Jane's By IHS Markit China’s Advanced Weapons Systems May 12, 2018 Lead Author: Tate Nurkin Contributing Authors: Kelly Bedard, James Clad, Cameron Scott, Jon Grevatt Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in this commissioned research report. About Jane’s by IHS Markit Jane’s by IHS Markit has a 120-year legacy as the global leader in the delivery of open source information and analysis on defense, security and defense industry issues to defense and intelligence communities as well as the global defense industry. We publish over 70 products, including Jane’s Defense Weekly, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Jane’s International Defense Review, Jane’s Military and Security Assessments, Jane’s Markets Forecasts, Jane’s Navigating the Emerging Markets and Jane’s Defense Equipment and Technology. In addition to our publications, Jane’s also provides trainings on open source research and analysis methods and techniques and provides customized reports on key emerging defense and security issues. In 2007 Jane’s was acquired by IHS, Inc., a publicly held information services company. In 2016, IHS merged with Markit, a financial services information provider to form IHS Markit, a company with business lines focused on financial markets, energy, automotive, maritime and trade, aerospace and defense, chemicals, technology, media and telecommunications, economics and country risk, and product design and standards. About the Authors Delivery of this report was led by Tate Nurkin, a Senior Associate with Jane’s. Tate previously established and ran Jane’s Strategic Assessments and Futures Studies Center from December 2013 – February 2018. The SAFS Center was dedicated to tracking geopolitical, military and industry competitions and how innovations in technology, competitive strategies, and operational concepts can drive these competitions in new directions. Tate has 20-plus years tracking China’s military modernization effort and the future of military capabilities. In March 2018, Tate started OTH Intelligence Group LLC. The core Jane’s team also included analysts Kelly Bedard and Cameron Scott as well as Jon Grevatt and James Clad, subject matter experts on China’s defense industrial base and broader defense and geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. Comments may be sent to: Tate Nurkin Senior Associate Jane’s by IHS Markit [email protected] Table of Contents Acronyms 4 Executive Summary 7 Background, Objectives, Methods and Structure 18 Section 1: Strategic Context Chapter 1: China’s Military Modernization: Status, Objectives and Priorities 25 Chapter 2: China’s Defense Industrial Base, STEM Education and S&T Innovation Capacity 63 Chapter 3: China, the Fourth Industrial Revolution and Artificial Intelligence 107 Section 2: China’s Advanced Weapons Systems Chapter 4: Overview China’s Advanced Weapons Systems Industry 126 Chapter 5: China’s Counter-Space Capability 137 Chapter 6: China’s Unmanned Systems 150 Chapter 7: China’s Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRVs) 177 Chapter 8: China’s Directed Energy Weapons 200 Chapter 9: China’s Electromagnetic Railguns and Hyper-Velocity Weapons 213 Section 3: Implications and Recommendations Chapter 10: Implications 226 Chapter 11: Recommendations 238 Acronyms A2/AD: Anti-Access/Area Denial AAW: Anti-Air Warfare AECC: Aero-Engine Corporation of China / Aero-Engine Group of China AFRL: Air Force Research Laboratory AI: Artificial Intelligence AR: Augmented Reality ASAT: Anti-Satellite ASBM: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare AUV: Autonomous Underwater Vehicle AVIC: Aviation Industry Corporation of China BAT: Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (three major Chinese high-tech companies) BLOS: Beyond-Line-Of-Sight BMD: Ballistic Missile Defense C4ISTAR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information/Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting Acquisition and Reconnaissance CASC: China Aerospace Science and Technology Company CASIC: China Aerospace Science and Industry Company CCP: Chinese Communist Party CETC: China Electronic Technology Group Corporation CFIUS: Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States CHIRP: Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload CIWS: Close-In Weapon System CMC: Central Military Commission CMI: Civil-Military Integration CNSA: China National Space Administration COMAC: Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China CONOPs: Concept of Operations CSIC: China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation CSSC: China State Shipbuilding Corporation DARPA: U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DoD: U.S. Department of Defense DUI(x): Defense Innovation Unit Experimental EM: Electromagnetic EML: Electromagnetic Launcher EW: Electronic Warfare FEL: Free Electron Lasers GEUAV: Ground Effect Unmanned Aerial Vehicle GPS: Global Positioning System GSSAP: Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program