December 2020 Universities and the Chinese Defense Technology Workforce CSET Issue Brief AUTHORS Ryan Fedasiuk Emily Weinstein CENTER for SECURITY and EMERGING TECHNOLOGY Table of Contents Executive Summary ...............................................................................................3 Introduction ............................................................................................................5 Methodology and Scope .....................................................................................6 Part I: China’s Defense Companies Recruit from Civilian Universities...............9 Part II: Some U.S. Tech Companies Indirectly Support China’s Defense Industry................................................................................................................ 13 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 17 Acknowledgments.............................................................................................. 18 Appendix I: Chinese Universities Included in This Report ............................... 19 Appendix II: Breakdown by Employer ............................................................. 20 Endnotes.............................................................................................................. 28 Executive Summary Since the mid-2010s, U.S. lawmakers have voiced a broad range of concerns about academic collaboration with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but the most prominent have been about China’s strategy of military-civil fusion (MCF). One concern holds that Chinese university students or graduates may come to the United States on exchange programs or for postgraduate education, then return and contribute to China’s military modernization. To address this concern, U.S. policymakers must first understand which forms of collaboration, and with which Chinese universities, pose the greatest risk to U.S. research security. This report examines 2019 graduate employment data from 45 elite Chinese universities, in addition to Ministry of Education documents, which list collaborative training projects between private companies and Chinese universities. Key findings include the following: • Chinese defense state-owned enterprises (SOEs) directly hired a combined 6,000 graduates from 29 leading Chinese universities in 2019. • China’s defense SOEs tend to recruit far more graduates completing advanced degree programs than those finishing baccalaureates. • Three quarters of graduates recruited by defense SOEs come from China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense,” a group of universities administered directly by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. • From 2018–2019, 13 U.S. technology companies established collaborative training programs with the Seven Sons. These projects primarily involved training faculty and developing course curricula related to machine learning, big data, and integrated circuit design. China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense” include the following universities: • Beijing Institute of Technology • Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics • Harbin Engineering University • Harbin Institute of Technology • Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics • Nanjing University of Science and Technology • Northwestern Polytechnical University • U.S. tech companies may inadvertently aid China’s military modernization through their subsidiaries’ relationships with defense-affiliated universities. Our findings confirm that the Seven Sons of National Defense are important feeders for China’s military and defense industry. However, it appears that the vast majority of civilian universities in China maintain at least some connection to the country’s defense industry. Furthermore, despite the risks of collaborating with universities so closely tied to China’s defense industrial base, we find that several prominent U.S. technology companies have established close working relationships with the Seven Sons and other defense affiliated universities in China. Documents from the Chinese Ministry of Education indicate that the Seven Sons have benefited from training programs and partnerships with the China-based subsidiaries or joint ventures of Autodesk, Dell, Google, Honeywell, IBM, Intel, Merrill Lynch, Microsoft, National Instruments, Rockwell Automation, Synopsys, Tektronix, and Texas Instruments. Introduction In recent years, the U.S. government has sought to limit U.S. research institutions’ exposure to China’s defense industry. Despite mounting concerns around U.S.