SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2024 APRIL 2024 Authors: CLAYTON SWOPE KARI A. BINGEN MAKENA YOUNG MADELEINE CHANG STEPHANIE SONGER JEREMY TAMMELLEO Foreword: ERIC FANNING A REPORT OF THE CSIS AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ABOUT CSIS The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world's greatest challenges. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS's purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS's values work in concert toward the goal of making real-world impact. CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and the interested public. CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ABOUT ASP The Aerospace Security Project (ASP) is a trusted resource for policymakers, offering insightful thoughts and in-depth analyses on policy issues, operational concepts, technology trends, and economic drivers in the space and air domains. Our mission is to educate and inform policymakers and the public, conduct independent research and analysis, and convene experts with broad perspectives to advance creative and practical solutions that address the security challenges facing the United States and our allies and partners. ASP also fosters the next generation of scholars in national security space and air power policy through fellowship and internship opportunities. Part of the International Security Program at CSIS, Aerospace Security is led by Senior Fellow Kari A. Bingen and includes a distinguished group of expert affiliates spanning national security, civilian, commercial, and international aerospace issues. Center for Strategic & International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report. The Aerospace Security Project would like to thank BlackSky, COMSPOC, ExoAnalytic Solutions, HEO Robotics, LeoLabs, Planet, and Slingshot Aerospace for their contribution of data, images, and analysis. Finally, many thanks to Audrey Schaffer, Steve Jordan Tomaszewski, Jeeah Lee, Phillip Meylan, Katherine Stark, Julia Huh, and Louis Gleason for their support in the research, review, and publication process. CONTENTS 1 FOREWORD 2 INTRODUCTION 3 OVERVIEW OF COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES 7 CHINA 13 RUSSIA 16 FEATURED ANALYSIS: NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE 20 INDIA 23 IRAN 26 NORTH KOREA 28 OTHER COUNTRIES 27 Australia 28 France 28 Israel 28 Japan 28 South Korea 29 United Kingdom 29 Non-state Actors 31 FEATURED ANALYSIS: COALITIONS OF CONVENIENCE 35 WHAT TO WATCH 40 CONCLUSION 41 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 43 ENDNOTES FOREWORD IN AN ERA MARKED BY TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT AND global interconnectedness, space has become increasingly vital to economic prosperity and national defense worldwide. This edition of the Space Threat Assessment by the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides accessible insights into the evolving global space landscape, outlining key developments and resulting threats. Today, the United States, with its pioneering spirit and innovative capabilities, stands at the forefront of leveraging space and its limitless potential for the good of humankind. From satellite communications and navigation systems to intelligence gathering and missile defense, space assets have become ingrained in the fabric of modern life and our nation's security. This position is not assured. While the U.S. increasingly focuses on space, foreign nations are also reaching new milestones. As the space domain becomes more congested and contested, collaboration between government agencies and private industry becomes imperative. Synergy between governmental oversight, regulatory frameworks, and private sector innovation is essential for maximizing the potential of space while mitigating risks and safeguarding national interests. A strong and resilient aerospace and defense workforce is a vital part of this challenge. Trained professionals in government and industry underpin a thriving space sector and are essential to overcome attacks. Our people are a strategic asset and a key advantage. Technology and innovation, especially from the private sector, are also primary strengths. We must continue to mature and integrate new technologies like artificial intelligence into space systems and find better ways for governments to take advantage of new cutting-edge capabilities. We can accelerate change by incentivizing the private sector to invest in the research and development of new technologies. Through insightful analysis that comes at a crucial time, this report underscores the critical need for proactive cooperation between government and industry to harness the full spectrum of opportunities offered by space. By working together, we can unlock the vast potential of space exploration and utilization, drive economic growth, strengthen national security, and ensure America's continued leadership in the final frontier. ERIC FANNING President and CEO, Aerospace Industries Association INTRODUCTION WELCOME TO THE SEVENTH EDITION of the Space Threat Assessment by the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). For the last seven years, CSIS has used open-source