CONCEPT FUTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES Summary of the three Concept Papers: - Future of Ground Forces - Air Defence of the Future - General Concept for Cyber and Electromagnetic Capabilities Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft Confédération suisse Confederazione Svizzera Confederaziun svizra Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport DDPS Swiss Armed Forces Table of contents Concept – Future of the Armed Forces Foreword by the Chief of the Armed Forces - 3 1 Introduction - 4 2 Background information - 6 3 Strengthening the capabilities of the Swiss Armed Forces - 9 4 Nature of Conflicts - 11 5 Future of Ground Forces - 15 5.1 Tasks - 17 5.2 Required capabilities and means - 19 5.3 Implementation - 20 6 Future of Switzerland's Air Defence - 23 6.1 Tasks - 25 6.2 Required capabilities and means - 27 6.3 Implementation - 27 7 Global Concept for Cyber and Electromagnetic Capabilities - 31 7.1 Tasks - 32 7.2 Required capabilities and means - 34 7.3 Implementation - 34 8 Initial Findings from the War in Ukraine - 37 Since 24 February 2022, disturbing images have been reaching us from Ukraine: images of war, of massacres of civilians, of destruction of entire cities and of the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. These images convey immeasurable human suffering. The Russian invasion is not only a disaster for Ukraine, but has drastic and lasting effects on the whole of Europe. Russia's war of aggression against a sovereign, independent neighbouring country is a breach of international law and will undoubtedly remain a major lasting concern for us. Many illusions were shattered on 24 February: the certainty that borders between European states and their territorial integrity are inviolable, that disputes between states are settled peacefully and that the threat or use of military force never is a solution. The war in Ukraine has reminded many in Europe and Switzerland of the value of security. Many in Switzerland are asking themselves, whether the Swiss Armed Forces were capable of defending the country and its population in the event of an armed attack and whether they are adequately set up for the future. In recent years, the Swiss Armed Forces have devoted a great deal of time and energy to analysing on how they need to develop in order to continue to effectively fulfil their obligations in the future. They have assessed possible threats, developed scenarios, worked out concepts and carried out simulations. They have clear ideas that indicate the ways to further develop our military capabilities in a near future. The outcome of these considerations are put together in three concept papers: the 'Air Defence of the Future' (2017), the 'Future of Ground Forces' (2019), and the 'General Concept for Cyber and Electromagnetic Capabilities' (2022). The present brochure is a summary of these three concept papers. In a very condensed format, we present current concepts and provide an overview of plans and timeframes. This set of statements forms an important basis for current and future discussions on the strategic orientation of the Swiss military. The core mission of Swiss Armed Forces is and remains defence. Capability-based planning and procurement planning aim at modernising our military capabilities by taking into account the deterioration of the security situation over the past few years. Initial military findings from the war in Ukraine confirm the assessments made and the resulting requirements. At present, however, the war is still raging. We will continue to closely observe the ongoing course of hostilities and draw insights for the further development of Switzerland's own military. We must anticipate possible threats to our country and its population by drawing the right conclusions from what we see in the war in Ukraine as well as in any other conflict. Lt Gen Thomas Süssli Chief of the Armed Forces For years, the Swiss Armed Forces have been conducting detailed analysis of armed conflicts as well as other risks and threats to decide on how their own capabilities are best adapted. This analytical process began several years ago, long before the security situation in Europe began to deteriorate. Russia's attack on Ukraine has more than confirmed that wars in Europe cannot be ruled out and that consequently Switzerland and its Armed Forces must be prepared to be indirectly or even directly involved in an armed conflict. In the past few years, specific concepts have been developed that show how the Swiss military intends to counter current and future risks and threats. These considerations have been published in the form of concept papers that describe how military capabilities should evolve in the 2020s and 2030s and what expenditures will be required for this. Three concept papers were drafted: — Air Defence of the Future (2017), — Future of Ground Forces (2019) und — General Concept for Cyber and Electromagnetic Capabilities (2022). Even before Russia's attack on Ukraine, it was clear that Switzerland would need to upgrade its means of protection and defence against threats in and from the air, modernise its ground forces and strengthen its cyber defences. Both the 2021 security policy report and the three concept papers mentioned above stated that conventional weapons systems such as combat aircraft, tanks and artillery would continue to be used in future armed conflicts, complemented by other, sometimes more innovative means (e.g. cyber-attacks, drones). The following is a summary of the principles underlying the future orientation of Switzerland's Armed Forces. It shows the general direction that needs to be taken, although there are still lessons to be derived from the current war in Ukraine. DDPS General Concepts: The DDPS general concepts "Air Defence of the Future" (2017), "Future of Ground Forces" and "General Concept for Cyber and Electromagnetic Capabilities" (2022) make clear: The focus on current and future threats and the corresponding further development of the military capabilities are on track. The capabilities of the Armed Forces must be aimed in a more focussed way to the requirements of present and future conflicts, including threats from the cyber domain. To this end, the Armed Forces must cover a broad spectrum of capabilities. At the same time, they should be able to effectively fulfil protection and security tasks, provide assistance in the event of disasters or emergencies (such as pandemics) and – in the worst case – defend the country, its population and infrastructures. Since the end of the Cold War, the Swiss Armed Forces have gone through several major reforms (Armed Forces 95, 1995; Armed Forces XXI, 2004; Armed Forces Development, 2018) in order to adapt to the perceived new security environment. While the mobility of the military units was constantly improved, manpower decreased. In the first twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the military budget was reduced several times. In 1990, Switzerland invested some 1.4% of its GDP for military security; today this proportion is around 0.7%. A first shift took place some 10 years ago, as the annual budget for military defence started to increase again, from CHF 3.95 billion in 2010 to some 5 billion Swiss francs in 2021. The Armed Forces XXI reform of 2004 foresaw an improved security environment that would provide Switzerland a ten-year period to prepare for any potential military escalation. It was argued at the time that Switzerland could raise the level of readiness through a so-called ramp-up of its remaining defence skills once the security situation should deteriorate. In such a situation, stored equipment and, if possible, the purchase of additional weapon systems would provide the necessary capacities. Furthermore, already dismissed conscripts and additional recruits could be called to service