency would be mutually reinforcing, that is to say, in general agreement concerning its scope, size, and particularly its mission. Unfortunately for NASA, this near-unanimity would not last for long. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4 I Sputnik III, launched the following May, weighed one and a half tons. 2It is now known (although it was also suspected at the time) that in reality, the Russian space program was not as advanced as it appeared. Beset by far more technical difficulties and breakdowns than they revealed to the outside world, the Soviets more than once placed their personnel in great danger. In 1960, for example, dozens of scientists, technicians, and soldiers were killed in a launch pad explosion, reportedly the result of political pressure to launch a probe so that Premier Nikita Khrushchev could announce it during a trip to New York. Similar problems and near-catastrophes would occur later during the USSR's manned flights (see James Oberg, Red Star in Orbit." The Inside Story of Soviet Failures and Triumphs in Space. New York: Random House, 1981, especially chapter 3). Nevertheless, as far as many American officials and the general public were able to tell, the Soviet "lead" in space seemed very great indeed. 3 For a review of early Soviet space achievements, see Oberg, Red Star in Orbit; John Noble Wilford, "First into Space, then the Race" in Harrison E. Salisbury (ed), Anatomy Chapter 4:46 of the Soviet Union. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1967, pp. 342-357; Ronald D. Humble, The Soviet Space Program. London and New York: Routledge, 1988. 4 See Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History. Washington: NASA, 1970. 5 Since, in the administration's view (see below), Sputnik had established the "freedom of space" so important to the president, there was no longer any need for the U.S. satellite program to stay "purely" scientific. Von Braun was given approval to begin work on Explorer in late October 1957. 6"The President's News Conference of October 9, 1957," Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 719-732. 7"Radio and Television Address to the American People on Science and National Security, November 7, 1957," Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 789-799; "Radio and Television Address to the American People on "Our Future Security,' November 13, 1957," ibid., pp. 809-816. 8Personal letter from Dwight David Eisenhower to Loyd S. Swenson, August 5, 1965, in NASA Historical Reference Collection (Hereafter NHRC). 9 ibid., p. 792 toA point made quite persuasively in Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. II Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower." The President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 425. 12Memorandum of Conference with the President, 8 October, 1957. Copies in NHRC and Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter DEL) Chapter4:47 13"Memorandum:Discussionatthe339thMeetingoftheNationalSecurityCouncil, October10,1957."CopiesinNHRCandDEL. 14Quotedin DonaldW. Cox,TheSpaceRace.Philadelphia:ChiltonBooks,1962,p. 137. 15ReproducedinEugeneM.Emme,"PresidentsandSpace"inFrederickC.DurantIII (ed),Between Sputnik and the Shuttle: New Perspectives on American Astronautics. San Diego: Univelt, 1981, pp. 5-138, p. 21. 16George E. Price, "Arguing the Case for Being Panicky." Life (18 November 1957), p. 125. J7Quoted in R. Cargill Hall, "Origins of U.S. Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space" in John M. Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume 1: Organizing for Exploration. Washington: NASA, 1995, p. 225. 18Quoted in Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point." Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971, p. 273; see also Richard Hutton, The Cosmic Chase. New York: Mentor, 1981, p. 37. 19These charges are discussed in Walter A. McDougall,... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. New York: Basic Books, 1985, chapter 6. 20Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980, pp. 428-9. There is some evidence, however, that this statement represents a bit of revisionism on Nixon's part. The minutes of the October 1957 NSS meeting (see note 13) state that the vice president expressed "full support" for Eisenhower's position on Sputnik and the U.S. rocket program. Of course, vice presidents are expected to support Chapter4:48 theadministrationofwhichtheyareapart;it isalwayspossiblethatNixon expressed his"frustrations"withthepresidentinprivate. 21See,forexample,DavidHalberstam,The Fifties. New York: Villard, 1993, p. 625; McDougall .... the Heavens and the Earth, pp. 146-8. 22U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-1979. Washington: USGPO, 1990, pp. 2-4. 23See also Interview with Gerald W. Siegel, staff worker for (then) Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, by Jay Holmes of the NASA Historical Staff, 25 June 1968, p. 2 (copy in NHRC). 24See, for example, Roger D. Launius, "Eisenhower, Sputnik, and the Creation of NASA: Technological Elites and the Public Policy Agenda." Prologue 28:2 (Summer 1996): 127- 143. 25Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975, p. 101. See also John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1958. 26Amrbrose, Eisenhower: The President, p. 424. 27For a useful summary of these feelings, see Roger D. Launius, "Prelude to the Space Age" in John M. Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume 1: Organizing for Exploration. Washington: NASA, 1995, pp. 1-22. 28James R. Killian, Jr., Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, p. 2. Chapter4:49 29TomWolfe,The Right Stuff. New York: Bantam Books, 1979. 3o"Announcement of the First Satellite," Pravda (5 October 1957), quoted in John M. Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume 1: Organizing for Exploration. Washington: NASA, 1995, pp. 329-330. 31Outline of the History of the USSR (trans. by George H. Hanna). Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, p. 361. 32Quoted in Walter A. McDougall .... the Heavens and the Earth, p. 328. 33ibid, p. 8. 34"Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union." Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1958, pp. 2-3. 35Congressional Record--House, 2 June 1958, pp. 9919-9920. 36Bemard Holland, "Van Clibum: Man Behind the Contest." New York Times (27 March 1989), p. C13. 37See, for example, Max Frankel, "U.S. Pianist, 23, Wins Soviet Contest." New York Times (14 April 1958), p. A1 38See, for example, Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973. 39"The President's News Conference of October 9, 1957," Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p.722. 4o"The President's News Conference at Augusta, Georgia, October 22, 1959." Public Papers of the President." Dwight D. Eisenhower 1959, p. 734. Chapter4:50 41"ThePresident'sNewsConferenceof July 29, 1959." Public Papers of the President." Dwight D. Eisenhower 1959, p. 555. 42Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 1994, pp. 24-5; Edwin Diamond, "Sputnik." American Heritage 48:6 (October 1997): 84-93. 43"Memorandum: Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, October 10, 1957." Copies in NHRC and DEL. 44Memorandum of Conference with the President, 8 October, 1957." Copies in NHRC and DEL. 45See, for example, Launius, "Eisenhower, Sputnik, and the Creation of NASA," as well as the discussion in the preceding chapter. 46W. D. Kay, interview with George Brown, 10 July 1997. See also Daniel J. Kevles The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, chapter 23. 47U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Independent Offices. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 86thCongress, 1st session (1959). Washington: USGPO, p. 322. 48W. D. Kay, "Congressional Decision-Making and Long-Term Technological Development: The Case of Nuclear Fusion" in Gary Bryner (ed), Science, Technology, and Politics: Policy Analysis in Congress. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 87-106. 49With some important exceptions; see chapter 6. 50Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as basis for physical research in the United States, 1940-1960 (Part I)." HSPS: Historical Studies in Physical Chapter 4:51 and Biological Studies 15:1 (1985), pp. 149-229; Kevles, The Physicists; Stuart M. Feffer, "Atoms, Cancer, and Politics: Supporting Atomic Science at the University of Chicago, 1944-1950." HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 22:2 (1982), pp. 233-261. 51Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science. New York: New American Library, 1967, p. 215fn. 52See, for example, David Halberstam, The Fifties, especially pp. xvvx-wzzy. 53Alexander, Holding the Line, p. 242. 54Eileen Galloway, "U.S. Congress and Outer Space" in Frederick C. Durant HI (ed), Between Sputnik and the Shuttle: New Perspectives on American Astronautics. San Diego: Univelt, 1981, pp. 139-160; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier, p. 1. 55Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 272-3. 56Siegel interview. 57Memo to Lyndon Baines Johnson from George E. Reedy, 17 October 1957, LBJ Presidential Library (hereafter LBJL). 58McDougall, ...the Heavens and the Earth, pp. 148-9; Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis, pp. 186-7. 59Memo from Reedy to Johnson. 60Reported in Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 430. See also the discussion in the last chapter. 61U.S. Congress, Senate, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Chapter4:52 85thCongress,1stand2ndsession(25-27November,13-17December1957,10-23 January1958)Washington:USGPO,1958,pp.2-3. 62MemofromReedytoJohnsone,mphasisadded. 63MemofromReedytoJohnson,15November1957,in LBJL. 64MemofromGlenWilsontoWalterJenkins,4April 1958,inLBJL. 6s"StatementofDemocraticLeaderLyndonB.JohnsontotheMeetingofDemocratic ConferenceonJanuary7,1958"in LBJLandNHRC. 66 ibid. 67Detailed accounts of the birth of NASA can be found in McDougall .... the Heavens and the Earth, chapter 7; Launius, NASA, chapter 3 and "Eisenhower, Sputnik, and the Creation of NASA,"; Killian, Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower, pp. 122-138. See also the documents reproduced in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Vol. I, pp. 628-643. 68Peter B. Dow, Schoolhouse Politics: Lessons from the Sputnik Era. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. 69Killian, Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower. See also Bruce L. R. Smith, The Advisors: Scientists and the Policy Process. Washington: Brookings, i992, chapter 8. 70James M. Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology. Washington: NASA SP4001, 1963, p. 12. See also Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy Since World War lI. Washington: Brookings, 1990, p. 55. 71U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federally Funded Research: Decision for a Decade. Washington: OTA, 1991, p. 112. Figures are in constant 1982 dollars. 72ibid., p. 114. Chapter4:53 73EileenGalloway,"U.S.CongressandOuterSpace"inFrederickC.DurantIII (ed), Between Sputnik and the Shuttle: New Perspectives on American Astronautics. San Diego: Univelt, 1981, pp. 139-160; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier, p. 1. 74See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier, pp. 15- 17. 75Senate Committee on Government Operations, Staff Memorandum No. 85-1-73, 8 November 1957, copies in DEL and NHRC; Launius, "Eisenhower, Sputnik, and the Creation of NASA." 76"The Problems of Congress in Formulating Outer Space Legislation" in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Astronautics and Space Exploration, pp. 5-10; Killian, Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower, especially pp. 30-32. 77"Message from the President of the United States Relative to Space Science and Exploration," House Document No. 365, 85thCongress, 2nasession, 2 April 1958. 78U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Astronautics and Space Exploration. Hearings before the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. 85th Congress, 2nd session (15-30 April, 1-12 May, 1958). 79U.S. Congress, Senate, National Aeronautics and Space Act. Hearings before the Select Committee on Space and Astronautics, 85th Congress, 2nd session (6-8 May, 1958), p. 6 80Congressional Record--House, 2 June 1958, p. 9917. 81ibid., pp. 9917-8. 82ibid., p. 9918. Chapter4:54 83ibid.,p.9921. 84ibid.,p.9926. 85Congressional Record--Senate, 16 June, 1958, p. 11293. See also Launius, NASA, p. 31. 86Which, in fact, may well have been Johnson's intention. See Skolnikoff interview with Killian (1968?), p. 11, in NHRC. 87See Killian, Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 137. 88"Statement by the President Upon Signing the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, July 29, 1958," Public Papers of the President: Dwight David Eisenhower 1958, p. 573. 89j. D. Hunley (ed), The Birth of NASA: The Diary ofT. Keith Glennan. Washington: NASA SP-4105, p. 2. 90See discussion in the next chapter. 91Hunley, The Birth of NASA, p. 31. He does, however, acknowledge that there was a "competition" between the two countries. 92U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 1960 NASA Authorization. Hearings before the Committee on Science and Astronautics and Subcommittees 1, 2, 3, 4, 86th Congress, 1st session (20-29 April, 4 May, 1959). Washington: USGPO, pp. 3-4, emphasis added. 93U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee, Introduction to Outer Space: An Explanatory Statement. Washington: USGPO, 1958, pp. 1-2. 94National Security Council, Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space. NSC 5814/1, 18 August 1958, in NHRC. Chapter4:55 95ibid. 96NationalSecurityCouncil,Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space. NSC 5814, 20 June 1958, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, p. 353. 97The practice here will be to adopt whatever phrasing was used at the time being examined. Thus, instead of the phrase "human" space flight currently employed by NASA, this (and most subsequent) section uses the term "manned." 98U.S. Congress, Senate, Project Mercury: Man-in-Space Program of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 86thCongress, 1st session (1 December, 1959), p. 1 99Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander. This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury. Washington: NASA History Series, 1966, p. 91 .; Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology, p. 13. 10oHunley, The Birth of NASA, p. 13. See also U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, United States Civilian Space Programs 1958-1978. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, Committee on Science and Technology, 97th Congress, 1st session, January 1981, p. 347. Responsibility for the man-in-space program was transferred to NASA by President Eisenhower (acting on advice from Killian) in August 1958 (see Swenson, et. al., This New Ocean, pp. 101- 102). On November 26, it was officially named Project Mercury (Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology, p. 32. 101Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology, p. 31. 1o2U.S. Congress, Senate, Project Mercury, p. 2, Chapter4:56 103President'sScienceAdvisoryCommittee,"ReportoftheAd-hocCommitteeon Man- in-Space," 16 December 1960, in Launius, NASA, p. 167, emphasis added. Jo4National Aeronautics and Space Council, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space," 26 January 1960, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, p. 365. lo5 On Eisenhower and Mercury, see Ambrose, Eisenhower." The President, pp. 591-2. Io6 Swenson, et. al., This New Ocean, p. 306. 107See, for example, "Difficult Decisions." Science (1 November 1960), p. xxx; "Too Much Speed in Space?" Wall Street Journal (19 December 1960), p. 5. For a general discussion, see William David Compton, Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions. Washington: NASA SP-4214, 1989, p. 16. Io8Swenson, et. al., This New Ocean, pp. 304-5. i09Launius, NASA, p. 40. For an especially entertaining look at this period, see Wolfe, The Right Stuff. 110U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1995Activities. Washington: NASA, 1996, Appendix A-1. It was widely believed that the USSR had had a number of failures as well, but simply did not acknowledge them. Ill See, for example, "Too Much Speed in Space?" ; Howard Benedict, "U.S. Prestige Rises In Space Exploration." NNVDaily Press (19 April 1960), p. xxx; and William R. Codiss, Scientific Satellites. Washington: NASA SP-133, 1967, chapter 2. lla Oberg, Red Star in Orbit. 113Swenson, et. al., This New Ocean, p. 307. Chapter4:57 ll4Themajorexceptionhere,ofcourse,istheso-called(and,asit laterturnedout, fictitious)"missilegap"withtheUSSRthattheEisenhowerAdministrationhad allegedlypermittedto"openup."This,however,wasnotnecessarilyassociatedinthe publicmindwithspaceexploration. 115QuotedinCourtneySheldon,"TheSpaceChallengeIssue,"Christian Science Monitor (10 August 1960), p. 7. 116Position Paper on Space Research (Washington: Democratic Advisory Council, 7 September 1960), p. 3. Copies in NHRC and John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (hereafter JFKL). 1_7Quoted in Jack Doherty, "Space in the 1960 Campaign," 21 July 1963 (copies in NHRC). 118"Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy," 20 January 1961, Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 2. 119"Annual Message to the Congress," 30 January 1961, Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 26-27. _2o"Draft Paper on US-USSR Space Cooperation," April 4, 1961, in John M. Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the US Civil Space Program. Volume II: External Relationships. Washington: NASA, 1997, p. 143. _21Launius, NASA, pp. 57-58; McDougall, ...the Heavens and the Earth, chapter 17. For a more in-depth discussion, see W. D. Kay, "John F. Kennedy and the Two Faces of the U.S. Space Program, 1961-1963." Presidential Studies Quarterly 28:3 (Summer 1998), pp. 573-586. Chapter4:58 122JohnF.Kennedy,"If theSovietsControlSpaceT, heyCanControlEarth."Missiles and Rockets (10 October 1960): 12-13. 123See Linda T. Krug, Presidential Perspectives on Space Exploration: Guiding Metaphors from Eisenhower to Bush. New York: Praeger, 1991, chapter 2. 124Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy: President. New York: Atheneum, 1964, p. 118. 125A practice he continued throughout the Johnson presidencyl See chapters 5 and 6. 126"Administrator's Presentation to the President," 21 March 1961, NHRC. See also Webb' s own account of the meeting in W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series in NASA History, 1995, p. 92. _27In December 1960, Kennedy had suggested to Johnson that he take over as chair of the Space Council. Congress approved an amendment to the National Aeronautics and Space Act on April 20, 1961, by which time the issue had already been settled (see next chapter). See Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 278. _28At least not at that time. There are today a number of coordinating councils, covering a wide variety of policy areas, within the Executive Office of the President. 129Congressional Record House (2 June 1958), p. 9927. _30It is worth pointing out that even this "cut" budget was still just below $1 billion. 131W. D. Kay, Can Democracies Fly in Space? The Challenge of Revitalizing the U.S. Space Program. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995, pp. 48-51. 13zSee, for example, Hutton, The Cosmic Chase, pp. 50-51. 133Ambrose, Eisenhower." The President, p. 433. CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION PART Ih FIRST MISSION Chapter 5: Mission Advanced Broad declarations of government policy, such as Lyndon Johnson's declaration of "war" on poverty or George Bush's vow that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would "not stand," are actually, in and of themselves, nothing more than statements of intention. They have real meaning only to the extent that they are accompanied by some sort of specific actions, such as--in the case of the War on Poverty--the creation of concrete programs and projects, or--as in Desert Storm--direct orders to military commanders. I Of course, even when there is widespread agreement among policymakers and the public at large about the general goals, there may still be considerable controversy over the particular initiatives selected to achieve them? For most U.S. citizens (and many elected officials) in 1961, the tangible proof that the their country had become "first" in space--that is, that the promises made repeatedly throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, as well as the 85 th, 86th and 87 thCongresses had finally been fulfilled--would be for the United States to "beat" the USSR to the next "milestone," putting a man into space. Thus, despite warnings to the contrary by experts like Jerome Weisner, Americans by early Chapter5:2 1961hadcometoviewNASA's ProjectMercuryastheprimary(if nottheonly) governmenpt rogramspecificallydesignedtomeetthestatedgoaloftakingthe"lead"in spaceawayfromtheSoviets.Onceagain,however,theU.S.wasdestinedtocomein "second";andonceagain,itssecondplacefinishwastohavefar-reachingconseque/aces. LOSING ROUND TWO Shortly after 1:00 AM (Washington time) on Wednesday, April 12, 1961, U.S. radar detected a rocket launch from the Soviet space center in Central Asia. One hour later, Radio Moscow announced that Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin, a 27 year-old major in the Soviet Air force, had just become the first man to fly in space. His spacecraft, Vostok /, carried him on a single orbit of the earth at a maximum altitude of more than 200 miles in a little less than 90 minutes. After bringing the Vostok out of orbit, he ejected from the spacecraft at around 23,000 feet and landed safely by parachute in a pasture near the Volga river. 3 Many, if not most, authors tend to treat the Gagarin flight as a sort of Sputnik redux (Walter McDougall's prize-winning book even refers to it as a "second Sputnik"4), as least as far as American and world reaction was concerned: Viewed in a larger context, however, it can be argued that the overall impact of Vostok was actually far greater than that of Sputnik. Indeed, its effects--as filtered through the political and institutional conditions of the times--are Still felt strongly today. To be sure, there were a number of similarities between the two events. As they had in 1957, the Soviets immediately sought to maximize the flight's propaganda value. Chapter5:3 GovernmentleadersandothercommentatorstoutedVostok as further proof of their technological prowess and the virtues of socialism. Khrushchev called it "the greatest triumph of the immortal Lenin' s ideas."6 The Central Committee of the Communist Party declared that the flight "embodied the genius of the Soviet people and the powerful force of socialism] International Affairs, a Moscow journal, stated that Soviet space accomplishments were the result of ...the specific features of Socialist society, in its social structure, its planned economy, the abolition of exploitation of man by man, the absence of racial discrimination, in free labor and the released creative energies of peoples. Our achievements in the field of technology in general and in rocketry in particular are only a result of the Socialist nature of Soviet society. 8 For Pravda, the official Communist Party newspaper, the flight represented nothing less than "the global superiority of the Soviet Union in all aspects of science and technology". 9 Once again, a number of Americans seemed to take this claim very seriously. A Washington Post editorial published the day after the Gagarin flight echoed the Pravda declaration almost exactly, stating that "many persons will of course take this event as new evidence of Soviet superiority. ''1°A NASA scientist remarked "[w]ait until the Russians send up three men, then six, then a laboratory, then start hooking them together and then send back a few pictures of New York for us to see. ''n Congressman Victor L. Anfuso, a Chapter5:4 memberoftheHouseScienceandTechnologyCommitteew, orried,"Lordknowswherethe Russianswill be[intenyears]...andwhetherAmericawill stillbeinexistence''._2 Vostok also rekindled the fears that Soviet triumphs in space would translate into a strategic advantage in the Third World and elsewhere. A New York Times editorial published five days after the flight Worried that "[t]he neutral nations may come to believe that the wave of the future is Russian, ''_3 and journalist Hanson W. Baldwin wrote that "[e]ven though the United States is still the strongest military power and leads in many aspects of the space race, the world impressed by the spectacular Soviet firsts--may believe we lag militarily and technologically. ''14 Along these same lines, a U.S. Senator noted that: In the world stadium, nations are carefully watching the contest between the major protagonists of freedom and communism in space exploration--the United States and the Soviet Union. Although we didn't plan it that way, this is, indeed, a real space race. According to experts, the cumulative scientific-technical value of our space accomplishments far exceeds that of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore nor underestimate the psychological impact which Russian firsts in space have had upon the minds of the world. ...the task now is to first, predetermine the next major accomplishment in space; and second, as soon as possible, set up the timetable so that the United States can get the maximum benefit not only from the accomplishments Chapter5:5 themselvesb,utalsofromthegreatpsychologicalimpactof 15 firstsinthespacerace. AndCongressmaOnvertonBrooksdeclared: IknowthateverymemberoftheHouseCommitteeon ScienceandAstronauticsisconvincedthatagreatdeal moredependsuponthesuccessofournationalspaceeffort thanasimpleraceforscientificachievemenbtetweenthe UnitedStatesandRussia.Rightnowtheesteemin which theUnitedStatesisheldin theeyesoftheworldis dependenutponwhatwedoin spaceasit isdependent uponfewotherareasofnationalendeavorT. hisis so whetherwelikeit ornot.ThesecurityofourNation,infact ourverysurvival,oureconomicandmaterialwell-being, dePendinnosmalldegreeonwhatweareableto accomplishinthisspaceprogram.Thisistrueofboththe civilianandmilitary aspectsoftheprogram._6 ThepotentialimpactofGagarin'sflightin theThirdWorldhadclearlynotbeenlost onSovietleadersw, ho,evenwhilethemissionwasinprogresst,ookfull advantageofthe factthatahumanbeingmakesamuchbetterspokesmanthanabeepingsatellite.Gagarin latersaid,forexample,thatduringtheflight hehadbeen"thinkingofourLeninistParty, ourSovietMotherland,"_7andthatduringreentryhewassinging"theMotherlandhears, theMotherlandknows.''_8Hissingleorbitoftheearthhadalsoallowedhimtotransmit "revolutionarygreetings"tocountriesinSouthAmericaandNorthwestAfrica.19A cartoon captioned "In Tune with the Times--Africa!" from a 1961 Soviet publication depicts a Chapter5:6 smilingcosmonauitnorbit(aboardacraftlabeledVostok, but which bears little resemblance to the actual vehicle), waving to an African citizen, who has evidently just broken his shackles and is reaching heavenward. 2°If the press reaction to the flight in some developing countries is any indication, many were impressed. 21 Finally, the American "response" once again came across as somewhat feeble) _ Three weeks after Vostok, NASA launched Alan B. Shepard aboard Freedom 7 on the first mission of the Mercury series. Unlike Gagafin, who had actually gone into orbit, Shepard's flight followed a parabolic, "suborbital" trajectory that lasted only 15 minutes. Vostok weighed almost five times as much as the Mercury capsule. Gagarin experienced 90 minutes of weightlessness; Shepard just five. z_ Such an evident "gap" led, once again, to numerous calls for the U.S. to "catch up." Representative James Fulton of the House Science and Technology Committee complained at a hearing the day of the flight, "I am tired of coming in second best all the time, ''za and President Kennedy reportedly said a few days later, "there's nothing more important [than catching up]. ''25 NUMBER TWO, TRYING HARDER Despite all of these common features, 26the fact is that Yuri Gagarin was flying over a very different political world than that traversed by Sputnik three and a half years earlier. The depth of these changes, and their impact on the subsequent conduct of American space policy, can best be illustrated by drawing upon some of the concepts introduced in chapter 2. Chapter5:7 Problem Definition As galling as Sputnik might have been, Americans in 1957 could perhaps console themselves with the idea that they never knew that they were in a "race" to begin withy According to this view (which was much encouraged by the Eisenhower Administration28), the Soviets had, in effect, stolen a march on the U.S. Put another way, Sputnik had been launched in a political vacuum. The idea that the space program's purpose should be to meet and overcome a Soviet challenge was not automatic; indeed, a number of officials, particularly those in the Eisenhower Administration, actively resisted it. By 1961, however, this definition of space policy was firmly in place. Despite the advice of numerous officials (including some from the incoming Kennedy Administration) against placing too much emphasis on the manned portion of the space program, the enormous public attention focused upon Project Mercury, and particularly upon the seven Mercury astronauts, inevitably gave rise to the impression that America was aiming to be the first to put a man in space. In other words, to most Americans, "losing" this latest "race" was very different than not being the first to orbit a satellite. This time, it appeared to many that the U.S. had lost a direct, head-to-head competition)gIn some respects, therefore, Vostok represented an even worse defeat for the U.S. than did Sputnik. And this time, the Americans could not accuse the USSR of sneaking up to the starting line. In other words, the primary political issue raised by Sputnik was the direction of the U.S. space program. All of the speeches, exhortations and criticism directed at Chapter5:8 EisenhowerandhisofficialswereallgearedtowardgettingtheAdministrationtoaccepta particularvisionof spacepolicy(andallthatwentwith it). After Vostok, the question had changed to one of sufficiency: Kennedy now seemed to be open to the charge that he had not "done enough" to stave off this latest "defeat." Reorganization Along with settling upon the definition of the program, Congress and the Administration expended a great deal of time and energy during the 1957-58 period in setting up a number of space-related organizations and institutions, in both the executive and legislative branches. By 1961, those agencies, committees, and councils had been up and running for more than two years. Thus, all of the effort that had gone into the general mobilization that followed Sputnik now went directly into the development of specific programs and proposals (see below). What is especially important to note here is that each of these organizations had a strong interest in expanding the program. For example, the House of Representatives' Committee on Science and Technology had already scheduled a round of hearings when the Vostok launch was announced. The Committee heard from Edward Welsh of the National Aeronautics and Space Council on April 12, and from Webb, Dryden, and Robert Seamans of NASA on April 13 and 1470 None of these three organizations--the House Committee, the Aeronautics and Space Council, or NASA---even existed three years earlier. Moreover, these new organizations and agencies provided government officials and the public at large--and particularly the media--with a focal point for their attention. Following his appearance before the House Committee on April 14, Seamans described Chapter5:9 steppedoutofthehearingroomintoa"blindinglightoftelevisioncameras"andaseaof reportersdemandingtoknowhowtheU.S.intendedtorespondtotheGagarinflight) t Theofficialsclearlyknewthattheywerebeingwatched.TheScienceandTechnology CommitteehearingonApril 13,forexample,wasmovedtothemuchlargerCannon caucusroominordertoaccommodatetheCommittee's"friends"in "thepress,radio,and television'.'32 Politicians and Goals By far the most significant differences between Sputnik and Vostok, however, was with respect to the major political actors. This was, of course, most obvious at the top. As the last chapter suggested, President Kennedy's approach to space policy in the first few months of his term bore a close resemblance to his predecessor's. This may, as some have suggested, have been due to his relative lack of interest (at that time). Even so, taking into account each man's overall temperament, their philosophical outlooks, and relative political position, it is difficult to think of two more different leaders. Eisenhower was older, more cautious about government spending, and more committed to stability. He was serving his second and final term at the time that Sputnik was launched. Kennedy was a younger man who wished to convey an impression of vigor and vitality. He had campaigned on a pledge to "get America moving again." He was, by all accounts, less resistant to large government programs than was Eisenhower. Finally, he was still in his first term--indeed, his presidency was barely three months old at the time of the Gagarin flight. Chapter 5:10 Not surprisingly, Eisenhower's reaction to Kennedy's Apollo decision (see below) was decidedly negative. Writing to a friend, the former president characterized his successor's proposal as "almost hysterical" and a bit immature. 33On numerous occasions, in public and private, Eisenhower sharply criticized the moon program as a waste of the nation's resources. Some Congressional Republicans, however, seemed to part company with their former president's views (at least for a while). Having been on the receiving end of constant Democratic criticism in the aftermath of Sputnik and throughout the 1960 presidential campaign, many in the GOP saw Vostok as a prime opportunity for political payback. For example, confronting Webb at the April 13thmeeting, Congressman Fulton roundly criticized Kennedy's decision in March to agree to only part of NASA's budget request. Webb had no choice but to defend the president's actions, even though he privately agreed that the budget was inadequate. 34 Another event which may have been an influence in the Apollo decision occurred just one week after Gagarin's flight. An armed contingent of Cuban exiles, trained and supported by the CIA, failed in their attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime. The defeat of the U.S.-backed guerrillas at the Bay of Pigs represented a serious foreign policy and domestic setback for the still-new Kennedy Administration. Despite the efforts of the president and others to blame the affair on Eisenhower's policies, it was beginning to appear that, in author Tom Wolfe's words, "the 'New Frontier' was looking like a retreat on all fronts. ''35 There is considerable disagreement as to how much any of this influenced Kennedy. Lambright's recent biography of James Webb, for example, notes that there is Chapter5:1 1 nodirectevidencelinkingtheBayofPigsandApollo36L.yndonJohnsonwrotein 1971 that"he[Kennedy]nevergavetheleastindicationthatinanyofourdiscussionsthathe thoughttherewasanyrelationship'.'37Ontheotherhand,ArthurM. Schlesingerdoes drawadirectconnectionbetweentheinvasion,Gagarin,andthemoonchallenge3.8 Curiously,virtually alloftheattentioninthisregardisfocusedonthepossibleeffectson Kennedypersonally.Therehasbeenrelativelylittle investigationhowtheBayofPigs mayhaveaffectedtherestofWhiteHousestaff,membersofCongress3,9orthepublicat large.Aswill beseenbelow,manyindividualshadinputintotheApollo decision,and anyofthemcouldhavebeenmotivatedbythedefeatinCuba,oratleastmayhave becomemorereceptivetoaproposalthatpromisedtoreasserUt .S.leadership. Finally,the1960electionbroughtintotheWhiteHouseanumberofindividuals whowerefarmorewilling todefinespacepolicyinColdWartermsthanmost Eisenhowerofficialshadbeen.Firstandforemostamongthese,ofcourse,wasVice PresidentLyndonJohnson.Asthelastchapternoted,Kennedyhadalreadyrequestedthat theNational Aeronautics and Space Act be amended to allow Johnson to serve as chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. Although the Council had been largely inactive during the Eisenhower Administration, the new president clearly intended to put vice-president's expertise to use. 4°Johnson, who absolutely hated the vice- presidency, 4'could at least settle for some position of responsibility over a highly visible issue (and one which had given him some measure of national prominence). He would later play a key role in persuading reluctant members of Congress to support NASA's expansion .42 Chapter5:12 Otherofficialsseemedequallydisposedtoviewspaceasa"race"with the Soviets¢3Secretaryof StateDeanRusktoldtheSenateSpaceCommitteethathefeareda "misunderstanding"amongothernations"concerningthedirectionin whichpoweris movingandwherelong-termadvantagelies.''_ DefenseSecretaryRobertS.McNamara, in amemotoJohnsonconcerningtheaccelerationofthespaceprogram(seebelow), notedthat WhattheSovietsdoandwhattheyarelikely todoare... mattersofgreatimportancefromtheviewpointofnational prestige.Ourattainmentsconstituteamajorelementinthe internationalcompetitionbetweentheSovietsystemand our own. 45 As chapter 2 pointed out, however, policymakers can use a single policy position to pursue multiple goals, and there is reason to believe that McNamara was no exception. He had already been overseeing cutbacks in defense spending that were upsetting many in the aerospace industry. 46A larger space effort would easily fill the gap left by these cuts. In short, for the first time in the young history of the Space Age, the leadership in the Congress and most of the officials in the executive branch were, for the most part, on the same side of the issue. Given this fact, as well as his own political Situation, it was all but inevitable that Kennedy would begin to look for the next major spaceflight "milestone." Or, more precisely, to try to select a milestone sufficiently distant that the U.S. would have the time it needed to "catch up" at long last. Chapter5:13 GOING TO THE MOON 47 As of early 1961, NASA's proposed timetable for human spaceflight called for a circumlunar mission by 1970, with a landing at some unspecified time in the futurefl The Gagarin flight, however, quickly made that timetable--which had represented a sort of compromise between the cautious Eisenhower Administration and the more ambitious space advocates--obsolete. 49On April 20, 1961, Kennedy sent a memo to Vice President Johnson asking for a survey on where the U.S. stood "overall" in space. Item number one, however, makes it very clear where the president's priorities lay: Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back With a man? Is there any other space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win? 5° In announcing Johnson's assignment to the press the following day, Kennedy added that he was seeking to identify a project in which ,"regardless of cost," the United States could be a "pioneer. ,'51 In preparing his report for the president, Johnson received input from numerous individuals in and out of government. Far from challenging the basic premise underlying Kennedy's request, most participants embraced it openly, even to the point of continuing the "racing" imagery. Wemher Von Braun, for example, spoke of the U.S. having a "sporting Chapter5:14 chance"oflandingaprobeonthemoonorsendingathree-mancrewaroundthemoon aheadoftheRussians2:HealsoclaimedthattheUnitedStateshadan"excellentchanceof beatingtheSovietstothefirstlandingofacrewonthemoon"sincethiswouldrequirea rocketthatneithersideyetpossessed3:TheMcNamaramemoreferredtoabovespokeof theneedto"matchtheSovietsinallareasofinternationaclompetition''.54 Johnson'sinitial replytoKennedy,inabriefmemodatedApril28,continuedthis theme: Thiscountryshouldberealisticandrecognizethatother nations,regardlesosftheirappreciationofouridealistic values,will tendtoalignthemselveswiththecountrythey believewill betheworldleader--thewinner in the long run. Dramatic accomplishments in space are being increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership. ff we do not make a strong effort now, the time will soon be reached when the margin of control over space and over men's minds through space accomplishments will have swung so far on the Russian side that we will not be able to catch up, let alone assume leadershipY It goes on to identify a lunar landing as an "achievement with great propaganda value" and as a goal in which "we may be able to be first. ''s6 The final report was transmitted to the vice president on May 8 (the Monday after Alan Shepherd's flight). It suggests "four principal reasons" for undertaking projects in space: scientific research, commercial enterprises, defense, and national prestige. In an odd Chapter5:15 sortofbackhandedcompliment,thereportconcededthattheU.S."isnotbehind"inthefirst threecategories":Scientificallyandmilitarily weareaheadW. econsiderourpotentialin thecommercial/civilianareatobesuperior."TheUSSR,ontheotherhand,leads"in space spectacularwshichbestowgreatprestige."Inlayingoutthelogicbehindthisobservation, thereportmakesanadmissionthatisratherstartlinginitsfrankness: All largescalespaceprojectsrequirethemobilizationof resourcesonanationalscale.Theyrequirethedevelopment andsuccessfualpplicationofthemostadvanced technologiesT.heycallforskillful managemenct,entralized controlandunflaggingpursuitoflongrangegoals.Dramatic achievementisnspacet,herefores,ymbolizethe technologicaalndorganizingcapacityofanation. It isforreasonssuchasthesethatmajorachievementisn spacecontributetonationalprestige.Majorsuccessess,uch asorbitingamanastheSovietshavejustdone,lendnational prestigeeven though the scientific, commercial or military value of the undertaking may by ordinary standards be marginal or economically unjustified. 57 Just in case any doubt as to the primary purpose of U.S. space policy remained, this section of the report concludes: The non-military, non-commercial, non-scientific, but "civilian" projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are.., part of the battle along the fluid front of the cold war Chapter 5:16 [sic].Such undertakings may affect our military strength indirectly if at all, but they have an increasing effect upon our national posture: 8 In other words, like Congressional debate over the original Space Act, this report presents--and immediately discounts--the other justifications for developing spaceflight technology. In fact, it goes even further, suggesting that highly visible "space spectaculars" can be justified even if they prove to be wasteful from an economic, scientific, or military point of view. Overall, the report provides the most direct statement yet of space policy definition during this period. The culmination of all of this activity was Kennedy's famous "Urgent National Needs" speech (described as an unprecedented second State of the Union message59), delivered before a joint session of Congress on May 25, 1961. The most well known part of the address, in which the president declares a lunar landing before 1970 as the primary goal of the U.S. in space, strongly suggests that the country was largely out to recapture the prestige it had lost to the USSR: I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in this period will be more impressive to mankind as it makes its judgment of whether the world is free or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult Or expensive to accomplish. Chapter5:17 It isintheother,lessoftenquotedpartsofthespeechh,owever,thatKennedymakes it veryclearwhoistheprimarytargetofthepolicy.Indeed,hereferredtotheSovietsand theirspaceprogramtwice, clearly casting them as America's principal adversaries in both space and politics, and openly declaring that they were the primary reason for the U.S. going to the moon: ...if we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world between freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which occurred in recent weeks should have made clear to us all, as did the Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this adventure on the minds of men everywhere, who are attempting to make a determination of which road they should take. Recognizing the head start obtained by the Soviets with their large rocket engines, which gives them many months of lead- time, and recognizing the likelihood that they will exploit this lead for some time to come in still more impressive successes, we nevertheless are required to make new efforts on our own. For while we cannot guarantee that we will someday be first, we can guarantee that any failure to make this effort will make us last. 6° Given that many of its members had been calling for just such a response to the Vostok flight, it is hardly surprising that Congress overwhelmingly approved Kennedy's proposal, voting an immediate fifty percent increase in NASA's budget. Chapter5:18 Ofcoursea, shadhappenedafewyearsearlierduringthedebateovertheSpaceAct (seelastchapter)g, overnmenotfficialsdidfromtimetotimementiontheotherbenefitsof spacetechnologyA. salreadynoted,theMay8reportmadebriefreferencestoscientificand commerciaal pplicationsO. neseldomnotedfeatureoftheUrgentNationalNeedsaddress isthat,in additiontothelunarmission,Kennedy asked Congress to approve an additional $125 million for continued development of communication and weather satellites. 61He would also, on other occasions, note that his accelerated space program promised more than just national prestige: In the national interest, the United States must build the capacity to advance the most modem science and technology to the utmost, and extract from it the wealth of benefits it holds for this country's freedoms, economy, professions, and standard of living. 62 Nevertheless, as was the case in 1958, it is highly unlikely that even these "wealth of benefits" would have been enough to justify the billions of dollars the Apollo project would ultimately cost, 63or that the potential economic or scientific results by themselves would have persuaded Congress to support the program. Indeed, a survey of House members taken in early 1962 by the magazine Aviation and Space Technology found that most thought the expense of the space program "'questionable except when viewed from the standpoint of the Cold War. ''64 In short, most policymakers---including by 1961 key members of the executive branch--were now committed to a policy definition that conceptualized spaceflight Chapter5:19 (particularlythatinvolvinghumans)asacriticalelementin U.S.nationalsecuritypolicy. Kennedy himself put the matter rather bluntly in 1963 when he said that the United States' goal in going to the moon was "'not only our excitement or interest in being on the moon, but the capacity to dominate space, which... I believe is essential to the United States as a leading free world power. ''65 Like any political debate over budget increases for (conventional) defense spending, defining space policy in a way that makes it essential to "national survival" allowed Apollo's supporters to answer----or, in some cases, ignore---criticisms of the program's high costs, which began in earnest in late 1961 and continued for the rest of the decade. In his public statements, for example, Kennedy would sometimes raise the threat of another "new, dramatic" [Russian] breakthrough ''_ "which could affect our national security ''67when asked about the costs of the moon program. Indeed, for the rest of his life (with one major exception to be discussed below) the president described his space policy almost exclusively in Cold War terms. In his press conferences, reports, and public speeches he practically never mentioned the U.S. program without also referring to Soviet capabilities. His rhetoric was constantly laced with images and metaphors of racing: he would, for example, concede that the U.S. was running "second" or "behind" the USSR, 68but at the same time expressed confidence that it would soon "catch up" and "be ahead.., where.., we ought to be.,,69 On the day before his assassination, in a speech in San Antonio, the president proclaimed: I think the United States should be a leader. A country as rich and powerful as this.., should be second to none .... while I do not regard our mastery of space as anywhere near complete, Chapter5:20 whileIrecognizethatthereareareaswherewearestill behind..,thisyearI hopetheUnitedStateswill beahead7.° Vice-PresidenJtohnsona,susual,wassomewhamt oredirect.Heoncetoldagroupof CongressmewnhowereexpressingsomereluctanceonApollo,forexample,"wouldyou ratherhaveusbeasecond-ratenationorshouldwespendalittle money?''7' Asimilarpatterncanbeseeninofficialresponse(or,rather,thelackofit) tothe growingdisapprovaalmongprofessionaslcientistsM. ostmembersofthescienceand engineeringcommunitytended--notunreasonably--toviewspacepolicysimplyasone amongmanyoftheofnation'sR&DprogramsT. heybelieved--again,notunreasonably-- thatthesize,pace,andfundingofsuchprogramsoughttobebasedupontheirpotential scientificortechnologicarleturn.Although they were not yet organized in any meaningful way (that would come later), a number of prominent scientists and engineers were highly critical of Apollo, since the scientific returns could not possibly justify the costs: anything astronauts could do on the moon could be done more cheaply (and more safely) by automated probes. 7zOne of the more notable critics was Vannevar Bush, the principal architect of post-war U.S. science policy. Although he had initially seen Sputnik as a "wake-up call" for Americans who had grown too smug, 73Bush favored a more balanced approach to space R&D, somewhat along the lines of the Eisenhower Administration. Throughout the early 1960s, he wrote numerous articles decrying the Apollo project, and even sent a letter to this effect directly to Kennedy himself (through Webb, whom he had known from the Truman Administration). 74He was by no means alone. A "straw poll" Chapter 5:21 conducted by the editor of Science magazine in 1963 of 116 scientists "not connected by self-interest" to NASA found only 3 in favor of the manned space program. 75 Chapter 2 noted, however, policymakers pay attention to outside information only to the extent that it conforms to their way of conceptualizing the issue. Since most public officials had long ago stopped seeing the U.S. space program as "science"--the May 8 report to the vice-president stated explicitly that space missions conferring national prestige did not need scientific (or, for the matter, economic or military) justification-- scientists' objections were simply dismissed as irrelevant (there is no indication that Kennedy even replied to the Bush letter76). Finally, chapter 2 described how policymakers' definition of public problems guides them in their selection of proposed solutions. In this case, the "solution" meant not only deciding upon a goal--landing on the moon by 1970---but also upon the means of getting there. The overriding objective beating the Soviets (which, since no one knew precisely the USSR's plans or emerging capabilities, was taken to mean simply that the appropriate technology had to be developed as rapidly as possible) was to play a major role in shaping the technologies that made up the Apollo Transportation System. 77 Mission planners originally conceived of three different approaches to getting astronauts onto and off of the lunar surface: direct ascent (a non-stop flight with a single, very large rocket), earth-orbit rendezvous (EOR, launching the lunar landing craft from near-earth orbit), and lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR, the landing craft would leave from and return to lunar orbit). Direct ascent was quickly discarded, as there seemed to be no chance of building and testing a booster of required size any time in the near future. 