-China collaboration, however, U.S. policymakers recognize that placing blanket limitations on Chinese universities with any connections to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would incur major costs for the U.S. research enterprise. The United States needs a targeted approach to research security. Recent policy decisions such as Presidential Proclamation 10043 have placed selective restrictions on Chinese students and researchers with clear ties to China’s MCF strategy. U.S. policymakers and university administrators are asking which forms of engagement, and with which Chinese universities, may unwittingly aid in China’s military modernization. To inform that question, this study highlights relationships between certain leading Chinese universities and the PRC defense industry, based on how many graduates they supply to defense SOEs. We find that a select group of universities, China’s Seven Sons of National Defense, contribute the lion’s share of new hires at Chinese defense SOEs. Beyond defense SOEs, Appendix I also details how many graduates joined the PLA, as well as the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), China’s leading nuclear weapons lab. Table 1. Chinese Universities with the Most 2019 Graduates Employed by Major Defense Companies Name | Name (Chinese) | No. of 2019 Grads Employed by Chinese Defense SOEs | Portion of Employed Graduates Working at Chinese Defense Companies | Member of “Seven Sons of National Defense” Northwestern Polytechnical University | 西北工业大学 | 963 | 26% | Yes Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (Beihang University) | 北京航空航天大学 | 833 | 24% | Yes Beijing Institute of Technology | 北京理工大学 | 767 | 17% | Yes Harbin Engineering University | 哈尔滨工程大学 | 753 | 24% | Yes Harbin Institute of Technology | 哈尔滨工业大学 | 581 | 13% | Yes Nanjing University of Science and Technology | 南京理工大学 | 416 | 13% | Yes Xi'an Jiaotong University | 西安交通大学 | 241 | 6% | No Tianjin University | 天津大学 | 229 | 4% | No Dalian University of Technology | 大连理工大学 | 191 | 3% | No Shanghai Jiaotong University | 上海交通大学 | 153 | 3% | No Total: Top Ten Universities: 5,127 graduates employed by Chinese defense SOEs Source: Chinese universities’ 2019 employment quality reports. Methodology and Scope Universities in China publish yearly graduate employment quality reports (毕业生就业质量报告), which detail how many of their graduates find jobs after graduation, and where. We looked at employment data published by a group of 45 leading universities: all 42 “Double First Class” (双一流) universities, and the remaining three Seven Sons of National Defense (国防七子).* * We added Harbin Engineering University, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and Nanjing University of Science and Technology, which are not considered Double First Class universities, but which are three of China’s Seven Sons of National Defense. • Double First Class Universities are a group of 42 elite Chinese universities that the Chinese government believes have the potential to become world-class universities with world-class curricula (hence the name Double First Class). As a result of their status, these universities receive preferential treatment and access to greater resources from the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance. • The Seven Sons of National Defense are a group of seven universities with historical ties to China’s defense industry. They are directly administered by the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (国家国防科技工业局; SASTIND), and their academic disciplines focus predominantly on science and technology with dual-use applications. Four of the Seven Sons—Northwestern Polytechnical University, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing Institute of Technology, and Harbin Institute of Technology—are also considered Double First Class Universities. A full list of the 45 universities considered in this report can be found in Appendix I. Of the 45 elite universities we considered for analysis, 29 published data detailing how many of their graduates went to work at specific companies. Collectively, these 29 universities produced 250,000 graduates in 2019, of whom 141,000 had secured post-graduation job contracts. This paper focuses on their career moves—specifically, how many took jobs at China’s state-owned defense companies, outlined in Table 2. Table 2. China’s State-Owned Defense Companies Company | Year Established | No. of Employees | Key Areas | Subject to U.S. Export Controls? Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC; 中国航空发动机集团) | 2016 | 96,000 | Aircraft engines and materials | No Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC; 中国航空工业集团公司) | 1951; reorganized in 2008 | 450,000 | Aviation weapons and equipment, military transport aircraft, helicopters, airborne systems, general aviation, aviation R&D | Yes China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC; 中国航天科工集团有限公司) | 2002 | 150,000 | Aerospace defense, commercial aerospace, industrial internet, smart industries | Yes China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC; 中国航天科技集团有限公司) | 1999 | 180,000 | Aerospace products, missile/weapons systems and products | Yes China Electronics Technology Group (CETC; 中国电子科技集团) | 2002 | 190,000 | Electronic equipment, software, hardware components | Yes China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC; 中国核工业集团公司) | 1999 | 150,000 | Nuclear technologies, nuclear energy | Yes China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO; 中国兵器工业集团公司) | 1999 | 220,000 | Military technology, tanks and armored vehicles, air and missile defense | Yes China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC; 