HALE: High-Altitude Long Endurance HAWC: Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon Concept HGV: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles HiFIRE: Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation HSMW: High-Speed Maneuvering Weapons HVP: Hyper-Velocity Projectile IC: Intelligence Community ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IED: Improvised Explosive device IEPS: Integrated Electrical Power System ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISTAR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance KE-ASAT: Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite kW: Kilowatt LEO: Low Earth Orbit MAHEM: DARPA’s Magneto Hydrodynamic Explosive Munition weapon MALE: Medium-Altitude Long Endurance MaRV: Maneuverable Re-entry vehicle MBT: Main Battle Tank MGWOT: Maximum Gross Take-Off Weight (sometimes MTOW/Maximum Takeoff Weight) MIIT: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology MOR: Mixed Ownership Reform MOST: Ministry of Science and Technology MW: Megawatt NORINCO: China North Industries Group Corporation ONA: U.S. Office of Net Assessment PISA: Program for International Student Assessment PLA: People’s Liberation Army PLAAF: People’s Liberation Army- Air Force PLAN: People’s Liberation Army- Navy PLARF: People’s Liberation Army- Rocket Force PSC: Politburo Standing Committee QUESS: Quantum Experiments at Space Scale R&D: Research and Development RELI: U.S. Army’s Robust Electric Laser Initiative RMB: Renminbi ROV: Remotely Operated Vehicle RPG: Rocket Propelled Grenade S&T: Science and Technology SASTIND: State Agency for Science, Technology and National Defense SATCOM: Satellite Communication SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLV: Space Launch Vehicle SSBM: Ballistic Missile Submarine SSN: Nuclear powered submarine STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering and Math STFC: Science Technology Facilities Council TACAIR: Tactical Air THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UCAV: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle UGV: Unmanned Ground Vehicle USV: Unmanned Surface Vehicle UUV: Unmanned Underwater Vehicle VTOL: Vertical Take-Off and Landing This paper uses Chinese designations for ships and other sea platforms where appropriate. Ship Type | Chinese Designation | NATO Designation --- | --- | --- Aircraft Carrier | Type 001 | Liaoning-class Aircraft Carrier | Type 002 | (Forthcoming) Attack Craft | Type 037G | Houxin-class Submarine | Type 039 | Yuan-class Destroyer | Type 052 | Luhu-class Frigate | Type 053 | Jianghu-class Light Frigate | Type 053H3 | Jiangwei II-class Frigate | Type 054 | Jiangkai-class Destroyer | Type 055 | Renhai-class Corvette | Type 056 | Jiangdao-class Amphibious Transport Dock | Type 071 | Yuzhao-class Landing Ship Tank | Type 072 | Yukan-class Mine Countermeasure Vessel | Type 081 | Wochi-class Mine Countermeasure Vessel | Type 082 | Wosao-class SSN | Type 093 | Shang-class SSN | Type 094 | Jin-class SSN | Type 095 | Sui-class SSBN | Type 096 | (Forthcoming) Icebreaker | Type 272 | (Unknown) Intelligence-gathering Ship | Type 815 | Dondiao-class General Supply Vessel | Type 901 | (Forthcoming) Replenishment Ship | Type 903 | Fuchi-class Mine Countermeasure Vessel | Type 6610 | (Unknown) Executive Summary Jane’s research and analysis examined five categories of China’s advanced weapons systems: counter-space, unmanned systems, maneuverable reentry vehicles, directed energy and electromagnetic railguns. In addition, this report also focuses on China’s notable investment in and emphasis on development of artificial intelligence applications for national defense. The following key themes and insights across four linked analytical categories emerged throughout the course of our research: • The strategic context in which China’s advanced weapons systems are being developed • China’s defense industrial base and science and technology community • The advanced weapons themselves • Policy measures and investments required to mitigate risk and capitalize on opportunity generated by China’s advanced weapons systems and other dynamics identified in this paper. Strategic Context Through the Lens of a Changing U.S-China Strategic Competition: China’s advanced weapons systems development is taking place within the context of an intense and complex geopolitical, military and technology acquisition and development competition. At a geopolitical level, this competition results in part from China’s perception that the United States and its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, India, future Southeast Asian partners and possibly Vietnam) are cooperating to strategically contain China. It also emanates from what the 2013 Science of Military Strategy—an authoritative book published by the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences—describes as a momentum of transition from an “unprecedentedly unipolar” world to a new 21st