78Many officials, including Kennedy's science advisor, favored EOR because it lent itself more Chapter5:22 directlytootherspace-relatedactivitiesbeyondthelunarmissions7.9It wouldtherefore betterservethegeneral,long-runinterestoftheprogram.Unfortunately,it alsopresented anumberoftechnicalproblems--mostnotablylarge-scaleconstructionandthefuelinga spacecrafitnorbit--that engineerswerenotcertaincouldbeaddressedsuccessfully within thepresident'stimetable. LOR,theoptioneventuallyselectedd,idpresentsomeadditionalrisk, inthat someofthemoredifficult partsofthemission,suchasrendezvousanddocking,would betakingplaceinlunarorbit,farfromanyhopeofrescue.Neverthelesse,vensupporters ofEORconcededthattheapproachhadthevirtueofbeingtheonemostlikely tomeet Kennedy'stargetdateg,°whichit did.Ontheotherhand,it alsorepresentedaformof "lock-in" forNASA.Aschapter2noted,anagencymayfinditsfutureactions constrainedbythescale,cost,orcomplexityoftechnicalsystemsortechnological infrastructureselectedatanearlierpointintime.WhiletheelementsofEORmight (after all, this is all speculative) have readily lent themselves to missions beyond Apollo, the hardware used in LOR proved to be highly specialized. As a result, NASA was forced after the lunar missions to redesign its space transportation system, at considerable expensefl THE SEEDS OF EVOLUTION? Chapter 2 stated that issue evolution--a shift in the patterns of government support for a policy or program---can be influenced by a number of factors, such as interest group activity, external events, and general political change. A number of Chapter5:23 observers(includingsomewriting atthetime)havesuggestedthat,ineffect,theCold War-baseddefinitionofU.S.spacepolicy--and thusitscommitmenttotheApollo program--beganchangingasearlyas19638.2Whilethefixing precisedatethatsupport foragivenpolicybeginstochangeisaratherdifficult task,it isclearthatmanyofthe elementsthatchapter2describedascontributingtoissueevolutionwereindeedpresent in the1962-63period. Tobeginwith,PresidentKennedywascomingunderincreasingpressuretorevise hispositiononthelunarprogram.Although(asseenearlier)someRepublicanmembers ofCongresshad,inthefirst fewdaysaftertheGagarinflight, attackedthepresidentfor notinvestingenoughinthespaceprogram,by 1963GOPRepresentativeasndSenators hadtakentocriticizinghimfor spendingtoomuch.InMay,forexample,theSenate RepublicanPolicyCommitteereleasedareporturgingthatApollobescaledbackandthat themoneyberedirectedto--using aphrasethatwouldbeheardmoreandmore frequentlyintheyearsahead--"problemshereonearth'.'83Thatfall, CongressmaLnouis WymanofNewHampshiresoughta$700million reduction($550million ofwhichwas tocomefromthemoonprogram)inNASA's FY 1964budget.Theproposalwassoundly defeated(132-47),butthefactthatit waspresentedatallisanindicationthatopposition wasbeginningtodevelop. Moreserious,fromKennedy'spointofview,wasthegrowingcriticismcoming fromprominentmembersofhisownparty.SenatorJ.William FulbrightofArkansas emergedthelatterhalfof 1962asastaunchopponentofApollo. Hisprimaryobjection, hesaid,wasnotthelunargoalitself,butrathertheend-of-thedecadetimetable,which addedconsiderablytothecostoftheprogram_. Hewasjoinedbyfellow liberalSenators Chapter5:24 JosephS.Clark(Pennsylvaniaa)ndEmestGruening(Alaska),bothofwhom(like Fulbright)wantedtoincreasefundingforsocialprograms.Fulbright'sattempttocut NASA's 1964budgetbytenpercentfaredsomewhabtetterthanWyman'ssimilareffort intheHouse,losingbyonlytenvotes(46-36).85 Inadditiontogrowing(albeitstill relativelysmall)domesticdiscontent,there wereanumberofinternationaleventsthatserved,if nottoreduceColdWartensions,at leasttoreassureAmericansabouttheirstatusintheworld.InOctober1962,theU.S. successfullypressuredtheSovietUniontowithdrawnuclearmissilesthatit hadplacedin Cuba.TowhateverextenttheBayofPigsdebaclethepreviousyearhadplayedanyrole inKennedy's(or,forthatmatter,Congress'orthepublic's)thinkingaboutspacet,he American"victory" intheCubanMissileCrisismayhaveprovidedaneffectiveantidote. Inaddition,thesigningofalimitedNuclearTestBanTreatywith theSovietsseveral monthslaterappearedtoseta(somewhat)morecooperativetonein superpowerrelations. Finally,althoughitsvalidityhasbeenthesubjectofmuchdebate,thepresident waspresentedwithevidencethattheremightnotevenbeamoonraceafterall.Ina 1962 report(in responsetoaproposaltoaccelerateApollo; seefurtherdiscussionbelow), Kennedy'sBudgetDirectornotedthat"thereis noevidence...thattheRussiansare actuallydevelopingalargebooster...ortherendezvoustechniques"requiredtomounta lunarmission?6Thissameviewwasairedpubliclythefollowing July,whentheBritish astrophysicisSt irBernardLovellwrotealettertoNASAdescribinghisrecentvisittoa numberofSovietspaceinstallations.Duringthecourseofhisdiscussionsh,elearnedthat, duetothetechnicaldifficultiesinvolved,theUSSRhadnoplanstolandacosmonauotnthe moonanytimeinthenearfuture,butwouldbeopentoajoint missionwiththeU.S.As Chapter5:25 mightbeexpectedt,heletter(theBOBreporthadnotbeenmadepublic)createdan immediatecontroversy8.7Someofficials,clearlystilloperatingundertheprevailingCold Wardefinitionofspacepolicy,warnedthattheadmissiontoLovellcouldhavebeena "Soviettrick"todistractthecountryfromitsvitalmission8.8Forhispart,Kennedyseemed tobrushoff thenewinformation: Thekindofcooperativeeffortwhichwouldberequiredfor theSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatestogotothemoon togetherwouldrequireabreakingdownofagoodmany barriersofsuspicionanddistrustandhostilitywhichexist betweentheCommunistworldandourselvesT.hereisno evidenceasyetthatthosebarrierswill comedown,though quiteobviouslywewouldliketoseethemcomedown....I wouldwelcomeit,butIdon'tseeitasyet,unfortunately8.9 Neverthelesst,herearesomesmallindicationsthattheprevailingdefinitionof spacepolicywasbeginningtochange,andthateventhepresidenthimself(bearingin mindthattheremayneverbeanywaytoprovethisdefinitively)mayindeedhavebeen reevaluatingtheApollocommitment.It isusefultorecallattheoutsetof anysuch discussionthatKennedyhadnotembracedtheColdWarvisionoftheprogramin hisfirst monthsin office.Asseeninchapter4,muchofhisearly(i.e.,pre-Gagarin)rhetoricwas aimedatpromotingspacecooperation,andhehadevenorderedhisScienceAdvisorto begindraftingproposalsforjoint U.S.-Sovietspaceprojects.Hewasalsopreparedto proposeanumberofcooperativescienceandtechnologyprograms,includingspace researchd,irectlytoChairmanKhrushchevduringtheir1962summitinVienna.Although Chapter5:26 theofferwasnotmadeformally(duetothegenerallycontentiousnatureof the meeting), the president did raise the possibility of a joint lunar mission during a lunch conversation. Khrushchev did not make any commitment at that time, but he did accept a proposal, made by Kennedy a few months later, to join the U.S. in a limited number of space projects? ° Certainly the most dramatic event in this vein was the president's speech before the United Nations in October 1963, where he publicly called for a joint mission to the moon, using language that actually seemed to contradict the justification he himself had given for Apollo two years earlier: ...in a field where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capacity--in the field of space--there is room for new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the regulation and exploration of space. I include among these possibilities for a joint expedition to the moon. Space offers no problems of sovereignty .... Why, therefore, should man's first flight to the moon be a matter of national competition? Why should the United States and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become involved in the immense duplications of research, construction, and expenditure? Surely we should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of our two countries--indeed of all the world---cannot work together in the conquest of space, sending some day in this decade to the moon not the representative of a single nation, but the representatives of all of our countries. 91 Chapter 5:27 In view of all of this activity, particularly the UN speech, some scholars have concluded that Kennedy's "true" preference was for space cooperation with the Soviets-- or at least to avoid extending the Cold War into that realm--but that he felt the need to adopt a more competitive posture in the face of Vostok (and perhaps the Bay of Pigs). 92 One--somewhat less charitable--author has gone so far as to claim that the moon challenge was result of the president being "rattled by momentary crises. ''93 Either assessment, if correct (and, once again, it should be stressed that there is no direct evidence either way), would suggest that a bit of distance from the events of 1961, in combination with some policy successes (and perhaps growing confidence in his reelection prospects), might have led Kennedy to consider looking for a face-saving way out of the moon race. 94 Another clue as to the president's thinking was his decision (whether it would have been technically feasible is another matter) not to speed up the Apollo program. In late 1962, R. Brainard Holmes, NASA's Apollo project director, had called for moving the projected date for first lunar landing to late 1966. 95This proposal, and particularly the large budget increases it would have required, prompted Kennedy in November to ask the Bureau of the Budget for an overall review of the space program (referred to earlier), and to pursue the matter directly with Webb. The BOB report, dated November 13, and a follow-up letter from Webb, written two weeks later, were generally supportive of the Apollo program as it then existed, but recommended against any further acceleration. The Budget memorandum began by noting that Apollo's projected costs were rising faster than had been anticipated and, as discussed above, that there was no direct evidence that the USSR was engaged in a moon Chapter5:28 programofitsown.It thenmoved,however,intoadiscussionofU.S.spacepolicythat, inbothlanguageandreasoning,departedsignificantlyfrom(if notdirectlycontracted)the argumentsemployedbyMcNamara,Johnson,andothersinformulatingthelunar programjusteighteenmonthsbefore: Thespecialattentiongiventothemannedlunarlanding programhassometimesobscuredtheotherprogram objectivesbeingpursuedbyNASA.Perhapsthemost importantaretheprogramsforscientificinvestigationsin spacei,n whichtheUnitedStatesfromthestarthasbeen recognizedastheworldleader,whichhaveintrinsicvalue, whichhavebeenthefocusofsignificantprogramsof internationalcooperationa,ndwhich,in somecases...can providespectaculaarchievementwsithsomeofthesame popularappealasmannedspaceflights.Lesscostly,but mostimportant,aretheprogramsdirectedatdeveloping practicalapplicationsofspacetechnology,chieflyin the meteorologicaal ndcommunicationsfields.96 Thereportfurthernotesthat NASA takestheviewthat the importance of maintaining the proposed general level of effort in the "other" areas is so great that if any reduction were to be made in $6.2 billion budget request, it shouM be applied at least in part to the manned lunar landing program, in order to maintain a "balanced" total program. 97 Chapter5:29 Webb'slettertoKennedygenerallyechoesthistheme.Henotesthat"NASA has manyflight missions,eachdirectedtowardanimportantaspectofournationalobjective," addingthat Althoughthemannedlunarlandingrequiresmajor scientificandtechnologicael ffort,it doesnotencompassall spacescienceandtechnology,nordoesitprovidefundsto supportdirectapplicationsin meteorologicaal nd communicationssystemsA. lso,universityresearchand manyofourinternationalprojectsarenotphasedwiththe mannedlunarprogram,althoughtheyareextremely importanttoourfuturecompetenceandpostureinthe worldcommunity. Heconcludesthat"themannedlunarlandingprogram,althoughofhighestnational priority,will notbyitselfcreatethepreeminenptositionweseek'.'98 Thus,forthefirsttimesinceVostok and the establishment of the lunar landing goal, members of the administration--including the director of NASA--are taking the position (at least in internal discussions) that other areas of space R&D, if not quite as high a priority as Apollo, are nonetheless essential components of the agency's overall mission. Such a view is in stark contrast to the sentiments expressed in documents like the Vice President's May 8, 1961 report. It is even more striking to compare Kennedy's original April 20, 1961 memo to Johnson, which asked "[a]re we working 24 hours a day on existing programs[?] ff not, why not?" and "[a]re we making maximum effort? '99with the BOB report, which concedes that rejecting Holmes' proposal "will be criticized in Chapter5:30 somequartersasrepresenting slightly less than a maximum effort. ''1°° Even so, Kennedy evidently found the new logic persuasive. Apollo was kept on its original schedule, and Holmes left NASA soon after. Of course, it does not necessarily follow that issue evolution (if that is in fact what was occurring here) happens overnight, or that it will take place among all relevant policymakers simultaneously. It should be noted, for example, that although both documents described above extol the virtues of non-Apollo space projects to an unprecedented (at least since mid-1961) degree, they are still careful to place those projects in the same general Cold War context as before (i.e., that they will enhance national prestige and the U.S. "world posture," have popular appeal, will help the United States achieve "preeminence" in space, etc.). Moreover, it is quite clear that at least some Administration officials did not share this "evolving" view. In April 1963, Kennedy asked Johnson, in his capacity as chair of the Space Council, to provide him with still another report to provide "a clearer understanding of a number of factual and policy issues relating to the National Space Program. ''1°1This time, it was the president himself who raises the issue of spaceflight's "other benefits": What specifically are the principal benefits to the national economy we can expect to accrue from the present, greatly augmented program in the following areas: scientific knowledge; industrial productivity; education, at the various levels beginning with high school; and military technology? Chapter5:31 It hasbeensuggestedthatKennedy'spurposeinmakingthisrequestwasnotto beginamajorreevaluationoftheprogram,butrathertoseekadditionaljustification(and arguments)forit.A significantpointin thisregardisthatthememowasaddressedto NASC(asopposedto,say,BOB),whichwascertaintogiveapositiveresponse1.°_ Moreover,evenif KennedyhadbeenfeelingpressuredbycriticismoverNASA's budget, heneverthelesms adeit clearwherehisprioritieslay,regardlessofhisstatedinterestin theprogram's"additionalbenefits":thememospecificallyasksJohnsontoidentify placeswheretheprogramcouldbe"reduced...inareasnotdirectlyaffectingtheApollo program." Inhisresponset,hevice-presidendtutifully notedthat"[i]t cannotbequestioned thatbillionsofdollarsdirectedintoresearchanddevelopment...willhaveasignificant effectuponournationaleconomy."Thereportcitestheusualadvancesinspacescience, communicationsa,ndweatherforecasting,aswell asanumberofspecificimprovements in industrialtechnologyandmaterialssciencesa,n"augmentation"in thesupplyof trainedtechnicalmanpower,and"greaterstrengthfortheeducationalsystem."Inhis conclusion,however,Johnsonnotonlyretainsthelogicof theMay8 1961report,but essentiallyreturnstotherhetoricofhisSenatedays,makingit abundantlyclearwhathe believed truly justifies U.S. space policy: There is one further point to be borne in mind. The space program is not solely a question of prestige, of advancing scientific knowledge, of economic benefit or of military development, although all of these factors are involved. Chapter5:32 Basically,amuchmorefundamentailssueisatstake-- whetheradimension[sic]thatcanwell dominatehistory forthenextfewcenturieswill bedevotedtothesocial systemoffreedomorcontrolledbythesocialsystemof communism. ...Wecannotcloseoureyesastowhatwouldhappenif we permittedtotalitariansystemstodominatetheenvironment oftheearthitself.Forthisreason,ourspaceprogramhasan overridingurgencythatcannotbecalculatedsolelyin terms ofindustrial,scientific,ormilitary developmentT. hefuture ofoursocietyis atstake._°3 ThisviewseemedequallyentrenchedamongmanymembersofCongressa,scan beseenintheresponsetoKennedy'sUNspeechproposingajoint lunarmission.Asit happenedt,hepresident'saddresscoincidedwithCongressionadlebateonNASA's FY 1964budget,inwhichtheApolloprogramwascomingunderincreasinglyheavycriticism. Opponentsoftheprojectimmediatelymadeuseofwhattheysawasthe"illogic" ofthe Administration'sposition,asking,forexample,"[i]f thereisgoingtobemilitaryvalueina triptothemoon,howisthatgoingtobepossibleif itisdonejointly withRussia?''1°4 Apollo'ssupportersinCongressc,learlystill operatingundertheColdWar definition,feltthattheyhadbeenbetrayedA. lbertThomasandOlinTeagueeachsent Kennedystrongly-wordedlettersofprotest,thelatterexpressing"disappointment"over theproposal,andaskingif "this nationalgoal[of beingthefirst nationtoplaceamanon themoon]haschanged''._°5Onthefloorof theHouse,Teaguearguedforcefullyfor Chapter5:33 continuedApollofunding,butalsodeclaredthat"forgoodnesss'akeI hopeweneverreach thepointoftryingtogetintoacapsuleandgotothemoontogether''.'°6 AttemptingtounderstandwhetherKennedy's position on the moon program really had changed was not made any easier by his response to Thomas' letter (there is not indication that he ever replied directly to Teague), dated September 23. The president stated that seeking out cooperative ventures with the Soviets had been Administration policy from the beginning (which, as has been seen, was true), as had efforts to build up U.S. capabilities in space. Thus, he concluded, the "great national effort" of Apollo and the "stated readiness to cooperate" were not at all in conflict, but were rather "mutually supporting elements of a single policy. ''_°7 What the president really intended for Apollo (as well as what he actually meant in his letter to Thomas) will never be known with any certainty. He was assassinated in Dallas just a month and a half after the controversy erupted, and up to the end his actions on the question appeared contradictory. On the one hand, he ordered NASA to begin preparing "specific technical proposals" for a joint lunar expedition._°8 At the same time, he never mentioned the idea in public again, except to note in answer to a question at a press conference that he had not received a response from the Soviets, _°9and for the most part returned to calling for U.S. space leadership (as in his last speech, delivered in San Antonio)Y ° There is, however, another way of interpreting Kennedy's proposal that is still TM consistent with the Cold War definition of space policy. As has already been shown, superpower competition in space was more than a simple head-to-head contest of technological prowess (although that was obviously a major component). The larger issue Chapter5:34 behindthespaceraceofthelate1950sandearly1960swaswhichpoliticalsystemcould successfullypresentitselftotherestoftheworldasthemore"progressive"",forward- looking"society.Kennedymay therefore have reasoned that, by making such a sweeping, unprecedented offer to move into the newly dawning Space Age together, the United States could claim that it, although still at that point "behind" in terms of raw technology, was truly the more "visionary" country. 112Paradoxically (as was so much of foreign and domestic policy during the Cold War), "cooperation" can be seen as another, more subtle form of competition. Whatever the case, it is highly unlikely that a joint lunar mission could have taken place during the 1960s, even if Kennedy had lived. In the first place, there is some question about its technical feasibility. Robert Gilruth, Director of NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center (later called the Johnson Space Center) reportedly told a National Rocket Society meeting in September 1963 in response to a question about the that he "trembled at the thought of the integration problems" in merging American and Russian space systems."ll3 Moreover, the Russians never accepted the offer. In fact, they never made any official response at all beyond Khrushchev's remark on November 1 that "[w]hat could be better than to send a Russian and an American together, or, better still, a Russian man and an American woman. ''114 Given the level of secrecy surrounding the USSR program in the early 1960s, it is difficult to imagine---even if they had agreed to the proposal--that the Soviet government would have in the end been willing to share enough information for true cooperation to occur. Chapter5:35 Finally,perhapsthemostseriousobstacle(andtheonemostrelevanttothepresent discussioni)sthatitwouldhavebeenagainstthelaw. On October 10, the House passed (125-110) an amendment to the NASA appropriation preventing the agency from participating in a lunar landing project jointly with "any Communist, Communist- controlled, or Communist-dominated country. ''_ 15The language was later softened by the Senate to prohibit cooperation on a lunar program with any "other country" without the consent of Congress, i16a restriction that would be included in the NASA Appropriation for the next three years. As it happened, however, the Congressional action was to have little impact on the conduct of the program. The new president, Lyndon Johnson was somewhat obligated to support (at least verbally) his predecessor's call for cooperation, and in January 1964 he did duly receive the NASA report that Kennedy had ordered. !17 Not surprisingly, he did little to advance the UN proposal. His view of space policy--for the first few months of his presidency, at any rate (see next chapter}--continued to be that the U.S. should use the program to demonstrate its space leadership: Our plan to place a man on the moon in this decade remains unchanged. It is an ambitious and important goal. In addition to providing great scientific benefits, it will demonstrate that our capability in space is second to no other nation' s.118 Thus, as of the beginning of 1964, the Cold War definition of NASA's mission was still firmly in place. Chapter 5:36 CONCLUSION: THE HIGH POINT? From this point until the Apollo 11 landing in July 1969, the agency would encounter few, if any, problems (of a political nature, at any rate) in completing Kennedy's mandate. Indeed, to the casual observer, NASA's and the space program's prospects during 1964 and 1965 could hardly have seemed brighter. First, it was growing rapidly. The number of full-time workers grew from 10,000 in 1960 to more than 34,000 in 1965) _9The number of employees working on a contractual basis rose from 36,500 in 1960 to more than 370,000 (i.e., by more than a factor of 10) in 1965. _2° Second, its political backing appeared stronger than ever (the few dissenters notwithstanding). Congress continued to approve large budget increases: between 1962 ($1.8 billion) and 1963 ($3.67 billion), NASA appropriations more than doubled, rising to $5.1 billion in 1964 and $5.25 billion in 1965. Lyndon Johnson, one of NASA's principal architects and its most ardent champion, had not only succeeded to the presidency, but in the 1964 election was given one of the largest electoral mandates in modem American history. Even the general public---despite the criticism from some Congressmen and members of the science and engineering community, generally stood behind the program. Polls taken during the 1964 election found that substantial majorities favored moving ahead with the lunar landing, m Third, while some Americans might have complained about the high costs of the program, no one could deny that at least the country's space capabilities were obviously improving. In 1959, NASA's first full year of existence, the U.S. success rate in launching spacecraft was only 50 percent (9 successes, 9 failures), n2By 1962, that figure Chapter5:37 hadimprovedto82percentandby 1965hadrisento93percentn,3Moreover, it began to look as though the U.S. was actually moving ahead of the USSR, at least as far as sheer quantity was concerned. Despite starting out "behind" at the end of the 1950s, by 1965 the United States had had a total of 270 successful launches compared to 130 for the Soviet Union. It even seemed as though the U.S. was finally "catching up" in manned spaceflight, the one area that the Russians had dominated since 1961. After completing the Mercury series in 1963, NASA launched its first 2-man spacecraft, Gemini 3, in March 1965. The agency set a number of milestones during the three Gemini flights that year, including the first manual orbital maneuvering by a spacecraft (Gemini 3), the first extra-vehicular activity (i.e., "space walk") by an American (Ed White from Gemini 4), and the longest human spaceflight up to that time (Gemini 5, almost 8 days). Probably TM the most important achievement of this period was the launch of the first Saturn-I rocket on January 29, 1964. For the first time, the U.S. had a booster that could lift heavier payloads than the USSR. Despite these feats, as well as the claims by some that the Russians were not in fact going to the moon, 125the space race--at least in terms of the image presented to the public--showed no signs of slowing down. In October 1964, six months before Gemini 3, the USSR launched the world's first multiple crew, three cosmonauts, aboard Voskhod 1. The headline in Pravda the following day read "Sorry, Apollo!" and an accompanying article, using language almost identical to that from the days of Sputnik I and Yuri Gagarin, ridiculed the idea that the U.S. would ever catch up: Chapter5:38 NowsuchpropheciesfromtheAmericanscanbringforth anironicsmile.Thegapisnotclosing,butincreasingT. his isnatural..,theso-calledsystemoffreeenterpriseis turningouttobepowerlessincompetitionwith socialism in suchacomplexandmodemareaasspaceresearch_.26 Theofficial AmericanresponsetoVoskhod clearly echoed the concerns that dated back to Sputnik and Gagarin: The flight of the multi-passenger ship Voskhod demonstrated a continuing Soviet ability to mount flights on a scale surpassing that of the U.S. The capacity of the Soviets to launch larger spacecraft in manned flight remained the negative factor affecting foreign opinion of U.S. space activities) v The following March (five days before the first Gemini flight and 2 months before Ed White's "space walk"), a Russian cosmonaut, Alexei Leonov, performed the world's first EVA from Voskhod 2. In short, although the U.S. program clearly was making progress, Americans who had always feared Soviet exploits in space still seemed to have reason to be afraid (and to continue to support NASA's programs). Nevertheless, there were still signs that major political change was coming. Although the agency's budget was growing steadily, Congress was beginning to give NASA less than it asked for. The appropriation for FY 1964 ($5.1 billion), for example, was $500 million below the agency's request. The FY 1965 budget ($5.25 billion) was trimmed by less than $100 million, but this was to be this was tobe the agency's high- Chapter5:39 watermark:fundingforNASA (asmeasuredinconstantdollars)wouldneverbethis highagain.Moreimportant,policymakers--includingthosewhomighthavebeen consideredthemostlikely torally totheagency'sside--chosenottogetinvolvedinone ofthemostimportantevents,fromtheagency'spointofview,totakeplaceduringthis period:theselectionofthemissionsthatweretocomeaftercompletionoftheApollo program. At first glance,it mightseemstrangethatapublicagencyforwhichmatterswere goingsowell wouldencountersuchdifficulties.Asthenextchapterwill show,however, thereasonNASA began,in thewordsofonehistorian,its"eclipse''_2gatthistimeis actuallyrathersimple:theColdWardefinitionasawayofconceptualizingspacepolicy wasbeginningtoloseitspoliticalpersuasivenesTs.his,inturn,raisedthequestionof whatdefinitioncouldbefoundtoreplaceit. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5 l Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood, The Politics of Policy Implementation. New York: St. Martin's, 1980. 2For a discussion of the War on Poverty and its programs, see Michael L. Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History. London: Prentice-Hall International, 1996; Edward Ziegler and Jeannette Valentine (eds) Project Head Start: A Legacy of the War on Poverty. New York: Free Press, 1979. On Operation Desert Storm, see Bob Woodward, The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991; James K. Chapter 5:40 Matthews, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and its Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Washington: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research Center of U. S. Transportation Command, 1996. 3Questions about how Gagarin had landed were to prove somewhat embarrassing for the Soviets when they claimed world records for the flight, since the rules of the Federation Aeronautique Intemationale (the organization that certifies such records) require that a pilot take off and land inside the same vehicle. See James Oberg, Red Star in Orbit: The Inside Story of Soviet Failures and Triumphs in Space. New York: Random House, 1981, pp. 54-55. 4Or even a third, if one counts the Lunik flight around the moon. See Walter A. McDougall .... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. New York: Basic Books, 1985, p. 244. 5See, for example, Murray and Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon, p. 77; Henry C. Dethloff, Suddenly Tomorrow Came: A History of the Johnson Space Center. Washington: NASA, 1993, p. 29 6Pravda, 12 May 1961, quoted in McDougall,... the Heavens andthe Earth, p. 245. vQuoted in John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: ProjectApoUo and the National Interest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 101. 8 Quoted in McDougall .... the Heavens and the Earth, p. 245. 9Quoted in William B. Breuer, Race to the Moon: America's Duel with the Soviets. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993, p. 163. Chapter5:41 IoWashington Post, 13 April 1961, p. A18. Ix Quoted in Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President. New York: Atheneum, 1964, p. 99. 12Quoted in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-1979. Washington: USGPO, 1990, p. 82 13New York Times, 17 April 1961, p. 5. 14Quoted in Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Malabar, FL: Krieger, p. 59. 15Congressional Record, Senate 8 May 1961, p. 7465. 16Congressional Record, House 24 May 1961, p. 8828. 17Quoted in Lester A. Sobel, Space: From Sputnik to Gemini. New York: Facts on File, 1965, p. 120. is Quoted in T. A. Heppenheimer, Countdown: A History of Spaceflight. New York: John Wiley, 1997, p. 192. In 1962, Pavel Popovich carried a famous (in the USSR, at any rate) photograph of Lenin at age 4 aboard Vostok 4, which orbited the earth 48 times. See Louis Fischer, The Life of Lenin. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, p. 1. x90berg, Red Star in Orbit, p. 52. z0McDougall .... the Heavens and the Earth, p. 247. 21Reviewed in ibid., pp. 246-7. 22Of course, it could have been worse. Vanguard, after all, had blown up on the launching pad. Chapter5:42 23Launius,NASA, p. 59. 24Quoted in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier, p. 82. 25Quoted in John Logsdon, The Decision to go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National lnterest. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970, p. 103x? 26Ill some respects, of course, the general U.S. reaction to the flight was a bit milder than to that of Sputnik L With the Space Age by now nearly four years old, many of the more irrational fears that grew out of the unfamiliarity of spaceflight had largely subsided. In addition, unlike 1957, the American public was aware that at least the country had a space program, and that it had been making steady, if slow, progress. Finally, Vostok had not been quite the surprise that Sputnik had been. A Newsweek story a month earlier, for example, had predicted the Soviet flight would come first (see Murray and Cox, Apollo, p. 76). 27Of course, as the last chapter has shown, this was not exactly correct. Many officials in the Eisenhower Administration were aware that a Soviet satellite launch was imminent. 28Shortly after Sputnik, for example, President Eisenhower stated that "It]here never has been one nickel asked for accelerating the [space] program. Never has it been considered as a race..." See "The President's News Conference of October 9, 1957," Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 720. 29For a brief period, it actually appeared as though the U.S. had a chance to win. NASA could have launched Shepard in March, but decided instead to conduct an additional test of the Redstone booster. Chapter5:43 30Inaddition,theyhadalsohadWebbasawitnessonApril 10andGeorgeLowof NASA onAril 11.SeeU.S.HouseofRepresentativeTso,ward the Endless Frontier, p. 79 31Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Aiming at Targets: The Autobiography of Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Washington: NASA SP-4106, 1996, p. 85. 32U.S. House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Front&r, p. 83 33Quoted in Michael R. Beschloss, "Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon" in Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (eds) Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1997, pp. 51-67, p. 61 34This exchange is described in Lambright, Powering Apollo, pp. 93-4. 35Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff New York: Bantam Books, 1979, pp. 227-228. 36W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series in NASA History, 1995, pp. 94-5. 37Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971, p. 280. 38Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 318 39Although there is certainly evidence that some Congressmen, particularly Republican opponents of Apollo (see discussion below) believed at the time that Kennedy was attempting to divert public attention with Apollo. See, for example, Representative James D. Weaver's comments in Congressional Record (28 October 1963), p. 20385. 40Johnson biographer Robert Dallek has suggested--although upon what basis is unclear--that Kennedy also wished to have the vice president in a position to take some Chapter5:44 of the criticism if the program suffered any sort of major setback. See Robert Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning" in Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (eds) Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1997, pp. 71-3. 41ibid; see also Doris Kearns Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. New York: Harper and Row, 1976, pp. 162-4. 42Beschloss, "Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon," p. 58 43Although there certainly were some, such as Science Advisor Wiesner and Budget Director David Bell, who were at least cautious about Apollo. 44Quoted in Beschloss, "Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon," p. 58 45Memorandum from Robert S. McNamara for the Vice President (21 April 1961), LBJL and John M. Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume 1: Organizing for Exploration. Washington: NASA, 1995, p. 424. 46Beschloss, "Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon," p. 57. See also McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth, p. 322. 47There is a very large body of literature examining President Kennedy's decision to send Americans to the moon. Indeed, it is probably one of the most heavily studied areas in all of space history. See Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon.. See also his "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans" in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 377-393, especially, pp. 379-381; Murray and Cox, Apollo, chapter 5; Launius, NASA, Chapter 5:45 chapter 5; Leonard Mandelbaum, "Apollo: How the United States Decided to go to the Moon." Science (14 February 1969), pp. 649-654. 48National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, The Long Range Plan of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Washington: NASA (16 December, 1959) NASA Historical Reference Collection (hereafter NHRC). Excerpts from this report can be found in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 403-407. 49In any event, there is no evidence that anyone in the Eisenhower Administration (or, for that matter, Kennedy's prior to April) was particularly committed to this "goal." 50John F. Kennedy, Memorandum for the Vice President, 20 April 1961. John F. Kennedy Library (hereafter JFKL). A copy can also be found in Launius, NASA, pp. 173- 4 and in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 423-4 (emphasis added). 51President's News Conference, 21 April 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 310. 52Although he did note that, if it were to waive some safety requirements and limit the mission to a single cosmonaut, the USSR was capable of achieving a circumlunar flight by 1962 or 1963. 53 Letter from Wernher Von Braun to the Vice President of the United States, 29 April 1961, NHRC and Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 429-433. 54Memorandum from Robert S. McNamara for the Vice President (21 April 1961). 55Lyndon B. Johnson, Memorandum for the President, 28 April 1961. NHRC and Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 427-428 (emphasis added). Chapter5:46 56 ibid. 57Letter from James E. Webb and Robert S. McNamara to Lyndon B. Johnson, 8 May 1961, NHRC and Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 443-444 (emphasis added). 58ibid, p. 444 (emphasis added). 59Logsdon, "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans," p. 380. 60,,Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs, delivered in person before a joint session," 25 May 1961, Public Papers, 1961, pp. 403-405. 61ibid, p. 405. 62Quoted in John W. Finney, "President Links Space to Growth." New York Times 1 February 1962, p. x. 63Although for years after, NASA would gamely point to the moon program's "spin- offs." 64Expanded Effort Viewed as a Cold War Need, Survey Shows," Aviation Week and Space Technology (5 February 1962), p. 34. 65President's News Conference, 17 July 1963, Public Papers 1963, p. 568. 66President's News Conference, 24 April 1963, Public Papers 1963, p. 144. 67President's News Conference, 17 July 1963, Public Papers 1963, p. 305. 68President's News Conference 22 August 1963, Public Papers 1963, p. 633. 69ibid; see also President's News Conference, 3 April 1963, Public Papers 1963, p. 310. For a general review of Kennedy's use of such imagery, see Linda T. Krug, Presidential Chapter 5:47 Perspectives on Space Exploration: Guiding Metaphors from Eisenhower to Bush. New York: Praeger, 1991, chapter 2. 70Remarks at the dedication of the Aerospace Medical Health Center, San Antonio, Texas, 21 November 1963. Public Papers, 1963, pp. 882-883. 71Quoted in Beschloss, "Kennedy and the Decision to go to the Moon," p. 58 7z See McDougall .... the Heavens and the Earth, pp. 389-90; William David Compton, Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions. Washington: NASA SP-4214, 1989, chapter 1. 73That view in itself represented something of a reversal for Bush, since (as seen in chapter 3) he had urged Congress not to pursue the technologically infeasible ICBM. 74G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Front&r: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century. New York: Free Press, 1997, pp. 388-91. 75Reported in James L. Kauffmann, Selling Outer Space: Kennedy, the Media, and Funding for Project Apollo, 1961-1963. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994, p. 106. 76ibid, p. 290 77Ill fact, the friction between perceived political necessity and what was technologically possible was evident from the very beginning of the Apollo program. The original draft of the Urgent National Needs speech called for the lunar landing to take place by 1967 which, as the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, was generally assumed to be the year that the Soviets would make their attempt (assuming that they would make one at all). Reportedly, some members of the Administration felt that it was not prudent Chapter5:48 toselectsospecificadatesonearin thefuture(which,giventhattheU.S.uptothatpoint hadonlymanagedtoputamaninspacefor 15minutes,wasprobablyawiseprecaution). Thus,thelessprecise"beforethisdecadeisout" languagewassubstituted.SeeLogsdon, "TheEvolutionofU.S.SpacePolicyandPlans,"pp.380-381. 78MurrayandCox,Apollo, pp. 109-1 t0. 79Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicle. Washington: NASA History Series, 1980, p. 67. 80See Director, Bureau of the Budget, Memorandum for the President, Draft, November 13, 1962, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1,p. 456. 81See Richard Lewis, "The Kennedy Effect." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 24 (March 1968): 2-5 82Atlanta Constitution (21 September 1963): 2-3; "Kennedy's Space Boomerang," Congressional Record (10 October 1963), pp. A6352-3; "Lunar Landing Lunacy," Congressional Record (3 October 1963), pp. 18614-18615. 83Reported in Congressional Record (24 May, 1963), p. 8203. 84See his comments in Congressional Record (19 November 1962), p. 22363; (19 November 1963), p. 22370; (20 November 1963), p. 22451. 85For an overview of Congressional debate of the Apollo program, see Kauffmann, Selling Outer Space, chapter 6. 86Director, Bureau of the Budget, Memorandum for the President, Draft, November 13, 1962, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume I,p. 456. Chapter5:49 87Forafull accountoftheLovellaffairandthereactionstoit,seeEdwardClintonEzelland LindaNeumanEzell,The Partnership: A History of the ApolIo-Soyuz Test Project. Washington: NASA, 1978, pp. 49-51; Dodd L. Harvey and Linda C. Ciccoritti, US-Soviet Cooperation in Space. Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974, pp. 112-121. The complete text of the Lovell letter can be found in Congressional Record (9 August 1963), pp. 14701-14702. 88Representative George P. Miller of California, for example, stated on the floor of the House that "nothing would please a rival power which seeks leadership in the field of outer space than to have us accept their word that they are going to the moon. It is a fine ploy to lead us into a sense of security and then to turn around and destroy our prestige..." See Congressional Record--House, 29 October 1963, p. 20438. 89President's Press Conference, 17 July 1963, Public Papers 1963, pp. 567-568. 90For a more complete discussion of these events, see W. D. Kay, "John F. Kennedy and the Two Faces of the U.S. Space Program, 1961-1963." Presidential Studies Quarterly 28:3 (Summer 1998), pp. 573-586. 91"Address before the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations," 20 September 1963. Public Papers 1963, pp. 695-6. Chapter5:50 92JohnM.Logsdon,"TheDevelopmenotfInternationaSl paceCooperation"inJohnM. Logsdon(ed),Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume 2: External Relationships. Washington: NASA, 1996, pp. t2-13. 93Beschloss, "Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon," p. 63. 94Which still might not have been a simple matter. Noting the "heavy costs" of the lunar landing goal in his Urgent National Needs speech, Kennedy declared that "[i]f we were to go only halfway, or reduce our sights in the face of difficulty, it would be better not to go at all" (Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs, delivered in person before a joint session," 25 May 1961, Public Papers, 1961, p. 405). In other words, the president appears to have deliberately deprived himself of any sort of graceful exit strategy. 95Although the 1967 target had been omitted from Kennedy's speech (see note 74), it was still the date guiding NASA planning. It would slip to 1968 due to budget cuts in the mid-1960s and to 1969 due to the Apollo 1 fire. See the discussion below and in chapter 6. 96Director, Bureau of the Budget, Memorandum for the President, Draft, November 13, 1962, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume l,p. 457. 97ibid, p. 458 (emphasis added). 98James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to the President, November 30, 1962, in ibid, pp. 461-467. 99See note 50. 100Director, Bureau of the Budget, Memorandum for the President, Draft, November 13, 1962, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1,p. 457. Chapter5:51 1olThe following passages are taken from John F. Kennedy, memorandum for the Vice President 9 April 1963, in NHRC, JFKL, and Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 467-8. _o2See Logsdon's comments on the memo in "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans," p. 467. 103All quotes taken from Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President, to the President, May 13, 1963, with attached report, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 468-473. 1o4Congressional Record, 10 October 1963, p. 19240. 105Quoted in ibid, p. 128. See also US Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Front&r: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-1979 (Washington: Government Printing Office, i980), p. 175. 1o6Congressional Record, 10 October 1963, p. 19240. _07For the complete text of Kennedy's letter, see National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963 (Washington: NASA, 1964), pp. 349- 350. 108National Security Action Memorandum No. 271 to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space Matters," 12 November 1963 (NHRC). 109"The President's News Conference of October 9, 1963," Public Papers, 1963, p. 769. ll0See note 70. !11Actually, there are a number of interpretations. See Kay, "John F. Kennedy and the Two Faces of the U.S. Space Program." Chapter5:52 112Thiswould,forexample,explainthepresident'scoolnesstotheLovell letter,which wasmadepublicjust acoupleofmonthsbeforehisUNspeech.Simplyacceptinganoffer madebytheSoviets(assumingthatit wasgenuine),wouldnothavehadthesameeffect. Underthestrategyoutlinedhere,it wouldhavebeenessentiaflortheU.S.tobeseenas makingtheofferfirst. J13See New York Times (21 September 1963): A9. Of course, such an integration did prove possible ten years later during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (see next chapter). 114Quoted in a memo from E. Ci Welsh to Andrew Hatcher, 1 November 1963 (JFKL). Actually, if the speculation about Kennedy's intent provided above is correct (and if Khrushchev recognized what was behind the proposal), then declining without refusing outright was perhaps his only available response. 115Congressional Record, 10 October 1963, p. 19260. It should be noted, however, that some members supported the idea. See remarks by Senator J. William Fulbright in Congressional Record, 2 October 1963, pp. 18543-18544. In addition, Congressman George Brown of California, then serving his first term, later recalled reacting favoring it. See interview with George Brown, 10 July 1997; also interview with Don Fuqua, 10 July 1997. il6Congressional Record, 19 November 1963, p. 22357. 117US-USSR Cooperation in Space Research Programs, report to the President from the Administrator, NASA, 31 January, 1964 (NHRC). ll8 Quoted in Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning", p. 75. Chapter5:53 119U.S.NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration,NASA Pocket Statistics, 1996. Washington: NASA, 1996, p. C-28. 120Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, p. 70. 121Space did not play much of a role in the 1964 campaign. Senator Barry Goldwater, the GOP candidate, was one of several Republican officials who had called for more money for military space programs, and had criticized Apollo on the grounds that it was irrelevant to national security. Thus, while, in view of public opinion at the time, it may have been, as Dallek asserts, "superb politics," there is no evidence, that Johnson's or Goldwater's position on Apollo actually swayed many voters one way or the other. See Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning", pp. 78-79. 122Of course the previous year it had been zero: the only attempt, the ill-fated Vanguard, blew up in December 1958. 123U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, appendix A-1. It should be noted that these figures include all U.S. spacecraft, not just those launched by NASA. 124ibid, Appendix C. 125James Oberg has written widely about his belief that the USSR did indeed intend to beat the U.S. to the moon, but could not complete its large booster rocket in time. See Oberg, Red Star in Orbit, chapter 7. 126Quoted in ibid, p. 77. 127U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1964 Activities. Washington: USGPO, 1965, p. 120. Chapter5:54 128Launius,NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, chapter 8. CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION PART IIh SECOND MISSION? Chapter 6: Mission Accomplished... Now What? As the Apollo 11 command module Columbia splashed down in the Pacific Ocean on July 24, 1969, two statements appeared across the twenty- by ten-foot video screen in NASA's Mission Control center in Houston. The first was the famous challenge issued by President John F. Kennedy eight years earlier: I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and retuming him safely to the earth. Below it was the declaration: Mission Accomplished, July 19691 Most observers date the scaling back of the U.S. space program from this moment. "And then," says one author, "it was all over, ''2 or, as another put it, "the television sets around the country began to flick off. ''3 Somewhat more soberly, a 1981 report for the House Space Science and Applications Subcommittee notes simply that once this "primary goal" had been achieved, "the pace of the U.S. program slowed Chapter6:2 considerably''.4Whattheseauthors--nottomentionthecelebrantsin MissionControl-- failedtorealize,however,isthatthetruegoalofthespaceprogram,NASA's real mission, had actually been achieved some years earlier. THE BIGGER THEY ARE... Between 1960 (the final Eisenhower budget) and 1965, NASA's funding grew by 900 percent. When adjusted for inflation, its 1965 budget represented a thirteen-fold increase over that of five years earlier. After hitting this peak, however, the agency went through ten straight years of spending cuts (as measured in constant dollars). In fact, it was not until 1982, the year after the first space shuttle flight, that the NASA budget for space activities (again in constant dollars) matched that of 1962, the year of John Glenn's (first) orbital flight. 5Of course, as chapter 2 noted, public issues come and go, political priorities change, and the budget will always be shifting as a result. Still, it is difficult to imagine another public issue that matches the speed and scale of NASA's roller-coaster ride of the 1960s; 6significantly, the closest approximation would be to the pattern of military spending just before and after a major war. To be sure, the reductions began slowly. NASA's appropriation for FY 1966 (approximately $5.18 billion) was only about $75 million less than the previous year, a decline of around one and a half percent. Still, it was the first time since the beginning of Apollo that the agency had received less than the year before, and it clearly made Webb nervous. His efforts to secure an increase for FY 1967 (to $5.3 billion) were rejected by Chapter6:3 theBureauoftheBudget7,with theresultthatNASA fundingfellbelow$5billion (to $4.97)forthefirst timesince1964. Bynowseriouslyalarmed,WebbinformedPresidentJohnsonthat1968wasa "critical" year,andthatanythinglessthana$6billion NASA budgetwouldmeanthe "liquidation" ofmanyofthecapabilitiestheagencyhadbuilt up(suchasproductionlines forthegiantSaturnbooster;seebelow),thelossofnumerousfuturemission opportunities,andwidespreaddemoralizationthroughouttheagency)Despitethese warnings,thepresidentsignedaFY 1968appropriationsbill thatincludeda$500million cut for NASA. This was followed several months later by another half-billion dollar reduction for FY 1969, dropping the agency's budget below $4 billion. Under these conditions, NASA was scrambling simply to keep its current programs on schedule. It is therefore hardly surprising that few officials were giving much attention to--much less making serious plans toward--what sorts of missions might follow the completion of the Apollo program. In early 1964, Johnson asked NASA for "a statement of possible objectives beyond those already approved. ''9 Webb, however, was wary of the agency being put in the position of proposing its own missions. As he saw it, the more proper approach (and one less politically risky for the agency) was for the nation's political representatives, that is, its elected officials, to tell NASA what they wanted it to do, much as Kennedy had done with the original Apollo program. _° Accordingly, in early 1965 (several months late) Webb sent the president a "Future Programs Task Group" report outlining a number of projects--including the use of robot probes to explore Mars, continued exploration of the moon, and use of the Apollo-Saturn technology for earth applications--that the agency could undertake after Chapter6:4 Apollo, butmadenospecificrecommendations.I"nhiscoverletter,Webbreminded Johnsonthat"[m]orethaninmostareas,majordecisionsonspacerequireabroad consensus''.n Thepresident,however,refusedtotakethehint,andmadenocommenton therecommendations. TheagencytookasomewhastimilarapproachwithCongress, listing the types of missions that would become "feasible" after Apollo, but making no clear statement of priorities. A 1965 presentation on "Advanced Manned Missions" made before the House Subcommittee on Manned Spaceflight, for example, noted NASA could in the future undertake missions of 2-3 months duration in space science and "earth-oriented applications" in near-earth orbit, as well as extended lunar exploration missions of up to 2 weeks. 