China has embarked on a whole-of-government strategy to become the world's preeminent space power. Beijing views space as a warfighting domain and it seeks to achieve space superiority as a cornerstone of its broader effort to establish information dominance—a prerequisite to controlling the battlespace and gaining operational advantage in future conflicts. To this end, China has rapidly developed, deployed, and operationalized advanced capabilities in space launch, satellites, and ground-based infrastructure spanning its civil, military, and commercial sectors. These advancements are closing the gap in the strategic competition between the United States and China in space. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly expanding its space- and ground-based assets to enhance its battlespace awareness, operational coordination, and capacity for force projection. These capabilities improve China's ability to monitor, target, and challenge U.S. and allied forces across the Indo-Pacific. Over the past decade, China has launched more than 1,000 satellites, dramatically increasing its capacity for persistent surveillance, communications, and precision targeting in support of long-range strike systems. The PLA has also fielded both ground- and space-based counterspace capabilities designed to deter U.S. military action or, in the event of a conflict, degrade U.S. space-enabled operations and power projection. However, as Beijing has expanded its military space capabilities, it has also deepened its own dependency on space assets, potentially creating vulnerabilities of its own. Like any spacefaring nation, this dependency exposes China to counterspace threats that could disrupt its command and control (C2), precision strike, and situational awareness capabilities in a conflict. Globally, China has harnessed its ambitious space program to deepen relations with developing countries and expand its space architecture in support of military, commercial, and broader strategic gains. China's rapid progress in establishing a private, though state-directed, commercial space ecosystem in just a decade poses a formidable technological, economic, and geostrategic challenge to the United States. Employing state-led industrial policy and drawing on its vast network of state-owned enterprises in aerospace and defense, China has quickly cultivated a dynamic startup sector focused on seeking to rival U.S. firms in commercial launch and satellite networks. With a growing list of civil space achievements, China is aggressively positioning itself as a global leader in space technology and exploration. It is now seeking to reshape international space governance, influence the development of technical standards, and displace the United States as the world's premier space power. • China is pursuing an aggressive long-term, whole-of-government campaign to expand its space capabilities across military, commercial, and civil domains with the explicit intent of surpassing the United States. These rapid advances in space pose an escalating threat to U.S. national security, intensify U.S.-China strategic competition for international partnerships, and undermine the ability of U.S. commercial firms to compete internationally. • China views space as a warfighting domain and has invested heavily in weapons and technologies that can degrade, damage, or destroy the U.S. satellites that provide the backbone of the U.S. military's C2 network as well as its targeting system. By seeking to deprive the U.S. military of the use of space-based assets, the PLA aims to deny the United States the ability to use its advanced military systems, eroding the foundations of U.S. power projection and joint operations. • Over the past ten years, China has launched a wide variety of satellites on an aggressive schedule, fielding a growing array of space-based capabilities that has strengthened its ability to coordinate its own operations as well as to conduct the persistent surveillance and targeting of U.S. forces. The expansion reflects China's broader strategy to achieve space superiority and strengthen its ability to use long-range precision weaponry to target and disrupt the flow of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. • China is actively leveraging its space capabilities as strategic tools to expand its geopolitical influence. Through offering other countries the use of its satellite networks, launch services, and space infrastructure, China enhances the resilience and global coverage of its space architecture. At the same time, it draws partner nations more deeply into its technological ecosystem, creating long term strategic and economic dependencies on Chinese technology. • China's military-civil fusion strategy erases the line between military and civilian space activities, enabling systems and technologies such as satellites, robotic arms, and launch systems to serve both commercial ends and PLA objectives. The dual-use nature of these systems—compounded by blurry lines between state-owned enterprises and nominally private firms—makes it difficult to distinguish commercial innovation from military capability. • In just ten years, China has dramatically transformed an almost non-existent commercial space sector into a thriving, state-orchestrated startup ecosystem. Fueled by strong government backing and industrial prowess, Beijing is now seeking to cultivate national champions that will challenge U.S. space companies on the global stage at a fraction of the cost. This strategy does not just seek innovation and commercial advancement—it seeks to reshape the competitive balance in what will be the most strategic domain of the 21st century. • China has achieved major civil space milestones, such as the Chang'e-6 mission returning the first samples from the Moon's far side. These "global firsts" are much more than just about science; Beijing uses them to assert technological leadership to reshape global perceptions of power. The competition now extends beyond symbolic milestones to a contest over who will define the rules, infrastructure, and norms governing space. If the United States cedes leadership, China is poised to advance a state-driven, opaque governance model that could embed long-term global reliance on its systems and standards. • Losing U.S. leadership in space would amount to relinquishing the advantage first secured during the original space race. China seeks to use its rapid advancements in space to position the country as a technological powerhouse and undermine U.S. prestige and economic competitiveness. Falling behind in space would not only diminish U.S. standing, it would also threaten U.S. national security, global influence, technological dominance, and commercial competitiveness in the growing space economy. The Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957 shocked the United States, driving then-President Dwight Eisenhower to accelerate space efforts. These initiatives were later expanded under then-President John F. Kennedy, who undertook a "Space Race" to the Moon to demonstrate to the world that the U.S. model for economic development and technological innovation was superior to that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and worth emulating. For over half a century, space has existed in the popular imagination as the "final frontier"—the last realm for humankind to explore and harness in favor of human progress. Through rapid experimentation, technological advancement, visionary government support, and determination, the United States became the world's premier space power, bestowing many benefits on U.S. citizens, advantages to the U.S. military, and global prestige for the United States and its economic, innovation, and governance models. This leadership position secured during the Cold War is now at risk due to China's rapid advances in space. China has undertaken a rapid and multifaceted expansion across its military, civil, and commercial space sectors that is presenting a comprehensive challenge to U.S. space leadership. This growing competition reflects the broader strategic rivalry between the United States and China as both countries view the space domain as critical to national security, economic growth, and global influence. If the United States does not rededicate itself to winning the new race, it will surrender its military advantage, jeopardize critical space-based infrastructure, undermine key sectors of the U.S. economy, and be subject to a space environment increasingly shaped by China's strategic priorities for years to come. Most Americans depend on space far more than they realize. Many may think of GPS navigation and weather forecasting, but many do not comprehend the scope and breadth of our reliance on space. Cell phones, the internet, and streaming services routinely use satellites to increase the speed and resiliency of their networks. Banks, stock markets, and online payment services rely on satellites to ensure secure transactions. Utility companies rely on control systems that communicate via satellite to monitor energy flows and reroute electricity across power grids. Farmers use satellite imagery to monitor crop health, optimize fertilization and irrigation, and plan harvesting schedules. Airlines, railroads, and shipping and logistics companies use satellites to navigate, optimize routes, and track cargo. The U.S. military relies on space for a wide range of missions, including navigation, global communications, intelligence gathering, early warning, and targeting weapons systems, to name but a few. These capabilities are vital, especially in the context of a Western Pacific contingency, where long distances and dispersed forces require resilient space-based systems to coordinate military operations, monitor and target adversary movements, and project power effectively. So, what are the risks to the United States if it is no longer the dominant space power? General B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations of the U.S. Space Force, put it starkly: "Space superiority is not only a necessary precondition for Joint Force success but also something for which we must be prepared to fight. Gained and maintained, it unlocks superiority in other domains, fuels Coalition lethality, and fortifies troop survivability. It is therefore the basis from which the Joint Force projects power, deters aggression, and secures the homeland." The space ecosystem involves interconnected sets of capabilities and assets. Below is a basic discussion of key space concepts and how they inter-relate. • Space-based assets: These include satellites, vehicles, and payloads in orbit that deliver mission-critical capabilities from space. Space-based assets include various types of satellites, including those dedicated to communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); position, navigation, and timing (PNT); and those hosting sensors, such as for weather observation, as well as those that provide on-orbit support capabilities. While some space-based assets are solely designed for military use, others may support both military and civilian uses. This is particularly true of PNT satellites as they support systems like the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides targeting data to the U.S. military, but also provides data to civilian companies that offer navigation services to U.S. consumers. Many civilian satellites are also capable of supporting military activities, if called upon. • Orbit types: Different orbital regimes support different mission sets. In recent years, there has been increased focus and investment in "proliferated low Earth orbit" (pLEO) satellite constellations to enable global broadband, persistent surveillance, and resilience through redundancy. Other examples include medium Earth orbit, useful for PNT capabilities, and geo-stationary orbits used extensively for weather monitoring and communications. While space seems vast and limitless, orbit locations are a scarce resource. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a specialized agency of the UN through which countries allocate radio frequency spectrum and coordinate orbital positions. • Deep Space: A subset of space assets are those used in deep space, generally understood to mean beyond the Earth's orbit and beyond "cislunar" space (defined as the areas of space between the Earth and the Moon). To date, deep space assets are generally used for science and civil space exploration (i.e., not commercial or military uses), though in recent years, commercial entities have begun planning deep space missions. • Launch: Launch refers to the systems that propel assets from Earth into space, including the ground-based facilities that support launch operations. Launch technology varies depending on the size of the payload and the distance into space it must travel. The United States and China are both investing heavily in reusable launch vehicle (RLV) technologies. SpaceX is currently the global leader in these technologies, which provide cheaper and faster launch options, enabling greater activity in space. • Ground-Based Infrastructure: This includes the terrestrial systems that link, connect, and communicate with space-based assets. These include ground stations that conduct telemetry, tracking, command and control, provide space-domain awareness (i.e., the ability to detect, track, and identify objects and threats in orbit), and receive down-links from satellites. Ground-based infrastructure is necessary for communication with and/or control of space-based assets. China recognizes how dependent the U.S. general public and U.S. military are on space-based assets for day-to-day activities. Just as China has invested heavily in cyber tools to exploit U.S. reliance on the internet, China has invested heavily in counterspace capabilities—kinetic and non-kinetic weapons that can deny, degrade, or destroy U.S. satellites. Many U.S. satellites have limited defensive capabilities as many were deployed when the United States viewed space as a benign environment, not a warfighting domain. The United States has also not markedly changed its restrictive guidance and direction that has long sought to avoid the perception of "weaponizing" space, leaving the United States with no real offensive space program of its own. China leverages its bold space program to advance both domestic and international security goals. Under General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping, space exploration has been closely tied to the "China Dream" of national rejuvenation with high-profile missions—such as lunar sample returns and the construction of a space station—used to showcase Party leadership, reinforce domestic confidence, and signal China's rise as a global scientific and technological power. Internationally, these accomplishments are used to build prestige, grow China's space economy, support efforts to reshape global space governance to reflect China's interests, and position China as a strategic rival to the United States. Over the past decade, China has systematically expanded its space capabilities across military, civil, and commercial sectors. It has launched satellite constellations that provide global communications and navigation, deployed sophisticated counterspace weapons, and is developing a rapidly growing commercial space sector that could challenge U.S. leadership within the decade. Enabled by a state-directed model and its military-civil fusion strategy, this holistic approach reflects China's ambition to establish itself not only as a space power, but also as a global leader in science and innovation, using space development to boost its comprehensive national strength and international influence. "Mind-boggling." That is the word General Saltzman used in testimony before the Commission to describe China's rapid military buildup of its space capabilities over recent years. He added, "[China's] potent and expanding arsenal of space-based capabilities multiplies its combat potential many times over" and threatens the U.S. military's access to—and effective use of—space in conflict. Over the past ten years, China has launched increasing numbers of satellites—with more than 1,060 satellites in orbit as of December 2024—significantly enhancing the PLA's use of space for warfighting. These satellites support both intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) missions as well as provide a suite of counterspace capabilities that could monitor, target, deny, degrade, or destroy U.S. and allied space assets. The PLA's growing space capabilities undermine the U.S. military's ability to rely on the space assets that are integral to the success of its operations and force projection across all domains—land, air, sea, cyber, and space. The degradation or destruction of U.S. space assets could prevent U.S. forces from fully seeing the battlefield, guiding munitions, providing missile warning, and supporting global command and control (C2). This could severely limit U.S. and allied forces in their ability to respond rapidly in any theater of operations, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Although the PLA has long viewed space as a critical war fighting domain, China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 marked its growing ambitions in space. China's military space program dates back to the 1950s, when it began the development of its first nuclear weapons. In 1970, China launched its first satellite and, in the 1990s, began development of various anti-satellite vehicles and possible directed-energy weapons. General Saltzman referred to China's 2007 successful anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test as a "pivot point" that demonstrated China's destructive capability using an offensive missile in space, creating the largest debris field in space and threatening other space assets in orbit. In 2015, China published a Defense White Paper that was the first official government document to lay out the need for an advanced military space program, referring to outer space as one of the "new commanding heights in strategic competition" and describing these revolutions in military affairs—such as informationized warfare, precision strike capabilities, and space-enabled operations—as posing "new and severe challenges to China's military security." The PLA's creation of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) in December 2015 and its subsequent reorganization as the Aerospace Force in April 2024, further solidified the integration and increased role of space capabilities in military operations. For the PLA, achieving space superiority is important to establish the information dominance that would allow it to control the battle space and gain operational advantage in wartime. The 2020 edition of the strategic-level PLA textbook Science of Military Strategy highlighted the importance of space control, noting that without it, information control would be impossible, and consequently air control, sea control, and land control would quickly fall one after another. PLA strategists also advocate targeting space systems such as communication satellites, early warning platforms, and reconnaissance assets, viewing them as critical nodes in the enemy's command, control, and intelligence capabilities. China's expanding military space capabilities advance its warfighting concept of multi-domain precision warfare, enabling the PLA to exploit key vulnerabilities in an adversary's "network information system-of-systems." China's development and expansion of its space and counterspace strategies and capabilities reflect how the PLA may conduct multi-domain precision warfare and target U.S. space assets as a means to deter and counter a U.S. military intervention during a regional military conflict. The PLA has acted with urgency to develop overhead intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to ensure it can persistently monitor U.S. and allied activity in the Pacific region. Overhead ISR space systems provide support to warfighters through the collection and processing of signals and imagery, monitoring adversary weapons and force movements, generating accurate targeting data, and enabling battle damage assessments. Over the past decade, the PLA has rapidly increased the number and capabilities of satellites in orbit. The number of Chinese satellites in orbit since the end of 2015 has increased by approximately 620 percent (+875 satellites), with more than 1,060 satellites in orbit as of December 2024. Currently, China has about 510 ISR-capable satellites equipped with a variety of optical, multispectral, radar, and radio frequency sensors that benefit the PLA, increasing its ability to detect U.S. military assets in the air and sea, including aircraft carriers, expeditionary forces, and air wings. In addition, China has expanded its ISR capabilities by launching synthetic aperture radar (SAR) remote-sensing satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) that offer higher-resolution imagery and persistent, all-weather condition surveillance. In December 2023, China launched the Yaogan-41, its fourth optical surveillance satellite in GEO, which likely provides China with continuous surveillance of the Pacific and Indian oceans and the ability to identify and track car-sized objects, including U.S. military assets. The PLA's increased investment in, and deployment of, remote sensing ISR capabilities means that even as U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific are shifting to a more distributed, resilient posture, it is increasingly difficult for them to be undetected in the region. In addition to ISR, China has developed positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities to ensure its forces and weapons