Journal of International Security and Strategic Studies Volume VI, Issue I, Spring 2022 The Journal of International Security and Strategic Studies is published twice annually—in April and December—and it is supported by the Center for National Security Studies (CNSS) at Utah Valley University (UVU). The JISSS publishes timely, insightful articles on critical international security matters, including topics relating to foreign affairs, intelligence, homeland security, terrorism, and US national defense. Submissions may be sent to the Editor-in-Chief at [email protected]. The Center for National Security Studies The CNSS at UVU was established in January 2016. The Center is the first of its kind in the State of Utah. The CNSS is a nonpartisan academic institution for the instruction, analysis, and discussion of issues related to the field of US national security. The mission of the CNSS is twofold: to promote an interdisciplinary academic environment on campus that critically examines both the theoretical and practical aspects of national security policy and practice; and to assist students in preparing for public and private sector national security careers through acquisition of subject matter expertise, analytical skills, and practical experience. The CNSS aims to provide students with the knowledge, skills, and opportunities needed to succeed in the growing national security sector. Utah Valley University UVU is a teaching institution that promotes student success, provides opportunity, and meets regional educational needs. UVU builds on a foundation of substantive scholarly and creative work to foster engaged learning. The university prepares professionally competent people of integrity who, as lifelong learners and leaders, serve as stewards of a globally interdependent community. The opinions expressed in this journal are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of Utah Valley University. CONTENTS - A Note from the Editor-in-Chief (Rebekah Bushlaev) - Page 1 - Viability of the Bay of Pigs Strategy (Mark Stamilio) - Page 3 - An Overview of Global Hypersonic Weapon Technological Advancements with Potential Remediation and Policy Options (Ashton Earl) - Page 10 - International Law of Statehood: What Has the Great Debate between the Constitutive Theory and the Declaratory Theory Done for the China–Taiwan Issue? A New Approach Moving Forward (Yihao Yun) - Page 25 - Strategic Medicine: Treating Competitive Interdependence and Convergent Threats, Not a Cold War (Colonel James A. Chambers) - Page 60 - Policy Progress in Terrorist Rehabilitation: The Case of Kazakhstan (Samuel Elzinga) - Page 101 - How We Lose the Next War (Michael Lacey) - Page 113 - Motivations for Developing Nuclear Weapons Programs: Argentine and Brazilian Case Studies (Elmas Hasanovikj) - Page 146 - From a Weak State to a Failed State: Push and Pull Factors in Burkina Faso (Mallika Parlikar) - Page 159 EDITORIAL BOARD Volume VI, Spring 2022, Issue I Editor-in-Chief: Rebekah Bushlaev Executive Editor: Sam Peterson Managing Editors: Mitchell Kleinsmith, Katie Lewis, Addison Gardner Content Editors: Brenton Rasmussen, Isaac Garside, Alysa Warlin, Kaden Smart, Colton Baum, Bryan Davis, Serena Siglock, Camden Mead, Hope Fager Technical Editors: Addison Gardner, Katie Lewis, Morgan Llewellyn, Kyle Scherer, JoLyn Brown, Justin Black Faculty Advisors: Ryan Vogel, Michael Smidt, Deb Thornton I have been extremely grateful to work on the Journal of International Security and Strategic Studies this semester. It was an honor to be asked to lead this publication. I have had opportunity to reach out to many renowned practitioners in the security field and it broadened my horizons; these authors write about so many different topics, but all are of extreme importance to our society. These thought-provoking pieces will bring great discussion and information to those reading. I would like to thank the many people who have worked with me to help this journal be what it is today. To my executive editor, Sam Peterson, and managing editor, Mitchell Kleinsmith, along with my content editors, thank you for your time and effort in helping support this journal. Thank you to my other managing editors, Katie Lewis and Addison Gardner, who, with Deb Thornton and their team of editors, spent so much of their time and energy on helping source check, copy edit, typeset, and so much more. This truly would not have been possible without each and every one of you. Thank you to faculty member, Mike Smidt, who assisted me in finding wonderful authors to publish and guiding the journal to where it is today. Publishing the Journal of International Security and Strategic Studies is an experience I will never forget, and I am forever appreciative of the time I had and the people I met during this process. I hope every reader is able to enjoy this edition as much as I have. Rebekah Bushlaev, Editor-in-Chief Mark Stamilio is a Foreign Affairs Specialist in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the US Department of