century “international balance that is characterized by multi-polarity and co-governance.” The United States remains the world’s only superpower, but China is a critical player in this rebalanced world of diminishing U.S. power and influence. China views its role as capitalizing on the opportunities presented by globalization and the informatization of society to propel itself forward economically, socially and technologically. This geopolitical context has security and defense implications for China and for the region. China sees a change in the types of conflicts for which it needs to prepare and in the domains in which it will be required to compete and potentially contest. According to the 2013 Science of Military Strategy: “Generally, the possibility of a large-scale ground invasion by an adversary is minimal. However, the danger of being the target of high-technological warfare, such as air-naval, air-space, and space-cyber wars, is intensifying. The threat from the east is more severe than that from the west, the threat from the sea is more severe than that from the ground; the threat from space and cyber network is gradually becoming true. The probability of conducting military operations to protect rights and limited oversea war operations is ever increasing. The most severe war threat is a large-scale strategic sudden attack launched by a strong adversary, which aims at destroying our war potential to force us to surrender. The most probable war threat is a limited military conflict from the sea. The war we need to prepare for, particularly given the background of nuclear deterrence, is a large-scale, and highly intensive local war from the sea.” Technological development is critical for maintaining deterrence in an environment in which “the emergence of new deterrence forces, based on new technology such as information, cyberspace, space, and new-material technologies, is revolutionarily changing the mechanism, method, and area of operation. It heralds a completely new method of deterrence, symbolized by constructing asymmetrical method of deterrence.” Jane’s analysis throughout our research effort strongly suggests that U.S. advantage in this regional competition is being eroded due in part to shifting perceptions of the reliability of U.S. technological superiority as well as the perception among allies and partners that the United States lacks a coherent vision for the region. U.S. advantage is also affected by China’s aggressive and proactive pursuit of its interest across the region, which places pressure on regional actors, and accelerates and intensifies the need for a clear U.S. posture, regional vision and support. Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization: China’s military modernization is in the midst of three transitions: 1. Enhanced focus on the maritime domain to support A2/AD objectives 2. New emphasis on power projection capabilities 3. A growing imperative to develop artificial intelligence-infused platforms and systems to fully exploit emerging trends shaping the future of conflict and military capability The first of these transitions is clearly the most urgent; however, the last—the move from informatized warfare to “intelligentized” or cognitive warfare—is likely to be the most impactful over the next 15–20 years. It simultaneously offers China an opportunity to shift the nature and trajectory of military competition with the United States beyond traditional platforms and systems in which China is currently viewed as being “behind” and also provides a pathway to gain advantage over the United States in future military capabilities. China’s advanced weapons systems support each of these transitions and also enhance China’s position in critical military competitions, such as the undersea domain, space, the EM spectrum and missile versus missile defense, as described in Table 1 below. Table 1: Summary analysis of China's advanced weapons systems programs and their implications for the United States Advanced Weapons System Category | Implications for the United States ---|--- Counter-space: China has demonstrated each of the components of its counter-space program, including the highly provocative 2007 destruction of a disabled Chinese weather satellite in space by a kinetic kill vehicle. China continues to mature and refine its space-based capabilities. | Space-based assets at risk: The U.S. space-based architecture is currently vulnerable to China’s counter-space program. However, the United States is taking aggressive steps to remedy this vulnerability through physical hardening of satellites and development of new concepts, such as disaggregation, that build in redundancy and resilience to U.S. space-based architecture and, as a result, to U.S. advantage in this domain. Dual-use capabilities: China benefits from the dual-use nature of its space program. It is able to develop and test sophisticated counter-space solutions under the guise of the furtherance of its civil space