in order to foster the Armed Forces' personal strength. As a result, Switzerland's defence capabilities were reduced with the aim to preserve relevant know-how and to follow relevant developments. In addition, the quick mobilisation system was abolished and logistics were redesigned, using economic principles. In 2016, the Swiss Parliament adopted the Armed Forces Development Programme (AFDP), which aimed to improve operational readiness, to focus on officer and NCO training, to increase equipment and weapons supplies, and to foster the regional anchoring of the military units. At the same time, the reserve was disbanded and the Armed Forces' command and control organisation was restructured. Implementation of the AFDP began in 2018 and will be completed by the end of 2022. In early 2022, it was also decided to transform the Armed Forces Command Support Organisation (AFCSO) into an Armed Forces Cyber Command by 2024 in order to be able to more effectively counter new threats in the cyber domain. The readiness of the Swiss military has improved steadily in recent years. The reintroduced quick mobilisation system allows to quickly call up, equip and deploy large numbers of troops at any moment. Switzerland's air policing intervention capability has also improved steadily. As of 31 December 2020, two armed combat aircraft remain on operational standby 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In recent years, the financial resources were used to cover the Armed Forces' operational costs and to focus investments on those missions that were considered as most likely. In addition, some capability shortfalls and improvements in certain areas were included, in particular short-range anti-tank defence, indirect fire support over short distances and tactical intelligence gathering. However, Switzerland has not yet implemented all measures needed to adequately defend the country against an armed attack. The Swiss Armed Forces must continue to evolve. This includes both the gradually closing of identified capability gaps and the inclusion of new trends and technologies. Several main combat systems used by the Armed Forces (e.g. the M109 field artillery introduced in the 1960s, the Leopard 2 main battle tank 87 or the Piranha armoured personnel carrier 93) were introduced during or immediately following the Cold War. Some of these vehicles have become practically obsolete under the conditions of a modern armed conflict. In the 2020s and 2030s, many of these systems will reach the end of their technical life cycle. In addition, many information technology systems in use today were developed in stovepipes and are about to become outdated. These developments are both a major financial challenge and an opportunity: future capabilities and systems can be aligned with the latest security, military and technical realities and trends. Based on current budget allocations, a total of some CHF 15 billion will be set aside for the purchase of new armaments over the next ten years: Some CHF 8 billion will be invested to purchase new combat aircrafts and a long-range ground-based air defence (GBAD) system. Some CHF 7 billion will be used to upgrade other military capabilities. In order to implement all these changes, military spending will increase by 1.4% per year in real terms from 2021 onwards. Despite these budget increases, the Swiss Armed Forces will need to set priorities with regard to capabilities and procurement: Priority have air and cyber defence capabilities. In the late 2020s and the 2030s, considerable funding will be allocated to upgrade the capabilities of the Ground Forces. Given the fiscal planning available, new systems will be procured gradually over a longer period. Additional financial resources would allow faster procurements and bigger volumes. «We intend to further develop our Armed Forces to a coherent, modern and integrated system: financially viable, able to recruit adequate personnel and capable of effectively countering the various threats and risks that the future might bring.» Major General Jean-Paul Theler, Head of Armed Forces Staff The planning cycle of the Armed Forces does not foresee to merely replace old weapon systems, but to modify the Armed Forces along new and future risks and threats. In recent years, the Swiss military has developed and applied several capability-based planning tools. This has given rise to a specific planning process for the post-2030 period, reflecting the three concept papers on the future of air defence, ground forces and cyber and electromagnetic capabilities mentioned earlier, approved by both the DDPS and the Federal Council. The internal Armed Forces planning process is designed to integrate new developments at any moment, including lessons from the current war in Ukraine. The procurement requests are submitted to Parliament on an annual basis in the form of a Dispatch on the Swiss Armed Forces ("Armed Forces Message"), based on military implementation plans approved by the Federal Council. The Dispatch covers the Armed Forces' needs with regard to procurement of new systems, real estate measures and the acquisition of other military equipment. If needed, the Federal Council could also request Parliament to adopt amendments to the Armed Forces Act or to the Ordinance on the Organisation of the Armed Forces. In order to allow a coherent military investment planning, the Federal Council intends in 2024 to present Parliament for the first time an outline on required military capabilities over a twelve-year period, including an investment plan. This new feature will provide Parliament a better view on the military planning and should facilitate decision-making. The Dispatch will also include a proposed financial framework for the new legislative period with corresponding budget appropriations for military equipment covering a four-year period. The budget appropriations relating to armaments and real estate, on the other hand, will continue to be requested on an annual basis. Capability Development Process: 1. REQUIREMENTS (1x/legislature): Security Policy Report (Defining Swiss security policy; Analysing global trends and specific threats and risks; Setting the contribution of security policy instruments to achieve objectives). 2. CAPABILITY PLANNING (Permanently): Defining fundamental principles guiding the Armed Forces; Determining and specifying required capabilities; Carrying out simulations. 3. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING (Permanently): Concept Papers (Determine ways required capabilities can be developed; Developing options to close capability gaps and develop new capabilities). 4. IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING (Yearly): Planning and management of investments; Adjusting capability requirements to available resources; Determine timing and level of investments. 