A REPORT OF APRIL 2021 THE CSIS AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT S P A C E T H R E A T A S S E S S M E N T 2 0 2 1 Authors TODD HARRISON KAITLYN JOHNSON JOE MOYE MAKENA YOUNG ABOUT CSIS The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy re- search organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS’s purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary schol- arship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS’s values work in concert toward the goal of making real-world impact. CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and the interested public. CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Center for Strategic & International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org ABOUT ASP The Aerospace Security Project (ASP) at CSIS explores the technological, budgetary, and policy issues related to the air and space domains and innovative operational concepts for air and space forces. Part of the International Security Program at CSIS, the Aerospace Security Project is led by Senior Fellow Todd Harrison. ASP’s research focuses on space security, air dominance, long-range strike, and civil and commercial space. Learn more at aerospace.csis.org. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report. As always, the Aerospace Security Project team would like to thank Jeeah Lee, Phillip Meylan, and Emily Tiemeyer for their contributions to the editing, publication, and design of this report. Additional thanks to Thomas G. Roberts for his substantive contributions to this effort. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed above should be understood to be solely those of the authors. These views similarly do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, the Depart- ment of Defense, or the U.S. government. All information is accurate as of March 12, 2021. II SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................................................................1 TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS .....................................3 Kinetic Physical .....................................................................................4 Non-kinetic Physical ..............................................................................4 Electronic ................................................................................................4 Cyber ........................................................................................................4 CHINA ............................................................................................8 Space Organization ................................................................................9 Counterspace Weapons ........................................................................10 RUSSIA ..........................................................................................12 Space Organization ................................................................................12 Counterspace Weapons ........................................................................13 IRAN ..............................................................................................17 Space Organization ................................................................................17 Space Launch Capabilities ...................................................................18 Counterspace Weapons ........................................................................19 NORTH KOREA .............................................................................21 Space Organization ................................................................................21 Space Launch Capabilities ...................................................................22 Counterspace Weapons ........................................................................22 INDIA .............................................................................................24 Space Organization ................................................................................24 Counterspace Weapons ........................................................................25 OTHERS ........................................................................................26 France ......................................................................................................26 Israel ........................................................................................................26 Japan .......................................................................................................27 South Korea ............................................................................................27 United Kingdom ......................................................................................27 WHAT TO WATCH .........................................................................28 ABOUT THE AUTHORS .................................................................30 III SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 INTRODUCTION THE PAST YEAR HAS BEEN ONE OF UNCERTAINTY and unpredictability driven by the Covid-19 pandemic, the ensuing global recession, and political change in the United States. For space security, however, 2020 was largely a year of continuity and predictability. Perhaps the most notable change in the space environment since the last CSIS Space Threat Assessment was published is the addition of some 900 SpaceX Starlink satellites to low Earth orbit (LEO), bring- ing the total constellation size to more than 1,200, as shown in Figure 1. This is the largest satellite constellation in history by a wide margin, and it already makes up roughly a third of all oper- ating satellites in space.1 SpaceX continues to build out its con- stellation, with launches of 60 Starlink satellites at a time every few weeks. Several notable developments in space policy also occurred in the United States over the past year. Before leaving office, the Trump administration issued three new space policy directives (SPDs). SPD-5 directed government departments and agencies Figure 1 SpaceX’s Starlink Constellation as of February to develop cybersecurity policies and practices to improve the 25, 2021 protection of government and commercial space assets from cy- astriagraph berattacks.2 SPD-6 updated national policy for the development and use of space nuclear power and propulsion, and SPD-7 up- dated policy and guidance for space-based positioning, naviga- tion, and timing (PNT) programs and activities.3 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) also unveiled the Artemis Accords in 2020, which includes 10 principles nations must agree to abide by to be part of the Artemis program. By the end of the year, eight other countries had signed on to the accords and Brazil issued a statement of intent to sign.4 The standup of the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command continued throughout the year as expected. The Space Force submitted its first budget request for $15.4 billion, and $15.3 bil- lion of this was transfers from existing accounts within the Air Force.5 The Space Force also published its first capstone docu- ment, Spacepower Doctrine for Space Forces, which was more notable for its continuity with current policy and doctrine than any significant changes.6 The new commander of U.S. Space Command, U.S. Army General James Dickinson, issued his com- mander’s strategic vision in February 2021, which focused on developing a warfighting mindset throughout the command, maintaining key relationships with allies and partners, and im- proving integration across the U.S. government and with com- mercial space organizations.7 Throughout the year, other nations continued development and testing of counterspace weapons. Most notably, Russia conduct- ed several antisatellite (ASAT) tests in 2020. As detailed later in this report, Russia tested a co-orbital ASAT weapon in July 2020, and it tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in De- cember 2020. These activities are not new and reflect a pattern of behavior in which Russia has continued to develop and recon- stitute its counterspace capabilities. 1 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 The purpose of this annual report from the CSIS Aerospace Security Project is to aggregate and analyze publicly available information on the counter- space capabilities of other nations. It is intended to raise awareness and understanding of the threats, debunk myths and misinformation, and highlight areas in which senior leaders and policymakers should pay more attention. This year’s report focuses on the changes in counterspace capa- bilities and new developments that have occurred or come to light over the past year. A more complete history of counterspace developments can be found on the new CSIS space threat interactive timeline, available at: https://aerospace.csis.org/counterspace-timeline/. This online tool will be updated periodically throughout the year and allows users to easily navigate through the large body of publicly available information on space threats, sorting by country, type of threat, and year. This report and the interactive tool are not a comprehensive assessment of all counterspace activities because much of the information on what other countries are doing is not publicly available. The information in this report is current as of March 12, 2021. 2 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS SPACE IS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ENABLER OF econom- ic and military power. The strategic importance of space has led some nations to build arsenals of counterspace weapons to dis- rupt, degrade, or destroy space systems and hold at risk the ability of others to use the space domain. However, the strategic importance of space has also spurred renewed efforts to deter or mitigate conflict and pro- tect the domain for peaceful uses. For example, the U.S. Space Force’s cap- stone publication on spacepower notes that, “military space forces should make every effort to promote responsible norms of behavior that perpetu- ate space as a safe and open environment in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict, the Outer Space Treaty, and international law, as well as Illustration A ballistic U.S. government and DoD policy.”8 missile can be used as a kinetic phys- Counterspace weapons, particularly those that produce orbital debris, ical counterspace pose a serious risk to the space environment and the ability of all nations weapon. to use the space domain for prosperity and security. This chapter provides an overview and taxonomy for different types of counterspace weapons. Counterspace weapons vary significantly in the types of effects they create, how they are deployed, how easy they are to detect and attribute, and the level of technology and resources needed to develop and field them. This report categorizes counterpace weapons into four broad groups of capabil- ities: kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber. SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 3 COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS lites or cause components to overheat. including from other satellites pass- KINETIC PHYSICAL High-powered microwave (HPM) weap- ing by in orbit. For both laser and HPM ons can disrupt a satellite’s electronics weapons, the attacker may have limited KINETIC PHYSICAL COUNTERSPACE or cause permanent damage to electri- ability to know if the attack was success- weapons attempt to strike directly or cal circuits and processors in a satellite. ful because it is not likely to produce vis- detonate a warhead near a satellite or A nuclear device detonated in space can ible indicators. ground station. The three main forms of create a high radiation environment and The use of a nuclear weapon in space kinetic physical attack are direct-ascent an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that would have large-scale, indiscriminate ASAT weapons, co-orbital ASAT weapons, would have indiscriminate effects on effects that would be attributable and and ground station attacks. Direct-as- satellites in affected orbits. These at- publicly visible. A nuclear detonation in cent ASAT weapons are launched from tacks operate at the speed of light and, space would immediately affect satel- Earth on a suborbital trajectory to strike in some cases, can be less visible to lites within range of its EMP, and it would a satellite in orbit, while co-orbital ASAT third-party observers and more difficult also create a high radiation environment weapons are first placed into orbit and to attribute. that would accelerate the degradation of then later maneuvered into or near their Satellites can be targeted with lasers satellite components over the long term intended target. Attacks on ground sta- and HPM weapons from ground- or tions are targeted at the terrestrial sites ship-based sites, airborne platforms, or responsible for command and control of other satellites. A satellite lasing system satellites or the relay of satellite mission requires high beam quality, adaptive data to users. optics (if being used through the atmos- Kinetic physical attacks tend to cause ir- phere), and advanced pointing control reversible damage to the systems affect- to steer the laser beam precisely—tech- ed and demonstrate a strong show of nology that is costly and requires a high force that would likely be attributable and degree of sophistication. A laser can be publicly visible. A successful kinetic phys- effective against a sensor on a satellite if ical attack in space will produce orbital it is within the field of view of the sen- debris, which can indiscriminately affect sor, making it possible to attribute the other satellites in similar orbits. These attack to its approximate geographical types of attacks are one of the only coun- origin. An HPM weapon can be used to disrupt a satellite’s electronics, corrupt terspace actions that carry the potential data stored in memory, cause processors for the loss of human life if targeted at to restart, and, at higher power levels, crewed ground stations or at satellites in cause permanent damage to electrical orbits where humans are present, such circuits and processors. HPM attacks can as the International Space Station (ISS) in be more difficult to attribute because the LEO. To date, no country has conducted attack can come from a variety of angles, a kinetic physical attack against another country’s satellite, but four countries— the United States, Russia, China, and In- dia—have successfully tested direct-as- cent ASAT weapons. NON-KINETIC PHYSICAL NON-KINETIC PHYSICAL COUNTER- SPACE weapons have physical effects on satellites or ground systems without making physical contact. Lasers can Illustration A laser is an be used to temporarily dazzle or per- example of a non-kinetic manently blind the sensors on satel- counterspace weapon. SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 4 COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS for unshielded satellites in the affected technology needed to jam and spoof orbital regime. The detonation of nucle- many types of satellite signals is commer- ar weapons in space is banned under the cially available and inexpensive, making Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which it