information to produce an annual assessment of threats to U.S. national security space systems, referred to as counterspace threats, and trends in counterspace capabilities. Each report in this series catalogs yearly developments, uses, and advancements of counterspace weapons and enablers to provide policymakers and the public with accessible insights into the global space threat landscape. Today, there are more satellites and systems in space providing services, information, and capabilities to people on Earth than ever before. While many of these systems have a civilian mission and are built and run by companies instead of governments, they also support U.S. national security. As noted in past assessments, these civilian and commercial space systems face expanding threats from foreign adversaries, which increasingly include cyber and espionage threats. Given the criticality of services and capabilities provided by space systems to U.S. national and economic security, the authors believe that policymakers should think in terms of threats and risk as they resource and prioritize mitigation measures. In addition to threats, a risk assessment includes analysis of vulnerabilities as well as the likelihood of and impacts from undesired events. Continuing past trends, 2023 saw foreign nations reach new milestones in space: record-setting launches, deployments of satellites, and missions to the Moon and other parts of the solar system. While not strictly advancing in counterspace weapons, foreign countries have shown progress in building and expanding the foundational capabilities needed to support both space and counterspace systems. China broke its national record for launches in one year and, for the third time, sent its reusable spaceplane into orbit. North Korea successfully launched a satellite into space, while Iran placed its third surveillance satellite into orbit. Over the last year, both India and Japan landed missions on the Moon. In February 2024, the world learned that Russia is developing a space-based counterspace weapon involving nuclear technology, bringing more public awareness and policymaker attention to space security. As in the prior two years, space-based capabilities, especially commercial space services, played a publicly visible role in conflict zones. Information from commercial remote-sensing space systems and connectivity from satellites continued to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression. Space also influenced the conflict in Israel and Gaza, with media organizations using commercial satellite imagery to share information about the conflict's impacts. These examples demonstrate the accessibility and utility of space-based services offered by U.S. companies to parties involved in conflicts, putting space business leaders in the middle of geopolitics, global security questions, and, in some cases, military conflict. The information cut-off date for this report is March 30, 2024. For more detail on past counterspace weapons activities, please review the prior Space Threat Assessments (editions 2018–2023) or visit the project's interactive timeline at https://aerospace.csis.org/counterspace-timeline/. OVERVIEW OF COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES This chapter provides an overview of different types of counterspace weapons and a useful taxonomy to classify and differentiate them. Counterspace weapons vary significantly in the technical methods used to create effects against space systems, in how they are deployed, and in the level of technology and resources needed for their development and fielding. For the purposes of this report, counterspace capabilities are organized into four main categories: kinetic weapons, non-kinetic weapons, electronic weapons, and cyber operations. This report also discusses unfriendly behaviors in space and the potential implications of such behaviors on space security. Capabilities intended to conduct espionage only are not considered weapons but are discussed in this report. Kinetic attacks are defined here as those taken through physical, material means such as bombs, bullets, missiles, and other munitions. All kinetic attacks are considered as meant to destroy or damage. This category includes weapons that target spacecraft, such as direct-ascent (DA) anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles outfitted with conventional warheads, and projectile attacks launched from one on-orbit satellite to another. It also includes attacks using bombs, missiles, or other physical means on terrestrial space infrastructure, such as ground stations, launch sites, rocket and satellite factories, and space monitoring infrastructure. Orbital grappling satellites are another form of kinetic attack. Such a grappler physically handles a target spacecraft to do it harm or attaches itself to a spacecraft and maneuvers it to another location. In the latter case, such "kidnapping" would not destroy the target satellite, but could effectively disable it without generating any debris. Non-kinetic attacks are defined as those that use radiated energy to destroy, damage, or interfere with space systems. This energy can be directed, such as with laser or microwave