5. ARMED FORCES DISPATCH (Yearly): Overall scope of Armed Forces' development; Proposing annual budget appropriations; Proposing decommissioning; Four-year financial framework (1x/legislature). Armed Forces have to prepare for current and future deployments. In the past, distinctions were usually made between conflicts using conventional or unconventional means and methods, between regular and irregular military forces and between symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare. The modern conflict, however, brings all these forms together. Aggressors often try to achieve their objectives without using military means openly. They avoid direct confrontation with the defender's armed forces as much as possible. Instead, diplomatic pressure, blackmail, propaganda, disinformation and cyber-attacks are used. The aim is to progressively destabilise a country, weaken its defence capabilities and to reach one's own objectives without resorting to the direct use of military power. Irregular combatants, armed groups, mercenaries or unmarked special operation forces often play an important role in such situations. They are able to perpetrate violent attacks against the population and security forces, perform acts of sabotage against critical infrastructures or occupy key terrain, all the while providing their sponsors with plausible deniability. Such indirect action was observed in Ukraine, for example, from 2014 onwards – prior to the escalation of hostilities at the end of February 2022 – during the occupation of Crimea by Russian special forces, during the low-threshold conflict in the Russian-backed separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as well as in the form of cyber-attacks and information operations. Countries increasingly obtain means to enforce their interests from a distance. In addition to political and economic pressure, there are military means to extort governments and force them into concessions; examples include cyber-attacks or distance weapons such as long-range drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or hypersonic weapons, potentially equipped with nuclear warheads. The mere threat of using such means is likely to cause considerable anxiety within the population and possibly compel the governments to buckle and make concessions. In addition, with Russia's open military attack against Ukraine the direct threat and use of conventional weapons by state actors in Europe has become a reality again. Armed forces may initially be used to intimidate a country by deploying military units across the border and thus building up a threatening backdrop. If intimidation is not enough, an aggressor may feel the need to create a pretext and attack directly. In order to disable the defender's means and impede freedom of movement, air strikes might be carried out over long distances. In addition, critical infrastructures such as command and control facilities, communication hubs, control or media centres might be destroyed using long-range guided missiles fired from aircraft, surface-to-surface systems, submarines or warships. Communications might be disrupted by means of electronic warfare or cyber-attacks. Finally, the use of ground forces serves to take possession of terrain, eliminate the defender's formations or support irregular combatants. In 2019, the DDPS released its report entitled, 'Future of Ground Forces', which was adopted by the Federal Council on 15 May 2019. This concept paper describes the Swiss Ground Forces' challenges and presents three possible options for their development. «Our Ground Forces can only fulfil their mission within a comprehensive joint military system and in coordination with our partners of the Swiss Security Alliance.» Major General René Wellinger, Chief of Land Forces The development of ground forces depends on both the nature of conflict and the environment in which they are deployed. This environment has changed considerably in Switzerland in recent decades. The steady growth of the residential population has led to a considerable growth of urban and suburban areas, especially on the Central Plateau and in mountain region valleys. The Armed Forces must therefore develop new methods to be successfully deployed in urban and suburban operations. This has implications for operational procedures and needed weaponry. Ground forces must be able to assist, protect and fight in a densely populated environment with small units simultaneously deployed in the same area as autonomously as possible. As a result, they need, inter alia, powerful networked sensors and very precise weaponry. It is also important for the Swiss military to be able to cooperate very closely with civilian authorities in their area of operations, especially with emergency services, border security and civil protection. Working in tandem with these partners, ground forces must conduct their operations in order to minimise their impact on the civilian population. A comprehensive attack by large mechanised units, supported by long-range artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, is possible in principle. However, such an attack is not likely to succeed due to the high degree of urbanisation and the limited number of efficient roads in central Switzerland. It is more likely that a military confrontation would be fought out in several contiguous actions involving smaller combat units. Technological progress also has an impact on combat operations. Many armed forces already use drones for surveillance, reconnaissance and positioning, especially in urban and suburban areas. Increasingly, attack drones are also being used to precisely engage targets from the air. It is expected that the development of drones will accelerate and that only a few years from now swarms of UAVs will be used to engage targets. In addition, unmanned ground systems are being developed. They are currently used for reconnaissance and explosive ordonnance disposal. However, it is possible that they will be used for targeted strikes. All of this has an impact on how ground forces will fight in the future, both in offensive and defensive operations. Technological developments affecting the use of ground forces be observed in other areas: sensor technology and artificial intelligence are constantly developing, the range of weapon systems is increasing and munitions are becoming more precise. Moreover, digitalisation is having a major impact on operational procedures, as operational pictures and command and control (C2) information is shared between units and command levels instantaneously. This greatly shortens decision-making cycles and thus significantly accelerates the operational tempo. The aim is to gain an information and decision superiority over an adversary. The pre-requisite for this is a technical network where information can be shared rapidly between command levels as well as between sensors, weapon systems and vehicles as well as, in certain cases, even to individual military personnel. Peacetime: In peacetime, Swiss Ground Forces are deployed to support civilian authorities, for example, in disaster relief or conference protection. Such missions usually last only a few days or weeks. In some situations, however, military units might be deployed for longer periods for protection tasks, e.g. to deter a terrorist threat. Increasing tensions: In situations of increasing tension, the Swiss Armed Forces might also be deployed primarily on a subsidiary basis for protection tasks. If decided by Government, the Ground Forces may transition from supporting civilian authorities to engaging in defence operations. In such a scenario, the protection of critical infrastructure is key. Since not all sites can be protected to the same extent, the Armed Forces must concentrate its units where the threat and risk is greatest, for example in densely populated areas, in areas where several critical infrastructures are concentrated or – if an armed attack becomes imminent – in areas near the border. In doing so, the deployed units must be able to hold their assigned positions, block main routes and – in close cooperation with the civilian authorities – take action against irregular combatants, armed groups and enemy special operation forces. If violence would reach a level that met the conditions of an armed conflict under international law, or if a state was to openly threaten the use of military force, further protection arrangements would have to be implemented and heavy troops be mobilised. The combat units would be formed on an operational basis, i.e. they would be provided with all the resources needed to accomplish their mission in a specific operational environment. The primary objective would be to support civilian authorities in order to protect infrastructures and, at the same time, to deter enemy forces deployed across the border from an armed