13As was the case with Johnson, however, the Congress never made a formal commitment to any of these proposals. Throughout the mid-1960s, Webb tried time and again to get some sort of major post-Apollo commitment out of the president, to no avail. Matters became particularly acute as development of major elements of the Apollo Transportation System neared completion. Some NASA facilities, most notably the launch complex at Cape Canaveral in Florida and Mission Control at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, would be fully engaged with Project Apollo up until the very end. Others, however, such as the Marshall Space Center in Huntsville, which oversaw the construction of the giant Saturn V booster, would have completed their assignments long before. Similarly, the private contractors who manufactured Apollo's components had orders for only a specified number of items. These companies would need to be told well in advance whether they could expect future orders. As private businesses, the only way they could afford to keep Chapter6:5 open the lines dedicated to the production of Apollo hardware would be if they knew that the government was committed to making further purchases. Working against this impending deadline, Webb hoped to move the president to a decision on a post-Apollo program by warning him in the summer of 1966 that the agency was faced with no other choice but "to accelerate the rate at which we are carrying on the liquidation "of some of the capabilities we have built up. ''14 Indeed, one of the reasons Webb was so anxious to secure approval for the Apollo Applications Project, _5an orbiting space laboratory built largely from existing hardware, was to keep the Apollo production lines open as long as possible. 16This was, however, simply staving off the inevitable. By August 1968, with no new major program forthcoming, Webb had no choice but to order that Saturn rocket production be shut down? 7It was to be one of his last acts as NASA Administrator: the following month, he announced that he would retire from government service on October 2, his sixty-second birthday. 's The NASA Administrator was not the only one frustrated by Johnson's silence. Beginning in mid-1965, Congressman Olin Teague, Chairman of the Manned Spaceflight Subcommittee, had been pressing NASA on its post-Apollo goals. During budget hearings in March 1966, Teague reacted angrily to the news---delivered by an equally frustrated Webb--that the president intended "to hold open for another year the major decisions on future programs." "To me," said the Congressman, "it is like telling a child that we are going to make you crawl another year before you can walk. ''19The following July, the Committee directed NASA "to report to the Congress, no later than December 1, 1966, its recommendations on possible major national space objectives," including estimated costs, benefits, and its composition in terms of manned and unmanned Chapter6:6 elementsW. henthedeadlinecame,however,alltheCommitteereceivedwastwo-page letterwithWebb'snametypedatthebottom,butsignedby Seamansc,itinguncertainty asto"whatthepresidentwill approve"asareasonfornotprovidingthedetailedanalysis requested2.° Inshort,by 1968, Afteraheadydecadeofuninterruptedhiring,building,and dreaminggreatdreamsoffar-reachingexploration,the Americanspaceprogramisgearingdowntoaslowerpace andalesscertainfuture.... Thegrowingfeelinginthe spaceestablishmenitsthatonceastronautshavelandedon themoon,theywill havenootherplaceofsignificanceto gofor severalyearsbecauseofsharpbudgetcuts.These cutshavetrimmedtotheboneallpreparationsforfuture missions.It isasif theastronautsareheadingforadead endonthemoon2. _ LIVE BY THE SWORD... As might be expected, at the root of the agency' s decline was a substantial--and, in some cases, rather sudden---change in NASA's political support. Nowhere is this more obvious than with regard to President Johnson. Indeed, given how much time and effort he expended on behalf of NASA and the space program while in the Senate and as Vice President, it is rather startling to realize how little this issue seemed to hold his attention once he became president. As biographer Robert Dallek has noted, Johnson's own Chapter6:7 accountofhispresidency,a600-pagevolume,containsonly 17pagesaboutspace, almostallofwhich(14pages,tobeexact)dealswitheventspriorto 19632.2Duringan interviewwithWalterCronkitein 1969,headmitted"quitefrankly" todoingmuchmore fortheprogramin'"57 and'58and'59 and'60, andupto63,thanI didafterIbecame President''.z3 Moreover,thepresident(thesamepoliticianwho,just afewyearsearlierhadtold somewaveringCongressmen",wouldyouratherhaveusbeasecond-ratenationorshould wespendalittlemoney?''24)wasnowaccedingto--and in someinstanceseven initiating--substantialcutsintheNASAbudget.Asnotedabove,Johnson'sBOB blockedWebb'sefforttosecureafundingincreaseforFY 1967,imposinga$200million reductioninstead.SomemembersofCongressh,owever,wantedtoslashspacespending evenfurther.WisconsinSenatorWilliam Proxmirehadproposedcuttingtheagencyby anadditional$1billion. Inaclearindicationofhowthepoliticaltidessurroundingthe programhadshifted,WebbfeltcompelledtoseektheassistancoefIllinois Senator EverettDirkson,theRepublicanLeader,toheadoff Proxmire'sproposal(whichwas defeated)."It isneveraneasything,"helatertoldthepresident,"to decidethetimehas cometoaskforhelpfromtheminorityleader'.'25 The$500million reductioninNASA's FY 1968budgetcameaboutinpart throughapoliticaldeal.Earlierin 1967,theAdministrationhadprojectedthatthebudget deficitforFY 1968wouldbearound$8billion. Bythatsummer,however,itbecame clearthatthetruefigurewouldbemuchhigher--closeto$30billion--and Johnsonfelt asthoughhehadnochoicebuttoaskCongressfora 10percenttaxincreaseC. ongress didcomplywith thepresident'srequest,buttheHouseofRepresentativeaslsodecided Chapter6:8 thatdeficitreductionshouldbeaccomplishedby bothtaxincreasesandcutsinfederal spending,andreducedNASA's appropriationtheyearaccordingly.DespiteWebb's proteststhatthiswouldprove"thestrawthatbreak'sthecamel'sback','26Johnsonfelthe hadnochoicebuttogoalong.Inapprovingthemeasureh,enotedthat UnderothercircumstancesI,wouldhaveopposedsucha cut,[but]thetimesdemandresponsibilityfromusall. I recognize--asalsomusttheCongress--thatthereduction in fundsrecommendebdytheHouseAppropriations Committeewill requirethedeferralandreductionof some desirablespaceprojects.Yet,in thefaceofpresent circumstancesI,join withtheCongressandacceptthis reduction2.7 Privately,thepresidenttoldWebbthathedidnot"choosetotakeonedimefrom myspaceappropriationsforthisyear,"buthadtoagreeorrisklosingthetaxbill.28 AlthoughJohnsontoldtheNASA administratorthathehoped"to makeupforthis" the following year2,9in 1968theAdministrationonitsownproposedreducingtheagency's budgetby$250million, andultimatelyacceptedthehalf-billiondollarcutimposedby Congress. Tobesure,Johnsondidcontinuetotalkabout,andactonbehalfof,theprogram. Assomeauthorshavenoted,however,by late1964Johnson'srhetoricaroundspace explorationhadmellowedconsiderably3.°Althoughhedidcontinue,fromtimetotime,to talkabouttheprogramincomparative--ifnotnecessarilycompetitive--terms(see Chapter6:9 below),forthemostparthisspeechesandpressconferenceswerenolongerlacedwith vivid andapocalypticimages(recountedthroughouttheprevioustwochapters)of communistdominationoftheheavens. Indeed,thepresidentoftenspokeoftheneedfor morecooperation in space. 3tIn 1965, for example, following in a telephone conversation with returning Gemini astronauts, Johnson said that "[w]e do hope and we do pray that the time will come when all men of all nations will join together to explore space together, and walk side by side toward peace. ''3z Similarly, while speaking with employees of the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, the president invited those living under communism "to open your curtains, come through the doorways and the walls that you have built, and join with us to walk together toward peace for all people. ''33 Indeed, Johnson at times seemed to embrace a view of space that transcended traditional superpower politics and explicitly rejected national competition. "We have," he declared in 1965, "no need for arms races or moon races. ''34 The following year, when accepting the Goddard Trophy, the president claimed that "[t]he true significance of space is the story of victory over the forces of nature. ''35 And once, during a press conference, he asked: As [man] draws nearer to the stars, why should he also not draw nearer to his neighbor? As we push even more deeply into the universe, we must constantly learn to cooperate across the frontiers that really divide the earth's surface. 36 Chapter 6:10 This sea change in Johnson's sentiments (if not his style) was far more than just rhetoric. He actively sought to act upon these newly found cooperative impulses. In 1964, he sent NASA's Hugh Dryden to Geneva to seek out new opportunities for space cooperation. The trip ultimately came to nothing, due to an apparent reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to enter into any new agreements. Nevertheless, the president persisted. In late 1963, while the body of the President Kennedy was still lying in state in the White House, the president consulted with UN Ambassador Aldlai Stevenson about U.S. policy on weapons in space? 7This conversation led the president, in 1966, to open the negotiations at the UN that ultimately produced the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which banned space-based nuclear weapons, required the assistance and safe return of astronauts who landed in another country, and prohibited claims of sovereignty over the moon or other celestial bodies) 8 In addition to Johnson himself, there were other influential White House officials who were beginning to take a more skeptical view of NASA and the "space race." The State Department, for example, urged the "defusing" of the space race and the "stretching out" of "costly programs aimed at the moon and beyond" so as to free up resources for other needs, such as "foreign aid, domestic needs, [and] scientific efforts in other areas. ''39 Donald F. Hornig, Johnson's science advisor, took issue with some of Webb's budget requests and his growing sense of alarm, especially later in the decade. 4° It was Budget Director Charles L. Schultze, however, who proved to be the most constant critic of Webb's assessments of space policy and (particularly) the latter's fears that continuing funding cuts would mean "losing" the moon race. 41In fact, in 1967 Chapter6:11 Schultzeevenwentsofarastourgethepresidenttoabandonthe1969 lunar-landing goal. Noting that "we may fail in any event" to make the end-of-the-decade deadline, Why not make a virtue out of necessity? It would be better to abandon the goal now in the name of competing national priorities, than to give it up unwillingly a year from now because of technical problems. 42 Two points seem clear here. First, unlike the near-unanimity over Apollo that had reigned just a few years earlier, the White House now seemed more sharply divided over the future (and even the current) course of the program. Second, the fact that Schultze would make such a direct challenge to NASA's requests, and particularly the lunar landing goal, strongly suggests that Johnson himself may have been feeling ambivalent about the program. While budget directors in particular are prone to oppose most costly programs, it is highly unlikely that Schultze would be quite so forthright in his assessment of NASA and Webb if he thought that both had the president's unequivocal support. Congress seemed to be cooling on the program as well. Although NASA still had strong support among some of the more important members of both the House and Senate, it is clear that the institution as a whole having second thoughts about an aggressive U.S. posture in space. An internal White House survey of Congressional attitudes taken in late 1966 revealed that most members favored keeping Apollo on track, but wanted to reduce NASA's budget by cutting back on most post-Apollo programs (which was, in fact, precisely the course Johnson followed). 43In addition, the president Chapter6:12 appearstohavereadCongressm' oodcorrectlyin 1967whenaccepteditsbudgetcutsin exchangefor hisproposedtaxsurcharge. Finally,publicsupportseemedtobeevaporating.Virtually allpublicopinion pollstakenduringthemid-tolate1960sshowedsignificantdifferences--sometimeson theorderoftwotoone--betweenthepercentageofrespondentswhofavoredreducing governmentspendingonspaceandthosewhosupportedincreasingit.44Inshort,it appearsasthough,exceptforNASA andarelativelysmallgroupofspaceenthusiasts, mostpeople--publicofficialsaswell asordinarycitizens--wantedtoseeasmallerspace program. CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS Of course, it is not especially helpful to explain the space program's decline by simply saying that it had lost its earlier political support. Obviously this begs the fundamental question of why public, Congressional, and Administration support had eroded so precipitously. There are, however, no shortage of ideas on this topic. "Anti-Science" Attitudes One common observation, for example, is that the space program became caught up in the general distrust toward scientists and engineers that had become part of the American social fabric by the mid-1960s. According to this view, the environmental movement (prompted by such books as Rachel Carson's The Silent Spring and Barry Commoner's Science and Survival), the consumer protection movement (which also had Chapter6:13 afoundingbook,RalphNader'sUnsafe at any Speed), protests over the Vietnam war (and DOD-funded research generally), and the growing realization that science and technology could not address fundamental problems like poverty and urban decay all came together to create a social and political environment that was far more hostile to the science and engineering community than that which existed just a few years earlier. 45As one of the more visible (not to mention more expensive) R&D projects of the 1960s, the space program was especially vulnerable to this sort of criticism (e.g., "we can send a man to the moon, but we cannot .... "). Vietnam and Other Issues Another commonly-held view is that government officials--beginning with President Johnson--were becoming "distracted," both politically and financially, by other issues, most notably the war in Vietnam. 46It is known, for example, that the president was receiving constant reminders about the cost of the war from his budget director, who frequently cited "the continued fighting in Vietnam" as a reason for cutting NASA's budget requestsY Moreover, Webb clearly believed the war was a major factor in the president's behavior. In the August 1966 letter referred to earlier, he told Johnson that he "believed firmly in the actions you are taking.., in Vietnam" and that he had serious doubts about involving the president in the budget disputes because he had "no desire to add to your burdens. ''4gThe Webb/Seamans letter sent to the House Science and Technology Committee in late 1966 also referred to the war as the source of NASA's "uncertainty" concerning the president's wishes. 49 Chapter 6:14 Administration officials were not the only ones who saw a relationship between the cost of the war and funding for the space program. In a speech on the floor of the House in 1966, for example, Congressman Teague complained that "the war in Vietnam has already forced a substantial reduction in the NASA budget for the coming year. ''5° It should also be remembered that the $500 million cut for NASA that Johnson was forced to accept in 1967 had been ordered by Congress to help address a $29 billion deficit created, at least in part, by the war. There is also reason to believe that, in addition to its cost, Vietnam was consuming large shares of the president's personal attention as well. Webb believed that toward the end of his presidency, Johnson had become "obsessed" with the war) IIt is also known that during his last few years in office, the president began each day reviewing casualty reports and other accounts of ground action fromVietnam) 2 Finally, it seems clear that substantial portions of the general public were beginning to see spaceflight as less important than issues like Vietnam, race, or the condition of American cities. A 1967 poll by the New York Times showed that the public ranked five other policy areas as more important than space: 3As a 1968 Newsweek article concluded The U.S. space program is in decline. The Viet Nam war and the desperate condition of the nation's poor and its cities--which make spaceflight seem, in comparison, like an embarrassing national self-indulgence--have combined to drag down a program where the sky was once no longer the limit) 4 Chapter6:15 "What Have you Done for me Lately?" Another--far more cynical---explanation relates back to the November 1957 memo from George Reedy telling Johnson that the Sputnik issue could "elect [him] president" (see chapter 4). If, as some have suggested: 5Johnson's interest in the space program in the wake Sputnik was motivated primarily by his personal political ambitions, there would have been little reason for him to maintain that same level of support much beyond the 1964 election (particularly in the face of growing opposition in Congress and among the general public). With his landslide victory of Senator Barry Goldwater, Johnson had achieved everything he had ever wanted in public life. In short, it is possible that, from the president's point of view, NASA and the space program outlived their political usefulness. This might explain, for example, why he sought out Webb's advice on future programs in early 1964, only to show little interest in the information when it was presented to him early the following year (i.e., after the election). It would also account for the sudden shift in his way of speaking about space. Having reached the presidency, and no longer in need of the attention and visibility that his "alarmist" (and at times outright bellicose) rhetoric brought him, Johnson could now afford to sit back and adopt a more "statesmanlike" tone. Disorganization at NASA Finally, some authors have criticized NASA itself for the lack of any Apollo follow-on program. It has been argued, for example, that the agency did not have any sort of planning mechanism in place to respond to President Johnson's first (i.e., 1964) Chapter6:16 request,andthatsubsequenetffortstoputtogethersuchapanelbecameboggeddown amongallofNASA's variousconstituencies(mannedspaceflight,applications,space science,etc.)?6 Accordingtothisview,it isnocoincidencethatthegeneralquestioningabout whattheU.S.shoulddoin spacecoincidedwiththegreatestcatastropheinNASA history (untiltheChallenger accident nearly 20 years later). On January 27, 1967, three astronauts--"Gus Grissom," Ed White, and Roger Chaffee--were killed when a fire broke out in their Apollo 1 spacecraft during a routine launch simulation. Subsequent investigations into the accident--along with Webb's apparent efforts (now generally regarded as ill-advised) to withhold from Congressional investigators an internal report critical of North American Aviation, the prime contractor for the Apollo command module--led to NASA's competence being called into question for the first time? 7 Indeed, one editorial writer quipped that the initials in the agency's name really stood for "never a straight answer. ''58 It is possible, of course, to take issue with each of these accounts of the space program's decline. To begin with, although there clearly was a sort of "backlash" against science and technology among sections of the general public (especially the so-called "counterculture"), it is far from clear that this had much of an effect on federal R&D policy (at least not until the early 1970s; see below). The rate at which overall funding for science and technology increased did slow somewhat toward the end of the decade (in fact, measured in constant dollars, it even decreased slightly in 1968 and 1969), but only one other field--to be discussed further below--experienced anything like NASA's Chapter6:17 reversesI.ndeed,someagenciess,uchastheNationalInstitutesofHealth,received budgetincreases during this period, s9 Vietnam certainly was expensive and, particularly as the decade progressed, politically divisive and time-consuming. Still, it is worth remembering that the war was started, at least initially, for the same general reasons as the space program: to meet the perceived threat of communism. On the face of it, there is little reason why one high-cost anticommunist program by itself ought to squeeze out another. Although his enthusiasm clearly was diminished, it is simply not the case that Lyndon Johnson started ignoring the program once he became president. He frequently referred to space in his speeches, and was known to follow each flight of the Gemini program closely. It is said, for example, that Johnson personally pushed NASA into including a space walk on Gemini-4. The agency had originally intended for an astronaut simply to stick his head and shoulders out of the spacecraft. After Leonov's walk on Voskhod-2, however, Johnson reportedly told NASA, "if the guy can stick his head out, he can also take a walk. I want to see an American EVA. ''6° Finally, given the lack of consensus in the Administration and Congress, it hardly seems reasonable to have expected NASA to develop its post-Apollo mission on its own, particularly with regard to large-scale projects. Moreover, as has already been discussed, Webb was reluctant to act without clear signs of strong political support. The most important problem with virtually all of these explanations, however, has to do with the idea of "decline" itself. Since most (although by no means all) space histories are written by space enthusiasts, it is not uncommon for such "explanations" to focus on the program's post-Apollo "decline," as though the unprecedented build-up that Chapter6:18 precededit wereperfectlynormal(if notlaudable).Ontheotherhand,opponentsof the Apolloprogram--e.g.,manymembersofthescienceandengineeringcommunity, Eisenhoweradministrationofficials,somecontemporarycritics,etc.--would arguethat NASA'slongstringofshrinkingbudgets(atleastuntiltheapprovalofthespaceshuttle program)requirenoexplanationwhatsoevert:heyrepresenat necessaryperiodof "readjustment."Forthem,what"really" needstobeexplainedistheabnormallylarge spendingonspacethatoccurredearlierin thedecade6._Thediscussionoverthepastfew chaptershasbeenbaseduponthepremisethatboth events--NASA's rapid expansion and its almost-as-rapid decline--are unusual, given the way American politics normally works. Thus, it is important that whatever explanation is advanced for the one should also be able to explain the other. "DE-DEFINITION?" In defining space as a Cold War issue, political leaders like Kennedy and Johnson (along with many members of the U.S. Congress) had charged NASA with giving the U.S. a capability in space that at least matched--and hopefully would soon surpass--that of the USSR's. All of the specific projects undertaken by the agency were subsumed under this one basic mission. As seen in the previous chapter, for example, Kennedy explained that Apollo was justified "not only [by] our excitement or interest in being on the moon, but [by] the capacity to dominate space, which... I believe is essential to the United States as a leading free world power. ''62 Chapter6:19 Thelastchapteralsonotedthatthatgoalhadsubstantiallybeenmetbythemid- 1960s:clearly,theU.S.wasnolonger"behind"theRussiansF.ollowing Voskhod 2 in 1965 (see last chapter), the United States launched 10 consecutive manned flights without a single Soviet response. 63When the USSR finally did place another man in space, Soyuz-1 in 1967 (after almost a two year hiatus), the pilot was killed during reentry. 64The first successful Soyuz flight did not take place until late 1968, just a few months before the first U.S. circumlunar flight. A similar trend could be seen in the area of unmanned scientific probes. Although the U.S. certainly had its share of problems with projects like Ranger (unsuccessful until the 7thattempt in 1964), the USSR's difficulties were even worse. The Russian Luna 9 (3 February 1966) did beat the U.S. Surveyor 1 (16 May 1966) to the first soft landing on the moon, and its Luna 10 became the first artificial object to orbit the moon on April 3, 1966, beating American Lunar Orbiter 1 by four months, 6sbut over this same period they also experienced six (announced) unsuccessful probes of Venus, five of Mars, and four of the moon. 66 Last, but far from least, the successful tests of large boosters like the Saturn I-B (the precursor to the massive Saturn V that would carry the astronauts to the moon and place the Skylab laboratory in earth orbit) beginning in 1966 had finally given the U.S. what it had always lacked in its competition with the USSR: a rocket powerful enough to carry very large objects into space. 67 Not surprisingly, public statements by government officials, as well as internal documents, show a steadily increasing level of confidence that U.S. was roughly even Chapter6:20 with--if notaheadof--the USSRintermsof itsspacecapability.Thepresident,for example,declaredin 1965that: Wewereunmistakablybehind.Someprophesiedthat Americawouldremainbehind,thatoursystemhadfailed, thatthebrightnessofourfuturehaddimmedandwould growdarker.Butnosuchprophesiesareheardtoday6.8 Similarly,thefollowing yearhenotedthat"we haven'twipedoutallofthe deficienciesyet,butwehavecaughtupandarepulling ahead''.69 Inprivate,theassessmentwseresimilarlyoptimistic.A 1966memofromWelsh toVicePresidentHubertHumphreyobservedthatthroughtheendofProjectGemini,the U.S.hadloggednearly2000man-hoursinspace(includingthesixMercuryflights) comparedto507fortheSoviets,aswell asmorethat11hoursof space-walking comparedto20minutesfortheUSSR7.°Welshalsonotesanumberof"firsts" inthe Geminiprogram(somealsodiscussedinthepreviouschapter):thefirst manualorbiting maneuveringt,hefirstcontrolledrendezvousinspace,andthefirst dockingofapiloted spacecrafttoanothervehicle.Neitherofthelasttwohadbeenaccomplishedbythe Russianprogrambythispoint.7, A fewmonthsearlier,Schultzeinformedthepresident: Thereisonlyone area of space activity in which the number of Soviet launches to date exceeds that of the U.S. But, in this area, planetary exploration, we have had far Chapter 6:21 better success with our limited number of attempts than the Soviets have had with their larger effort. In every other area of launches we have a substantial lead .... Evidence indicates that they [the Soviets] are working on a launch vehicle which may.., exceed.., our Saturn V, but there are indications that they are at least a year behind our current Saturn V flight schedules. This situation is a good deal different from that which existed in 1961 when the Russians were demonstrating a weight-lifting capability superior to anything we expected to have for several years and were clearly ahead of us in manned space capability. 72 Accordingly, references by NASA or Administration officials to the Soviet space program diminish significantly beginning in 1965. Whether reporting the agency's progress, celebrating its achievements, or discussing post-Apollo plans, the USSR no longer cast the very long shadow over U.S. space planning that it had earlier in the decade. For example, in a statement marking the tenth anniversary of NASA, President Johnson never mentioned the Russians or the space race at all. Instead, he notes that "we have seen space science and technology assume a high-ranking position in human affairs." He singles out for special mention the probes to the moon, Venus, and Mars, the development of weather and communication satellites. The closest he comes to any sort of a Cold War reference is toward the very end, where he notes that "[o]ur program has Chapter6:22 beenconductedopenly,in thesightoftheentireworld.''v3Moreover,asnotedabove,ona numberofoccasionsthepresidentexplicitlyrejectedtheideaof"competition"inspace. Finally,it begantoappearthattheoneareamostfearedbyAmerican policymakersduringtheearlydaysof spaceflight--worldopinion,particularlyin developingcountries--wasfinally breakingintheU.S.' direction.A 1965U.S. InformationAgencyreportnotesthat,whereasthree-quartersofNigerianssurveyedin May feltthattheUSSRwas"ahead"inspace,inSeptembemr orethanhalffeltthatthe U.S.nowhadthe "lead. ''74 An Administration official stationed in Bolivia during the Gemini 4 flight in 1965 reported that every "transistor-radio-liberated peasant" was aware of Ed White's walk in space and now "worships our technology. ''75 Stated simply, given NASA's ongoing success, the apparent lack of progress on the part of the Soviets, and the general "de-mystification" of space technology on the part of the U.S. public, "the anti-Russian theme," in the words of astronaut John Glenn, "had worn out. ''76 AS a result, NASA was about to be retired from Cold War service. To be sure, the Cold War itself was still very much in progress, and many Americans (as well as many public officials) still harbored deep-seated fears of the Soviet Union. Even so, it appears that by the mid-1960s most policymakers (along with a significant portion of the general public) had stopped seeing accomplishments in space as being particularly relevant to the larger superpower conflict. For the most part, those who continued to express concern over the USSR in space (mostly conservative Republicans) spoke of a gap in military space applications. 77 Perhaps the clearest evidence of this can be found in the experience of James Webb, who, in trying to stave off the ongoing budget cuts at NASA, played the "anti- Chapter6:23 Russiantheme"almostcontinuously(ashehadalmostfromthebeginning;seechapter 4).From 1966untilheleftNASA in 1968,Webbwouldalwayswarnofsomeimminent Russianbreakthroughin space,thattheycouldstill beatustothemoon,etc.Afterthe USSRsuccessfullysoft-landedLuna-9 on the moon in 1966, for example, Webb tried to warn the president that the U.S. could still lose the lunar landing "race. ''7s He also warned of the "political consequences" that would come from underestimating Soviet capabilities. 79 Webb took a similar line with the Congress. In presenting NASA's proposed 1967 budget to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, he stated that The competition is still fierce, and we are not yet able to feel assurance that we will end up ahead in the option areas where the Russians are developing their strongest potential. A $5 billion budget level in the years ahead will not be adequate to develop and utilize the options we are now in the final stages of developing, s° In March 1968, he told the House Committee on Appropriations During this period when we are reducing our efforts by one-third, the USSR is still increasing its effort. We must therefore face the probability that in the coming year, and those following, the Soviets will continue to demonstrate capabilities beyond those which we have. Chapter 6:24 Thehardfactwenowfaceisthatjustaswehavebegunto catchupinlarge-scaleboosteroperations..,wearecutting backourprogramwhiletheSovietscontinuetoadvance8._ When advising Budget Director Schultze on the language that Johnson should use when signing NASA's FY 1968 budget, which included a half a billion dollars in cuts (see above), but which did not even mention the USSR's program, Webb noted that "As to possible language about Russian activity... I regard this omission as one the President will regret .... The activity of the Russians is... spectacular and.., calculated to show the world how far in front they are. ''82 In 1968, after the Soviet Union successfully sent their Zond 5 spacecraft (carrying two turtles) around the moon and back for a safe (albeit rough) landing in the Indian Ocean, Webb called it the most important demonstration to date of all the capabilities required for operations around the earth and outward to the moon and planets--in other words, all the capabilities for any purpose in space. 83 In the September 16 press conference announcing his retirement, he complained that the U.S. was still second to the Soviets in space, and was so because NASA's budget had been cut so sharply over the past three years, g4 Webb was by no means alone in these efforts. Ed Welsh informed the Senate Appropriations Committee in May 1968 that "the acceleration of the space program in the Soviet Union is much greater than ours.., their technology progress [sic] is greatly Chapter6:25 increased''.s5Earlierintheyear,WemherVonBrauntoldtheHouseScienceand AstronauticsCommitteethat TherearenosignsthattheSovietsarecuttingbackintheir spaceprogram.Underthesecircumstancesournational postureinthiscompetitionisalreadyrapidlyworseningas thestrengthoftheSovietthrustisaffirmedagainandagain whileourownspacebudgetis shrinkingyearafteryear?6 TheseandothersuchclaimsweregenerallymetoutsideofNASA withemotions rangingfromgeneralunconcerntooutrightskepticism.Asalreadynoted,theBureauof theBudgetrejectedWebb'sfearsoutofhand.Inaddition,membersofCongress-- whetherin committeeoronthefloor---didnotrespondtoassertionsofSovietambitions inspaceinquitethesamewayastheyhadduringtheperiodimmediatelyafterSputnik and Vostok 1. It also seems that even the president--who had once evoked fears of Americans "going to bed by the light of a Communist moon"--had reached the conclusion that the U.S. had finally developed an insurmountable lead and definitely would land men on the moon ahead of the Soviets? 7 There was still a possibility that the USSR might have beaten the U.S. to the moon (the Soviets reportedly had planned a circumlunar mission that would have flown two weeks before Apollo 8, but cancelled it due to problems with the booster rocket88). Such an event would certainly have been disappointing, but it almost certainly would not have inspired the same level of anxiety and fear as had Sputnik and Vostok. Despite such serious setbacks as the Apollo I fire, the United States had, by 1966-1967, achieved the primary goal of its space program. If it could not say definitively that it was indeed "first" Chapter6:26 inspace---duesolelytothefactthatsolittle wasknownforcertainaboutthestatusof USSRspacepolicy--it couldwithgreatconfidenceclaimthatit had"caughtup." Althoughthemoonlandingitselfwouldnotoccurfortwomoreyears,itisclearthatthe U.S.hadmetits"real"goalinspaceby 1967. Assuggestedearlier,noneofthismeantthatpublicofficialsin anywayregarded theColdWarasbeingover.Indeed,superpowercompetitionwasstill adrivingforceina numberofpolicyareas(nottheleastofwhichwasVietnam),including some aspects of space. Even as NASA's budget was shrinking, DOD funding for space activities was actually going up. Between 1965 and 1969, the budget for space-based defense grew by nearly one-third, g9primarily due to the advanced work on the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, a military space station approved by the Secretary of Defense in late 1963. Significantly, it was one of the few major "new starts" in space undertaken during the Johnson Administration. In other words, although the Cold War was still raging, policymakers were being much more selective in just what types of policy areas they were willing to see as relevant to it. As a result, there were a few programs, like spaceflight, that had benefited from that association which suddenly found themselves losing political support (and thus funding). HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS: THE SAME BOAT It was noted above that federal programs in support of basic science generally held their own--or even received modest increases--during the latter part of the Johnson Chapter6:27 Administration.Themajorexceptiontothistrend(in additiontocivilian spaceflight)was highenergyphysics.Indeed,thecomparisonbetweenthepoliticalstatusofthetwo fields isratherstriking. Chapter4notedthatSputnik had helped boost funding for physics research. Like their brethren in the space program, physicists had been using Soviet advances in the field as a way of obtaining federal funding for still larger and more powerful machines. During the earlier part of the 1960s, this strategy had proven wildly successful: the budget for basic physics research increased two and one-half times between 1959 and 1965Y ° Funding for high energy physics alone rose from $53 million in 1960 to $135 million in 1964, and it was expected that it would grow to $500 million by 1970. 9_ By the middle of the decade, however, it was clear that the field no longer held quite such a lofty status. Scientists had been seeking approval for a new $280 million particle accelerator. As before, they held up the example of the USSR, which, by the mid- 1960s, was in possession of the world's largest such machine, a 70-billion electron volt (GeV) device located at Serpukhov. 92The proposed machine would easily outclass that, operating in the range of 200 GeV. This would be followed, it was hoped, by an even larger, 600-1000 GeV machine costing $800 million. Much to the physics community's surprise, however, this time policymakers were reluctant (to say the least) to go along. Moreover, their concerns were markedly similar to those being expressed (at about the same time) about NASA. First, there was the cost Congressman Chet Hollifield, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, cautioned that "there is no end to scientific ambitions to explore, but there is an end to the public purse. ''93Meeting with a group of physicists and Congressmen from the Midwest Chapter6:28 (wherethefacility wastobebuilt),PresidenJtohnsonscoffedthathewas"theonlyman in governmenwt howantstosavemoneyandhereareallthesepeoplewhowanttospend money'.'94Ingeneral,criticsopenlywonderedatthepracticalvalueoflargeparticle acceleratorsg,iventhatthefederalbudgetwasundersuchstrain.95 Second,manyopponentsofthemachine--whichevenincludedsome physicists--arguedthatitshighcostdivertedmoneyfromotherR&D programs.Alvin Weinberg,DirectorofOakRidgeNationalLaboratory(andwhoiscreditedwithcoining theterm"big science")claimedthatresearchinparticlephysicsdidnotcarryoverinto otherfields,evenwithinphysicsitself.Overall,heratedtheproject"nil" intermsof technologydevelopmenatndsocialvalue,andconcluded: Thoseculturesthatdevotedtoomuchoftheirtalentsto monumentswhichhadnothingtodowiththerealissuesof humanwell-beinghaveusuallyfallenuponbaddays.... We mustnotallowourselvesb,yshort-sightedseekingafter fragilemonumentsofBig Science,tobedivertedfromour realpurpose,whichistheenrichingandbroadeningof humanlife.96 Ultimately,PresidentJohnsonkilled theprojectinearly1964.Its demise 97 signaled a downturn in funding for high energy physics generally, with largely negative effects for the field overall. By 1966, applicants for jobs at the American Physical Society national convention were nearly double the number of openings. Two years later, it was estimated that only seven out of ten physics Ph.D.s were finding jobs in the field, and that Chapter6:29 asmanyasone-thirdweremakingtheirliving aspost-doctoralfellows?sThesituationled physicistVictorWeisskopftothebittercommentthat Hereis agenerationofpeoplewhostudiedphysicsunder thestimulusofSputnik. As kids in school they were told that there was this great national emergency and that we needed scientists. So they worked hard--it's not easy to become a physicist--and now they have maybe a wife and a child and they are out on the street and naturally they feel cheated. 99 ALL BUILT UP AND NO PLACE TO GO A common criticism of the U.S. space program since the moon landing--one that is still heard today--is that it has never had a similar sort of long-range "goal." Space advocates often call for some sort of overarching objective (a mission to Mars is a perennial favorite) that would, in their view, serve the same function as Apollo in the 1960s/°° Implicit in this view is the notion that the success of the lunar program stemmed, at least in part, from the dramatic, "challenge" format initiated by President Kennedy. The analysis presented here, however, suggests that the problem was really much more basic. Although the Cold War certainly must stand as one of the most traumatic periods in U.S. (not to mention world) history, its political utility to organizations like NASA cannot be overstated. Because it was identified with the single most salient issue of the time, spaceflight became a higher-priority item than it ordinarily would have been. Chapter6:30 Moreover,thisidentificationprovidedpublicofficialsstrongpoliticalandpersonal incentivesfor supportingtheprogram. Ashasalreadybeenpointedout,nootherpotentialjustificationfor spaceactivity had(orhastothisday)anywherenearthesamedegreeofpoliticalappeal.Thus,theloss ofitsColdWardefinitionwasdevastatingi:t struckdirectlyatthepoliticalheartofthe program--andofNASA itself.Statedbluntly,by thelate1960s,therewasnolongerany agreemenatmongpolicymakersastowhatthespaceprogram--withitsbillions ofdollars worthoftechnology,facilities,andpersonnewl asfor. It is therefore hardly surprising that political leaders could not decide upon any sort of new "goal." This can clearly be seen in the experiences of President Nixon's Space Task Group, the final attempt to develop a set of post-Apollo space objectives. Less than a month after taking office, Nixon asked his vice-president, Spiro Agnew, to chair the STG, which also consisted of the Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, acting TM NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine, Science Advisor Lee A. DuBridge, and a few other officials (including, significantly, Budget Director Robert P. Mayo) as "observers." Its stated purpose was to produce "definitive recommendations on the direction the U.S, space program should take in the post-Apollo period. ''1°2 Unfortunately, the STG was unable to reach a "definitive" consensus. The vice- president, for example, favored NASA's current course. During one of the early meetings, he called for an "Apollo for the 70s, ''x°3and on the day of the Apollo 11 launch, stated that it was his "individual feeling that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, optimistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end of the century. '''°4 The other members, however, were more skeptical, believing that, even if it were desirable from a Chapter6:31 programmaticstandpoint,suchanexceedinglylargeprojectstoodlittle chanceof approvalt,°5Thus,likeitspredecessodrocumentsduringthelatterpartof theJohnson Administration,thefinalSTGreportcontainsnospecificrecommendationsb,utlistsa numberofpossiblepost-Apolloprograms.TheseincludedaMarsmission,alongwith continuedexplorationofthemoon(eventuallyleadingtoapermanenbt ase),anorbital spacestation,andareusableshuttle)°6 AlthoughtheSTGsubmitteditsreporttothepresidentin September1969,Nixon didnotofficially respondtoit untilthefollowing March,largelybecausethedissentthat markedthegroup'sdeliberationscontinuedevenafteritsworkhadbeencompleted.In September25memorandum(i.e.,lessthantwoweeksaftertheSTGreport),BOB DirectorMayowarnedthepresidentthatendorsinganyof therecommendations committedtheadministrationtosignificantnear-termbudgetincreasesw, iththeresult thatit could"loseeffectivefiscalcontroloftheprogram."Herecommendeddelayingany decisiononthefuturedirectionofspacepolicypendingafull reviewbytheCabinet,the NationalSecurityCouncilandOMB)°7Thesereviews,andsubsequendtebatesl,astedfor severalmonths. Nixonultimatelyendeduprejectingvirtually alloftheSTG'scandidatemissions, albeitrathergently.InhisMarch7statemenotnthefutureofthespaceprogram,the presidentstatedthatamissiontoMarswouldhappen"eventually";thatadecisionona permanenstpacestationwouldawaittheresultsobtainedfromSkylab; and he called for studies on the feasibility of a reusable shuttle. For the near term, he announced that the NASA budget for FY 1971 would be even less (by more than $400 million) than the year before. Space activities, he said, must "take their place within a rigorous system of Chapter6:32 nationalpriorities,"andthat"manycritical problemshereonthisplanetmakehigh prioritydemandsonourattentionandourresources''l.°gClearly,spacewasnolonger viewedasessentialto"nationalsurvival." It isimportanttonotethat,beyondrejectingasecondApollo-likecommitment, thepresidenthadrelativelylittle tosayaboutwhatNASA should do. The March 7 did list six "specific objectives"---continue exploring the moon, scientific investigation of other planets in the solar system, lowering the cost of space operations, extending human capability in space, expand practical applications of space technology, and encourage greater international cooperation--but it provided few details and almost no concrete proposals or actual projects beyond those which had already been approved (such as Skylab). In other words, Nixon's "specific" objectives were, in reality, rather vague. This was, however, to become something of a pattern for statements regarding U.S. space policy. For the next ten years, through three different presidential administrations (Democratic and Republican), _°9virtually every discussion, public and private, of NASA and American efforts in space would be characterized by three basic themes. The first was to refer to the program in the negative, that is, to describe what it was not doing. Nixon's 1970 statement, for example, explicitly rejected projects which required "a series of separate leaps, each requiring a massive concentration of energy and will and accomplished on a crash timetable. ''L_°Clearly, the intent here was to differentiate decision-making on space policy in the 1970s from that of the previous decade. This tendency was particularly pronounced during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Although Carter did not appear to regard the space program as a particularly high Chapter6:33 priority(sixmonthsaftertakingoffice,thepresidentwaswarnedby hisScienceAdvisor FrankPressthatthelackofguidelinesonspacewasplacingNASA in "a difficult position"andthattherewereconcernsoveragencymoraleH_)h,isadministrationdid begintodevelopitsapproachtospacepolicyin mid-1978.At thattime,Pressnotedthat tofocustheU.S.onahighchallenge[sic],highvisibility majornewspaceinitiativedoesnotseemfeasiblewithin anyprojectedbudgetenvelopeor thetechnological opportunitiesontheimmediatehorizon.N2 Accordingly,Carter'sfirst majorstatemenotnspacei,ssuedin May 1978,called foraprogramthatdidnotcenter"aroundasingle,massiveengineeringfeat.''_3Similarly, theSpacePolicyitself,announcedthefollowingOctober,statedthat"it is neitherfeasible ornecessaryatthistimetocommittheUnitedStatestoahigh-challengespace engineeringinitiativecomparabletoApollo.''m Privately,ScienceAdvisorFrankPress, ina 1978memorandumc,ongratulatedthepresidentonR&D policiesin spacethat avoided"largespectaculars''t._5 Second,therewererepeateddeclarations--toadegreethatbordersonthe comical--that NASA andthespaceprogramshouldbe"balanced."In 1969,President Nixon's ScienceAdvisorLeeA. DuBridgetoldaCongressionaclommittee: I seearequirementforabalancedprogramfor thefuture, plannedwithasubstantiaml arginofflexibility in objectives,permittingtheopportunityforexploitationof newscientificfindingsornewcapabilitiesthatmay develop_. 16 Chapter6:34 Nixon's firstNASA administrator,ThomasO.Paine,echoedthissentiment duringhisSenateconfirmationhearings,callingfor "abalancedprogramthatcontainsa healthymannedspaceflightprogramandalsocontainsastrongapplication,planetary, aeronauticsa,ndotherprograms'.'_vThepresidenthimselfassertedinhis 1970statement that"[o]ur approachtospacemustcontinuetobebold--but it mustalsobebalanced''.H_ ThisperspectivewasalsoprevalentthroughouttheCarterpresidencya, lthough thereseemedtobeensomeattemptmadetofind wordsotherthan"balanced"todescribe it. TheMay 1978memofromFrankPress,forexample,arguedthatthegoalofU.S. spacepolicyshouldbeto"[m]aintainavigorous,diversified,andbroadly-basedprogram ofspaceexploration,researcha,nddevelopmen't'._ Similarly,theOctoberpresidential directivespokeof"pluralisticobjectives'.'_°ThefinalSpacePolicy,however,callsonce againfor"abalancedstrategyofapplications,science,andtechnology'.'