中国船舶重工股份有限公司) † | 1999 | 165,000 | Ship R&D, ship design and manufacturing, marine defense and transportation equipment, deep-sea equipment | No China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC; 中国南方工业集团公司) | 1999 | 170,000 | Firearms, vehicle parts, and optical-electronic devices | No China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC; 中国船舶集团有限公司) | 1982 | 310,000 | Naval weapons and equipment R&D, production, testing, and support | No Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC; 中国商用飞机有限责任公司) | 2008 | 11,000 | Large aircraft manufacturing and R&D | No Note that for some companies, only a subsidiary is subject to U.S. export controls. † CSIC and CSSC merged in 2019 to form the new China State Shipbuilding Corporation. The findings of this study are limited in several ways. First, our findings are restricted to the 29 universities for which data was available. Adding data from the missing 16 elite universities could change our results; any of the excluded universities may disproportionately produce graduates who work in the defense industry. Second, this report only assesses graduate flows from 2019; it is not clear to what extent this 2019 snapshot reflects longer-term employment trends in China. Third, Chinese universities highlight their employment data in different ways; some include every company that employs more than 10 graduates, or only the top 25 or 50 employers. Therefore, we do not know exactly how many students took jobs at each company discussed below. Finally, this analysis does not account for alternative career paths into China’s defense industry. Students could pursue advanced degrees and be hired as professors at defense-affiliated universities, or enter private companies that contract with the PLA, and our analysis would not capture these inroads to China’s defense industry. Despite these limitations, our findings establish a floor for universities’ graduate flows, and highlight clear relationships between certain Chinese defense companies and the universities that feed them. Moreover, this study does not tell a complete story. Using our approach, foreign observers of the United States could describe U.S. universities like Carnegie Mellon, the University of Arizona, or Georgia Tech as “defense-affiliated” because their graduates frequently take jobs at Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, or Raytheon. To be sure, there are fundamental differences between the U.S. and Chinese higher education systems, and U.S. defense companies are not state-owned. But policymakers should carefully consider the political and scientific costs and benefits of labeling certain universities as “defense-affiliated.” Part I: China’s Defense Companies Recruit from Civilian Universities Chinese state-owned defense firms directly hired a combined 6,000 graduates from 29 leading Chinese universities in 2019—a 0.3 percent increase over their estimated 2018 workforce of 2.1 million people. Nearly two-thirds of graduates bound for the defense industry (3,725 people) took jobs at the three largest state-owned electronics and aerospace companies: China Electronics Technology Group (CETC), Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). Table 3. Chinese Defense SOEs’ New Hires (2019) from Leading Chinese Universities Name | No. of 2019 Elite University Grads Employed China Electronics Technology Group (CETC) | 1,370 Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) | 1,210 China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) | 1,145 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) | 697 China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) | 322 China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) | 318 Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) | 280 China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) | 209 China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) | 177 Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC) | 164 China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC) | 87 Total: All Eleven Defense Companies | 5,979 Source: Chinese universities’ 2019 employment quality reports. There are several notable trends in the way China’s state-owned defense companies recruit recent university graduates. First, China’s defense giants recruit primarily from a small group of elite universities. Nearly every leading Chinese university produces some graduates who take jobs in China’s defense industry. However, of the 10 universities that produce the most defense industry employees, six are members of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense”—the seventh “Son” being Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (南京航空航天大学), for which data was not available. Collectively, these six universities produced just 16 percent of the employed graduates in our dataset, but 72 percent of the graduates who took jobs at major defense companies. By comparison, the next four universities—Xi'an Jiaotong University, Tianjin University, Dalian University of Technology, and Shanghai Jiaotong University—generated 11 percent of the employed graduates in our dataset, and 