• China is pursuing a range of advanced weapons with disruptive military potential. Six types that China’s leaders have prioritized are maneuverable reentry vehicles, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counterspace weapons, and unmanned and artificial intelligence-equipped weapons. • China’s advanced weapons programs align with the People’s Liberation Army’s overall modernization drive over the past several decades, but appear to reflect a more careful degree of planning as to the U.S. weaknesses they are designed to exploit. • Current technological trends increase the difficulty of preserving an advantage in developing advanced weapons. The United States for the first time faces a peer technological competitor—a country that is also one of its largest trading partners and that trades extensively with other high-tech powers—in an era in which private sector research and development with dual-use implications increasingly outpaces and contributes to military developments. • The requirements for developing advanced weapons are fundamental scientific knowledge, unique materials, and abstract skill-based enablers (i.e., abilities, tools, and techniques). China has clear policies to exploit government funding, commercial technological exchange, foreign investment and acquisitions, and talent recruitment to bolster its dual-use technological advances. For China, the only ultimate barrier to such advances is likely to be effort—time, will, and money—and it will be difficult for the United States and its allies and partners to deter this. • While China has only achieved incremental innovation in military technologies in the past, its research efforts at the technological frontier indicate it may be moving from a phase of “catching-up” to pursuing “leap-ahead” technologies. China’s limited returns on science and technology investments indicate shortcomings that may render its development of innovative advanced weapons more costly or protracted, but do not rule out successful innovation. • China’s achievement of a surprise breakthrough in one of these technologies is possible, due to the secrecy surrounding these programs and the uncertain nature of advanced weapons development in general. Such a breakthrough could have significant strategic implications for the United States, particularly in its potential to further existing access challenges and hold forward deployed U.S. forces at risk. • Given Beijing’s commitment to its current trajectory, and the lack of fundamental barriers to advanced weapons development apart from time and funding, the United States cannot assume it will have an enduring advantage in developing weapons at the technological frontier. China is pursuing a wide range of military technologies at the global technological frontier—weapons just now being developed or not yet developed by any country. These advanced weapons programs could yield potentially disruptive military effects, presenting important implications for the United States and its allies and partners in the Asia Pacific. China’s advanced weapons programs draw heavily on its wider effort to develop next frontier technologies, discussed in the preceding section. Over the coming decades, China is poised to challenge U.S. technological leadership in both commercial and military terms, in an environment in which dual-use commercial technology increasingly contributes to military technological strength. China’s government has taken a comprehensive and state-directed approach to the development of key dual-use technologies, one that carefully considers how to leverage state funding, licit and illicit technological exchange, foreign investment, and talent recruitment opportunities to build national champions and advance its military capabilities. It is thus imperative for the United States to meet this challenge, and consider the security implications of China’s high-technology weapons in particular, over the coming decades. This section examines China’s advanced weapons programs in six categories, selected based on their prioritization by China’s leaders and their clear status as currently emerging and consequential technologies: maneuverable reentry vehicles, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counterspace weapons, and unmanned and artificial intelligence (AI)-equipped weapons. It specifically discusses the drivers behind China’s advanced weapons programs, China’s activities in each of the six areas, inputs to China’s ability to develop advanced weapons, and implications for the United States. In doing so, it draws upon the Commission’s February 2017 hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, unclassified statements by U.S. and Chinese officials, and open source research and analysis. China’s pursuit of advanced weapons bolsters the interests of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which seeks to strengthen the nation and defend what it defines as the country’s “core interests,” including Taiwan and other territorial claims, in order to maintain its hold on power. China’s advanced weapons programs specifically contribute to Beijing’s longstanding goal of military modernization and its efforts to compete militarily with the United States. These programs also go hand-in-hand with the desire of China’s leaders for the country to become a leading high technology power across commercial and dual-use areas. Military Modernization: China’s advanced weapons programs align with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) overall modernization drive over the past several decades. China’s military modernization began under then President Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978, and its programs to develop the advanced weapons discussed in this section appear to have originated in the 1980s and early 1990s (with the exception of a 1960s military laser research