_z_ Finally,virtually allofficialpronouncementasboutspacebegantoemphasize applications,thatis,usingspacetechnologytomakelife better"hereonearth."Ashas alreadybeenseen,theeconomicandotherpracticalbenefitsofspaceR&D-- communicationsw, eatherforecasting,remotesensing,andsoon--had alwaysbeen includedasoneofthejustificationsoftheprogram,buthadneverbeenconsidered(at least,notsinceSputnik) as its primary purpose. During the 1970s, however, "using t space" began to take on a special prominence. President Nixon spoke of making a "concerted effort to see that the results of our space research are used to the maximum advantage of the human community" and of"hasten[ing] and expand[ing] the practical applications of space technology. ''_22His approval of the space shuttle program (see below) was based on the belief that it would "go a long way toward delivering the rich Chapter6:35 benefitsof practical space utilization and the valuable spinoffs from space efforts into the daily lives of Americans and all people. ''_z3 Not surprisingly, President Carter's approach to space policy strongly emphasized "applications for economic and human development. ''n4 The "needs of our society," stated the October 1978 presidential directive, "will set the course for future space efforts. ''n5 Indeed, the president left little doubt that he saw such efforts as the real purpose of the program: "the spectacular efforts to send men to the moon have been a precursor to the more practical and consistent and effective use of space technology. ''n6 On the face of it, "balance" and "practicality" would seem to be laudable enough traits for any public program. Moreover, choosing not to pursue another costly space venture like Apollo was almost certainly in line with the prevailing public mood. A 1969 Harris poll, for example, found that 56 percent of the public felt that Apollo cost too much and that a $4 billion budget for NASA was too high. n7 A 1969 memorandum to President Nixon also reported that The October 6 issue of Newsweek took a poll of 1,321 Americans with household incomes ranging from $5,000 to $15,000 a year. This represents 61% of the white population of the United States and is obviously the heart of your constituency. Of this group, 56% think the government should be spending less money on space exploration, and only 10% think the government should be spending more money. _28 Unfortunately, such goals did very little to help NASA officials design a coherent post-Apollo space policy. "Balance," for example, can be taken to mean virtually Chapter6:36 anything,particularlywhencombinedwithtermslike"bold" (Nixon)or "vigorous" (Carter).Indeed,in 1962,whileplanningforApollowaswellunderway,JamesWebb referredtoNASA's programsas"well-balanced...inallareas''.lz9 Ingeneral,oneofthemorestrikingfeaturesofthisperiodofspacehistoryishow few specific decisions were made, other than rejecting proposed projects from NASA and elsewhere (and even the rejections were not always the result of an actual "choice." There is no record, for example, that Lyndon Johnson ever explicitly turned down Webb's requests for a post-Apollo program; rather he delayed deciding until the only reasonably available option was to terminate production of Apollo hardware). Far from carrying out the directives handed down from above, NASA was forced to return to administration officials time and again with new or modified proposals. On the other hand, these types of actions---or lack thereof--make perfect sense for a policy area that no longer has any sort of issue definition attached to it. No longer identified with the Cold War, and with no other generally accepted definition to take its place, it is difficult to see how policymakers could have reached a consensus on a new mission for NASA, particularly in view of the exceedingly high cost of its programs. As seen in the previous chapter, such a "system of priorities," as it was understood at the time (e.g., a matter of "national survival"), was the impetus for Project Apollo. What was now lacking was a clear sense of how space exploration's "proper place" was to be defined. Chapter 6:37 LOCK-IN AT NASA To make matters worse, it is far from clear that, even if a new definition--or purpose, or mission--for U.S. space policy had been developed, that NASA as an organization would have been in any position to act upon it. For more than a decade, the agency's growth and development had been directed toward the primary goal of establishing U.S. preeminence in space. That goal, in turn, was based upon the central premise that such preeminence could only be established through human spaceflight. As seen in previous chapters, public officials and other knowledgeable observers time and again noted that the U.S. was well "ahead" of the Soviet Union in space science and applications, but that it required "man in space"_3°--and, later, "man on the moon" 131--to demonstrate "true" dominance. Acting upon this premise, NASA had, with presidential and Congressional approval and encouragement (and even, at times, outright prodding) invested substantial sums of public money to develop the facilities, technology, and infrastructure intended to achieve this end. Chapter 2 described the phenomenon of "technical lock-in," in which an organization has become so heavily invested in a particular set of technologies or in one technological approach that it cannot, either for financial reasons or because of organizational inertia, deviate from it, even when doing so might be beneficial in the long run. This phenomenon seems to describe NASA's position by the i970s. The sort of "applications" that were then under discussion--communications, remote sensing, and so on--seldom required human presence in space. Indeed, as has been noted earlier, critics of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo (including the Apollo Applications Project) frequently Chapter 6:38 maintained that the cost (and the risk) involved in human spaceflight could not be justified by its economic or scientific returns. Moreover, it could be argued (and many did argue) that the very large proportion of NASA's budget devoted to the manned program did not fit into any reasonable notion of "balance." Finally, the explicit rejection of large-scale space endeavors, such as Mars mission or a permanent space station would seem to preclude any new ventures involving humans in space. In short, a case could be made that a "new," post-Apollo NASA would look very different, with little, if any role for the astronaut corps. This was a course which many at NASA, and the space community generally, could reasonably have been expected to resist. To begin with, most (although not necessarily all) space enthusiasts were personally committed to keeping the human spaceflight portion of the program. They regarded (and many still regard) it as an indispensable part of the program, part of our "destiny" as a species. Second, such a retrenchment involved much more than simply not writing any more checks. Dismantling the vast infrastructure devoted to astronaut operations would have required a massive effort (and almost certainly great expense). Finally, by 1970, human spaceflight represented more than half of the NASA's budget (and was widely seen as its primary source of visibility and prestige). Thus, to many involved with the space program, eliminating, or even downgrading _3zthis activity would have amounted to an unacceptable "gutting" the agency. As it happened, however, at least part of NASA officials' feelings were shared by some in the White House. In a memo to President Nixon, Caspar Weinberger (who was then serving as a deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget) contended Chapter6:39 thatsuchacutback"would beconfirming,in somerespectsa, beliefthatI fearisgaining credenceathomeandabroad:thatourbestdaysarebehindus,thatweareturning inward....,,_3F3orhispart,Nixonwasbecomingconcerned--particularlyafterthe cancellationoftheSupersonicTransport--thattoomuchdownsizingoftheprogram mighthurttheRepublicanParty(andperhapshimpersonally)in statesl,ikeCalifornia, thatwereheavilydependenotntheaerospaceindustry. In addition, he did not wish to TM go down in history the president who ended the era of man in space. 13_Evidently, a sort of "political lock-in" was also operating within the executive branch. THE SPACE SHUTTLE: AN UNDEFINED TECHNOLOGY This, then was the policy environment that gave rise to the Space Transportation System. 136Destined to become one of the largest and most controversial programs in NASA history (see chapters 7 and 8), it would represent, to its many critics, a clear case of political manipulation and technological ineptitude, a symbol of everything that had "gone wrong" with the agency. Clearly, as will be seen in the following chapters, the space shuttle fell far short of NASA's rather extravagant promises of the 1970s. Its technical and economic shortcomings are also all too obvious. Still, it is possible to argue that STS was very much a product of its time. Viewed in its larger political and historical context, it is a near-perfect example of a technology designed by an agency with no clear mission: a means for implementing an undefined policy. Means, in fact, is the critical term here. The shuttle was originally conceived as simply one of the supporting elements of NASA's post-Apollo program, providing Chapter6:40 servicetoapermanentspacestation(proposedintheSTGreport).By 1970,however,it hadbecomeNASA's solerallyingpoint.Havingfailedtogainapprovalforanyofits otherproposedprograms,STSwastheagency'slasthopeformaintainingthehuman spaceflightprogramoncetheApolloflightswerecompleted.Unfortunately,sincethe othermissionsit wasintendedtosupporthadbeenrejected,theshuttlewouldhavetobe justified tothepresidentandCongressonitsownmerits. Accordingly,NASA officialssoughttopackagetheprogramin awaythatfit into thenewethicsurroundingU.S.spacepolicy,whichmeantemphasizingitseconomic benefits.A reusablespacecraftt,heyargued,woulddramaticallylowerlaunchcosts(as lowas$100perpound137th),erebyproviding"routineaccesstospace."This,in turn, wouldopenupthespaceenvironmenttomoreusersthaneverbefore:commercial opportunitiesandscientificresearchf,orexample,wouldbegreatlyexpandedI.n addition,sinceitscostsweretobebelowthatofexpendablelaunchvehicles,theshuttle couldbeusedtolaunchsatellites(includingthoseoftheDepartmentofDefense,akey sellingpoint)anddeepspaceprobes,aswell astorepair,maintain,andevenreturn objectsfromearthorbit. Thus,fromthestart,STSwasdepicted,notasa"goal" inandofitself,butasthe meanstoavarietyof otherends.Indeed,JamesFletcher(appointedbyNixon tobe NASA administratorin 1971),whodisliked"highlightingthecost-benefitargument," statedthattheshuttle's"mostimportantjustification" wasthe"entirely newcapability for working routinely and quickly in space. ''138This particular way of visualizing the program, it should be noted, extended to NASA itself. From the agency' s point of view, Chapter6:41 thesuccessofSTSwouldpavethewayforother,moreambitiousprojects:apermanent spacestation,lunarbasese, tc. Ofcourse,justifying amulti-billionprogramonthebasisofwhatit could do, without clearly stated, specific objectives, was a somewhat risky strategy. Many critics, for example, attacked STS as "lacking a mission." Such a strategy was, however, completely rational (which is not to say necessarily a justifiable) when seen in the context of the post-Apollo political environment. During the 1960s, the Cold War had provided NASA with a constituency large enough to support its major programs. By 1970, there was no longer any single objective (or even a set of objectives) that would generate the same level of political support. Thus, in order to secure approval for the shuttle (or any other large-scale project), NASA was forced to piece together a coalition of supporters by promising to provide a (very) broadly based service) 39 The various technical and budgetary travails that accompanied the shuttle's development have been widely discussed elsewhere) 4°Although NASA had initially estimated that the R&D for STS would cost $15 billion (later lowered to $10 billion), it ultimately had to settle for $5.5 billion. This, in turn, required a substantial redesign, resulting in a system that was only partially reusable (the external fuel tank would be discarded on each flight). The agency also encountered some difficulties in developing a design that would fully satisfy all of its potential customers (particularly DOD), and struggled (ultimately unsuccessfully) with making the overall system truly cost-effective. As a result, the program fell far behind schedule. It also ran well over its budget, forcing the agency to divert funds from its other programs (most notably space scienceJ41). All of this turmoil might well have been justified if STS had performed up to the standards Chapter6:42 originallysetbyNASA (thereisanoldsayinginthetheaterthat"nothingisascheapasa hit,nomatterwhatitcosts"),but,despitetheinitial excitementfollowing thefirstshuttle launchin 1981(seenextchapter),theshuttleultimatelyfell farshortof those expect_ions. CONCLUSION: RIPE FOR A CHANGE A document prepared for the Carter-Mondale presidential transition team noted that "NASA has more difficulty than most agencies in describing national goals in a way that its programs relate to them" and that "[m]uch apprehension and uneasiness about the NASA budget would disappear if the civilian space program, like its military counterpart, had clear objectives related to national goals. ''_4zAlthough this assessment was, on the face of it, essentially correct, the analysis presented here suggests that this was not a problem of NASA's making. For much of the previous decade, the agency had been closely identified with one of the nation' s most important "goals." Moreover, that goal had been articulated, not by NASA, but by President Kennedy, President Johnson, and the U.S. Congress. It can therefore be argued that the agency's "difficulty" resided less in its own shortcomings than in the unwillingness of elected officials (beginning, ironically, with Johnson) to identify the policy problem(s) NASA was expected to address. In short, what the space program needed--badly--was a new definition, a connection to an ongoing and compelling public issue. Although some policymakers still expressed mild concerns about the USSR in space, t43few people--in and out of government--would have accepted once again defining NASA in Cold War-based terms. Chapter6:43 Thisnewdefinitionwouldhavetobedrawnfromsomeotherpolicy area.Asthenext chapterwill show,theresultsofthe1980electionbegantomoveNASA andthespace programinpreciselythisdirection. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6 ! Recounted in Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon. New York: Touchstone Books, 1989, p. 370 2Linda T. Krug, Presidential Perspectives on Space Exploration: Guiding Metaphors from Eisenhower to Bush. New York: Praeger, 1991, p. 46. 3Richard Hutton, The Cosmic Chase. New York: Mentor, 1981, p. 104 4U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, United States Civilian Space Programs 195-1978. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, 97thCongress, 1stsession (January 1981). Washington: USGPO, p. 380 s U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1994 ActfiHties. Washington: NASA, 1995, Appendix E-1 6There is one somewhat similar, albeit smaller in scale, policy issue, to be described below. Chapter 6:44 7 Memo for the President from Charles L. Schultze (BOB Director) with attached letter to James E. Webb, 4 October 1966, copy in the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter LBJL). 8Letter to the President from James E. Webb, 16 May 1966 (LBJL). 9Quoted in John M. Logsdon "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans" in John M. Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume I: Organizing for Exploration. Washington: NASA, 1995, p. 382. 10ibid. See also W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series in NASA History, 1995 (as well as his W. Henry Lambright, "James E. Webb: A Dominant Force in 20th Century Public Administration." Public Admin&tration Review 53:2 (March-April 1993), pp. 95-99. il U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Future Programs Task Group, Summary Report, January 1965, in Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown, Volume L pp. 473-489. 12Letter to the President from James E. Webb, 16 February 1965 (LBJL). 13U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 1966 NASA Authorization. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 89thCongress, 1stsession (3, 4, 11, 16, and 17 March 1965). Washington: USGPO, pp. 134- 135. J4Letter to the President from James E. Webb, 26 August 1966, LBJL and in Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown, Volume L p. 491. Chapter 6:45 J5This program, in a greatly reduced form, was renamed Skylab in 1970. 16W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series in NASA History, 1995, p. 139. 17Memorandum to Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight from James E. Webb, "Termination of the Contract for Procurement of Long Lead Time Items for Vehicles 516 and 517," 1 August 1968, in Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 494-495. 18This is not to suggest that these events are necessarily related. Indeed, there is no little mystery surrounding Webb's departure from NASA. See ibid, pp. 85-85; and Lambright, Powering Apollo, pp. 200-205. 19Quoted in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier." History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-1979. Washington: USGPO, 1990, p. 190. 20ibid, p. 191. 21John Noble Wilford, "U.S. Space Effort is Shrinking After Era of Growth." New York Times 16 April 1968, p.zx. 22Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," p.80. See also Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971. 23Quoted in ibid. Chapter6:46 24QuotedinMichaelR.Beschloss",KennedyandtheDecisiontoGototheMoon" inRogerD.LauniusandHowardE.McCurdy(eds)Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1997, p. 58 25Letter to the President from James E. Webb, 26 August 1966, in Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown, Volume/, p. 492. 26Letter to the President from James E. Webb, 10 July 1967 (LBJL). 27Signing Statement on S. 1296, the FY 1968 NASA Authorization Bill (LBJL). 28Confidential memorandum to James E. Webb from the President, 29 September 1967 (LBJL). 29Quoted in Robert Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning" in Launius and (eds) Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, p. 84. 3oFor a general view of President Johnson's rhetoric on space, see Krug, Presidential Perspectives on Space Exploration, chapter 2 31This on top of the Kennedy Administration's initiatives, which had already pushed space R&D collaboration to unprecedented levels. 32"Telephone Conversation Between the President and Astronauts McDivitt and White, 7 June 1965." Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon Johnson 1965 (hereafter Public Papers), vol. II, p. 646. 33"Remarks in Houston at the Manned Spacecraft Center, 11 June 1965." Public Papers 1965, vol. II, p. 656. Chapter6:47 34"RemarksataCeremonyintheStateDepartmenAt uditoriumin Honorofthe Gemini4 Astronauts,17June1965."Public Papers 1965, vol. II, p. 685. 35"Remarks Upon Accepting the Robert H. Goddard Trophy 16 March 1966." Public Papers 1966, vol. I, p. 330. 36"News Conference, 29 August 1965." Public Papers 1965, vol. II, p. 945 37See Confidential Memorandum to Secretary Dean Rusk regarding President Johnson on UN Affairs, 26 November 1963 (LBJL). The substance of the discussion is also recounted in Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1964. New York: Signet, 1965, pp. 63-64. 38"Outer Space Treaty Chronology," (LBJL). 39U.S. Department of State, Space Goals After the Lunar Landing, October 1966 (LBJL). 4oSee Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," p. 82 See, for example, memorandum for the President from Charles L. Schultze, 1 41 September 1966 and 16 December 1966 (both LBJL). 42Memorandum for the President from Charles L. Schultze, 11 August 1967 (LBJL). 43Cited in ibid, p.83. 44Herbert E. Krugman, "Public Attitudes Toward the Apollo Space Program, 1965- 1975." Journal of Commun&ation (Autumn 1977), pp. 87-93. Chapter6:48 4_ThomasP.Hughes,American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970. New York: Viking, 1989, chapter 9; Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy Since Worm War H. Washington: Brookings, 1990, chapter 4; Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modem America. Cambridge, MAI Harvard University Press, 1995, especially chapters 24 and 25; Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 1994, pp. 94-95; John McDermott, "Technology: The Opiate of the Intellectuals" in Albert H. Teich (ed) Technology and the Future (7thedition), New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp. 77-92. 46See (among many others) W. D. Kay, Can Democracies Fly in Space? The Challenge of Revitalizing the U.S. Space Program. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995, p. 55; Logsdon "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans," p. 383; Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," p. 81; Lambright, Powering Apollo, p. 193. 47See, for example, memo to the President from Charles L. Schultze, 20 September 1966 (LBJL). 48Letter to the President from James E. Webb, 26 August 1966, LBJL and in Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, p. 491. 49U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier, p. 191. 5oibid., p. 193. 5_Reported in Lambright, Powering Apollo, p. 193. Chapter6:49 52ReportedinJimF.Heath,Decade of Disillusionment: The Kennedy-Johnson Years. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975, p. 264. 53Cited in Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," p. 83 54Quoted in ibid. 55Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. 56Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era. Washington: NASA, 1982, chapter 9. 57See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier, pp. 195-205; Lambright, Powering Apollo, chapter 8. 5gQuoted in Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," p. 84. 59U.S. National Science Foundation, National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators, 1996 (NSB-96-21). Washington: NSF, 1996, Appendix Table 4-3; see also Alexander J. Morin, Science and Politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993, chapter 4 60Quoted in Hutton, The Cosmic Chase, p. 80. 61This does not, however, seem to be represent any sort of acknowledgement of a mistake. 62.President's News Conference, 17 July 1963, Public Papers 1963, p. 568. 63Oberg, Red Star in Orbit, p. 90. Chapter 6:50 64Moreover, although this had not been known in the West at the time, the flight did not even come close to achieving its objectives. Apparently the plan had been to eclipse the U.S. Gemini program by having 2 spacecraft dock and exchange crews (a mission which was accomplished 2 years later). The second Soyuz craft, however, was never launched. See ibid, p. 94. 65U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Exploring the Moon and Mars: Choices for the Nation. Washington: OTA, 1991, pp. 50-53. 66Hutton, The Cosmic Chase, p. 81. See Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the 67 Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicle. Washington: NASA History Series, 1980. 68"Remarks Made at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center," 11 June 1965. Public Papers 1965, vol. H, p. 656. 69"Remarks Upon Accepting the Robert H. Goddard Trophy." In fact, on the day of his assassination in 1963, President Kennedy had planned to say that "there was no longer any fear that a Communist lead in space would become a basis for military superiority" (quoted in Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," p.75). v0Memorandum for the Vice President from E. C. Welsh, 17 November 1966 (LBJL). 71On two occasions, Soviet Vostok spacecraft flew relatively close to one another, but this was due exclusively to the precision of the orbital paths on which they were Chapter6:51 launchedinitially. Inneithercasecouldthepilotofeithercraftmaneuverclosertothe otherontheirown. 72MemorandumforthePresidentfromCharlesL. Schultze,1September1966 (LBJL),pp.4-5,emphasisintheoriginal. 73"StatementbythePresidentontheTenthAnniversaryofNASA," LBJL. 74"Nigerians"inLagosseeU.S.TakingSpaceLeadfromSoviets."USIAreport M-402-65(USIA-IRS/AA)30September1965(LBJL). v5MemorandumforW.W.RostowfromRobertL.Sansom24December1968 (LBJL). 76QuotedinDallek,"JohnsonP, rojectApollo,andthePoliticsofSpaceProgram Planning,"p.75. 77Toward the Endless Frontier, pp. 171-2; McDougall .... the Heavens and the Earth, pp. 391-3. 78Memorandum for the President from James E. Webb, 1 April 1966 (LBJL). Memorandum for the President from James E. Webb, 16 May 1966 (LBJL). 79 soQuoted in Letter to the President from James E. Webb, 26 August 1966, (LBJL) and in Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown, Volume L p. 491. sl Quoted in letter to the President from James E. Webb, 5 October 1968 (LBJL), pp. 3-4. s2Memorandum for Charles Schultze from James E. Webb, 6 November 1967 (LBJL) Chapter6:52 s3Quotedin lettertothePresidentfromJamesE.Webb,5October1968(LBJL), p.3;SeealsoT. A.HeppenheimerC,ountdown: A History of Spaceflight. New York: John Wiley, 1997, p. 238. s4Recounted in Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," p. 86. s5Quoted in letter to the President from James E. Webb, 5 October 1968 (LBJL), p. 4. s6ibid, p. 5. s7Dallek, "Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," p. 80. 88Oberg, Red Star & Orbit, chapter 7. s9U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1994 Activities. Washington: NASA, 1995, Appendix E-1. 90National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Physics Survey Committee, Physics in Perspective. Washington: National Academy Press, 1972, volume I,p. 2. 9JCited in Kevles, The Physicists, p. 416. 92An electron volt is the amount of energy of motion acquired by an electron by an electrical potential of one volt. The first postwar accelerators generally were in the range of 4-5 billion electron volts (abbreviated GeV). By contrast, the Superconducting Super Collider, which was cancelled in 1993, was to operated in the neighborhood of 40 Chapter 6:53 trillion electron volts. See W. D. Kay, "Particle Physics and the Superconducting Super Collider: The Collaboration that Wasn't" in Vicki L. Golich and W. D. Kay (eds), International Collaboration in Science and Technology Among Advanced Industrial Societies. London: Routledge (forthcoming). Quoted in Kevles, The Physicists, p. 416. 93 94Quoted in Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science. New York: New American Library, 1967, p. 260. 95See, for example, John Fisher, "Why Our Scientists are About to be Dragged, Moaning, Into Politics." Harper's (September 1966), p. 27. 96Quoted in Kevles, The Physicists, pp. 417-418. 97That was not the end of the matter, however. A few years later, the project was revived (albeit not without controversy), and a large accelerator was built at a site near Chicago(later named the Fermi National Laboratory, or Fermilab). 98Kevles, The Physicists, p. 421. 99Quoted in ibid. _0oFor a review of these arguments, see Kay, Can Democracies Fly in Space? pp. 19-20. _o_Laird was represented by Air Force Secretary (and former NASA Associate Administrator) Robert Seamans. _o2Memorandum from the President to the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Acting Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Chapter6:54 Administration,andtheScienceAdvisor,13February1969,(NASAHistoryOffice)and inLogsdon(ed),Exploring the Unknown, voI. I, pp. 512-513. 103Quoted in Logsdon "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans," p. 384 104Quoted in New York Times, 17 July 1969, p. 1. 10_Logsdon "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans," pp. 384-385; see also Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Aiming at Targets: The Autobiography of Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Washington: NASA SP-4106, 1996, pp. 242-244. 106See U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, America's Next Decade in Space: A Report for the Space Task Group. Washington: NASA, 1969. 107Memorandum from Robert P. Mayo to the President, "Space Task Group Report," 25 September 1970, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 544- 546. 108"Statement about the Future of the United States Space Program," 7 March 1970, Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1970, pp. 250-253. io9Although it should be noted that during his brief tenure in office, Gerald Ford made few definitive statements about the program. See, for example, Krug, Presidential Perspectives on Space Exploration, pp. 56-59. 110"Statement about the Future of the United States Space Program," 7 March 1970. i11Memorandum from Frank Press to the President, 30 August 1977, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (hereafter JCL). Chapter6:55 11M2emorandumfromFrankPressto Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, Energy; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Director, Domestic Policy Staff; Director, Office of Management and Budget, "Civil Space and Aeronautics Policy," 8 May 1978 (JCL). 113Presidential Directive NSC-37, "National Space Policy," 11 May 1978 (JCL). See also Logsdon, "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans," pp. 388-389. 114White House Fact Sheet: "U.S. Civil Space Policy," 11 October 1978 (JCL). ,5 Memorandum from Frank Press to the President, "Basic Research," 17 October 1978 (JCL). 116U.S. Congress, Senate, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1970. Hearings before the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 91stCongress, 1stsession, Part 2 (1, 6, and 9 May 1969). Washington: USGPO, 1969, p. 876. 117U.S. Congress, Senate, Nomination of Dr. Thomas O. Paine to be Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (14 March 1969). Washington: USGPO, 1969, p. 12 118"Statement about the Future of the United States Space Program." 119Memorandum from Frank Press, "Civil Space and Aeronautics Policy," p. 14. 120Presidential Directive NSC-37, "National Space Policy." 121White House Fact Sheet: "U.S. Civil Space Policy." 122"Statement about the Future of the United States Space Program." Chapter6:56 u3"StatementAnnouncingDecisiontoProceedwithDevelopmentoftheSpace Shuttle,"5January1972,Public Papers, 1972, pp. 20-21. _4 Memorandum from Frank Press to the President, "Basic Research." _25Presidential Directive NSC-37, "National Space Policy." n6 "Remarks and a Q&A Session with Editors and News Directors," 13 October 1978, Public Papers of the Presidents, James E. Carter 1978, vol. II, p. 1777. In marking the 10th anniversary of the Apollo 11 landing, Carter noted that the primary benefit of the space program was to "help us manage our earth." See "Apollo 11 Anniversary"(JCL). _27Louis Harris, The Harris Survey Yearbook of Public Opinion, 1970. New York: xxxxxxxxx, 1971, pp. 83-84. 12gMemorandum from Peter M. Flannigan to the President, 6 December 1969, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, p. 546. 129Memorandum from James E. Webb to the President, 30 November 1962, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, p. 466. _30See, for example, National Aeronautics and Space Council "U.S. Policy on Outer Space," 26 January 1960, in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, p. 365. 13I."President's News Conference," 17 July 1963, Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 568. 132It should also be kept in mind that human spaceflight represents what is sometimes called a "lumpy" requirement, in that very large costs are required for it to be done at all, even at a relatively reduced level. Chapter6:57 13M3emorandumfromCasparW. Weinbergerv,iaGeorgeP.Schultz,tothe President,"FutureofNASA," 12August1971,in Logsdon,Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 546-548. On one copy of the memo, Nixon wrote, "I agree with Cap." Although Weinberger does not explicitly mention human spaceflight, he was moved to write the memo by proposals, mostly within OMB, to reject the proposed space shuttle and to cancel Apollo 16 and 17. 134See John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" Science 232 (30 May 1986), pp. 1099-1105. For a view on Nixon's political views concerning space, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962-1972. New York: Simon and Schuster 1989, p. 498. 13sInterview with John Erlichman by John M. Logsdon, 6 May 1983, NASA History Office. See also Timothy Ferris, "Some Like it Hot." New York Review of Books 44:14 (25 September 1997), pp. 16-20. 136Next to Apollo, NASA's efforts to secure approval for the shuttle is one of the most closely examined events in the history of the space program. See, for example, John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Decision: Technology and Political Choice." Journal of Contemporary Business 7 (1978), pp. 13-30; "The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle." Space Policy 2 (May 1986), pp. 103-119; and "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" Science 232 (30 May 1986), pp. 1099-1105; Thomas H. Johnson, "The Natural History of the Space Shuttle." Technology in Soc&ty 10 (1988), pp. 417-424; Jeffrey S. Banks, "The Space Shuttle" in Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll (eds) The Technology Pork Barrel. Washington: Brookings, 1991, pp. 179-216; Dennis R. Jenkins, The History Chapter 6:58 and Development of the Space Transportation System: The Beginning Through STS-50. Marceline: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992p; Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, chapter 9; and "NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-1972," unpublished paper. 137"Budget for Approved Shuttle $2.3 Billion less than NASA Wanted." Space Business Daily 60:4 (7 January 1972): 1-2. "" Claude E. Barfield, "Technology Report/NASA Report Broadens Defense of Space Shuttle to Counter Critics' Attacks. National Journal 4 (August 1972), pp. 1323- 1332, emphasis added. See also Launius, "NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-1972." W. D. Kay, "Democracy and Super Technologies: The Politics of the Space 139 Shuttle and Space Station Freedom." Science, Technology, and Human Values 19:2 (April 1994), pp. 131-151. 14oSee note 136. 141For more on the problems of space science during this period, see (among many others) Bruce Murray, Journey Into Space: The First Thirty Years of Space Exploration. New York: W. W. Norton, 1989; John M. Logsdon, "Missing Halley's Comet: The Politics of Big Science." Isis 80 (Spring 1989): 254-280; W. D. Kay, "Where no Nation has Gone Before: Domestic Politics and the First International Space Science Mission." Journal of Policy History 5:3 (Winter 1993), pp. 435-452. Nick MacNeil, Carter-Mondale Transition Planning Group, to Stuart Eisenstat, 142 A1 Stern, David Rubenstein, Barry Blechman, and Dick Steadman, "NASA Chapter6:59 Recommendations,3"1January1977,inLogsdon,Exploring the Unknown, Volume 1, pp. 559-574. 143A 23 May 1978 memorandum from Stuart Eisenstat to A1 Stem (JCL) warns about the "distinct possibility of Soviet space spectaculars," but suggests that "we need not programmatically anticipate" them. CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION PART HI: SECOND MISSION? Chapter 7: Space Policy Redefined (Again) During the latter part of the 1970s, U.S. space advocates had predicted that the following decade would see spaceflight becoming "routine," with NASA's new space shuttle making as many as 40 or 50 flights per year. Although the STS itself came nowhere near achieving this goal (the actual number of flights in 1989, for example, was 6), it can be argued that in another, perhaps more meaningful way, space technology did make major strides toward a sort of "routinization." As this chapter will show, for the first time since the 1960s, space technology played a significant role in a number of "conventional" areas of government policy- making during the 1980s. In other words, spaceflight was transformed--that is to say, redefined--from an end in itself (or as a path to "future benefits") into a mechanism for achieving other policy ends. It is therefore quite likely that the 1980s will be remembered as a major turning point in the history of space exploration, possibly as important a decade as the 1960s. This was due in large part to a convergence of two very different, but ultimately intertwined, series of events. First, space technology itself had matured to the point where, while not exactly as "routine" as aeronautic or marine transport, it had become more fully integrated into the American civilian economy. Put another way, many aspects Chapter7:2 of spaceoperationsnownolongerneededtobeperformedexclusivelybyNASA (or evenby governmentf,orthatmatter).Moreover,it appearedthatanumberofspace applications,suchasrocketlaunching,remotesensing,andperhapsevenspace-based materialsprocessingappearedtobeonthevergeoffollowing communicationsatellites (whichhadbeencommerciallyviableformanyyears)intothemarketplace. Second,theU.S.politicalsceneexperiencedaprofoundchange.Theelectionof RonaldWilsonReagantothepresidencyin 1980(and,toalesserextent,thetakeoverof theSenatebytheRepublicanParty)broughttopowerinWashingtonanewgroupof policymakerswhosoughttoremakevirtuallyeveryfederalpolicy andprogram.In particular,thesemenandwomenhadverydefiniteideasaboutusingspacetechnologies toattaintheseends.Theresultwas,bytheendoftheReaganPresidency,averydifferent approachtospacepolicyandalotofquestionsforNASA,manyofwhichhaveyetto receiveanswers. RONALD REAGAN, CONSERVATISM, AND R&D There is a strong tendency among political scientists and historians to portray the Reagan presidency as being uniquely monolithic in its outlook. Some, for example, describe his Administration as being the most "ideological" since Franklin Roosevelt's, _ or "the most explicitly pro-business.., since the 1920s. ''2 In fact, Reagan's government, like those examined in previous chapters, had its fair share of differences over goals, priorities, and approaches to governing, even among those personally loyal to the president. Since (as the discussion below and in chapter 8 will show) these divisions were Chapter7:3 tobeafactorin theadministration'sapproachtospacepolicy,it will beusefultoexplore them--andtheirsources--insomedetail: Internal Policy Differences To begin with, it is a great oversimplification to refer to the Reagan presidency simply as "conservative" with no further elaboration. Like most political philosophies, modern conservatism comes in a number of varieties. 3The supply-side theories that guided much of Reagan's economic policies, for example, were not universally accepted by "traditional" conservative economists. 4Similarly, the so-called "religious right" does not have same set of priorities or approach to policy-making as do free-market libertarians. Second, the Republican Party during the 1980s, although certainly "conservative" in its overall makeup, represented a coalition of somewhat diverse--and, in some cases, contradictory--interests, 5including at various times traditional Republicans, social and religious conservatives, and the group of southern whites and northern blue-collar workers that came to be known as "Reagan Democrats. ''6 In addition, one of the more significant--and least remarked upon--additions to the Reagan coalition was an unusually unified business community. Although often seen as exclusively Republican in their sympathies, business interests have, in most postwar elections, given support to candidates from both parties (so that they will continue to have access regardless of the outcome). In 1980, however, virtually all business interests lined up behind one candidate: Ronald Reagan. 7While this coalition was highly successful from an electoral standpoint, winning two national elections by wide margins, it did run into difficulties Chapter7:4 whenitcametoformulatingandimplementingpolicy,8particularly--aswill beseen-- withregardtothespaceprogram. Finally,evenabroad-basedconsensuosveramatterofprinciplecanonoccasion breakdownoverquestionsofhowthatprincipleshouldoperatein practice,orhowit appliesin aspecificsituation.Thistendencyissometimesexacerbatedbythepropensity ofindividualsoccupyingdifferentpolicy-makingpositionstoviewproblemsaccordingto theirparticularareaofresponsibility(i.e.,thecommonly-observedphenomenonof "whereyoustanddependsuponwhereyousit").It isgenerallythecase,forexample,that aBudgetDirector,regardlessofadministrationorpartyaffiliation, alwayscomesacross asmorefiscallyconservativea,ndmoresuspiciousofhigh-costprograms,thanother Cabinetmembersoragencyheads.Thiscomes,inlargepart,fromthatindividual's positionas"guardianofthepublicpurse'.'9Thus,it shouldcomeasnosurprisewhenthe SecretariesofStateorDefenseseeanissuedifferentlythantheDirectorofOMBorthe Administrator if NASA, even if all adhere to the same general philosophy and are serving the same president. Man and Administration Second, it is always important to make distinctions between the views, policies, and proposals of various administration officials and those of Reagan himself. Most personal descriptions of the president portray him as a man more focused upon a larger vision of America than with the policy details needed to implement those visions. Thus, he was at times predisposed to make statements that were at variance with established Chapter7:5 fact,orevenwith (intheviewof someofhisadvisors)conservativeprinciples.Asone reporternotedinafamousNew Yorker article: Reagan understands the importance of having a vision and stating it forcefully, and knows that this can be far more powerful than facts. People who intrude with facts are "doomsayers" and "handwringers" who should be ignored. 10 Or, as a group of Newsweek reporters observed, "he sketched his outline of a vision and left others to color it in. He resisted detail and endured conferences with jokes and stifled yawns.,,l 1 Combined with the multiplicity of views outlined above, the tendency of the President to operate at such a high level of generality meant that, at its worst, the Administration was "unable to speak with a single voice" on important issues.12 This could be particularly troublesome in a policy area such as space, which readily lent itself to Reagan's lofty and sweeping rhetoric, but which at the same time required an unusual amount of careful and detailed planning (not to mention the fact that is also one of the larger and more expensive of government programs). In short, the Reagan Presidency, for a variety of reasons, was characterized by a multiplicity of political and ideological goals. Not only did different members of the administration sometimes pursue vastly different policies, but the president himself would on occasion take a position or embrace a goal that would surprise--and even Chapter7:6 outrage--aidesandsupportersalike.13Thissortof"fractured"policymakingshowsup fromtimetotimeindecisionsonthespaceprogram,leadingatleastoneauthorto concludethattheAdministrationreallyhadnospacepolicy atall.14 Grand Themes Itsinternal differences notwithstanding, there were a number of basic principles that remained relatively constant throughout the Reagan presidency and which did, to varying degrees, influence its approach to the space program. First and foremost among these was a belief in rolling back the size and power of the federal government. In his first Inaugural Address, the President declared that "government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem. ''15 He would often describe the federal bureaucracy as "overgrown and overweight," an "automatic spending machine" that employs "thousands upon thousands of bureaucrats, researchers, planners, managers, and professional advocates who earn their living from the great growth industry of government." 16 The administration moved to scale back the size of government on a variety of fronts. First, it was part of the justification behind the large tax cuts enacted in the first few months of Reagan's first term. These were, of course, a reflection of the widely-held view among Republicans that American taxes were too high overall. They also were intended (consistent with the President's belief in supply-side economics) to provide a fiscal stimulus and promote economic growth. In addition, however, the reduction in government revenues (and resulting record budget deficits) were also aimed at inhibiting, if not preventing outright, new public programs. Within a few years, scarcity of funding Chapter7:7 ledtoallproposalsfornewspendingreceivingamuchhigherlevelof scrutinythanever before.Ineffect,Reagan'staxpoliciesredefinedvirtually allmajorpublicinitiativesas "budgetissues,"17and(withsomeimportantexceptionsd,escribedbelow)madeit far moredifficult togetapprovalforanymajornewprograms. Second,Reaganactivelysoughttoreducethenumberandscopeoffederal regulationsgoverningbusinessactivity.Criticshadlongarguedthat"needless" regulatoryactivitywascostlyforconsumersM. urrayWiedenbaumR,eagan'sfirst ChairmanofhisCouncilofEconomicAdvisors,onceclaimedthatcompliancewithall federalregulationscostAmericansmorethan$100billion (or$500percapita)ayearin larger,"hidden"prices T . MIn addition, it was said, the resources, time, and paperwork required to deal with the government's regulatory demands had cut into business' research and development budgets, resulting in U.S. companies becoming less innovative. 19Although significant changes in regulatory policy had taken place in the Carter administration (most notably in such areas as trucking and commercial airlines), deregulation was to become one of the central themes of the Reagan Presidency. Third, the administration engaged in a major effort at privatizing a large number of federal programs that involved the production or distribution of goods or services. The term "privatization" was coined by the libertarian Reason Foundation in 1976, 20although the doctrine that The federal government will not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or a product.., if such product or service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary business channels Chapter7:8 actuallydatesbacktotheEisenhowerAdministration2. 1Thefundamentalpremisebehind privatizationisthat,exceptforpublicgoods(likenationaldefense),themarketforces thatshapeprivatesectorbehaviorarefarmorelikely toproduceoptimumresults(higher quality,lowercost,etc.)thanisthe"command-and-controlm" ethodof operatinginherent inagovernmenbt ureau2.2 Therearetwoprimaryapproachestoprivatization2. 3Inso-called"loadshedding," thegovernmentsells(ortransfersinsomeotherfashion)apubliclyownedassettoa privateinterest.In 1987,forexample,theDepartmenotfTransportationsoldConrail,a freightrailroadthatthegovernmenthadtakenoverfromthebankruptPennCentralten yearsearlier,for$1.6billion publicstockoffering.Thesecondmajorprivatization arrangemenitscontracting,inwhichagoodorserviceutilizedbyagovernmenat gencyis actuallyprovidedbyaprivatecompanyunderafixed-termcontractwith thatagency. Sincethegovernmenat lwayshastheoption(intheory)ofswitchingtoanotherfirm when acontractperiodisup,thecompanythatprovidesthegoodorserviceissaidtohavea strongincentivetoasoperateefficientlyaspossible2.4Contractinghasbecome increasinglypopularinrecentyears,atalllevelsofgovernmentT. otakeonlyonecasein point,anumberoffederalagenciess,uchastheNationalScienceFoundation,have recentlymovedfromgovernment-ownebduildingsintospacesleasedfromprivateoffice complexes. InRonaldReaganp, rivatizationwastofinditsmostardentchampion,atleast rhetorically.Alongwith Conrail,theAdministrationsought,atonetimeoranother,to privatizetheNationalInstituteofHealth'sintramuralresearchactivities(althoughnotits grant-makingfunction),25theAmtrakpassengerrail system,theOverseasPrivate Chapter7:9 InvestmentCorporation,anumberof insuranceandloanprogramss,everaloil fields ownedbytheDepartmentofEnergy,and(seebelow)theNationalWeatherServiceand theLandsatremote-sensingsatellitesystem2.6Mostoftheseeffortswererejectedby Congress. Asnotedearlier,Reaganwasheldtobemore"pro-business"thanmostofhis predecessorsT.hisdidnotnecessarilymean,however,thatgovernmentwould automaticallycometotheaidofprivatefirms.TheAdministration'sabidingfaithin the freemarketsystemalsomeantthat,intheoryatanyrate,theprivatesectorwastosinkor swimonitsown.Thus,the 1980ssawthebeginningofthestill-ragingdebateover "industrialpolicy," programsintendedtoaidselectedfirmsor"strategic"economic sectors2.7Forthemostpart,conservativeRepublicansusuallyrejectthisapproachto economicdevelopmentasjust anothernameforgovernmen"tplanning''28thatreplaces "thetestofthemarketplacewithrawpoliticalpower''29andputsbureaucratsin the positionof"pickingwinners.''3° Theother"grandtheme"oftheReaganPresidencywasastrongcommitmentto nationaldefensec,ombinedwith afierceanticommunismC. haracterizingthe1970sasa "periodofneglect,"theAdministrationsetoutto"makeAmericanstrongagain."Toward thatend,itproposedthelargestandfastestbuildupofdefense-relatedbudgetauthorityin peacetimehistory.Between1980and1985,theDODbudgetgrewbynearly53percent (by$1.5trillion over the five-year period), with spending for procurement more than doubling (in real terms).31 Chapter7:10 Althoughit mightappear(andreportedlydidappeartosomeofhisdomestic advisors)thattheexceptionallyrapidandexpensivebuild-upofthemilitary wasatodds with hisotherfrequently-expresseddeterminationto"shrink"government,Reagan evidentlysawnosuchconflict.Tohim,keepingthearmedforcesstrongandwell- suppliedwasthe"first duty" ofgovernment,theprimarymeansofprotectingthefreedom andindividuallibertythathehopedtoachievethroughtaxcuts,deregulationand privatization.Thus,asoneobserverputit, hekeptdefenseexpenditures"in adifferent partofhisbrain"fromthebudgetfordomesticprograms3.2 Reagan'spersonalattitudetowardtheUSSR,whichwasgenerallysharedby everyoneinhisgovernmentw, asclearlyexpressedinJanuary1981,athisfirst presidentialpressconferenceR. espondingtoaquestionaboutU.S.-Sovietd&ente,the newpresidentsaid: [TheSoviets]haveopenlyandpubliclydeclaredthatthe onlymoralitytheyrecognizeiswhatwill furthertheircause, meaningthattheyreserveuntothemselvetsherightto commitanycrime,tolie,tocheat,inordertoattain[world revolution.]... weoperateonadifferentsetofstandardsI. thinkwhenyoudobusinesswiththem,evenatadftente, youkeepthatinmindY Not surprisingly,duringthefirst threeyearsofReagan'sfirstterm,theUnitedStates' relationswith theSovietUnionreachedtheirlowestlevelinmanyyears.At onepoint, GeorgiArbatov,theleadingSovietexpertonAmericanpoliticsandculture,evenaccused ReaganofactinglikeHitler.34 Chapter7:11 Becauseof hisdistrustof the USSR, the president tended to regard arms control agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties negotiated by his predecessors, with a high degree of skepticism. In a 1981 speech at West Point (where he referred to the Soviet Union as an "evil force"), he declared that ...no nation that placed its faith in parchment or paper, while at the same time giving up its protective hardware, ever lasted long enough to write many pages of history. 35 This need for "protective hardware" referred not only to weaponry, but also to his insistence that any arms control agreement with the USSR must contain some means of effective verification. This, in turn, was the basis of his aphorism of "trust but verify," a phrase he repeated so often that Soviet President Gorbachev would hold his hands over his ears every time he heard it.36 Reductions in spending, deregulation, privatization, national defense, dealing with the Soviet Union over nuclear weapons: to a remarkable degree, space policy and space technology (as it had developed by the early 1980s) intersected in one way or another with each and every one of these issue areas. Combined with Reagan's personal feelings about the "space frontier" (see below), the stage was set for a number of major developments in the U.S. space program---except for one last item. What is Conservative Science Policy? The only area of federal R&D policy in which the application of conservative political and economic principles appears to be relatively straightforward is when it is in Chapter 7:12 support of national defense. Obviously, if raising and maintaining an army is a (if not the) primary duty of government, it follows that research and development activities carried out on its behalf must be considered a public good as well. It is therefore not surprising that the budget for defense-related research and development rose rapidly throughout the Reagan years. 37 With regard to civilian science and technology, however, the situation is less clear. The dominant conservative position is that, in most cases, the best way to stimulate scientific advancement and the creation of new technologies is "to reward private inventors, entrepreneurs, and investors. ''38 Government support, if it is to be provided at all, should be limited to establishing "a supportive climate for private initiative and individual enterprise ''39 or, if more direct means are needed, by providing tax incentives. 4° Most conservative commentators acknowledge, however, that there are cases, most notably basic research (i.e., investigations into fundamental scientific questions41), where--despite its evident value--the costs are so high, the risks are so great, and the rewards (in the form of commercial profit) so distant that private industry cannot (or will not) make the necessary investments no matter how favorable the business climate or generous the government's tax breaks. Thus, the Reagan administration accepted as a general principle the notion that the federal government has a broad responsibility to support "'basic research across all scientific discipline, ''42 with a particular emphasis on "high-cost, high-risk, long-term research. ''43 By 1985, 42 percent of all federal non- defense R&D funding went to basic research, compared to 29 percent in 1981. 44 Moreover, by the end of Reagan's eight years in office, government funding for basic Chapter7:13 researchhadnearlydoubled(afterinitially beingcut;seebelow),from$5.9billion in 1980to$11.7billion.45William Carey,ExecutiveDirectoroftheAmericanAssociation fortheAdvancement of Science, went so far as to declare that scientists across the country must be "pinching themselves" over their good fortune. 46 In some respects, it is a rather simple rule of thumb: government funding is appropriate in the case of vital scientific research that, for reasons of cost or profitability, is beyond the reach of the private sector. Such reasoning, however, is not necessarily relevant to the processes of applied research (investigation motivated by a direct, recognized need47), or technological development (the direct production of materials, designs, processes, or prototypes48). Unlike basic research, these activities seen, at first glance, to be more appropriate for private industry, especially since they are commonly the last step before actual commercialization. When viewed in this way, government involvement in this type of R&D begins to resemble direct aid to business, the same sort of "industrial policy" and "picking winners" that conservatives generally decry. 49 Clearly, Democratic presidents have had little problem with this idea. The Carter administration was quite fond of so-called "demonstration" projects--particularly those related to energy production, such as solar, nuclear fusion, oil shale, and coal gasification--intended to demonstrate technical feasibility or commercial potential. 5° Indeed, by FY 1980, the last Carter budget, the federal government accounted for nearly half of all U.S. spending on applied research, almost as much as industry, universities, and non-profit sources combined. 