attack. Armed conflict: Increased tensions could lead into an open armed conflict. In such cases, military infrastructures would become primary targets for the enemy, especially command and control sites, logistics centres and air force facilities. These would have to be fully protected, not only against attacks by enemy ground forces, but also against air strikes and cyber threats. In Switzerland, mechanised troops would quickly reach urban and suburban areas. This is partly because there is fewer and fewer open terrain – especially near the border – and partly because most targets are located in urban areas or can only be reached by going through them. If Switzerland's own combat units need to deploy over longer distances or carry out larger-scale counteroffensives, they would be exposed to great risks. An enemy equipped with modern and powerful means can easily spot them with satellites or drones and engage with long-range weapons. For this reason, combat units should mainly be deployed in preestablished positions where they can conduct an active defensive battle, i.e. stop enemy advances and engage the enemy through ambushes and local counterattacks. In doing so, they should use both indirect and direct fire to inflict as many casualties as possible on enemy forces so that they can no longer continue their attack. In an armed conflict, ground forces must use means that can effectively counter enemy attacks while at the same time act in a measured and precise manner, because the civilian population is probably still in the contested area. Capabilities of ground forces: - Integrated command and control: Coordinating combat, defence and support activities throughout the entire Armed Forces. - Joint digital C2: By use of a digitalised system sharing command and control information between command posts, vehicles, weapon systems and military personnel. - Intelligence: By various means (drones, cameras, infrared and thermal imaging equipment, etc.) obtaining information about various actors in a confusing and complex operational environment and condensing this into a real-time operational picture. - Protection: Protecting critical infrastructure against a wide range of threats (harden, surveillance, guard). - Intervention: In close cooperation with civilian security forces, neutralising irregular actors and infiltrated enemy special operations forces. - Combat: Combatting enemy forces at different ranges in a precise and scalable manner using autonomous, modular, lower tactical level forces in built-up areas. - Indirect fire: Supporting own combat units from decentralised positions with precise, indirect fire at different ranges. - Mobility and countermobility: Enabling the own freedom of movement while restricting the mobility of adversary forces. - Force protection: Protecting own forces against enemy action through mobility and specific protective equipment. Ground Forces have to be prepared for changing conflict environment and for operations in urban and suburban terrain (corresponds to Option 2 in the concept paper 'Future of Ground Forces'). In the event of increasing tensions, they should be able to effectively handle asymmetrical threats and prevent the situation from escalating. If this does not succeed, modular units must be able to transition quickly and flexibly from protection to combat tasks, without time-consuming regrouping of the C2 organisation. To achieve this, Ground Forces will be equipped to enable rapid assignment to specific missions. This includes all capabilities needed to carry out their tasks in a complex operational environment independently. The fleet of armoured vehicles should be standardised as much as possible. This will simplify command and logistics, especially when additional means are allocated to units. The aim is therefore to gradually replace the current fleet of armoured vehicles (i.e. the Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT) 87, the CV 9030 armoured combat vehicle (ACV) 2000, the remaining M113 armoured personnel carrier (APC) 63, as well as the ageing Piranha armoured personnel carrier (APC) 93) with new wheeled armoured vehicles that can be equipped with different weapon systems. This means that an identical basic vehicle type for different configurations will be equipped with different sensors, weapon systems or long-range guided weapons. The same vehicle type could, for example, be designed as a wheeled tank, armoured personnel carrier, command vehicle, heavy reconnaissance vehicle as well as an armoured vehicle for military engineers, a medical vehicle or logistics carrier. The combat support units (engineering, artillery) will also be equipped with standardised armoured platforms, which would greatly simplify vehicle fleets. The capability for medium-range indirect fire support will become more precise and mobile, which will greatly improve performance, and the range will be significantly extended (from just under 20 km to up to 50 km or more). With lighter, but still well protected mobile and versatile systems, the Armed Forces would be better equipped for today's operational environment, although the degree of protection of heavy units and their ability to assert themselves against conventional forces would be somewhat reduced. The ability to conduct mobile combat with mechanised units aside of roads will be largely abandoned. Such combat is becoming less feasible in Switzerland: first of all, the expected area of operations is more urban and densely populated, and secondly, many armed forces now have the capability to spot larger formations and weapon systems from a distance and are able to launch precision strikes against them using long-range air-to-ground and ground-to-ground weapons. In recent years, the Swiss Armed Forces have devoted significant funding to renew its ground systems. In particular, 12-cm and 8.1-cm mortars, shoulder-launched multi-purpose weapons with different ranges, thermal imaging devices and night vision equipment, new armoured vehicles for military engineers and a tactical intelligence gathering system have been purchased. All of these procurements are aligned with the new concept mentioned above. The renewal of ground systems will extend well into the 2030s. Given limited financial resources, there is a need to prioritise the capabilities to be maintained and further developed during this period. The first priority is to build up a digital network that enables information to be shared more quickly and thus to have a faster impact. Key factors here are command and control capabilities, including telecommunications, intelligence gathering capabilities and the ability to link all of these components and effectors together in a network. Without networked C2, it is not possible to properly coordinate the deployment of ground forces. New telecommunications systems were purchased already under the 2015 and 2020 armament programmes; further procurement steps are planned for the late 2020s and early 2030s. Effectiveness is the second priority: Swiss Ground Forces need be able to deploy troops adequately within a complex environment, i.e. to engage an enemy precisely at different distances and to minimise collateral damage. In addition to the already introduced shoulder-launched multi-purpose weapons, troops will require easily deployed weapon systems that can engage armoured vehicles at medium distances. In addition, artillery capabilities will be upgraded in the second half of the 2020s in order to assure support with indirect fire at medium distances (at least 50 km). To replace the M109 field artillery from the 1960s and early 1970s, a modern artillery system will be procured to provide greater range, mobility and precision. Protection and mobility are our third priority: Ground Forces must be able to evade enemy reconnaissance and firepower capabilities while simultaneously