Defense in Washington, DC, where he currently serves as Principal Director for African Affairs. The Bay of Pigs invasion was a flawed strategy for countering the spread of Communism in the Western Hemisphere, as there was little chance the plan would succeed in overthrowing the Castro regime, and significant risk the operation would discredit the United States and embolden the Soviet Union. The strategy, as implemented, was an unmitigated failure. It failed because the Kennedy administration failed to align the available ways and means to the desired end, which was the removal of Fidel Castro from power, and it failed to align that end with the administration’s broader political aim, which was a free and democratic western hemisphere. President John F. Kennedy reasonably assumed that a Soviet base in Cuba was a threat to US national security, but he believed he must address the threat without directly involving the US military, lest he provoke Soviet retaliation in Berlin. This belief and faulty assumptions led Kennedy to adopt a risky strategy. First, Kennedy assumed removing Castro would prevent Soviet presence, but revolutionary movements elsewhere in Latin America existed. Second, he assumed the CIA had the competency to execute an invasion, ignite popular uprising, and install a provisional government. Third, he assumed the US could conceal its involvement despite training exiles and using B-26 bombers. Furthermore, Kennedy failed to consider coercive diplomacy or alternative covert means. The planning suffered from groupthink, where dissenting views, such as those from Arthur Schlesinger, were suppressed, leading to what Kennedy later lamented as a 'colossal mistake.' Ashton Earl is an undergraduate student in the National Security Program at Utah Valley University. Global advances in hypersonic missile technology threaten existing international deterrents on the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and quicken the pace of battle to incentivize first-strike use of nuclear weapons. Hypersonic weapons travel at Mach 5 or higher and combine high speed with maneuverability, range, and low-altitude flight. Hypersonic weapons fall into two main categories: Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (powered by scramjets) and Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs, boosted by rockets). Russia has deployed the Avangard HGV (capable of Mach 20) and the 3M22 Tsirkon anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile. China has developed the DF-17 missile carrying the DF-ZF HGV, as well as a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS/HGV) that circumnavigated the globe. The United States is pursuing offensive systems including the Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), Air Force's AGM-183 ARRW and HACM, and DARPA's TBG and HAWC programs, alongside defensive tracking systems utilizing low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations and glide phase interceptors. The policy debate in the US revolves around four approaches: Get Ahead, Shields Up, Draw the Line, and Avoid the Race. The author argues for a combination of Get Ahead and Shields Up to maintain strategic deterrence against rising Chinese and Russian capabilities. Yihao Yun is a JD candidate at BYU Law School. This article examines the status of Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) under international law by evaluating the two predominant theories of statehood: the constitutive theory (statehood created by recognition from other states) and the declaratory theory (statehood based on objective, factual criteria, such as the Montevideo Convention). Historical analysis traces Taiwan's status from the Qing Dynasty, through the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the Chinese Civil War (1949), UN Resolution 2758 (1971), and the Anti-Secession Law (2005). Under the constitutive theory, Taiwan is likely not a state due to limited formal recognition resulting from the PRC's One-China Principle. Under the declaratory theory, Taiwan meets traditional Montevideo criteria (permanent population, defined territory, functioning government, capacity for international relations), but faces challenges regarding unilateral secession outside the decolonization context. The author argues that both theories are inadequate and propose an integrated seven-step framework where an entity satisfying objective internal criteria must also secure recognition from more than half of UN member states, undergo ICJ advisory review, and receive formal recognition through a binding UN Security Council resolution. Colonel James A. Chambers (US Air Force) is the Command Surgeon for US Strategic Command. Health expands the dimensions of competition in international security and shared existential threats. Drawing upon historical analogies from the Peloponnesian and Greco-Persian wars, the paper outlines eight strategic lessons for integrating global health into national security strategy: 1. Know Yourself: Embrace democratic ideals and provide equitable domestic healthcare. 