program geared toward missile defense, and unmanned and AI technologies, which emerged more recently). China’s modernization efforts have specifically sought to narrow gaps in the PLA’s ability to defend national interests and “win informationized local wars” (wars incorporating information technology and networked information operations), an objective reinforced by several crises that have highlighted the limited options available to Beijing in contingencies. These events included the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the collision of a PLA fighter with a U.S. EP–3 reconnaissance aircraft in 2001. The 1991 Gulf War and 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention in Serbia, while they did not directly involve China, also underscored the capability gaps China would face in a potential conflict and lent urgency to PLA modernization. All of these encounters contributed to Beijing’s recognition of the need to address the limited options and capability gaps it might face in regional contingencies involving its core interests. This solidified the requirement for an antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) or “counterintervention” component within PLA missions in anticipation of potential outside interference. In continuation of these efforts, the PLA is developing weapons at the global technological frontier. Military Competition with the United States: In relation to its past modernization activities, China’s advanced weapons programs appear to reflect a more careful degree of planning as to the U.S. weaknesses they are designed to exploit. In 1999, China’s then President Jiang Zemin used the accidental bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade to underscore military gaps in relation to the United States. He initiated and reinforced major programs for the construction of asymmetric weapons designed to exploit U.S. weaknesses, stating, “That which the enemy fears most, that is what we must develop.” This objective is reflected in the Chinese term shashoujian, translated as “assassin’s mace weapon,” which generally refers to the idea of a weaker power utilizing a certain capability to defeat a stronger one. The term has been applied in Chinese strategic writings and top leadership statements to antiship ballistic missiles in particular. In addition, Chinese military writings on elements of the U.S. Third Offset strategy—which sets forth U.S. requirements for developing many of these advanced military technologies—often assess that the pursuit of these new systems is aimed at China, and the PLA’s focus on advanced weapons has only intensified in response to the Third Offset Strategy. Breakthroughs in any of the advanced weapons categories discussed in this section would contribute strongly to China’s A2/AD capabilities and directly challenge U.S. advantages. Dr. Timothy Grayson, president of Fortitude Mission Research LLC, former senior manager at Raytheon, and former program manager at the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), termed China’s pursuit of advanced weapons “the next phase” of China’s modernization strategy, testifying to the Commission: "Instead of simply relying upon overwhelming the U.S. with 'catch-up' capabilities in large numbers, China is now developing weapons in key areas that may leapfrog the U.S., attempting to negate specific U.S. strengths. ... Hypersonics [are] an extension of existing ballistic missile and cruise missile capabilities, but instead of saturating missile defenses with numbers, the speed and maneuverability of hypersonic weapons may make kinetic missile defenses obsolete. Directed energy and space control target the current overwhelming U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) advantage. ... New capability in directed energy threatens U.S. sensor capabilities with blinding or damage, and space control systems threaten U.S. satellites themselves." To these observations can be added the potential effects of maneuverable reentry vehicles and large numbers of unmanned/AI-equipped weapons on large U.S. platforms and fixed bases key to the U.S. security posture in the Asia Pacific. Broader Technology Plans: Chinese President and General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping’s efforts to move China toward high-end innovation and establish the country as a global technology center, building upon and accelerating previous initiatives, are inseparable from China’s push to develop advanced weapons. Many of the government plans that have funded China’s defense modernization, including the advanced weapons programs discussed in this section, have spanned both military and commercial areas. For example, the High Technology Research and Development Plan (863 Plan), National Basic Research Plan (973 Plan), Medium and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006–2020) (MLP), “Made in China 2025” initiative, and various five-year plans have been instrumental for funding advances in China’s computing, robotics, and biotechnology sectors. In addition to the military benefits provided by advances in computing and robotics, portions of these plans have directly funded advanced weapons programs or their contributing technologies—the 863 Plan included funding for lasers, space technologies, unmanned systems, and AI; the 973 Plan included funding for unmanned systems; the MLP includes three secret military megaprojects that experts have suggested may be hypersonic vehicle technology, the second generation of the Beidou satellite navigation system, and a laser project for inertial confinement fusion; Made in China 2025 guides investment in space and aviation equipment and new materials; and five-year plans have guided investment in Beidou, unmanned vehicles, space technologies, and AI, for example. China’s recent consolidation of its science and technology funding into