engage the enemy with their own fire. To achieve this, new armoured vehicles for command and control, intelligence gathering, as effectors and for logistics will be purchased in several stages from the mid-2020s until well into the 2030s. The current diversity of platforms will be reduced while mobility will be enhanced to accommodate for an increasingly urban operational environment. Due to the large number of armoured and protected vehicles and the limited financial resources, the vehicle fleets cannot be standardised on short notice. The only way to ensure that mechanised units can function cohesively at all times is to extend the life cycle of individual systems. With the 2020 Armed Forces Dispatch, the service life of the ACV 2000, which is the main system used by the armoured infantry, was extended into the 2040s. For its part, the Leopard 2 MBT 87 requires an overhauling of its steering components in the mid-2020s, without which these tanks will no longer be operational. By the end of the 2020s, a decision will then have to be made on whether the existing main battle tanks will be refurbished or replaced by a new system. In 2017, a group of experts appointed by the head of the DDPS, released a report entitled 'Air Defence of the Future'. This concept paper described ways for the Swiss Armed Forces to develop their capabilities beyond the mid-2020s. The four options proposed aimed to protect the population from airborne threats and ensure the continued deployment of ground forces in the coming decades. This concept paper formed the basis for procurement of a new combat aircraft and a long-range ground-based air defence (GBAD) system. It also includes proposals to bolster future airspace protection capabilities and discusses the decommissioning of existing assets. «Air policing is essential in maintaining the security of Swiss airspace on a daily basis. However, the actual purpose of the Air Force is to protect and defend the population and ground forces from a wide range of threats from the air.» Major General Peter Merz, Chief of Air Force Switzerland aims to protect its territory and population from threats in and from the airspace in peacetime and during periods of increasing tensions or in an armed conflict. Any uncontrolled airspace over an area of operations limits the possibilities to deploy ground forces considerably, as these forces would be reconnoitred and engaged with guided or cruise missiles from a great distance. While terrain plays a less important role in the protection of airspace than for ground forces, the enormous technological progress is a major consideration. Modern combat aircraft have very powerful sensors, long-range and precise guided weapons and advanced electronic warfare technologies. Their ability to data fusion and information sharing with other systems is crucial. Ground-based air defence systems have also continuously evolved in recent years. Systems of different ranges are now deployed – together with combat aircraft – as part of a network. They can be used to counter not only military aircraft and combat helicopters, but also cruise missiles and drones, and in some cases ballistic missiles. Due to rapid technological progress and continuous proliferation, a wide range of means and operational possibilities have to be considered for both current and future conflicts. Threats in and from airspace remain a crucial concern, as an increasing number of non-state actors are able to deploy weapons over greater distances. The military use of airspace is therefore of paramount importance and an increasing number of states in Europe are modernising and upgrading their air force capabilities. Peacetime: In peacetime, the Swiss Air Force is responsible for the permanent airspace surveillance. Civil and military radars are used for this purpose, including radar data from combat aircrafts. The latter is also used to detect air vehicles in valleys and provide a more precise recognised air picture. However, airspace surveillance alone does not suffice: it must also be possible to enforce the own sovereignty and compliance with air traffic regulations. For this reason, combat aircrafts patrol the airspace, assist airplanes in distress and intervene if air vehicles use Swiss airspace without permission or fail to heed instructions from air traffic controllers. Increasing Tensions: In cases of risks such as a terrorist attack, an imminent air strike or increased international tensions near Swiss borders, the Swiss Air Force is required to intensively patrol Swiss air-space with its combat aircrafts and to counter any possible airspace violations. Such situations may last several weeks or months. Intensified protection of airspace during weeks or even months might also be needed in the event of armed conflicts erupting close to Switzerland. As a neutral state, Switzerland has to ensure that parties to an armed conflict do not use Swiss territory. In addition, unauthorised crossings and potential flyover bans have to be enforced by the Air Force, requiring respective means. Increased protection of airspace is particularly necessary if an armed conflict were to occur in the immediate vicinity or if Switzerland were directly threatened by military force. Such a crisis would very likely affect not only Switzerland, but also neighbouring countries. In such cases, Switzerland would presumably have to contribute to the security of Europe, or at least to be able to protect its own airspace. Swiss Air Force requirements take into account the need to protect Swiss airspace during periods of increasing tensions. The required number of combat aircraft (only jets are suitable for such tasks) is not measured in terms of day-to-day air policing, but rather in terms of how well and for how long Switzerland is able to maintain air sovereignty in the event of prolonged tensions and to control the airspace at the beginning of an armed conflict. The more efficient and numerous our own resources are, the more credible deterrence becomes. This, in turn, diminishes the likelihood that Swiss airspace will be violated and that Switzerland will be drawn into a conflict. Armed Conflict: If Switzerland is directly attacked in an armed conflict, the Air Force will defend the population and critical infrastructure. At the same time, it will support ground forces. Combat aircraft and ground-based air defence systems of different ranges complement each other: With ground-based air defence, areas and sites might be protected on a continuous basis, thus relieving some of the burden placed on combat aircraft. The latter can then remain on quick reaction alert on the ground and only be engaged as needed. Conversely, combat aircraft are flexible and can be deployed anywhere. Switzerland does not have adequate resources to maintain a completely autonomous air defence system capable of countering concentrated attacks from a powerful adversary. However, any military attack on Switzerland might nullify its neutrality obligations. In such case, Swiss air defence could coordinate with other countries, provided the political will of Switzerland and respective states. In an armed conflict, the Air Force must be able to support ground forces by providing air-borne reconnaissance and carrying out air-to-ground fires. Air reconnaissance is used to gather information about sites and enemy positions. Information obtained from combat aircraft serves to complement intelligence obtained by other means, such as drones or satellites. In air-to-ground operations, precision strikes are carried out e.g. against artillery systems, guided missile positions or combat helicopters still on the ground. Precision strikes from the air – like indirect fire from artillery systems, but at greater distances – deter enemy forces from deploying personnel and equipment before they can engage directly with Swiss troops