platforms are able to navigate and more accurately target and achieve operational objectives across the globe. The third generation of BeiDou satellites, China's competitor to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), achieved full operational capacity in 2020. BeiDou's 49 operational satellites provide global, high-accuracy, all-weather, PNT services. BeiDou has increased the PLA's capabilities to conduct precision strikes globally and offers the PLA global coverage for coordinated operations and maneuver across multiple theaters. BeiDou's short messaging service could also provide real-time updates for missile systems and allow military operators to provide commands to autonomous weapons, enhancing the PLA's global command and control of weapons systems. Under China's military-civil fusion strategy, rather than maintaining a strict separation between sectors, China leverages its civilian and commercial industries to advance national defense and security capabilities. As a result, many advancements and tests of space systems that are framed as having civil or commercial purposes may have potential military applications as well. The inherent dual-use nature of these technologies and programs is further complicated by blurry distinctions between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and commercial companies—due to overlapping funding, firms founded by former SOE employees, or SOE spinoffs—which obscures the line between civilian and military activities. The Party's oversight of commercial companies also gives it great influence in ensuring that commercial activities align with national policies and objectives. Civilian and commercial capabilities—including satellites, launch systems, ground stations, and on-orbit servicing technologies—support legitimate civil purposes such as communication, navigation, and maintenance operations, but they could also be adapted for military applications, such as targeting missiles, tracking adversary submarines, or disrupting and maneuvering adversary satellites. Specific examples of these dual-use systems and their applications are provided throughout this chapter. While China's ISR and PNT systems provide high-resolution, persistent surveillance in the Indo-Pacific region, the build out of its global coverage holds serious consequences for U.S. global force posture. A truly global ISR and PNT capability would be a major component of the PLA's expanding Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure and support its efforts to develop what has variously been called a space "kill mesh" or "kill web." China's aspiration is to create an integrated, resilient network that would automatically collect, integrate, and analyze information from ISR and PNT satellites and rapidly distribute it to weapon systems to provide the PLA with accurate, space-enabled targeting of U.S. forces using its long-range precision weapons. China has designed its satellite constellations to focus coverage on the Western Pacific region, but as it launches additional satellites into a greater variety of orbits—and makes corresponding advancements in the other aspects of its C4ISR network—the "kill mesh" will provide broader coverage, enhanced precision, and increased resiliency to PLA operations. General Saltzman assessed that China's full deployment of such a space-enabled targeting network could "prevent [U.S.] forces from taking meaningful action before they even reach theater." He further warned that if the threat posed by the network is not mitigated, it would mean U.S. military objectives "will be tough to meet" without significant threat of major U.S. casualties. Over the past two decades, China has invested heavily in capabilities to deny, degrade, or destroy U.S. satellites. Those capabilities would allow China to incapacitate U.S. communications, PNT, and ISR satellites (including those providing early warning of missile launches) as well as to undermine the ability of the United States to conduct joint operations and project power. China has continued to invest in a broad range of counterspace capabilities, including ground-based and space-based kinetic, radio frequency, and directed energy systems. • Kinetic: China has at least one, if not three, programs underway to develop direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) capabilities. U.S. intelligence has assessed that by 2021, China had the capability to field ground-based ASAT missiles that could target and destroy satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO), and that the PLA intends to field ASAT weapons with the capability to destroy satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) at 36,000 kilometers (about 22,369 miles). The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) assessed that since 2006, China has been researching space-based kinetic weapons, including technical areas such as reentry methods, payload separation, delivery vehicles, and transfer orbits—all of which are necessary to make space-based kinetic operations effective. China has also conducted tests of satellite operations that could lead to a co-orbital anti-satellite capability, such as satellite maneuvers and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs) that could change the orbital trajectory of another satellite. China has been experimenting with on-orbit satellite maneuvers since 2010. China uses robotic arms powered by artificial intelligence (AI) for various civil space missions including satellite maintenance, refueling, and removal of space debris. Robotic arms have been used on China's Tiangong space station to support assembly, maintenance, and operations in orbit. Orbital analysts and U.S. officials believe that in 2022, China's SJ-21 satellite was conducting sophisticated rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), using a robotic arm to capture and tow another object. Although RPOs can be used for peaceful operations like inspection, repair, refueling, upgrades, or removal of space debris, they also have the potential for military purposes such as disabling or interfering with another country's satellites. SJ-21's ability to dock with and tow a satellite introduces a potential counterspace capability that would allow China to disable a satellite without generating dangerous space debris or the associated reputational cost. In counterspace operations, avoiding debris or international backlash is strategically valuable, making SJ-21's capabilities appealing for low-visibility, high-impact interference. In 2024, the U.S. Space Force reported that China conducted its first proximity operations involving five satellites, three Shiyan-24C and two Shijian-6 05A/B, in synchronized maneuvers in LEO. This shift from simple two-satellite rendezvous to complex, coordinated movements signals China's advancing dual-use space capabilities and suggests potential for future "dogfighting" tactics intended to maneuver near or potentially interfere with other satellites, threatening the security and stability of space assets for strategic gain. Despite China's peaceful framing of robotic arms and RPOs, SJ-21 demonstrates that these technologies and operations are inherently dual use, posing complex challenges for space security and military stability by enabling covert, reversible interference with adversary satellites without creating debris. • Radio frequency: China has significant electronic warfare counterspace capabilities that can be directed against global navigation satellite systems and satellite communications. The PLA regularly incorporates radio frequency jammers targeting space-based communications, radars, and navigation systems during military exercises. Ground-based cyber and electronic warfare can also be used to degrade satellite services by interfering with an adversary's telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) ground stations and jamming uplink and downlink communications with satellites. DOD reported that China is probably developing jammers to target adversary synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites to protect its own ground-based assets from being imaged and targeted during a conflict. China could use RPO satellite capabilities to position radio frequency jammers close to an adversary satellite, amplifying its ability to interfere with communications. • Directed energy: Lasers offer significant potential for military counterspace applications. Ground-based laser systems are capable of dazzling or blinding Earth-orbiting satellites and can inflict thermal damage on most LEO satellites. DOD assessed that the PLA has multiple ground-based laser weapons capable of disrupting, degrading, or destroying satellites and may also possess limited capabilities to target satellite sensors directly. These lasers could provide a non-kinetic means of attack that is hard to detect and difficult to trace back to the source. While China has continued to actively pursue both offensive and defensive counterspace capabilities, the United States has refrained from developing an offensive space program and has dutifully sought to avoid actions that could be seen as "weaponizing space." This position was originally rooted in the principles for the peaceful use of outer space and later tied, especially during the Cold War, to the notion that satellites were stabilizing, as they would provide early warning of a nuclear strike and allow time for a response. Thus, an attack on those satellites could be interpreted by an adversary as a sign of an imminent nuclear strike. However, as the space environment has evolved and is now seen by China as a warfighting domain, the U.S. Space Force is spearheading a new approach to counterspace operations to meet the growing threats to U.S. space assets. In March 2025, the U.S. Space Force released a framework on space warfighting that emphasized the need to establish space superiority and described counterspace operations as essential to joint operations. The framework said the United States needed to be able to undertake offensive actions to disrupt, degrade, deny or destroy enemy counterspace capabilities and other space assets that support their military forces as well as defensive actions to protect friendly space capabilities from attack, interference, and unintentional hazards. In testimony before the Commission, General Saltzman stated that much of the U.S. Space Force's time and effort has been spent on delivering services, which has consequently led to underfunding of capabilities to defeat an adversary's counterspace weapons. While U.S. space assets may increasingly be held at risk by the PLA's space buildup, China has also exposed itself to vulnerabilities due to its own growing dependency on space assets that could be exploited by changes to the U.S. military's approach to offensive and defensive space operations. As the PLA has increased the number and capabilities