relatively easy to proliferate among has more than 100 signatories, although state and non-state actors. China and North Korea are not included.9 CYBER ELECTRONIC Illustration A truck-mounted WHILE ELECTRONIC FORMS OF ATTACK ELECTRONIC COUNTERSPACE weapons jammer is a type of electronic attempt to interfere with the transmission target the electromagnetic spectrum counterspace weapon. of RF signals, cyberattacks target the data through which space systems transmit itself and the systems that use, transmit, and receive data. Jamming devices in- and control the flow of data. Cyberat- terfere with the communications to or tacks on satellites can be used to monitor from satellites by generating noise in the same radio frequency (RF) band. An up- data traffic patterns, intercept data, or link jammer interferes with the signal go- insert false or corrupted data in a system. ing from Earth to a satellite, such as the These attacks can target ground stations, command and control uplink. Downlink end-user equipment, or the satellites jammers target the signal from a satel- themselves. While cyberattacks require lite as it propagates down to users on the a high degree of understanding of the Earth. Spoofing is a form of electronic at- systems being targeted, they do not nec- tack where the attacker tricks a receiver essarily require significant resources to into believing a fake signal, produced by conduct. The barrier to entry is relatively the attacker, is the real signal it is trying low and cyberattacks can be contracted to receive. A spoofer can be used to inject out to private groups or individuals. Even false information into a data stream or, if a state or non-state actor lacks internal in extremis, to issue false commands to cyber capabilities, it may still pose a cy- a satellite to disrupt its operations. User ber threat. terminals with omnidirectional antennas, such as many GPS receivers and satellite A cyberattack on space systems can re- phones, have a wider field of view and sult in the loss of data or services be- thus are susceptible to downlink jamming ing provided by a satellite, which could and spoofing from a wider range of angles have widespread systemic effects if used on the ground.10 against a system such as GPS. Cyberat- Electronic forms of attack can be difficult tacks could have permanent effects if, for to detect or distinguish from acciden- example, an adversary seizes control of a tal interference, making attribution and satellite through its command and con- awareness more difficult. Both jamming trol system. An attacker could shut down and spoofing are reversible forms of at- all communications and permanently tack because once they are turned off, damage the satellite by expending its communications can return to normal. propellant supply or issuing commands Through a type of spoofing called “mea- that would damage its electronics and Illustration coning,” even encrypted military GPS sig- sensors. Accurate and timely attribution Cyberattacks can be nals can be spoofed. Meaconing does not used to take control require cracking the GPS encryption be- of a cyberattack can be difficult because of a satellite and cause it merely rebroadcasts a time-de- attackers can use a variety of methods to damage or destroy it. layed copy of the original signal without conceal their identity, such as using hi- decrypting it or altering the data.11 The jacked servers to launch an attack. SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 5 COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS Kinetic Physical Non-kinetic Physical SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 6 kcattA fo sepyT High Altitude High- Ground Direct-Ascent High- Laser Dazzling Co-orbital ASAT Nuclear Powered Station Attack ASAT Powered Laser or Blinding Detonation Microwave noitubirttA Variable Can be Clear attribution attribution, Launch site can attributed by Launch site can Limited of the laser’s Limited depending on be attributed tracking previous- be attributed attribution location at the attribution mode of attack ly known oribt time of attack ytilibisreveR Reversible or Reversible or Irreversible or re- irreversible; irreversible; Irreversible Irreversible versible depend- Irreversible Irreversible attacker may or attacker may or ing on capabilities may not be able may not be able to control to control ssenerawA May or May or Publicly known Only satellite Only satellite Only satellite may not be may not be depending on Publicly known operator will be operator will be operator will be publicly publicly trajectory aware aware aware known known egamaD rekcattA tnemssessA Limited Limited Near real-time Near real-time Near real-time Near real-time confirmation of confirmation of No confirmation confirmation of confirmation of confirmation of confirmation of success if satellite success if satellite of success success success success success begins to drift begins to drift uncontrolled uncontrolled egamaD laretalloC Table 1 TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS Station may Orbital debris Higher radiation Could leave Could leave target control multi- May or may not could affect levels in orbit target satellite satellite disabled ple satellites; produce orbital None other satellites in would persist for disabled and and uncontrol- potential for loss debris similar orbits months or years uncontrollable lable of life Electronic Cyber SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 7 kcattA fo sepyT Uplink Downlink Data Interccept Data Seizure Spoofing Jamming Jamming or Monitoring Corruption of Control noitubirttA Modest attribution Modest attribution Modest attribution Limited or Limited or Limited or depending on mode depending on mode depending on mode uncertain uncertain uncertain of attack of attack of attack attribution attribution attribution ytilibisreveR Irreversible or Reversible Reversible Reversible Reversible Reversible reversible, depending on mode of attack ssenerawA Satellite operator Satellite operator Satellite operator Satellite operator May or may not be May or may not be will be aware; may will be aware; may will be aware; may will be aware; may known to the known to the or may not be or may not be known or may not be known or may not be known public public known to the public to the public to the public to the public egamaD rekcattA tnemssessA Limited confirmation of Limited Near real-time Near real-time Near real-time No confirmation success if monitoring confirmation of confirmation of confirmation of confirmation of of success of the local RF success if effects success success success environment is are visible possible egamaD laretalloC COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS Only dirupts the Only disrupts the Only corrupts the Could leave target signals targeted and signals targeted and specific RF signals None None satellite disabled possible adjacent possible adjacent targeted and uncontrollable frequencies frequencies CHINA CHINA MINIMAL COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS or tests were identified in open-source information over the past year. However, as has been reported in previous iterations of this re- port, China has a robust direct-ascent ASAT program, dual-use capabilities on orbit that are necessary for co-orbital ASAT weapons, and widely used electronic and cyber counterspace capabilities.12 Despite the global pandemic, 2020 saw many accomplishments for China in civil space missions. The Chang’e-5 Moon mission returned 2 kilograms, or about 4.5 pounds, of lunar regolith in December 2020.13 The Yutu-2 rover is still operating on the far side of the Moon and has traveled over 600 meters, or over 2,000 feet, on the lunar surface.14 China also plans to launch the core section of its national space station in 2021.15 In June 2020, China launched its first Mars rover, Tianwen 1, which entered Martian orbit in February 2021 and will likely land on Mars in May or June 2021. The planned mission is for the rover to operate for 92 Martian days (about 95 days on Earth).16 China is one of three countries pursuing mis- sions to Mars in 2021, with the United States landing the Perseverance rover on February 18, 2021 and an orbiter mission from the United Arab Emirates entering Mars orbit in February 2021. SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 8 CHINA China successfully launched the final po- sitioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) BeiDou satellite of the current constella- tion in June 2020. Essentially a Chinese version of GPS, the BeiDou constellation is now composed of 35 satellites in orbit that provide location and timing services to over 120 countries.20 BeiDou has been in the works for over two decades and al- lows China to be independent of the U.S. GPS system for national PNT.21 Notably, BeiDou has been a cornerstone of the Chi- nese Belt and Road Initiative. China’s space launch vehicle (SLV) pro- gram suffered a setback in March 2020 when the inaugural launch of the Long March 7A failed due to an engine malfunc- tion and the payload was lost. However, almost exactly one year later, on March 12, 2021, the Long March 7A SLV success- fully delivered its first payload into orbit, a classified, experimental satellite. The China’s spaceplane is rumored to be similar to the United States’ X-37B (pictured above). Long March 7 series is intended to deliver payloads into geostationary (GEO) orbit u.s. air force and to launch cargo to China’s upcoming national space station. Long March 8, the next SLV in the Long March family, is cur- China’s New Spaceplane Chinese Military Affairs report notes that, rently in development and will boast a re- “another important principle that ap- coverable and reusable first stage, much A NOTABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 2020 was pears to have influenced the design of like SpaceX’s Falcon family.22 the launch and recovery of a national the SSF is the enduring Maoist impera- spaceplane, similar to the United States’ tive of peacetime-wartime integration.”23 X-37B spaceplane program. The Chinese This principle is well suited for the du- SPACE ORGANIZATION space plane was launched by a Long- al-use nature of many space and coun- March 2F on September 4, 2020, and after terspace capabilities. orbiting Earth in LEO for two days, it suc- The organization of space assets and cessfully landed in northwest China on a Chinese civil space capabilities, such as missions within China’s People’s Libera- five-kilometer runway. The United States the Martian rover, are led by the China tion Army (PLA) remains unclear. Many has catalogued at least two new objects National Space Administration (CNSA), space missions, such as space launch and the acquisition and operation of in orbit that were likely deployed by the which falls within the purview of the satellites, remain within the Strategic space plane.17 Experts, however, are uncer- State Council’s State Administration for Support Force (SSF). Often presented tain of the motivations behind or mission Science, Technology, and Industry for as the “information domain,” the SSF of this new space plane, but it is unlikely National Defense (SASTIND). The Chi- maintains PLA efforts for cyber, electron- to be used as a counterspace weapon.18 na Aerospace Science and Technology ic, and psychological warfare, as well as Unrelated to this space plane test is the Corporation (CASC) and China Aero- space. According to experts, the Space Tengyun project, a horizontal takeoff and space Science and Industry Corporation Systems Department and Network Sys- landing spacecraft to be completed by (CASIC) are two examples of the many tems Department (co-equal semi-inde- 2025. Not many details have been released research and development arms of the pendent branches within the SSF) share publicly about the success of this program, joint missions, including counterspace which is intended to provide a rapid launch Chinese government which specialize in capabilities. A Center for the Study of capability.19 space technologies.24 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 9 CHINA ed its unusual movements in late 2019. COUNTERSPACE From December 2019 through late Jan- WEAPONS uary 2020, SJ-17 was in close proximity to Chinasat 6B, a television broadcasting communications satellite. SJ-17 then Kinetic Physical drifted slightly eastward to rendezvous China continues to conduct tests of its with another experimental Chinese sat- operational SC-19 direct-ascent ASAT sys- ellite, SJ-20, from late January through tem.25 However, China no longer needs to early April 2020. The closest SJ-17 and Illustration New robot designed by Tian- use kinetic tests to prove its direct-ascent SJ-20 were to one another was under jin University shown capturing a satellite ASAT capabilities can threaten any U.S. five kilometers.26 After this encounter, on orbit. satellite in LEO, and likely medium Earth SJ-17 performed an unusual drift to sta- orbit (MEO) and GEO as well. tion itself about 50 degrees eastward. Three months later, SJ-17 performed a The notorious Chinese inspector satel- westward drift that allowed it to be in lite, dubbed Shijan-17 (SJ-17), was rel- close proximity with GF 13, a Chinese atively quiet this past year but did make a few stops near other satellites as it Earth observation satellite.27 moved around the GEO belt. According Tianjin University has developed a new to CSIS analysis, SJ-17 performed three robot intended to support space de- enduring rendezvous proximity opera- bris-removal missions. This tentacle-like tions (RPOs) nearby other Chinese satel- robotic arm would be placed on sat- lites, Chinasat 6B, SJ-20, and Gaofen 13 ellites and launched into orbit to then (GF 13). After a long period of inactivity CHINA . . . CAN grapple debris and clear it from popular that lasted about a year, SJ-17 restart- orbits. However, the robotic arm could THREATEN ANY in theory be used to grab an adversary’s satellite.28 Furthermore, the design of the U.S. SATELLITE arm would probably require an extreme- Chinese Rendezvous and Proximity Op- IN LEO, AND ly close RPO that would not be effective erations in GEO. Publicly available orbital with debris or defunct satellites that positioning data suggests that Chinese LIKELY IN MEO could be tumbling uncontrolled in space. satellite SJ-17 has made several close The target debris would likely need to be approaches and inspections in GEO. Learn AND GEO AS in a predictable motion in an established more about SJ-17’s behavior, including a orbit in order for capture by the robotic WELL. list of the satellite’s nearest neighbors. at arms to be possible. The design of this aerospace.csis.org/SJ17. satellite lends itself to a co-orbital ASAT, space-track.org / csis aerospace security even if that is not the stated intent. 175˚E 155˚E 135˚E 115˚E JAN MAR MAY JUL SEPT NOV SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 10 )˚( EDUTIGNOL SJ-17 Nearest Neighbors in 2020 SJ-17 Chinasat 6B SJ-20 Apstar 6 Yamal 202 Gaofen 13 CHINA PAKISTAN CHINA Ladakh Region INDIA Map of the Ladakh Region, where Chinese satellite jammers are rumored to be placed 60km from the border. 