five major plans continues this approach. The largest and most important of these, the 2016 National Key Research and Development Plan, supports research and development in both national security and commercial areas. Definition. A maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) is a ballistic missile reentry vehicle that is capable of maneuvering after reentering Earth’s atmosphere, in contrast to a standard reentry vehicle, which continues on its trajectory without any course correction capability. MaRVs can be more difficult to intercept and therefore better able to penetrate adversary missile defenses. They also offer greater potential than standard reentry vehicles for striking moving targets, if configured to do so. China’s Activities. China likely began preliminary research into MaRV technology in 1991 and engineering research and development (R&D) on its first ballistic missile system incorporating this technology in 2002. Beijing publicly revealed two ballistic missile systems that reportedly have MaRV capabilities in 2010 and 2015, respectively: • China fielded the world’s first antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) in 2010, a variant of the DF–21 family of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) known as the DF–21D. It reportedly features a range of at least 1,500 kilometers (km) (932 miles [mi]) and is road mobile, meaning it can be driven by vehicle and launched from multiple locations. At its maximum extent, this range would cover an area beyond the first island chain, including large portions of the East, Philippine, and South China seas. • China unveiled the DF–26 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2015, reportedly also with an ASBM variant. The DF–26 has a credited range of 3,000–4,000 km (1,800–2,500 mi), and is also road mobile. At its maximum extent, this would cover U.S. military installations on Guam and most of the area within the second island chain. This has prompted some analysts and netizens to refer to the missile as the “Guam Express” or “Guam Killer” (similar to the term “carrier killer” sometimes used to refer to the DF–21D). China’s activities have also centered on developing the reconnaissance-strike complex necessary for these missiles to successfully strike a moving target at sea. As ASBMs require accurate “over-the-horizon” targeting support, this complex likely involves a combination of satellites and ground-based radar, possibly including microsatellites and even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for temporary augmentation. Questions regarding these ASBMs’ true capabilities persist, and their combat effectiveness may never be fully certain to observers in the public domain outside of their actual employment in a conflict. Seven years after the DF–21D’s unveiling, neither ASBM has yet been reported to have been tested against a moving target at sea. Dr. Andrew Erickson, professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, testified to the Commission in 2017 that “the missiles themselves work,” but “the ability of China’s reconnaissance-strike complex to provide accurate targeting for its ASBMs remains unclear.” To successfully strike a moving target at sea, China would need to master an extremely complex process. Put simply, the ship must be located, current location data must be uploaded to the reentry vehicle’s sensors before firing, the vehicle must conduct a mid-course maneuver upon reentry to identify the target’s signature, and then the vehicle must conduct a terminal maneuver to strike the ship before the ship has moved beyond the pre-programmed “box” within which it was originally detected to be operating. This presents several obstacles (notwithstanding any potential U.S. countermeasures): • China probably does not yet have sufficient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage, particularly at the far end of its ASBM ranges, to obtain this data in the first place. For this reason, it continues to launch Yaogan and Gaofen ISR satellites—as well as Beidou navigation satellites to improve missile guidance—to enable coverage of a greater area of the Pacific. • Coordination among the different service elements of the PLA involved in data fusion and command and control presents an organizational challenge. Dr. Erickson assesses that China’s military reforms, aimed at making the PLA more joint and better structured to wage modern wars, will be helpful in this regard. The creation of the Strategic Support Force in particular may enable better coordination of space-based functions. The Force’s mission is to integrate China’s space, cyber, electronic warfare, and signals intelligence capabilities. Therefore, responsibility for the intelligence and reconnaissance functions involved in locating and tracking targets will be centralized rather than dispersed among different units. Furthermore, some expert observers of the PLA have debated whether strategic level human intelligence collection capabilities have also been absorbed by the Force. The addition of these capabilities could likewise aid in focusing national-level collection assets for targeting purposes. • The warheads and terminal guidance sensors themselves must be able to withstand the rigors of atmospheric reentry without adverse effects to their required performance. Although the DF–21D reportedly includes a terminal guidance system, its utility against an uncooperative target is again untested. The performance of China’s ASBMs is difficult to assess, given a decline in the availability of public Chinese technical writings, likely to conceal sensitive details. However, Dr. Erickson notes that “China is constantly extending and improving its reconnaissance-strike complex. It is launching satellites at a pace that only the United States and Russia can hope to match.” In coming years, he assesses China is likely