of satellites in orbit, it has become increasingly reliant on its space-based ISR, PNT, and communication satellites for its own joint warfighting. The PLA's long-range strike capabilities depend on ISR satellites for targeting and damage assessments, as well as communications for command and control (C2), and PNT to enable precision strikes. China's growing dependency on space may, in turn, also help deter escalatory activities in space. In a study assessing how the United States could deter China's use of force in space, Kevin Pollpeter, Director of Research at the U.S. Air University's China Aerospace Studies Institute, suggested that as China's dependency on its space assets increases, the ability of the United States to deter China from attacking space assets could also increase. Mr. Pollpeter assessed that due to its advancements, China may be more reluctant to engage in escalatory behavior in space that risks a widening space war. In his testimony to the Commission, General Saltzman noted that China has developed such a need for its space capabilities that the idea of irresponsible space behavior may be starting to affect the way the PLA views the space domain. General Saltzman cited Russia's 2021 anti-satellite test as an example of irresponsible behavior that China could view as jeopardizing the way it may want to use space. China is actively cultivating space partnerships with developing countries as part of its broader strategy to expand its global influence. A central part of this effort is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Spatial Information Corridor, also known as the Space Silk Road. This initiative consists of constructing a global network of ground infrastructure across BRI countries to support Chinese space operations, which strengthens Beijing's ties to developing countries while enhancing its satellite, navigation, and remote sensing capabilities. To entice countries to participate in the Space Silk Road, China offers free access to the BeiDou satellite navigation network as well as a wide range of services to partner countries including satellite communications, Earth imaging, and broadcasting capabilities, while encouraging regular reliance on, purchase of, and integration of Chinese satellite data into their own government and commercial operations. Additionally, partner countries receive low-cost internet and telecommunications services as well as the ability to launch their own satellites using Chinese systems. For many developing countries with limited means to build out their own indigenous space technologies, China presents an attractive option for securing access to space-based services. In Africa, for example, China has been active in pursuing its space partnerships as part of the Space Silk Road. This year, China completed a satellite production facility in Egypt that manufactures satellites with remote sensing capabilities that can be used for defense intelligence gathering. On April 20, 2025, the African Union opened the African Space Agency (AfSA) near Cairo, Egypt, to serve as the primary point of contact for other nations and organizations. The agency's location is strategically significant, as it sits near the Chinese-funded satellite production facility in Egypt. This new institution will likely serve as a forum for deepening China-Africa space collaboration as Beijing aims to position itself as a key partner in serving the region's space development needs. While China markets the Space Silk Road as supporting a wide range of civilian sectors—agriculture, disaster response, port logistics, telemedicine, transportation, financial services, and urban planning, to name a few—the PLA undoubtedly could benefit from the enhanced situational awareness and extended operational reach these capabilities provide across BRI regions. In addition, China often promotes satellite services that are interoperable with its telecom, AI, and data platforms—such as Huawei's technology integrated into BeiDou applications. This enables China to essentially market an exportable tech ecosystem that extends beyond the space sector, creating long-term economic and strategic dependencies on Chinese technology and magnifying concerns about data security. General Saltzman warns that there are significant strategic implications to China's expanding space partnerships, emphasizing that other countries' choices to adopt BeiDou are not merely technology issues, but also reflect deeper geopolitical alignment. This strategy not only strengthens the resilience and global coverage of China's space architecture but also binds partner nations more deeply into Beijing's technological ecosystem. Originally designed to protect national security by providing the PLA with navigation and targeting capabilities, China's global satellite navigation system, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), has been increasingly marketed for commercial and scientific purposes in recent years. China has offered BeiDou services as a key component of the Space Silk Road, claiming it offers affordable satellite services, equipment, and training to users globally. As of 2025, BeiDou has 49 operational satellites in orbit, significantly more than the U.S. GPS system's 31 operational satellites, and a global network of monitoring stations, many of which are located in developing countries. China is using BeiDou as a strategic tool to expand its geopolitical influence, particularly in Southeast Asia, Africa, and other developing regions. It integrates BeiDou into economic development, infrastructure, and training programs through bilateral agreements and regional forums. As of 2019, China had signed agreements with 120 partners to use BeiDou satellites. In 2021, Beijing hosted the first China-Africa BDS Cooperation Forum, which was attended by representatives from nearly 50 African countries and promoted BeiDou's role in economic and environmental development. In Southeast Asia, countries such as Thailand, Brunei, Laos, Indonesia, and Malaysia have expanded cooperation through platforms like the China-ASEAN Technology Transfer Forum and the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation Forum. China has also promoted BeiDou in Central Asian and Arab regions through similar forums. China is aggressively seeking to expand the use of BeiDou beyond navigation and transform it into a core component of its global digital infrastructure. The upcoming BeiDou-4 constellation aims to provide more precise, resilient, and reliable positioning services, which will improve accuracy from meters to decimeters and expand applications for use in aerospace, maritime, and autonomous systems. These upgrades could further reduce global reliance on the United States' GPS system, strengthen China's appeal as a space technology partner, and expand Beijing's ability to set technical standards in global navigation and positioning infrastructure. China is actively working to grow its commercial space sector, including launch services, satellite manufacturing, and downstream applications, as part of a broader strategy to expand its global market share and reduce reliance on Western systems. Currently, China Great Wall Industry Corporation, a subsidiary of the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, is the primary commercial provider of international satellite services, offering launch, construction, and operational support to countries such as Pakistan, Nigeria, and Venezuela. China's international expansion of its space services acts as a force multiplier for its geopolitical ambitions. Through a heavily state-led model, Beijing closely coordinates military, civil, and commercial activities—enabling civilian space services to directly support the PLA's goals while being marketed globally as purely commercial services. By embedding dual-use technologies in partner nations' infrastructure, China boosts its global space market share, gains access to sensitive data, and draws developing countries deeper into its geopolitical and economic orbit. In testimony before the Commission, Victoria Samson, Chief Director of Space Security and Stability at Secure World Foundation, noted that China often builds ground infrastructure and hosts satellites for other countries in regions that are rich in natural resources or have strategic value. This approach allows China to gain access to those resources and collect sensitive data or communications that can be used to exert diplomatic leverage and secure support for its broader geopolitical objectives. China's network of ground stations supports satellite constellations like BeiDou, as well as Earth observation and communications platforms, by enabling faster and more robust data transfer and enhancing China's ability to perform critical telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) functions. China currently operates or is developing overseas ground stations in South America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific. Previously, China had access to ground stations operated by the Swedish Space Corporation in Sweden, Chile, and Australia, but in September 2020 the company decided not to renew its contract with China, citing geopolitical changes and security concerns. China markets ground stations as providers of civilian services such as navigation, weather forecasting, disaster monitoring, and remote sensing, but experts raise concerns that the same infrastructure could also support the PLA's military objectives. The majority of these facilities are built and operated by the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC), a state-owned entity closely linked to the PLA's then-Strategic Support Force Space Systems Department. All TT&C operations are centrally coordinated through the Xi'an Satellite Control Center, a subordinate arm of the CLTC, suggesting a high degree of military integration. A prominent example is the Neuquén ground station operated by China in Argentina, which opened in 2017 under a 50-year, tax-free lease. Despite its framing as a diplomatic and cooperative venture, the facility is staffed by Chinese military personnel and operated solely by the CLTC; Argentina is granted access for just 10 percent of its operational time. Argentina is barred from interfering with the site's activities, and the site is surrounded by a 62-mile frequency exclusion zone under Chinese control. Essentially, China is using Argentine territory to advance its strategic goals. This imbalance, where host countries have little visibility or authority, raises broader concerns that such installations may serve military functions, such as ISR, under the guise of peaceful civilian cooperation. From a military operations perspective, China's expansive global network of ground stations could enhance the PLA's ability to conduct resilient and survivable space operations in conflict. TT&C stations are essential for monitoring