14 percent of new defense company hires. Second, China’s defense companies tend to recruit far more graduates with advanced degrees than they do undergraduate degree holders. Few universities disaggregate their employment data in a way that would allow us to measure this trend comprehensively, but there are some notable examples. At Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, just eight percent of graduates hired by defense companies had completed only their undergraduate degrees; the remaining 92 percent had completed graduate degree programs. The same is true at Harbin Engineering University and at Tianjin University, where undergraduates represented more than half of all graduating students, but fewer than a quarter of those who took jobs at defense companies. Third, we found several instances where a Chinese university had established an especially close relationship with one or more defense companies. Three universities have especially close relationships with defense SOEs; other relationships are explored in Appendix II: ● Northwestern Polytechnical University (NWPU) and Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). NWPU is the top generator of new employees at China’s largest defense company. The university has established a scholarship program specifically for students looking to work at AVIC, and generated more than a quarter of all elite university graduates AVIC recruited in 2019. ● Harbin Engineering University (HEU) and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC). HEU was established as a shipbuilding institute in the 1970s, and today maintains strong connections to China’s shipbuilding industry. More than half of the elite university graduates CSIC recruited in 2019 came from HEU. ● Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) and China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). BIT is consistently among the top feeder schools of many large defense companies, but it holds a particularly important place for NORINCO, for whom it is the top source of new employees. BIT and NORINCO have signed several strategic cooperation agreements and hold exclusive job fairs. Although NORINCO has been on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List since 2003, BIT is not. Figure 1 illustrates relationships between universities in China and the defense companies they feed. The vertical size of each box indicates the number of graduates (for universities to the left) or new hires (for companies to the right) in 2019. The strongest relationships are between NWPU, BUAA (Beihang University), BIT, and HEU; and AVIC, CASC, CASIC, and CSIC, respectively. Finally, in addition to the Seven Sons of National Defense—which have clear connections to the military—we find that several students from civilian universities like Dalian University of Technology, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Tianjin University, and Shanghai Jiaotong University took jobs at defense SOEs in 2019.* Many, if not all, civilian Chinese universities maintain at least some connection to China’s defense apparatus. For example, the Dalian University of Technology in 2004 jointly established the National Defense Education College (大连理工大学国防教育学院) with the Shenyang Military Region (now the Northern Theater Command) to “cultivate new military talents for national defense.” The project included hiring PLA generals as faculty members at the university. Similarly, Tianjin University, which was named an “Advanced Unit of National Defense Education” (国防教育先进单位) by the local PLA branch in Nankai, maintains a joint research institute on human-computer interaction with the PLA Academy of Military Science. These are just two examples, but it is likely that the majority of top universities in China have some observable connection to the defense industry or the PLA. The extent of these relationships requires further analysis beyond the scope of this report. * It is difficult to estimate how many graduates at any given Chinese university will enter the defense industry. At half of the universities we examined, more than 3 percent of employed graduates (between 50 and 1,000 people) went to work for state-owned defense companies. At the other half, fewer than 1 percent (fewer than 50 people) did so. Part II: Some U.S. Tech Companies Indirectly Support China’s Defense Industry The findings of this report imply that seven universities—China’s Seven Sons of National Defense—are particularly important feeders for China’s military and defense industry. Collectively, they produce nearly three quarters of the elite university graduates hired by China’s largest defense companies. Despite the risks associated with collaborating with these institutions, we find that several U.S. technology companies have established and maintain close working relationships with the Seven Sons and other defense-affiliated universities in China. Specifically, we counted 42 cases where U.S. companies and their subsidiaries have trained faculty members at China’s Seven Sons of National Defense; developed course curricula related to computer science and integrated circuit