60 kilometers of the Line of Actual Con- Non-kinetic Physical trol (LAC) in Ladakh , part of the disputed Some analysts have made recent claims Kashmir region between India, Pakistan, of massive developments in Chinese and China. The source asserts that the ground-based laser stations, including movement of jamming technology into the identification of five suspected lo- the region is intended to hide PLA move- cations of such programs within China. ments in the area.30 Despite efforts from While some of the programs identified the CSIS study team, these claims could appear to be academic and therefore are not be substantiated by another source. likely not ASAT systems, one location of primary concern is a military base known Cyber for conducting kinetic physical ASAT tests There have been no recent publicly ac- that is also rumored to house a laser knowledged cyberattacks from China weapon system.29 There is no indication against the United States’ or other na- of how advanced or “ready-to-mobilize” tions’ space systems. However, China has such a directed energy system may be, successfully proven this capability before and there has been no publicly available and continues to be active with cyberat- information about potential tests or at- tacks in other domains against financial tacks against space systems. or defense-related targets. Electronic In late October 2020, an Indian news source, the Hindustan Times, accused China of moving mobile jammers within SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 11 RUSSIA RUSSIA THOUGH MOST INDUSTRIES, AND A LARGE PORTION OF OTHER countries mentioned in this report, were slowed down due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s military space capabilities kept a steady pace. In the last year, Russia tested numerous counterspace capabilities, performed complex RPOs, and expanded its space-based mil- itary infrastructure. The country’s consistent space launch capability, the continuous advance of counterspace capabilities, and civil space contri- butions through the ISS have maintained Russia’s status as a major space power, and its prowess in the space domain has fostered unique relation- ships with foreign countries that are sometimes rivals in other domains. SPACE ORGANIZATION Russia’s state-sponsored space activities fall into either the Russian Aer- ospace Forces (RAF) or the civil Roscosmos program. Within the Russian military, space capabilities fall under the RAF. A subsection of the RAF is the Russian Space Force, which was created in 1992 as the world’s first space force and is responsible for the monitoring of all space-based assets, mili- tary launches, and potential threats to space systems.31 Roscosmos is a longtime partner of NASA, and the two agencies, together with Japan, Canada, and Europe, serve as the principal partners on the ISS. Roscosmos CEO Dmitry Rogozin announced that there were 17 launches of rockets in 2020 and 29 space launches planned for 2021. Rogozin also confirmed the country will begin exploration of the Moon via automated SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 12 RUSSIA modules and lunar probes, followed by a tary infrastructure. In addition to defend- crewed program.32 The crewed program ing against conventional weapons, space- is slated to land on the Moon in 2030, RUSSIA’S based weapons are mentioned as a threat with regular missions to follow. Ros- in the document. The document also calls cosmos has also announced plans for a PROWESS IN out the potential deployment of missile permanent lunar base to begin in 2035.33 defense and offensive strike weapons in Additionally, Russia has ongoing dis- THE SPACE space as posing a threat to Russia.39 The cussions with China to establish a Moon approval of this document signals that DOMAIN HAS research base. Roscosmos and China’s Russia believes space-to-Earth weapons space agency signed a 5-year space co- could pose as much of a threat as nuclear FOSTERED operation program in 2017.34 In February weapons and would elicit the same re- sponse from the country. of 2021, the Roscosmos press office con- UNIQUE firmed that the agency was ready to sign an agreement with the “Government of RELATIONSHIPS People’s Republic of China on cooper- COUNTERSPACE WITH FOREIGN ation to create the International Lunar WEAPONS Research Station,” and the two space COUNTRIES agencies signed a memorandum of un- derstanding on March 9, 2021.35 A state- Kinetic Physical THAT ARE ment from Roscosmos outlined a plan of Russia has possessed kinetic physical cooperation with international partners SOMETIMES counterspace capabilities since the Sovi- “with the goal of strengthening research et Union’s first co-orbital ASAT test in the cooperation and promoting the explora- RIVALS 1960s. The technology used in Soviet-era tion and use of outer space for peaceful programs proved to be solid building purposes.” To further solidify their rela- IN OTHER blocks for more recent Russian develop- tionship in space going forward, the two DOMAINS. ments, and the country has repeatedly countries signed another agreement to displayed direct-ascent and co-orbital create a data center to assist in future ASAT capabilities—both of which were missions to the Moon and deep space.36 tested over the past year. To aid in these goals, Russia continued On April 15, 2020, Russia tested its PL- testing a new SLV called the Angara, which 19/Nudol direct-ascent ASAT system, is the first SLV fully developed in post-So- which was publicly condemned by U.S. viet Russia. The Angara family of vehicles Space Command.40 The PL-19/Nudol was will include both heavy and light launch launched from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome vehicles, all of which will be capable of in northern Russia, travelling 3,000 kilom- reaching LEO and two of which will be eters before splashing down in the Arctic capable of reaching GEO.37 Angara vehi- Ocean. This test did not appear to make cles resumed testing in December of 2020 a kinetic impact with anything in LEO.41 and are planned to be batch-produced for On December 19, 2020, Russia tested the both Roscosmos and the Russian Ministry system once again, further prompting of Defence beginning in 2023. Roscosmos U.S. Space Command officials to state also announced plans to begin building that “Russia’s persistent testing of these satellites for foreign partners, which will systems demonstrates threats to U.S. and include telecommunication and remote allied space systems are rapidly advanc- sensing satellites.38 ing.”42 These appear to be the ninth and tenth tests of this system, the last eight of In 2020, Russian president Vladimir Putin which were successful.43 approved a document which empowers him to use nuclear weapons in response In addition to the repeated testing of the to a conventional strike targeting the Nudol direct-ascent ASAT capability, the country’s critical government and mili- United States accused Russia of conduct- SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 13 RUSSIA COSMOS 2542 MANEUVERS PROJECTILE AWAY RELEASED FROM 2543 COSMOS 2543 RELEASED FROM 2542 MANEUVERS AWAY COSMOS 2535 MANEUVERS BACK COSMOS 2536 JULY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT 12TH 21ST NOV 2019 2020 Russian Co-orbital ASAT Test in LEO, 2019-2020 ing a co-orbital ASAT test in July 2020. ing, satellites are deployed for routine an additional satellite, Cosmos 2536. In This test was more sophisticated than inspections and surveillance of Russia’s September 2020, Cosmos 2543 began to the direct-ascent ASAT test, involving a other space assets.46 The Kremlin has con- drift away from the others, but Cosmos Russian satellite Cosmos 2542 which con- tinued to assert that Russia has always 2535 and 2536 continued to remain close tained a smaller satellite inside of it, labe- been and remains a country that is com- to one another for several weeks. The two led Cosmos 2543. Cosmos 2542 ejected mitted to the goal of fully demilitarizing satellites were so close together that it is Cosmos 2543 in 2019. On July 15, 2020, outer space and not deploying weapons possible they performed docking maneu- Cosmos 2543 fired a small projectile near in outer space.47 vers; however, it is hard to be certain an unrelated Russian satellite, Cosmos without increased space domain aware- Since being ejected from its mother sat- 2535.44 This instance mimicked a similar ness (SDA). One SDA ground observation ellite, Cosmos 2543 has been very active. operation with nesting satellites in 2017 reported a single object, instead of two Before firing the projectile in July 2020, when satellite Cosmos 2521 was ejected unique objects, which further increased from its mother satellite Cosmos 2519.45 the inspector satellite was constantly speculation that the satellites docked. On In response to the July 2020 test, U.S. changing its orbit to synchronize with October 12, 2020, Cosmos 2536 and 2535 Space Command released a statement other Russian satellites. This is out of separated, and four days later Cosmos which condemned this test and asserted the ordinary for most satellites, which 2536 was reportedly 20 kilometers from that the small projectile fired from Cos- rarely maneuver in this way. In June of Cosmos 2535. By October 21, Cosmos mos 2543 could be used to target satel- 2020, Cosmos 2543 joined Cosmos 2535 2536 was again within a kilometer of Cos- lites. In response, the Russian Ministry of in orbit.48 For months the two satellites mos 2535.49 While not a weapons test, this Defence said these matryoshka, or nest- performed RPOs with one another and much movement in orbit is highly unusu- SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 14 RUSSIA Luch’s Nearest 110˚E Neighbors in 2020 90˚E Luch (Olymp) Eutelsat 70B 70˚E Eutelsat 21B 50˚E Skynet 4E Intelsat 3-F7 30˚E Intelsat 4A-F6 10˚E Eutelsat 5 West A ABS 3A 10˚W 30˚W JAN MAR MAY JUL SEPT NOV al and raises suspicions about the motiva- tions behind such space capabilities. In addition to the movements of the Cosmos satellites, the Russian satellite Luch contributed co-orbital activities in 2020. Luch has been consistently mov- ing around in the GEO belt since its 2014 launch and continued to perform RPOs in the past year. According to CSIS analy- sis, the satellite maneuvered next to sev- en satellites, which included European, UK, U.S., and Asian broadcast satellite operators. Though these orbital maneu- vers are no longer rare for this particular satellite, the vast majority of satellites that operate in GEO are stationary, which makes the activity of Luch highly unusu- al year after year. Russia continues to develop its air and missile defense systems. Though not of- ficially designated as ASAT weapons, the S-400 and S-500 series surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems could likely reach a satel- SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 15 )˚( EDUTIGNOL Luch Continues to Explore the GEO Belt. lite in LEO.50 The S-500 was heavily tested A New Update on an Old The Russian satellite has made several close in 2020 and is scheduled to be completed approaches and inspections in GEO since its Weapon in 2021 as a replacement for the capable launch in 2014, including those depicted here S-400. Russian military sources claim that in 2020. Learn more about Luch’s behavior, NEW INFORMATION EMERGED IN 2020 the missile is designed to strike objects in including a list of the satellite’s nearest neigh- about an old Soviet-era space weapon. space as well as defend areas from space- bors at aerospace.csis.org/luch. The Soviet Union’s R-23M cannon is known based weapons. The head of Russia’s Air as being the only gun fired in space. The and Space Forces has said that the S-500 space-track.org / csis aerospace security system reached orbit on June 25, 1974, is capable of destroying hypersonic weap- and the cannon was tested on its last day ons and satellites in near space.51 Assert- in space in 1975. A reported 20 shells were ing further that the missile class will be fired from one to three blasts, which all able to be used as a counterspace weapon, burned up in the atmosphere. The gun the deputy chief of the RAF’s SAM troops, was originally developed to help protect Yuri Muravkin, said that “the boundaries airborne bombers, but its small frame and between air and space are being and will lightweight made it an easy choice to at- be erased as the aerial enemy gradually tach to a spacecraft. A factory visit in early becomes an aerospace one.”52 2021 produced the second known photo of the only cannon to be fired in orbit .53 Non-kinetic Physical As with kinetic counterspace capabilities, Russia continues to maintain a variety of non-kinetic counterspace weapons. An- nounced by Russian president Vladimir Putin in 2018, the Peresvet laser system was thought to be a mobile trailer-mount- ed laser system, but plans to put Peresvet on an airborne carrier were made public in 2021.54 The Peresvet system will be the second airborne laser system in develop- ment by Russia, following Sokol-Echelon, which was announced in September 2016 and has been reported as likely to have RUSSIA The first Russian orbital launch of 2021 included a satellite to be added to the Liana constellation, an electronic intelli- gence program for space-based surveil- lance and targeting.61 The satellites in this constellation are designed to intercept radio communications and can be used to detect objects on the surface the size of a car.62 Additionally, Russia is devel- oping ground-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) sites under the name Sledopyt with the capability to gain access to ra- dio signals emitted by foreign satellites orbiting above Russian territory.63 Anoth- er project, known as Tobol, or 8282, has been described as “electronic warfare complexes for space-related purposes,” and infrastructure related to this system was built near satellite tracking facilities.64 Cyber Russia flexed its offensive cyber capabil- ities in 2020 in what is being called “one Mobile Tirada-2 satellite jamming systems of the most devastating cyberattacks in history.”65 This hack, commonly known russian ministry of defense as the SolarWinds breach because ac- cess was gained through a network man- agement software company of the same ASAT capabilities.55 Sokol-Echelon’s chief terspace weapons include the Tirada-2 , name, is reported to have affected over designer claimed the laser system was a a mobile jamming system “for suppres- 250 U.S. federal agencies and business- response to the U.S. withdrawal from the sion of space communications.”58 Anoth- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 er electronic warfare system in develop- es, to include the U.S. State Department, and that it was intended to counter “air- ment is the Bylina-MM, a ground-based parts of the Pentagon, and the cyberse- based and space-based reconnaissance mobile system with a focus on jamming curity firm FireEye.66 Before President assets.”56 satellite communication channels. Bylina Joe Biden took office, he affirmed that has been reported as “a series of ground- the United States must be able to quick- Electronic based mobile automated stations” and a ly deter and disrupt future cyberattacks Russia continues to grow its electronic mobile command and control system with and stated that he would “not stand idly counterspace capabilities and has recent- artificial intelligence (AI).59 It includes an by in the face of cyber assaults on our na- ly focused on developing mobile ground- automated system that is able to recog- tion.”67 The SolarWinds