energy, or distributed through nuclear detonations or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) events. High-powered lasers and dazzlers and high-powered microwave ASAT systems are included in this category. Dazzlers are intended to temporarily blind an optical satellite, although they may also unintentionally damage targeted satellites. Nuclear detonations in near space or space are included in this category because these attacks primarily damage electronics through the resulting EMP and lingering radiation that gets trapped in orbit by Earth's magnetic field. Other non-nuclear weapons that create EMP events in space would also be included in this category. To date, no country has used a kinetic or non-kinetic weapon to destroy or permanently disable another country's satellite, but four countries—the United States, Russia, China, and India—have successfully tested DA ASAT missiles against their own satellites. These types of attacks risk the creation of orbital debris, which can indiscriminately affect other satellites and human-crewed systems, such as the International Space Station (ISS) and China's Tiangong space station. Depending on altitude, orbital debris can persist for decades, if not centuries, and pose a long-term risk to the space environment. According to one industry expert, over half of all low Earth orbit (LEO) fragments today comes from just six breakup events, with more than a quarter of LEO debris fragments produced by one event: China's DA ASAT test that destroyed its Fengyun 1C weather satellite in 2007. Electronic weapons use the electromagnetic spectrum to deny or interfere with a target's ability to use space services and capabilities. These weapons cannot destroy; they only impart temporary effects as long as the electronic system engages its target. This category includes jamming and spoofing of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and satellite communications (SATCOM) signals. Spoofing is a form of electronic attack where an attacker tricks a receiver into believing a fake signal produced by the attacker is the real signal it is trying to receive. It can affect GNSS signals from the Global Positioning System (GPS), Galileo, BeiDou, and GLONASS systems, in addition to non-encrypted satellite downlinks. Use of GNSS jamming and spoofing has become commonplace, with GNSS interference observed around the world, often by commercial airline pilots. Also included are any electronic attacks to jam space-based radar and the reception of radio frequency (RF) signals by the user of a satellite service on Earth, the satellite itself, or the ground station of a space system. The final category, cyber operations, includes any offensive activity in cyberspace that targets space systems, including ground infrastructure, satellite terminals, spaceports, and spacecraft. Cyber operations can destroy or permanently disable a targeted system, although they can also be used to temporarily disrupt or to conduct espionage, including gaining access to proprietary or sensitive technical information on a target network. A network exploitation can be a beachhead for any of these purposes, as a cyber operation's intent is often ambiguous. The same ambiguity also clouds efforts to understand and accurately classify most unfriendly satellite behaviors conducted by Russian and Chinese satellites, including close approaches. It is generally difficult to neatly categorize these capabilities. For example, Russia's second Luch/Olymp satellite, launched in 2023, probably positions itself near other satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) to conduct intelligence activities. But it might also be validating a concept of operations for future orbital kinetic attacks, or as some speculate, it may be carrying an electronic attack satellite-jamming payload. With limited open-source information available, it is difficult to draw a definitive conclusion. A grappler satellite—defined in this report as a satellite that can attach itself to a target spacecraft and maneuver both into other orbits—is an example of a counterspace capability enabled by unfriendly close approaches. While a grappler satellite may not destroy its target, it could effectively disable a satellite without generating any debris. Not every nation possesses the full breadth of counterspace capabilities described here, as the level of technological sophistication and ground and space infrastructure required for counterspace weapons dramatically varies. For example, A satellite lasing system requires high beam quality, adaptive optics (if being used through the atmosphere), and advanced pointing control to steer the laser beam precisely—all technology that is costly and sophisticated. A high-altitude nuclear detonation requires not only the capability to build a nuclear weapon but also the capability to place that weapon into the right location in space to affect targeted satellites. On the other hand, the technology needed to jam and spoof many types of satellite signals is commercially available and inexpensive, making it relatively easy to proliferate among state and non-state actors. The same is true for cyber operations. Like jamming and spoofing, there is a