design, constructed new laboratory facilities, or furnished them with equipment. Considering the number of graduates from these universities who take jobs in China’s defense industry, it is likely that U.S. tech companies are inadvertently aiding in China’s military modernization by providing resources and information to the next generation of China’s defense industry engineers. For private companies, collaboration with local research institutions is often the price of doing business in China. Many U.S. companies fear they will lose market access or face regulatory reprisal unless they comply with PRC government and Communist Party policies, including coerced technology transfer. One such policy is the Ministry of Education’s charge to promote “industry-university cooperation and collaborative education projects” (产学合作协同育人项目), whereby the MOE calls upon private enterprises, especially foreign companies’ China-based subsidiaries and joint ventures, to aid in Chinese universities’ research, curriculum development, and teacher training. Since 2006, China’s National Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development Plan has sought to “encourage multinational corporations to establish their R&D centers in our country.” In 2014, MOE formalized a “matchmaking” process to recommend collaborative projects between specific multinational companies and Chinese universities, including the Seven Sons. We canvassed the lists of “industry-university collaborative education projects” published by the Chinese MOE in 2018 and 2019. In those two years, MOE documents indicate that the China-based subsidiaries or joint ventures of 13 U.S. technology companies established training programs with China’s Seven Sons of National Defense. These companies include Autodesk, Dell, Google, Honeywell, IBM, Intel, Merrill Lynch, Microsoft, National Instruments, Rockwell Automation, Synopsys, Tektronix, and Texas Instruments. We have not been able to confirm that every one of these companies actually established the training programs indicated by the Chinese government. However, we have been able to find corroborating information about several projects in news articles and on university and company websites. Below, we present three examples: • IBM China and Beijing Institute of Technology signed a contract to build the IBM-BIT Mainframe Excellence Center (北理工—IBM 主机卓越中心) in 2014. According to BIT, under the agreement, IBM would jointly build the facility and “provide our school with the world-class mainframe IBM System z10 enterprise server (z10 EC) for free.” MOE documents indicate that in 2018, IBM launched a follow-up training program at BIT titled “Artificial intelligence for mainframe operation and management” (大型机操作和管理的人工智能). A Sohu post from IBM China that year insisted that “As an advocate of the Ministry of Education's ‘new engineering’ construction, IBM has actively participated in it from the beginning,” and said the company would launch 84 online technical courses for students at a coalition of universities that included BIT. The courses are related to quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and cognitive computing, among other topics. In 2019, BIT was one of just eight universities partnering with IBM. A statement on the company’s website reads, “We cherish the long-term love and support given to IBM by the Ministry of Education and partner universities, and will continue to support the reform and development of China's education industry.” • Microsoft Research Asia and Harbin Institute of Technology jointly launched the MSRA-HIT Artificial Intelligence and Machine Translation Joint Laboratory (哈工大-微软机器翻译技术联合实验室) in 2000. By 2006, the Chinese Ministry of Education classified it as one of the country’s Key Laboratories. HIT’s website indicates the lab is jointly financed by MOE and Microsoft Research Asia, and carries out research projects on behalf of the National Natural Science Foundation of China. In the course of its operations, the lab employs 120 HIT graduate students. It is unclear which HIT students may have trained in the lab during their studies, but university-wide data indicates that at least 14 percent of HIT graduate students entered the Chinese defense industry upon graduation in 2019. MOE documents also indicate that MSRA aided in developing computer science curricula and provided teacher training sessions related to artificial intelligence and natural language processing for HIT faculty in 2018 and 2019. On its website, Microsoft Research Asia confirms it launched cooperative training programs with at least four of the Seven Sons. • Texas Instruments and Harbin Engineering University established the TI-HEU “Pocket Laboratory” Innovation Base (哈尔滨工程大学与美国德州仪器口袋实验室) in 2015. The project constructed an equipment sharing system, whereby HEU students could borrow advanced TI processors to run computationally demanding programs from the comfort of their classrooms or dormitories. More recent MOE data indicates that in 2018 and 2019, TI aided HEU staff in developing curricula for courses on integrated circuit design. Conclusion The evidence presented in this report