attack is the latest based systems to interfere with foreign nize assets and determine how to attack in a long line of large Russian hacking satellites.57 Electronic capabilities have them, and it can be used against a variety incidents, similar to the 2017 NotPetya been increasing at a steady pace since of ground, air, and space-based targets. attack. This incident targeted Ukrainian the early-2000s and accelerated in 2009 Russia also reportedly has two radar jam- with the standup of Electronic Warfare mers, called Krasukha-2 and Krasukha-4, companies such as Antonov, a Ukrainian Troops within the Russian military. Re- which may be capable of interfering with aircraft manufacturing company, and the cent developments in electronic coun- radar reconnaissance satellites.60 Kyiv International Airport in Zhuliany.68 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 16 IRAN IRAN DESPITE ADVANCEMENTS IN ITS SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAM in the past year, Iran’s counterspace capabilities have not shown significant progress. Iran still appears far from developing a vi- able direct-ascent ASAT weapon; however, many scholars and world leaders continue to accuse Iran of using space launches as a veil for its ballistic missile program.69 To make significant progress on kinetic and non-kinetic physical counterspace systems, Iran would likely need to ac- quire technology and resources from a major counterspace actor, such as Russia or China, as reports indicate they have in the past.70 Iran continues to develop electronic and cyber counterspace capabilities and demonstrates increased success in jamming and hacking attacks against foreign govern- ments and civilian systems. SPACE ORGANIZATION Iran’s space programs fall under two primary organizations. The Iranian Space Agency, under the oversight of the Ministry of Information and Com- munication Technology and the direction of the Supreme Space Council, is the civilian entity responsible for policy, research and development, and cooperation for peaceful civilian space issues.71 Iran’s military space pro- gram is headed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force.72 The IRGC’s redesignated its Air Force to the Aerospace Force in SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 17 IRAN 2009, indicating Iran’s recognition and to the satellite as “multi-purpose,” high- elevation of space forces and capabilities lighting its strategic intelligence-gath- IRAN’S within the military.73 As further evidence ering capabilities.78 An Iranian report of this, Iran revealed the existence of its added that the Noor-1 satellite is a re- COUNTERSPACE own Space Command in April 2020 after connaissance satellite with visual and a successful satellite launch by the IRGC.74 thermal monitoring technology.79 Many CAPABILITIES There is no open-source reporting to experts believe it is a rudimentary sat- HAVE NOT provide details as to the IRGC Space ellite with limited capabilities.80 Shortly Command’s organization, capabilities, after launch, the U.S. Space Force’s 18th SHOWN and missions; however, it is reasonable Space Control Squadron tweeted that it to surmise that this new organization is was tracking both the satellite and the SIGNIFICANT responsible for all space- and counter- rocket’s upper stage.81 This launch has space-related forces and missions within three notable differences from previous PROGRESS. the IRGC. Iranian launches. First, the Qased launch vehicle purport- edly is a three-stage system. Its first SPACE LAUNCH stage is comprised of a liquid-propellant ballistic missile called Ghadr, which is an CAPABILITIES upgraded version of the Shahab.82 What makes this launch vehicle different for After several failed launch attempts by Iran is the second and third stages. The the Iranian Space Agency in 2019 and ear- second stage used a solid-propellant ly 2020, the IRGC successfully launched motor called the Salman, which has its first military satellite into LEO on sophisticated technologies such as a April 22, 2020.75 Named Noor-1, the sat- carbon-fiber motor casing and a swive- ellite is reported to be a 3U or 6U Cube- ling thrust vector control nozzle. Less is Sat, weighing roughly 15 to 30 pounds.76 known about the third stage; however, Iranian news sources reported that the some statements indicate that it was a satellite was successfully placed into a smaller solid-propellant kick motor, of- 425-kilometer orbit.77 IRGC Commander ten used to help deliver a satellite to its Major General Hossein Salami referred final orbit.83 The successful incorpora- image courtesy of the james martin center for nonproliferation studies at the mid- dlebury institute of international studies in monterey, california SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 18 IRAN tion of solid-fuel motors is a technolog- A New Iranian Rocket, COUNTERSPACE ical advancement not previously report- ed in Iranian SLV capabilities. the Zuljanah WEAPONS Second, the launch was conducted by ON FEBRUARY 1, 2021, Iran announced the IRGC, as opposed to the Iranian Kinetic Physical that it again tested a new SLV.92 Called the Space Agency, which was responsible Zuljanah, it is reported to be able to send a Current open-source information does for most previous launches. While Iran 485-pound satellite into LEO.93 The Zuljan- not indicate that Iran has or is attempt- has confirmed the existence of an IRGC ah features solid-fuel propelled engines in ing to develop either direct-ascent or space program previously, a launch its first and second stages and a liquid-fu- co-orbital ASAT weapons. However, from the military program had not been el third stage.94 Though compatible with reporting on the April 2020 successful reported until April 2020. A successful Iran’s mobile launcher, reports indicate launch and February 2021 test launch launch after multiple failures and using that the Zuljanah was launched from the brings Iran closer to possessing a future new technology signals Iran’s intention fixed-structure launch pad in Iran’s Sem- direct-ascent kinetic ASAT capability. to press the launch envelope, despite nan province.95 One report cited the seem- Iran must still overcome other techno- logical hurdles before it can field a vi- Tehran’s insistence that Iran will main- ingly unnecessarily large diameter of the able direct-ascent kinetic ASAT weap- tain its self-imposed range limit on mis- first stage motor, stating it had a thrust of on. As in last year’s report, Iran could siles.84 75 kilotons.96 This latest test again raises threaten satellites by creating a debris concerns over Iran’s ballistic missile aspira- Third, the Noor-1, via the Qased SLV, hazard in orbit.98 By placing a small sat- tions. At the time of this publication, there was launched from a mobile launcher.85 ellite in orbit, Iran demonstrates that it have been no open-source comments from The Qased is the first not to be launched could be closer to developing a co-or- the U.S. government or its allies about the from Iran’s Imam Khomeini Spaceport, bital ASAT weapon. However, it is still reportedly launching from a mobile February launch. An Iranian Defense Min- unlikely until there is evidence that Iran transport-erector launcher at the IRGC istry Space Department spokesman noted possesses the more advanced technical that the first launch of the new SLV was for means and expertise required to place missile development and launch com- suborbital testing and will be ready to put and maneuver a satellite in orbit to exe- plex in Shahroud.86 A mobile launch ca- operational satellites into orbit after the cute such a threat. pability serves little purpose in a civil- completion of research tests.97 ian satellite program, but it does for a Non-kinetic Physical military program concerned about pre- Current open-source information also launch strikes.87 Coupled with Iran’s fail- does not indicate with any certainty ure to issue any Notice to Airmen (NO- that Iran has made strides in non-kinet- TAM) about the launch, the introduction ic physical weapons in the past year. of a mobile launcher lends weight to the As with a direct-ascent ASAT capability, claims of space launch being a means to Iran’s recent launch successes could lead a ballistic missile end.88 to a greater threat if Iran is also success- ful in nuclear weapons development. U.S. defense officials downplayed the success and overall value of the launch.89 Electronic Chief of Space Operations General Ray- The IRGC conducted two major exercis- mond, at the time dual-hatted as the es in 2020, which Iranian sources claim commander of the U.S. Space Com- included “space operations” using jam- mand, tweeted his view of the satellite ming drones and radar units from the as a “tumbling webcam.”90 While in- IRGC Aerospace Force.99 In February dependent reporting concurs that the 2021, Aerospace Force Brigadier General Noor-1 is much too small to be an effec- Mehdi Hadian hailed Iranian electronic tive military spy satellite, the advance- warfare capabilities in recent exercises, ment in launch capabilities should with a focus on offensive and counter concern policymakers with what Iran is electronic warfare against enemy air planning to pursue next.91 power.100 In March and May 2020, there SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 19 IRAN were reports of Iranian GPS circle spoof- pabilities in other domains. Additionally, ing. GPS circle spoofing differs from in January of this year, Iran and Russia THE INCREASE IN other spoofing attacks in that it causes signed an information security agree- transponders to show various erroneous ment that signals closer interaction be- FREQUENCY AND positions forming odd ring-like patterns tween the two in cybersecurity activi- around a central location.101 Previously SOPHISTICATION ties.109 That agreement could mean that observed in China, the March 2020 in- Iran will benefit from Russian technolo- cident involved a potential GPS spoofing OF RECENT gy, expertise, and training to further its device in operation at Iran’s Army Com- mand and Staff College.102 The May 2020 IRANIAN own cyberattack capabilities. incident also involved the circling phe- nomena with GPS-based reporting sys- CYBERATTACK tems from vessels and fitness trackers in Tehran.103 Iran has publicly claimed in CAMPAIGNS the past to have the capability to spoof SUGGESTS THAT GPS receivers.104 Cyber CYBERATTACKS Iran has demonstrated its cyber capabil- ON SPACE ities most prominently this year through its use of civilian cyberattacks against SYSTEMS Israel.105 Past reports suggest that Iran leverages contract hacking groups to COULD BE THE conduct cyberattacks on its behalf.106 In PREFERRED line with this assertion, the Iran-linked Pay2Key hacking group claimed that it COURSE OF hacked a database of Israel Aerospace Industries’ subsidiary Elta Systems in ACTION December 2020. While Pay2Key is not officially linked to the Iranian govern- ment, it is based in Iran and matches the modus operandi of previous Iranian cy- berattacks.107 That same month, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Securi- ty Agency issued an Iranian hacker warn- ing. The report stated that “Iranian cyber threat actors have been continuously improving their offensive capabilities.” Noted threat activities included website defacement, distributed denial of servic- es, theft of personally identifiable infor- mation, and use of destructive malware, among other activities.108 While there is no recent open-source in- formation of Iranian cyberattacks specif- ically against space assets, the increase in frequency and sophistication of recent Iranian cyberattack campaigns suggests that cyberattacks on space systems could be the preferred course of action to compensate for the imbalance of ca- SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 20 NORTH KOREA NORTH KOREA THE PAST YEAR PROVED TO BE A QUIET ONE for North Korea’s counterspace pursuits. It remains unlikely that North Korea is ca- pable or actively pursuing direct-ascent or co-orbital ASAT weap- ons, and there is little indication that North Korea has made any advancement in its non-kinetic physical capabilities, though some sources insist that a North Korean EMP threat exists. North Korea has demonstrat- ed the ability to conduct electronic warfare through jamming capabilities, and its cyberattack threat is active and viable. It is these latter two capabil- ities that have the greatest potential for counterspace applications. Recent claims that North Korea and Iran have resumed cooperation on missile and launch vehicle technology could suggest that advancement by one nation may eventually be transferable to the other.110 SPACE ORGANIZATION North Korea continues its claims of peaceful intentions in space, despite a UN Security Council report labelling North Korea’s space program a threat to international peace.111 In May 2020, North Korean state television aired a segment on the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) to promote the nation’s space program.112 Pyongyang’s propaganda service, Naenara, stated that the purpose of North Korea’s space program is to “ad- here to the interests of the state and to use science and technology to solve SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 21 NORTH KOREA scientific and technological problems technology to pursue a complementary essential to economic construction and direct-ascent ASAT capability. However, IT IS WIDELY people’s lives.”113 However, much like in lacking the means to guide the warhead the case of Iran, it is widely suspected that to directly strike a satellite, the best North SUSPECTED North Korea’s space intentions are closely Korea could hope to achieve is a broad THAT NORTH tied to its ballistic missile aspirations. area weapon meant to create a danger- ous debris hazard for orbiting satellites.119 KOREA’S SPACE Likewise, North Korea does not appear SPACE LAUNCH to be pursuing a co-orbital ASAT weap- INTENTIONS CAPABILITIES on. To date, North Korea has not demon- ARE CLOSELY strated the means and expertise to con- duct RPOs or active guidance measures North Korea maintains two established TIED TO ITS required for a viable co-orbital ASAT ca- launching areas for space capabilities: the pability.120 With only a handful of North BALLISTIC Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground and Korean objects currently in space, and the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground. minimal activity at its two launch facil- MISSILE No open-source information emerged in ities, it is unlikely that North Korea is the past year regarding use of the Tong- actively pursuing either direct-ascent or ASPIRATIONS. hae site. The website 38 North published co-orbital ASAT capabilities. imagery and analysis three times since March 2020 reporting normal mainte- Non-kinetic Physical nance, snow clearing, and routine activi- No recent open-source information indi- ty, but nothing to indicate the preparation cates that North Korea has made any ad- for or execution of a launch in the past vancements in non-kinetic physical ASAT year.114 North Korea also has a General weapons. Some reports highlight the po- Satellite Control Building (GSCB) intend- tential for North Korea to place a nuclear ed to track and monitor its own satellite weapon on a long-range missile, giving launches and orbiting satellites.115 