to achieve a robust architecture for finding carriers and large surface vessels. In the nearer-term, Dr. Erickson states that placing ground-based radar on all of the Spratly and Paracel islands features China occupies in the South China Sea (one such installation is already in place on Cuarteron Reef in the Spratlys) would likely enable China to detect and target carrier strike groups across the vast majority of the South China Sea. China’s Objectives. The PLA seeks the ability to hold adversaries’ vessels at risk via multi-axis strikes launched from a wide range of platforms as part of its suite of A2/AD capabilities, of which ASBMs are a key component. The DF–21D in particular has been referenced as an “assassin’s mace” weapon by China’s leaders, while the DF–26 is likely designed to reach Guam, viewed in PLA strategic and academic writings as an “anchor” of the United States’ regional presence and its ability to surge forces into the region in a contingency. Definition. Hypersonic speeds are usually defined as exceeding five times the speed of sound, or Mach 5 (3,836 mi per hour). Although ballistic missiles have long operated at these speeds, three emerging systems could be used to deliver a precision strike over long ranges at hypersonic speeds: terminally-guided ballistic missiles (including the MaRV-equipped ASBMs discussed previously), and two other systems that would utilize more advanced technologies and are generally the focal point of discussions on “hypersonic weapons.” These are (1) hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), which are launched from a large rocket on a relatively flat trajectory that either never leaves the atmosphere or reenters it quickly before being released and gliding unpowered to its target (the whole system, including the booster, is referred to as a “boost-glide weapon”); and (2) hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by a supersonic combustion ramjet or “scramjet” engine that activates after the missile’s release from a ground, sea, or air launcher (see Figure 1). The very high speeds of these two types, combined with their potential maneuverability and ability to travel at lower, radar-evading altitudes compared to ballistic missiles, could make them far less vulnerable than existing missiles to some current missile defenses. Importantly, HGVs are a subset of MaRV technology at the high end of the maneuverability spectrum, while the MaRVs on China’s ASBMs are on the low end. Although both types are launched by rockets, an HGV glides to its target at shallow angles after separating from the rocket booster and covers a much greater distance, while the MaRV on an ASBM continues on a ballistic trajectory until reentry. China’s HGV program may be an outgrowth of its program to develop lower-end MaRVs. China’s Activities. China has been working to develop both types of hypersonic weapons: • Glider. Since 2014, China has likely conducted seven tests of its HGV, now referred to as the DF–ZF by China’s news media and called the Wu–14 by U.S. officials (see Figure 2). Beijing has not officially acknowledged testing an HGV, but experts have assessed that six of the seven tests may have been successful. • Scramjet. At a March 2017 conference on hypersonic technology hosted by the Chinese Academy of Engineering (subordinate to China’s State Council), China acknowledged a 2015 scramjet engine flight test for the first time. China’s government previously had presented an award to a military engineer for developing and testing a scramjet engine at the China Aeronautical Science and Technology Conference in 2015, likely for work on the same program. If true, this would make China one of five countries, along with the United States, Russia, India, and Australia (in conjunction with the United States) to have reportedly test flown a scramjet engine. These efforts indicate China highly values the development of scramjet technology. Scramjet technology would also be relevant to potential efforts by China to develop a spaceplane (discussed in “Counterspace Weapons” later in this section). While China has moved rapidly on both fronts, its hypersonic program is still in development stages. James M. Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, notes that “many tens” of tests of different systems with progressively longer ranges would likely be needed to develop an intercontinental range glider, and numerous technical challenges would need to be overcome. China would likely not be able to place its existing glider model, apparently tested at MRBM range, on an intercontinental ballistic missile to achieve intercontinental range. Dr. Acton also notes that “given the relatively short range of China’s glider tests ... it is possible, though by no means certain, that its glider is essentially a ‘souped-up’ version of an existing type of terminally guided reentry vehicle.” Intended Capabilities. Mark Stokes, president of the Project 2049 Institute, testified to the Commission that “the primary driver for PLA investment into hypersonic weapons is to offset shortcomings in the face of a more technologically-advanced adversary equipped with missile defenses.” However, it remains unclear whether China ultimately intends to use hypersonic weapons for nuclear missions, conventional missions, or both. Dr. Acton testified to the Commission that there is significant uncertainty about why China is pursuing this technology, but he has no reason to doubt the assessment of the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center that China’s HGV is associated with its nuclear program. He notes, “It is also possible that China does not currently have firm ideas about the purpose of a boost-glide system. China has a well-documented history of initiating advanced strategic military programs mainly because it worries about other states’ opening up a technology