suggests a significant and meaningful relationship between the Seven Sons of National Defense and China’s largest state-owned defense companies. Despite the risks posed by research collaboration, however, U.S. technology companies’ China-based subsidiaries and joint ventures have established collaborative training projects with most of these universities. As a result, U.S. tech companies may inadvertently aid in China’s military modernization. Beyond training students who end up working in the PRC defense industry after graduation, U.S. tech companies' participation in MOE-sponsored collaborative training projects may indirectly enhance or accelerate the Seven Sons’ research into technologies with dual-use applications. Because the technical knowledge U.S. companies provide in these exchanges is not easily controllable, there is little way of ensuring it does not proliferate across China’s wider defense industry after students graduate. To protect its edge in innovation while incurring the least cost for its research enterprise, the United States should continue to focus on managing U.S. institutions’ exposure to the Seven Sons and, by extension, China’s defense industry. Several U.S. policies have addressed threats to U.S. research security, including Presidential Proclamation 10043, the publication of Chinese military-linked companies operating in the United States, and legislation aimed at addressing PRC government influence in higher education. Beyond the Seven Sons, the departments of several leading, ostensibly civilian Chinese universities require their researchers to hold advanced security credentials, receive funding from China’s Ministry of State Security, or contribute directly to PLA-led research projects. The difficulty for the United States is that many of those universities are also some of the most advanced and well-funded in the world, and contribute countless person-years of expertise to the U.S. science and technology enterprise through their partnerships with U.S. companies and universities. Moving forward, it will be crucial for policymakers to find a way to balance the risks to research security and the benefits that come from engagement with China’s civilian universities. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Dakota Cary, Shelton Fitch, Igor Mikolic-Torreira, Dewey Murdick, Ben Murphy, Anna Puglisi, Lynne Weil, and Remco Zwetsloot for their suggestions on style and content. They are especially grateful to Tai Ming Cheung, Scott Harold, and Glenn Tiffert for their comprehensive reviews. Ben Murphy translated key documents, and Rebecca Gelles aided in graphic design. The authors are solely responsible for any errors. © 2020 by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/. Document Identifier: doi: 10.51593/20200043 Appendix I: Chinese Universities Included in This Report This appendix includes all 45 “elite” Chinese universities considered in this report, and details which 29 published disaggregated employment information. We considered all 42 “Double First Class” universities, plus three universities that are not considered Double First Class, but which are members of China’s Seven Sons of National Defense. “Class A” universities are institutions the Ministry of Education considers to be well on their way to becoming world-class universities; “Class B” institutions at least have the potential to do so. Name (English) | Name (Chinese) | Type of University | Disaggregated Employer Data Available? Beijing Institute of Technology | 北京理工大学 | Class A | Yes Beijing Normal University | 北京师范大学 | Class A | No Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (Beihang University) | 北京航空航天大学 | Class A | Yes Central South University | 中南大学 | Class A | Yes China Agricultural University | 中国农业大学 | Class A | No Chongqing University | 重庆大学 | Class A | Yes Dalian University of Technology | 大连理工大学 | Class A | Yes East China Normal University | 华东师范大学 | Class A | Yes Fudan University | 复旦大学 | Class A | Yes Harbin Engineering University | 哈尔滨工程大学 | Not DFC | Yes Harbin Institute of Technology | 哈尔滨工业大学 | Class A | Yes Huazhong University of Science & Technology | 华中科技大学 | Class A | Yes Hunan University | 湖南大学 | Class B | Yes Jilin University | 吉林大学 | Class A | Yes Lanzhou University | 兰州大学 | Class A | Yes Minzu University of China | 中央民族大学 | Class A | No Nanjing University | 南京大学 | Class A | Yes Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics | 南京航空航天大学 | Not DFC | No Nanjing University of Science and Technology | 南京理工大学 | Not DFC | Yes Nankai University | 南开大学 | Class A | Yes National University of Defense Technology | 国防科技大学 | Class A | No Northeastern University | 东北大学 | Class B | No Northwest Agriculture & Forestry Technology University | 西北农林科技大学 | Class B | No Northwestern Polytechnical University | 西北工业大学 | Class A | Yes Ocean University of China | 中国海洋大学 | Class A | No Peking University | 北京大学 | Class A | Yes Renmin University | 中国人民大学 | Class A | No Shandong University | 山东大学 | Class A | Yes Shanghai Jiaotong University | 上海交通大学 | Class A | Yes Sichuan University | 四川大学 | Class A | No South China University of Technology | 华南理工大学 | Class A | No Southeast University | 东南大学 | Class A | Yes Sun Yat-sen University | 中山大学 | Class A | No Tianjin University | 天津大学 | Class A | Yes Tongji University | 同济大学 | Class A | Yes Tsinghua University | 清华大学 | Class A | Yes University of Electronic Science & Technology of China | 电子科技大学 | Class A | No University of Science and Technology of China | 中国科学技术大学 | Class A | Yes Wuhan University | 武汉大学 | Class A | Yes Xi'an Jiaotong University | 西安交通大学 | Class A | Yes Xiamen University | 厦门大学 | Class A | Yes Xinjiang University | 新疆大学 | Class B | No Yunnan University | 云南大学 | Class B | No Zhejiang University | 浙江大学 | Class A | Yes Zhengzhou University | 郑州大学 | Class B | No Appendix II: Breakdown by Employer This appendix includes disaggregated recruitment data for Chinese defense SOEs mentioned in this report. Although beyond the scope of our analysis, we also include information about how many university graduates joined the PLA directly or went to work for the China Academy of Engineering Physics, China’s leading nuclear weapons lab. 1. Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC; 中国航空发动机集团) At least 164 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at AECC in 2019. Among our sample, 154 employees (93 percent) came from six universities, the largest being Beihang University, which makes up 34 percent of total graduates employed by AECC in 2019. • Beihang University: 55 (1% of all employed graduates) • Harbin Engineering University: 45 (1%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 35 (<1%) • Shanghai Jiaotong University: 11 (<1%) • Huazhong University of Science and Technology: 8 (<1%) 2. Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC; 中国航空工业集团公司) At least 1,210 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at AVIC in 2019. Among our sample, 853 employees (71 percent) came from five primary feeder universities, the largest being Northwestern Polytechnical University (NWPU). • Northwestern Polytechnical University: 321 (9%) • Beihang University: 214 (6%) • Harbin Engineering University: 133 (4%) • Dalian University of Technology: 97 (2%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 88 (2%) 3. China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC; 中国航天科工集团有限公司) At least 697 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at CASIC in 2019. Available data indicates that 604 employees (87 percent) came from five primary feeder universities, the largest being Beihang University. • Beihang University: 192 (6%) • Beijing Institute of Technology: 185 (4%) • Harbin Engineering University: 86 (3%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 73 (2%) • Northwestern Polytechnical University: 68 (2%) 4. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC; 中国航天科技集团有限公司) At least 1,145 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at CASC in 2019. Available data indicates that 870 employees (76 percent) came from five primary feeder universities, the largest being Beihang University. • Beihang University: 210 (6%) • Beijing Institute of Technology: 200 (4%) • Northwestern Polytechnical University: 198 (6%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 170 (4%) • Nanjing University of Science and Technology: 92 (3%) 5. China Electronics Technology Group (CETC; 中国电子科技集团) At least 1,370 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at CETC in 2019. Available data indicates that 669 employees (49 percent) came from five primary feeder universities, the largest being Northwestern Polytechnical University. • Northwestern Polytechnical University: 157 (5%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 151 (3%) • Beijing Institute of Technology: 135 (3%) • Nanjing University of Science and Technology: 122 (4%) • University of Science and Technology of China: 104 (4%) 6. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC; 中国核工业集团公司) At least 209 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at CNNC in 2019. Among our sample, 174 employees (83 percent) came from six primary feeder universities, the largest being Harbin Engineering University. • Harbin Engineering University: 66 (2%) • Xi'an Jiaotong University: 33 (1%) • Tsinghua University: 29 (1%) • Tianjin University: 26 (<1%) • Southeast University: 10 (<1%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 10 (<1%) 7. China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO; 中国兵器工业集团) At least 318 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at NORINCO in 2019. Available data indicates that 282 employees (89 percent) came from five primary feeder universities, the largest being Beijing Institute of Technology. • Beijing Institute of Technology: 110 (2%) • Nanjing University of Science and Technology: 67 (2%) • Northwestern Polytechnical University: 58 (2%) • Beihang University: 28 (1%) • Harbin Engineering University: 19 (1%) 8. China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC; 中国船舶重工股份有限公司) At least 322 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at CSIC in 2019 prior to its merger with CSSC. Available data indicates that 281 employees (87 percent) came from five primary feeder universities. Harbin