satellite health, tracking orbits, and sending commands, but they require line-of-sight, limiting contact to brief windows between satellites and ground stations. To maintain continuous control, China augments its network with Yuan Wang-class tracking ships and the new Liaowang-1 vessel. This globally dispersed architecture provides global coverage, reduces vulnerability to localized disruptions, and could complicate adversary efforts to target satellite control. It also accelerates the reception of real-time ISR, navigation, missile warning, and secure communications, enabling faster, more precise decision-making. A summary of space cooperation between China and international partners across Ground Stations, Satellite/Launch, and General Partnerships: - Algeria: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Angola: Satellite/Launch (X) - Antarctica: Ground Station (X) - Argentina: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Austria: Partnership (X) - Azerbaijan: Ground Station (X), Partnership (X) - Bahrain: Partnership (X) - Belarus: Ground Station (Agreement reached), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Bolivia: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Brazil: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Burkina Faso: Ground Station (Agreement reached), Partnership (X) - Burma (Myanmar): Partnership (X) - Cambodia: Satellite/Launch (Past/discontinued), Partnership (X) - Chile: Ground Station (Past/discontinued), Satellite/Launch (Past/discontinued) - Cuba: Partnership (X) - DRC: Satellite/Launch (Agreement reached) - Djibouti: Ground Station (Agreement reached) - Ecuador: Partnership (X) - Egypt: Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Ethiopia: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - France: Partnership (X) - Hungary: Partnership (Non-government entity) - Indonesia: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Iran: Ground Station (Agreement reached), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Italy: Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Kazakhstan: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Kenya: Partnership (X) - Kyrgyzstan: Partnership (X) - Laos: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Luxembourg: Partnership (Non-government entity) - Malaysia: Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Mexico: Satellite/Launch (X) - Mozambique: Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Namibia: Ground Station (X), Partnership (X) - Nepal: Partnership (X) - Nicaragua: Partnership (X) - Nigeria: Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Pakistan: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Panama: Partnership (X) - Peru: Ground Station (X), Partnership (X) - Philippines: Partnership (X) - Russia: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Rwanda: Partnership (X) - Saudi Arabia: Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Senegal: Partnership (X) - Serbia: Satellite/Launch (Agreement reached), Partnership (X) - South Africa: Ground Station (X), Partnership (X) - Sri Lanka: Satellite/Launch (X) - Sudan: Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Sweden: Ground Station (Past/discontinued), Satellite/Launch (Past/discontinued), Partnership (Past/discontinued) - Tanzania: Partnership (X) - Thailand: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Tunisia: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) - Turkey: Satellite/Launch (X) - UAE: Partnership (X) - United Kingdom: Partnership (X) - Uzbekistan: Partnership (X) - Venezuela: Ground Station (X), Satellite/Launch (X), Partnership (X) In the competition to lead the emerging space economy—the commercial market to sell goods and services related to space—the United States is currently the global leader, but China has distinct capabilities that could translate to significant geostrategic and military advantage. Building on its established state-led aerospace and defense sector and network of research institutions, China has quickly fostered a dynamic startup ecosystem focused on rivaling U.S. firms in commercial launch and satellite networks. Though the United States currently leads in two capabilities vital to the future space economy—reusable launch rockets (RLRs) and LEO satellite constellations—China is deploying its industrial policy playbook and leveraging strengths in manufacturing and rocketry in an attempt to rapidly catch up. The stakes are high, as the competition extends beyond technological development to finite orbital positions for satellites, international influence in establishing ground stations, and control over future markets and space-based applications—many of them with significant national security implications. The commercial space economy is on the precipice of a dramatic transformation due to several concurrent advances. In the upstream segment, launch frequency is accelerating and costs are dropping rapidly due to the advent of RLRs by companies like SpaceX, while innovations in satellite design are similarly enabling companies to build satellites at lower cost and faster. Both also have clear military implications, as the ability to rapidly deploy or reconstitute space assets could be vital in a space-based conflict. Meanwhile, in the mid-stream segment, improvements in satellites' onboard technology—like higher throughput for data transmission and faster processing through edge computing—are enabling larger satellite networks to communicate with each other and ground stations more efficiently and perform more complex tasks. Taken together, these advances are enabling mega-constellations of LEO satellites to provide less expensive, more feature-rich applications in the downstream segment, including global telecommunications and internet connectivity, enhanced navigation and tracking, and remote sensing and imagery. Starlink's essential role in Ukraine's defense since Russia's invasion in 2022—from providing real-time encrypted communications to imagery and geolocation used to coordinate attack drones—demonstrates the breadth of dual-use applications possible through LEO constellations. Breakdown of commercial space market segments and leading players: 1. Upstream (Components and manufacturing): - Launch vehicle manufacturers: China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) [China] vs. SpaceX, Blue Origin [United States] - Satellite manufacturers: China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) [China] vs. Lockheed Martin, SpaceX [United States] - Propulsion developers and rocketry firms: CASC, Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology, LandSpace [China] vs. Lockheed Martin, Anduril Industries Inc., SpaceX [United States] - Subsystems providers: China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) [China] vs. Northrop Grumman, Ball Aerospace [United States] 2. Midstream (Operations and mission services): - Satellite constellation management: China Satellite Network Group Co. Ltd. [China] vs. Starlink, Planet Labs, ViaSat [United States] - Ground control systems and mission management: Chang Guang Satellite Technology [China] vs. Kratos, General Dynamics [United States] - Secure data relay: China Satellite Communications Co. Ltd [China] vs. Starlink, Capella Space [United States] - On-orbit services: China Academy of Space Technology [China] vs. Maxar Technologies [United States] 3. Downstream (Space-enabled applications): - Satellite internet: SpaceSail (Qianfan), China SatNet (Guowang) [China] vs. Starlink, ViaSat [United States] - Geolocation and navigation: BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) [China] vs. Global Positioning System (GPS) [United States] - Remote sensing and imaging: Chang Guang Satellite Technology, Space View Technology, and Spacety [China] vs. Planet Labs, Maxar Technologies, BlackSky [United States] In just a decade, China has gone from having an almost non-existent private commercial space sector to a vibrant ecosystem of space startups. Like other strategic industries, this rapid progress is an outgrowth of extensive government support to break through technological "chokepoints," foster innovation, and catch up to and surpass competitors, particularly in the United States. At the same time, space has been a heavily-regulated and state-dominated industry in China, so industrial policy initially took a gradualist approach, and commercial activity remains largely dependent on technical support and regulatory coordination from state-owned aerospace conglomerates. After China declared space a strategic sector in 2023, several provinces and cities announced plans for regional clusters that compete with and complement one another, developing redundant capabilities and alternative paths to achieve the same goals. China's policy support for private commercial space firms evolved fairly rapidly while being implemented through incrementally larger opportunities for the private sector. A 2021 white paper on China's space sectors made growth of China's private space sector a central element of many objectives. Before 2014, China's space sector was confined to state-led aerospace conglomerates that focused mostly on civil and military applications as well as navigation. These SOEs were poorly positioned to innovate and compete in emerging areas like low-cost satellite production and commercial space applications. Seeking to rectify these weaknesses, in 2014 China's state planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission, relaxed restrictions on satellite manufacturing and commercial launch. A broader strategy for industrial development followed in 2015, with a focus on reducing foreign reliance, and in 2016 China announced plans to promote commercial satellite services abroad through the BRI. The private space economy further accelerated after 2019, when China reduced barriers to private investment in rocketry. Then in 2020, telecommunications firms became more involved as China encouraged the growth of satellite internet in its sweeping "new infrastructure" investment plan. Only in 2023 did China designate commercial space as a "strategic emerging sector," the same label it first applied to new energy vehicles and other major beneficiaries of industrial policy in 2007. The 2023 designation, later codified in 2024, kickstarted a series of provincial-level action plans to build regional commercial space clusters. For instance, the plan for Wenchang, located in southern Hainan province, builds on the city's preexisting strengths as China's southernmost spaceport and launch site for Long March rockets used in space station missions and deep space exploration. The regional plan seeks to expand the volume of commercial launches and position Wenchang as a space tourism hub. A nearby "satellite mega factory" announced in 2024 is projected to have an output of 1,000 satellites annually, using processes from auto-manufacturing to mass-produce satellites that could then be put into orbit immediately from adjacent launch sites. Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Wuhan, among other cities and provincial-level municipalities, have announced similar plans that build on preexisting strengths, such as Shanghai's civil aviation industry, Shenzhen's telecommunications industry, and Beijing's rocketry industry and research institutes and universities. Notably, many of these plans include fiscal incentives for satellite manufacturers, driving a surge in production capacity. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were the foundation of China's commercial space economy and remain dominant players today even as private space firms have grown rapidly. Prior to 2014, virtually all space initiatives were under China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), the two major state-owned aerospace and defense conglomerates. Aside from their military focus and efforts in space exploration, these firms and their affiliates led almost all commercial space activity, with CASC subsidiaries the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) and Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST) conducting most of China's launches. CASC also led China's highly successful buildout of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System. Today, the breadth of SOEs' operations complements the targeted capabilities of China's private firms, and they are both competitors and collaborators. CASC still leads in annual launches (including non-commercial launches), with 49 in 2024—the second-most globally, behind SpaceX's 140. CASC is also leading the buildout of one of China's two LEO mega-constellations, with the other being state-coordinated but mostly privately built. It remains the top Chinese manufacturer of GEO satellites, while Chinese startups focus on cheaper LEO satellites. At the same time, SOEs are investors in and customers of China's private space firms, and private firms seek partnerships with SOEs to clear regulatory hurdles. CASC's investment arm, China Aerospace Investment Holdings, funds startups that advance China's strategic objectives like Beijing Xingtu (Space Trek), a rocketry firm developing solid-fueled rapid launch capabilities. Many Chinese space startups were also founded by former CASC employees, including MinoSpace, Spacety, and Galaxy Space. Investment in China's commercial space firms has closely tracked the expansion of policy support, accelerating to a crescendo with China's designation of the sector as a strategic emerging industry in 2023. The following year, China surpassed the United States in venture capital (VC) funding for commercial space startups for the first time, receiving $2.7 billion compared to the U.S. funding of $2.6 billion. Preceding that, China's commercial space market has grown rapidly since China eased private investment in rocket companies in 2019—growing from $113 billion in 2019 to $268 billion in 2023, with projections reaching $900 billion by 2029. Capital from both U.S. and foreign investors has also contributed at least in part to China's commercial space sector, with Sequoia, Lightspeed, and Matrix as notable funders. Aside from VCs, foreign funds such as the state-led Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) have also invested in Chinese commercial space firms, notably rocketry. This funding landscape has led to a rapid increase in the number of commercial space firms, with private companies now outnumbering state-owned counterparts four to one, even as the latter maintain much larger, more complex operations by comparison. In 2024, the Chinese government accounted for the majority of investment in China's commercial space sector, rising from 49 percent in 2023 to 51 percent in 2024 and reaching 54 percent in the first quarter of 2025. However, government support comes with strings attached, as commercial space firms face pressure to focus on long-term goals in chokepoint technologies rather than near-term profitability. Compared to the United States, China's commercial space ecosystem appears fairly nascent, but the breadth of companies competing in similar technologies, government support, and synergies from the substantial capabilities of China's aerospace SOEs provide firm footing to close this gap. For the moment, SpaceX and Starlink are market leaders in RLR and LEO constellations, respectively, and retain a substantial first mover advantage due to vertical integration: SpaceX reduces market risk with Starlink as a guaranteed customer, while near-cost access to space through in-house launch has enabled Starlink to rapidly and affordably scale its satellite network. Although China trails in satellites currently in orbit, its construction of multiple mega factories puts it on track to rival production volumes at SpaceX's Redmond facility, which in August 2025 indicated it was producing 70 satellites per week or roughly 3,600 annually. According to research from intelligence firm Exovera and SpaceNews, planned mega-factories and projected output include: • Geespace Mega Factory in Zhejiang—500 satellites annually. • Aerospace Satellites Mega Factory in Hainan—1,000 satellites annually. • Galaxy Space Nantong Intelligent in Jiangsu—300 small satellites and 100–150 medium satellites annually. • Shanghai Gesi Aerospace Technology (Genesat)—300 satellites annually. Similarly, although China trails in total launches, it has firms experimenting with far more approaches to propulsion and reusable launch, from liquid and solid fuels (SpaceX uses liquid methane) to novel technologies such as Maglev launch systems akin to high-speed trains. The vibrancy of China's ecosystem could ultimately provide a competitive edge over the United States, which is highly concentrated in a few companies and heavily invested in a narrow set of approaches. These limitations create a higher risk of setbacks and may leave the U.S. government with limited leverage when negotiating with a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry. Launch and RLR: China currently has about 50 commercial launch firms, a number Orbital Gateway Consulting founder Blaine Curcio highlighted in his testimony before the Commission on its diversity and breadth compared to U.S. firms. While U.S. leader SpaceX is far ahead of China's leading commercial launch company, Galactic Energy, and U.S.-based Rocket Lab is also ahead of China's second most developed commercial launch company, Mr. Curcio estimates that China's fifth-most-developed company is probably on par with its U.S. counterpart. In 2024, China had 66 successful launches carrying 263 satellites, compared to 66 launches carrying 212 satellites in 2023. Mr. Curcio's tracking found 15 launches by commercial firms that sent 67 satellites into orbit. The country is aiming to exceed 100 launches in 2025; as of September 25, 2025, it had conducted 55 launches (by comparison, the United States had conducted 126). Numerous Chinese firms are also advancing in RLR development, with both SOEs and commercial firms planning test flights for reusable rockets. In 2024, China made significant strides in developing reusable space launch vehicles, including a successful 12-kilometer (7.4 miles)-high vertical takeoff and landing test. At least seven Chinese commercial RLR prototypes are scheduled for their maiden launch in 2025, with experts predicting they will be competitive with SpaceX's RLR by 2030. Landspace, Space Pioneer, Galactic Energy, Deep Blue Aerospace, and iSpace, are among the major Chinese commercial companies working towards launchers that could be made reusable in the future. iSpace's chief designer estimated that in 2025, the firm's RLR could achieve technological parity with SpaceX's 2015 rocket technology. General Saltzman highlighted China's investment in reusable launch as one of the inflection points in space access that may result in China overtaking U.S. leadership in launch. China's investment in LEO satellite constellations supports both military and geopolitical aims as Chinese companies attempt to catch up to and compete against U.S. constellations, in particular Starlink's. China currently has about ten commercial companies working to build LEO communication satellites for two prominent state-owned mega constellations, Thousand Sails (Qianfan) and Guowang (China Satnet). Both currently trail Starlink, with 2,272 U.S. satellites launched in 2024 compared to China's 270. However, Guowang aims to launch a total of 13,000 satellites, primarily for domestic telecommunications and potential military use. Qianfan plans to launch 15,000 satellites focused on providing service to foreign telecom companies. Hongqing Technology has filed a plan with the ITU to launch a third mega constellation of 10,000 satellites, bringing China's total close to Starlink's planned constellation. Finally, smaller entrants like Geespace (a satellite manufacturer funded by commercial firm Geely Automotive) and commercial space firm GalaxySpace are also planning satellite constellations of 6,000 and 1,000 satellites, respectively. The state-backed Guowang and Qianfan constellations programs will be the largest driver of demand for China's commercial space sector, including commercial manufacturing and development of satellite systems, subsystems, and components. Since 2023, the Shanghai Engineering Center for Microsatellites (SECM) and its joint venture subsidiary Genesat have been the key entities building the Qianfan constellation. China's SOE China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) will likely continue to be the prime manufacturer of the Guowang constellation, and Mr. Curcio expects all other LEO communications manufacturers will likely become system suppliers to SECM and CAST. Table 3: Chinese Companies Developing LEO Satellites Compared to Starlink: - Shanghai Lanjian Hongqing Technology Company (Commercial): 10,000 planned, Satellites Launched: TBD - China Satellite Network Group Ltd. (Guowang/Xingwang) (SOE): 13,000 planned, Satellites Launched: 110 - Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology (SSST/ Qianfan) (SOE): 15,000 planned, Satellites Launched: 90 - Geespace (Commercial): 6,000 planned, Satellites Launched: 64 - GalaxySpace (Commercial): 1,000 planned, Satellites Launched: TBD - Starlink (Commercial): 42,000 planned, Satellites Launched: 9,868 In parallel to its advances in launch and satellite manufacturing capacity, China has reached new milestones in demonstrating key enabling technologies for satellite communications and other space-based applications. In March 2025, China's Chang Guang Satellite Technology announced that its Jilin-1 satellite constellation achieved a record-setting 100 gigabit-per-second laser transmission to a mobile ground station (roughly equivalent to transmitting ten full-length high-definition feature films in one second). Laser-based