51More recently, President Clinton has instituted a number of controversial (particularly among Republicans) programs that provide direct Chapter7:14 federalaidtoprivatefirms forthepursuitofhigh-risk,"pre-competitive"technological developmen(tseenextchapter)5.2 Consistentwithconservativeprinciples,Reaganofficialsgenerallyopposedsuch policies,atleastuptoapoint.Certainly,thefree-marketrhetoricwasthere.The President's1984Economic Report, for example, declared: Some industrial policy proponents advocate government aid to "linkage" [i.e., strategic] industries .... Steel and semiconductors are often cited as examples of "linkage" industries. However if such an industry is vital, then the industries that rely on it will demand its output. 53 OMB Director David Stockman, characterizing Carter's energy R&D policies as unwarranted handouts to big oil companies, called industrial experimentation "precisely the kind of thing that Adam Smith invented the free market to accomplish. ''54 Reagan's first Science Advisor, George Keyworth, in announcing the elimination of programs like solar energy research, stated that the Administration intended to create a "clear-cut... distinction between what should be public sector and what should be private sector responsibilities. ''55 Thus, most authors view the Reagan administration as far less likely to approve of "interventionist" technology policies than those of the Carter, Clinton, or even the Bush Administrations. 56 As would be expected, most of the Carter energy projects were either substantially downgraded or canceled outright when Reagan took office 57 (with one important exception; see below). There was even--for a brief time--an effort to roll back the federal government's long-standing commitment (i.e., back to the founding of NACA Chapter7:15 in 1918)toaeronauticaRl &D. Believingthattheaircraftindustrywaswealthyenoughto fundsuchresearchonitsown,Keyworthconvenedaspecialpanelof theWhiteHouse ScienceCouncilin 1982toconsiderphasingoutthoseprograms,thenpartofNASA. Noting,however,thatsuchareasasaerodynamicss,afety,andcommon-usetechnologies werereceiving"insufficient" attentionfromtheprivatesector,thepanelrecommended thatsuchfundingbemaintained,if notincreased5.8Overall,bytheendofthePresident's secondterm,federalSpendingfor appliedresearchhadfallentolessthanone-thirdofthe nationaltotal.59 Neverthelesst,hisreluctancetosupport"industrial"researchanddevelopment wasfarfromabsolute.Tobeginwith,althoughgovernmentfundingfor appliedR&D grewmoreslowlyduringthe1980sthanit hadinpreviousdecadesb,y 1988itwasstill morethan$10.5billion,anincreaseofabout40percentsince1980 6 . 0 In addition, Reagan officials did maintain at least one Carter-era energy program. Even as the budgets for research into fossil fuels, energy conservation, and solar power were experiencing significant budget cuts (if they were not wiped out altogether), spending on nuclear fusion research remained relatively intact (which is to say that it was not cut as heavily as were the others). 6j The administration--and sometimes the president personally--also were not above pursuing large-scale, high-tech demonstration projects of their own. Notwithstanding the fact that the 1980s were a time of great budget stringency, the Reagan Presidency at one point or another gave its support to such costly--and controversial, even among Reagan officials62--programs as the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, 63the Superconducting Super Collider, 64and NASA's space station. Chapter7:16 Finally,pushedbyCongresst,heR&D community,andbusinessleaders,the Reaganadministrationdid,towardtheendofthesecondterm,begintoenterintosome cooperativearrangementwsithprivateindustryonselectedtechnologiesT. hemostwell- knownoftheseistheSematecha, public-privateresearchconsortiumestablishedin 1987 toadvancesemiconductotrechnology6.5Otherinitiativesprovidedassistancteothefields ofbiotechnology,superconductivitya,ndhigh-speedcomputing6.6Infact,bytheendof theReaganpresidencyR, obertReich(whowouldlaterbecomePresidentClinton'sfirst SecretaryofLabor)wasclaimingthat"[r]arely hasanAdministrationsoughtmore activelytoencouragespecificindustriesandtechnologies''.67 Tosomeextent,thisallegedlyunprecedenteldevelof federalinvolvementin industrialR&D couldbedefendedongroundssimilartothoserelatingtobasicscience. Accordingtotheadministration,supportcouldbegrantedto"technologiesrequiringa longerperiodofinitial developmen't'.68Thiswould,forexample,justify continued governmenftundingof fusionresearchg,iventhatthefieldisconsideredtobestill onthe "cuttingedge"ofplasmaphysics,andthusnotyetviableenoughtoattractasufficient levelofprivateinvestment6.9 Therewas,however,anadditionalelementtotheseprogramsbeyondasimple correctionofapresumedmarketfailure.Reaganhimselfofteninvokedapoliticaltheme thathadbecomeamajorpublicconcerninthe1980s:U.S.competitivenessinthe internationalmarketplaceH. is 1983StateoftheUnionMessage,forexample,notesthat WeAmericansarestill thetechnologicalleaderinmost fields.Weneedtokeepthatedge.... Tomanyofusnow, computers,siliconchips,dataprocessingc,ybernetics,and alloftheotherinnovationsofthedawninghightechnology Chapter 7:17 ageareasmystifyingastheworkingsofthecombustion enginemusthavebeenwhenthatfirstModelTrattled downMainStreet,USA.ButassurelyasAmerica's pioneer spirit made us the industrial giant of the 20 th century, the same pioneer spirit is opening up on another vast front of opportunity, the frontier of high technology. In conquering the frontier we cannot write off our traditional industries, but we must develop the skills and industries that will make us a pioneer of tomorrow. This administration is committed to keeping America the technological leader of the world now and into the 21st century. 7° Science Advisor Keyworth, among others, 7_echoed this idea, reminding scientists that the Administration's generosity in R&D funding was not an "entitlement," but a reflection of the faCt that "our leadership in the international marketplace is at stake. ''72 Indeed, the relationship between R&D and American "economic growth," "jobs," and so on would come to be heard of so much that Reich would remark in 1988 that '[n]ever has an Administration so often justified its interventions by appeals to American competitiveness. ''73 The end result, however, is that administration research and development policies, including those related to space, arguably did upon occasion stray into the realm of industrial policy, despite the seeming contradiction with conservative economic principles. Reagan's (and others') repeated references to American "leadership" are quite significant. They are, after all, somewhat reminiscent of the themes struck by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in calling for an expanded space program. Unlike that earlier era, Chapter7:18 however,inwhich"leadership"waslooselyconstruedas"demonstrating"U.S. economic,political,andtechnicalsuperiority,theReaganAdministration had some very clear ideas on how it wanted America to "lead," and how space policy was to contribute. PRELUDE, 1980-1981 Ironically, the space program--as well as science policy in general--was not at first a terribly high priority for the new administration. During the 1980 presidential campaign, candidate Reagan had relatively little to say about either topic, other than as part of a general criticism of the Carter administration (e.g., for not "responding to Soviet moves to establish military superiority in space."74). The primary transition document (the self-proclaimed "'Bible' of the Reagan Administration"), prepared by the Heritage Foundation, also said very little about federal R&D--a chapter on technology written by the famous physicist Edward Teller was confined solely to discussion of military technology. 75 What little was known was not particularly encouraging to the science and engineering community. In fact, the scientific community initially regarded Reagan with some skepticism. Many scientists' eyebrows were raised, for example, after he had questioned the theory of evolution during a speech before a group of ministers. 76During the transition period following the election, science professionals were alarmed to learn that a former Congressional aide who had criticized NSF's education programs during the 1970s for promoting a "liberal, anti-religious" ideology called "secular humanism" in public schools was on the President-elect's transition team, charged with formulating new Chapter7:19 policiesforthatagency7.7BruceMurray,directorofNASA's JetPropulsionLaboratory, recalledexaminingalist ofReagans' closefriendsandadvisors,andwasdismayedatnot beingabletofind asingleindividualwithany"personalcompetence"inscience, engineering,or technology (he then proceeds, however, to describe Reagan's "political instincts about man in space" as better than any President since Kennedy). 78 Even after entering office, the personal views of the new President were to remain a bit of a mystery for some time. As of April 1981, the eve of the first shuttle launch, Reagan had not yet appointed either a NASA administrator or a Science Advisor, and no one at the White House had been assigned (at least officially) to deal with space-related issues. 79This was, some felt, a deliberate strategy to allow the President to distance himself from NASA in case the Columbia mission failed. 8° The difficulties in selecting a director for the Office of Science and Technology Policy (i.e., the Science Advisor) seemed to confirm the scientists' worst fears about the kind of administration they were dealing with. Rather than report directly to the president, as previous OSTP chairs (and their predecessors) had done, the Reagan White House placed the Science Advisor under the Domestic Policy Advisor, Edwin Meese. White House officials were said to be cool to the idea of a Science Advisor anyway, believing that it had degenerated into nothing more than another mechanism by which scientists pleaded for more funds. 8_Reportedly, a large number of noted scientists turned down the position specifically because of the lack of presidential access. 82 While all of this was happening, the first Reagan budget was made public. It called for the elimination of NSF's education programs along with sharp reductions (on the order of fifty percent) in its social science research budget and funding for biomedical Chapter7:20 research8.3Inaddition,theNASA budgetwascutbyabout9percent,withthespace sciencesprogramaloneabsorbingareductionofover22percent(approximately$170 million). BudgetDirectorStockmanhadwantedNASA tocancelitsGalileo Jupiter probe, 84but the agency instead chose to terminate the U.S. portion of the International Solar-Polar Mission, a joint project with the European Space Agency to explore the polar regions of the sun. Although the European half of the mission did go forward (renamed Ulysses), the American cancellation had a chilling effect on NASA-ESA relations for some time after. 85There were budget increases for some basic sciences, but these were not necessarily coordinated in any fashion, resulting in some odd decisions. Space Astrophysics, for example, received a healthy increase, while spending on planetary astronomy was cut. According to most outside observers, these apparently inconsistent policies were largely due to the lack of a central organizing figure representing the sciences, the role usually played by the Science Advisor. 86In short, for the first several months of his presidency, Ronald Reagan did not appear even to have a science policy of any sort, let alone a plan for the U.S. space program. Congress did involve itself to a small degree in filling in the void. It rejected, for example, some of the President' s proposed cuts in NSF education and social science programs, and smoothed out some of the maldistribution within the agency's research budget. Individual members also lobbied for the continuation of Galileo. On the other hand, it did not act to save ISPM, nor did it restore NASA's space science funding. It must be remembered that the first Reagan budget also called for deep cuts in a large number of other government programs, and most representatives and senators were fighting the White House of issues like public housing and welfare. 87 Chapter7:21 All ofthisbegantochange--albeitslowly--as theyearprogressedD. uringthe summerof 1981,theSenateconfirmedpresidentialappointmentsfor ScienceAdvisoras well asforadministratoranddeputyadministratorofNASA.ForScienceAdvisor, ReagannominatedGeorgeA. Keyworth,a41-year-oldphysicistfromLosAlamos nationallaboratory(andaprot6g6ofEdwardTeller,afactthatwouldbecomesignificant duringthedebateovertheStrategicDefenseInitiativeS8)K. eyworthwasnotwell-known outsideofLosAlamos,andhadrelativelylittle experienceinWashingtonpolitics. Moreover,hedidnotstartoutwith muchpoliticalcapitalamongscientistsandengineers, duetothepoorfirstimpressionsconveyedbytheAdministration'sbudgetproposalsand theperceptionofhislowly statuswithin theWhiteHousehierarchy.Tomakematters worse,KeyworthdidnotappointaWhite HouseScienceCounciluntil thefollowing February,nordidheeverhavesufficientstaffsupport(reportedly,hehadtoborrowstaff fromotheragenciesandorganizations)8.9Evenso,Keyworthultimatelygaineda reputationasaneffectivespokesmanfortheAdministration9. ° ThenewNASA administratorwasJamesM. Beggs,anaerospaceexecutivewith GeneralDynamicswhohadheadedtheagency'sresearchprogramsduringthe1960s.He hadmovedtotheDepartmenotfTransportationin 1969,dueinlargeparttothelooming reductionsin NASA's budget.Beforetakingthejob,Beggssoughtassurancefsromthe Presidentthathedidnotintendto"assassinatet"heagency9.1Meetingwith Reaganin March1981,hewastoldthat"althoughhedidn't knowmuchaboutit," thepresidentfelt thatthespaceprogram"wassomethingthatthegovernmenot ughttodo.'+It didnot appeartoBeggsthatReaganhadanyspecificplansforNASAatthepoint(neitherdid Beggs).92 Chapter7:22 Ofcourse,oneofthemostimportanteventsofthisperiodwasnotpolitical,but technical.OnApril 12,1981thespaceshuttleColumbia--the world's first reusable spacecraft--made a near-flawless first test flight, followed by equally successful missions in November and two more through mid-1982. For nearly six years, while the STS had been encountering numerous political, budgetary, and technical problems (see last chapter), the USSR had had human space flight entirely to itself. Between the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission and STS-1, the Soviets had flown 31 cosmonauts (some more than once) on 22 missions. They had orbited two space stations (Salyuts 5 and 6), which had housed crews on missions as long as 184 days. With just one flight, however, the U.S. seemed to have leapfrogged completely over the Soviet program, an apparently stunning display of American technological capability. Although the initial appearance of success would prove to be premature, the general feeling within the White House after Columbia was that anything was possible. 93 As members of the administration sat down in July 1981 to begin formulating their approach to space policy, the shuttle's presumed capabilities clearly informed their discussion. A July 17 National Security Council memo, for example, requests that the use of STS in anti-satellite (see below) and even in "active military operations" be included as part of the national space policy, and that the committee drafting the policy consider "turning the Shuttle over to the U.S. private sector. ''94 In short, STS appeared to provide the Reagan White House with the final ingredient--the requisite technology--that it needed to integrate the U.S. space program into its larger political and economic goals. Chapter 7:23 STEP ONE: REDEFINITION One of George Keyworth' s first assignments as the new Science Advisor was to review the direction of the entire U.S. space program. Keyworth and others within the Administration worked at this task for almost a year, and the final product was issued as National Security Decision Directive number 42, dated July 4, 1982 (timed to coincide with the shuttle's final "test" mission and the beginning of its "operational" status)Y Although there were to be a number of "official" statements on space policy associated with the Reagan Presidency, they all share the same underlying philosophy as this document. Stated simply, NSDD 42 marks the nothing less than the beginning of the redefinition of U.S. space policy. For the first time since Sputnik, government officials revisited--and substantially revised--the objectives, values, and even the fundamental meaning of the space program. Obviously, it is worth examining the document in some detail. In its introductory section, the directive described the "basic goals" of United States space policy. Some of these were the usual declarations dating back to the 1950s, such as the need to "maintain space leadership" and to "cooperate with other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for all activities that enhance the security and welfare of all mankind."96 Other parts of the list, however, were quite different. Chapter7:24 Defense Tobeginwith, theveryfirst "basicgoal"wasto"strengthenthesecurityofthe UnitedStates."EvenattheheightofColdWar-drivenspacepolicy(seechapterfour),the Eisenhower-eraIntroduction to Outer Space, defense was only listed second (after "the compelling urge of man to explore and discover"), 97and the nation's first official space policy of 1958 speaks of scientific, military and political purposes, in that order. 98It should also be understood that the term "security", as used here, was not meant not in the broader--some might say overly vague--Cold War sense used by politicians during the late 1950s and early 1960s, but refers specifically to military space activities. Indeed, military applications were highlighted throughout the directive. Following the "basic goals," it listed a set of "basic principles" that were to govern U.S. space policy. The first of these began in a (once again) fairly standard fashion, declaring that "the United States is committed to the exploration and use of space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind. ''99 Unlike other such documents, however, there followed a second, clarifying statement that "'[p]eaceful purposes' allow activities in pursuit of national security goals. ,1oo In addition, another principle stated that the "United States will pursue activities in space in support of its fight to self- defense." 101 All of this was necessary, according to another administration document, because "[t]he Soviet Union has initiated a major campaign to capture the 'high ground' of space. ''I°2 Clearly, then, the White House saw space technology as another component its expansion of the nation's conventional and nuclear forces generally, as well as its more confrontational (or, depending upon one's point of view, more realistic) stance toward the Chapter7:25 USSR.Moreover,it iseasytoseehowtheseprinciplesandgoalsfit directlyinto Reagan'spersonalbeliefsconcerningforeignanddefensepolicies. Space Commerce Goals number three and four of NSDD-42 were "obtain[ing] economic and scientific benefits through the exploitation of space" and "expand[ing] United States private-sector investment and involvement in civil space and space-related activities." Thus, for the first time in the history of the U.S. space program, a high-level official document made a direct reference to the American business community. Of course, the idea of space's "economic benefits"--communications, weather forecasting, remote sensing, navigation, etc.--was nothing new. As previous chapters have noted, these had been part of the discussion surrounding U.S. space policy (albeit usually not a very important part) as far back as the 1950s. Most space advocates, however, seldom addressed specifically the question of exactly how these services would be provided, or by whom. Up until this time, space activity had been undertaken almost exclusively by governments, 1o3and, at least until the Reagan presidency, there was little indication that this was going to change. With NSDD 42, the Reagan White House began the process of challenging, and ultimately Overcoming, the assumption that all space service delivery had to be through government provision, indeed, by 1988, Secretary of Commerce William Verity would be referring to space as "just a place to do business, m°4 As was the case with national defense, the commercialization issue was well represented throughout NSDD 42. Another "basic principle," for example, was that "[t]he United States encourages domestic commercial exploitation of space capabilities, Chapter7:26 technology,andsystemsfornationaleconomicbenefit'."°5Furtherdown,underasection entitled"Civil SpaceProgram,"thedirectivedeclaredthat TheUnitedStatesgovernmentwill provideaclimate conducivetoexpandedprivatesectorinvestmentand involvementincivil spaceactivities,withdueregardto publicsafetyandnationalsecurity.Privatesectorspace activitieswill beauthorizedandsupervisedorregulatedby thegovernmenttotheextentrequiredbytreatyor internationallaw.106 Finally,theNSDDcalledformakingthespaceshuttleavailabletoallcommercialusers (with theusualnationalsecurityproviso),andfortheeventualprivatizationof governmenrtemoteSensingsatellites1.07 Afollow-uptothedirective(NationalSecurityStudyDirective 13-82,issuedthe following December)continuedthistheme.It calledforaninquiryintotheorganization, roles,andresponsibilitiesof"[t]he PrivateSector,especiallyconcerningitsrelationship withtheU.S.Governmentandtheneedforregulation,oversight,andincentivesto stimulateinvestment,"andforthegovernmenttoidentify"newareasofprivatesector investmentinspacewhichtheAdministrationshouldstimulatem.,°8 An Issue Paper on the United States Space Program, written by the Office of Policy Development in February 1983, concluded that "[t]he future will bring further exploitation of unique advantages afforded by space, with particular emphasis on... private sector participation. ''1°9 In general, like the approach to military applications, these statements on space commercialization were completely consistent with the administration's overall Chapter7:27 philosophiesconcerningprivateenterpriseandtheproperroleofgovernmentA. nd,ashis subsequenptubliccommentsonthematterwouldmakeabundantlyclear,theywerealso inperfectaccordwith thePresident'spersonalviews. Redefinition and Political Rhetoric Although the White House clearly considered both space defense and commercialization to be high priorities, for obvious reasons there was far more emphasis placed on the latter in official statements, speeches, and public events. In August 1983, for example, the White House invited representatives from eleven major space-related companies to meet with high-level Administration officials and have lunch with the President. The primary purpose of the conference, which was widely reported in the trade press,110 was to explore the "major themes" related to encouraging more private enterprise activity in space. Topics included economic incentives, techniques for expanding space markets, removal of regulatory barriers, and the appropriate role for NASA. TM There was also some discussion of whether the government should build a space station, with some of the industry participants reportedly making an appeal for such a facility to Reagan directly. 112Ongoing discussion with business leaders was to play a major role in shaping the Administration's first major policy changes regarding commercial space. For his part, the President seldom missed an opportunity to hail the economic potential of space. Just as Kennedy, Johnson, and sometimes even Eisenhower would speak of the U.S. space program largely (if not exclusively) in the context of an American-Soviet "race" during the late 1950s and early t960s, Reagan almost never Chapter 7:28 made any statement about space policy without also mentioning--usually with great enthusiasm--the whole host of new products, additional marketing opportunities, and potential for job creation that it would bring about. During his 1984 State of the Union Message, for example, the president declared that Just as the Oceans opened up a new world for Clipper Ships and Yankee Traders, space holds enormous potential for commerce today. The market for space transportation could surpass our ability to develop it.... We'll soon implement a number of executive initiatives, develop proposals to ease regulatory constraints, and, with NASA's help, promote private sector investment in space. 113 The President chose the 15thanniversary of the first moon landing to announce his new commercial policies. Proclaiming that Apollo 11 "wasn't our last great moment in space," but that "most of our great moments are ahead of us," Reagan called for encouraging private investment in space in order "to improve the quality of life on earth." Given the opportunity, space-based businesses could perhaps find cures for diabetes---or even cancer--"create new metals that are lighter and stronger than anything we've ever known," generate "tens of thousands of jobs, billions of dollars in foreign trade, and tens of billions of dollars added to the gross national product." _14The following year, at a speech at the National Space Club Luncheon, the President continued with this theme: Individual freedom and the profit motive were the engines of progress which transformed an American wilderness into an economic dynamo that provided the American people Chapter 7:29 with astandardof living that is still the envy of the world .... We must make sure that the same incentives that worked so well in developing America's first frontier are brought into play in taming the frontier of space._15 Of course, talk---even such highly extravagant talk--is cheap. As the introduction to chapter five pointed out, political statements of intent are truly meaningful only to the extent that they are supported by specific policies and programs. As it happened, by the time Reagan delivered his address to the National Space Club, a number of far-reaching initiatives were well underway. STEP TWO: A NEW POLICY AGENDA Consistent with their new definitions of space policy, Reagan officials soon set out to reshape the program to an extent not seen since the early days of Apollo. While some of the these proposals and initiatives were blocked or cancelled by Congress, others were opposed even by some members of the Administration, and not all of them could be counted as entirely successful (a common occurrence for government programs involving emerging technologies), they stand as compelling evidence that the White House was fully committed to their particular vision of what a public space program was all about. Defense As already noted, the frequency of public statements concerning the new approach to military space came nowhere matching that associated with space commerce. Chapter7:30 Thisinnoway,however,meantthattheareawasbeingneglected.Infact,the administrationoversawamajorexpansionofthedefensespacesector,in almostallareas. Therewere,however,twomajorinitiatives,bothinvolvingthedevelopmenotf newspace technologiest,hatmeritparticularattention: Strategic Defense Initiative The most well-known--and controversial--program associated with Reagan-era space-based defense was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a plan to construct a "shield" to protect the United States from a missile attack. Most Americans heard of the proposal for the first time during a televised speech by the president on March 23, 1983, in which he called upon "the scientific community.., to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering [nuclear] weapons impotent and obsolete." 116 The idea, however, was by no means new. It had been widely discussed in conservative political circles during the 1970s, _17and Reagan had personally become aquatinted with the concept of Ballistic Missile Defense during a tour of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1967, shortly after he had been elected governor of California. _18He reportedly had wanted to make BMD a major issue in the 1980 presidential campaign, but was talked out of it by aides who feared its association with the Republican right wing 119(it was, however, included in the 1980 GOP platform). 120 Indeed, this appears to have been one of those issues in which the President parted company with many of his closest aides. Although the specific proposal had been developed by Robert McFarlane and Admiral James Watkins, who was then Chief of Chapter7:31 NavalOperations,it wasoneof the few initiatives in his presidency for which he personally--and uncharacteristically--took sole credit: "SDI was my idea," he told reporter Lou Cannon in 1989, TM a claim which has been borne out by the president's aides as well as outside observers. 122Very few administration officials were even told in advance that the proposal was forthcoming (the ostensible purpose of the March 23 address was to talk about defense spending), _23and support for the idea among most of them was tepid at best, although all were duty-bound to support the president, at least in public.124 Nevertheless, some White House officials opposed to SDI (reportedly including Chief of Staff James Baker) undertook behind-the-scenes efforts to "moderate" the proposal. 125 That the measure not only survived, but flourished--appropriations for SDI had totaled more than $15 billion by the end of the president's second term, nearly $20 billion by 1990, and according to some estimates, more than $36 billion by 19951Z6--was due in no small part to Reagan's direct interest in it. _z7Members of Congress and officials in the federal bureaucracy, even if they were themselves skeptical of the idea, were all aware that the president was personally following the progress of the issue. This (relatively) close attention helped to ensure that SDI outlasted most of its opponents. What is even more impressive is that the program lived beyond not only the Reagan Presidency, but the end of the Cold War itself, and continues on even to this day. Anti-Satellite Systems The other major--and also highly controversial--program of this period was the renewed emphasis on ASAT systems. As satellite technology became an increasingly Chapter7:32 importantelementin military planningandoperations(forreconnaissance, communicationsa,ndnavigation),defenseofficialsbegantofearthatsatelliteswould themselvesbecomeamilitary target.TheUSSRwasknowntohavebegunexperimenting withASAT technologyin thelate1960s,andhadconductedaround20testsbetween 1968and1982._28TheSovietswereapparentlyattemptingtodevelopwhatwasknownas a"co-orbital"ASAT, inwhichanexplosivesatellite(nicknameda"killer satellite")is launchedintoanorbitdesignedtointersectwithitstarget.Oncewithin range,it is detonated. AlthoughtherewasaU.S.ASATprograminplaceby thetimeReagantook office,previousadministrationshadnotgivenit veryhighpriority.PresidentCarterhad evengonesofarastoopenupthepossibilityofnegotiationswiththeUSSRonatreaty limiting, oreveneliminating,suchsystems_.29PresidentReaganh, owever,wasanxious tomoveforwardwith ASATdevelopmentN. SDD42declaredthat TheUnitedStateswill proceedwith developmenotfan ASATcapability,with operationaldeploymentasagoal. TheprimarypurposesofaUnitedStatesASATcapability aretodeterthreatstothespacesystemsoftheUnitedStates anditsAllies and,within suchlimitsimposedby internationallaw,todenyanyadversarytheuseofspace- basedsystemsthatprovidesupporttohostilemilitary forces. 130 The Reagan administration was therefore the first to consider ASAT capability as a form of deterrence. _3xMoreover, it seems clear from the latter part of the section that the Chapter7:33 administrationwasnotadversetousingsuchasystemina"first-strike" soasto"deny anyadversarytheuseofspace-basesdystems." TheU.S.Air Forceconductedtwosuccessfual nti-satellitetestsin 1984.Unlike theSovietco-orbitalapproacht,heAmericanweaponwascarriedonasmallrocket,fired fromanF-15.Afterthesetwosuccessesh,owever,Congress banned further ASAT research, largely because the Soviet Union had been adhering to a unilateral moratorium in ASAT development since 1982.132 In general, funding for defense-related space research and development doubled during Reagan's first term, while that for ground support (satellite detection, tracking, and control) tripled. 133Overall, DOD spending on space increased from $3.8 billion to $17.7 billion--growing from 44 to 66 percent of the total federal space budget--between 1980 and 1988. By contrast, over the same period, NASA's share of government space spending fell from 54 to 31 percent. In other words, by the end of Reagan's second term, NASA was no longer the nation's leading space agency (at least in budgetary terms)., having lost that distinction to DOD.134 Space Business Beginning in 1984, the White House proposed, instituted, and administered a large number of new programs intended to carry out the edicts of NSDD-42. It is particularly interesting to note how closely many of these initiatives match up with the so-called "grand themes" of the Reagan Presidency discussed earlier: Chapter7:34 Taxation/Regulation In his radio address commemorating the Apollo 11 anniversary, Reagan spoke of the need to remove "needless regulation" and to revise existing tax and tariff laws that "inadvertently discriminate against companies that do business in space rather than on the ground:" For example, the way the law is written now, products made in space might be subject to import tariffs just because they weren't made in America. Well, we're going to change that. Another example: Businesses which operate at home receive various kinds of tax incentives. But, again, as the laws are written now, space products companies would not receive those incentives. We'll be looking at that, too._35 Accordingly, the Administration issued National Security Decision Directive 144, entitled "National Space Strategy" that called for the federal government to "encourage the private sector to undertake commercial space ventures" by eliminating or revising "discriminatory" laws and regulations, and by updating laws and regulations "to accommodate space commercialization. ''_36 The most clear-cut--and easily the most successful--application of this principle was with regard to the commercial launch industry. By the 1980s, a number of private firms (particularly in the U.S.) had developed considerable experience in building and servicing rocket boosters for government and military organizations. Nevertheless, space launches had remained exclusively a government function. In 1982, however, the first privately-developed commercial rocket, Conestoga I, was successfully test-launched by Chapter7:35 SpaceServicesIncorporated,afirm basedinHouston.SSI'spresident,DavidHannah, informedCongressthefollowing yearthatobtainingthenecessarylicensesandwaivers wasthecompany'sbiggestsingleexpenseintheentireproject.137Essentially,thefirm hadtosatisfythedemandsof22differentfederalstatutesa, swell asdealwith 18 separateagenciesi,ncludingNASA, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, the State Department, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. _38Most (if not all) of these requirements had been formulated in a piecemeal fashion by each individual organization, without any regard for how they might possibly affect the commercial launch sector (which, after all, did not even exist when the regulations were created). The Reagan Administration's efforts to ease this regulatory tangle--and to help in the development of a new industry--started even before NSDD-144 was issued. The previous February, the President signed an Executive Order in designating the Department of Transportation as the "single point of contact" to "expedite the processing of private sector requests to obtain licenses" to operate expendable launch vehicles. 139In other words, instead of applying for separate permits and waivers from the FCC, NASA, BAT, etc., commercial launch vendors would Simply go to a single agency housed within the Transportation Department. That same year, Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, which codified most of the provisions in the Executive Order. _4°In 1988, Congress amended the Act to allow the Secretary of Transportation to set the maximum level of insurance required for private launch providers using government-owned launch facilities. 141The first two launches licensed by DOT (conducted by SSI and McDonnell Chapter7:36 Douglas)tookplacein 1989,142 and by 1992, the U.S. commercial space launches were generating more than half a billion dollars in revenue. 143In fact, by the end of 1990s, the industry had matured to the point where most government payloads--including those for the military--were being placed in orbit by private launchers. 144 Privat&ation Obviously, the creation of the commercial launch industry does represent a type of privatization. In addition, however, the Administration did attempt--this time with rather less success--to engage in the type of "load shedding" described above. That is, it tried to transfer selected government-owned, space-related assets to the private sector. These efforts by and large failed for both political and economic reasons. In 1981, for example, Reagan sought to privatize the satellite system--managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration--that provides data for the National Weather Service. A majority of the Congress, however, felt strongly that information about the weather represented a public good, and should therefore be obtained and disseminated by the government. It moved, therefore, to block the satellite sale, going so far as to include a specific prohibition any such transfer as a provision in the FY 1984 budget, 145 A second attempt at satellite privatization, however, proved to be more successful, at least initially. For many years, the technology known as remote sensing had been steadily, if slowly, moving into the civilian marketplace. 146Basically a derivative of military reconnaissance satellites, remote sensing involves the use of high-resolution photographs of the earth from space to aid activities such as mapmaking, prospecting for Chapter7:37 oil orotherminerals,andmakingcropforecasts.Duringthe 1970s,thefederal governmenltaunchedanumberofsatellites,knownasLandsat,fortheseandother purposes. At theadministration'surging,CongresspassedtheLandRemote-SensinAgct of 1984, which authorized the Secretary of Commerce to award to private industry a contract to market Landsat data. 147The contract was awarded to EOSAT, a consortium of Hughes Aircraft Corporation and RCA. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons--both political and market-related--this arrangement was essentially rescinded eight years later, when the federal government took over responsibility for the development of Landsat 7.148 Finally, in addition to the nation's satellite systems, the administration also sought to move part of its own space station program to a private space facility. This program (and its problems) will be discussed in the next chapter. Providing Infrastructure; Aid to "'Infant Industries" Although, as noted above, economic conservatives generally want government to be removed from most economic decisions, most acknowledge some role for the state in creating and maintaining national infrastructure, that is, the network of roads, tunnels, bridges, communication networks, and so on that allow goods and services to move freely, but which are not the province of any one business or industry. In general, it is held, government intervention is required to assure free access to these facilities and to ensure that they are kept in reasonably good condition. Chapter7:38 Suchthinkingcanbeseenthroughout1980sspacepolicy.Inthewordsofone analyst: If wewereinCanadaandoneweretoturntoindustryand say:I thinkit isagoodideaif youbuildawidgetplantand theindustrialistssayyes;widgetsaresellingandweshould buildawidgetplant.Andthenwesaytothem:wewant youtobuildit inthemiddleoftheNorthwestTerritory. Thebusinessmaanskswhy?Therearenoroads,thereisno electricity,thereisnogas,nowater,nosewagen,othing. Thatistheroleofgovernmentm, unicipalorfederal.The roleofgovernmenitstoprovidetheinfrastructure necessaryforbusinesstooperate.Thesamethingistruein spaceW. eareaskingbusinesssometimein thefutureto buildmachinerytodobusinessin spaceI.t isthe responsibilityofgovernmenttoputthatinfrastructurein space1.49 Thus,accordingtoearlyadministrationpolicy(e.g.,NSDD-42),theshuttlewastohave beentheprimarymeans--virtuallylikeahighway--for businessandgovernmenttoget intospacea, ndNASA wasdirectedtoensurethatalllegitimateusersweretohave guaranteedaccesstoit.Inaddition,viewingtheshuttleinthiswayjustifiesthepublic subsidiesassociatedwithits(pre-1986)use.Similarargumentswereusedbyproponents duringtheinternaladministrationdebateoverapprovingNASA's requestforaspace station(seebelow). Alongthesesamelines,theadministrationwassometimeswilling toprovide someformsof aidtofirmsthatwereengagedindevelopingnewer,"cutting-edge" Chapter7:39 technologies(sometimesknownas"infant industries").Asnotedearlier,policiestoassist "technologiesrequiringalongerperiodofinitial development"hadbeeninplaceasearly as1982.Forthemostpart,theadministrationsoughttosupportthesenewventures withoutresortingtodirectsubsidiesI.ndeed,thenotionofsubsidizingprivatespace enterpriseswasexplicitly rejectedinmostcommercializationdocumentsT. herewas, however,animportantexceptiontothisproscription:until theChallenger accident in 1986, commercial users of the space shuttle were charged rates that were far below its "true" costs (or, in the language of the time, shuttle pricing did not reflect "full cost recovery"). Again, more will be said about this issue below and in the following chapter. Generally, however, the government limited its help to fledgling space industry to simply becoming its primary (if not its only) customer. This approach served not only to provide the company with revenue, but also to send an important signal to other potential customers or investors. Once again, the commercial launch sector is the most prominent example. Even as late as 1992, when the industry's revenues were in the neighborhood of half a billion dollars, government users accounted for nearly 90 percent of its sales. _50 STEP FOUR: REORGANIZATION In view of all of this activity, it should come as no surprise that the Reagan Administration was responsible for the most extensive overhaul of the organizational structure of the American space program since the Sputnik era. As might also be expected, this reorganization was largely (although not exclusively) policy-driven (as opposed to some of the other forces that can motivate reorganization as described in Chapter7:40 chapter2).Whatis somewhat surprising--albeit virtually unnoticed at the time--was where this extensive reshuffling ultimately would leave NASA. To help set the broader parameters for space policy, the Administration made extensive use of a "cross-disciplinary" approach to executive organization that had also been employed when Reagan was Governor of California. 151Recognizing that the responsibility for space-based activity had spread well beyond NASA and DOD (by the early 1980s, it also included the Departments of Commerce and State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and several others), NSDD-42 established a Senior Interagency Group for Space, usually referred to as SIG (Space). Its members included the Administrator of NASA, the Deputy or Undersecretary of State, Commerce, and Defense, the Director of the CIA and the Arms Control and Development Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was chaired by the National Security Adviser, with the Science Advisor and Budget Director serving as non-voting "observers. ''_52 In a somewhat similar vein, the traditional Cabinet structure was complemented by a unique system of "cabinet councils," five cross-Departmental boards responsible for major areas of public policy: Economic Affairs, Commerce and Trade, Human Resources, Natural Resources and the Environment, and Agriculture and Food. The Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade (CCCT) quickly became the Administration's focal point regarding issues related to space commercialization and privatization. In addition, the Economic Policy Council would at one point become involved with a specific space commerce issue concerning NASA's space station (see discussion below and in the next chapter). Chapter7:41 EvenbeforeNSDD-42wasissued,CraigFuller,AssistanttothePresidentfor CabinetAffairsandastaffmemberoftheCCCT,hadbeenworkingtoincorporatesuch initiativesintotheproposedNationalSpacePolicy.InaJune1982memo(i.e.,themonth beforethenewpolicybecamepublic),forexample,Fullerraisedaseriesofquestions aboutspaceandtheprivatesector,includingwhethertheNationalAeronauticsandSpace Act shouldbeamendedtoallowNASA agreaterrolein fosteringspace commercializationt,he"level of... privateresources"neededtomaintainaU.S.leadin thespacearea,and"whatsortof taxincentivesshouldbeconsideredwith respectto encouraginggreatercommercialization''.153CCCTalsoplayedaroleinsettingupthe Administration'scommercialspacelaunchpolicy.154Finally,in April 1984,theCCCT establishedaWorkingGrouponSpaceCommercializationt,hefinalreportofwhich (issuedinJune)providedmuchofthematerialforReagan'sJulyspeechoncommercial spaceinitiatives._55 InadditiontotheselessformalExecutiveBranchorganizationsw, hichgenerally changefromonepresidentialadministrationtothenext,_56theReaganAdministration andCongressalsoestablishedanumberofnewpermanenotrganizationsdesignedto implementspecificprograms.Tocarryoutitsnewresponsibilitiesforregulatingthe privatelaunchindustry,forexample,DOTin 1984createdanOfficeofCommercial SpaceTransportationI.n 1987,theDepartmenotfCommerce,whichhadbeeninvolved intheAdministration'scommercializationeffortsfromthebeginning(Reagan'sfirst CommerceSecretaryM, alcomBaldridge,waschairmanof the CCCT), 157set up an Office of Commercial Space to encourage the private development of space technologies and applications. 158Within DOD, the U.S. Air Force Space Command was established in Chapter7:42 December1982tooverseetheoperationofthe(rapidlyexpanding)U.S.spacedefense system1.59Finally,SDIresearchanddevelopmenwt asadministeredbyanewStrategic DefenseInitiativeOffice(SDIO). AND NASA? It may well appear that the discussion up to this point has departed significantly from the main theme of the book, which is the evolution of NASA's mission. It is therefore worth asking precisely how--or even/f--Reagan officials saw the nation's first and still most important space agency fitting into their newly-minted definition of space policy. Obviously, under the terms of the 1958 Space Act, NASA could have no direct role in the administration's expanded programs of space-based defense: by law, that is the exclusive province of DOD. With regard to space commerce, however, there clearly were opportunities for NASA to participate (the place of scientific research, another of the agency' s primary responsibilities, in all of this will be considered in the next chapter). It had, after all, been directly responsible for the development and dissemination of virtually all of the technologies that were now being discussed as part of the commercialization effort (rocket launchers, space platforms, various types of satellites, etc.). Moreover, ever since its major post-Apollo initiatives had been rejected (see last chapter), NASA on its own had been looking for ways to move more directly into providing commercial services--that had, in fact, been one of the primary justifications for the space shuttle program. Chapter7:43 Tobesure,thereappearedtobemanyintheadministrationandCongresswished toseeNASA moveinjust suchadirection.ChiefamongthesewasReaganhimself.Ona numberofoccasionst,hepresidentgavetheclearimpressionthathewasquitefavorably disposedtowardtheagency.Inaspeechcommemoratingits 25 thanniversary, for example, he declared that "NASA's done so much to galvanize our spirit as a people, to reassure us of our greatness and our potential. ''_6° As has already been seen, he also made frequent references to its great achievements of the past, particularly the Apollo moon landings. More to the point, Reagan often noted that his new initiatives on space transportation or privatization would be carried out "with NASA's help. ''161 Finally, he gave his support to NASA's largest program of the decade, the space station (see below). Most of the early administration space policy documents--both public and internal--also acknowledge the agency as the principal organization in U.S. space policy, suggesting that officials expected, at least initially, that NASA was to play a significant role in implementing their programs. NSDD-42, for example, gives the agency responsibility for "operational control of STS for civil missions" and for assuring "the Shuttle's utility to the civil users [sic]. ''162 Along these same lines, NASA was heavily involved in the CCCT Working Group on Space Commercialization, serving as the "convening" agency at each of its meetings and in the drafting of its final report. 163Not surprisingly, that document repeatedly "reaffirms" that NASA is the "lead agency for space non-regulatory functions" and calls for it to continue working toward providing low-cost access to near-earth orbit and otherwise help to produce an environment conducive to private sector development. 164 Chapter7:44 Finally,Congresstookitsownstepstomakecommercializationapermanenpt art ofNASA's operation.In 1984,itpassedanamendmenttotheNationalAeronauticsand SpaceActdeclaringthat"thegeneralwelfareoftheUnitedStatesrequiresthatthe NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministrationseekandencouragetothemaximum extentpossiblethefullestcommercialuseofspace''.165 Putting NASAin Business Acting in accordance with these directives and recommendations, NASA set out that same year to develop its own Commercial Space Policy, based upon five operating principles: 1. The Government should reach out to and establish new links with the private sector. . Regardless of the Government's view of a project's feasibility it should not impede private efforts to undertake commercial space ventures. . If the private sector can operate a space venture more efficiently than government, then such commercialization should be encouraged. . The Govemment should not expend tax dollars for endeavors the private sector is willing to underwrite. However, the Government should invest in high-cost and/or high-risk technologies and space facilities which encourage private investment. Chapter 7:45 . When a significant Govemment contribution to a commercial space endeavor is requested, generally two requirements should be met. First, the private sector must have significant capital at risk, and second, there must be significant potential benefits for the nation. 