or before they are able to attack civilian infrastructure using long-range offensive capabilities. Required capabilities: - Command and Control (C2): With joint digital command and control, seamlessly sharing information between tactical operation centres and air- and ground-based systems. - Recognised air picture: Using mobile sensors to detect and identify airborne objects and displaying them in a recognised air picture. - Air policing: Using combat aircraft to intercept, identify, escort and force manned and unmanned aircraft to land and, if necessary, engage them. In the case of enhanced air policing missions, using additional aircraft and ground-based air defence to intervene where needed. - Integrated air defence: Using combat aircraft and ground-based systems in a coordinated fashion to engage manned and unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, guided weapons and ballistic missiles. - Airborne reconnaissance: Obtaining information from the air on objects and enemy troop movements on the ground. - Air-to-ground fires: precisely engaging ground targets while avoiding collateral damage and, once weapons have been deployed, delivering an initial battle damage assessment. - Drone defence: Detecting, identifying, repelling and engaging small drones in a defined operational area. In order to fulfil its mission, the Swiss Air Force would need around forty high-performance combat aircrafts alongside ground-based air defence systems of varying ranges (following evaluation, a conclusion was drawn that 36 F-35A combat aircraft were needed). These resources might enable Switzerland to police its airspace on a daily basis (including 24-hour intervention capability) and maintain air sovereignty during periods of increasing tensions lasting several weeks at a time. If an armed conflict erupts, the Air Force might also prevent an enemy from achieving air superiority for a limited period of time and within a limited area over Switzerland. Precise air-to-ground fire requires developing a limited capability, including the procurement of a small quantity of precision munitions for training purposes. The amount of munitions could be increased if the security situation deteriorates further. With long-range ground-based air defence, it should be possible to protect an area of around 15,000 km² in total in at least two separate areas in Switzerland's upper airspace. This corresponds roughly to the area of the Swiss Plateau with its populated areas. The system should reach an operational altitude of just over 12 kilometres and an operational range exceeding 50 kilometres. The system must enable interception of military aircraft, drones and cruise missiles in relevant areas. In addition to this, long-range ground-based air defence should also be able to intercept and destroy short-range ballistic missiles. As far as lower Swiss airspace is concerned, there are at least six smaller, particularly important sites (e.g. military airbases, military logistics centres, and critical civilian infrastructure) that require close-range protection from air threats. At the same time, short- to medium-range systems are needed to counter combat helicopters, drones and cruise missiles. This is a particularly important means of protecting Switzerland's own ground forces and military infrastructure against enemy attacks from the air. In order to protect Swiss airspace, a comprehensive system is needed. This includes C2 and communication systems, sensors and effectors (i.e. combat aircraft and ground-based air defence). This complex system must continuously be kept at an adequate technological level, which means regular replacement, refurbishment and upgrading. The various components of the existing and soon to be 20-year-old Florako airspace surveillance and mission control system have been replaced or refurbished in recent years. This means that the system can remain operational for the time being and complete replacement can be postponed until around the second half of the 2030s. With the 2017 Armed Forces Dispatch, the life cycle of the F/A-18 was extended by five years, until around 2030. This should prevent a gap in airspace protection between the decommissioning of the F/A-18 and the introduction of the new combat aircraft. The renewal of air defence capabilities is centred on the procurement of new combat aircraft and a long-range ground-based air defence (GBAD) system. Both procurements were closely coordinated from the outset. With the 2022 armament programme, the Federal Council requested the procurement of thirty-six F-35A combat aircraft and five fire units of the Patriot ground-based air defence system. Threats at short range are covered by the 35mm anti-aircraft artillery system combined with shoulder-launched Stinger anti-aircraft guided missiles, which were purchased in the early 1990s. This capability needs to be replaced by the end of the 2020s. At the same time, new means of attack have opened up additional vulnerabilities that need to be closed. The threat of cruise missiles and drones has grown, which underscores the importance of using medium-range ground-based air defence to engage such targets. These systems can also increase the deterrent effect of F-35A combat aircraft and Patriot system. Unlike long-range ground-based air defence, such systems might also be used in combination with fighter jets as a means of protecting conference sites from airborne threats, for example. One key area for Air Force investments is drone technology. Part of this R&D push is to find ways to defend against drones of different sizes: large high-altitude drones can be intercepted by combat aircraft and ground-based air defence. In contrast, there is still no effective defence system to counter smaller-sized drones. In 2020, the Swiss military launched an R&D project to develop defensive procedures against mini drones. At the same time, Swiss Armed Forces have been actively using drone technology itself for over 25 years. Under the 2015 armament programme, the Armed Forces purchased six Hermes 900 HFE reconnaissance drones. These are high-flying drones equipped with daylight and thermal imaging cameras. For some years now, combat and rescue forces have also been using mini-drones to reconnoitre the immediate vicinity of their areas of operation. In 2017, the DDPS created a specialist unit, the Swiss Drone and Robotics Centre (SDRC), to address the opportunities and risks of unmanned systems. In 2022, the DDPS published the "General Concept for Cyber and Electromagnetic Capabilities", accepted by the Federal Council on 13 April 2022. This concept paper describes the cyber, electromagnetic and IT capabilities required by the Swiss military. The aim is to improve the Armed Forces' ability to withstand attacks from the cyber and electromagnetic domain and to make even more effective use of new military support options. The concept paper lays the foundation for the digitalisation of the Swiss Armed Forces. Implementation is expected to take place in stages until the 2030s. «Cyber and electromagnetic capabilities are crucial in providing the Armed Forces with an information and decision superiority in every possible situation. This is key for success of our commanders and troops.» Major General Alain Vuitel, Head of Cyber Command Project The military cyber domain includes all IT and IT-equipped weapons systems used and operated by the Swiss Armed Forces as well as the data processed in these systems. A large portion of these data is transmitted by radio waves, which propagate in the electromagnetic domain; electronic warfare capabilities make it possible to locate the corresponding transmitters and disrupt or block the transmission of raw data and information. Actions in the cyber and electromagnetic domain are an integral part of modern warfare. They might be used to prepare a physical attack, but