Re- it the capability to create a high-altitude ports indicate the ongoing construction EMP effect.121 However, there has been no of what is believed to be new scientific reported activity in the past year to indi- testing facilities next to the GSCB, though cate that North Korea is actively pursuing it is unclear what the exact purpose of that capability. those facilities will be.116 Electronic North Korea continues to exercise its COUNTERSPACE downlink jamming capabilities. In April WEAPONS 2020, North Korea announced that it was preparing to deploy a new “GPS jamming device” for use against South Korea.122 Kinetic Physical There have been multiple reports in the No recent open-source information indi- past year, as recent as January 2021, cates that North Korea has or is attempt- that North Korea continues to conduct ing to develop a dedicated direct-ascent jamming operations along the peninsu- ASAT program apart from its ongoing la. Many open-source reports in the past ballistic missile programs.117 North Ko- year highlight jamming focused on com- rean leader Kim Jong Un proclaimed in mercial radio broadcast frequencies and January 2021 that North Korea will build civilian GPS signals rather than military a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic mis- targets.123 The U.S. Army published a new sile.118 It is conceivable that if North Ko- manual titled North Korean Tactics in July rea achieved this it could leverage that 2020 which details North Korea’s elec- SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 22 NORTH KOREA tronic warfare organizations, capabilities, North Korean Cyber techniques, and tactics.124 It highlights the Electronic Warfare Jamming Regi- Profiteering ment focused on electronic jamming and THE U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT CHARGED signals reconnaissance.125 three North Korean computer program- Cyber mers, identified by prosecutors as mem- bers of a North Korean military intelligence According to government officials, the agency, with carrying out a broad range of greatest North Korean counterspace threat global hacks at the behest of the North to the United States is a cyberattack. North Korean government.129 According to the Korean Tactics calls out North Korea’s report, it is believed that the defendants elite cyber warfare unit, the Cyber War- executed a number of cyberattacks from fare Guidance Unit, which is also known as locations in Russia and China.130 The hacks Bureau 121. The Army manual claims that were primarily profit-driven, believed to Bureau 121 consists of more than 6,000 be intended to offset sanctions against members, with many operating outside North Korea. This aligns with a report to of North Korea in countries such as China, the UN Security Council detailing North Russia, India, Malaysia, and Belarus.126 Korean-linked cyber actors conducting operations against financial institutions Former secretary of state Mike Pompeo and virtual currency exchange houses to claimed in December 2020 that North “generate money to support its weapons Korea posed a greater threat to U.S. cy- of mass destruction and ballistic missile bersecurity than Russia.127 This sentiment programs.”131 The report contended that was echoed by the current administration North Korea’s “total theft of virtual assets in February 2021, as State Department from 2019 to November 2020 is valued at spokesman Ned Price noted that North approximately $316.4 million.”132 Korea’s malicious cyber activities threat- ening the United States and its allies will inform an ongoing review of U.S. policy toward North Korea.128 North Korea is also suspected of conduct- ing cyberattacks targeted at cybersecu- rity researchers.133 The attacks, reported by Google researchers in January 2021, involved sophisticated social media de- ception and phishing techniques to en- tice researchers to click links containing malicious code designed to give hackers full access to the victim’s computer.134 While North Korea’s cyberattacks have not been specifically targeted at space systems, they demonstrate North Korea’s continued focus on developing more so- phisticated and viable cyber capabilities. As North Korean hackers acquire more advanced technology, likely through illicit means, and gain experience and expertise, threats to U.S. space systems and ground stations will become more credible. SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 23 INDIA INDIA SINCE LAUNCHING ITS FIRST SATELLITE IN 1980, India has shown progressive growth in its space capabilities. With a successful ASAT test in 2019, India became only the fourth country to demonstrate a kinetic counterspace capability. India is also advancing its civil space program, which is currently working on its third mission to the Moon. SPACE ORGANIZATION India’s space activities are bifurcated into civil and military space organi- zations. All civil space developments fall under the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), which operates under the Department of Space.135 The agency celebrated its 51st launch in November 2020, its only launch of 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic.136 India’s first orbital launch of 2021 was on February 28, when the country successfully delivered a total of 19 satellites into orbit, including a Brazilian Earth observation satellite.137 In 2019, India created the Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO), which is charged with the research and development of national secu- rity space systems and operates under the Defence Space Agency in the Ministry of Defence. These new agencies are part of India’s larger goals SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 24 INDIA of advancements in strategic space op- range aerial targets, most likely drones. erations. At its creation, the DSRO was One system is trailer-mounted, the other THESE NEW tasked with developing “space warfare is tripod-mounted, and both are capable systems” and technology.138 Many Indian AGENCIES of jamming command and control links counterspace capabilities are developed to close-range aerial targets.142 The DRDO to respond to security threats posed by ARE PART OF has a subsection called the Laser Science China and Pakistan.139 and Technology Centre, the website for INDIA’S LARGER India has also been working with private which specifies work on developing “high companies to provide SDA data to “de- power laser sources and related technol- GOALS OF tect, identify, and track enemy assets.” ogies for directed energy applications” as According to a request for information, well as “laser countermeasure systems.”143 ADVANCEMENTS the Defence Space Agency is hoping that, Though there are no indications of ful- once developed, the system can play both IN STRATEGIC ly functional counterspace systems yet, defensive and offensive roles.140 these reports indicate that high-powered SPACE lasers and directed energy technologies with potential counterspace applications OPERATIONS. COUNTERSPACE are in development. WEAPONS Electronic The DRDO provides electronic warfare Kinetic Physical capabilities for the Indian military. One of After a successful direct-ascent ASAT test India’s most used systems is the fully mo- in March 2019, India has not conducted bile Samyukta electronic warfare system, additional public demonstrations of any which is used for surveillance, intercep- kinetic physical counterspace weapons. tion, position fixing, and jamming of com- Satheesh Reddy, head of DRDO, stated munications and radar signals in a wide that while the 2019 direct-ascent ASAT range of wavelengths.144 Another fully de- test was at a low altitude to prevent large veloped electronic warfare system is the amounts of space debris, the missile ground vehicle-based Himshakti, report- would be capable of reaching most sat- edly the most powerful electronic warfare ellites in LEO. A second kinetic test does system in India’s arsenal. It is designed to not seem likely for the country, but Reddy be used as an offensive and defensive sys- announced that the team was working on tem and can jam frequencies over an area technologies related to EMP capabilities as large as 10,000 square kilometers.145 It and co-orbital weapons.141 is reported that India was able to jam Pa- Non-kinetic Physical kistani radars and communication dur- ing a 2019 airstrike, though it is not clear There have not been any publicly report- which system was used.146 ed developments of India’s non-kinetic physical capabilities, though there is rea- Cyber son to believe they are being developed. India has continued to develop its Defense In late 2020, Reddy announced a program Cyber Agency, which responds to threats to begin development of directed energy in the cyber domain.147 As the country’s weapons, specifically high-energy lasers and high-powered microwaves which cyber capabilities grow, its most frequent could in theory be adapted as counter- targets are the governments of Pakistan space weapons. Though most of these and China.148 Based on open-source in- weapons are in the early stages of de- formation, it does not appear that India velopment, there are two systems which has tested or used its cyber capabilities have lasers capable of striking short- against space systems. SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 25 OTHERS OTHERS WHILE CHINA, RUSSIA, IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND INDIA have the most public advancements in counterspace weap- ons, other states are developing counterspace capabilities as well. This chapter examines the counterspace applications “. . . There’s that other countries possess, including U.S. allies and partners, and include public remarks and changes in doctrine. a realization amongst nations that access FRANCE to space is no longer a given. After issuing a new Space Defense Strategy in 2019, France has had a contin- We’ve got to ued focus on military space. In March of 2021, the French Space Command make sure that began a simulated “stress test” of existing systems, in what the French com- we stay ahead mander, Major General Michel Friedling, denoted as a “first for the French of this growing army and even a first in Europe.” These simulations reportedly included threat.” “monitoring of a potentially dangerous space object, as well as a threat to a satellite.” The drills lasted five days and included participation from the U.S. – GENERAL JOHN RAY- Space Force and German space agencies.150 MOND, CHIEF OF SPACE OPERATIONS, U.S. SPACE FORCE149 ISRAEL As reported last year, Israel has continued development of a laser defense system called the Iron Beam, which can intercept lower-tier rockets and missiles. Israel’s Ministry of Defense has announced land, sea, and air sys- SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 26 OTHERS tems to compliment the laser.151 Israel has that “Japan’s security space activities are also developed a smaller laser defense premised on cooperation with the United weapon, Light Blade, that can target bal- States.”156 CONTINUED loons or kites up to two kilometers in the While Japan has not demonstrated any DEVELOPMENTS distance.152 Continued developments and direct-ascent ASAT systems, the country investments in laser technology used on has U.S.-made SM-3 missile defense in- AND Earth are a step closer to counterspace la- terceptors that have a latent ability to at- ser technology; however, there are many tack space assets in LEO. Because military INVESTMENTS additional technical challenges for lasing developments in space are relatively new a satellite from Earth that Israel has not to the country, most public remarks have IN LASER yet demonstrated. been about the possibility of capabilities that the country is interested in pursuing, TECHNOLOGY such as co-orbital ASAT and jamming ca- USED ON EARTH JAPAN pabilities. In 2020, then-prime minister Shinzo Abe declared that the country ARE A STEP will “drastically bolster capability and Japan continues to advance its civil and systems in order to secure superiority,” military space operations. Prior to the CLOSER TO though no specific programs have been passage of the 2008 Basic Space Law, Ja- made public.157 COUNTERSPACE pan had a national policy that prohibited the use of space for national defense.153 LASER The 2008 law permitted the country to SOUTH KOREA begin military developments in space, TECHNOLOGY. and government officials have begun to speak out about the development of de- In an October 2020 blog post, the govern- fensive counterspace capabilities.154 The ment of South Korea discussed its need timing of this law and the ramping up of to reinforce satellite navigation with ter- many counterspace developments are restrial systems to combat jamming and in response to actions by China in space, spoofing. The country cited its past trou- such as the 2007 Chinese debris-produc- bles with spoofing from North Korea, spe- ing ASAT test. cifically from 2010 to 2016, as a driving force to augment GPS use with terrestrial This year, Japan authorized a bill to set systems.158 The Ministry of Science also up its proposed Space Domain Mission released a statement detailing plans to Unit within the Japan Air Self-Defense upgrade space capabilities, including the Force. The squadron is slated to be fully launch of the first locally built rocket that operational by 2023, with plans to launch will carry satellites and orbiter probes to the first satellite for monitoring the space the Moon, with aims for a more powerful environment by 2026.155 The Space Oper- rocket by 2029.159 ations Squadron was established in 2020 as the first space domain mission unit with the official mission to protect Jap- UNITED KINGDOM anese satellites from damage, including armed attacks, and to monitor the space environment, including space debris, as- The United Kingdom continues to inte- teroids, and other satellites. The Space grate space into its military structure. In announced in February 2021, and the Operations Squadron will cooperate with 2021, the country announced its largest command is scheduled to be operational U.S. Space Command and Japan’s civil defense budget since the Cold War, a and capable of launching its first rock- agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration portion of which will go toward build- et by 2022.160 Space Command will work Agency. Yasuhito Fukushima, a senior ing the Royal Air Force Space Command alongside the Ministry of Defence’s re- research fellow at the Japanese Nation- in Scotland. The first commander of the cently formed Space Directorate as a joint al Institute for Defense Studies, added United Kingdom’s Space Command was command structure.161 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 27 WHAT TO WATCH WHAT TO WATCH THE COMING YEAR MAY BE MARKED MORE BY THE CONTINUITY of current trends rather than any disruptive changes. While China continues to make progress in developing counterspace weapons, its focus appears to be shifting to integrating these capabilities into its forces and operational plans. A key issue to watch over the coming year is China’s overall investment in space-related research and development and the development of potentially dual-use space capabilities, such as its ten- tacle space debris cleanup robot. From an operational perspective, a key development to track is the progress China makes integrating its