166 Over the next few years, NASA set out to implement its new policy through a variety of channels. It continued to offer commercial users relatively inexpensive (i.e., below cost) access to the shuttle. With the international market for space launches becoming increasingly dominated by the European Arianne rocket, this practice had the added beauty of giving the agency a role in the growing political debate over American economic competitiveness. (which, as noted earlier, was also a concern of the President's) 167 NASA also began trying to stimulate the development of new commercial space technologies. In 1985, it established a number of Centers for the Commercial Development of Space (CCDS). These government-industry-university partnerships were to use "seed" money from the agency (ranging from $750,000 to $1.1 million 168)to promote the creation of new industries in such areas as materials processing, life sciences, remote sensing, automation and robotics, propulsion, structures and materials, and power sources. NASA expected that the Centers would evolve into self-sufficient business enterprises within an average of five years.169 Starting with five in 1985, the number of CCDSs had increased to seventeen by 1990. Along these same lines, the agency made efforts to "reach out and establish new links with private business." In 1988, for example, NASA signed an agreement with Spacehab, Inc., a Washington-based company promoting industrial research in Chapter7:46 microgravityprocessingU. ndertheagreementt,hecompanywastodevelopapressurized module,tobeflowninsidetheshuttle'smaincargobay,containing50"lockers"for supportingavarietyofmicrogravityexperiments1.7°Theselockers--which wouldbe tendedby shuttleastronautswhowouldmovetoandfromthemodulethroughatunnel connectedtotheshuttlesmid-deck--wouldbeleasedtogovernmentandcommercial users.Foritsfirst sixflights(whichbeganin 1992)NASA committeditselftoleasing 200ofthe300lockersavailable1.71 TheNew Trans-Continental Railway? Perhaps the most telling example of NASA's new "commercial approach" was the manner in which it and its allies in the Administration secured Presidential approval for the agency's most sought-after project, a permanently inhabited space station. Ever since Apollo, NASA's efforts to begin work on such a facility had been repeatedly rejected as simply another high-cost space "stunt" that the nation could not afford. _72 Until 1983, policymakers simply could not be persuaded that an orbital station served any pressing national need. This view continued into the early years of the Reagan Administration. Beggs and Hans Mark, the two top men at NASA, were both strong supporters of a station, and Beggs had even discussed the idea during his Senate confirmation hearing.173 In order to present the idea to the President, however, it first had to receive the endorsement of SIG (Space). Unfortunately for NASA, the interagency group, which was heavily skewed in the direction of national defense (five out of its eight voting members came from security-related organizations), refused to pass on the project, primarily due to opposition from the Defense Department. Although (as seen in previous Chapter7:47 chapters)DOD hadsoughtrepeatedlytogetmilitary personneilntospaceintheearly daysof theprogram--andhadevenpursueditsownspacestationprogram,theManned OrbitingLaboratory,inthe1960s--bythe1980stheDepartmenhtadconcludedthatits missioncouldbeconductedmoreefficiently(nottomentionmorecheaply)with unmannedsatellites. Inretrospect,it isamatterof supremeironythataproposallongderidedbyits opponentsasonemoreexampleofabig-spendingpublicprogramwouldnotonlyreceive theblessingof apresidentwhowasgenerallycommittedtoshrinkingthesizeofthe federalgovernmentb,utwouldalsoobtainsuchapprovallargelyonthebasisofits commercialappeal.Asnotedabove,ReaganwasfirstintroducedtotheideaattheAugust 1983spacecommercializationconferencew, hereanumberofbusinessleaderstoldhim thattheyneededanorbitalfacility todevelopnewproductsandcreatenewindustries,but couldnotaffordtobuildoneontheirown.174Thatsamemonth,thePresidentreceiveda letterfromCongressionaslupportersclaimingthatastationwas"particularlycompatible withyoureconomicprogram"andthat"withoutgovernmenbt ackingin thislargely unchartedarea,spacedevelopmenwt ill beunnecessariiydelayed'.'175 Byfar,however,NASA's mostimportantpartnerinthisendeavorwastheCCCT. In craftingitscommercialspaceproposals(with, asnotedearlier,significantNASA input),theCouncilhaddeclaredthatapermanentlyinhabitedorbitalfacility wassquarely within thegovernment's"infrastructure"responsibilities.Moreover,theCCCTbelieved thatoneofthemoreseriousimpedimentstocommercialspacedevelopmentwasthe perceptionwithin thebusinesscommunitythatgovernmenpt olicy inthisareawas constantlyshifting.Accordingtothisview,privateenterprisewasreluctanttomake Chapter7:48 substantiailnvestments--andtoshouldertheattendantfinancialrisks--in space enterpriseswithoutsomeassurancethatfederalsupportwouldcontinueformorethana fewyears(i.e.,beyondthespanofasinglepresidentialadministration).Thus,in addition toitsdirectutility, aspacestationwouldprovidepotentialinvestorsandentrepreneurs with aclearanddramaticdemonstrationofthegovernment'scommitmenttotheir operations1.76 Besidesprovidingthemwith much-neededpoliticalammunition,CCCTwasable togivestationadvocatessomethingwhich,fromapracticalpointofview,wasallthat reallymattered:accesstothepresident.Themostobviousroutetothisgoal,SIG(Space), hadbeenclosedwhenthatbodyrefusedtogivetheirendorsementI.t wasthereforeata meetingoftheCabinetCouncilonCommerceandTrade,onDecember1,1983,that proponentsfinally hadtheopportunity--completewithascalemodelandviewgraphs-- tomakeadirectappealtoReaganpersonally. UsingtheCCCTasaforumhadtheaddedadvantageofbroadeningthe discussionbeyondthenationalsecurityinterestssoheavilyrepresentedinSIG(Space). Ofcourse,aDODrepresentativewaspresent--asweresuchstationopponentsas StockmanandKeyworth--but themeetingalsoincludedsupportersliketrade representativeWilliam Brock,CommerceSecretaryMalcolmBaldridge,CraigFuller, Beggs,andMark.It was,asMcCurdyhasdescribedit, "thefirsttimein theinteragency reviewprocesswhere...theayesatleastequaled the nays. ''177 It was also of no small importance that the makeup of this group served to highlight the facility's commercial potential. Although Reagan did not announce his decision at the meeting, NASA clearly had carried the day. Chapter7:49 Ofcourse,NASA viewedthestationasfarmorethansimplyaplacetoconduct businessI.t wasalsosupposedtoserveasalaboratoryforbasicresearchinbiology, spacescience,geophysicsa, ndmanyotherdisciplines1.78Formanyintheagency(and spaceflightadvocatesgenerally),however,itsmostimportantfeaturewasthatit seemed tosignalarenewalofthehumanexplorationofspaceW. ith thestationasa"staging area,"itwaspossibleonceagaintoenvisionsuchgrandprojectsasapermanenbtaseon themoonand,eventually,missionstoMars.If fulfilling thatlong-cherisheddream requiredacertainamountofprofit-makingactivity alongtheway,sobeit. Inotherwords,just assupportersof anaggressivegovernmenstpaceprogramhad beenperfectlywilling tocoupletheirambitionswith theColdWarfearsofpolicymakers andthegeneralpublicduringthe 1960s, 179NASA was seeking to graft its larger goals onto the economic-based priorities of the 1980s. Stated simply, the agency was making every effort to carry on as before under a new definition of space policy. For a brief time, it appeared as though NASA's hoped-for marriage of exploration and profitability might actually succeed. While clearly committed to his commercialization policies, President Reagan had always been a firm believer--at least judging from his rhetoric--in the space program's loftier goals, is° Rather than simply issuing a statement supporting the station, the president opted to unveil the project in the most public fashion available, his annual State of the Union message. On January 25, 1984, in the same spot where President Kennedy had issued his lunar landing challenge, Reagan announced the new initiative in terms that deftlycombined the lofty with the practical: Chapter 7:50 TheSpaceAgeisbarelyaquarterofacenturyold.But alreadywe'vepushedcivilization forwardwith our advancesinscienceandtechnology.Opportunities and jobs will multiply as we cross new thresholds of knowledge and reach deeper into the unknown .... America has always been greatest when we dared to be great. We can reach for our greatness again. We can follow our dreams to distant stars, living and working in space for peaceful, economic, scientific gain. Tonight, I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station and to do it within a decade. A space station will permit quantum leaps in our research in science, communications, in metals, and in lifesaving medicines which could be manufactured only in space. _st Needless to say, NASA officials and their supporters were ecstatic. 182Their mood, however, would prove to be short-lived. Despite the president's endorsement (and continued support), the agency's bid to redefine its mission, and to link its other aims to it, was about to receive several serious setbacks. It remains an open question as to whether it has, or ever will, fully recover. Notes for Chapter 7 Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams, "The Reagan Presidency: Style and Substance" in Dilys M. Hill, Raymond A. Moore, and Phil Williams (eds), The Reagan Presidency: An Incomplete Revolution? New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, pp. 3-25. Chapter7:51 2GrahamK. Wilson,Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction, 2nd edition. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1990, p. 53 3See, for example, Gillian Peele, "The Agenda of the New Right" in Moore and Williams, The Reagan Presidency: An Incomplete Revolution ?pp. 29-47. 4Paul J. Quirk, "The Economy: Economics, Electoral Politics, and Reagan Economics" in Michael Nelson (ed) The Election of 1984. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985, pp. 155-187. 5Which, incidentally, is a common feature of American political parties. 6Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, "A Critical Realignment? The New Politics, the Reconstituted Right, and the Election of 1984" in bid, pp. 1-25. 7Which may mean, in fact, that (the admonition at the beginning of the chapter notwithstanding) Reagan's may well have been the most pro-business administration since the 1920s. Allen M. Kaufman, Marvin J. Karson, and Jeffrey Sohl, "Business Fragmentation and Solidarity: An Analysis of PAC Donations in the 1980 and 1982 Elections," in Alfred A. Marcus, Allen M. Kaufman, and David R. Beam (eds) Business Strategy and Public Policy. New York: Quorum Press, 1987, pp. 119-136. See also Theodore J. Eismer and Phillip H. Pollock III, "The Retreat from Partisanship: Why the Dog Didn't Bark in the 1984 Election," in bid, pp. 137-147. s Ginsberg and Shelter, "A Critical Realignment?" See also Theodore J. Lowi, "An Aligning Election: A Presidential Plebiscite" in Nelson (Ed) The Election of 1984, pp. 277-301. 9 Irene S. Rubin, The Politics of the Budgetary Process: Getting and Spending, Borrowing and Balancing, 2"a edition. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993, p. 12 Chapter7:52 10ElizabethDrew,"A PoliticalJoumal.New Yorker (20 February 1984), p. 132. 11Peter Goldman and Tony Fuller, The Quest for the Presidency 1984. New York: Bantam, 1985, p. 26. lz ibid, p. 27. 13Hill and Williams, "The Reagan Presidency: Style and Substance." 14Lyn Ragsdale, "Politics, Not Science: The U.S. Space Program in the Reagan and Bush Years" in Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (eds) Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1997, pp. 133-171, quote on p. 134. 15"Inaugural Address," xx January, 1981. Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981 (hereafter Public Papers), p. xx. 16Quoted in Charles T. Goodsell, The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic, 3rd edition. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1985, p. 166. 17Dilys M. Hill, "Domestic Policy in an Era of 'Negative' Government" in Hill, et. al. (eds), The Reagan Presidency: An Incomplete Revolution? pp. 161-178. _8Murray I. Wiedenbaum, "Government Power and Economic Performance" in Peter Duigan and Alvin Rabushka (eds), The United States in the 1980s. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1980, p. 181. 19bid, pp. 175-176; see also Gillian Peele, "The Agenda of the New Right" in Hill, et. al. (eds), The Reagan Presidency: An Incomplete Revolution ? pp. 29-47. 20E. S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987, p. 3. Chapter7:53 zi U.S. President's Commission on Privatization, Privatization: Toward More Effective Government. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988, p. 1 z2E. S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government, pp. 288-291; see also James Q. Wilson, "The Rediscovery of Character: Private Virtue and Public Policy" in Mark Gerson (ed), The Essential Neo-Conservative Reader. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996, pp. 291-304; Arthur A. Goldsmith, Business, Government, Society: The Global Political Economy. Chicago: Irwin, 1996, pp. 26-28. z3This does not include the use of voucher systems, which proponents advocate for services like education or housing (see E. S. Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1982), especially pp. 67-9), nor does it include deregulation, which some consider a form of privatization (see Commission on Privatization, Privatization: Toward More Effective Government, p. 2). z4Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector and Privatization: The Key to Better Government. 25Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy Since Worm War II. Washington: Brookings, 1990, p. 125. 26Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government; Commission on Privatization, Privatization: Toward More Effective Government, pp. 3-4. 27See Richard D. Bingham, Industrial Policy American Style: From Hamilton to HDTV. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998. Bingham points out in chapter 1 that, although the term "industrial policy" is fairly recent, debate over the policies themselves goes back to the time of Alexander Hamilton. 28Nicolas Spulber, The American Economy: The Struggle for Supremacy in the 21st Century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 120. Chapter7:54 29DavidA. Stockman,The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed. New York: Harper and Row, 1986, p. 157. 30Goldsmith, Business, Government, Society, p. 366; see also Kevin P. Phillips, "U.S. Industrial Policy: Inevitable and Ineffective." Harvard Business Review (July/August 1992), pp. 104-112. 31W. W. Kaufman, "A Defense Agenda for Fiscal Years 1990-94" in John Steinbruner, Restructuring American Foreign Policy. Washington: Brookings, 1987, p. 57; see also Phil Williams, "The Reagan Administration and Defence Policy" in Hill, et. al. (eds), The Reagan Presidency: An Incomplete Revolution ? pp. 199-230. 3zLou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991, pp. 92-93. 33Quoted in ibid, pp. 281-2. 34Raymond A. Moore, "The Reagan Presidency and Foreign Policy" in Dilys M. Hill, Raymond A. Moore, and Phil Williams (eds), The Reagan Presidency: An Incomplete Revolution? New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, p. 183. 35Quoted in Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, p. 296 36ibid. 37See, for example, David Dickson, The New Politics of Sc&nce. New York: Pantheon, 1984, especially chapter 3. 38Quoted in Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, p. 151. 39"Science and Technology for America's Future" 11 March 1986, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRL). 40Smith, American Science Policy Since Worm War II, p. 129. Chapter7:55 41SeeU.S.NationalScienceFoundation,NationalScienceBoard,Science and Engineering Indicators, 1996 (NSB-96-21). Washington: NSF, 1996, p. 4-9. 42U. S. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Annual Science and Technology Report to the Congress, 1982. Washington: OSTP, 1982. 43"Science and Technology for America's Future." 44ibid. 45U.S. National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators, 1996, appendix table 4-5. Figures are in current dollars. Some estimates place the increase at more than one hundred percent. See Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy Since Worm War II. Washington: Brookings, 1990, p. 133. 46Quoted in Dickson, The New Politics of Science, pp. 11-12. 47NSF. Science and Engineering Indicators, 1996, p. 4-9. 48ibid. 49See Sylvia Ostrey, Governments and Corporations in a Shrinking World. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990. For a specific example, see Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, pp. 114-115. For an overview of both sides of the argument, see Ernest Sternberg, Photonic Technology and Industrial Policy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992, chapter 4. 50Lewis M. Branscomb, "Targeting Critical Technologies" in Lewis M. Branscomb (Ed) Empowering Technology: Implementing a U.S. Strategy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 36-63. See also Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, The Technology Pork Barrel. Washington: Brookings, 1991. Chapter7:56 51U.S.NationalScienceFoundation,Scienceand Engineering Indicators, 1996, appendix table 4-6. 52Lewis M. Branscomb and George Parker, "Funding Civilian and Dual-Use Industrial Technology" in Branscomb, Empowering Technology: Implementing a U.S. Strategy, pp. 64-102. 53U.S. Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President, 1984. Washington: USGPO, 1984, p. 106. 54Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, p. 115. 55George A. Keyworth, "The Role of Science in a New Era of Competition." Science 217 (13 August 1982), p. 607. 56Sylvia Ostry and Richard R. Nelson, Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: Conflict and Cooperation. Washington: Brookings, 1995, especially chapter 2; David Dickson, The New Politics of Science. New York: Pantheon, 1984, especially chapter 1; Branscomb, "Targeting Critical Technologies." 57Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, pp. 114-115. Actually, the demise of Carter's synfuels program was a little more protracted. See Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, "Synthetic Fuels from Coal" in Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, The Technology Pork Barrel. Washington: Brookings, 1991, pp. 259-321; Alfred A. Marcus, Controversial Issues in Energy Policy. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992. 58Smith, American Science Policy Since Worm War II, pp. 137-138. 59U.S. National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators, 1996, appendix table 4-6. See also OSTP, Annual Science and Technology Report to the Chapter 7:57 Congress, pp. 108-9; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federally Funded Research: Decision for a Decade. Washington: OTA, 1991, p. 73. 6oU.S. National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators, 1996, appendix tables 4-5 and 4-6. 61See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy. Washington: OTA, 1987, p. 51. 62Stockman, for example, was strongly opposed to Clinch River. See The Triumph of Politics, pp. 144-146. 63Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, "The Clinch River Breeder Reactor" in Cohen and Noll, The Technology Pork Barrel, pp. 217-258. 64Mark Crawford, "Reagan Okays the Supercollider." Science 235 (6 February 1987), p. 625; W. D. Kay, "Particle Physics and the Superconducting Super Collider: The Collaboration that Wasn't" in Vicki L. Golich and W. D. Kay (eds), International Collaboration in Science and Technology Among Advanced Industrial Societies. London: Routledge (forthcoming). 65See Smith, American Science Policy Since Worm War II, p. 140. 66Ernest Sternberg, Photonic Technology and Industrial Policy, p. 78. 67Robert B. Reich, "Behold! We Have and Industrial Policy." New York Times (22 May 1988), p. 29. 68U. S. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Annual Science and Technology Report to the Congress, 1982. Chapter 7:58 69Robin Herman, Fusion: The Search for Endless Energy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. See also Smith, American Science Policy Since World War I1, p. 130. 70"State of the Union Message, January 23, 1983." Public Papers 1983, p. xxx. 71See Dickson, The New Politics of Science, chapter 1. 72George A. Keyworth, "Federal R&D: Not an Entitlement." Science 219 (18 February 1983), p. xxx. 73Reich, "Behold! We Have and Industrial Policy." 74"Reagan on Aerospace, Aviation." Aerospace Daily (30 September 1980), p. 167. 75Peter Duigan and Alvin Rabushka (eds), The United States in the 1980s. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1980. See especially Edward Teller, "Technology: The Imbalance of Power" in, pp. 281-318. 76Lou Cannon, "Reagan" in Richard Harwood (Ed), The Pursuit of the Presidency, 1980. New York: Berkley Books, 1980, pp. 53-72. 77Reported in Dickson, New Politics of Science, p. 15. 78Bruce Murray, Journey Into Space: The First Thirty Years of Space Exploration. New York: W. W. Norton, 1989, p. 207fn.. 79Robert Reinhold, "Reagan's Policy on Space Program Still Uncertain." New York Times (9 April 1981), pp. A1, B16. 80ibid. 81See Smith, American Science Policy Since Worm War II, pp. 126-127; Jerome B. Weisner, "The Rise and Fall of the President's Science Advisory Committee" in William Chapter7:59 T. Golden(Ed),Science and Technology Advice to the President, Congress, and the Judiciary. New York: Pergamon, 1988, pp. 372-384. 8zWilliam J. Broad, Teller's War: The Top-Secret Story Behind the Star Wars Deception. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992, p. 104; Robert Reinhold, "Los Alamos Physicist May Get Post as Science Advisor in the White House," New York Times (8 May 1981), p. A20. 83Smith, American Science Policy Since World War II, p. 125. 84Murray, Journey Into Space, pp. 210-215. See also U.S. Executive Office of the President, America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery. Washington: Executive Office of the President, 1981, chapter 6, pp. 35-36. 85W. D. Kay, "Where no Nation has Gone Before: Domestic Politics and the First International Space Science Mission." Journal of Policy History 5:3 (Winter 1993), pp. 435-452; Joan Johnson-Freese, "Canceling the U.S. Solar-Polar Spacecraft." Space Policy 3 (February 1987): 24-37. 86Smith, American Science Policy Since World War II, p. 131 87Kay, "Where no Nation has Gone Before," p. 452fn. 88In fact, Keyworth himself would later say that his connection to Teller was the primary (if not the only) reason he got the job in the first place). See Broad, Teller's War, p. 104. 89Smith, American Science Policy Since Worm War iI, pp. 126-127. 9oibid. p. 126. 91Howard E. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics and Technological Choice. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series on NASA History, 1990, pp. 35-36. Chapter7:60 92Interviewwith JamesM.BeggsbyHowardE.McCurdy,inbid,p.36. 93BroadT,eller's War, p. 107. 94Memo for Martin Anderson, Edwin Harper, Verne Orr, Richard Darman, George A. Keyworth, James Beggs, Hans Mark, and William Schneider from Allan J. Lenz (NSC Staff Director) 17 July 1981 (RRL). 95"National Space Policy," National Security Decision Directive 42 (4 July 1982). For the complete (unclassified) text, see Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 136-143 (classified version) and 144-150 (unclassified version). All references are to the latter. Page numbers refer to the Simpson collection 96bid, p. 144. 97U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee, Introduction to Outer Space: An Explanatory Statement. Washington: USGPO, 1958, pp. 1-2. 98National Security Council, Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space. NSC 5814/1, 18 August 1958, in NASA History Office. 99"National Space Policy," NSDD 42, p. 144. loobid, p. 144, emphasis added. t01 bid, p. 145. 102"National Space Strategy," National Security Study Directive 13-82, 15 December 1982 (RRL). _03The sole exception to this were communication satellites, which had been privately owned and operated since the early 1960s. Chapter7:61 104Quotedin KathySawyer,"Commercializationof Space: Riding on Government Guarantees." Washington Post (1 March 1988), p. A17. 105"National Space Policy," National Security Space Directive 42, p. 145. 106bid, p. 147. 1o7bid, p. 148. 1o8"National Space Strategy," National Security Study Directive 13-82, 15 December 1982 (RRL). 109"Issue Paper: United States Space Program," White House Office of Policy Development (RRL). lloSee "President Meets With Space Industry Leaders." Defense Daily 129:4 (4 August 1983); Craig Covault, "Reagan Briefed on Space Station." Aviation Week and Space Technology 8 August 1983, pp. 16-18. _l_ "Space Commercialization Meeting," memo with agenda, participants, and outline of policy issues, 13 August 1984, in John M. Logsdon (Ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume 3: Using Space. Washington: NASA, 1998, pp. 498-501. 112Reported in McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, p. 180. See also Covault, "Reagan Briefed on Space Station." ll3 "State of the Union Address" Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, 1984, p 90. _14"National Commercial Space Initiatives (Radio Address to the Nation 21 July 1984), Public Papers 1984, pp. 1057-8. 115"National Space Club Luncheon, xx March 1985," Public Papers 1985, vol. I, p. 365. Chapter7:62 116"AddresstotheNationonDefenseandNationalSecurity,23March1983,"Public Papers 1983, vol. I, p. 442 ll7Broad, Teller's War, chapter 3; Teller, "Technology: The Imbalance of Power," pp. 281- 318. For a brief technical discussion of strategic defense technologies, see Alexander Flax, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Concepts and History" in Franklin A. Long, Donald Hafner, and Jeffrey Boutwell (eds), Weapons in Space. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986, pp. 33-52. _18This visit was also significant in that it was when Reagan first got to know Edward Teller, the physicist who would play a major role in advancing SDI. See the oral history interview with Edward Teller, 6 July 1987 (RRL); and also Broad, Teller's War, pp. 97- 98. 119Broad, Teller's War, pp. xxx-xxx. 120"1980 Republican Platform Text," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1980, p. 59-B 121Ronald Reagan interview with Lou Cannon, reported in Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, p. 320. 122See, for example, oral history interview, with George A. Keyworth, 28 September 1987 (RRL), p. 1;Williams, "The Reagan Administration and Defence Policy," p. 213. _23bid, pp. 331-332; Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, p. 367. 124On the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, see Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, p. 330 and Broad, Teller's War, p. 125; on Keyworth, see Broad, pp. 131-132; on Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, see Cannon, pp. 328-329. 125Keyworth oral history interview, pp. 34-35. Chapter7:63 126SeeEricSchmitt,"Now,After$36BillionRun,ComingSoon:'StarWarsH.'" New York Times (7 February 1995), p. A20;Colin Norman, "SDI Heads for Fiscal Crash." Science 247 (16 March 1990), pp. 1283-1285. 127See W. Henry Lambright and Dianne Rahm. "Presidential Management of Technology" in Michael E. Kraft and Norman J. Vig (eds) Technology and Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 81-97 as well as their "Ronald Reagan and Space Policy." Policy Studies Journal 17:3 (Spring 1989), pp. 513-527. 128Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985, appendix II, table 2. 129bid, chapter 9. 130"National Space Policy," NSDD-42, p. 148. 131Stares, The Militarization of Space, pp. 218-219. 132Colin Norman, "Army, Air Force Eye SDI Spinoffs" Science 247 (16 March 1990), pp. 1284. 133Stares, The Militarization of Space, Appendix I, Table 2. 134U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President." Fiscal Year 1992 Activities. Washington: NASA 1993, Appendix E-1. 135"Radio Address to the Nation on Commercial Space Initiatives, July 2 l, 1984" Public Papers1984, p. 1071 136White House, "Fact Sheet: National Space Strategy," 15 August 1984. Complete text (and commentary) can be found in Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Chapter7:64 137U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Space Commercialization. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, 98 thCongress, 1stsession (x1983x). Washington: USGPO, 1983, pp. 60-61. 138Congressional Record, 1984, p. S-13888; see also Kim G. Yelton, "Evolution, Organization, and Implementation of the Commercial Space Launch Act and Amendments of 1988." Journal of Law and Technology 4 (Winter 1989), pp. 117-137. 139Executive Order 12465, "Commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle Activities," Federal Register 49:40 (28 February 1984), 7211-2. 140Public Law 98-575, 1984. 141Public Law,100-657, 1988. 142U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Fifth Annual Report. Washington: DOT, 1990. 143U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Commercial Space Activities Washington: CRS, 1992. 144With the exception of those payloads which must be launched from the shuttle. 145Pamela E. Mack and Ray A. Williamson, "Observing the Earth from Space" in Logsdon (Ed), Exploring the Unknown, Volume 3. Washington: NASA, 1998, p. 162. 146For a complete history and introduction to the technology, see Pamela E. Mack, Viewing the Earth: The Social Construction of the Landsat Satellite System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. 147Public Law 98-365. For a complete text see, "Land Remote-Sensing Act of 1984" in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, Volume 3, pp. 329-344. 148Pamela E. Mack and Ray A. Williamson, "Observing the Earth from Space." Chapter7:65 149JohnJ.Egan,"ConductingBusinessandScientificExperimentsinSpace"inWayneC. ThompsonandStevenW.Guerrier(eds)Space: National Programs and International Cooperation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, p. 140. _5oJoel S. Greenberg, "The Commercial Launch Industry: Will it Fly on its Own?" Aerospace America (May 1992), pp. 32-35, 41. See also Kathy Sawyer, "Commercialization of Space: Riding on Government Guarantees." Washington Post (1 March 1988), p. A17. _51For more on this style of organization, see Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams, "The Reagan Presidency: Style and Substance," particularly p. 18; Michael Turner, "The Reagan White House, the Cabinet, and the Bureaucracy" in John D. Lees and Michael Turner (eds), Reagan's First Four Years. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, pp. 39-67; Shirley Anne Warshaw, "The Reagan Experience with Cabinet Government" in Eric J. Schmertz, Natalie Datlof, and Alexej Ugrinsky (eds) Ronald Reagan's America, volume 2. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997, pp. 717-737; and Deborah Hart Strober and Gerald S. Strober, Reagan: The Man and his Presidency. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1998, pp. 100-102. 152"National Space Policy," NSDD-42, pp. 149-150. The Secretary of Transportation was added to this group in 1983, following Reagan's decision to give DOT the responsibility for regulating commercial space launches. 153Memo to William P. Clark from Craig L. Fuller, 26 June 1982 (RRL). 154See also W. D. Kay, "Space Policy Redefined: Ronald Reagan and the Commercialization of Space." Journal of Business and Economic History 27:1 (Fall 1998), pp. 237-247. Chapter7:66 155CabinetCouncilWorkingGrouponSpaceCommercialization,"PotentialNational CommercialSpaceInitiatives,"June1984(RRL). 156Aswill beseeninthenextchapter,forexample,SIG(Space)wasnotcarriedoverto theBushAdministration,andPresidentClintonchosetorelegateoverallresponsibility forspacepolicytotheNationalScienceandTechnologyCouncil,anorganizationwithin OSTP. _57Infact,it appearsthatthereeveseriousthoughttogivingDOC,ratherthanDOT, responsibilityforregulatingcommercialspacelaunchactivity.A 16November1983 decisionmemotothePresidentfromCraigFuller(RRL) gaveReagantheoptionof selectingeitherDepartmentforthisrole.Reportedly,oneofthereasonsthatDOTwas chosenwasbecauseSecretaryElizabethDolepromisedthePresidentthatshecouldcarry outthemissionwithoutabudgetincreaseS. ee"Mrs.DoleIsGivenNewSpaceDuties." New York Times (19 November 1983), p. 13. 158It should be noted, however, that this particular organization has not always had a comfortable existence with the nation's other space agencies. See, for example, W. D. Kay, Can Democracies Fly in Space? The Challenge of Revitalizing the U.S. Space Program. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995, p. 81; and Joan Johnson-Freese and Roger Handberg, Space, The Dormant Frontier: Changing the Paradigm for the 21srCentury. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997, p. 184. As will be seen in the next chapter, it did play a role in the 1988-9 controversy involving a private space station. 159Thomas Karas, The New High Ground: Strategies and Weapons of Space-Age War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, particularly chapter 1. Chapter7:67 160"NationalAeronauticsand.SpaceAdministration,Remarksatthe 25 th Anniversary Celebration," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 19 October 1983, pp. 1462-1463. 161"State of the Union Address" Public Papers1984, p 90; see also "Radio Address to the Nation on the Space Program" 28 January 1984 Public Papers1984, p. 108, where Reagan stated that "NASA...will be taking a number of initiatives to promote private sector investment [in space activities]." 162"National Space Policy," NSDD-42, p. 146. At the time, it should be noted, it was believed that virtually all other launch vehicles would be phased out in favor of the shuttle. Thus, this directive effectively gave NASA total responsible for private sector access to space. 163"Overall Schedule, Cabinet Council Working Group on Space Commercialization" 23 April 1984 (RRL). 164Cabinet Council Working Group on Space Commercialization, "Potential National Commercial Space Initiatives." 165Public Law 98-361, as amended 1984. 166National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Commercial Space Policy, October 1984 (copy at Space Business Archive). 167See, for example, Letter from James M. Beggs to Robert C. McFarlane, 17 July 1984 (RRL). 168"Centers for the Commercial Development of Space Named." NASA News 85-120 (22 August 1985). Chapter7:68 169U.S.NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration,Officeof Commercial Programs, Centers for the Commercial Development of Space. Washington: NASA, n.d.. 170"NASA Agrees to Fly Commercial Spacehab Flights." Space News Roundup (26 August 1988), p. 4 171See "Spacehab Unveils First Module, Predicts Four Flights Annually." Aviation Week andSpace Technology (11 May 1992), p. 59. 172For a brief history of NASA's early attempts to develop a station, see McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, chapter 2. 173bid, p. 39. 174See note 111. 175Letter to the President from Congressmen Jerry Lewis, Manuel Lujan, Bill Lowery, Newt Gingrich, Rod Chandler, and Robert S. Walker, 29 August 1983 (RRL). 176Cabinet Council Working Group on Space Commercialization, "Potential National Commercial Space Initiatives." 177McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, p. 184. _78U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of the Space Station, Space Station Freedom: A Foothold on the Future. Washington: NASA, 1988. 179And just as von Braun and other German scientists and engineers had been willing to work for the Nazis. 180See Linda T. Krug, Presidential Perspectives on Space Exploration: Guiding Metaphors from Eisenhower to Bush. New York: Praeger, 1991, chapter 4. 181"State of the Union Address" Public Papers 1984, p 90. 182McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, p. 190. Chapter7:69 CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION PART III: SECOND MISSION? Chapter 8: Dollars, Not Dreams; Business, Not Government For over 40 years, succeeding generations of space enthusiasts had been able to secure the resources necessary to advance the state of the art in spaceflight technology-- at times considerably--by convincing an impressive variety of political leaders that this would enable them to achieve their own goals. Wernher Von Braun and his colleagues were able to develop the first liquid-fueled rocket only because Adolf Hitler was persuaded that it could be an effective weapon of war. Nearly twenty years later, believing that only by beating the Soviets to the moon could the United States demonstrate its true resolution and spirit, American policymakers lavished unprecedented amounts of money, attention, and prestige on NASA scientists and engineers. A decade after that, NASA officials received presidential and Congressional approval--and, once again, billions of dollars--to build the world's first reusable spacecraft by convincing Richard Nixon and the Congress that such a vehicle would allow economical access to earth orbit(and that it would help win the Republican Party votes in aerospace-dependent states like Califomia).l By the beginning of 1984, it was starting to look as though they had done it yet again. The most conservative President in modern American history, one passionately Chapter8:2 devotedtoshrinkingthesizeofgovernmenat ndreducingpublicspending,hadjust been persuadedtosupportoneofthelargestspaceinitiatives--if notthelargestpublicworks project--ever,largelyonthestrengthoftheclaimthatitwouldprovideaboosttoprivate enterpriseN. ASA wasactivelyseekingbusinesscustomersfor itsgrowingfleetof shuttles,andwasbusilypromotingnewspace-basedenterprisesallacrossthecountry. Theagency,it seemedh,adsuccessfullybeatenitsColdWar swordsintoplowsharesa,nd waspoisedtousethispositiontocontinueitsowngoaladvancinghumanityintospace. Thistime,however,thetransformationcouldnotbemade.Justfouryearsafter PresidentReagan'sdramaticspacestationdeclaration,NASA's status,anditsoverallrole in U.S.spacepolicy,would,if anything,beless clear than it had been before Reagan took office. What makes this situation particularly ironic is the fact that by the end of the President's second term, the use of space technology was growing faster than ever before. What could account for such a complete (and rapid) turnaround for the agency? Not surprisingly, many commentators blame NASA itself, claiming that by this time the agency had become too political and/or too bureaucratic, or too fixated on "big" missions like the space station. 2A somewhat more comprehensive view of this period (which does not necessarily minimize NASA's responsibility), however, requires placing the agency's actions in the context of the changing definitions of space policy. When viewed in this context, the decline of the agency in the late 1980s can be attributed to a number of factors, both extemal and internal. Chapter 8:3 THE NEW POLITICS OF SPACE COMMERCE In retrospect, it now seems perfectly obvious: public officials who decry "big government" programs and call for bureaucracies to "get out of the way" of the private sector usually do not look favorably upon an agency the size and scope of NASA, even when it seems to be (some might even say particularly when it seems to be) supporting their agenda. Seen in this light, the intent of official documents like NSDD 42 was not-- as many saw it at the time--to develop a new role for NASA, but rather to remove it (and all other government organizations) from space activity to the greatest extent possible. 3 Traditional space advocates could perhaps be forgiven for not immediately grasping the full meaning of this new political reality. After all, in the early 1980s this represented a fundamentally different way of thinking about space: as the last chapter noted, up to this time virtually all space-based services had been provided by government. Moreover (as also seen in the last chapter), space technology possesses a number of features--the development of large-scale infrastructure, cutting-edge, high- risk research, and so on--that even many economic conservatives argue requires some role for government. Nevertheless, it is clear that by the middle of the decade, many people in the Administration (as well as in Congress and in the private sector) began to view NASA as an impediment to their plans. The resulting controversy quickly grew to engulf two of the agency's largest, most expensive, and most visible programs. Chapter8:4 STS Pricing By far, the most serious of these conflicts centered on NASA's policies toward commercial users of the space shuttle. As noted earlier, one of the agency's primary justifications of STS was that it would provide private business with "routine and economical" access to space. Several critics, however, began pointing out that shuttle flights were only "economical" because NASA underpriced its services while making up the difference out of the STS budget. 4In other words, commercial shuttle flights were based upon hefty government subsidies. According to one estimate, were NASA to charge non-government users a price based upon so-called "full cost recovery," that is, a price that reflected the actual cost of operating the shuttle, businesses would end up paying somewhere in the neighborhood of $85 million per flight. The agency, however, was only charging its commercial customers around $20 million. Private launch companies, on the other hand, who were using less expensive expendable launch vehicles, were forced to charge $25-30 million, which was far less than the shuttle's real cost, but millions of dollars higher than the subsidized price that NASA charged commercial users. 5Under such conditions, private firms would have a very difficult time (to say the least) competing with NASA. This practice had come under some criticism within the Reagan Administration as early as 1982. 6 In early 1983, after only 6 shuttle flights (including the first by Challenger, the second orbiter to join the fleet), free-market advocates were complaining that the policy was detrimental to the development of the private-sector launch industry. A report from the conservative Heritage Foundation, for example, warned that the federal Chapter8:5 governmentwould"suffocatespaceentrepreneurswithredtapeandsubsidized governmentcompetition'.'7 Bymid-1984,astheAdministration'scommerciallaunchpolicywasmoving forward,NASA's pricingpoliciescameunderrenewedscrutiny.InlateJune, RepresentativEedZschauofCaliforniaurgedhisRepublicancolleaguesinCongressto signapetitionforPresidentReaganprotestingNASA's practiceof using"taxdollarsto marketitslaunchservices."Thispolicy,accordingtotheCongressmann,otonly threatenedto"devastateabuddingprivatesectorindustry,"butwasalso"clearly inconsistentwiththeprinciplesofourparty[and]thestatementsmadebythepresidentin hisStateoftheUnionaddress"8: Wecontinuetosupportwhole-heartedlyNASA initsquest fornewdiscoveriesH. owever,in itseagernestsoprovide greaterjustificationfor thespaceshuttle,wefearthatthe agencymaybedilutingitsbasicR&D missiontoinclude providingcommercialservicesincompetitionwith the privatesector.NASA shouldrecognizethatthereal incentivesforcommercializingspacelie inaprivatesector environmentthatencouragesentrepreneurshipa,ndthat suchanenvironmentcanbegreatlydamagedbyunfair competitiononthepartofafederalagency9. OneofthemoresignificantfeaturesofthispetitionisitsassessmenotfNASA'smotives. Phraseslike"in itseagernestsoprovidegreaterjustificationforthespaceshuttle"suggest thatatleastsomeinCongressbelieved(notwithoutreason)thattheagencywasusingthe Chapter8:6 politically popularnotionofexpandingspacecommerceasameansof advancingitsown agendaS. uchachargewouldbemademorethanonceintheyearsahead. Meanwhile,theissuewasalsoreceivingacompleteairingwithin various executivebranchagenciesN. otsurprisingly,theDepartmentofTransportation(which hadbeenassignedresponsibilityforthecommerciallaunchindustry)wasstrongly opposedtotheNASA policy,andsupportedtheremovalofgovernmentsubsidiesT. his wasalsothepositiontakenbytheOfficeofManagemenatndBudget,whichnotedthat itsownguidelinesprohibitedgovernmenftromprovidingacommercialproductor servicethatcouldbeproducedmoreeconomicallybytheprivatesector_.0 NASA, ofcourse,arguedonbehalfofthecurrentshuttlepricingsystem.Ina seriesofletterstotheWhiteHouse,AdministratorJamesBeggsassertedthat"pricing the shuttleoutofthemarket"wouldonlycrippletheprogramwithoutnecessarilyaiding industry.Rather,statedBeggs,themostlikely beneficiarywouldbetheEuropean Arianne launcher (which itself receives significant government subsidies). Thus, an increase in shuttle prices could have a serious effect upon U.S. international economic competitiveness. Moreover, Beggs maintained, the relatively low shuttle prices encouraged a number of businesses to enter into space-based initiatives in the first place, il Given its stated support (not to mention all of its legislative and administrative activity) for the commercial launch industry, it seems somewhat surprising that the White House chose to side with NASA. In a memo to DOT Secretary Dole, Robert McFarlane, the president's Assistant for National Security Affairs, stated that "we must proceed Chapter8:7 prudentlyandcautiouslyinresolvingthisissue'.'_2It citedtheproblemofintemational competitivenessa,swell astheneedtopreservethe"uniqueattributes"oftheshuttle. Thus,in August1984,theAdministrationissuedanewNationalSpaceStrategy allowingNASA topostponeimplementingafull-costrecoverypricingstructureforthe shuttleuntil October1,1988(i.e.,thebeginningofFY 1989).13InanotherNational SecurityDecisionDirectiveissuedthefollowingJuly,thepost-1988minimumpricewas setat$74million (1982dollars),14afigurethatmanyinDOTfeltwasstill toolow (relativetotheshuttle'sactualcost).15Neverthelesst,hematterwasapparentlysettled.It would,however,bereopenedinanunexpectedandtragicfashionsixmonthslaterwith thelaunchofthespaceshuttleChallenger (see below). A Private Space Station? Although easily the most visible, shuttle pricing was by no means the only instance where policymakers began to regard a major NASA program as a barrier to free enterprise. Less than two years after the STS controversy, a similar type of dispute erupted between the agency, the rest of the administration, and some influential members of Congress, this time over what NASA viewed as its most important project, the space station. In 1984, Space Industries Incorporated, a Houston-based firm (headed by Maxime Faget, a retired NASA employee who had developed the original concept for Project Mercury), approached the government with a plan to build the Industrial Space Facility, a so-called "industrial park in space. ''!6 SII planned to lease space on the ISF to private companies and the federal government to conduct long-range experiments in such areas Chapter8:8 aslow-gravitymaterialsprocessing.1U7nlikeNASA's futurespacestation,whichwasto becontinuouslyoccupied,theISFwasonlytobe"humantended":shuttleastronauts wouldvisit it twoorthreetimesayeartoreplaceexperimentsandconductroutine maintenanceD. ay-to-dayoperationofthefacility wouldbemanagedbyrobotsand computersI.tstotalcostwasestimatedat$700million, andtheexpectedalaunchdate waslate1991(i.e.,threeyearsearlierthanPresidentReagan's"within adecade"deadline forthespacestation). Thefollowing year,NASA signedanagreemenwt ith SII wherebytheagency wouldprovidethecompanywith threeshuttleflightsoncredit.OnceSIIbegan generatingincome,itwouldpayNASA 12percentofitsgrossrevenuesuntiltheoriginal transportationcostswerepaidoff.It wouldthencontractforshuttleserviceslikeany othercommercialcustomer. At thetime,thearrangemensteemedideallysuitedtothenew,"business- oriented"wayNASA wasnowtryingtoconductitself.Moreover,byprovidingsupport forafledglingprivatecompany,itwasalsocreatingstill morecustomersforthespace shuttle.It isthereforehardlysurprisingthattheprojectreceivedagreatofsupportinside theagency.A "Microgravity MaterialsScienceAssessmenTtaskForce"ofJune1987 (chairedbyDr. BonnieDunbar,ashuttleastronaut)f,orexample,notedthatNASA had traditionallypaidtoolittle attentiontospace-basemdaterialsresearch.Anotherreport, fromsixofNASA's Centers for the Commercial Development of Space (see last chapter), described a number of microgravity experiments they would wish to pursue on a facility like the ISF._8 Chapter8:9 Unfortunately,despitealloftheseendorsementsth,eventuresoonraninto trouble.First,SII hadseriouslyoverestimatedtheshort-runcommercialappealof microgravitymaterialsprocessingA. lthoughtheideaof makingnew(orbetter)products in space---crystalsp,harmaceuticalsm,etals,etc.--hasalwayssoundedattractivein principle,thedevelopmentofanactualmarkethasbeensluggishatbest.Thecompany soonreachedtheconclusionthatthemarketwouldnot"mature"untilatleast1995.19In addition,theChallenger explosion and subsequent grounding of the U.S. shuttle fleet made some potential investors and users nervous: how could the company guarantee that customers would have regular access to the facility? As a result, by 1987 SII had lost one major client (McDonnell Douglas) and had managed to raise only $30 million, less than 10 percent of the amount required. 2° In the fall of 1987, the company approached NASA 21again, this time with a proposal that the agency become a sort of "anchor tenant" on the ISF. Under this arrangement, NASA would lease around 70 percent of the facility, at a cost of $140 million per year, for five years. 22The federal govemment's involvement with the program--not to mention the five years of guaranteed income--would help the company raise the capital it needed to build the facility, and would also help reassure the company's anxious customer base. For NASA, however, such an invitation could hardly have come at a worse time. Although its space station program had received a strong endorsement from President Reagan in 1984, members of Congress, particularly some of the more influential committee chairs, were far more skeptical. 23Ever since it had first been proposed, for example, Representative Edward Boland, chair of the House Appropriations Chapter8:10 subcommitteethatoversawtheNASA budget,hadpushedfora(relatively)smallerand simplerfacility thantheagencywasproposing.Arguing(correctly,asitturnedout)that thepermanentlyoccupiedstationwouldcostfarmorethan$8-9billion,asthePresident hadclaimed,Bolandclaimedthatautomatedplatformsanda"man-tended"laboratory couldperform80percentofthemissionsproposedforthefull stationat15-20percentof its cost. 24 Against this backdrop, NASA officials were not enthusiastic (to say the least) about a private company touting a smaller and cheaper version of one of its largest programs. They were right to be concerned: Congress was just then considering the agency's FY 1988 budget request, which asked for $767 million for the space station, more than the total estimated cost of the ISF. Not surprisingly, a number of station opponents, including Boland, Congressman Bill Green (the ranking Republican on Boland's subcommittee), and Senator William Proxmire (a longstanding critic of expensive space projects), found the facility very attractive indeed. Thus, in the FY 1988 continuing budget resolution, Congress ordered that $25 million of NASA's station budget (which had already been cut nearly in half from that requested, to $387 million) be set aside as a "placeholder" on the ISF. The resolution also directed NASA "to conclude a satisfactory funding arrangement that will lead to a workable leased ISF vehicle in the 1991/1992 timeframe. ''25 NASA, as might be expected, vigorously opposed this move. Although few in the agency would say so publicly, it was widely reported that the biggest fear was that ISF would ultimately weaken political support for the larger space station. 26Officially, however, the agency took the position that it had no "identified needs that would justify a Chapter8: 11 majorcommitmenttousetheISFcapability.''27Ironically,foratimeitappearedas thoughthislineofargumentwouldproduceexactlytheeffectNASA wishedtoavoid: manysawit asundercuttingtheargumentforthespacestation. Inanangryjoint responsetoNASA's "noidentifiedneeds"statementf,or example,SenatorProxmire,alongwithCongressmeBnolandandGreen,notedthat Suchastatemensteemstosuggestthat...NASA hasno requirementsformicrogravityresearch--andthatcausesus toquestionthepurposeofbuildingaspacestation2.8 InordertomakesurethatittooktheISFproposalseriously,theCongressmenstatetheir intentiontowithhold$90million ofstationdevelopmenftunding"until theseissuesare settled'.'29 Oneespeciallyinterestingpointaboutthisletterisitsobservationthat"[o]ftenit appearsthatthereisanelementwithin NASA whichisonlyinterestedinbuildinga permanently-manne[dsic]spacestation,"withoutregardforwhetherthis"resultsin a spacestationthathaslittle ornoresourcesavailableforactualexperiments''.3°Thus,like RepresentativeZschau'sclaimfouryearsearlieraboutNASA's "eagerness"tofind justificationsfortheshuttle,theCongressmeanppearedtobelieve(again,notwithout reason)thattheagencywaspursuinganagendaofitsown. WhileCongress'supportfortheprivatefacility appearstohavebeenbasedupon economics,manyseniorAdministrationofficialstendedtoviewthemattersomewhat moreideologically.Inlanguagethatwouldfit perfectlywithanyprivatizationinitiative, forexample,CommerceSecretaryWilliam Verityexpressedhisstrongsupportfor leasingspaceontheISF: Chapter8:12 Bybuyingservices,thegovernmentwill maketheprivate sectorresponsiblefordesign,financing,development,and operation.Thisreformwill savethegovernmentmoney, reducetheamountoffundingit mustsupplyup-frontand shifttheriskofcostoverrunstotheprivatesector3.1 GreggFawkes,directorofDOC'sOfficeofCommercialSpace,wasmoreadamanta,s wellasmoredirectlycritical ofNASA.Ashesawit,theagencywassimplytryingto maintainits"monopolycontrol"ofspace3.a Verity soonbroughttheISFissuetotheWhiteHouseEconomicPolicyCouncil, oneof theReagan-eracross-Cabineotrganizationsdescribedintheprecedingchapter.He wasabletopersuadeotherEPCmemberss,uchasTreasurySecretaryJamesBakerand TransportationSecretaryJamesBurnleytosupporttheanchor-tenanptroposal.Ashehad attemptedwiththeCongressN, ASA AdministratorFletcherarguedthattheagencyhad "norequirementsfortheparticularcapabilitythatISFisproposing'.'33OnJanuary7, 1988,however,theCouncilvotedtorecommendtothePresidentthatNASA makea commitmenttoSIItoleasespaceontheISF.34 Thus, the Administration's new National Space Policy, issued on February 11 (see below), announced that the federal government would indeed become the "'anchor tenant' in an orbiting research facility suitable for research and commercial manufacturing that is financed, constructed, and operated by the private sector." The contract was to be awarded that summer, with "services available to the government no later then the end of 1993. "35 Chapter8:13 NASAwas,however,abletogaintwoconcessionsF.irst,unlikethe$25million "downpayment"of thepreviousyear,theleasemoneywasnottocomeoutofitsbudget (thePresident'sdirectivecalledforthefacilitytobeusedby "variousFederalagencies with interestinmicrogravityresearch"36S).econd,theagencyconvincedthe Administrationthatthechoiceofcompanyoughttobeopentocompetitivebidding,rather thansimplyissueasole-sourcecontracttoSII.ThenameIndustrialSpaceFacilitywas dropped,andfromthispointforwardtheprojectbecameknownastheCommercially DevelopedSpaceFacility.OnemonthafterthePresident'sannouncementth, e Administration had drafted a request for proposals and was "ready to get the process under way. ',37 This, as it turned out, was the program's high-water mark. Despite its earlier endorsement by a few of their colleagues, some Senators--most notably Ernest Hollings, chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and Donald Riegle, chairman of the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space--had serious misgivings about CDSF and the process surrounding it. They urged delaying release of the RFP until a more thorough study of the whole project could be made. 38Although more sharply divided, the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics also had concerns. 