also to disrupt or disable infrastructures and systems. In preparation for and in support of military action, cyber and electromagnetic activities often occur months or weeks before ground and air operations. These activities include eavesdropping, disrupting and disabling military and civilian communication networks, interfering with supply and control systems and launching disinformation campaigns. However, a pure cyber war is unlikely. In order to maintain its C2 capabilities, the Swiss Armed Forces must comprehensively protect themselves against cyber threats while nevertheless tapping into the full potential of digitalisation. Cyber capabilities are not only essential when tensions flare or armed conflicts erupt, they are also needed in peacetime: cyber-attacks occur every day, anonymously and from every possible location. The rapid pace of technological progress and system development poses a major challenge. The civilian sector is the actual driver of change, with numerous technological innovations. For the Armed Forces, it is essential to monitor these developments and to be able to continuously adapt defence measures according to the constantly emerging threats resulting from technological progress. Peacetime: In peacetime, the Armed Forces must protect themselves first and foremost against cyber-crime and espionage, but also against actions taken in the cyber domain to prepare for possible future attacks. The aim here is to maintain constant readiness and safeguard the command and control capabilities as a first line of defence. The legal remit also includes other subsidiary cyber and electromagnetic activities (e.g. COMINT). Increasing Tensions: In some cases, increasing tensions may already be seen in the cyber domain long before the situation in other operational domains intensifies. Actors often strive to remain undetected for as long as possible and to achieve their objectives without resorting to open violence. Cyber-attacks and actions in the electromagnetic domain are ideal instruments, as they work from a distance and are difficult to identify. In the event of increasing tensions, the Armed Forces' cyber teams would probably be deployed to a large extent. They would handle the military's cyber defence, working with the same specialists who operate the military information and communication systems in peacetime. As far as the electromagnetic domain is concerned, in times of increased tensions, the aim would be to recognise backdoors that an adversary could use for attacks and to shut these down if necessary. It would also be important to allocate separate frequencies, monitor radio systems and eliminate interference. Depending on the enemy's actions and the possible evolution of the situation, system readiness may need to be raised. Finally, it would also be important to detect radio interference against our own systems (e.g. in the vicinity of an airfield) and to take protective and defensive measures. Armed Conflict: Actions in the cyber domain can significantly complement, support and reinforce the combat power of ground and air forces. They make it possible to gather information and to disrupt or disable weapons or C2 systems with pinpoint accuracy over long distances. In the electromagnetic domain, the Armed Forces would in particular attempt to restrict or disable adversary technical C2 capabilities during an armed conflict by disrupting or disabling the enemy's radio traffic. Unlike the use of conventional weapons, there is no direct physical collateral damage linked to cyber resources and means of electronic warfare. These means are therefore well suited for proportionate operations in urban and densely populated areas. Moreover, as action in the cyber and electromagnetic domains take place from a distance, they are relatively low-risk for our own troops. Required capabilities: - Force protection: Protecting military units, systems, infrastructures, raw data, information and networks against threats from both the cyber and electromagnetic domains. - Situational awareness: By automation, digitalisation and data science generating a common operational picture as well as needs-based individual operational pictures. - Robust and secure data processing: Operating a closed and expandable ICT infrastructure while constantly maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data. - Organisational and technical enabling of joint C2: Providing timely and sufficiently detailed information to various command levels and partners. - Action in the electromagnetic domain: Carrying out active and passive measures to interfere with enemy radio transmission and denying access to the electromagnetic domain. - Action in the cyber domain: Preventing enemy forces from gaining information and decision superiority while at the same time impairing or completely disabling enemy weapon systems. In the future, the Swiss Armed Forces must be able to protect themselves against the full range of attacks from the cyber and electromagnetic domains (corresponds to Option 3 in the corresponding concept paper). To achieve this, the required high-performance capabilities should be concentrated within a specialised battalion. At the same time, key infrastructures will be protected in a decentralised manner by assigning resources from the cyber battalion or subordinating these resources to other units of the Armed Forces (or to civilian partners if needed). Being able to actively defend against cyber threats is an advantage. Many weapon systems have built-in components, e.g. the C2 systems of the enemy's long-range artillery or ground-based air defence make use of the cyber domain and are therefore exposed to the risk of cyber-attacks. The Swiss Armed Forces intend to develop the ability to plan and carry out offensive operations against such military targets. In order to take passive and active measures in the electromagnetic domain, most Swiss battalions and companies will be prepared for independent operations and equipped with easily deployable systems for this purpose. This will allow them to independently suppress the enemy's radio-based data communications in their area of operations and disrupt the enemy's C2 capability even at tactical level. During operations, combat units will thus be able to largely compensate for the lack of their own cyber means. For larger operations in the electromagnetic domain, a small number of specialised units should be formed or expanded in a manner similar to the two existing EW batallions. The Armed Forces have already significantly upgraded their cyber capabilities in recent years. The number of cyber specialists within the Military Administration has risen steadily over the past few years; the number in the units of the Armed Forces is set to nearly triple in the coming years and should reach around 600 military personnel. Since 2018, a 40-week cyber training course for young people has been running. Moreover, regular investments in data centres, in the Swiss Command and Control Network and in other communication and command systems have resulted in an overall improvement of cyber defence capabilities on the technical side as well. In the coming years, capabilities in the cyber and electromagnetic domains will continue to improve. The first step will be to expand centrally managed capabilities as well as the services provided to the Armed Forces as a whole (e.g. defence against cyber-attacks). The second step will be to expand decentralised capabilities of battalions and companies by changing the structure of military units and bolstering their information and communication needs. The third and final step will be to develop capabilities to carry out cyber operations against military targets. At the same time, the ground forces will be provided with the means of taking action in the electromagnetic domain. As they do with every armed