communications offer higher data transfer rates, less susceptibility to interference, and greater security than conventional radio signals, though greater risk of atmospheric disruption (e.g., from rain or fog). Chang Guang's demonstration of the laser communication to a mobile ground station has clear commercial and defense implications and suggests China may be ahead in providing satellite communications for contexts requiring secure highspeed links in remote or austere environments. Relatedly, in May 2025, South China Morning Post reported that SatNet, the SOE that manages the Guowang mega-constellation, completed the first 5G satellite-to-smartphone video call. The demonstration stands out both for the volume of data transmitted and the use of 5G standards rather than special equipment unique to a network. To date, "direct-to-device" (D2D) communications—satellite-to-smartphone connectivity—has focused on transmitting text messages and voice calls, rather than video, with T-Mobile and Starlink partnering to soft launch satellite text messaging in January 2024 on select handsets. Moreover, other satellite-to-terrestrial network communications, including Starlink's partnership and Vodafone and AST SpaceMobile's partnership, use custom technology rather than global 5G standards. D2D connections via 5G protocols would effectively enable satellites to become an orbiting extension of terrestrial networks, delivering coverage to remote areas and potentially opening up competition for new markets with limited ground-based telecommunications infrastructure. China Telecom has already announced hopes to expand its D2D geosynchronous Tiantong satellite constellation from Hong Kong and the Mainland to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Belt and Road participants in other regions. Chinese satellite constellations are also surpassing U.S. capabilities in orbital remote sensing, or collecting information from a distance using reflected or emitted radiation to provide imagery or other data. In an October 2024 ranking of global commercial space-based remote sensing systems, researchers found Chinese firms led in five of eleven areas, compared to just four for the United States. China's emerging dominance in remote sensing poses both national security and market risks. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Chang Guang Satellite Technology in December 2023 for providing satellite imagery to the Wagner Group. In April 2025, the U.S. Department of State indicated Chang Guang supplied Houthi rebels with satellite imagery to target U.S. warships and international vessels in the Red Sea. Aside from supporting attacks on U.S. assets and aiding Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Chang Guang is attempting to seize global market share for its services by undercutting competitors. Below-market pricing threatens the viability of U.S. remote sensing startups. Comparison of Remote Sensing Capabilities: - Electro-optical (EO) imaging: China Rank 1 (China Siwei SuperView Neo-1) vs. U.S. Rank 3 (Maxar Worldview) - EO revisit: China Rank 1 (Chang Guang Jilin-1) vs. U.S. Rank 3 (Planet Sky SkySat) - EO video: China Rank 3 (Chang Guang Jilin-1) vs. U.S. Rank 1 (Planet Sky SkySat 16-21) - Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) X-band: China not in top 3 vs. U.S. Rank 1 (Umbra SAR) - SAR revisit: China not in top 3 vs. U.S. Rank 2 (Umbra Constellation) - SAR C-band: China Rank 1 (SAST Gaofen-12) vs. U.S. not in top 3 - Multispectral capability: China Rank 1 (China Siwei SuperView Neo-3) vs. U.S. Rank 3 (Planet Sky-Sat 16-21) - Hyperspectral capability: China Rank 3 (Zhuhai Orbita) vs. U.S. Rank 1 (Orbital Sidekick GHOSt) - Short-wave infrared: China Rank 3 (SAST Gaofen-5) vs. U.S. Rank 1 (Maxar WorldView-3) - Mid-wave infrared: China Rank 2 (SAST Gaofen-5) vs. U.S. not in top 3 - Long-wave infrared: China Rank 1 (CAST Ziyuan) vs. U.S. not in top 3 China's commercial space firms are increasingly turning to the Middle East as a growth market, with Abu Dhabi—and to a lesser extent Egypt and Saudi Arabia—at the center of these efforts. In early 2024, USpace, a Hong Kong-based firm with several satellites already on orbit, unveiled plans for the Abu Dhabi Space Eco-City, a massive project designed to serve as a global hub for aerospace innovation and trade. The development will span three million square meters in the Khalifa Economic Zones, rolled out in two phases, and is intended to provide commercial aerospace services worldwide. In parallel, USpace also signed 2024 agreements with Egypt to establish satellite factories, and it plans to sign similar agreements with Saudi Arabia, further extending China's presence in the region. Alongside USpace, the UAE's space initiatives have also drawn a host of Chinese commercial space firms. XSat, a satellite payload and communications systems manufacturer, was among the first partners to join. It was followed by China Unicom Airnet, a subsidiary focused on satellite provided in-flight internet, InterstellOr, a Beijing-based commercial crewed spaceflight startup, and Fujian Jiwang Huimin Group, a diversified technology and industrial firm. For Chinese companies, the appeal is clear: exporting industrial capacity abroad while expanding their international footprint, often with state support and fewer restrictions on technology transfer than Western competitors. Middle Eastern governments, for their part, are eager to develop their domestic space industries and have welcomed Chinese firms as partners in building local capabilities. With Chinese, Middle Eastern, and North African leaders championing expanded civil, commercial, and TT&C cooperation along the Space Silk Road, initiatives like the Abu Dhabi Eco-City and Egypt's recently completed satellite assembly, integration, and testing (AIT) Center are likely just the beginning of a wider Chinese commercial space presence across the Middle East and North Africa. While commercial launch, mega-constellations, and the infrastructure they require as well as downstream applications they enable are the primary arenas of U.S.-China commercial space competition, China is also investing in several "over-the-horizon" space-based technologies. Some key technologies include: • Quantum communication satellites: Quantum communication satellites use quantum networking to enable highly encrypted communications, which potentially offer faster and more secure data transmission for finance, government, or military users. China launched its first LEO satellite designed for quantum communication, the Micius, in 2016 and its second LEO satellite, the Jinan-1, in 2022. China is planning to launch a third quantum communications satellite into LEO in 2025, and experiment with building a quantum communications satellite network based on low-earth orbit quantum satellites. • Space planes: Space planes are aircraft designed to fly both within the atmosphere and outer space. Like RLRs, space planes are reusable, but they can both take off and land on runways designed for airplanes. This makes them ideal for commercial applications that require frequent deployment as well as for military uses, including domain awareness and counterspace operations like disabling adversary satellites. In 2024 China began testing a highly secretive orbital spacecraft believed to mimic the U.S. Space Force's X-37B military-use space plane. • Space-based computing and AI: Higher volumes of space-based computing could sharply increase the demand for real-time data processing, particularly in dual-use applications like earth observation. In May 2025, China launched the first 12 satellites of its "three-body computing constellation," a space-based supercomputer comprising a planned constellation of 2,800 satellites. Slated for completion in 2030, the full constellation aims to reach 1,000 peta operations per second—putting it on track to rival the world's most powerful supercomputers. • Space solar power satellites (SSPS): Leading scientific organizations in China have called for SSPS as a potential breakthrough in clean energy. SSPS involves orbiting satellites equipped with solar arrays that collect solar energy and wirelessly beam it—typically as microwaves or lasers—to receiving stations on Earth, where it is converted into electricity. In 2023, Xidian University announced it had begun testing "Chasing Sun," the world's first complete ground verification system to receive transmissions from SSPS. Alongside these efforts, the Chinese Academy of Engineering revealed that a major SSPS project, known colloquially as "Three Gorges Dam in Space," is currently in planning stages. SSSP has distinct dual-use potential: satellites capable of delivering concentrated energy could be adapted for military use to power airships, drone fleets, and mobile maritime platforms. • Nuclear thermal propulsion: China is investing in nuclear-powered space propulsion technologies that could drastically reduce the time required for deep space missions. In early 2024, Chinese researchers revealed a compact, lithium-cooled fission reactor capable of delivering 1.5 megawatts of power that fits in a container-sized package on Earth but expands in orbit to the size of a 20-story building. Ground tests have validated key components, and officials claim the system could reduce a round-trip Mars mission to just three months. China's civil space ambitions go beyond science and technology and are a means to gain long-term strategic advantage. In addition to accumulating an impressive list of achievements, China has articulated ambitious plans to establish itself as the global leader in space technology and exploration, sought to reshape rules regarding international space governance, and aimed to position itself as a strategic rival to the United States. China has made it clear it does not seek to merely repeat U.S. efforts, but to achieve "global firsts," such as its June 2024 Chang'e-6 mission that returned the first-ever lunar samples from the Moon's far side. These accomplishments serve not only scientific and technological goals, but also political and diplomatic ones, bolstering national pride and supporting China's narrative of global leadership. China Seeks to Shape Outcomes in International Space Governance Bodies and Influence Technical Standards: China has actively sought to shape the rules and norms governing outer space to align with its own strategic interests, while undermining existing standards and U.S. leadership. Existing rules and norms support transparent practices and multilateral cooperation, while China has promoted bilateral arrangements and frameworks that emphasize sovereign rights gained through exploration. For example, this includes claiming rights to extract lunar minerals, which challenges the norm of space being a global commons. By pursuing high-profile "firsts" and leading initiatives like the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), China has sought to boost its global influence and attract partners to support its preferred model of space governance. If China is able to reshape the norms and rules of outer space, future missions to the Moon and Mars could give China early access to strategic resources, support the development of onsite infrastructure, and allow it to set technical standards that influence how other nations operate in space. China Overwhelms, Obstructs the ITU to Advance its Preferred Standards: China has adopted a strategy to both inundate and obstruct deliberations within the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in an effort to shape the foundational architecture of global communications, including the management of satellite constellations and the adoption of global technology standards. If China can exert influence over the global spectrum and orbital slot allocations—which are coordinated primarily through the ITU—it could restrict other countries' and companies' ability to launch or expand satellite constellations. Beijing's assertive role in the ITU is part of its broader China Standards 2035 plan, which aims to set global benchmarks in high-tech sectors, including those central to its space power. Beijing has also leveraged international bodies to challenge U.S.