low barrier to entry for the acquisition and use of cyber capabilities to target space systems. A nation's proficiency in cyber operations does not necessarily relate to its space capabilities, as a country without space launch capabilities may have mature offensive cyber capabilities. Table 1: TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES [Kinetic Weapons - Terrestrial Infrastructure Attack] Origin to Destination: Ground-to-Ground Permanence of Attack: Permanent Scale of Attack Effects: Widespread, if node supports multiple satellites Attributability of Attack: Variable attribution, depending on mode of attack Requires Space Launch Capability: No Requires Space Domain Awareness: No [Kinetic Weapons - Direct-Ascent ASAT] Origin to Destination: Ground-to-Space Permanence of Attack: Permanent Scale of Attack Effects: Widespread, if orbital debris creation Attributability of Attack: Launch site can be attributed Requires Space Launch Capability: Yes Requires Space Domain Awareness: Yes [Kinetic Weapons - Orbital ASAT] Origin to Destination: Space-to-Space Permanence of Attack: Permanent Scale of Attack Effects: Limited to Widespread, dependent on mode of attack Attributability of Attack: Can be attributed by tracking previously known orbit Requires Space Launch Capability: Yes Requires Space Domain Awareness: Yes [Non-kinetic Weapons - Nuclear Detonations] Origin to Destination: Ground-to-Ground; Ground-to-Space; Space-to-Space Permanence of Attack: Permanent Scale of Attack Effects: Widespread Attributability of Attack: Launch site can be attributed Requires Space Launch Capability: No Requires Space Domain Awareness: No [Non-kinetic Weapons - Directed Energy] Origin to Destination: Ground-to-Ground; Ground-to-Space; Space-to-Space Permanence of Attack: Varies, dependent on mode of attack Scale of Attack Effects: Limited and Regional, dependent on mode of attack Attributability of Attack: Limited attribution Requires Space Launch Capability: No Requires Space Domain Awareness: Yes [Electronic Weapons - Jamming] Origin to Destination: Ground-to-Ground; Ground-to-Space; Space-to-Space Permanence of Attack: Not Permanent Scale of Attack Effects: Limited and Regional, dependent on mode of attack Attributability of Attack: Modest attribution depending on mode of attack Requires Space Launch Capability: No Requires Space Domain Awareness: No [Electronic Weapons - Spoofing] Origin to Destination: Ground-to-Ground; Ground-to-Space; Space-to-Space Permanence of Attack: Not Permanent Scale of Attack Effects: Limited and Regional, dependent on mode of attack Attributability of Attack: Modest attribution depending on mode of attack Requires Space Launch Capability: No Requires Space Domain Awareness: No [Cyber Operations] Origin to Destination: N/A Permanence of Attack: Varies, dependent on mode of attack Scale of Attack Effects: Limited to Widespread, dependent on mode of attack Attributability of Attack: Limited or uncertain attribution Requires Space Launch Capability: No Requires Space Domain Awareness: No CSIS Aerospace Security Project research and analysis CHINA President Xi Jinping has said that to "develop the space industry and build China into a space power is our eternal dream." Over the last decade, China has solidified itself as a space power, maintaining its status as the second-most-capable space nation after the United States. Beijing relies on a suite of growing space and counterspace capabilities to support national goals, including using space as an extension of its soft-power Belt and Road Initiative to strengthen its economic and diplomatic ties with other countries. On the diplomatic front, China is working with Russia to create an international coalition oriented around lunar missions, a direct competitor to the U.S.-led Artemis program, while also pursuing strategic space cooperation with African, Latin American, and Asian countries. For China's space program, 2023 was another record-setting year. It conducted 67 space launches, resulting in over 200 satellites successfully placed into orbit and one launch failure. China's counterspace activities in 2023 appear largely to be an extension of activities conducted in previous years, including the launch of another spaceplane, operation of GEO-based satellites that conduct rendezvous and proximity operations, and use of electronic jamming and cyber operations against ground networks. As space and counterspace capabilities play an essential role in China's national security strategy, China will likely continue to emphasize the modernization and development of its space technologies in the coming years. SPACE POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND ORGANIZATIONS Beijing's space ambitions align with its overall national strategic interests. Space capabilities are seen as key to a modern military and modern warfare, advancing economic and diplomatic interests globally, and elevating the national prestige of China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In seeking the mantle of global space leadership, Beijing designated aerospace a top priority in its Made in China 2025 strategic initiative, aimed at achieving technological breakthroughs and boosting its