conflict, the Swiss Armed Forces are conducting detailed analysis of the war in Ukraine and drawing conclusions for their own development. More indepth lessons will still need to be learnt. Based on observations thus far, however, it is clear that the Armed Forces are on track with their three concept papers. «Every war has its own distinctive features. Recognising trends is important in order to anticipate future conflicts.» Brigadier General Daniel Krauer, Head of Military Intelligence Service As the war in Ukraine is still developing, it is impossible to comprehensively evaluate all aspects from a military perspective. That said, our initial findings indicate that the Swiss Armed Forces are on track with their current plans, particularly with regard to the coordination of various services; the ability to share information over a digitalised network; ensuring protected mobility of ground forces in urban areas; the importance of air defence in maintaining operational command for the entire Armed Forces; and the heavy emphasis placed on a robust cyber defence. The war in Ukraine is a military confrontation between two regular armed forces: It is a conventional conflict spanning all operational domains, where both sides are using both symmetrical and asymmetrical means and methods. Future armed conflicts in Europe are likely to take a variety of forms, ranging from air strikes over longer distances without significant land-based operations to conflicts fought primarily by state-supported irregular actors. The threat of terrorism, which still exists, should not be overlooked either. In order to be able to counter a multitude of different threats, the Swiss Armed Forces must be robustly positioned with a broad range of capabilities. As things stand today, the Swiss military is on the right track with the concepts described in the three concept papers. Land: Since the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, various forms of land-based operations have been observed: rapid strikes using light infantry units as well as mechanised attacks where main battle tanks are supported by combat aircraft, drones, helicopters, artillery and infantry. The Ukrainian defenders have used different tactics and means to counter these attacks: light, mobile units armed mainly with portable anti-tank weapons, for example, have applied hit-and-run tactics against the advancing enemy and its supply lines; there were also mechanised units that counterattacked with artillery and drone support. As in previous armed conflicts, the war in Ukraine shows that reconnaissance is a decisive factor. The use of reconnaissance to anticipate enemy operations is crucial, particularly for an outnumbered defender, as this provides the means to stop and repel the attacker in time. The key prerequisites for an effective defence include functioning logistics and adequate stockpiles (munitions, material, supplies, etc.). The defensive achievements of the Ukrainian military have thus far been more successful than expected thanks mostly to the support provided by the United States and Europe, which have constantly supplied Ukraine with armaments, particularly anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft systems, artillery pieces and large quantities of munitions. Air: Despite its qualitative and quantitative inferiority, the Ukrainian air force managed to prevent Russia from gaining air supremacy over the entire territory of Ukraine for several months. That said, the destruction of two aircraft factories has made the maintenance and upkeep of Ukrainian combat aircraft, all of which are still of Soviet production, very difficult. The airspace over certain areas is protected mainly by Ukraine's ground-based air defence system, which is highly mobile and regularly engages Russian military aircraft. After several months, the Russian air force has still not succeeded in effectively countering or destroying Ukraine's medium- and long-range ground-based air defences. This is despite the fact that Russia actually possesses adequate resources in the area of operations to do so. The concept described in the report 'Air Defence of the Future' matches the previous observations of the air war in Ukraine. Ukrainian air defence has so far proven effective even against Russia's air force, which is massively superior in size. The Ukrainian side seems to be holding back its combat aircraft and other flying assets so that they remain available for decisive action in a protracted conflict. At the same time, ground-based assets were heavily used to defend Ukrainian airspace in the first weeks of the conflict. For Switzerland, it is clear that in addition to planned procurement of new combat aircraft and longer-range ground-based air defence, there will also be a need for medium-range ground-based air defence in order to protect against long-range weapons and cruise missiles and to ensure resilience. In addition, short-range systems will be required as a means of countering enemy air forces, in particular mini drones, combat helicopters and fighter jets flying at low altitudes above our ground forces. This integrated air defence is described in the concept paper on the future of Switzerland's air defence; the corresponding acquisitions are planned. Cyber: The war in Ukraine is being waged using a variety of means, including civilian telecommunications. The conventional fighting on the ground and in the air is also accompanied by an intensive cyber war, which had already begun long before the invasion and which intensified considerably in the weeks leading up to 24 February. Russian attacks have so far been directed in particular against state institutions, critical infrastructure, the Ukrainian Armed Forces and not least against the civilian population: a number of cyber-attacks against the Ukrainian energy supply as well as against government and banking services are known to the public. On the morning of the first day of the attack, there was also a cyber-attack on a satellite communication provider, which also caused collateral damage in Western Europe. Russia is undoubtedly a major cyber power. The country has had significant defensive and offensive cyber capabilities for some time. Moreover, it is likely to be supported by several groups of non-state patriotic hackers and hacktivists. Despite this, Russia has so far failed to achieve any outstanding cyber warfare successes. Both warring parties use a variety of civilian and military means of communication, firstly to disseminate information (including their own narratives) on the internet, and secondly to conduct military operations. For Ukraine, it is essential that the government and the armed forces have access to functioning communication networks and solid strategic communication intelligence. These capabilities are vulnerable to Russian cyber-attacks and electromagnetic interference. Accordingly, the country attaches great importance to effective protective measures. Without effective cyber defence and electronic warfare capabilities, Ukraine would hardly have been so effective in repelling the Russian attack. The course of the war confirms that networking sensors and effectors is crucial when it comes to successfully carrying out military operations. For this, cyber and electromagnetic capabilities are crucial. The faster we are able to assess and merge data obtained by satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, drones or other sources into a comprehensive operational picture, the more precisely and quickly targets can be engaged. This makes it possible to achieve considerable effect with relatively limited resources. Impressum Editor: Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) Editorial Office: Armed Forces Staff (AFS) Premedia: Armed Forces Digital Media Centre AFDM, 81.325 e Copyright: 05.2022, DDPS Internet: www.armee.ch