program. For example, directed energy lasers have both a scientific purpose and a military one. Autonomous unmanned systems: China’s unmanned systems industry is developing rapidly, especially in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). China’s defense industry has also demonstrated an impressive volume and velocity in the introduction of new unmanned surface vehicle (USV) designs while China’s applied research community has been heavily involved in the development of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Given the importance of UUVs to the future trajectory of undersea competition with the United States, Jane’s anticipates that China’s navy will leverage UUV technologies and may already be engaged in classified programs. | Undersea domain: A proliferation of autonomous UUVs offers an opportunity for China to address critical vulnerabilities in the undersea domain. While the United States is also investing in UUVs, the combination of more of these systems and enhanced sensor nets, such as the Great Undersea Wall, could challenge the strategically invaluable U.S. advantage in the undersea domain. Electromagnetic spectrum: Unmanned systems will also play a prominent role in the rapidly intensifying electronic warfare competition as part of effort to jam, spoof and potential encrypt/decrypt communications spectrum. As with space, control of the EM spectrum is critical to bringing to bear many of the most consequential of U.S. military capabilities. Reconnaissance strike complex: Linked networks of more UAVs, USVs and UUVs will help address current shortcomings of China’s C4ISTAR infrastructure. This will enhance capabilities associated with advanced weapons addressed in this paper, especially Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRVs). Cognitive warfare: The intersection of China’s unmanned systems development with advanced artificial intelligence will enable novel capabilities such as drone swarms that could pose a significant challenge to existing U.S. capabilities. Autonomous unmanned systems will be a prominent feature of future warfare and the competition between the United States and China to develop the most sophisticated artificial intelligence–infused unmanned capabilities will be critical to shaping the future military balance between them. Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRVs): China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles (DF-21D and DF-26) already constitute a viable, if vulnerable, capability. Development of the maneuverability of the warhead and robustness of the reconnaissance strike complex continues in order to make this a more robust capability. China’s hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) program is also advancing, having completed seven tests since 2014 (six successful). The program is largely catalyzed by concerns that U.S. advanced missile defense systems, particularly and most recently the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), are severely undermining if not abrogating China’s strategic and conventional nuclear deterrent. It also views the weapons as a potentially useful conventional strike capability to support both A2/AD and power projection activities. | Challenge to air defense: Successful deployment of MaRVs, especially HGVs, constitutes a powerful challenge to U.S. concepts of air and missile defense and will require accelerated investment in new capabilities (railguns, hyper-velocity weapons, directed energy, enhanced electronic warfare capabilities) and concepts (left of launch interventions, distributed lethality) to mitigate future operational and strategic vulnerabilities. Destabilizing regional geopolitics: HGVs are particularly destabilizing. The combination of hypersonic speeds and anticipated maneuverability of these systems makes them especially provocative and invites pre-emption. They also motivate development of other advanced weapons systems, such as directed energy and railguns, to meet the HGV threat. Directed Energy Weapons: China’s interest in directed energy weapons is primarily in counter-space weapons. It also has developed hand-held counter-drone weapons, truck-mounted close-in defense weapons and non-lethal weapons for crowd-control and peacekeeping missions. | Counter-space: Continued development of both satellite-carried and ground-based laser dazzlers that can blind, jam or destroy satellites constitutes a particularly worrying threat to U.S. space-based architecture and requires development of a suite of counter-counter-space capabilities. China is likely to continue to mature its counter-space directed energy program. Counter-drone: As unmanned systems of all-types become more prominent on the battlefield, the capacity to deal with more and more sophisticated unmanned systems and swarms is prioritized. China’s directed energy program includes both hand-held and truck-mounted weapons capable of carrying out counter-drone operations. The use of directed energy to