innovation base, and has allocated large state and private investments to the expansion of its space sector. Beijing is pursuing a broad range of space exploration and human spaceflight activities, as outlined in its 2022 five-year plan, "China's Space Program: A 2021 Perspective." It plans to upgrade and expand its space launch vehicle (SLV) capabilities; expand its space station, Tiangong, which became fully operational in 2022; research key technologies for exploring and developing cislunar space, including establishing a human presence on the Moon; and pursue more robotic exploration of deep space, including Mars. Similar to the United States, Chinese military leaders aim to secure the full use of space for China, while at the same time preventing adversaries from using their own space capabilities. Chinese military theory stresses the importance of joint operations, emphasizing the key role that space capabilities, information warfare, and networked systems play in modern combat operations. At the same time, investments in counterspace weapons would allow the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to hold at risk their adversaries' space assets, especially those that would enable command, control, communications, and intelligence in the region. Separate organizations are responsible for military and civil space activities. Established in 2015, the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) centralizes the development, operations, and integration of space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. This includes development and management of SLVs and government launch sites; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites; navigation and communication satellites; satellite control centers; and cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and many counterspace capabilities. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) is responsible for civil space activities and international space cooperation, while the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) manages China's human spaceflight program, which includes the Tiangong space station and Shenzhou crewed spacecraft. Notably, the CNSA works closely with the PLA, while the CMSA falls under an equipment development division within the Central Military Commission. Although these organizations maintain separate priorities, the same SOEs produce much of the technology for both. Further, Beijing's military-civilian fusion policy blurs the line between civil and commercial activities and military endeavors, encouraging the acquisition of cutting-edge technologies, including space technologies, to achieve both economic and military dominance. SPACE CAPABILITIES China maintains an extensive suite of space capabilities, including space launch with its family of Long March rockets, GNSS through its Beidou system, satellite communications, ISR, missile warning, and space situational awareness (SSA). In space launch, 2023 was a breakthrough year, especially for commercial SLV providers. Enabled by a 2014 government policy change that opened select space sectors to private investment, seven Chinese commercial companies—including some subsidiaries or spin-offs from Chinese SOEs—conducted space launches in 2023 and early 2024. April 2023 saw China's first successful satellite launch by a private company using a liquid propellant rocket, built by Beijing Tianbing Technology (also called Space Pioneer). In July 2023, a private Chinese company, LandSpace, launched the world's first methane-liquid oxygen SLV, technology that promises to enhance rocket performance, and in January 2024, space start-up iSpace tested a reusable SLV. Also in January 2024, start-up Orienspace launched its new Gravity-1 rocket from a sea-based platform, successfully delivering three satellites to LEO and making it the most powerful launch vehicle developed by China's private space sector. Additionally, component-level testing continued in 2023 by a Chinese SOE developing the Long March 9, a super heavy-lift reusable rocket rivaling SpaceX's Starship that could enable China's deep space exploration plans. Beijing is also expanding its space launch sites to accommodate this commercial growth. The December 2023 opening of a commercial spaceport on the island of Hainan will increase China's ability to support more commercial launches, which are often deprioritized at the four main government launch sites. Another significant development in 2023 is China's growing space-based remote-sensing capabilities and their implications for the PLA's ability to track forces and assets across the Indo-Pacific. Over 400 satellites have been launched by China over the last two years, over half of which are remote-sensing satellites. Further, according to U.S. Space Command, as of January 2024, China had approximately 360 ISR satellites on orbit, more than triple the number in 2018. Notably, in August 2023, Beijing launched the world's first GEO-based synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) satellite, Ludi Tance-4, and in December 2023, it launched an optical imagery satellite to GEO, Yaogan-41. Some analysts estimate resolutions of 20 meters for Ludi Tance-4 and possibly 2.5 meters