39In May, four Senators--Hollings and Riegle, joined by ranking Republican members John C. Danforth and Larry Pressler--ordered that the project be delayed pending an independent study by the National Academy of Sciences. 4° That report, released in March 1989, concluded that there would be no real need for such a facility until at least the late 1990s, by which time, it was assumed, the space station would be Chapter8:14 completed. 41Combined with the change in administration (George Bush had never commented about the project), this effectively killed the CDSF. Can NASA Run a Business? It is, of course, possible to argue (as at least some observers did at the time4Z), that by requiring NASA and other federal agencies to lease space on the ISF/CDSF, the Administration was violating its own (often-stated) restriction on public subsidies to private space companies. 43Nevertheless, the most common descriptions of the episode were that of NASA opposing the small start-up company, fighting to block SII's project primarily in order to preserve its big-budget project. Combined with the earlier controversy over STS pricing, an image was beginning to emerge (fairly or not) that the agency was fundamentally "anti-business." Even in instances where NASA was sincerely (from its own perspective) trying to help the commercial space sector. A 1989 IEEE report, for example, accused the Office of Commercial Programs of "meddling" in matters that ought to be left solely to private business, and of viewing itself (rather than the financial or capital markets) as the "fundamental 'economic filter' in the space commercialization decision-making process. ''44 According to the report, the Office's attitudes raised [t]he disturbing question of whether or not NASA really understands how entrepreneurial elements of the United States free enterprise system actually go about the creation of new private sector businesses, and the truly useful, but Chapter8:15 sharplylimited,rolewhichthefederalgovernmentcanplay therein.45 A similarsentimentwasexpressedbyDOC'sGreggFawkes,whoduringtheISFdebate commentedthatNASA didnot"understandwhat'commercial'meansin space,and wouldn'tlikeit if theydid.''46 Thisassessmenotftheagencyandit properroleintheareaofspacecommerceis clearlyevidentintherevisedNationalSpacePolicy.Like itspredecessorsth,edocument reaffirmsU.S.governmentsupportfora"separate,non-governmentaclommercial sector'.'47Thistime,however,thelanguageismorepreciseandthetoneabit more pointed: ...theUnitedStatesgovernmentshallnotprecludeordeter thecontinuingdevelopmenotf aseparaten,on- governmentaCl ommercialSpaceSector.... Governmental SpaceSectors[sic]shallpurchasecommerciallyavailable spacegoodsandservicestothefullestextentfeasible,and shallnotConducatctivitieswithpotentialcommercial applicationthatprecludeordeterCommercialSectorspace activitiesexceptfornationalsecurityorpublicsafety reasonsC. ommercialSectorspaceactivitieswill be supervisedandregulatedonlytotheextentrequiredbylaw, nationalsecurity,internationalobligations,andpublic safety4. 8 ThebusinessofNASA,it seemsw, asnotbusiness. Chapter 8:16 TECHNICAL PROBLEMS At the same time this discussion was taking place, the agency was struggling with an unusual number of highly visible technical setbacks, ranging from the merely annoying to the catastrophic. Taken together, these mishaps and failures not only severely damaged NASA's reputation but were, in at least one case directly responsible for a major and far-reaching change in U.S. space policy. Challenger and its Aftermath Obviously, the most serious of these events was the loss of the space shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1996. Just 73 seconds after liftoff, the spacecraft exploded in a massive ball of flame, completely destroying the orbiter and killing all seven astronauts. Subsequent investigation by NASA and an external commission revealed that the accident had been caused by the failure of an O-shaped gasket meant to seal the joints between the different sections of the solid rocket boosters that help lift the shuttle into orbit. The chilly January weather (temperature at lift-off was only 36 degrees Fahrenheit, and during the previous evening had dropped into the high 20's) had partially frozen the rubber gasket, leaving it unable to expand and form a proper seal. The escaping hot gasses ignited the fuel in the shuttle's external tank, resulting in the explosion. 49 Amid the shock and grief, numerous accusations and recriminations were heaped upon NASA. Even before the first shuttle flight, critics had argued that the Space Transportation System was technically suspect, economically inefficient, and perhaps even downright dangerous. 5°The successful launch of Columbia in 1981 slowed, but did Chapter8:17 notfully stop,the questions and criticism. 51The general view of the shuttle's detractors was that, for purely political reasons (create work for itself, continue the uneconomical human spaceflight program, etc.), NASA had committed itself--and, since STS was to serve as the only U.S. launch system, the entire nation--to a fatally flawed technology. 52 To many, Challenger was the tangible--and tragic--proof of what they had been saying all along. Interestingly, it did not appear that NASA suffered a loss of political support because of the accident--at least not directly. President Reagan, for one, continued to spea k of the agency (shuttle and all) in typically lofty terms. In fact, there were times that he even made it appear that accidents like Challenger were only to be expected, a normal and accepted part of exploring space: They [astronauts] know that exploration has its risks. They know that with adventure, goes danger. They all know this, but they also know something far more important: something about the spirit and sense of joy that have kept man reaching through the ages to grasp for the limits of his universe and beyond that, despite hardships and peril. 53 Perhaps more significant was the fact that Reagan still supported NASA, at least up to a point. Seven months after the accident, the President declared: NASA and the shuttles will continue to lead the way, breaking new ground, pioneering new technology, pushing back the frontiers .... NASA will keep America on the leading edge of change. 54 Chapter8:18 Moreover,thissupportseemedtotranslateintoactualpolicy:theAdministration continuedtosupportthespacestation5,5andit approvedthepurchaseofanorbiterto replaceChallenger (the Endeavor). Nevertheless, the accident did have a major impact on the agency, one far greater than was generally recognized at the time. First, it accomplished what all of the arguments from the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Transportation, and several members of Congress could not: it got NASA out of the commercial launch business. In October 1986, the President issued an order that, with a few minor exceptions, "NASA shall no longer provide launch services for commercial and foreign payloads. ''56 This new policy, which in effect invalidated NSDDs 42, 144, and 181, was almost certainly directly responsible for the rapid growth of the commercial launch industry. With NASA--and its subsidized shuttle rates---out of the way, the number of private launches grew rapidly, from 2 in 1989 to 22 in 1998 (for a total of 106 over the 9-year period). 57Total revenues for the industry were projected to reach $1.3 billion in 1990. Moreover, NASA's prediction that the removal of the shuttle from the marketplace would benefit Arianne more than U.S. industry turned out to be incorrect, at least in the long run. In 1998, for example, American companies conducted 47 percent of all commercial launches worldwide, compared to Arianespace's 25 percent (Russia was third with 14 percent). 58 Clearly, the growth of this industry was also aided by another of the Administration's post-Challenger decisions. The 1988 Space Policy directed all federal agencies to "procure existing and future required expendable launch services directly Chapter 8:19 from the private sector to the fullest extent possible. ''59 Within a few years, virtually all government satellite launches, including most of NASA's 6°(and even DOD's), were being conducted by private companies. In effect, this decision changed the federal government from the industry's biggest competitor into one its major clients. 6j Thus, while no one would ever regard Challenger as anything less than a terrible national tragedy, it did represent a sort of victory--after their apparent defeat with NSDD- 181- for the pro-business segment of the space community, moving U.S. space policy precisely in the direction they had advocated throughout 1983 and 1984. 62 Second, the accident--and the subsequent grounding of the entire shuttle fleet-- vividly demonstrated the danger of relying upon a single launch system. The Department of Defense was particularly alarmed at the prospect of having no access to space for an extended period. Accordingly, the National Space Policy recognized the need for "U.S. space transportation systems that provide sufficient resiliency to allow continued operation, despite the failure of a single system. ''63 Thus, in a move somewhat parallel to the rise of the commercial launch sector, the Pentagon began once again to procure and operate expendable launch vehicles. 64Even after the shuttle began operating again in 1988, major military payloads (which would probably still have been permitted to use the system even under the new guidelines) virtually disappeared from its manifest. 65 In short, by 1988, STS had lost all of its business and military customers. Despite its return to flight status, the addition of a replacement orbiter, and even the President's strong endorsement, the largest NASA program since Apollo had no assigned role to play in either of the nation's primary space activities. Combined with the removal of Chapter 8:20 commercial activity from the space station (see below), 66NASA was finding itself increasingly removed from the new direction the space program was taking. Spiraling Costs, Dwindling Performance Even before the Challenger accident, it was clear that STS could not live up to NASA's ambitious vision of a decade earlier. The agency had predicted at least 2 shuttle flights per month by the mid-1980s; in 1985, its last full year of operation (pre- Challenger) there were only 6, and only 24 total over the five-year period. 67During the 1970s, NASA had promised that shuttle flights would be economical, costing as little as $400 per pound. By the mid-1980s, however, some estimates put the costs of a launch at more than $400 million, or around $10,000 per pound. 6s Similar problems confronted the space station. At the time Reagan approved the program, NASA had estimated that facility would cost around $8 billion over a decade. 69 By 1990, after a seemingly endless series of redesigns and "rescopings, ''7° that figure had reason to $30 billion, and some sources were predicting that the total price (including operating costs) would reach as high as $120 billion. 71Moreover, even as it was becoming more expensive, the station's capabilities were being scaled back. Originally envisioned as a series of laboratories supporting a wide range of scientific and commercial activity (astronomical and earth observation, research in biology and medicine, materials processing), as well as (eventually) a docking port for further human expeditions into space, by the end of the 1980s, NASA had steadily whittled its objectives down to one, biomedical research. 72In effect, critics claimed, astronauts would be permanently stationed in space simply to make observations about themselves. 73 Chapter 8:21 The selection of the station's primary mission is significant. Chapter 7 noted that although NASA had been touting the commercial value of a space station, its primar-y objective had been to create a permanent human habitat in space (hence its continued characterization of the project as "the next logical step"74). Such a facility was necessary, many space enthusiasts felt, to prepare for long-duration missions like a human expedition to Mars. 75If this could be done in a way that also accomplished the Administration's objectives, so much the better. Rising costs and mounting technical problems, however, required that some of the station's functions be scrapped, and it is hardly surprising that NASA chose to preserve the one relating to its highest priority. That decision, of course, did little to endear the project to policymakers (as seen, for example, in the debate over ISF). Cost increases and technical failures were by no means limited to these two programs. NASA was highly embarrassed over the mis-aligned mirrors of its $2 billion Hubble Space Telescope TMand the total loss of the $1 billion Mars Observer. 77Although neither was a commercial program (both were sponsored by the Office of Space Science), their problems clearly contributed to the growing image of NASA as an agency in disarray. As one critic put it, the nation's premier space organization was beginning to look "silly. ''78 The problems of this period, however, go beyond simple embarrassment. The types (and the frequency) of technical malfunctions and delays the agency was experiencing during the 1980s were clearly figuring into the private sector's investment decisions. As noted earlier, for example, the Challenger accident made it far more Chapter8:22 difficult forSpaceIndustriesIncorporatedtoraisestart-upfundingfortheISF.A 1989 CongressionaBl udgetOfficereportnotesthat Theprivatesector'sreturnonitsinvestmentwill inevitably dependuponhavingassuredaccesstothepublic infrastructureT. hisaccessisnotonlyconstrainedby governmentpolicy,butalsobyeventsunaffectedbypolicy suchastechnicaldelaysor catastrophelsiketheChallenger accident.If therecenthistoryofNASA infrastructure effortsisanyguide,thescheduleforitsnewinitiativesis likely toexperiencedelayssimilartothoseofthepast.79 Inotherwords,setbackslikeHubbleandtheMars Observer were simply one more reason why NASA needed to be kept far away from commercial operations. A New Definition, A New World Of course, it is possible to argue that there is a bit of a double-standard operating here. During the Apollo era, NASA certainly had its share of mishaps, failures, and even fatalities. In fact, when comparing the success rates of earth-orbit launches during the 1960s (85 percent) with those of the 1980s (93 percent), it appears that the agency was actually performing better than it had during its "glory days. ''8° Moreover, when adjusted for inflation, NASA was spending far less money during the 1980s ($109 billion) than it had twenty years earlier ($157 billion). 81Such comparisons, however, only serve to underscore the changes resulting from the change in the way space policy was defined. Chapter 8:23 As chapter 2 noted, different "types" of public policy are often evaluated according to different criteria. Thus, when considered as a sort of national security issue, as it was during the height of the Cold War, political leaders and the public at large were far more willing to accept high costs and relatively higher risks from the space program. After all, as seen in chapter 4, some politicians were characterizing projects like Mercury and Apollo as matters of "national survival" during the late 1950s and early 1960s. One minor--albeit telling--episode of that era involves the treatment of the chimpanzees that rode the first Mercury capsules into space. Writer Tom Wolfe has suggested that some of these animals were actually abused if they did not cooperate with researchers (in some cases, they were even beaten with rubber hoses). It is unimaginable that such treatment would be tolerated today; indeed, under current guidelines governing animal experimentation it would clearly be illegal. At the time, however, it was seen as a perhaps regrettable (Wolfe states that the researchers did not see themselves as being intentionally cruel) but necessary part of protecting the national interest. 82 Throughout the 1980s, civil space policy became increasingly identified with commercial operations. This had the effect, first, of placing the program overall somewhat lower down on the scale of national priorities. Although space exploration did not become unimportant during this period, it was, in the Administration's view, less important: making money is generally regarded as less critical than "national survival" (and, as seen in the last chapter, Reagan was spending far more money on military space applications). A second, and somewhat related, result of this change was that NASA began to be held to a standard that placed far more emphasis upon such factors as cost and efficiency Chapter8:24 thanit wasduringthe 1960s.Policymakersandthegeneralpublicmorewilling to"spare noexpense"inthedrivetoestablishsupremacyovertheSoviets,anideathatEisenhower fearedandtriedunsuccessfullytoavoid.Inaddition,duringtheearlydaysofspaceflight, whenmuchoftherelevanttechnologywasstill underdevelopmentp,ublicofficialswere moreunderstandingoftechnicalmishapsandaccidents8.3TowardtheendofReagan's secondterm,however,whenspaceflightseemedtohavematuredtothepointwhereit wasevenpossibleforprivatebusinessetsoengagein it, technicalfailuresonthepartof thegovernmenpt rogram(notwithstandingthefactthatitsobjectiveswereoftenfarmore challenging)wereviewedmuchmorecritically. Finally,bytheendofthe1980s,NASA wasoperatingin anenvironmentwhere itspresence--ifnotitsveryexistence--wasincreasinglysuspectU. ndertheReagan Administration'snewpolicydefinition,theroleofgovernmenthadbeenchangedfrom thatofadirectserviceprovider84tomoreofa"facilitator," inwhichtheprimarygoalwas tohelpothers move into space. As chapter 2 suggested, this new role required a rather different type of organizational structure. For nearly twenty years, NASA--which had been established (and organized) according to the Cold War definition of space policy-- had been struggling to carry out a new, service-based mission. The Reagan Administration, with the support of the business community and free-market conservatives generally, had chosen the somewhat more expedient path of simply creating new agencies, such as those in DOT and DOC, to carry out its commercial initiatives. Thus, by the end of Reagan's second term, a very large question loomed for space advocates: what was NASA's purpose? Chapter 8:25 NASA AT THE MARGIN For the most part, the transformation of space policy into an economic issue continued--and, in some respects, even accelerated during the Presidency of George Bush. Ten months after taking office, the Administration issued its own official statement on space, NSD-30, which in many respects was mirrored Reagan's revised Space Policy of January 1988. One of the major changes was purely organizational: a new National Aeronautics and Space Council, chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, replaced the Reagan Administration's SIG (Space). 85 Any resemblance between this organization and that headed by Lyndon Johnson during the early 1960s, however, was limited to the name. Its membership was more diverse then the defense-heavy SIG (Space), consisting of the secretaries of state, defense, treasury, commerce, and transportation, as well as the directors of the OMB and the CIA, the president's chief of staff and science advisor, and the NASA administrator. Nevertheless, under Quayle, an economic (and social) conservative, the Space Council generally adopted a strongly pro-business stance, on occasion even going so far as to seek industry advice (and thus bypassing NASA) on matters of space policy. 86 To be sure, Bush--like Reagan--was a staunch supporter of the space station, despite the fact that it was no longer viewed as a commercial facility. Unfortunately for NASA, the project was facing increasing opposition in Congress, and was saved from outright cancellation on a number of occasions only by direct White House lobbying. 87 Given the constant struggle to save its only major program, there was usually little opportunity to address the larger question of the agency's overall mission. Chapter8:26 SEI: TheExceptionthat Proves the Rule For a few months in 1989 and 1990, however, it appeared that NASA's fortunes were about to improve. In a speech at the National Air and Space Museum marking the 20 thanniversary of first moon landing--and with the Apollo 11 astronauts at his side, President Bush unveiled his Space Exploration Initiative, a bold plan to retum the nation to the moon and, eventually, to send humans to Mars. 88Under this proposal, the U.S. would set up a permanent research facility on the moon by 2000 and, using this base and the space station, would launch an expedition to Mars sometime between 2010 and 2019. The total cost of the venture was estimated at $500 billion over 20 years. 89 It is worth noting that, while Bush's National Space Policy, issued shortly after the NASM address, does indeed call for a "long-range goal of expanding human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit and into the solar system" and promises a forthcoming "presidential decision on a focused program of manned exploration of the solar system, ''9° this language actually comes, literally word-for-word, from Ronald Reagan's Space Policy of 1988. 91Unlike Reagan, however, who did not follow up this rather broad language (which one observer has characterized as a "mild gesture" to NASA's Office of Exploration 92) with any specific proposals, Bush was ready to be explicit. At the 1990 commencement ceremony at Texas A&M University, Bush declared that Leadership in space takes more than just dollars. It also takes a decision. And so, I'm announcing one today... I believe that before Apollo celebrates the 50thanniversary of Chapter 8:27 itslandingon the moon, the American flag should be planted on Mars. 93 To space advocates, this was a dream come true. It had long been assumed in this community (at NASA and elsewhere) that the only reason that the U.S. had not had a "grand vision" for space after Apollo was the lack of just such a declaration, another Apollo-like commitment. 94At long last, it seemed, the wait for the required "presidential leadership" had finally arrived. Moreover, unlike rocket launches or (according to ISF's supporters) a space station, a lunar base and a Mars expedition were unquestionably projects that only NASA--not some other government agency or private company---could perform. Thus, SEI appeared to present the agency with a larger purpose, a mission, that moved it out of the supporting (or, as some would have it, obstructionist) roles it had been playing for the past few years. Sadly for the enthusiasts, the dream faded quickly. Looking back, it seems safe to say that one of the more remarkable aspects of the SEI experience was the general indifference to the President's announcement. Particularly when compared to Kennedy's "moon speech" or Reagan's call for a space station "within a decade"--both of which it was clearly attempting to emulate95--Bush's proclamation seemed to hit the country with a resounding thud. This is not to say that the proposal was ignored altogether. Congressional opponents immediately attacked it as a wasteful extravagance at a time of extreme budget stringency. 96Even the criticism, however, seemed somewhat muted. The fact is that, although it was discussed in Congress and elsewhere, 97it almost appears as though few Chapter8:28 AmericanstookSEIveryseriously.Unlikethestormydebatesoverotherbig-budget R&D programsof theperiod,suchastheSuperconductingSupercollider(or,forthat matter,thespacestation),Congressionaalctiononthemoon-Marsproject,tookona ratherdetachedair.Itsdeathinthesummerof 1990wasnotmarkedby rancorous speecheosraclosely-watchedfinalconfrontationonthefloorofCongress(again,the demiseoftheSSCmakesatellingcontrast98b),utratherbyasortofquiet fade-out. 99 The analysis presented in chapter 2 suggests that the primary reason the Space Exploration Initiative possessed such an "unreal" quality was that it fell outside of any accepted definition of space policy. Kennedy's lunar landing goal was cast--and widely understood--as a direct challenge to a feared adversary. Similarly, the space station--at least as it was originally conceived--fit (albeit imperfectly) into the Reagan Administration's larger vision of encouraging space commerce (as well as Reagan's own enthusiastic vision of America's destiny). Even the space shuttle, which was not unveiled in a particularly dramatic fashion, was described in terms that conformed--if somewhat vaguely (see chapter 6)--to some broadly accepted notion of the space program's purpose. This was clearly not the case with SEI. There does not appear to have been any sort of effort to link it to national security policy (and it is difficult to imagine any public official regarding such a connection as credible). Bush and Quayle both referred to it as "an investment in America's future," but other administration officials, such as Science Advisor D. Alan Bromley, specifically rejected classifying it as an economic or even an R&D program: Chapter8:29 Some...projects[like] theSpaceExplorationInitiative... haveneverbeenprimarilyscienceprojects,althoughfor conveniencetheyareincludedwithR&D in thebudget.But theyarejustified primarilyonthebasisofconsiderations suchasexploringphysicalfrontiers,increasing appreciationofscienceandtechnology,maintaining nationalleadershipin agivenarea,ortakingtheinitial stepsin agreathumanadventureandonlysecondarilyon theirlong-term(thoughquitecertain)contributionsto scientificandtechnologicalprogressT. ocriticizethemon thegroundsthattheydonotadvancesciencesufficientlyis tofailtorecognizetheirmultipleobjectives1.00 OneofthemorestrikingfeaturesofthisstatemenitshowthereferencetoSEI's"multiple objectives"--noneofthemstatedspecifically--harkensbacktothe"multiple capabilities"(butnoclearmission)descriptionofthespaceshuttleduringthe 1970s(see chapter6). Finally,unlikeKennedy,Johnson,orReaganw, hosespaceproposalswereshaped (forthemostpart)bytheirAdministrations'respectivelargerpoliticalandideological objectives,SEIdidnotreadilylenditselftoanysortofoverallgoalthatBushmighthave setforhispresidency._°I_nshort,lackinganygenerallyrecognizedpolicydefinitionthat couldconceivablycoverit, theSpaceExplorationInitiativecameacrossalmostasan irrelevance,anideathatsimplydidnot"fit" Americanpoliticaldiscourseofthelate 1980sandearly1990s. Chapter8:30 THE GOLDIN AGE: THE END OF BUSINESS AS USUAL? Although the Space Exploration Initiative, for all of its initial fanfare, ultimately had little impact upon the program, another of Bush's decisions was to prove somewhat more long-lasting. By the early 1990s, it had become clear that NASA's organizational structure and procedures represented a serious impediment to its full participation in U.S. space policy as it was now defined (although obviously no one used the term at the time). Accordingly, in 1992 the President appointed a new Administrator, Daniel Goldin, who promised to "shake up" the agency. A former executive with the TRW corporation (as well as a former NASA employee), Goldin immediately set out to change what he called the "organizational culture" at NASA, largely by forcing it to adopt more of the practices--and the attitudes--of private industry. He pushed, for example, for a greater reliance on newer, more "cutting-edge" (and lower-cost) technologies. He sought to introduce the principles of Total Quality Management (widely employed by many firms at the time) into the organization, going so far at point as to appoint an associate administrator for "continuous improvement." Finally, he moved the agency away from very large, so- called "behemoth" space missions like the Mars Observer and the Galileo Jupiter and Cassini Saturn probes, _°2opting instead for a larger number of smaller, more focused projects. The phrase "faster, better, cheaper" was to become a sort of mantra within the agency. Organizationally, NASA under Goldin began to contract out a greater share of its work than ever before, including, ultimately, day-to-day operations of the space shuttle. Chapter8:31 This,inturn,ledtoasignificantdownsizingof itspermanensttaff.Thenumberof employees(excludingcontractorpersonnel)fell fromapproximately25,000in FY 1993 to20,000inFY 1995.1°E3ffortstoconsolidateorevenclosesomeoftheagency'sfield centers,however,wereforestalledbyheavyCongressionaolpposition.Aswith anymajor facility (suchasamilitary base),whichusuallyrepresentsignificantsourcesofeconomic activityandemploymentin individualCongressionadlistricts,electedofficialsalmost alwaysactquicklytoprotectthesefacilities. Thepoliticalcontroversyoverthefieldcentersunderscoreasseriousproblem with respecttoGoldin'sreforms,namelythathewasnot--and,undertheAmerican politicalsystem,couldnotbe--completelyincontrolofhisagendaI.t issignificant,for example,thatalmostallofhistechnicalinitiativesrelatetospacesciencemissions,which generallydonotreceivemuchlegislativeorpresidentialscrutiny.Evenif hehadbeen inclinedtomakeanymajordecisionsonNASA's largerprojects,suchastheshuttleand thespacestation(which,notcoincidentally,areassociatedwithhumanspaceflight), he wouldalmostcertainlyhavehadtoseeksomesortof approvalfromtheadministration and/orCongress. Tomakemattersworse,anagencylikeNASA mustfaceother,non-political limitationsaswell.Throughout1999,it encounteredaseriesoftechnicalproblems,some ofwhichraisedseriousquestionsaboutGoldin's "faster,better,cheaper"approachF. irst, inthebeginningofthesummer,theentireshuttlefleetwasgroundedduetofaultywiring. Then,inJune,theMarsClimateOrbiterwaslostjust asit wasabouttoenterMartian orbit.Subsequenint vestigationrevealedthattheproblemresultedfromafailureto convertallofthemetricmeasurementisntheOrbiter'snavigationdata.l°4Finally,in Chapter8:32 Decembert,heMarsPolarLandercrashedontheMartiansurfaceduetowhatwas believedtobeaprobleminthespacecraft'ssoftware1.°5Criticsbegantopointoutthatthe failuresoftheproberevealthedeficiencyofrelyingsoheavilyonlower-cost,butlargely untried,technology. Overall,Goldin'stenureatNASA clearlydemonstratetshelimits of"internal reform" asananswertotheagency'sproblems.Inparticular,noamountofinternal restructuring,evenif successfulc,anbyitselfreallyaddressthequestionofNASA's purpose. As James Webb noted a generation earlier (see chapter 6), that answer must come from higher up. POLITICAL CHANGE, POLICY INERTIA In politics, the clearest indicator that a major policy shift has acquired some degree of permanence is how well it endures from one presidential administration to the next, particularly when that transition involves a change in political party. As a fellow Republican, it is hardly surprising that George Bush retained much of Ronald Reagan's overall approach to space policy. What is surprising is the extent to which that approach was accepted, and even furthered, by Bush's successor. Despite the fact that Democratic President Bill Clinton was far less hostile to government programs--and, for the most part, less overtly "pro-business"--than either of his predecessors, his administration's official declarations on space continued to place a high priority on business and commerce, often employing language virtually identical to that of Reagan and Bush. Chapter8:33 Clinton's1996NationalSpacePolicy,forexample,notedthat"expandingU.S. CommercialSpaceActivitieswill generateeconomicbenefitsfortheNation,"and provide"anincreasingrangeof spacegoodsandservices."It calledfortheidentification andeliminationof"lawsandregulationsthatunnecessarilyimpedecommercialspace activities."Aswith similarReaganandBushdocumentsC, linton'sSpacePolicyalso prohibits"useofdirectFederalsubsidies''.1°6 Inhis 1995SpaceTransportationPolicy,however,thePresidenttookthe privatizationof spaceonestepfurther.Theprimarypurposeofthisdocumentwasto begintheprocessofdevelopingasuccessotrothespaceshuttle,whichby thattimehad beenin servicefornearly15years.Somepartsofthisdirectivesimplyreaffirmsuch post-Challengerpracticesaslimiting useofthespaceshuttletomissionsrequiring "uniqueShuttlecapabilities,"directingthegovernmenttopurchasecommerciallaunch services"to thefullestextentfeasible,"andproscribingpractices"thatprecludeordeter commercialspaceactivities'.'_°7Thedirectivepartscompanywith similardocuments fromtheReaganandBushyears,however,initsapproachtodevelopinganewlaunch vehicle: It isenvisionedthattheprivatesectorcouldhavea significantroleinmanagingthedevelopmentandoperation of anewreusablespacetransportationsystem.In anticipationofthisrole,NASA shallactivelyinvolvethe privatesectorinplanningandevaluatingitslaunch technologyactivities.1°8 Chapter8:34 Finally,in aremarkabledeparturefrompastpractice,thedirectivecallsforthefederal governmenttoencourageprivatesectorfinancing of any new launch system. 1o9 This move toward still greater reliance on industry reflects not only the ongoing change in policy (see below), but was also a testimony to the growing dominance of the commercial space sector. In 1999, the total amount spent on space activities by private firms (world-wide) exceeded total government expenditures for the first time ever. Moreover, public budgets for space were declining in every space-faring country except India._t° Clearly, a major transition in the conduct of global space policy was taking place. Of course, proponents of Reagan/Bush-era space policy might well argue that increasing business' role in space is such an inherently good idea that even a Democrat like Bill Clinton had to accept it. The more likely explanation, however, is that Clinton's approach to the program represented a passive acceptance of his predecessors policies, rather than an active endorsement. Unlike Reagan or Bush, Clinton seemed to take little interest in the space program. He made relatively few public statements about space during his eight years in office, and except for his National Space Transportation Policy, ltl put forward no proposals for any new projects. By 1998, NASA's budget was nearly $3 billion less than when Clinton took office (interestingly, space spending in the Department of Commerce went up by more than 20 percent over the same period), x12 The most revealing factor, however, was the way in which the Clinton White House organized its space policy. Rather than creating a central coordinating body like SIG (Space) or the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the Clinton Administration relegated space decisionmaking to the National Science and Technology Council, a Chapter8:35 departmenotftheWhiteHouseOfficeofScienceandTechnologyPolicy.Thishadthe effectofnotonlymovingspacepolicysomewhatlowerinthehierarchyoftheexecutive branch,but--sinceNSTC'sroleistocoordinateallfederalR&D policies---ofalso ensuringthatitwouldreceivelessspecialattentionthanbefore. Ironically,allof thiswasoccurringinanadministrationthatactivelysoughtto involvethefederalgovernmenitntechnologicaldevelopmengtenerally.By thetime Clintonenteredoffice,thepracticeofpublic-privateR&D collaboration--primarilyby meansofformalcooperativeresearchanddevelopmenatgreements(CRADAs)--was alreadywell-established1.13Inkeepingwith theconservativeviewabouttheroleof government(seepreviouschapter),however,thesehadbeenlimited toso-called "precompetitive"technologiesor(moreoften)tothosewithdirectdefenseapplication. Any commercialapplicationsthatmight"spinoff" fromthisactivitywerewelcomed,but theywereneverconsideredtobeitsprimarypurpose1.14 Fromthebeginning,Clintonofficialstookaverydifferentviewofthefederalrole inR&D. Onemonthaftertakingoffice,theadministrationdeclaredthat Wecannotrelyontheserendipitousapplicationofdefense technologytotheprivatesector.Wemustaimdirectlyat thesenewchallengesandfocusoureffortsonthenew opportunitiesbeforeus,recognizingthatgovernmenctan playakeyrolehelpingprivatefirmsdevelopandprofit frominnovation.l_5 Not surprisingly,thenumberofCRADAs--in areasrangingfromautomobilesto computerstotextiles--jumpedfrom29in 1991to90in 1993._!6Ill addition,Clinton Chapter8:36 boostedfundingfortheAdvancedTechnologyProgram(whichhadactuallybeencreated duringtheBushadministration),anagencyintheDepartmentthatprovidesfederal fundingforprivatecompaniespursuingparticularlyexpensiveorhigh-riskR&D._17 Thefactthatsucha"pro-technology"presidentwould(relativelyspeaking) neglectNASA anditsprogramssuggeststhathewasnotinclinedtodefinespaceasa technologyissue.WhereasReaganofficialsidentifiedspacepolicyasanintegralpartof theirlargerpoliticalaims(particularlywithregardtoeconomicprivatizationandnational defense)earlyon,theClintonadministrationneverseemedtomakesuchaconnection. NEW ACTORS AND A (SMALL) REDEFINITION This does not mean, however, that the program was neglected entirely. In 1994, the Republican Party captured control of the U.S. House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. 118The new Chairs of the relevant committees and subcommittees-- most notably Robert Walker, Chair of the Science Committee and James Sensenbrenner, Chair of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics--were staunch supporters of the space commercialization initiatives begun during the Reagan Administration.ll9 Their enthusiasm, combined with the relative indifference of the White House, meant that, by the end of the decade, Congress had become more influential in space policy than any time since the late 1950s and early 1960s. Still, to a limited degree, the Clinton Administration was responsible for a minor redefinition of one part of the space program. In late 1993, the U.S. invited the new Russian government to participate in the space station program--renamed the Chapter8:37 InternationalSpaceStation--joiningJapan,Canadaa, ndthemembersoftheEuropean SpaceAgency.Ostensibly,thiswasdoneinordertotakeadvantageofthevast experienceinstationoperationsandlong-durationspacemissionsthatdevelopedinthe Sovietprogram1.20It soonbecameclear,however,thattheAdministrationhadan additionalreasonforsupportingRussianinvolvement. Thetransitiontopoliticaldemocracyandamarketeconomyin theformerUSSR wasnotgoingwell.Thesubstantiael conomicdislocationsbroughtaboutthroughthe dismantlingofthestateplanningapparatusandstateownershipofmajorindustries (whichwerealreadyfarlessefficientthantheirWesterncounterpartsh)adimposed severefinancialhardshiponmuchofthepopulation.Not surprisingly,thegovernment foundthatit couldnotpossiblyaffordthesortofspaceprogramthathadenjoyedsucha highlyprivilegedpositionundertheSovietsystem1. 2xUnderthearrangemenwtith NASA,RussianfirmsweretobuildandlaunchseveraloftheISSmodules,paidforin part(inlargepart,asitwastoturnout)bytheU.S.Fromtheadministration'spointof view,thiswouldallowtheUnitedStatestosupporttheRussianeconomictransition(a sortof"backdoor"foreignaid)andkeepitsscientistsandengineersgainfullyemployed (asopposedtoofferingtheirservicestoaterroristorganizationoracountrylikeNorth KoreaorIraq).Inotherwords,Clintonofficialshadcometoview(and,ineffect, redefine)ISSasaninstrumentoftheirforeignpolicy. Whetherthisapproachwill succeedinrevitalizingtheRussianeconomyremains tobeseen(theresultstodatehavenotbeenencouraging_22A)s. aspace policy, however, the Administration's strategy had significant drawbacks. Already seriously behind schedule (Reagan had originally called for it to be operational "within a decade," i.e., by Chapter8:38 1994),thestationprogramwasthrownevenfurtherbehind,largelyduetotheRussian involvement.Thedelaysprovednotonlycostly(subsidiestotheRussianSpaceAgency greatlyexceededtheinitial estimates)b,utin atleastonecaseposedaseriousthreatto theprojectitself. Byearly1999,theRussian-builtZvezda module--a vital component which, in addition to providing habitation space for the crew was to be the station's primary source of propulsion and attitude control--was still not ready for launch. _23Without this module, there would be no way to keep the station elements launched the previous year in their proper orbit. NASA was forced to ask Congress for additional funding to develop an Interim Control Module as a temporary substitute. Needless to say, the Republican Congressional leadership, which had long been critical of the Clinton approach, was not at all pleased. 124 This, once again, underscores the problems that arise when policymakers adopt differing definitions of an issue. Viewing Russian participation as a foreign relations problem, the Administration seems more willing to accept the delays (and, since the conduct of foreign affairs is generally seen as a presidential prerogative, less inclined to accept Congressional "interference") than the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, which, naturally enough, sees it as matter of space policy. How this conflict is ultimately resolved may depend upon the outcome of the 2000 elections. CONCLUSION By the end of the 1990s, there were clear signs that the sense of direction imparted to U.S. space efforts by the redefinition fifteen years earlier was beginning to Chapter8:39 unravel.Thefirstindicationofthiswastheill-fatedSpaceExplorationInitiative,which raisedseriousquestionsastohowPresidentBushwasdefiningspacepolicy(orif he evenhadsuchadefinitioninmind).Mattersdidnotimproveduringthe1990s,witha presidentwhosevisionoftheprogram--totheextentthathehadone--differed considerablyfromthatoftheCongressionalleadershipM. eanwhile,NASA didlittleto helpitself,endingthedecadewith aseriesofhighlyvisible(andexpensive)technical failures. Thefundamentapl roblemhere,whichhadbeenquietlysmolderingsince Reagan'ssecondterm,wasthegrowingseparationbetweenspace policy and NASA policy. As chapter 7 noted, the dominant thrust of the Reagan redefinition---defense and commercialization--left no clear role for NASA. This fact had been partially obscured by proposals like the space station, which seemed, at least initially, to fit into the prevailing definition, while at the same time providing substantial work for the space agency. As the 1990s drew to a close, however, NASA's position seemed increasingly precarious. Within the growing number of space policy stakeholders---executive branch officials, members of Congress, industry leaders, the scientific community, etc.m whatever consensus there had been about the NASA's purpose (that is to say, its mission) was virtually non-existent. For an agency with a multi-billion dollar budget, this is not a particularly safe place to be. Chapter 8:40 NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8 i On this last point, see John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" Science 232 (30 May 1986), pp. 1099-1105. It is worth noting in passing that Soviet space proponents had managed to make similar bargains with their political masters. Khrushchev's support of Sergei Korolev, not by a desire to explore space, but by the belief that it would give the USSR an advantage in the Cold War. See James Hanford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997; James E. Oberg, Red Star in Orbit: The Inside Story of Soviet Failures and Triumphs in Space. New York: Random House, 1981, particularly chapter x; and William P. Barry, "How the Space Race Began: The Origins of the Soviet Space Program." Paper presented at the meeting of the Society of the History of the Federal Government, College Park, MD, 3-4 April 1997. 2For an overview of these and other "anti-NASA" arguments, see W. D. Kay, Can Democracies Fly in Space? The Challenge of Revitalizing the U.S. Space Program. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995, particularly chapter 2. 3With the exception, of course, of national defense, which (as seen in the preceding chapter) was considered a legitimate function of government, but was also specifically assigned to the Department of Defense by the original National Aeronautics and Space Act that created NASA in the first place. 4 See E. S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987, pp. 146-147. Chapter8:41 5Milton R. Copulos, "The Perils of a NASA Space Monopoly." The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum 109 (20 June 1984). 6 See note from David Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget to James Beggs, NASA Administrator, 14 June 1982. Copy in Space Business Archive (hereafter SBA). 7Stuart M. Butler, "An Amtrak for Space? No, Thanks." The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum 19 (11 April 1983). 8Letter from Representative Ed Zschau to Republican Members of Congress, 14 June 1984 (SBA). 9Letter from Representative Ed Zschau to President Ronald Reagan, 20 June 1984 (SBA). l0See Memorandum for Robert McFarlane from Glbert D. Rye, 19 June 1984. Copy in Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRL). The OMB policy is also mentioned in Letter from Zschau to Republican Members of Congress, 14 June 1984. 11Letter from James M. Beggs to Robert C. McFarlane, 17 July 1984 (RRL). 12Memorandum for Elizabeth H. Dole from Robert C. McFarlane, 21 June 1984 (RRL). 13"National Security Directive 144: National Space Strategy (15 August 1984)" in Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 416-421. Chapter8:42 14"NationalSecurityDecisionDirective181:ShuttleLaunchPricingforForeign andCommercialCustomers(30July1985)"inibid.,p.578. _5InterviewwithJennaDorn(firstDirectoroftheOfficeofCommercialSpace Transportation)2,0June1997(inNASA HistoryOffice). 16ForanoverviewoftheISFstorythrough1988,seeEliotMarshall,"Space StationsinLobbyland,"Air and Space (December 1988/January 1989), pp. 54-61. _7Letter to Larry Herbolsheimer, White House, from Maxime A. Faget, 1March 1984 (RRL). 18These reports are described in an unsigned memorandum from NASA, Office of the Administrator, to Lillian Trippet, Committee on Science Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 9 February 1988 (SBA). See also "ISF--A Commercial Space Venture That Raises Administration Dust." Defense Daily, 27 January 1988, pp. S1-$4. _9Lillian Trippet, "White Paper on Industrial Space Facility," memorandum for Robert Roe, Committee on Science Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 19 February 1988, p. 2 (SBA). 20ibid. 2_As well as the Department of Defense; see "ISF--A Commercial Space Venture That Raises Administration Dust," p. S-2. A 1987 House of Representatives budget authorization report for DOD "encouraged" the Department to "examine specific payload requirements that could be met by the ISF" (see Memorandum from Lillian Chapter8:43 TrippetttoChairmanRoe,4November1987(SBA),p.5.Thereisnoindication, however,thatDODeverseriouslypursuedthematter. 12Trippett,"White PaperonIndustrialSpaceFacility," p.2;seealsoKathy Sawyer,"CommercializationofSpaceR: idingonGovernmentGuarantees.W"ashington i_ost (1 March 1988), p. A17. 23See Howard E. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics and Technological Choice. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series on NASA History, 1990, especially chapters 20 and 23. 24Quoted in ibid., p. 213. 15An excerpt of the continuing resolution can be found as attachment VI in Trippett, "White Paper on Industrial Space Facility." See also Marshall, "Space Stations in Lobbyland." 26See, for example, Marshall, "Space Stations in Lobbyland"; "ISF--A Commercial Space Venture That Raises Administration Dust"; "NASA Use of Industrial Space Platform Ordered by White House Policy Group." Aviation Week and Space Technology (11 January 1988), p. 4. 27Letter from James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, to Representative Jamie Whitten, Chair of the House Appropriations Committee, 6 January 1988 (SBA), p. 1. 28Letter from Senator William Proxmire, Congressman Edward F. Boland, and Congressman Bill Green to James C. Fletcher, 21 January 1988 (SBA), p. 1. 29Ibid., p. 5. 3oibid., pp. 1-2. Chapter8:44 31Sawyer,"CommercializationofSpace:RidingonGovernmentGuarantees." 32Marshall,"SpaceStationsinLobbyland." 33LetterfromJamesC.FletchertoJamesA. BakerHI,SecretaryoftheTreasury, 31December1987(SBA),p.1. 34See"NASA UseofIndustrialSpacePlatformOrderedbyWhiteHousePolicy Group." 3sWhiteHouse,OfficeofthePressSecretary,"ThePresident'sSpacePolicyand CommercialSpaceInitiativetoBegintheNextCentury,"11February1988,p.2;"Fact Sheet:PresidentiaDl irectiveonNationalSpacePolicy"in SimpsonN,ational Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, pp. 856-866. See also William J. Broad, "White Hose Sets New Space Policy." New York Times (12 February 1988), p. A36. 36"The President's Space Policy and Commercial Space Initiative," p. 2. 37Memorandum from Nancy Risque to Howard Baker, 29 March 1989 (RRL). See also Memorandum for the Economic Policy Council from Eugene J. McAllister, Executive Secretary, 8 March 1988 (RRL). 38See, for example, a letter from Senators Ernerst Hollings and Donald W. Riegle, Jr. to Secretary of Transportation James H. Burnley, 16 March 1988 (RRL). 39See Andrew Lawler, "Space for Rent?" Space World (September 1988), pp. 15- 19. 40William J. Broad, "Senators Opposed on Space Station." New York Times (2 May 1988), p. B9. Chapter8:45 41NationalAcademyofSciencesN,ationalResearchCouncil,Aeronauticsand SpaceEngineeringBoard,CommissiononEngineeringandTechnicalSystemsR,eport of the Committee on a Commercially Developed Space Facility. Washington: NRC, 1989. See also Kathy Sawyer, "Commercial Space Laboratory Not Needed, Expert Panel Says." Washington Post (12 April 1989), p. A2; John Noble Wilford, "U.S. Urged Not to Back Private Space Station." New York Times (12 April 1989), p. D24. 42See, for example, Lawler, "Space for Rent?"; "ISF--A Commercial Space Venture That Raises Administration Dust"; "NASA Use of Industrial Space Platform Ordered by White House Policy Group." 43Indeed, some of SII's competitors, such as Spacehab (see previous chapter), publicly complained that the Administration's policies regarding ISF constituted an unfair advantage. See "Beggs Warns CDSF Threatens Spacehab," Defense Daily (12 April 1988), 245. 44T. F. Rogers, "Commercial Space Activities: A Disturbing Development." Paper presented at meeting of the IEEE Aerospace R&D Committee, 23 June 1989, particularly p. 6. 45ibid., p. 1. 46Quoted in Marshall, "Space Stations in Lobbyland." 47White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Presidential Directive on National Space Policy" in Simpson, National Security Directives, p. 856. 48ibid., pp.857-858 Chapter8:46 49U.S.President'sCommissionontheSpaceShuttleChallenger Accident, Report. Washington: USGPO, 1986. See also the commentary in Trudy E. Bell and Karl Esch, "The Fatal Flaw in Flight 51-L." IEEE Spectrum 24 (February 1987), pp. 36-51; Frederick F. Lighthall, "Launching the Space Shuttle Challenger: Disciplinary Deficiencies in the Analysis of Engineering Data." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 38:1 (February 1991), pp. 63-74; John L. Hunsucker and Japhet S. Law, "Disaster on Flight 5l- L: AN IE Perspective on the Challenger Accident." Industrial Management 28:5 (September-October 1986), pp. 8-13. 50See, for example, Gregg Easterbrook, "The Spruce Goose of Outer Space." Washington Monthly (April 1980), pp. 32-48. 