counter drones is also a priority investment area for the United States, driven in part by the rapid increase in the Islamic State’s use of commercially available drones in Iraq and Syria to carry out surveillance and strike missions. A2/AD and future naval applications: Unlike the United States, China does not yet have the capacity to place directed energy weapons on a naval vessel due to persistent challenges with weight, energy capture and storage and power generation. However, China clearly has this ambition. If achieved, China could use directed energy weapons to drive both manned and unmanned platforms and systems out of contested waters at close range, a capability that could be useful in China’s on-going maritime boundary disputes, such as in the South China Sea. Electromagnetic Railguns: China continues to focus on this capability area and has engaged in an impressive amount of academic research on the broader topic of electromagnetic science. Progress in development of EM railguns and hypervelocity weapons has lagged behind development of other systems of interest to this report, though, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, photographs published in open sources in February 2018 may show an EM railgun on a naval vessel. | Air and missile defense competition: China’s interest in EM railguns and weapons should be seen as part of the broader cascading implications of the missile versus missile defense competition that the introduction of HGVs and other MaRV-capable weapons is generating. Ancillary benefits of electromagnetic research: China also has leveraged this research to make strides in the development of electromagnetic launch (EML) catapults for its aircraft carriers. EML enables China’s future carriers to carry heavier and more heavily armed aircraft, enhancing an important component of its future power projection capability. China’s Defense Industrial Base and Sciences and Technology (S&T) Efforts China’s Advancing Defense Industrial and S&T Base: China’s state-owned enterprises dominate its defense industrial base, which Jane’s rates as the most advanced in the Asia-Pacific region. Recent development of capability and capacity in China’s traditional defense industry has enhanced its ability to “close the gap” in the on-going competition with the United States to field advanced platforms and systems. The United States maintains an overall advantage, but China’s industry’s ability to develop and refine A2/AD capabilities—including advanced weapons systems such as counter-space, unmanned systems capable of supporting China’s information, network and electronic warfare efforts and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)—that target U.S. and allied vulnerabilities pose credible threats to U.S. military superiority absent sufficient (and frequently costly) responses. More broadly, China’s defense industry and broader S&T community has achieved a series of high-profile technological successes in areas that have direct applicability to China’s advanced weapons systems programs. These successes include advancements in deep underwater exploration, quantum computing and encryption, supercomputers, artificial intelligence, robotics and hypersonics. China’s Formula for Innovation Success: China’s S&T successes in these areas are enabled by several common factors: • Sense of vulnerability (and opportunity): The formula for innovation success typically begins with an urgent sense of a strategic vulnerability that needs to be redressed. For example, China’s research in quantum computing and encryption was catalyzed by the Edward Snowden leaks, which revealed the degree to which the United States was monitoring conversations. China’s MaRV program can be viewed as a response to the strategic challenges posed by U.S. carrier battle groups through ASBMs and the increasing sophistication of U.S. missile defense systems through HGVs. Successful innovation is also motivated by a frequently-linked perception that a moment of vulnerability is accompanied by opportunity to, over time, drive current technology and capability competitions towards different trajectories, ones in which China is better prepared to compete. China’s burgeoning focus on Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies discussed in detail below is a particularly potent and relevant example of China’s attempts to redefine and rebalance competitions in which it perceives it is vulnerable. • High-level direction: High-level and top-down policy direction, typically in the form of an ambitious reform program or initiative is another consistent and common component of China’s innovation success especially in focusing cross-industry collaboration and prioritizing research allocation. Examples referenced in this paper include Project Jinan’s effort to develop an “unhackable” computer network, the “Made in China 2025” and “The Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” (see Chapter 3). • High-level funding: High-level