Engineering University was the single largest supplier of university graduates to CSIC, accounting for over half of all recruited employees in our sample. • Harbin Engineering University: 172 (5%) • Dalian University of Technology: 31 (1%) • Northwestern Polytechnical University: 31 (1%) • Xi'an Jiaotong University: 26 (1%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 21 (<1%) 9. China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC; 中国兵器装备集团公司) At least 87 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at CSGC in 2019. Among our sample, Harbin Engineering University is overwhelmingly the largest feeder school, with HEU graduates representing 75 (86 percent) of the employees recruited that year. • Harbin Engineering University: 75 (2%) • All Other Universities: 12 (N/A) 10. China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC; 中国船舶集团有限公司) At least 177 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at CSSC in 2019. However, data on graduates bound for CSSC was only available for five of the 45 universities selected for this study. All five feeder universities are shown to the right, Nanjing University of Science and Technology being the largest. • Nanjing University of Science and Technology: 54 (2%) • Shanghai Jiaotong University: 36 (1%) • Beijing Institute of Technology: 31 (1%) • Beihang University: 30 (1%) • Huazhong University of Science & Technology: 26 (1%) 11. Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC; 中国商用飞机有限公司) At least 280 graduates from leading Chinese universities took jobs at COMAC in 2019. Among our sample, 261 employees (93 percent) came from six universities, the largest being Beihang University. • Beihang University: 137 (4%) • Tongji University: 37 (1%) • Shanghai Jiaotong University: 34 (<1%) • Beijing Institute of Technology: 31 (<1%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 22 (<1%) 12. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Forces (解放军部队) At least 1,487 students at leading Chinese universities joined the PLA directly upon graduating in 2019. 28 of the 29 universities for which data was available reported one or more graduates joining the PLA. Among our sample, the top five source universities produced 512 PLA officers (26 percent), the largest being Lanzhou University. • Lanzhou University: 128 (3%) • Jilin University: 109 (2%) • Harbin Engineering University: 105 (3%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 88 (2%) • Northwestern Polytechnical University: 82 (2%) 13. China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP; 中国工程物理研究院) Founded in 1958, the China Academy of Engineering Physics is China’s leading nuclear weapons lab. It is headquartered in Mianyang, China, and employs 24,000 people. At least 92 graduates from leading Chinese universities took positions at CAEP in 2019. Only six universities published data about how many of their graduates worked for CAEP; all of them are featured below: • Xi'an Jiaotong University: 24 (1%) • University of Science and Technology of China: 20 (1%) • Harbin Institute of Technology: 19 (<1%) • Zhejiang University: 16 (<1%) • Beihang University: 8 (<1%) • Tianjin University: 5 (<1%) Endnotes 1 Ros Krasny, “GOP Senator Says Don’t Let Chinese Students Study STEM in U.S.,” Bloomberg, April 26, 2020. 2 Glenn Tiffert, “Global Engagement: Rethinking Risk in the Research Enterprise,” Hoover Institution, July 30, 2020; Alex Joske, “The China Defence Universities Tracker” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 2019); Elizabeth Redden, “New Restrictions for Chinese Students With Military University Ties,” Inside Higher Ed, May 29, 2020. 3 “Proclamation on the Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants of Certain Students and Researchers from the People’s Republic of China,” Executive Office of the President, May 29, 2020. 4 “New Chinese Double First Class University Plan Released,” Charlesworth Author Services, October 3, 2017. 5 Shengbing Li, “From 985 to World Class 2.0: China's Strategic Move,” Inside Higher Ed, February 7, 2018. 6 BIS Entity List and Federal Register Sanctions documentation. 7 “China Aviation Engine Group Co., Ltd. held its inaugural meeting in Beijing,” MIIT, August 2016. 8 “China launches state-owned aircraft engine maker: state media,” Reuters, August 28, 2016. 9-12 AVIC Group Profile documentation. 13-17 CASC and CASIC profile and history citations. 18-20 CETC Group Introduction citations. 21-22 CNNC Group Introduction citations. 23-25 NORINCO Group Profile citations. 26-27 CSIC 2019 Annual Report citations. 28-30 CSSC corporate profile citations. 31-33 COMAC corporate profile citations. 34 CSSC and CSIC merger notes. 35 University of Arizona career outcome comparisons. 36-37 Graduate employment reports from Beihang and Harbin Engineering University. 38-44 Entity list references, ASPI Tracker, and military defense education unit background. 45-70 Collaborative program guidelines and joint laboratory documentation (MSRA, IBM, TI, etc.). 71-74 Defense Department lists, congressional legislation, Nature Index international collaboration metrics, and related analytical sources.