gap, without necessarily being convinced [of] their ultimate military utility for China.” Definition. A directed energy weapon uses focused energy to damage or destroy a target. Three types are most relevant: • High energy lasers (HELs) generate beams of electromagnetic energy to damage a target’s physical structure. The amount of energy that hits the target is a function of the laser’s power and ability to focus its beam, as well as atmospheric conditions and target characteristics. More power requires the HEL to be larger and heavier. • High-power microwave (HPM) weapons generate short pulses of electromagnetic energy at discrete frequencies designed to disrupt, or even destroy, sensitive electronic components. The higher the energy, the greater the disruption. • Particle beam weapons use high-energy beams of atomic or subatomic particles to damage a target, generating additional highly-energetic particles and electro-magnetic fields inside the target; this technology is the least mature but perhaps the most destructive. A directed energy beam arrives at its target almost instantaneously, surpassing even the fastest-moving weapons currently fielded. In addition, benefits envisioned include low costs per “shot,” unlimited “ammunition” given power availability, enhanced standoff ranges, tailorable and scalable effects, strikes with low collateral damage, and “counterswarm” abilities. China’s Activities. China’s research into directed energy weapons likely dates back to at least the 1980s, when the 863 Plan included laser technology as a key investment area. Chinese writings and public reports have long indicated a high level of activity in this area; the most tangible publicly observed developments have been a potential HPM antimissile system and a series of increasingly-powerful HELs. HPM weapons. China’s HPM weapons program received new public coverage in 2017, building on a deep history of research in this area. In January, the deputy director of China’s Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology received a first prize National Science and Technology Progress Award from China’s State Council for his directed energy research; based on accounts of his remarks, this was related to achievements in developing an HPM antimissile system initially tested successfully in 2010. The scientist, a leading figure in China’s research on directed energy technologies since the 1990s, termed this a “disruptive technology” and “pioneering” achievement, as similar developments had yet to be publicly demonstrated elsewhere. Based on analysis of the scientist’s publication record, the system could be used as a ship-borne antimissile weapon, although authoritative information on the program is not available. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., senior fellow for Asian military affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, notes that developing a system small and light enough to deploy on a ship would be a significant technological accomplishment. Examples of China’s past publicly-known research on HPM weapons, dating back to the 1990s, include a 2005 article by authors from the then Weapons Equipment Academy of the PLA Second Artillery Force and the National University of Defense Technology that discussed the feasibility of using an HPM weapon to counter the seekers of antiradar missiles. A declassified 2005 U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center report noted Chinese research into the bio-effects of HPM radiation, assessing this was to evaluate how to protect future human operators of these systems. A declassified 2001 National Ground Intelligence Center report stated that China was “conducting research on high-power [radiofrequency (RF)] generation, susceptibility, and generation relevant to the development of RF weapons” and noted that China’s first significant publications on HPM generation appeared in the early 1990s. It identified six leading military and defense-affiliated facilities involved in directed energy research more broadly at that time. HELs. China is marketing low-power solid state laser weapons and has shown interest in using lasers on a range of platforms. China’s first 10 kilowatt (kW) fiber optic laser reportedly emerged in 2013, developed by state-owned defense conglomerate China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. State-owned Chinese defense contractor Poly Technologies has marketed a laser turret for shooting down small UAVs as a law enforcement tool since 2014, and displayed a 30 kW HEL called the Low-Altitude Laser Defending System at a 2016 military exhibit, reportedly with a 2.5 mi range and utility against swarms of small plastic UAVs. Mr. Fisher told the Commission that an improved version of this system was displayed at a 2017 exhibit, and reported learning from a company official that the new laser’s power was over 30 kW, but less than 100 kW. He reported that officials indicated they were developing a naval version of this system, but it would be too large for an airborne version. China’s defense industry and private sector will certainly continue efforts to increase the power and reduce the size and weight of these early systems. China previously conducted research on antimissile-capable lasers in the 1980s and 1990s, yielding work on chemical lasers with counterspace implications (see “Counterspace Weapons,” later in this section). Other efforts. Michael Carter, program manager for U.S. Department of Defense Programs at the National Ignition Facility and Photon Science Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), stated in April 2017 that China is on a path to build a laser similar to the one used in LLNL’s National Ignition Facility, currently the world’s most “energetic,” with 192 beams and the size of three football fields. LLNL’s laser was constructed for the study of inertial confinement fusion; China’s