for Yaogan-41. When paired with other Chinese ISR satellites, artificial intelligence to quickly identify objects, and networked communications systems, the PLA could possess near-real-time situational awareness of the vast Indo-Pacific theater. China is also courting foreign customers for its remote-sensing capabilities. In early 2023, the United States sanctioned Chinese companies Spacety and China HEAD Aerospace for providing imagery of Ukraine to Russia's Wagner Group. Though China has espoused neutrality in the Ukrainian conflict, this arrangement is an example of a Chinese entity providing direct support to Russian combat operations in Ukraine. Last year also witnessed progress by Chinese SOEs in the mass production and deployment of large satellite constellations in LEO. In November 2023, China is believed to have launched its first batch of satellites to test internet connectivity from space as part of a planned 13,000-satellite national LEO broadband constellation, GuoWang. Another 12,000-satellite constellation, G60 Starlink, saw its first satellites roll off the production line in December 2023. Deployments of both constellations are anticipated to start in 2024 and will provide broadband internet services akin to Starlink once operational. China maintains significant global SSA capabilities, which are required to maintain constant connectivity with its assets for basic on-orbit safety and collision avoidance, as well as to target satellites and employ counterspace weapons effectively. These capabilities include a fleet of ships equipped with radar tracking antennae, ground stations for satellite telemetry and tracking in China and more than a dozen other countries, and advanced communications equipment that assists in tracking SLV and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches and satellites. In 2023, a U.S. research institute reported that the PLASSF had established a new base focused on military SSA, called Base 37. This development suggests improvements to the PLA's ability to integrate data from ground- and space-based sensors, and units at this base will likely improve the PLA's ability to identify, track, and analyze foreign space objects and ballistic missile launches. The PLA also appears to be conducting training regarding how to evade collection by other countries' ISR satellites. Rendezvous and Proximity Operations: Previous iterations of CSIS's Space Threat Assessment have reported on unusual rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs) by Chinese satellites in GEO, last year highlighting the Shijian-21 (SJ-21) satellite, an experimental space debris mitigation satellite that latched onto and rapidly moved a defunct GNSS satellite. SJ-23, believed to be another experimental satellite, was launched into GEO in January 2023. Over the course of 2023 and into early 2024, SJ-23 and other Chinese spacecraft exhibited unusual behaviors in GEO, particularly in proximity to certain U.S. government and commercial satellites. For example, over several weeks in February 2023, SJ-23 and a U.S. Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) satellite appeared to move westward in GEO coincident with each other, covering about 100 degrees in longitude. In late 2023, a pair of Chinese satellites—Shiyan (SY) 12-01 and 12-02—appeared to move in synchronized yet opposite directions, apparently similar to maneuvers they did in 2022 after being approached by a U.S. government satellite. Such capabilities can contribute to space sustainability through orbital debris removal, but they can also serve as intelligence collectors and latent counterspace weapons. Spaceplane: On December 14, 2023, China launched the Shenlong spaceplane on a Long March 2F into LEO for a third mission. There are no indications that China's spaceplanes would act as counterspace weapons. However, Beijing's growing proficiency in complex RPOs, object releases, docking, and capture operations between spacecraft showcases the fundamentals necessary for an orbital ASAT capability. COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT China has demonstrated nearly every counterspace capability covered in this report, having fielded jamming and directed energy systems, demonstrated DA ASAT capabilities, and tested technologies relevant to on-orbit counterspace weapons systems. Additionally, China can conduct sophisticated cyber operations that target space and other important infrastructure. - Electronic Weapons: The PLA maintains a range of fixed and mobile EW systems targeting satellite communications, GNSS signals, and SAR satellites. In March 2023, Qantas and IFALPA issued warnings about Chinese warships engaged in radio signal and GPS jamming. - Cyber Operations: China has been implicated in cyberattacks against foreign satellite networks (NOAA, Indian networks). A notable Chinese cyber operation uncovered in 2023 was Volt Typhoon, targeting critical infrastructure in Guam and the U.S. including satellite communications. - Non-kinetic Weapons: China has multiple ground-based laser weapons capable of blinding or damaging optical satellite sensors, as observed at the Korla test site. - Kinetic Weapons: China possesses ground-based DA ASAT missile