electronic counterspace capabilities, such as jamming and spoofing, into its irregular warfare forces and tactics. In terms of norms of behavior in space, a key indicator to watch is the behavior of China’s SJ-17 GEO inspector satellite. While SJ-17 appears to have focused on inspecting other Chinese satellites so far, using this satellite to inspect another nation’s satellites in GEO would mark an important shift in its use that could have broader repercussions. Russia is perhaps the most likely nation to conduct additional counter- space testing and deployment over the coming year. Given the tests of its direct ascent and co-orbital ASAT weapons conducted in 2020, a key issue to watch is whether these tests continue and if new capabilities are demon- strated. Other areas to watch for Russia include tests of new direct ascent SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 28 or co-orbital ASAT capabilities, laser programs. As the new U.S. administra- ASAT systems on additional airborne and tion develops and refines its overall na- ground-based platforms, electronic war- tional security strategy, one of the key 2020 WAS A fare systems for the protection of critical areas to watch will be how it addresses platforms, and emboldened cyberattacks space policy issues in general and the SLOW YEAR FOR against civilian infrastructure and govern- proliferation of counterspace weap- COUNTERSPACE ment institutions. ons. Calls within the United States and Both Iran and North Korea continue to abroad for more clearly defined norms ACTIVITIES, have relatively immature space capa- of behavior in space are growing.162 An bilities, but their electronic and cyber early indication that the Biden admin- WITH A FEW counterspace capabilities pose a seri- istration intends to make progress to- ous threat. Over the coming year, Iran ward building norms in space would be NOTABLE will likely continue its space launch ac- an agreement among DoD and the intel- EXCEPTIONS. tivities under the IGRC and North Korea ligence community for which norms the may look to restart testing of its space U.S. government is willing to support launch capabilities after a year of rela- and abide by. Without an interagency tive dormancy. A key development to agreement within the U.S. government, watch is any additional indication that it will be difficult to start a meaningful Iran and North Korea are cooperating conversion with other governments. in space or ballistic missile technolo- gy, which could mean progress in one country is likely to be transferred to the other. Additional issues to watch include continued Iranian GPS spoofing in the Persian Gulf and North Korean GPS jamming into South Korea. An in- creased frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks by either country in oth- er domains could also indicate a higher level of cyber threats to space systems. India does not appear to be poised to conduct another test of its direct as- cent ASAT missile in the near future. It is more likely to continue development of high-powered lasers and other non-ki- netic ASAT capabilities. Key indicators for India in space include how its new military and research and development space agencies continue to develop, the level of funding provided for space and counterspace activities, and signs that it is adapting or testing its electronic warfare systems for use against space systems. Overall, 2020 was a slow year for coun- terspace activities, with a few notable exceptions detailed in this year’s report. The coming year may prove more active overall as nations reemerge from lock- down and return to their prior plans and SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 29 ABOUT THE AUTHORS TODD HARRISON is the director of Defense Budget Analysis and director of the Aer- ospace Security Project at CSIS. As a senior fellow in the International Security Pro- gram, he leads the Center’s efforts to provide in-depth, nonpartisan research and analysis of defense funding, space security, and air power issues. He has authored publications on trends in the defense budget, military space systems, threats to space systems, civil space exploration, defense acquisitions, military compensation and readiness, and military force structure, among other topics. He teaches classes on military space systems and the defense budget at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Mr. Harrison joined CSIS from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, where he was a senior fellow for defense budget studies. He previously worked at Booz Allen Hamilton, where he consulted for the U.S. Air Force on satellite communications systems and supported a variety of other clients evaluating the performance of acqui- sition programs. Prior to Booz Allen, he worked for AeroAstro Inc. developing advanced space technologies and as a management consultant at Diamond Cluster Internation- al. Mr. Harrison served as a captain in the U.S. Air Force Reserves. He is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with both a BS and an MS in aeronautics and astronautics. KAITLYN JOHNSON is deputy director and fellow of the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS. Ms. Johnson manages the team’s strategic planning and research agenda. Her re- search specializes in topics such as space security, military space systems, commercial space policy, and U.S. air dominance. Previously, Ms. Johnson has written on national security space reorganization, threats against space assets, the commercialization of space, escalation and deterrence dynamics, and defense acquisition trends. Ms. John- son holds an MA from American University in U.S. foreign policy and national security studies, with a concentration in defense and space security, and a BS from the Georgia Institute of Technology in international affairs. LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOE MOYE is an active-duty Marine Corps officer with near- ly 22 years of service. He graduated from Appalachian State University in 1998 with a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and commissioned in 1999. He holds a master’s degree in international public policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Inter- national Studies, with a strategic studies concentration. His operational assignments include a marine expeditionary unit afloat and six deployments to the Middle East, the African Continent, and European Theater. His most recent operational assignment was battalion command in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. His Marine Corps staff positions include Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command and Headquarters, Marine Corps. His joint assignments include United States Special Operations Command, Spe- cial Operations Joint Task Force/NATO Special Operations Component Command - Af- ghanistan, and Transregional Threats Coordination Cell, Joint Staff J5 Directorate. MAKENA YOUNG is a research associate with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS. Her research interests include international collaboration, space security, and orbital debris. Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Young worked for the Federal Aviation Administration as an aerospace engineer, focusing on automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast certification and integration in small aircraft. She holds a BS in aeronautical and astro- nautical engineering from Purdue University with minors in international relations and environmental engineering. SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 30 ENDNOTES INTRODUCTION 1 “UCS Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists, accessed February 26, 2021, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-data- base. 2 Makena Young, “How Does Space Policy Directive-5 Change Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems?,” Aerospace Security, September 14, 2020, https://aerospace.csis.org/how-does-space-policy-directive-5-change-cybersecurity-principles-for-space-systems/. 3 “Memorandum on the National Strategy for Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion (Space Policy Directive-6),” White House, December 16, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-national-strategy-space-nuclear-power-propul- sion-space-policy-directive-6/; and “Memorandum on Space Policy Directive 7,” White House, January 15, 2021, https://trumpwhitehouse. archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-space-policy-directive-7/. 4 “NASA Administrator Signs Statement of Intent with Brazil on Artemis Cooperation,” NASA, December 14, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/ feature/nasa-administrator-signs-statement-of-intent-with-brazil-on-artemis-cooperation. 5 Todd Harrison and Seamus P. Daniels, Analysis of the FY 2021 Defense Budget (Washington, DC: CSIS, August 2020), 45-49, https://de- fense360.csis.org/analysis-of-the-fy-2021-defense-budget/. 6 U.S. Space Force, Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces (Washington, DC: August 2020), https://www.spaceforce.mil/Portals/1/Space%20 Capstone%20Publication_10%20Aug%202020.pdf. 7 U.S. Space Command, Commander’s Strategic Vision (Washington, DC: January 2021), https://www.spacecom.mil/Portals/32/Images/cc-vi- sion/usspacecom-strategic-vision-22feb21.pdf?ver=xW4jfruY-cHS0HfWf6KN9A%3d%3d. TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS 8 U.S. Space Force, Spacepower, 43. 9 “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water,” Department of State, https://2009-2017.state. gov/t/avc/trty/199116.htm#signatory. 10 Brian Garino and Jane Gibson, “Space System Threats,” in AU-18 Space Primer (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, September 2009), 277, http://space.au.af.mil/au-18-2009/au-18_chap21.pdf. 11 Richard B. Langley et al., “Innovation: GNSS Spoofing Detection,” GPS World, June 1, 2013, http://gpsworid.com/innovation-gnss -spoof- ing-detection-correlating-carrier-phase-with-rapid-antenna-motion/. CHINA 12 “Counterspace Weapons Timeline,” Aerospace Security, accessed March 25, 2021, https://aerospace.csis.org/counterspace-timeline. 13 Leonard David, “China’s Chang’e 5 moon samples are headed to the lab,” Space.com, December 18, 2020, https://www.space.com/china- chang-e-5-moon-samples-lab. 14 “China’s Chang’e-4 probe resumes work for 27th lunar day,” Xinhua, February 2, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/eng- lish/2021-02/07/c_139727894.htm. 15 Stephan Clark, “China to begin construction of space station this year,” Spaceflight Now, January 10, 2021, https://spaceflightnow. com/2021/01/10/china-to-begin-construction-of-space-station-this-year/. 16 Leonard David, “China’s Tianwen-1 Mars mission adjusts orbit to prepare for a Red Planet landing,” Space.com, February 17, 2021, https:// www.space.com/china-tianwen-1-mars-mission-adjusts-orbit-for-landing. 17 Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “China’s Secret Spacecraft Looks To Have Landed At This Remote Base With A Massive Runway,” The Drive, September 8, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36270/this-remote-base-with-a-massive-runway-looks-to-be-where- chinas-secretive-spacecraft-landed. 18 Geoff Brumel, “New Chinese Space Plane Landed At Mysterious Air Base, Evidence Suggests,” NPR, September 9, 2020, https://www.npr. org/2020/09/09/911113352/new-chinese-space-plane-landed-at-mysterious-air-base-evidence-suggests. 19 Andrew Jones, “China’s CASIC reveals five-year plan for reusable spaceplane, commercial space projects,” SpaceNews, October 19, 2020, https://spacenews.com/chinas-casic-reveals-five-year-plan-for-reusable-space-plane-commercial-space-projects/. 20 “China puts final satellite into orbit to try to rival GPS network,” Reuters, June 22, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-explora- 31 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 tion-china-satellite/china-puts-final-satellite-into-orbit-to-try-to-rival-gps-network-idUSKBN23U08P. 21 “Beidou Global Navigation Satellite System,” Glonass, accessed February 26, 2021, https://www.glonass-iac.ru/en/guide/beidou.php. 22 Andrew Jones, “China successfully launches new Long March 7A on second attempt,” SpaceNews, March 11, 2021, https://spacenews.com/ china-successfully-launches-new-long-march-7a-on-second-attempt/. 23 John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 2018), 10-12, 15, 16, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf. 24 Alexander Bowe, “China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for the United States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 11, 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_China’s%20Space%20Power%20Goals.pdf. 25 “Counterspace Weapons Timeline,” Aerospace Security, accessed March 25, 2021, https://aerospace.csis.org/counterspace-timeline. 26 This approximation was derived from the formula: distance(km) = 2 * orbital radius * SIN (0.5*angular separation). 27 Thomas G. Roberts, “Unusual behavior in GEO: SJ-17,” Aerospace Security, March 30, 2020, https://aerospace.csis.org/data/unusual-behav- ior-in-geo-sj-17/. 28 “China develops new tentacle-like robot to clear space debris,” Xinhua, February 4, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/eng- lish/2021-02/04/c_139721266.htm. 29 Brian G. Chow and Henry Sokolski, “U.S. Satellites Increasingly Vulnerable to China’s Ground Based Lasers,” SpaceNews, July 10, 2020, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-u-s-satellites-increasingly-vulnerable-to-chinas-ground-based-lasers/. 30 Shishir Gupta, “China builds new structures near LAC, relocates troops. India reads a message,” Hindustan Times, October 24, 2020, https:// www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-spots-movement-across-lac-china-is-building-new-structures-relocating-troops/story-DIe- 6zUzawUyTwEBrakZ45K.html. RUSSIA 31 “Aerospace Defence Forces,” Space Forces: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/cosmic. htm; and Matthew Bodner, “As Trump Pushes for Separate Space Force, Russia Move Fast the Other Way,” Defense News, June 22, 2018, https:// www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/06/21/as-trump-pushes-for-separate-space-force-russia-moves-fast-the-other-way/. 32 “Russia to Launch 29 Space Rockets in 2021, Says Roscosmos Chief,” TASS, February 20, 2021, https://tass.com/science/1259053. 33 “Russian Space Agency Publishes Declassified Documents on World’s 1st Lunar Soft Landing,” TASS, February 12, 2021, https://tass.com/ science/1255965. 34 “Roscosmos Continues Discussing Joint Moon Base with China,” TASS, January 25, 2021, https://tass.com/science/1248511. 35 Andrew Jones, “Russia, China to Sign Agreement on International Lunar Research Station,” SpaceNews, February 17, 2021, https://space- news.com/russia-china-to-sign-agreement-on-international-lunar-research-station/. 36 Jessie Yeung, “China and Russia agree to build joint lunar space station,” CNN, March 10, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/09/asia/rus- sia-china-lunar-station-intl-hnk-scli-scn/index.html. 37 Anatoly Zak, “The Angara Family of Launch Vehicles,” Russianspaceweb.com, https://russianspaceweb.com/angara.html. 38 “Roscosmos Reaches Agreements to Build Satellites for Several Countries,” TASS, January 28, 2021, https://tass.com/science/1250283. 