laser could be linked to its potential megaproject for this purpose described previously. Researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, working at the State Key Laboratory of High Field Laser Physics in Shanghai, reportedly demonstrated a beam that reached a peak power of 5.13 petawatts in 2015, a world record. Researchers are now working on a 10-petawatt beam; although these “ultra-fast” lasers can only sustain their power for a fraction of a second and thus generate little energy, this research demonstrates China’s commitment to and capacity for pursuing breakthroughs in the field of directed energy. Intended Capabilities. China’s directed energy program is likely intended to negate specific U.S. strengths, potentially by affecting sensors on U.S. precision strike weapons and satellites. Chinese academic writings appear to show interest in using more advanced lasers on land, naval, air, and space platforms, and microwave weapons on space platforms, but specific information on their intended operational employment is highly limited. Potential capabilities against space platforms are discussed in “Counterspace Weapons,” later in this section. Definition. An electromagnetic railgun (EMRG) launches rounds using electromagnetic force rather than an explosive propellant. The rails are a pair of parallel conductors through which an electromagnetic current, generated from an external source, is passed, firing the projectile along the rails (see Figure 3). Mr. Fisher notes that railguns “offer potential advantages in numbers of ‘rounds’ and cost per round over missiles and other kinetic weapons, potentially transforming future battlefields.” China’s Activities. A research institute within China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, one of China’s leading state-owned defense industry conglomerates, announced in 2015 that a project on high-powered electromagnetic launch technology had led to “major breakthroughs” in technologies for short-range air defense and projectile velocity. This research institute also hosted the seventh Chinese Electromagnetic Technology Conference in 2015, where advances in material sciences to reduce railgun barrel wear were reported. At least 22 research institutes in China were studying aspects of electromagnetic launch as of 2007, according to a report published that year by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. China has also reportedly built experimental railguns. Research into railguns began in France in 1918 and has been ongoing in China since the 1980s; the challenge is not in building a railgun but in scaling up the technology and overcoming technical challenges. Intended Capabilities. Public writings on intended capabilities for China’s railgun are scarce and do not appear to diverge from those envisioned for the United States’ program. China’s system could be used for ship-based antisurface, shore bombardment, and antimissile operations as planned by the United States, and could also contribute to China’s land-based A2/AD arsenal, for which power generation would be less of a challenge than for naval platforms. Proposed applications for electromagnetic aircraft launch system technology appear to align with U.S. efforts related to its next generation of aircraft carriers. Definition. Counterspace threats can be divided into kinetic, non-kinetic physical, electromagnetic, and cyber categories, as Todd Harrison, director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explained in testimony to the Commission: • Kinetic attacks attempt to strike a satellite directly, detonate a warhead in its vicinity, or disable critical support infrastructure on the ground. ... Satellites are also vulnerable to co-orbital threats where a satellite already in orbit can be deliberately maneuvered to collide with another satellite, dock with an uncooperative satellite, or detonate a small warhead in the vicinity of a satellite. • Non-kinetic physical attacks can be used to ... degrade a satellite with less risk of debris and without directly touching it. Directed energy weapons, such as lasers and high-powered microwave systems, can target space systems within seconds and create effects that may not be immediately evident beyond the satellite operator. • Electromagnetic attacks target the means by which data is transmitted rather than the physical satellite or ground support system. Satellites are dependent on radiofrequency communications for command and control and to transmit data to the ground. Jamming is the use of electromagnetic energy to interfere with these radio communications. • Cyber attacks target the data itself and the systems that use this data. China’s Activities. China’s advanced weapons discussed in this section that correspond with these threats are direct-ascent antisatellite missiles (kinetic), co-orbital systems (kinetic, non-kinetic physical, or electromagnetic), and ground-based directed energy weapons (non-kinetic physical or electromagnetic). Direct-ascent antisatellite missiles. China has tested two direct-ascent antisatellite missiles: rocket and missile tests of the SC–19, one of which successfully destroyed a target in low Earth orbit; and a rocket test of the larger DN–2, which reached higher orbits, where Global Positioning System (GPS) and most U.S. intelligence satellites reside. The SC–19 was responsible for China’s highly publicized debris-generating antisatellite missile (ASAT) test in 2007, and was also tested in 2005, 2006, 2010, 2013, and 2014. These missiles would only be able to launch on predetermined flight paths against targets passing over China. Co-orbital systems. China appears to have the technology required to build and launch small satellites for “rendezvous and proximity operations” that could be applied to counterspace missions. David D. Chen, an independent analyst and expert on China’s