-led initiatives, most notably the Artemis Accords and the Artemis Program. Rooted in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the Accords have been signed by over 50 partner nations. While many of the norms promoted by the Accords are consistent with standards China has also endorsed, Beijing views the initiative as a geopolitical tool intended to constrain its space ambitions. Instead, China, alongside Russia, is leading its own multilateral initiative, the ILRS. China has announced goals to build an operational ILRS on the south pole of the Moon by 2035, aiming to attract 50 countries, 500 foreign research institutions, and 5,000 researchers to participate. Timeline of Civil Space Goals (Lunar vs Mars): - 2025: [U.S.] ESCAPADE Mars small orbiters launch. - 2026: [China] Chang'e 7 robotic mission to Moon's south pole for water ice and terrain data. - 2026: [U.S.] Artemis II first crewed lunar orbit mission. - 2027: [U.S.] Artemis III first crewed landing at Moon's south pole. - 2028: [China] Chang'e 8 in-situ resource utilization tests on Moon. - 2028: [U.S. / ESA] Mars sample return campaign. - 2028: [U.S.] Artemis IV first mission to Gateway lunar space station. - 2029: [U.S.] Blue Ghost Mission 4 commercial lunar south pole lander. - 2030s: [China] ILRS construction completed, crewed flight testing; first potential crewed lunar landing. - 2031: [China] Tianwen-3 Mars sample return mission. - 2030s: [China] Planning for long-duration crewed Mars missions. - 2030s–2040s: [China] Fully operational manned ILRS; launch first Chinese crewed Mars mission. - 2030s+: [U.S.] NASA aims to land astronauts on Mars. Losing U.S. leadership in space would amount to relinquishing the advantage first secured during the original space race—when space became essential to military superiority, global prestige, and geopolitical influence. Today's contest with China is about who controls the critical infrastructure and rulemaking mechanisms that will define the future of the space domain. If the United States retreats, China is prepared to fill the void with a model of space governance that serves its interests—state-directed, opaque, and designed to embed long-term global dependencies on Chinese systems. China's rapid expansion of space capabilities across the military, commercial, and civil/diplomatic realms—and intent to displace the United States as the world's premier space power—should concern all Americans. The challenges the United States faces in space are not only in the military sector. China's space capabilities allow it to threaten vital services enabled by satellites that affect the health and welfare of everyday U.S. citizens. China's attempts to reset international norms and standards in its favor could also undermine key sectors of our economy. U.S. policymakers must act urgently to ensure that the United States wins this new space race and retains the strategic high ground that has long underpinned our military and economic leadership. Even as the U.S. military increasingly relies on space-enabled assets to fight and win modern wars, many of those assets are vulnerable to China's sophisticated offensive space capabilities. Although the U.S. Space Force was established at the end of 2019 with the mission of ensuring continued U.S. space superiority, longstanding policy constraints have placed effective limits on its ability to achieve its critical mission. These constraints include limits on developing and using offensive counterspace capabilities like ASAT weapons, electronic jamming, and cyber operations as well as limited resources to update legacy systems or build new capabilities. The practical limits on the U.S. Space Force are in stark contrast to China's commitment. General Salzman clearly laid out the broad military implications of China's advances in space, warning that without space superiority, other domains of warfare become untenable: "Taken as a whole, China's potent and expanding arsenal of space-based capabilities multiplies its combat potential many times over... China can hold U.S. and allied forces at risk with long-range precision weapons, preventing our forces from taking meaningful action before they even reach theater. The consequence of failing to mitigate this threat means military objectives will be tough to meet without unacceptable loss of American lives." The Commission recommends: • To preserve and strengthen U.S. primacy in the critical space domain as China pursues sweeping advancements across military, commercial, and civil space sectors, Congress should: ○ Increase or reallocate appropriations for the U.S. Space Force to levels necessary to achieve space control and establish space superiority against China's rapidly expanding space and counterspace capabilities. ○ Direct the U.S. Department of Defense to enhance the U.S. Space Force's capacity to conduct space wargaming and develop realistic modeling and simulation of potential threats from China, including training programs for space operators on warfighting tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for space control. ○ Conduct oversight hearings and other activities to ensure the United States maintains primacy in the space domain by identifying investments in cutting-edge space technologies and assessing China's space capabilities and threats to U.S. space industrial base capacity. ○ Direct the U.S. Department of Commerce, in coordination with the U.S. Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury, to produce an unclassified report to Congress within 180 days identifying China's commercial space capabilities, the dual-use nature of Chinese space technologies, and China's commercial space industry's support to the People's Liberation Army. ○ Direct the U.S. National Space Council to increase international outreach on space launch services and ensure the United States remains the partner of choice for both government and commercial space launch. ○ Express support for the strategic importance of U.S. leadership in civil space exploration and direct relevant agencies to assess the progress of the Artemis Accords, evaluate risks China poses to U.S. civil space priorities, including National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs, and ensure program delays do not undermine U.S. credibility in establishing global norms for lunar and Martian exploration. Several concurrent and mutually reinforcing advances are leading to rapid development of the commercial space sector, driven by increased demand for satellite internet, remote sensing, and other space-based commercial services. Advances in launch and satellite manufacturing: Space used to be the provenance of governments and a limited number of large companies because of the immense costs associated with developing, launching, and operating space assets. Space launch and related infrastructure required hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in investment. At the same time, satellite launches demanded heavier, more expensive rocketry because satellites were larger and were headed to very high geo-stationary orbits (GEO, roughly 22,000 miles above the Earth). Within the last decade, parallel cost reductions and efficiency gains from reusable launch rockets (RLRs) and satellites have accelerated the commercial space market. Even before the advent of RLRs, economies of scale from higher launch cadences and reduced launch costs from smaller satellites that orbit closer to Earth's surface have made it quicker and cheaper to send satellites into space. RLRs reuse their first-stage booster, payload fairings, or other critical launch components that can account for as much as 70 percent of the rocket's total cost. At the same time, satellite design has improved and manufacturing costs have dropped significantly due to the advent of "SmallSats" and even miniaturized "CubeSats," advances in technology, improvements in production processes like 3D printing, and developments in durable, lightweight materials. Advances in satellite constellations, ground stations, and laser communications: The cost reductions from RLRs and cheaper, miniaturized satellites are critical to the economic viability of low Earth orbit (LEO) mega-constellations—groups of hundreds to tens of thousands of satellites in LEO. Because data transmissions from satellites in LEO reach Earth more quickly, they enable applications requiring low latency like satellite internet, offering solutions where ground-based infrastructure is not viable. However, unlike GEO satellites that remain in a fixed position relative to the Earth, LEO satellites move quickly, requiring networks of hundreds or thousands of satellites for continuous coverage, and sophisticated ground TT&C networks or intersatellite laser links for rapid data relay. Competition for limited "orbital real estate" and third country ground stations: Aside from competition for the underlying technologies, the future space economy is fueling a competition for satellite network positions in low-earth orbit and supportive ground infrastructure. The governing body for international satellites is the UN's International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which allocates satellite spectrum and orbital slots on a first come, first served basis. ITU rules give firms seven years to launch their first satellite and another seven to show steady deployment, or risk losing their allocations. With an estimated 70,000 LEO satellites expected to launch by 2029, commercial space firms are in a race against time to secure the best spectrum for their LEO constellations.