direction brings high-levels of funding. While this funding may not always be used efficiently, injections of large amounts of government funding are seen as critical enablers of China’s recent success in quantum encryption as well as its rapidly growing influence in artificial intelligence research across several industries. • Foreign technology and talent acquisition: China’s defense industry and its S&T community benefit from acquisition of foreign technology through several mechanisms, including: o Acquisition of Western companies o Partnerships with Western academic institutions and applied research centers (especially in Silicon Valley) o Joint ventures with companies seeking to enter the massive Chinese market (including U.S. aerospace giants and high-tech companies) o Direct and indirect investment in Western companies with interests in technologies such as sensors, artificial intelligence applications, big data analytics and advanced manufacturing. China has also been increasing its efforts to recruit Chinese scholars studying or teaching at U.S. academic institutions or working in U.S. high-tech sectors back to China to drive innovation in prioritized sectors. Persistent Challenges: Two structural and incentive-driven challenges are inhibiting more fulsome, consistently system-wide innovation. First, China’s science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) educational system and research culture are still maturing, limiting the actual depth of indigenously trained experts in engineering disciplines from which China’s industry can draw. Evidence of systemic research fraud, a conspicuously high number of retracted research articles from Chinese scholars and systemic cheating—all discussed later in this paper—combine to reflect a corrosive set of incentives and priorities within China’s rapidly expanding university and applied research communities. As a result, legitimate innovation and achievement exists alongside institutionally incentivized corruption, a dynamic that serves to undermine the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the system, even if some parts of this system are capable of world-class innovation. Second, China’s defense industrial base has been slowed by a fractured and redundant structure that inhibits the competition and collaboration frequently required for innovation. Reforms designed to introduce more market-oriented approaches to innovation and development—most notably consolidation of and collaboration across state-owned enterprises, mixed ownership reform and enhanced engagement of China’s private defense companies—have not yet achieved desired results. Rather, China’s industry’s success is likely more directly linked to aggressive and effective technology acquisition efforts and enhanced policy focus on key technology areas. China’s Advanced Weapons Systems Summary China and the Fourth Industrial Revolution— An Opportunity to Shift the Military-Technical Competition: China increasingly views exploitation of Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies as critical not only to economic resilience and national development, but also to China’s national security and its capacity to gain ascendency (or the very least parity) with the U.S. advanced military capabilities. Artificial intelligence stands out as an especially powerful catalyst of the development of “game changing” military capabilities that can: • Greatly improve the capacity of intelligence communities and operators to understand their strategic and operational environment, discern patterns and imminent threats and identify and track adversaries in complex and fast-moving environments. • Relieve some operators—especially pilots and vehicle drivers—of mundane tasks of interpreting multiple streams of C4ISR inputs and instead focus on the more mission critical tasks of flying/driving platforms and directing other assets to complete missions. • Introduce new types of platforms and systems capable of cognitively responding to and seamlessly adapting to fluid operational environments to carry out missions without human intervention. Drone swarms, autonomous (or semi-autonomous) munitions and cognitive electronic warfare systems all pose new challenges to even the most technologically advanced militaries. • Investments in quantum computing and encryption, advanced manufacturing and materials, robotics and cloud computing are improving China’s military capabilities as well as the proficiency of China’s industry to design and build more advanced capabilities. “Full Speed Ahead”: All of China’s advanced weapons systems are moving forward at “full speed” and are all seen as “priorities given [China’s] overarching emphasis on finding a vulnerability in the U.S. armor.” In addition, these weapons systems all support efforts to develop capabilities that will enable China to keep pace with the changing characteristics of conflict and confrontation articulated in the 2013 Science of Military Strategy: • “Confrontation