space programs, testified to the Commission that China has launched six space missions involving such operations over the past decade, as Table 1 describes in detail [BX-1 in 2008, Shijian-12 in 2010, Shiyan-7 in 2013, Tianyuan-1 in 2016, Aolong-1 in 2016, BX-2 in 2016, Shijian-17 in 2016]. A space-based platform could be used to launch kinetic, non-kinetic physical, or electromagnetic attacks. Mr. Chen specifically assesses China has the requisite expertise, doctrinal underpinnings, and research and development experience for a counterspace directed-energy weapons program, which could be used for electromagnetic attacks launched from co-orbital platforms. He cites numerous writings by Chinese military, defense industry, and university scientists on potential counterspace electronic warfare effects against U.S. satellites. For example, a 2012 paper by authors from the 36th Research Institute of CETC proposed overcoming high power requirements for jamming U.S. MMW satellite communications by using space-based jammers hosted on small satellites, identifying susceptible assets as AEHF, WGS, and GBS constellations. Other writings reference Iridium and DSCS satellites. Ground-based directed-energy weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense reported in 2006 that China was pursuing “at least one ... ground-based laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.” China also tested a laser against a U.S. ISR satellite in 2006, temporarily degrading its functionality; it is unclear whether this was intended to determine the satellite’s location or to test China’s ability to “dazzle” it, or temporarily blind its sensors. These capabilities are likely a product of China’s chemical laser development efforts dating back to the 1980s; China almost certainly has been working to develop more powerful lasers since this time. Lasers can blind or damage a satellite’s optical sensors at low energies, and can cause physical damage to satellites at high energies. In addition, since the mid-2000s China has acquired a number of foreign and indigenous ground-based satellite jammers, designed to disrupt an adversary’s communications with a satellite by overpowering the signals being sent to or from it. These could be employed to degrade or deny U.S. military systems’ access to GPS and most satellite communications bands if they are operating within a few hundred kilometers of China. Spaceplane. Chinese media reports in 2016 indicated that state-owned defense conglomerate China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation had begun advanced research on a spaceplane that could fly from the ground directly into orbit utilizing hypersonic technology. Chinese military scientists have stated that China aims to master the relevant technologies over the next three to five years, test a propulsion system in 2025, and use the system to power a spaceplane that would enter service by 2030. China reportedly plans to test a prototype propulsion system in late 2017. In theory, such a craft could fly in near space (roughly 12 to 60 mi in altitude), circumnavigate the globe in a matter of hours out of the reach of traditional air defenses, and potentially threaten U.S. space assets. These efforts have not been confirmed by official U.S. government sources, and achieving these technologies within this timeframe would likely be a significant challenge. Other plans. As the Commission reported in 2015, China plans to launch a permanent manned space station in several phases comprising an experimental “core module” in 2018 and two additional modules in 2020 and 2022. This station could have dual use applications; China’s Tiangong-2 spacelab was used to launch a satellite for a rendezvous and proximity operation in 2016, and China reportedly plans to orbit a space telescope alongside its space station in the 2020s, the first time a space station will have been used as a support base for a satellite. Chinese researchers, including the head of the China Manned Space Agency, have also written on the military use of space stations. Intended Capabilities. As the Commission assessed in its 2015 Annual Report to Congress, PLA doctrinal publications and military writings on space warfare and China’s demonstrated and developmental counterspace capabilities indicate these are primarily designed to deter U.S. strikes against China’s space assets, deny space superiority to the United States, and attack U.S. satellites. Authoritative Chinese documents specifically indicate Beijing believes space superiority would be critical to almost every component of its military operations during a potential Taiwan Strait conflict and against the United States and other potential adversaries in the region. Experts also testified that Chinese military strategy emphasizes battlefield control in a multi-dimensional space, and that counterspace operations are envisioned to “open up a window of opportunity” for potentially debilitating follow-on strikes in other dimensions. Definition. Unmanned aerial, underwater, surface, or ground vehicles operate without an internal pilot. They can be remotely piloted or automated, which refers to systems governed by prescriptive rules that do not allow for deviations, or autonomous, meaning they are delegated the ability to independently compose and choose between different courses of action. AI refers to the ability of computer systems to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, including learning and self-correction, and is foundational to autonomous systems. China’s Activities. China has made significant progress in developing and deploying automated unmanned systems, and has displayed strong interest and capabilities in developing autonomous programs. Automated systems: • China’s UAVs, including attack variants, have met military requirements and entered the global market in great numbers. Chinese defense industry is developing a range of cutting-edge systems, including high-altitude long-endurance UAVs with stealth/anti-stealth, supersonic, and precision strike capabilities, as well as electronic warfare and sea-skimming variants. • China has worked to develop unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) since the 1980s, and one series of UUVs is reportedly in service with the PLA Navy. Chinese UUVs carried out mineral exploration in 2016 and gliders performed simultaneous observations in the South China Sea in 2017. • The PLA Navy is exploring options for unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and the PLA Army has begun experimentation to a limited extent on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Autonomous systems: • Cruise missiles: Developing cruise missiles with AI and automation allowing real-time control, fire-and-forget, or task addition in-flight. • Swarming UAVs: Demonstrated record-breaking formations of 1,000 rotary-wing UAVs (2017) and 119 fixed-wing UAVs (2017), exhibiting autonomous swarm control concepts. • Autonomous UUVs & USVs: Research into bio-inspired robofish, autonomous underwater gliders, and intelligent USVs like the Jinghai USV series capable of autonomous navigation and obstacle avoidance. Intended Capabilities. Automated UAVs have been incorporated across all four PLA services and the SSF as force multipliers. Expected missions include ISR, strike, EW, and missile guidance. Autonomy and drone swarms are envisioned for overwhelming high-value targets like aircraft carriers, while long-term writings envision a potential 'battlefield singularity' where intelligentized machines surpass humans in operational decision-making. • MaRVs: The United States destroyed ground-based missiles ranging 500-5,500 km under the 1987 INF Treaty (including Pershing-II). While past U.S. work contributed to hypersonics, the U.S. has not developed advanced MaRV-equipped antiship ballistic missiles as China has. • Hypersonic Weapons: U.S. development is significantly more advanced in testing history and range/maneuverability (e.g., AHW tested to 3,800 km and planned to 6,000 km, scramjet tests since 2004 via X-43A and X-51A). However, rapid Chinese and Russian progress poses a risk to U.S. technological leadership. • Directed Energy Weapons: U.S. holds a longstanding lead (30 kW LaWS deployed, 150 kW tests planned for ships and aircraft, CHAMP HPM tests). However, technical hurdles in power scaling, size, and cost remain shared challenges. • Electromagnetic Railguns: Research was long dominated by the U.S., projecting ship-based EMRG by 2020-2025, but faces wear and power obstacles. China is also testing experimental railguns and material advances. • Counterspace Weapons: U.S. demonstrated direct-ascent ASAT capability (2008) and potential via SM-3 Block IIA, but adheres to outer space treaties and lacks deployed orbital weapons. China has demonstrated LEO kinetic ASAT (2007) and tested capabilities reaching higher orbits (MEO/GEO), while actively testing co-orbital proximity operations. • Unmanned & AI-Equipped Weapons: China lags in legacy subsystems (engines, sensors, datalinks) but is rapidly advancing toward swarms and autonomous architectures, while the U.S. leads in semiautonomous precision weapons (e.g., LRASM) and autonomous drone swarming demonstrations, balanced by strict U.S. DoD policy guidelines on autonomous lethal systems. The factors enabling China's programs fall into three primary categories: 1. Scientific Knowledge: China leverages open U.S./international scientific literature, international academic exchanges, overseas investment/acquisitions (especially in European AI firms), and talent recruitment programs such as the Thousand Talents Plan to bring foreign-trained STEM experts back to China. 2. Materials and Components: China possesses ample domestic supplies of critical materials (e.g., controlling 90% of global mining and refining for neodymium used in solid-state lasers). Its rapidly advancing commercial sectors in supercomputing, semiconductors, robotics, and industrial automation provide direct foundational inputs for military hardware. 3. Skills and Techniques: Skill-based enablers (advanced manufacturing, modeling/simulation, specialized testing) remain an area where China historically lagged. However, China benefits from a 'second-mover advantage,' absorbing established foreign approaches and rapidly transitioning from catch-up R&D to leap-ahead innovative designs. Direct Military Implications: • Operational access and forward posture: China's expanding arsenal of ASBMs (DF-21D, DF-26), hypersonic boost-glide systems (DF-ZF), and counterspace weapons directly threatens U.S. forward-deployed forces, aircraft carrier strike groups, and critical staging bases like Guam. • Asymmetric cost and defense challenges: Countering hypersonic gliders and directed-energy/railgun salvos imposes severe financial and tactical burdens on U.S. air and missile defense networks, which lack fully established defensive architectures against maneuvering hypersonic threats. • Space and C4ISR vulnerability: Anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital jammers, and ground lasers threaten U.S. command, control, communication, and reconnaissance constellations, heightening the risk of low-signature 'gray zone' disruption or pre-conflict blinding. Broader Competitive Implications: • The U.S. faces a peer competitor deeply integrated into the global economy, leveraging state-directed funding, foreign acquisitions, and civil-military integration to erode traditional U.S. conventional military advantages. • Maintaining U.S. superiority requires updated export control frameworks, robust investment in satellite resilience and counter-hypersonic defenses, expanded STEM retention, and sustained funding for next-generation military R&D.