51Alex Roland, "The Shuttle: Triumph or Turkey?" Discover 6 (November 1985), pp. 29-49. 52See (among many others) ibid.; Easterbrook, "The Spruce Goose of Outer Space" and "The Case Against NASA." New Republic (8 July 1991), pp. 18-24; Diane Vaughn, The Challenger Launch Decision. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996; Richard Hutton, The Cosmic Chase. New York: Mentor, 1981, particularly chapter 7; John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" and Thomas H. Johnson, "The Natural History of the Space Shuttle." Technology in Society 10 (1988), pp. 417-424. 53"Remarks to Employees of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on the First Anniversary of the Explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger." Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, 1987, vol. 1, p. 80. Chapter8:47 54"StatementontheBuilding ofaFourthShuttleOrbiterandtheFutureofthe U.S.SpaceProgram."Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, 1986, vol. II, p. 1111. 55Of course, as has already been seen, it was also supporting a commercial competitor (from NASA' s point of view) at the same time. 56Memorandum from James A. Baker III to the Economic Policy Council 6 October 1986 (RRL). 57See U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Fifth Annual Report. Washington, DOT: 1990; and "FAA-Licensed Launches Set Record in 1998." ASTNews Bulletin 3:4 (8 February 1999), p. 1. s8"U.S. Leads World in Commercial Market." ASTNews Bulletin 3:4 (8 February 1999), p. 1. 59"The President's Space Policy and Commercial Space Initiative," p. 3. 60The only real exceptions are those satellites and probes that require use of the shuttle. By the end of the 1990s, the selection of commercial launch vehicles for its missions had become one of NASA's most important procurement items. See Warren Ferster, "NASA Payload Sizes Give Delta Launcher and Edge." Space News (22 March 1999), pp. 1, 19. 6_See Joel S. Greenberg, "The Commercial Launch Industry: Will it Fly on its Own?" Aerospace America (May 1992), pp. 32-35, 41. 62See interview with Jenna Dorn, 20 June 1997. 63"The President's Space Policy and Commercial Space Initiative," p. 5. Chapter8:48 64Although,asnotedabove,thiswaseventuallyshiftedtoprivatelaunch providers. 65SeeJosephC.Anselmo,"ShuttleFailstoReplaceELVs,ButPentagonEyesit Again."Aviation Week and Space Technology (8 April 1996), pp. 52-53. 66The European Space Agency and Japan had insisted upon a prohibition of military activity aboard the station as a condition of joining the project. See McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, pp. 104-105. 67See Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 1994, p. 114. 68Roger Pielke, "Space Shuttle Value Open to Interpretation." Aviation Week and Space Technology (26 July 1993), pp. 57-58. 69McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, pp. 230-235. 7oSee U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Proposed Space Station Freedom Program Revisions. Hearings before Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 101 st Congress, 1st session (31 October 1989). Washington: USGPO, 1989; and Station Design Flaws. Hearings before the Committee on Space, Science, and Technology, 101 st Congress, 2d session, 29 March 1990. Washington; USGPO, 1990. See also Christopher Anderson, "U.S. Space Station Needs Another Redesign." Nature (29 March 1990), pp. 367; U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Space Station: NASA 's Search for Design, Cost, and Schedule Stability Continues. Washington: GAO, 1991. Chapter8:49 71William J.Broad,"Howthe$8Billion SpaceStationBecamea$120Billion Showpiece."New York Times (10 June 1990), pp. A1, A30; and "Higher Estimate for Maintaining Station in Space." New York Times (11 July 1990), pp. A1, B6. 72Eliot Marshall, "Space Station Science: Up in the Air." Science 246 (1 December 1989), pp. 110-112; Christopher Joyce, "NASA's Incredible Shrinking Space Station." New Scientist (17 November 1990), p. 14; Eric J. Lerner, "Space Station Changes Its Course." Aerospace America (January 1991), pp. 12-15; U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Questions Remain on the Costs, Uses, and Risks of the Redesigned Space Station. Washington: GAO, 1991; see also W. D. Kay, "Democracy and Super Technologies: The Politics of the Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom." Science, Technology, and Human Values 19:2 (April 1994), pp. 131-151. 73See, for example, Gregg Easterbrook, "NASA's Space Station Zero." Newsweek (l 1April 1994), pp. 30-33. 74See, for example, Hans Mark, The Space Station: A Personal Journey. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987. 75It is worth noting, however, that as its capabilities diminished, it was becoming less able even to support this goal. NASA's original plans to develop new technologies for "closed-loop" life-support systems and more sophisticated on-board computers (essential for extended missions outside near-earth orbit) had to be shelved due to their high cost. See McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, pp. 114-117. 76Craig Covault, "Hubble Team Makes Emergency Plans as Space Telescope Fails Focus Testing." Aviation Week and Space Technology (2 July 1990), pp. 23-24; and Chapter8:50 "NASA FightsImage,TechnicalProblemsonHubble,Shuttle."Aviation Week and Space Technology (9 July 1990), pp. 16-18. 77Colin Macilwain, "Did Last-Minute Change Cause Loss of $1-billion Mars Probe?" Nature 365 (2 September 1993), p. 3; see also John Travis, "Mars Observer's Costly Solitude." Science 261 (3 September 1993), pp. 1264-1267 and John Travis and John Cohen, "The Sounds of Silence: Chronology of Despair." Science 261 (3 September 1993), pp. 1265. 78Frederic Smoller, "The View from the Future." American Heritage (November 1992), pp. 70-72. 79U. S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Preliminary Analysis of NASA Commercialization Initiatives: Staff Memorandum. Washington: CBO, 1989 (SBA), p. 10. 80U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1995 Activit&s. Washington: NASA, 1996, Appendix A-1. 81ibid, Appendix E-lB. 82Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff. New York: Bantam Books, 1979. 83This is, of course, a relative statement. As seen in previous chapters, Vanguard and other such misadventures did generate a great deal of criticism. 84And, it should be noted, the "service" was one originally seen as directly related to national security. Chapter8:51 1 85"National Security Directive 30: National Space Policy (2 November 1989)" in Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, pp. 914- 928. The Space Council was established by Executive Order No. 12675. 86"Space Council Bypasses NASA to Get Industry Moon-Mars Ideas." Space News (11 December 1989), p. 4. 87See Kathy Sawyer, "Quayle, Citing Kennedy Legacy, Vows to Fight to Save Space Station Program." Washington Post (17 May 1991), p. A7; Helen Gavaghan, "Cut- Price Space Station Runs Out of Steam." New Scientist (23 March 1991), pp. 13; Patricia A. Gilmartin, "Bush Administration Rallies Support for Space Station as Crucial Vote Nears." Aviation Week and Space Technology 134:21 (27 May 1991), pp. 25-26; Peter Aldhous, "Space Station Back on Track." Nature 351 (13 June 1991), pp. 507. 88Kathy Sawyer, "Bush Urges Commitment to New Space Exploration." Washington Post (21 July 1989), p. xx. See also "Space Exploration Initiative," NSPD-6, 13 March 1992. 89See Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, p. 124. 90"National Security Directive 30" in Simpson, Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, p. 920. 91See "Fact Sheet: Presidential Directive on National Space Policy" in Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, p. 860. 92Lyn Ragsdale, "Politics, Not Science: The U.S. Space Program in the Reagan and Bush Years" in Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (eds) Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1997, p. 161. Chapter8:52 93Quotedin RogerD.LauniusandHowardE.McCurdy,"Introduction"in LauniusandMcCurdy,Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, p. 8. 94See ibid, pp. 1-14. For a specific example, see Bruce Murray, "Civilian Space: In Search of Presidential Goals." Issues in Science and Technology 2:3 (Spring 1986), pp. 25- 37. 95Indeed, one of the similarities with Kennedy borders on the eerie. Both elaborated on their initial announcements in speeches at Texas universities: Kennedy at Rice in 1962, Bush at Texas A&M in 1990. See Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, "Epilogue" in Launius and McCurdy, Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, p. 229. 96Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, p. 124. 97U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, President's Request for Mars and Lunar Missions. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 101 st Congress, 1st session, 26 September 1990. 98See Clifford Kraus, "House Halts Work on Supercollider." New York Times (25 June 1993), p. A18; Jeffrey Mervis and Karen Fox, "A Senate Victory Would Turn The Tide After House Defeat." Science 261 (16 July 1993), pp. 288-289; David Ritson, "Demise of the Texas Supercollider." Nature 366 (16 December 1993), pp. 607-610 99Patricia A. Gilmartin, "House Kills Funding for Mars/Moon Effort." Aviation Week and Space Technology (2 July 1990), p. 28. Chapter8:53 10oD.AllanBromley,"Science,Scientistsa,ndtheScienceBudget."Issues in Science and Technology 9:1 (Fall 1992), p. 44. _01This may, of course, be more of a comment on the Bush administration itself. During both the 1988 and 1992 presidential campaigns, George Bush faced criticism that he lacked both "vision" (particularly in 1988) and a coherent domestic policy agenda (in 1992). 102The latter was still under development when Goldin was appointed, but was too far along to cancel. 103U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Pocket Statistics, 1996. Washington: NASA, 1996, tables C-28 and C-29. !o4 Seth Borenstein, "NASA Probe to Mars Reported Lost." Boston Globe (24 September 1999), p. A3. 105Deborah Zabarenko, "NASA Faulted in Mars Failure." Boston Globe (29 March 2000), p. A3. 106U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Science and Technology Council, "Fact Sheet: National Space Policy," 19 September 1996, pp. 5-6. 107U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Science and Technology Council, "National Space Transportation Policy," NSTC-4, 5 August 1995, Section HI (1) (a) and Section IV (1) (c). lo8 ibid, Section HI (2) (d). 1o9ibid, Section IV (2) (a). Chapter8:54 11oPeterB.deSelding",GovernmentP, rivateSpendingNearlyEqual."Space News (19 April, 1999), pp. 3, 20. For fiscal year 2001, however, NASA was slated to receive a modest increase, its first in eight years. i11 And even that received nothing like the personal presidential attention given to the space station or SEI. ll2U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1998 Activities. Washington: NASA, 1999, Appendix E-lB. To be fair, it should be noted that at least part of reduction in NASA's budget was due to Goldin's downsizing policies. 113The most well-known of these during the Reagan-Bush years was SEMATECH, a government-industry corporation set up in 1987 to conduct research on advanced semiconductor technology. See David P. Angel, Restructuring for Innovation: The Remaking of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry. New York: Guilford Press, 1994; and Peter Grindley, David C. Mowery, and Brian Silverman, "SEMATECH and Collaborative Research: Lessons in the Design of High-Technology Consortia." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 13 (Fall 1994), pp. 723-758. 114This was, for example, clearly the case with SEMATECH. See Richard D. Bingham, Industrial Policy American Style: From Hamilton to HDTV. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998, chapter 6; and Lewis M. Branscomb, "The National Technology Policy Debate" in Lewis M. Branscomb (ed) Empowering Technology: Implementing a U.S. Strategy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 1-35. Chapter8:55 115U.S.ExecutiveOfficeof the President, Technology for America's Economic Growth: A New Direction to Build Economic Strength. Washington: The White House, 1993. See also Technology: The Engine for Economic Growth: A National Technology Policy for America. Little Rock, AR: Clinton-Gore Campaign, 1992. 116Charles V. Shank, "Recharging the Energy Laboratories." Physics Today (July 1994), p. 46. IX7Denis F. Cioffi, "Clinton Philosophy Transforms NIST into 'Partner for Industry.'" Physics Today (November 1994), pp. 75-77. _8 The Republicans also took control of the Senate for the first time in ten years. ll9Sensenbrenner succeeded Walker as Chair of the full Science Committee following the latter's retirement in 1996. His successor on the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, Dana Rohrbacher, was an official in the Reagan Administration, and has been highly critical of what he reagrds as the Clinton administration's lack of interest in the space program (see, for example, his remarks in "Space Shots." Space News (8 March 1999), p. 14). 12oPeter Bond, "Can Russian Skills Revive the Space Station?" New Scientist (30 October 1993), pp. 34-36; Warren E. Leary, "With Russian Aid, Better Space Lab." New York Times (5 November 1993), p. A20; Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Russia May Hold the Space Station Key." Aviation Week and Space Technology (23 August 1993), pp. 22-24. 121Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz and Boris Rybak, "Feeble Russian Economy Hinders Space Efforts." Aviation Week and Space Technology (15 March 1993), pp. 91-92; "Russian Space Program Seeks Needed Funding." Aviation Week and Space Technology Chapter 8:56 (23 August 1993), p. 24; Craig Covault, "95,000 Russian Layoffs, Launch Breakdown Feared." Aviation Week and Space Technology (15 November 1993), p. 27; Yuri Kolesnikov, "Russian Cosmonautics in Difficult Times." Spaceflight 35 (November 1993), pp. 366-367. Not only did the Russian program have less money than before, but it had additional expenses as well. The Soviet Union had built its launch complex in Kazakhstan, which, following the USSR's collapse had become an independent country. As a result, the Russian government has been forced to pay a fee to use the facility. See Fred Hiatt, "Russia Leases Back Cosmodrome." Washington Post (29 March 1994), p. A 14; Daniel Sneider, "Kazakhstan, Russia Reach Agreement Over Baikonur." Space News (4-10 April 1984), p. 12. 122See, for example, Simon Saradzhyan, "Soyuz Maker Demands Space Agency Pay its Bills." Space News (13 September 1999), p. 8. lz3 Simon Saradzhyan and Brian Berger, "NASA Predicts Longer Service Module Delay." Space News (22 February 1999), pp. 4, 28. 124James F. Sensenbrenner, "Be Realistic About Russia's Role in the Space Station." Space News (10 May 1999), p. 24; Paula Shaki, "U.S. Bill Could Halt Payments to Russia." Space News (14 June 1999), p. 6; "Lawmakers Grill Goldin on Russian ISS Work Delays." Space News (28 February 2000), p. 38. Chapter9 :1 CONTESTED GROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER NASA'S MISSION PART HI: SECOND MISSION? CHAPTER 9: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS The preceding analysis does not necessarily lead to a single conclusion. It does, however, provide the basis for a number of observations concerning the place of NASA within federal science and technology policy, the agency's future, and the overall status of the U.S. space program at the beginning of the 21stcentury. It is also possible to make one or two recommendations along the way, as well. DEFENSE CONVERSION REDUX Almost everyone involved--policymakers, scientists, members of the academic community, and the mass media--agrees that the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s represented a major turning point in the history of U.S. R&D policy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the major American science- and technology-based organizations were faced with 2 major challenges: (1) moving beyond the traditional national security justifications for federal sponsorship of their programs, and (2) reorienting those programs to accommodate such new demands as economic growth and U.S. industrial competitiveness. Thus, the 1990s saw a number of major initiatives to develop new missions for the national laboratories, encourage the Defense Advanced Research Chapter9:2 ProjectsAgencytodevelopmore"dualuse"technologies,andgenerallyto"convert" defense-baseRd&D institutionsintoenterprisesmorecompatiblewiththecivilianglobal economy.Along theway,theseeffortshavegeneratedhundredsofbooks,articles, governmenrteports,Congressionahlearingsandscholarlyconferences_,almostallof whichassume(atleastimplicitly) thatthisproblemisabrandnewone. ToNASA anditssupportersh,owever,theissue(althoughnotthefanfare)ought tolookquitefamiliar.Astheprecedingchaptershaveshown,theexperienceofthespace agencyfromthe 1970sforwardrepresentsanexample,notjust ofananalogoussituation, butofthe very same phenomenon, z During the late 1950s and most of the 1960s, NASA was just as deeply involved in "fighting" the Soviets as was DARPA or Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, or Sandia national laboratories. Unlike those institutions, however, it was (in the words of chapter 6) "retired" from the Cold War long before the conflict was over. In addition, virtually every strategy that has been proposed for (and, in some cases, enacted by) the defense establishment has already been tried by NASA sometime during the past 25 years. In other words, nearly a quarter century before defense conversion became a "recognized" issue, NASA was itself forced to "find a new role" and to "justify its existence" on grounds other than competition with the USSR. In doing so (or, as some see it, attempting to do so), it has provided an almost exact preview of what the national laboratories and others would encounter during the 1990s. That this has not even been generally recognized, let alone widely discussed, is almost as significant as the fact itself. By 1991 (the year of the Soviet Union's collapse), the U.S. government had already spent hundreds of billions of dollars developing the largest and most sophisticated Chapter9:3 R&Dinfrastructurein humanhistory.The30nationallaboratoriesoverseenbythe Departmenotf Energy, 3for example, employed more than 29,000 people in 16 states, and had a combined annual budget of nearly $6 billion (they had spent more than $100 billion in just the preceding 20 years alone). Their estimated capital value was approximately $30 billion. 4 Unfortunately (for them), their primary justification for their existence, the USSR, was now gone. Although a fair amount of activity at the labs was devoted to basic research (particularly in physics), almost half of their funding went to weapons development. In fact, three of the larger laboratories--Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia--existed almost exclusively as weapons laboratories. Most policymakers felt that, with the Cold War over, this was at least two too many. Even so, these were state-of- the-art facilities, staffed by some of the most brilliant scientists in the world (58 Nobel Prize-winners, according to DOES). Thus, the question quickly became, in the words of one science policy specialist, "[h]ow can the vitality of these laboratories be sustained and their capabilities put to the best use? ''6 Over the following decade, there emerged two major approaches for "using" the U.S. Cold War R&D infrastructure. The more straightforward was direct "defense conversion," following the Biblical adage to "beat their swords into plowshares" (or, as one newspaper article colorfully put it, "bombs into bulldozers"7). This was, of course, really only the option open (other than simply shutting down) to private firms that had previously survived exclusively on DOD contracts, and large numbers of companies attempted to convert their production lines from the manufacture and testing of military hardware to the production of goods for commercial sale. 8 Chapter9:4 Forthenationallabs,"conversion"meant,usinglanguagethatwill bynowseem quitefamiliar,finding"newmissions."9Fromthestart,theyandtheirsupportersin Congressdeclaredthatthelabswereuniquelysuitedtoservingtheneedsof thecivilian economy: Thebillions ofdollarsinvestedinthenationallaboratories haveproducedahostofuniquetoolsforresearch,including ...animpressiveinfrastructureofengineering,systems managemenatndcomputationahl orsepowern,ottomention acadreofscientistsskilledin mission-directedresearch. Nothingcouldbemorenaturalthan"leveraging"this investmenttoattackproblemsofimportancetoU.S. industry.10 LosAlamosproposedtotransformitselfintoa"researchanddevelopmenptartner forindustry"insuchareasasnon-pollutingcarsandadvancedsemiconductor manufacturinga, ndevenbroughtinexecutivesfromtheMotorolacorporationtohelp makeitsentireoperationmore"business-like T . M Similarly, in 1992 Congressman George Brown recommended restructuring Lawrence Livermore as a "critical technologies center," which would conduct research on such areas as materials science, biotechnology, and the next generation of computers. _2Indeed, most of the labs began to speak themselves as the heirs of the "cutting-edge" industrial research tradition that had once existed at IBM and AT&T. z3 More often than not, this "aid to industry" function of the labs (as well as other government agencies) is carried in partnership with a private firm through what is known as a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, or CRADA. There are now well Chapter9:5 overathousandCRADAsin force,involving dozensoffederalfacilities.Someofthe moreprominentaretheUnitedStatesAdvancedBatteryConsortium(formedin 1991to developeconomicabl atteriesforelectric-poweredvehicles)1,4thePartnershipforaNew GenerationofVehicles(formedin 1993todesignautomobileswithtriplethefuel efficiencyofcurrentmodels),_5andseveraldevotedtohigh-temperature superconductivity1.6It isstill toosoontosayhowsuccessfutlheseeffortshavebeen.17 Thesecondstrategy,whichcenteredprimarilyuponthework ofDARPA,18was toencouragethedevelopmenotfso-called"dual-use"technologiest,hatis,systemswhich havebothmilitary andcommercialapplications.Although it spends as much on research and development as (and, in some cases, far more than) its main economic rivals, the United States government devotes a far larger share of its science and technology budget to defense purposes than any other country. In 1992, for example, nearly two-thirds of U.S. federal R&D spending was defense-related, compared with 18 percent in Germany and 9 percent in Japan. _9With concems over industrial competition rising--and the fear of the Soviet Union no longer a factor--American policy-makers began to reconsider how science and technology funding was being distributed. The result--dubbed (dubbed "swords and plowshares ''2°) was to emphasize work in such areas as computers (especially high-speed computing), 21jet engines, optical fiber cable, and infrared sensors. 22 One of the more interesting features of both of these strategies is their wide political appeal. It might be expected that, given its general stance toward technology (see the previous chapter), that the Clinton administration would approve of programs such as these. What is more surprising is that they were actually initiated during the Reagan Chapter 9:6 years. It was in 1986 that Congress passed (and the president signed) the Federal Technology Transfer Act, 23that first authorized the use of CRADAs between private firms and federal agencies. For its part, the Bush administration seemed even less hesitant about using the laboratories in this fashion. Secretary of Energy James Watkins, in a letter to House Science Committee Chair George Brown, noted that The science and technology base of the Laboratories provides what I call the infrastructure for solving large problems of great complexity. It is this infrastructure that I propose to bring to bear on the question of the competitiveness of our industries and businesses. This should be done in partnership with business and universities .... business can provide the market pull on the talents of the Laboratories that will assure that their work is relevant. 24 The approach was even endorsed by Vice-President Quayle's Council on Competitiveness, which usually favored keeping govemment out of business decisions. 25 In short, belief in the desirability of involving the national labs in private sector development seems to transcend party and ideology. Ironically, it can be argued that NASA was actually the first government agency to employ both of these approaches. As chapter 6 pointed out, by the late 1960s the agency seemed no longer connected to the Cold War, and needed a new justification for its programs. Given that the most important factor driving decisions about space policy appeared to be its expense, and that opponents continued to criticize program advocates Chapter9:7 for"ignoringproblemshereonearth,"itis hardlysurprisingthatNASA plannersbegan aboutthistimetospeakaboutprojectsthatwere"costeffective"andthatpromiseddirect economicbenefits.Inseeking,forthefirsttimeinitshistory,toemployaneconomic justificationforitsprograms26whilestill makinguseoftheinfrastructureandcapabilities builtupduringApollo, NASAwas,ineffect,pursuingthe world's first examples of post- Cold War defense conversion, promising to use the technical expertise, administrative skills, and specialized hardware that it had originally developed to "fight" the USSR to provide goods and services for the civilian economy. Such reasoning was used, for example, to justify the Apollo Applications (Skylab) Project (see chapter 6). Indeed, AAP---even its title is significant--represents about as pure an example of defense conversion as one is likely to find. It utilized a great deal of the existing Apollo hardware--including the command and service modules, and a Saturn V rocket to place the Skylab module in orbit--in order to "help with such problems as air and water pollution, flooding, crop deterioration, and erosion. ''27 The project was described by a NASA official as "one of the most significant benefit-oriented programs of the space age, ''28 Similarly, the space shuttle program can be seen as the first attempt to develop a dual-use (if not a multiple-use) technology. It was expected to serve the needs of paying customers from the private sector, as well as act as the primary space vehicle for the Department of Defense. Indeed, DOD had had substantial input into the system's design, 29and the Air Force had even planned to construct its own shuttle launch facility in southern California. In additionl STS was to operate as an orbital platform for basic scientific research. 3° Chapter9:8 Tobesure,NASA had"ulteriormotives"in pursuingbothoftheseprojects.As notedinchapter6,WebbreportedlypushedSkylablargelybecausehewantedtokeepthe Apolloproductionlinesopenaslongaspossible3.1It isalsoasameansofkeepingits humanspaceflightprogramaliveinthehopethatsomeyearsdowntheroadit might gatherenoughpolitical supportforstill largerprojects,suchasapermanenstpace station3.2It isdifficult tosee,however,howthisis anydifferentfromtheeffortsof LivermoreorSandia25yearslater.Eachorganizationrepresentsamulti-billion dollar taxpayerinvestmentwhich,itcanreasonablybeargued,evenif it longerneedforits originalpurpose,canstill serveinsomeproductivecapacity. NASA's effortsatconversionwere,tosaytheleast,somewhatlessthan successfulT.herewasnofollow-ontoSkylab,whichfell outoforbitandburnedupin 19793.3Evenhadit survived,it wouldstill havehadmanycriticsarguingthatitsresearch resultsdidnotjustify itscosts.Theshortcomingsof STS,bothasacommercialanda militarysystem,havebeenwidelynoted.Still, thereisnoevidencethatcurrentattempts todobasicallythesamethinghaveworked(orwill work)anybetter.Althoughby no meansaperfectparallel,it isworthnotingthatanumberof DOD'sformercontractors whosoughttomoveintocommercialmanufacturinghavehadaverydifficult time. AccordingtoLewisBranscomb,whohaswrittenwidelyonthesubject: [C]ommercialinnovationisadelicateprocessrequiring veryspecialskills,alot ofinvestorcourage,ahighlevelof technicalagility,andthewillingnesstoacceptfailureina significantnumberofcases3.4 Chapter9:9 Havingbeenlargelyshieldedfromtheupsanddownsofthemarketplacebytheir relationshipwith thePentagonm, anyfirmsfoundthat,despitetheirtechnicalexpertise, theyaresimplyunabletocompete.Asforthenewprojects,CRADAs,andother arrangementcsurrentlybeingpursuedbythenationallaboratories,it is(asalreadynoted) tosoontomakeavalidassessment. Thebasicproblemhereisafundamentadlifferenceinthepoliticalsituationofthe 1970sandthe1990s.Althoughtherehasbeensomecriticismofspecificprograms3,5the laboratoriesandDARPAhave,forthemostpart,enjoyedanenormousreservoirof politicalgoodwill. Farfrombeingtreatedas"outmoded"relicsoftheColdWar simply tryingtohangon,theyhavefromthestartbeenviewedasavaluablenationalresource. Thequestionwasneverwhether they had a role to play in the post-Cold War world, but whether what role they should play. Unfortunately for NASA, concepts such as "defense conversion" and "dual use" did not exist in 1970. The idea of using the complex and highly specialized (not to mention extremely expensive) hardware from Apollo to study soil erosion must have seemed, to policymakers of that era, like the worst kind of technological overkill. Thus, many politicians saw NASA's proposals as little more than an agency's far-fetched efforts to save its budget. By the 1990s, in contrast, having a large, sophisticated technical organization work on (relatively) smaller problems became a generally accepted, if not encouraged, practice. 36 This is in no way to suggest that government officials have somehow been unfair to NASA, or that the agency is the victim of some sort of double standard. Just as sending a single unit home from a war is far different than the general demobilization that follows Chapter9:10 anarmistice,thereis anenormousdifference--politically,economically,andsocially-- betweenthe"reassignment"ofoneColdWaragencyandtheendoftheColdWaritself. Putanotherway,theverydifferentcircumstancesunderwhichNASA andtherestofthe ColdWarR&D community"completed"their"missions"hasgivenrisetoverydifferent definitionsoftheprobleminvolved:theeffortsofthenationallabs,DARPA, other similarorganizationshavebeendefinedas"defenseconversion";NASA ofthe1970s,as waspointedoutinchapter6,fit undernocurrentissuedefinitionatall. Whatisbeingsuggestedhereisthepolicymakerswhoareconcernedwiththese issuesmightwell profit fromareviewoftheagency'sexperienceswith conversion,dual technologiesa,ndthelike.Unlessoneiswilling topresupposethatNASA duringthe 1970sandearly1980swassignificantlylesscompetentthan,say,thenational laboratoriesarenow,examiningtheearlyhistoryofspacecommercializationcould provideausefulguidetopresent-dayconversionefforts.If nothingelse,it mighthelp pointoutpoliciesorprogramstoavoid. RED DAWN The preceding chapter pointed out that, ever since the 1980s, NASA has been in dire need of a major objective that only it--and it alone--could perform. The short-lived Space Exploration Initiative to (among other things) travel to Mars was clearly intended as one such objective. Even though that program died a quiet death (if you could truly be said to have had a life at all) in 1990, 37many space enthusiasts continue to press for Mars as NASA's next big destination. 38 Chapter9:11 Somewhaltike therocketsocietiesofthe1920sand30s(seechapter3), organizationsliketheMarsSocietycontainsalargenumberofmemberswith scientific andtechnicalbackgrounds(in fact,theMarsSocietypresident,RobertZubrin,isatrained engineer).Thus,in additiontotheusuallobbyingandcampaignstogenerate"grassroots" support,someMarsproponentshavealsobeenworkingtodevelop---andmoreimportant, lowertheexpenseof--the relevanttechnologiesB. elieving (correctly)thatamajor reasonCongressrefusedtoapprovefundingforSEIwasmulti-hundredbillion dollar pricetag(estimatedinsomequarterstobeashighas$450billion39),supportersofa missiontotheRedPlanet(or,assomeoftheirliteraturewouldhaveit, the"NewWorld") havemountedamajorefforttobringthecostsdowntowhataretobea"politically acceptablel"evel. Onesuchscenario,putforwardbyZubrinhimself,iscalledMarsDirect.Todate, spacemissionsinvolvinghumansalwayscarryalongalloftheirfuel,includingthat neededforthetriphome.Thisrepresentsamassiveweightrequirementw, hichin turn eitherlimits thesizeofthespacecrafot rdrivesupthedesigncosts.UndertheMars Directproposal,propellantforthereturnflightwouldbemanufacturedonMars,from chemicalsalreadyknowntoexistinabundancethere.Aspacecrafwt ouldthereforeonly havetocarryhalfasmuchfuelasmostcurrentplans,asavingsinbothweightandcost. Usingtheseandotherinnovative--butnotnecessarilyexotic--technologies,Zubrin estimatesthataMartianmissioncouldbeundertakenwithin thenextdecadefor atotal cost$20billion,n° Unfortunately,theanalysispresentedoverthepasteightchapterssuggeststhat suchefforts,well meaningthoughtheymaybe,arenotlikely tobesufficient.It maywell Chapter9:12 becorrectthatthefundingrequirementsofMarsDirectare--adjustedforinflation-- lowerthanthoseforApollointhe1960s.It mustberememberedh,owever,theelected officialsin 1961werewilling tosupportthemoonlandingdespite the cost, because they had defined it as an issue of immense national significance. As Vice-President Johnson noted, it is difficult to worry about cost if you believe that national survival is at stake. Certainly many of those same officials just a few years later balked at the costs of the proposed follow-ups to Apollo. Still, their past behavior suggests that they would have appropriated the necessary funds had they continued to view the program as any sort of national priority. Zubrin's proposal, even assuming that the technology worked as promised (something that, as NASA has discovered, is never a given), addresses only one side of the political equation. Even the very cheapest Mars program will still be among one of the government's larger budget items. It is therefore only likely to receive approval if members of Congress, as well as executive branch officials, view it as being worth the cost. In short, what sort of issue definition would persuade policymakers to approve an average appropriation of $2 billion, and continue to do so for more than a decade? Finally, the most recent developments suggest that the premise of this section-- that is, that a human flight to Mars is something that only NASA could accomplish--may not be correct. Consistent with the trend that began in the 1980s (see chapters 7 and 8), there is increasing discussion of bypassing the agency altogether and relying on the private sector. Zubrin himself has reportedly proposed that Congress offer a "Mars prize" of $20 billion to the business consortium that reaches the planet (and presumably returns safely) first. 41There is little reason to suppose that Congress will act on this idea--or that Chapter9 :13 privateindustrywill begearingupforarunatMars--anytimesoon.Still, thefactthat suchaproposalisbeingtakenatallseriouslysuggeststhatNASA maynolongerhavea monopolyonevenApollo-stylemissions. HELPFUL LEADERSHIP James Webb was almost certainly correct 35 years ago, when he told President Johnson that it was up to the government to tell NASA what to do, not the other way around. 42Part of Webb's thinking--also reflected in some later political writingn3--is that the significant resource requirements associated with spaceflight make it essential that there be a clear consensus among policymakers before any ambitious space plans get underway. Kennedy's "moon speech" seems, at first glance, to represent such an approach. That address, in fact, has become not just a model for how new space initiatives ought to be unveiled, but in some quarters it is seen as the very definition of "leadership" in space. Any president wishing to be regarded as a leader on this issue must make a grand, "Kennedy-like" declaration. Unfortunately, the subsequent success of Apollo (at least to the extent of getting funding and actually getting to the moon) has resulted in the Kennedy speech looking, in retrospect, far more significant than it actually was. Of course, it was significant; without it there probably would not have been anything like a Project Apollo for many years. 44 One must be careful, however, not to confuse a necessary condition with a sufficient one. The president's 1961 pronouncement was absolutely necessary to getting the program underway. It was not, in and of itself, sufficient: as chapters 4 and 5 point out, there were Chapter9:14 inthelate1950sandearly1960sanumberofpolitical,economic,andsocialfactors contributingtothespaceprogram'sheightenedpoliticalsaliency.Withoutthose(or similar)conditionspresent,nopresidentialdeclaration,nomatterhowloftyorpoetic,is enoughtoguaranteeamulti-billion dollar,multi-yearexpenditure.Thiscanbeseeninthe mostrecenteffortstoemulateJFK:foryears,Reagan'sspacestationproposalwasin greatdangerofcancellation,and,asalreadynoted,Bush'sspeechonbehalfofSEIcaused barelyaripple. ThisdoesnotmeanthatthereisnoroleforpresidentialleadershipP. erhapsthe mostsignificantcontributionafuturechiefexecutivecanmaketoNASA is provide an explicitly executive function. Many of the policy prescriptions addressed to the agency are couched as negatives, that is, as things that NASA should not do. It should not, for example, try to compete with the private sector, just as it should not be involved with space operations. Even some ostensibly prescriptive statements are really just backhanded negatives, as in the view that NASA should "carry out only those activities that cannot be accomplished by commercial means," or else too vague to be of any use, such as stating that "there is some role for NASA" without specifying what that might be. What would surely be more helpful would be some sort of actual policy guidance, a set of specific charges for the agency. Policymakers should, in conjunction with leaders from commercial space industry and other stakeholders, establish each group's jurisdictions and areas of responsibility. 45This would, among other things, force both elected officials and the NASA leadership to return--literally for the first time since the Space Act was written--to the basic question of what NASA is, or rather, what it is for. Although not as flashy or headline-grabbing as a grand, public speech, it is the sort of Chapter9:15 administrativereformthatmight,inthelongrun,beafarbetterservicetotheagencyand totheprogram. BACK TO THE FUTURE Some authors have characterized the Space Exploration Initiative as a failed attempt to revive the Space Age of the 1960s. 46The irony of contemporary space policy is that as the 20 thcentury drew to a close, the period that the U.S. program most closely resembled was the 1950s. As the previous chapter noted, Congress was more heavily involved in the space-related decision-making than at any time in the past forty years. Moreover, for the first time since the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had multiple space programs, conducted by a variety of government organizations as well as the private sector. Indeed, to speak of "the space program," as if it were a single entity, has started to sound a bit simplistic. It is true, of course, that unlike the earlier period (when branches of the military, although competing with one other, were trying to reach the same basic goal), each of today's "programs" is pursuing its own individual objectives: profit, national defense, scientific research, and so on. This does not mean, however, that there is no competition. Just as during the 1950s, when there was a perception (not entirely unfounded) that the space programs of the Army, Air Force, and the Navy were fighting among themselves more than they were with the USSR (a 1957 Herblock cartoon depicts one military officer watching Sputnik and saying to another with relieved expressions, "whew! At first I thought it was sent up by one of the other services" 47), U.S. space policy began in the late Chapter9 :16 1980stobedividedbyconflict.Althoughitwasoriginallycreatedtoleadthecountryina competitionwith theSovietUnion(whichalmostallAmericanswantedit towin),48 throughouttheReaganB, ushandClintonpresidenciesN,ASA wasincreasinglylikely to find itselflinedupagainstprivatecompaniesi,nfluentialmembersofCongressa,nd variousotherfederalofficialsandagenciesA. nd,inthesecontests,it wasbecomingmore commonfortheagencytofind itselfcastasavillain. Inshort,adivisionhasenteredspacepolicythatwouldhavebeenunimaginable 20yearsearlier.Formostofitshistory,NASA hadbeensynonymouswith spaceflight. Fromthe1950sthroughthe1970s,tobe"pro-space"was--automatically--to bepro- NASA.Althoughthereweresomepolicymakerss,uchasSenatorFulbrightduringthe laterdebatesoverApollo (see chapter 4), who sought to speak favorably about spaceflight in general while at the same time criticizing specific NASA programs, these individuals often came off sounding disingenuous at best (and, at worst, completely eccentric). Even after the space program's emphasis shifted from "spectaculars" intended to enhance national prestige to "applications" that would improve "life here on earth," there was never any serious doubt that NASA would play a leading--if not the dominant--role. The agency's "role" is increasingly being challenged all the time. As the last chapter pointed out, many in the space community now see a substantial difference between space policy and NASA policy. By the end of President Clinton's second term, this view had reached the point in which a growing number of private entrepreneurs, conservative scholars and commentators, and public officials now openly question--and, in many instances, actively opposed--the agency's involvement in what had become the primary areas of space policy. NASA no longer had the only ticket into space, and there is Chapter9 :17 nowlessagreementthaneverbeforeastowhatdestinationthatparticularticketshould havestampedonit. If thereisamajordifferencebetweentheprogram(s)nowandfifty yearsago,itis clearlyinthenatureofspaceactivityitself.Thereisagreatdealofironythat,in themidst of allofthisconflict,spaceflightitselfwashealthierandmorerobustthanatanyother timein history.Bytheendofthe 1990s,humanity(particularlyAmericans)wereworking in space(albeitusuallynotdirectly)andusingspace-basepdroductsasneverbefore. Moreover,just asNASA hadpromisedadecadeearlier,spaceoperationsthemselves reallyseemtobeonthevergeofbecomingroutine(orasclosetoroutineassuchthings asspacelaunchescanbe).Humanityactuallydoesseemtobein spacetostay.Whatwill becomeoftheorganizationthatmadeit allpossibleremainstobeseen. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 9 i See (among many others) see Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy. New York: Basic Books, 1992; Center for Strategic and International Studies, Steering Committee on Security and Technology, Integrating Commercial and Military Technologies for National Strength: An Agenda for Change. Washington: CSIS, 1991; Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Technology and Economic Performance: Organizing the Executh_e Branch for a Stronger National Technology Base. New York: Carnegie Commission, 1991; Lewis M. Branscomb (ed) Empowering Technology: Implementing a U.S. Strategy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993; Jacques Gansler, Defense Conversion: Transformation of the Arsenal of Chapter 9 :18 Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995; U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, The Department of Energy: National Laboratories Need Clearer Missions and Better Management. Washington: GAO, 1995. 2 Admittedly, the present problem is much larger in scale and scope. The $36 billion decline in spending for defense procurement between 1985 and 1993 represents a decrease, in real terms, of more than 50 percent. Such reductions could have had much more substantial economic consequences than the NASA cutbacks 25 years earlier. 3DOE inherited them from the Atomic Energy Commission in 1977. 4 See DOE, Department of Energy 1977-1994; Bernard Cole, "DOE Labs: Models for Tech Transfer." 1EEE Spectrum (December 1992), pp. 53-57; Charles V. Shank, "Recharging the Energy Laboratories." Physics Today (July 1994), pp. 42-48. It should be noted that the $6 billion does not include the DOD laboratories, defense-related university research, and the large number of private firms existing solely on defense contracts. 5DOE, Department of Energy 1977-1994, p. 100. 6Quoted in Branscomb, "National Laboratories: The Search for New Missions and New Structures," p. 110. 7John Burgess, "Bombs into Bulldozers." Washington Post (23 August 1992), p. X. 8Gansler, Defense Conversion; Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy. 9 Jay Stowsky and Burgess Laird, "Conversion to Competitiveness: Making the Most of the National Labs." American Prospect (Fall 1992), pp. 91-98; Lewis M. Chapter9:19 Branscomb,"NationalLaboratoriesT: heSearchforNewMissionsandNewStructures" inLewisM. Branscomb(ed)Empowering Technology: Implementing a U.S. Strategy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 103-134. l0Charles V. Shank, "Recharging the Energy Laboratories." Physics Today (July 1994), p. 45. 11See Scott McCartney, "With Cold War Over, Los Alamos Seeks New Way of Doing Business." Wall Street Journal (15 July 1993), pp. xx-xx. 12Ray Kidder, "Conversion of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Laboratories" in Judith Reppy (ed) Conversion of Military R&D. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 201-214. 13Charles V. Shank, "Recharging the Energy Laboratories." Physics Today (July 1994), pp. 42-48. _4U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Electric Vehicles and Advanced Battery R&D. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 103ra Congress, 2ndsession, (June 30, 1994). Washington: USGPO, 1995. 15Bob Davis, "White House and Auto Makers Prepare Joint Effort to Triple Fuel Efficiency." Wall Street Journal (29 September 1993), p. 1. See also U. S. Department of Commerce, Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles, Program Plan. Washington: DOC, 1994; and Inventions Needed for PNGV. Washington: DOC, 1995. 16U. S. Department of Energy, Office of Utility Technologies, Superconductivity Program for Electric Power Systems: FY 1994-1998 Multi-year Plan. Washington: DOE, 1994. Chapter9:20 17Amoredetaileddiscussion--withanassessment---othfeseandother projects can be found in Richard D. Bingham, Industrial Policy American Style: From Hamilton to HDTV. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998, chapter 7 (written with Maria Papadakis). 18Jeff Bingaman and Bobby R. Inman, "Broadening Horizons for Defense R&D." Issues in Science and Technology. 9:1 (Fall 1992), pp. 80-85. 19Bruce Berkowitz, "Can Defense Research Revive U.S. Industry?" Issues in Science and Technology 9:2 (Winter 1992/93), p. 74. See also Lewis M. Branscomb and George Parker, "Funding Civilian and Dual-Use Industrial Technology" in Lewis M. Branscomb (ed) Empowering Technology: Implementing a U.S. Strategy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 64-102, especially pp. 65-67. 20Cole, "DOE Labs: Models for Tech Transfer." zl Kenneth Flamm, Creating the Computer." Government, Industry, and High Technology. Washington: Brookings, 1988. 22Lewis M. Branscomb, "The National Technology Policy Debate" in Branscomb (ed) Empowering Technology, p. 34. It should be noted that this is quite different from the more familiar notion of a "spinoff." In the past, any civilian application that was "spun off" of some military technology was generally regarded by the defense establishment as little more than an after-the-fact "bonus" (see Berkowitz, "Can Defense Research Revive U.S. Industry?") The dual-use doctrine, however, treats commercial applications as a primary objective. z3Public Law 99-502. Chapter9:21 24QuotedinLewisM.Branscomb,"NationalLaboratories:TheSearchforNew MissionsandNewStructures"inBranscombEmpowering Technology, p. 103. 25U. S. Executive Office of the President, Council on Competitiveness, Industry as a Customer of the Federal Laboratories. Washington: Council on Competitiveness, 1992. It should be noted, however, that in endorsing this policy, the Council was engaging in a bit of redefinition of its own. The basic thrust of the report is that industrial modernization and the further development of the high-tech private sector are both an important element in military readiness. In other words, the involvement of government laboratories in the civilian economy--which under most circumstances economic conservatives would wish to avoid (see chapter 7)--is regarded as acceptable here due to national security considerations. 26John M. Logsdon, "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans" in John M. Logsdon (ed), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Volume I: Organizing for Exploration. Washington: NASA, 1995, p. 388. 27U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier." History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-1979. Washington: USGPO, 1990, p. 312 28Quoted in ibid, p. 309. z9 See John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" Science 232 (30 May 1986), pp. 1099-1105. 3oIt could also be argued that, in its earliest discussions of a space station program, NASA considered this same "multi-use" approach, promising that the system Chapter9:22 couldserveavarietyofusers.Itsusefordefensepurposesh,owever,wassoondropped. SeeHowardE.McCurdy,The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics and Technological Choice. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series on NASA History, 1990. 31W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins New Series in NASA History, 1995, p. 139. 32This is described in McCurdy, The Space Station Decision. 33This was largely due to the delays in developing the shuttle, as well as NASA's failure to account fully for the effects of atmospheric "drag." 34Lewis M. Branscomb, "Research and Innovation Policy: A Framework for Research-Based Industrial Policy." Paper presented at the Conference on U.S.-E.U. Technology Policy, Atlanta, Georgia, 9-10 April 1999, p. 2. 35Such as the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore, which was highly controversial even before running up large cost overruns. See "National Ignition Facility: DOE set to Double the Price of the Troubled Laser Project." Science (5 May 2000), p. 782; "U.S. National Ignition Facility Hits Crisis." Nature ( 9 September 1999), p. 101; Tom Zamora Collina, "The National Ignition Facility: Buyer Beware." Technology Review (1 February 2000), pp. xx-xx. 36 To take only one example (among many), the Sandia National Laboratory, once heavily involved in the development and testing of nuclear weapons, has more recently been working on building a safer handgun. See "Sandia Researchers Shoot for 'Smart Gun.' DOE This Month 18:3 (March 1995), p. 12. Chapter9:23 37PatriciaA.Gilmartin,"HouseKills FundingforMars/MoonEffort."Aviation Week and Space Technology (2 July 1990), p. 28. 38A call that has been intensified by the possible discovery of water below the Martian surface. See Sharon Begley and Erika Check, "NASA: Mars is All Wet." Newsweek (3 July 2000), pp. 48-50. 39Holman Jenkins, Jr., "Big Question on Mars: What are We Waiting For?" Wail Street Journal (28 June 2000), p. A23. 4oibid; Jeffrey Kluger, "Will We Live on Mars?" Time (10 April 2000), pp. 60-63; Robert M. Zubrin (with Richard Wagner), The Case for Mars: The Plan to Settle the Red Planet and why we Must. New York: Free Press, 1996. 41Jenkins, "Big Question on Mars: What are We Waiting For? 42See Logsdon, "The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Plans," p. 382; Lambright, Powering Apollo, p. xxx. See also the latter's "James E. Webb: A Dominant Force in 20th Century Public Administration." Public Administration Review 53:2 (March- April 1993), pp. 95-99. 43Such as W. D. Kay, "Democracy and Super Technologies: The Politics of the Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom." Science, Technology, and Human Values 19:2 (April 1994), pp. 131-151, and Can Democracies Fly in Space? The Challenge of Revitalizing the U.S. Space Program. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. 44Whether this would have been a good or bad thing is another matter. 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