2. Know Your Competition: Leverage health as a universal good for communication while preparing for WMD and biological risks. 3. Know Your Allies: Support international bodies like WHO and enhance civil-military interoperability. 4. Know Faraway Places: Train medical professionals in cultural and linguistic skills for global engagement. 5. Know What Works: Implement winning strategies, prolonged field care training, telemedicine, and AI-driven medical solutions. 6. Know the Importance of Logistics: Secure the medical Defense Industrial Base, strengthen the Strategic National Stockpile, address cybersecurity in health infrastructure, and manage critical resources like phosphorus and water. 7. Know the Importance of Leaders: Coordinate global health across US government agencies via the National Security Council and establish an International Health Corps. 8. Know Health Can Determine Strategic Outcomes: Proactively tackle pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and climate change impacts. Samuel Elzinga is a graduate of Utah Valley University and senior research consultant at the Oxus Society. Central Asia has been a significant source of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) in Iraq and Syria. Following the collapse of ISIS, Kazakhstan implemented comprehensive repatriation operations (Operation Zhusan, bringing back nearly 600 citizens, predominantly women and children in 2019). Prior to 2017, Kazakhstan's approach was primarily punitive and uncoordinated. After assuming a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (2017-2018) and contributing to Resolution 2396, Kazakhstan shifted toward an integrated model involving civil society, NGOs, theologians, psychologists, and educators. The program established 17 regional rehabilitation centers to provide religious re-education, mental health support, and social reintegration. Kazakhstan's model has gained international praise and serves as a viable blueprint for neighboring Central Asian states like Uzbekistan. Michael Lacey is Deputy General Counsel for the US Army. Presented as a speculative scenario set in 2032, the narrative depicts a conflict between the United States and China over the Senkaku and Ryukyu Islands (Yonaguni and Miyakojima). China rapidly seizes the islands using electronic magnetic jamming and localized force. When the US deploys a carrier strike group (including USS Abraham Lincoln, USS Enterprise, USS Gerald R. Ford, USS Ronald Reagan), Chinese hypersonic DF-28 and DF-30 missiles devastate the fleet, sinking 27 ships and killing over 4,600 sailors. Simultaneously, China executes crippling cyberattacks on the US homeland, wiping out financial market data across 23 major institutions ($180 trillion lost), cutting power to southern and eastern states via pre-embedded microchip kill switches, and disrupting regional fuel pipelines. Widespread civil unrest, panic buying, domestic militia violence (such as the Texan Freedom Corps), and political fracture compel the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire, recognizing China's regional sphere of influence. The paper highlights the danger of committing military power to peripheral interests without clear public backing, industrial readiness, and cyber resilience. Elmas Hasanovikj serves as cabinet advisor for defense policy to the Minister of Defense of North Macedonia. This paper examines the drivers behind the historical nuclear weapons programs in Brazil and Argentina. Rather than external security threats, both nations were driven by prestige, regional rivalry, and military regimes seeking domestic legitimacy. Both nations pursued covert parallel enrichment programs (Brazil through centrifuge technology under Captain Othon Pinheiro Da Silva; Argentina via gaseous diffusion at Pilcanyeu). Transition to civilian democracy in both countries during the 1980s and 1990s introduced transparency and civilian oversight. This led to mutual nonproliferation commitments, including the 1991 Bilateral Agreement, the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, and accession to the Tlatelolco Treaty and NPT. Mallika Parlikar is an Intelligence Analyst at Aon Cyber Solutions. This paper analyzes the escalation of violent extremism in Burkina Faso. While external narratives attribute the conflict solely to spillover from the Malian civil war and incoming refugee flows (pull factors), the primary driver is rooted in domestic weak state structures (push factors). Factors such as systemic corruption, state absence in rural northern provinces (Soum), land misallocation, herder-farmer disputes, and abusive security forces created a legitimacy vacuum. This vacuum fostered the growth of local self-defense militias (Koglweogo, Rouga) and enabled Islamist militants to recruit from disenfranchised local Burkinabè populations. The author concludes that sustainable security requires reinforcing governance, rule of law, and human security rather than focusing solely on border containment.