39 , “Russia Seeks to Counter Space Threats,” Chinadaily.com.cn, June 4, 2020, http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202006/04/WS5e- 代艳 d85870a310a8b24115ac9c.html. 40 “Russia Tests Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile,” United States Space Command, April 15, 2020, https://www.spacecom.mil/MEDIA/ NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2151611/russia-tests-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile/. 41 Kyle Mizokami, “Meet Russia’s Imposing New Satellite-Destroying Missile,” Popular Mechanics, April 16, 2020, https://www.popularmechan- ics.com/military/weapons/a32173824/nudol-missile-anti-satellite/. 42 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Official: Russian Missile Tests Expose Vulnerability of Low-Orbiting Satellites,” SpaceNews, December 17, 2020, https://spacenews.com/space-force-official-russian-missile-tests-expose-vulnerability-of-low-orbiting-satellites/. 43 Pavel Podvig, “Nudol ASAT System Tested from Plesetsk,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 16, 2020, http://russianforces.org/ blog/2020/12/nudol_asat_system_tested_from.shtml. 44 “Russia Conducts Space-Based Anti-Satellite Weapons Test,” United States Space Command, July 23, 2020, https://www.spacecom.mil/ MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2285098/russia-conducts-space-based-anti-satellite-weapons-test/. 45 “Kosmos 2519 / Kosmos 2521 / Kosmos 2523,” Gunter’s Space Page, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/kosmos-2519.htm. 46 Beyza Unal, “Russia’s Behaviour Risks Weaponizing Outer Space,” Chatham House, July 31, 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/ 32 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 russias-behaviour-risks-weaponizing-outer-space. 47 “Russia Committed to Full Demilitarization of Outer Space, Kremlin Says,” TASS, July 24, 2020, https://tass.com/politics/1181997. 48 Jonathan McDowell, Twitter Post, June 15, 2020, 12:30 pm,https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1272567228416827395?lang=en. 49 Anatoly Zak, “Soyuz-2-1v Launches Four Classified Payloads,” Russianspaceweb.com, http://russianspaceweb.com/Cos- mos-2535-2536-2537-2538.html. 50 Peter Suciu, “S-500: Russia’s F-35 Killer Coming Next Year,” National Interest, November 30, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/s- 500-russias-f-35-killer-coming-next-year-173514. 51 “Russia Touts S-500’s Ability to Destroy Hypersonic Weapons in Space,” Moscow Times, March 5, 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes. com/2020/07/03/russia-touts-s-500s-ability-to-destroy-hypersonic-weapons-in-space-a70767. 52 “Is the S-500 Russia’s Answer to America’s Space Corps? Hypersonic Missile System Designed to Intercept Attacks from Space,” Military Watch Magazine, July 8, 2019, https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/is-the-s-500-russia-s-answer-to-america-s-space-corps-hy- personic-missile-system-designed-to-intercept-attacks-from-space. 53 Joseph Trevithick, “Here’s Our Best Look Yet at Russia’s Secretive Space Cannon, The Only Gun Ever Fired in Space,” The Drive, February 16, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39277/heres-our-best-look-yet-at-russias-secretive-space-cannon-the-only-gun-ever-fired- in-space. 54 Bart Hendrickx, “Peresvet: a Russian Mobile Laser System to Dazzle Enemy Satellites,” The Space Review, June 15, 2020, https://www. thespacereview.com/article/3967/1. 55 John Pike, “A-60 Ladoga 1A Airborne Laser,” https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/a-60.htm. 56 Hendrickx, “Peresvet.” 57 Bart Hendrickx, “Russia Gears up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 1),” The Space Review, October 26, 2020, https://www.thespacere- view.com/article/4056/1. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Anatoly Zak, “Lotos-S spacecraft for the Liana system,” Russianspaceweb.com, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/liana.html; and “Liana Electronic Intelligence Program,” Spaceflight101, https://spaceflight101.com/spacecraft/liana-electronic-intelligence-program/. 62 “Liana - Lotus C and Pion-NCC,” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/liana.htm. 63 Bart Hendrickx, “Russia Gears up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2),” The Space Review, November 2, 2020, https://www.thespacere- view.com/article/4060/1. 64 Ibid. 65 Terry Thompson, “The SolarWinds Hack Was All but Inevitable – Why National Cyber Defense Is a ‘Wicked’ Problem and What Can Be Done about It,” The Conversation, February 9, 2021, https://theconversation.com/the-solarwinds-hack-was-all-but-inevitable-why-national-cy- ber-defense-is-a-wicked-problem-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-153084. 66 Jason Murdock, “Who Has Been Affected by the Huge SolarWinds Cyberattack so Far?,” Newsweek, December 18, 2020, https://www. newsweek.com/solarwinds-orion-software-cyberattack-hack-victims-targets-list-1555840; and David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth, and Julian E. Barnes, “As Understanding of Russian Hacking Grows, So Does Alarm,” New York Times, January 2, 2021, https://www.nytimes. com/2021/01/02/us/politics/russian-hacking-government.html. 67 Ibid. 68 Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Wired, August 22, 2018, https://www.wired. com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/; and “Global Ransomware Attack Causes Turmoil,” BBC News, June 28, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40416611. IRAN 69 Samuel Hickey, “Iran’s military satellite launch: What just happened?,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 4, 2020, https:// armscontrolcenter.org/irans-military-satellite-launch-what-just-happened/; “Iran Lying About Peacefulness of Space Program, Pompeo Says,” Radio Farda, April 25, 2020, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-lying-about-peacefulness-of-space-program-pompeo-says/30576344. html; “US Calls On Europe, Others To Take Action Against Iran After Satellite Launch,” Radio Farda, April 26, 2020, https://en.radiofarda. com/a/us-calls-on-europe-others-to-take-action-against-iran-/30577148.html; and “UK Says Iran’s ballistic missile launch is of significant concern,” Reuters, April 24, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-satellite-britain/uk-says-irans-ballistic-missile-launch-is-of-sig- nificant-concern-idUSKCN2261JA. 33 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 70 Andrew Hanna, “Iran’s Ambitious Space Program,” The Iran Primer, Updated February 1, 2021, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/ jun/23/iran%E2%80%99s-ambitious-space-program; and Shaul Shay, “Iran and the Middle East space race,” Israel Hayom, May 4, 2020, https://www.israelhayom.com/opinions/__trashed-7/. 71 “نامزاس ییاضف ناریا,”Iranian Space Agency, July 9, 2016, https://www.isa.ir/find.php?item=1.66.10.fa; and“Space Industry Development Requires National Willpower: Minister,”Tehran Times, May 26, 2018, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/423935/Space-industry-development-re- quires-national-willpower-minister. 72 Fabian Hinz, “Have Iran’s space ambitions taken a worrisome turn?,” European Leadership Network, April 24, 2020, https://www.european- leadershipnetwork.org/commentary/have-irans-space-ambitions-taken-a-worrisome-new-turn/. 73 Anthony Cordesman, Iran and the Changing Military Balance in the Gulf (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2019), https://csis-website-prod. s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200326_Iran_Gulf_Net_Assesment.Third_Phase.Reduced.GH6%281%29.pdf. 74 “Iran Unveils Military Space Command, New Details on Satellite Launch,” SpaceWatch.Global, April 27, 2020, https://spacewatch.glob- al/2020/04/iran-unveils-military-space-command-new-details-on-satellite-launch/. 75 Marcia Smith, “Iran Launches First Military Satellite From New Launch Site,” Space Policy Online, April 23, 2020, https://spacepolicyonline. com/news/iran-launches-first-military-satellite-from-new-launch-site/; Fabian Hinz, “Have Iran’s space ambitions taken a worrisome turn?,” European Leadership Network, April 24, 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/have-irans-space-am- bitions-taken-a-worrisome-new-turn/; and Samuel Hickey, “Iran’s military satellite launch: What just happened?,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 4, 2020, https://armscontrolcenter.org/irans-military-satellite-launch-what-just-happened/. 76 Peter Pry, “Iran’s Satellite is No ‘Tumbling Webcam’,” Newsmax, May 5, 2020, https://www.newsmax.com/peterpry/irgc-sputnik-emp- space/2020/05/05/id/966149/. 77 Marcia Smith, “Iran Launches First Military Satellite From New Launch Site,” Space Policy Online, April 23, 2020, https://spacepolicyonline. com/news/iran-launches-first-military-satellite-from-new-launch-site/. 78 Ibid. 79 “Guards Commander Says Iran’s Eye in the Sky Makes it a ‘A World Power’,” Radio Farda, April 22, 2020, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/guards- commander-says-iran-s-eye-in-sky-makes-it-a-world-power-/30570301.html. 80 Jeremy Binnie, “US SPACECOM Commander Dismisses Iranian ‘Webcam’ Satellite,” Janes, April 30, 2020, https://www.janes.com/de- fence-news/news-detail/us-spacecom-commander-dismisses-iranian-webcam-satellite; and Pry, “Iran’s Satellite is No ‘Tumbling Web- cam.’” 81 Smith, “Iran Launches First Military Satellite From New Launch Site.” 82 Fabian Hinz, “Perspectives on Iran’s Satellite Launch: Fabian Hinz on the Qased Satellite Launch Vehicle,” SpaceWatch.Global, May 13, 2020, https://spacewatch.global/2020/05/spacewatchgl-perspectives-on-irans-satellite-launch-fabian-hinz-on-the-qased-satel- lite-launch-vehicle/; and Hickey, “Iran’s military satellite launch.” 83 Ibid. 84 Hinz, “Perspectives on Iran’s Satellite Launch.” 85 Hickey, “Iran’s military satellite launch.” 86 Fabian Hinz, “Have Iran’s space ambitions taken a worrisome turn?,” European Leadership Network, April 24, 2020, https://www.european- leadershipnetwork.org/commentary/have-irans-space-ambitions-taken-a-worrisome-new-turn/. 87 Hickey, “Iran’s military satellite launch.” 88 Smith, “Iran Launches First Military Satellite From New Launch Site.” 89 “Pentagon Official Says Iran Satellite Launch Vehicle Traveled ‘Long Way’,” Radio Farda, April 23, 2020, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/penta- gon-official-says-iran-satellite-launch-vehicle-traveled-long-way-/30571984.html. 90 Jay Raymond, Twitter Post, April 25, 2020, 2:19 PM, https://twitter.com/SpaceForceCSO/status/1254158221243277315. 91 Pry, “Iran’s Satellite is No ‘Tumbling Webcam’”; Fabian Hinz, “Have Iran’s space ambitions taken a worrisome turn?”; and Hickey, “Iran’s military satellite launch.” 92 Mihailo Zekic, “Iran Flexes its ‘Space Muscles’ With New Rocket Launch,” Watch Jerusalem, February 9, 2021, https://watchjerusalem. co.il/1162-iran-flexes-its-space-muscles-with-new-rocket-launch; Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Iran Launches New Rocket, Showing Advances in Potential Missile Technology,” Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-launches-new-rocket-show- ing-advances-in-potential-missile-technology-11612214948; David Axe, “Iran’s New Space Rocket Could Double as a Nuclear Missile,” Forbes, February 1, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/02/01/irans-new-space-rocket-could-double-as-a-weapon/?sh=5e- 2ec5da2d40; Batya Jerenberg, “Iran tests new ‘most powerful’ rocket capable of carrying nuclear warhead,” Janglo, February 4, 2021, https://www.janglo.net/item/qbkS7rNbA6G; and Elizabeth Howell, “Iran Tests new Rocket on sub-orbital test flight,” Space.com, February 17, 2021, https://www.space.com/iran-tests-new-rocket-zoljanah. 34 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 93 Rasmussen, “Iran Launches New Rocket”; and Axe, “Iran’s New Space Rocket”; and Batya Jerenberg, “Iran tests new ‘most powerful’ rock- et”; and Howell, “Iran Tests new Rocket on sub-orbital test flight.” 94 Axe, “Iran’s New Space Rocket”; Jerenberg, “Iran tests new ‘most powerful’ rocket”; and Howell, “Iran Tests new Rocket.” 95 Rasanah, “Iran’s Space Dreams are Clear and Dangerous,” International Institute for Iranian Studies, February 16, 2021, https://rasanah-iiis. org/english/monitoring-and-translation/reports/¬irans-space-dreams-are-clear-and-dangerous/. 96 Rasmussen, “Iran Launches New Rocket.” 97 “Iran test launches new domestically manufactured satellite launch vehicle,” Pars Today, February 2, 2021, https://parstoday.com/en/ news/iran-i133504-iran_test_launches_new_domestically_manufactured_satellite_launch_vehicle; and Howell, “Iran Tests new Rocket.” 98 Todd Harrison et al., Space Threat Assessment 2020 (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2020), https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/up- loads/2020/03/Harrison_SpaceThreatAssessment20_WEB_FINAL-min.pdf. 99 “IRGC launches final stage of joint military exercise in southern Iran,” Iranian Students’ News Agency, July 28, 2020, https://en.isna.ir/ news/99050705060/IRGC-launches-final-stage-of-joint-military-exercise-in-southern; “Iran Air Defense forces perform large-scale electron- ic warfare drills,” Iran Project, October 21, 2020, https://theiranproject.com/blog/2020/10/21/iran-air-defense-forces-perform-large-scale- electronic-warfare-drills/; “Iran launches large-scale electronic aerial drills,” Tehran Times, October 21, 2020, https://www.tehrantimes. com/news/453826/Iran-launches-large-scale-electronic-aerial-drills; “Second day of ‘Velayat-99’ maneuvers performed by Army, IRGC,” Iranian Students’ News Agency, October 22, 2020, https://en.isna.ir/photo/99080100336/Second-day-of-Velayat-99-maneuvers-performed- by-Army-IRGC; and “Massive war games light up Iran’s skies,” Al Monitor, October 21, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi- nals/2020/10/iran-war-games-air-defense-exercise-regional-tensions.html. 100 “IRIAF capable of giving ‘prompt’ response to any threat,” Mehr News Agency, February 9, 2021, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/169722/ IRIAF-capable-of-giving-prompt-response-to-any-threat. 101 Joseph Trevithick, “New Type of GPS Spoofing Attack in China Creates “Crop Circles” of False Location Data,” The Drive, November 18, 2019, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/31092/new-type-of-gps-spoofing-attack-in-china-creates-crop-circles-of-false-location-da- ta. 102 Dana Goward, “GPS circle spoofing discovered in Iran,” GPS World, April 21, 2020, https://www.gpsworld.com/gps-circle-spoofing-discov- ered-in-iran/. 103 Dana Goward, “New GPS ‘circle spoofing’ moves ship locations thousands of miles,” GPS World, May 26, 2020, https://www.gpsworld.com/ new-gps-circle-spoofing-moves-ship-locations-thousands-of-miles/. 104 Scott Peterson and Payam Faramarzi,“Exclusive: Iran hijacked U.S. drone, says Iranian engineer,”Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 2011, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer. 105 Gil Baram and Kevin Lim, “Israel and Iran Just Showed Us the Future of Cyberwar with Their Unusual Attacks,” Foreign Policy, June 5, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/05/israel-and-iran-just-showed-us-the-future-of-cyberwar-with-their-unusual-attacks/. 106 Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, Iran’s Cyber Threat: Espionage, Sabotage, and Revenge (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Iran_Cyber_Final_Full_v2.pdf; United Against Nuclear Iran, The Iranian Cyber Threat (New York: December 2020), https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/The%20Iranian%20Cyber%20 Threat_1220_JMB_CLEAN.pdf; and Miriam Baksh, “CISA Warns of Iran’s Offensive Cyber Capabilities,” Nextgov, December 4, 2020, https:// www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2020/12/cisa-warns-irans-offensive-cyber-capabilities/170505/. 107 “Iran-Linked Group Says it Hacked Israeli Aerospace Industries,” Yeshiva World, December 21, 2020, https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/ news/headlines-breaking-stories/1930427/iran-linked-group-says-it-hacked-israeli-aerospace-industries.html; and Yossi Mekelberg, “Cy- berspace: the new frontier in the Israeli-Iranian battleground,” Arab News, December 26, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1783176. 108 Baksh, “CISA Warns of Iran’s Offensive Cyber Capabilities.” 109 John Hardie and Annie Fixler, “Russia-Iran cooperation poses challenges for US cyber strategy, global norms,” C4ISRNET, February 8, 2021, https://www.c4isrnet.com/thought-leadership/2021/02/08/russia-iran-cooperation-poses-challenges-for-us-cyber-strategy-glob- al-norms/; “Iran, Russia sign information security cooperation pact,” Iranian Students’ News Agency, January 26, 2021, https://en.isna.ir/ news/99110705109/Iran-Russia-sign-information-security-cooperation-pact; and “Iran, Russia Ink Cybersecurity Cooperation Pact,” Tasnim News Agency, January 26, 2021, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/01/26/2440530/iran-russia-ink-cybersecurity-coopera- tion-pact. NORTH KOREA 110 David Wainer, “Iran and North Korea Resumed Cooperation on Missiles, UN Says,” Bloomberg, February 8, 2021, https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2021-02-08/iran-and-north-korea-resumed-cooperation-on-missiles-un-says; “UN Report Says Iran and North Korea Resumed Missile Cooperation,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, February 9, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/un-report-says-iran-and- north-korea-resumed-missile-cooperation/31093315.html; and “North Korea-Iran missile cooperation is reason for ambitious diplomacy,” 35 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 The Survival Editor’s Blog, February 15, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2021/02/north-korea-iran-missile-cooperation. 111 “North Korea hits back at the UNSC for calling its space program threatening,” Business Insider India, November 20, 2020, https:// www.businessinsider.in/science/space/news/north-korea-hits-back-at-the-unsc-for-calling-its-space-programs-threatening/article- show/79319410.cms. 112 Yonhap, “NK pushing for five-year space development program purely for peaceful purposes: state media,” Korean Herald, April 2, 2020, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200402000655; and Colin Zwirko, “North Korean TV airs new segment promoting national space program,” NK News, May 29, 2020, https://www.nknews.org/2020/05/north-korean-tv-airs-new-segment-promoting-national-space- program/. 113 Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea highlights space program in state media,” UPI, April 2, 2020, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World- News/2020/04/02/North-Korea-highlights-space-program-in-state-media/8821585835441/. 114 “Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Service Roads Regraded,” 38 North, March 31, 2020, https://www.38north.org/2020/03/sohae033120/; Peter Makowsky and Jack Liu, “Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Signs of Daily Life,” 38 North, December 4, 2020, https://www.38north. org/2020/12/sohae201204/; and Peter Makowsky and Jack Liu, “Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Snow Removal Underway,” 38 North, February 5, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/02/sohae-satellite-launching-station-snow-removal-underway/. 115 “North Korean Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Weapons and Warfare, October 16, 2020, https://weaponsandwarfare. com/2020/10/16/north-korean-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-weapons/. 116 Colin Zwirko, “North Korean TV airs new segment promoting national space program,” NK News, May 29, 2020, https://www.nknews. org/2020/05/north-korean-tv-airs-new-segment-promoting-national-space-program/. 117 “North Korean Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Weapons and Warfare. 118 David Axe, “ Kim Jong Un Throws Down a Nuclear Gauntlet – His Regime will Build a Solid-Fuel ICBM,” Forbes, January 14, 2021, https:// www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/01/14/kim-jong-un-throws-down-a-nuclear-gauntlet-his-regime-will-build-a-solid-fuel-icb- m/?sh=29f6544b75b4. 119 “No Dong 1,” Missile Threat, CSIS, June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/no-dong/; and David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005), 77, https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/physics-space-security.pdf. 120 “North Korean Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Weapons and Warfare, October 16, 2020, https://weaponsandwarfare. com/2020/10/16/north-korean-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-weapons/. 121 Peter Pry, “North Korea’s Satellites Could Unleash Electromagnetic Pulse Attack,” Center for Security Policy, March 11, 2019, https://www. centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2019/03/11/north-koreas-satellites-could-unleash-electromagnetic-pulse-attack/; Rajesh Uppal, “China, North Korea, and Others Developing Super-EMP and Other Electromagnetic Weapons, Posing Serious Threat to Civil Society,” International Defense Security & Technology, August 31, 2020, https://idstch.com/geopolitics/the-rise-of-emp-and-microwave-weapons-or-weapons-of- mass-electrical-destruction-pose-threat-to-civil-society/; and Peter Pry, “EMP ignorance is bliss,” Secure the Grid, August 5, 2020, https:// securethegrid.com/2020/08/05/emp-ignorance-is-bliss/. 122 Jeong Tae Joo, “N Korea readies deployment of new GPS jamming device,” Daily NK, April 27, 2020, https://www.dailynk.com/english/ north-korea-readies-deployment-new-gps-jamming-device/; and “North Korea is Enhancing its Electronic Warfare Capabilities,” iHLS, May 1, 2020, https://i-hls.com/archives/100960. 123 Steven Silver, “Is North Korea Jamming Radio Signals?,” National Interest, January 7, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/ north-korea-jamming-radio-signals-175977; Mun Dong Hui, “North Korea appears to be jamming Unification Media Group radio broad- casts,” Daily NK, January 7, 2021, https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-appears-jamming-unification-media-group-radio-broad- casts/; and “North Korean Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Weapons and Warfare, October 16, 2020, https://weaponsandwarfare. com/2020/10/16/north-korean-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-weapons/. 124 Department of the Army, North Korean Tactics, Army Technical Publication 7-100.2 (Washington, DC: July 2020), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/ army/atp7-100-2.pdf. 125 Eduard Kovacs, “U.S. Army Report Describes North Korea’s Cyber Warfare Capabilities,” Security Week, August 18, 2020, https://www.secu- rityweek.com/us-army-report-describes-north-koreas-cyber-warfare-capabilities; and Department of the Army, North Korean Tactics. 126 Kovacs, “U.S. Army Report Describes North Korea’s Cyber Warfare Capabilities”; and Department of the Army, North Korean Tactics. 127 Yonhap, “Pompeo says N. Korea a greater threat than Russia in cyber security,” Korea Herald, December 15, 2020, http://www.koreaherald. com/view.php?ud=20201215000110&np=13&mp=2. 128 “U.S. says threat posed by North Korea cyber activity part of policy review,” Reuters, February 17, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSKBN2AH2PA. 129 Eric Tucker, “US charges North Korean computer programmers in global hacks,” Associated Press, February 17, 2021, https://apnews.com/ article/us-charges-north-korea-global-hacks-3c8145431462830e8f80e1576f731577. 36 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 130 Ibid. 131 Edith Lederer, “UN experts: North Korea using cyberattacks to update nukes,” Associated Press, February 9, 2021, https://apnews.com/arti- cle/technology-global-trade-nuclear-weapons-north-korea-coronavirus-pandemic-19f536cac4a84780f54a3279ef707b33. 132 Ibid. INDIA 133 Paulo Shakarian, “North Korea targeted cybersecurity researchers with hacking, espionage,” UPI, February 5, 2021, https://www.upi.com/ Top_News/Voices/2021/02/05/North-Korea-targeted-cybersecurity-researchers-with-hacking-espionage/8221612529846/. 134 Ibid. 135 “About ISRO,” ISRO, https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro. 136 Hanneke Weitering, “India’s Space Agency Breaks Dry Spell with Its 1st Rocket Launch of 2020,” Space.com, November 10, 2020, https:// www.space.com/india-pslv-rocket-1st-launch-2020. 137 Andrew Jones, “Indian PSLV rocket launches Brazilian Amazonia-1 satellite,” SpaceNews, February 28, 2021, https://spacenews.com/indi- an-pslv-rocket-launches-brazilian-amazonia-1-satellite/. 138 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India to Launch a Defense-Based Space Research Agency,” Defense News, June 12, 2019, https://www.defensenews. com/space/2019/06/12/india-to-launch-a-defense-based-space-research-agency/. 139 John Sheldon, “Indian Space Wars: India’s DRDO Head Outlines Counterspace Capability Ambitions,” SpaceWatch.Global, April 15, 2019, https://spacewatch.global/2019/04/indian-space-wars-indias-drdo-head-outlines-counterspace-capability-ambitions/. 140 Aakriti Sharma, “India’s Defense Space Agency Hunting for New Technology That Can Track Enemy Assets,” EurAsian Times, February 24, 2021, https://eurasiantimes.com/india-steps-up-space-warfare-program-begins-hunt-for-new-technology. 141 Rajat Pandit “ASAT Missile: Satellite-Killer Not a One-off, India Working on Star Wars Armoury,” Times of India, April 7, 2019, https://time- sofindia.indiatimes.com/india/satellite-killer-not-a-one-off-india-working-on-star-wars-armoury/articleshow/68758674.cms. 142 “DRDO Accelerates Work on ‘Laser Weapons’; But Where Does India Stand Against China, Russia, and The US?,” EurAsian Times, September 28, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/drdo-accelerates-work-on-laser-weapons-but-where-does-india-stand-against-china-russia-the-us. 143 “Technologies,” Defence Research and Development Organisation - DRDO, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://www.drdo. gov.in/labs-establishment/technologies/laser-science-technology-centre-lastec. 144 “Electronic Warfare – Denying Electromagnetic Advantage to Enemy,” SP’s Land Forces - Defence, http://www.spslandforces.com/sto- ry/?id=698. 145 “Himshakti EW:- India Indigenous Electronic Warfare System,” Indian Defence News, May 4, 2019, https://defenceupdate.in/himshak- ti-ew-india-indigenous-electronic-warfare-system/. 146 Ibid.; and IANS, “Pakistan’s Radars Were Jammed by IAF during Airstrike at Balakot,” Business Standard, February 26, 2019, https://www. business-standard.com/article/news-ians/pakistan-s-radars-were-jammed-by-iaf-during-airstrike-at-balakot-119022601215_1.html. 147 “(Formerly NM Urban) Homesteader - Blog,” https://formerlynmurbanhomesteader.weebly.com/uploads/2/2/5/0/22509786/weebly_for- merlynmurbanhomesteader_links_master__version_1_autosaved_.xlsx. 148 John Leyden, “Indian Cyber-Espionage Activity Rising amid Growing Rivalry with China, Pakistan,” Daily Swig, February 25, 2021, https:// portswigger.net/daily-swig/indian-cyber-espionage-activity-rising-amid-growing-rivalry-with-china-pakistan. OTHERS 149 Jim Garamone, “Chief of Space Operations Discusses Need for Outreach to Partners, State of Space Force,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 25, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2427918/chief-of-space-operations-discusses-need-for-out- reach-to-partners-state-of-spac/. 150 AFP Staff Writers, “France conducts first military drills in space,” Spacewar, March 9, 2021, https://www.spacewar.com/reports/France_con- ducts_first_military_drills_in_space_999.html. 151 SPIE Europe Ltd, “Israeli Ministry of Defense Claims Laser Weapon Breakthrough,” Optics.org, accessed March 5, 2021, https://optics.org/ news/11/1/25. 152 “Israel’s Space-Age Laser Weapon Targets Explosive Balloons from Gaza,” VOA, accessed March 5, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/epi- sode/israels-space-age-laser-weapon-targets-explosive-balloons-gaza-4407646. 153 Joanne Wheeler ed., The Space Law Review, 2nd ed. (London: December 2020), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-space-law-review. 37 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 154 Doug Messier, “An Overview of Japan’s Counterspace Strategy,” Parabolic Arc, April 26, 2020, http:// parabolicarc.com/2020/04/26/an-overview-of-japans-counterspace-strategy/. 155 Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan Launches New Unit to Boost Defense in Space,” Defense News, May 18, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/05/18/japan-launches-new-unit-to-boost- defense-in-space/; “Japan’s New Space Domain Mission Unit and Security in the Indo-Pacific Region,” International Institute for Security Studies, accessed March 5, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/mili- tary-balance/2020/05/japan-space-domain-mission-unit-security; and Suzuki Kazuto, “Space: A New Battleground for Japan,” Nippon, December 5, 2018, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a06101/. 156 Sam Wilson, “Japan’s Gradual Shift Toward Space Security,” The Diplomat, May 6, 2020, https://thedip- lomat.com/2020/05/japans-gradual-shift-toward-space-security/; Yamaguchi, “Japan Launches New Unit to Boost Defense in Spacehttp://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/research/profile/anzen/06-fukush- ima.html. 157 Doug Messier, “An Overview of Japan’s Counterspace Strategy,” Parabolic Arc, April 26, 2020, http:// parabolicarc.com/2020/04/26/an-overview-of-japans-counterspace-strategy/. 158 Dana A. Goward et al., “South Korea Discusses Decision to Combine GPS and ELoran,” Geospatial World, November 17, 2020, https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/south-korea-discusses-decision- to-combine-gps-and-eloran/. 159 , “Upcoming Military Exercise with U.S. Should Be Postponed or Halted: Expert,” Yonhap News 이원주 Agency, February 25, 2021, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210225009200325. 160 “Air Commodore Paul Godfrey announced as Commander United Kingdom Space Command,” Royal Air Force, February 1, 2021, https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/air-commodore-paul-godfrey-an- nounced-as-commander-united-kingdom-space-command/. 161 Steve Shaw, “Britain Gears Up To Join the Space Arms Race,” Byline Times, December 3, 2020, https:// bylinetimes.com/2020/12/03/britain-gears-up-to-join-the-space-arms-race/. WHAT TO WATCH 162 Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Bruce McClintock, and Stephen J. Flanagan, “Navigating Norms for the New Space Era,” National Interest, February 8, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/navigating-norms-new- space-era-177592. 38 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021