systems, continuing non-destructive testing of weapons that can reach LEO and GEO. RUSSIA Russia has had both successes and failures in space over the past year. A Russian attempt to land on the Moon failed in August 2023, with Luna-25 crashing into the lunar surface. Three Russian spacecraft supporting the ISS suffered coolant leaks in the last year. However, Russia successfully launched several civilian and military satellites and picked up new foreign launch customers (including the UAE and Malaysia). Arguably, the biggest revelation since the last report involves allegations that Russia is developing a nuclear-capable ASAT weapon that the United States says would violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. While Russian officials have outlined an ambitious space agenda, sanctions continue to block access to Western technology critical to Russia's ability to build modern satellites. The bedrock of Russian strength in space, including its counterspace capabilities, is Soviet-era technology and infrastructure. SPACE POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND ORGANIZATION Space plays a critical role in Russian military thinking, which has long emphasized "strategic aerospace operations" to counter U.S. air power and active defense frameworks. In October 2023, Russia warned that Western "quasi-civilian" satellites could be legitimate targets, following previous threats against Starlink. Roscosmos manages civil and human space programs, while the Russian Space Forces (part of the Russian Aerospace Forces) manage military space activities. SPACE CAPABILITIES Since the Soviet Union's dissolution, Russia has developed only the Angara rocket (maiden launch in 2014) alongside its workhorse Soyuz. Russia conducted 20 space launches in 2023. Satellite manufacturing processes remain slow and heavily dependent on Western electronics impacted by sanctions. Russia brought online a new radar-based SSA system, Razvyazka, near Moscow in 2023 and inaugurated an optical-electronic monitoring station in South Africa. COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT - In February 2024, the U.S. government confirmed Russia is developing a new space-based ASAT capability involving nuclear technology. - Russia's Luch/Olymp inspector satellites continue proximity operations near Western commercial and military communications satellites in GEO. - Russia maintains DA ASAT systems (tested in 2021) and ground laser systems (Peresvet). - Russia extensively uses EW jamming against GPS and SATCOM (including Starlink jamming attempts in Ukraine and GPS spoofing in the Baltic/Eastern Europe regions). FEATURED ANALYSIS: NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE Coined by American sociologist Diane Vaughan in her analysis of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, normalization of deviance refers to an environment in which people grow accustomed to and tolerant of what had previously been considered unacceptable behavior. Unsafe or aggressive practices become commonplace, increasing risks and leading toward catastrophe. In counterspace activities, a pattern has emerged indicating the normalization of certain disruptive behaviors: 1. Cyber Operations: Discoveries of nation-state cyber exploitations against space networks, defense industrial contractors, and teleports have become routine with little effective deterrence. 2. Unfriendly Behaviors in Space: Uncoordinated close-approach operations and inspector satellite maneuvering (e.g., Russian Luch/Olymp and Cosmos series, Chinese Shiyan and Shijian series) are becoming regular occurrences without clear international norms. 3. Jamming and Spoofing: Widespread, ubiquitous GNSS interference across conflict zones (Middle East, Eastern Europe, South China Sea) now routinely impacts commercial aviation and maritime safety, often without direct retaliatory consequences. INDIA India continues to expand its space activities, achieving a historic landing near the Moon's South Pole with Chandrayaan-3 in August 2023. India spent approximately $1.5 billion on civil space in 2023 and has plans to send astronauts to space by 2025 under the Gaganyaan program. India signed the Artemis Accords in June 2023 and is partnering with Japan and France on space initiatives. SPACE POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND ORGANIZATION Managed under the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Space Agency (DSA) and Defence Space Research Agency (DSRO) oversee military space operations and technology development. India has announced plans to launch and operate over 100 military satellites within the next seven to eight years to enhance national security and deterrence. COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT India demonstrated DA ASAT capability in March 2019 (Mission Shakti). While DSRO leadership has mentioned research into directed energy, lasers, EMP, and orbital weapons, no recent public tests or operational fielding have been disclosed. IRAN Under President Ebrahim Raisi, Iran has accelerated space and missile developments under a 10-year space plan. In January 2024, Iran conducted two successful orbital launches via Simorgh and Qaem 100 SLVs, deploying