of systems as the fundamental manner of confrontation”: Warfare under informatized conditions is not limited to the defense sector or armed units. It is confrontational to all aspects of a country: political, economic, social, and legal systems as well • “Mid- and long-range accuracy strike as the determining method of operation”: Technology has enabled wars to be conducted remotely • “Power enhancement by using networked military information system”: Information networks are vital to enhancing the capabilities and efficiency of militaries • “Unification of information and artillery as the main method of operation”: Information technology enhances the accuracy of distance striking, and informational attacks can cripple the ISR of an adversary • “Area of operation expands from three-dimension to five-dimension”: Warfare is conducted in the land, air and sea domains, but also space and cyberspace • “The fast-movers dominate the slow-movers”: Time is a key component in modern war • “Unmanned, invisible and inaudible wars are emerging”: Weapons and military operations are using increasingly advanced technology Figure 1: Areas of continued technology challenges in each of the advanced weapons systems of interest to this paper. (Divided into energy capture and storage, materials, and communications): - Counter-Space: Areas of strength: Direct-Ascent ASATs, Laser Dazzlers, Space Launch Vehicles; Areas of continued development: Co-orbit Maneuvering, Independent Space Infrastructure, Space Reconnaissance, Stronger Ground Based Lasers. - Unmanned Systems: Areas of strength: Modularity, Diversity of Design; Areas of continued development: Integrating weaponry, Autonomy, Hull Designs, Sensors, Range and persistence, Communications, SATCOM Links. - MaRVs: Areas of strength: ASBMs, Hypersonic flight; Areas of continued development: Sensor to Shooter Communication, Materials, Maneuverability, Reconnaissance / Strike Complex and OTH targeting. - Directed Energy: Areas of strength: Low Power Lasers, Jammers; Areas of continued development: Scaling, High Power Lasers, Microwave weapons, Power Generation, Energy Storage, Adjusting to Environmental Factors. - EM Railguns: Areas of strength: Breadth of EM Research; Areas of continued development: EM Aircraft Catapults, Power Generation and Storage, Pulsed Alternators, Materials, Managing Heat Output. “Game-Changer and Game-Leveler”: Effective development and deployment of China’s advanced weapons systems are “both a game-changer and game-leveler.” These weapons could upset current U.S. advantage or, at the least, affect stabilizing balances in the key domain area competitions that impact Indo-Pacific security. Success in China’s advanced weapons systems programs will also undermine slipping confidence in U.S. and allied capacity, leading to degraded alliances, more aggressive behavior by regional actors, and more regional actors turning to China for military sales. The Amplifying Effects of Mutually Supporting Programs: Intersections between China’s advanced weapons systems will amplify strategic and operational effects and create more significant challenges to U.S. military superiority. Prioritizing Systems: Of the five systems evaluated (plus artificial intelligence), Jane’s assesses that China’s counter-space program is the highest priority due to the centrality of space-based assets for the U.S. reconnaissance-strike complex (C3ISTAR). Counter-space capability was followed by autonomous unmanned systems, maneuverable reentry vehicles, directed energy and EM railguns. In the late 2020s, autonomous unmanned systems and AI are likely to switch with counter-space as top priorities as intelligentized warfare matures. Implications and Recommendations: Countering China’s advanced weapons programs will require the United States to: • Up the United States’ competitive game (engage allies in joint programs, accelerate quadrilateral collaboration between U.S., Japan, Australia, and India, and restrict access to high-value strategic technologies). • Mitigate operational and strategic military risks (investments in directed energy, EM railguns, cognitive electronic warfare, and resilient space/undersea concepts). • Determine capabilities required to maintain U.S. advantage via operational red teaming. • Incorporate scenario planning and wargaming to explore alternative future scenarios. • Fund development of more complete intelligence on comparative strengths and vulnerabilities. Background, Objectives, Methods and Structure Jane’s is pleased to provide this report to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission entitled China’s Advanced Weapons Programs. This report marks the culmination of a research effort completed in January 2018 to assess five categories of China’s advanced weapons systems. Table 2: The weapons systems investigated in this project - Counter-Space: Capabilities to deny space to the U.S. and allies (ASAT missiles, Co-orbital satellites, Directed energy weapons, