Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rbul20 Chinese nuclear weapons, 2025 Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns & Mackenzie Knight To cite this article: Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns & Mackenzie Knight (2025) Chinese nuclear weapons, 2025, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 81:2, 135-160, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2025.2467011 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2025.2467011 Published online: 12 Mar 2025. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbul20 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 2025, VOL. 81, NO. 2, 135–160 https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2025.2467011 NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK Chinese nuclear weapons, 2025 Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight ABSTRACT The modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal has both accelerated and expanded in recent years. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that China now possesses approximately 600 nuclear warheads, with more in production to arm future delivery systems. China is believed to have the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal among the nine nuclear-armed states; it is the only Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is significantly increasing its nuclear arsenal. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, associate director Matt Korda, and senior research associates Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists dating back to 1987, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/. KEYWORDS: China; ballistic missiles; nuclear arsenals; nuclear risk; nuclear weapons; nuclear notebook Within the past five years, China has significantly expanded its ongoing nuclear modernization program by fielding more types and greater numbers of nuclear weapons than ever before. Since our previous edition on China in May 2024, China has continued to develop its three new missile silo fields for solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), continued the construction of new silos for its liquid-fuel DF-5 ICBMs, has been developing new variants of ICBMs and advanced strategic delivery systems, and has likely produced excess warheads for these systems once they are deployed. China has also further expanded its dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile force, which appears to have completely replaced the medium-range DF-21 in the nuclear role. At sea, China has been refitting its Type 094 ballistic missile submarines with the longer-range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. In addition, China has recently reassigned an operational nuclear mission to some of its bombers with an air-launched ballistic missile that might have nuclear capability. In all, China’s nuclear expansion is among the largest and most rapid modernization campaigns of the nine nuclear-armed states. We estimate that China has produced a stockpile of approximately 600 nuclear warheads for delivery by land-based ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic missiles, and bombers (see Table 1). The Pentagon reported in 2024 that China’s nuclear stockpile had “surpassed 600 operational warheads as of mid-2024” (US Department of Defense 2024, IX). But Chinese warheads are not “operational” like the US and Russian nuclear warheads deployed on operational missiles and at bomber bases; nearly all Chinese warheads are thought to be stored separate from the launchers. Moreover, we cannot replicate the warhead estimate based on the reported and observable force structure unless we assign warheads to a significant number of China’s new silos. The Pentagon also estimates that China’s arsenal will surpass 1,000 warheads by 2030, many of which will probably be “deployed at higher readiness levels” (US Department of Defense 2024, IX). The Pentagon’s 2024 report to Congress, like in 2023, notably did not include the projection made in previous Department of Defense reports that China might field a stockpile of about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035 (US Department of Defense 2022b, 94, 98). These projections depend on many uncertain factors, including: • How many missile silos China will ultimately build; • How many silos China will load with missiles; • How many warheads each missile will carry; • How many DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles will be deployed and how many of them will have a nuclear mission; • How many ballistic missile submarines China will field and how many warheads each missile will carry; • How many bombers China will operate and how many weapons each will carry; and • Assumptions about the future production of fissile materials and the number of warheads China will be able to produce. Table 1. Chinese nuclear forces, 2025. Type | NATO designation | Number of launchers | Year deployed | Range (kilometers) | Warheads x yield (kilotons) | Warheads Land-based ballistic missiles Intermediate-range: DF-26 | CSS-18 | 250 | 2016 | 4,000 | 1 × 425 | 100 Subtotal: 250 launchers | 100 warheads Intercontinental range: DF-5A | CSS-4 Mod 2 | 6 | 1981 | 12,000 | 1 × 4.5 MT | 6 DF-5B | CSS-4 Mod 3 | 12 | 2015 | 13,000 | Up to 5 × 425 | 60 DF-5C | (CSS-4 Mod 4) | .. | (2025) | 13,000 | 1 × “multi-MT” | .. DF-27 | ? | .. | (2026) | 5,000–8,000 | 1 × ? | .. DF-31 | CSS-10 Mod 1 | .. | 2006 | 7,200 | 1 × 425 | .. DF-31A | CSS-10 Mod 2 | 24 | 2007 | 11,200 | 1 × 425 | 24 DF-31A | CSS-10 (silo) | 320 | (2024) | 11,200 | 1 × 425 | 30 DF-31AG | (CSS-10 Mod 2) | 72 | 2018 | 11,200 | 1 × 425 | 72 DF-41 | CSS-20 (mobile) | 28 | 2020 | 12,000 | Up to 3 × 425 | 84 DF-41 | CSS-20 (silo) | .. | .. | 12,000 | Up to 3 × 425 | .. Subtotal: 462 launchers | 276 warheads Total land-based: 712 launchers | 376 warheads Submarine-launched ballistic missiles: JL-2 | CSS-N-14 | 0 | 2016 | 7,000+ | 1 × 700 | 0 JL-3 | CSS-N-20 | 6/72 | 2022 | 9,000+ | 1 × 425 | 72 Aircraft: H-6N | B-6 | 20 | 2020 | 3,100+ | 1 × ALBM | 20 H-20 | ? | .. | (2030) | ? | (ALCM?) | .. Subtotal: 804 launchers | 468 warheads Warheads produced for incoming delivery systems: 132 Total: 600 warheads Abbreviations used: ALBM: air-launched ballistic missile; ALCM: air-launched cruise missile; DF: Dong Feng (“East Wind”); DOD: US Department of Defense; IRBM: intermediate-range ballistic missile; JL: Ju Lang (“Giant Wave”); H: Hong (“Bang”); MRBM: medium-range ballistic missile; MT: megaton; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missiles; SSBN: nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; TEL: transporter erector launcher. Research methodology and confidence The analyses and estimates made in the Nuclear Notebook are derived from a combination of open sources: (1) state-originating data; (2) non-state-originating data; and (3) commercial satellite imagery. Fissile materials production How much and how fast China’s stockpile can grow will depend upon its inventories of plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and tritium. The International Panel on Fissile Materials assessed in 2023 that China had a stockpile of approximately 14 tonnes of HEU and approximately 2.9 tonnes of separated plutonium available for nuclear weapons. Those inventories were sufficient to support a doubling of the stockpile over the past five years and potentially an increase to approximately 1,000 warheads by 2030. Producing more than 1,000 additional warheads by 2035 would require additional fissile material production. China reportedly operates two commercial-sized CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast-breeder reactors under construction at Xiapu in Fujian province. Extraction of plutonium from spent fuel is centered around reprocessing facilities at Jinta and Jiuquan (Plant 404). US estimates and assumptions about Chinese nuclear forces Evaluation of current US projections about the future size of China’s nuclear weapons stockpile must take earlier projections into account. Successive Pentagon CMPRs projected growth from 400 warheads in 2022 to over 600 in 2024, forecasting over 1,000 operational warheads by 2030. Nuclear testing China’s nuclear testing program of the 1990s partially supported the development of the warhead (#535) type currently arming the DF-31-class ICBMs. Commercial satellite imagery indicates significant ongoing construction and modernization activity at the Lop Nur test site, including new buildings, drill rigs, roads, and tunnels, though this does not prove intent to conduct full-scale explosive nuclear tests. Nuclear doctrine and policy Since its first nuclear test in 1964, China has maintained a declaratory policy of 'no first use' (NFU) of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, keeping capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. The PLARF maintains a 'moderate' readiness level in peacetime, storing most warheads in central hardened storage facilities (such as Base 67 in the Qinling mountain range) separate from launchers, but conducts combat readiness drills and is developing an 'early warning counterstrike' (预警反击) launch-on-warning posture supported by space-based early warning satellites. Land-based ballistic missiles The PLARF operates approximately 712 launchers for nuclear-capable land-based missiles, of which 462 can target the continental United States. Silo fields: • Yumen silo field: Gansu province, 120 silos, ~1,110 km² • Hami silo field: Eastern Xinjiang, 110 silos, ~1,028 km² • Yulin silo field: Hanggin Banner / Ordos, 90 silos, ~832 km² • DF-5 liquid-fueled silos: expanding from 18 to 48 silos across existing and new brigades. Mobile ICBMs include the DF-31A, DF-31AG, and DF-41. Medium- and intermediate-range missiles include the dual-capable DF-26 with an estimated 250 launchers across seven or eight brigades, assigned roughly 100 nuclear warheads. Table 2. Chinese missile brigades, 2025 summary: • PLARF Headquarters: Beijing • Base 61 (Huangshan): 611 (DF-26), 612 (DF-21A / DF-31AG?), 613 (DF-15B / DF-17?), 614 (DF-17), 615 (DF-11A), 616 (DF-17), 617 (DF-16A) • Base 62 (Kunming): 621 (DF-31AG?), 622 (DF-31A), 623 (DF-10A), 624 (DF-21D), 625 (DF-26), 626 (DF-26), 627 (DF-17) • Base 63 (Huaihua): 631 (DF-5B/C), 632 (DF-31AG), 633 (DF-5A), 634 (DF-5C), 635 (DF-17?), 636 (DF-16A) • Base 64 (Lanzhou): 641 (DF-31AG), 642 (DF-31AG), 643 (DF-31AG), 644 (DF-41), 645 (DF-41?), 646 (DF-21C/DF-26), 647 (DF-26?), Hami Silo Field, Yumen Silo Field • Base 65 (Shenyang): 651 (DF-41), 652 (DF-31AG), 653 (DF-21D), 654 (DF-26), 655 (DF-17), 656 (CJ-100?), 657, Yulin Silo Field • Base 66 (Luoyang): 661 (DF-5B), 662 (DF-5C), 663 (DF-31A), 664 (DF-31AG), 665 (DF-26?), 666 (DF-26) • Base 67 (Baoji): Central nuclear weapons storage complex Total: 45 brigades (~30 nuclear-capable). Submarines and sea-based ballistic missiles China fields six Type 094/A (Jin-class) SSBNs based at Yalong Naval Base on Hainan Island, each equipped with 12 launch tubes for JL-2 or JL-3 SLBMs. Development of the next-generation Type 096 SSBN is underway at Bohai Shipyard in Huludao. Bombers The PLAAF has re-established an operational nuclear mission centered around the H-6N bomber, which can carry the CH-AS-X-13 nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). China is also developing the stealth H-20 bomber with intercontinental potential. Cruise missiles China currently has no confirmed nuclear cruise missiles in its active stockpile, though future developments (such as for the H-20) remain possible. Authors and Contributors: Hans M. Kristensen (Director, Nuclear Information Project, FAS) Matt Korda (Associate Director, Nuclear Information Project, FAS) Eliana Johns (Senior Research Associate, FAS) Mackenzie Knight (Senior Research Associate, FAS) Funding provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York, Jubitz Family Foundation, New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, and Prospect Hill Foundation.