National Aeronautics and Hold for Release Until Space Administration Presented by Witness December 18, 2025 Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight United States House of Representatives Statement by: Dr. Daniel Evans, Assistant Deputy Associate Administrator for Research, Science Mission Directorate National Aeronautics and Space Administration HOLD FOR RELEASE UNTIL PRESENTED BY WITNESS 12/18/2025 Statement of Dr. Daniel Evans Assistant Deputy Associate Administrator for Research Science Mission Directorate National Aeronautics and Space Administration before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology United States House of Representatives Regarding Research Security: Examining the Implementation of the CHIPS and Science Act and NSPM-33 Good morning. I am Dr. Daniel Evans, Assistant Deputy Associate Administrator for Research and now Head of Research Strategy and Security in NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (SMD). As of November 17, 2025, SMD is the lead within NASA for all current and future activities associated with National Security Presidential Memorandum 33, Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Support Research and Development National Security Policy, and related activities such as those under the CHIPS and Science Act, P.L. 117-167. As such, I support Administration efforts to advance research security at NASA. NASA’s scientific and technical mission is unique among Federal agencies. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (“Space Act”) established NASA as a civilian Agency charged with “the preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere.” The Space Act also directed NASA to provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities and the results thereof and to cooperate with other nations in peaceful furtherance of Space Act requirements. As we push the frontiers of space and aeronautics in close collaboration with the private sector, we will spur new capabilities. For example, faster, safer space transportation; greater access to surface destinations; and new capabilities in space utilities and resource utilization will enable NASA’s future space missions, while also fostering growth and job creation in domestic industries. Aeronautics capabilities such as low-impact supersonic flight, as well as safer, cleaner, and faster aviation technologies will revolutionize commercial air transportation by reducing emissions from the aviation sector, improving efficiency and effectiveness for the traveling public, and ensuring that the United States remains the global leader in aerospace for decades to come. NASA recognizes the very nature of our mission, and the extremely important technical and intellectual capital produced makes the Agency’s information a valuable target. Therefore, protecting NASA’s people, its infrastructure, and our missions is a priority for the Agency and the country. In general, NASA focuses on the types and method of threats, as opposed to one specific country. However, real- 2 time threat information is shared with senior leadership throughout the Agency and employees based on their roles and missions within the Agency. Where appropriate, access to NASA resources and facilities will be and have been denied based on such information. RESEARCH SECURITY AT NASA NASA has built its leadership in research security upon a key strength: the close and longstanding links between NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (SMD) and our NASA-funded research communities. As managers of these relationships with universities, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), the aerospace industry, and others within our research ecosystems, SMD is well placed to support increased compliance and more sophisticated oversight of risks related to research security. Relying on these relationships to expand institutional oversight capacities is one of the most effective ways to ensure that our laws and policies regarding research security are met both in letter and spirit. Pursuant to Section 10631 of the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, NASA has established a strict prohibition against participation in Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs (MFTRP). Effective October 2024, NASA policy (NASA Grant and Cooperative Agreement Manual (GCAM)) requires all covered individuals supported by a NASA grant or cooperative agreement to actively certify – at the proposal stage and annually thereafter – that they are not a party to an MFTRP. This is a dual-layer verification system: individuals certify on their disclosure forms, and entities must separately attest in the NASA Solicitation and Proposal Integrated Review and Evaluation System (NSPIRES) that their researchers are compliant. This statutory firewall is enforced through the GCAM, helping prevent NASA funding from subsidizing the strategic goals of foreign competitors. NASA has moved aggressively to operationalize the requirements of National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33), fundamentally shifting our posture from one of administrative compliance to active research security vetting. In August 2023, we implemented a rigorous Financial Conflict of Interest policy (GCAM Sec. 29.7), requiring grant recipients to mitigate the impact of significant financial interests or disclose them to NASA for action. Building on this, as of October 2024, NASA fully adopted the government-wide Common Forms for Biographical Sketches and Current and Pending Support. These standardized disclosures are the bedrock of our transparency initiative and provide NASA with information that helps us to determine if a covered individual has a conflict of commitment that may impact their ability to faithfully implement grant-funded research. NASA faces specific and persistent challenges, and Congress has seen fit to address several of them, including statutory limitations on interactions with foreign entities of concern and nationals of countries of concern. To further operationalize these mandates, NASA and its Science Mission Directorate are developing a risk-based security review process. NASA is currently examining proposals in specific, high-priority technology areas for potential security issues. At the same time, we are simultaneously building out the broader analytical capability required to conduct these assessments at scale. This allows us to refine our risk assessment criteria, ensuring that our process is both rigorous and agile. NASA is also working with its federal partners to implement new statutory requirements. To meet the research security training certification requirements of CHIPS and Science Act § 10634, NASA is harmonizing the requirements of its training modules with those used by the National Science Foundation to ensure a consistent standard for researchers. We anticipate full implementation of this requirement in early 2026. Similarly, to enforce new Research Security Program (RSP) certification obligations for entities receiving over $50 million in federal research funding, NASA will issue its 3 requirements immediately following the finalization of an NSF-led interagency Memorandum of Agreement with a number of partnering Departments and agencies. This sequenced approach ensures that NASA’s standards are harmonized with government-wide protocols, minimizing administrative burden while maximizing security. NASA continues to work with other Federal partners to implement Agency requirements established by the CHIPS and Science Act and NSPM-33. NASA has been an active participant in the National Science and Technology Council’s (NSTC) Subcommittee on Research Security and has worked with Federal partners on new Federal funding disclosures and research training requirements for extramural proposing institutions, building on the work of the National Science Foundation, NSTC members, the witnesses at this hearing, and other partners in the Federal research enterprise. Furthermore, we collaborate closely with the intelligence community and counterintelligence officials to ensure our security practices are validated against the evolving national threat landscape. NASA seeks to support research security while meeting our mandate for international collaboration and maintaining an open research environment. And while this hearing focuses on NSPM-33, CHIPS Act compliance, and research security, NASA also works with its personnel contractors, and partners to identify and mitigate risks in several areas, including counterintelligence/counterterrorism, insider threats, communications security, foreign national access management, information, identity, credential, and systems access management, project protection planning, and systems security engineering. NASA is prepared to brief the Committee on these topics as requested. NASA contributes to our Nation’s economic competitiveness, fueling growth in American industry and supporting quality, high-paying jobs across the country. The economy of every U.S. state benefits from NASA activities. We work with small businesses, industry, academia, and other government agencies to address our research and engineering challenges, and to transfer out our technologies, capabilities, and data for public benefit. We approach this work with a clear objective: to maintain the United States’ strategic edge in science and technology, deliver broad public benefit, and do so fully in accordance with the law. Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I welcome your questions. 4