four satellites, alongside the September 2023 launch of Noor-3 by the IRGC Aerospace Force. Iran is also developing the new Sarir rocket and building a spaceport at Chabahar. COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT Iran relies heavily on cyber operations and electronic warfare. It actively conducts GPS spoofing and satellite signal jamming. It also operates the Cobra V8 electronic warfare system capable of interfering with space-based SAR sensors. Iran does not possess DA ASAT or orbital kinetic weapons. NORTH KOREA In November 2023, North Korea achieved its first successful satellite launch since 2016, placing the Malligyong-1 military reconnaissance satellite into orbit using the solid-fueled Chŏllima-1 SLV. Pyongyang has upgraded its Sohae Satellite Launching Station and deepened cooperation with Russia, trading munitions for Russian technical assistance. COUNTERSPACE ASSESSMENT North Korea has not demonstrated DA ASAT or orbital counterspace weapons. Its primary counterspace capabilities lie in mature cyber operations and electronic warfare, having resumed GPS jamming drills near South Korea in March 2024. OTHER COUNTRIES - Australia: Partnered with the U.S. and UK on the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) under AUKUS; signed a Technology Safeguard Agreement with the U.S. in October 2023. - France: Outlined plans in its 2024–2030 Military Programming Law for orbital counterspace systems, including FLAMHE (orbital laser) and BLOOMLASE (ground laser), and the YODA GEO active defense demonstrator planned for 2025. - Israel: Deployed GPS jamming/spoofing defensively in the Israel-Hamas conflict; demonstrated exo-atmospheric intercept capabilities with the Arrow missile defense system against a Houthi MRBM. - Japan: Released its first Space Security Initiative in June 2023; allocated ¥1 trillion ($6.7B) over 10 years to JAXA; confirmed U.S.-Japan treaty defense commitments extend to space attacks. - South Korea: Released its 4th Space Development Promotion Basic Plan, successfully launched KSLV-2 (Nuri) and its first military spy satellite, and founded KASA. - United Kingdom: Advancing its National Space Strategy, SkyNet 6 military communications, and DARC radar network participation. - Non-State Actors: Cyber hacktivist groups (e.g., GhostSec) and proxy actors utilize commercial jamming hardware and cyber exploits targeting satellite communications and GNSS receivers. FEATURED ANALYSIS: COALITIONS OF CONVENIENCE Geopolitical polarization has driven Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea into transactional partnerships to counter Western sanctions and technological isolation: - Sino-Russian Collaboration: Joint efforts on GNSS interoperability (GLONASS and BeiDou), the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), and mutual diplomatic alignment in the UN against Western space norms. - Russian Cooperation with Iran and North Korea: Russia exchanges missile and space technical assistance for Iranian drones and North Korean artillery and ballistic missiles used in the Ukraine conflict. WHAT TO WATCH & CONCLUSION Key trends to watch include: 1. Impacts to Public Safety from GNSS Interference: Expanding GPS jamming and spoofing risks disrupting commercial aviation and maritime navigation. 2. Pervasiveness of Cyber: Continued exploitation of satellite and ground networks for espionage and operational disruption. 3. Proliferation of Commercial SSA and In-Orbit Servicing: Commercial spacecraft conducting inspection, characterization, and rendezvous operations. 4. Geopolitical Vulnerabilities of Commercial Space: Ethical, operational, and regulatory dilemmas facing commercial satellite operators providing critical communications and imagery in active conflict zones. 5. Russian Nuclear ASAT Developments and Chinese Megaconstellations: Russia's pursuit of counter-constellation weapons and China's launch of GuoWang and G60 LEO broadband constellations. Conclusion: While kinetic DA ASAT tests have paused since 2021, space threats have diversified and moved into non-kinetic, electronic, cyber, and co-orbital domains. Ensuring space resilience requires enhanced space domain awareness, public-private partnerships, and proactive counterspace defense planning. ABOUT THE AUTHORS - Clayton Swope: Deputy Director of the Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS. Former lead for national security and cybersecurity public policy at Amazon's Project Kuiper, House of Representatives senior adviser, and 14-year CIA veteran. - Kari A. Bingen: Director of the Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow at CSIS. Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and Policy Director on the House Armed Services Committee. - Makena Young: Fellow with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS focusing on space security, international collaboration, and orbital debris. - Madeleine Chang: Horizon Fellow at CSIS Aerospace Security Project; background in satellite software engineering at Lockheed Martin. - Stephanie Songer: Research Intern with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS. - Jeremy Tammelleo: Research Intern with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS.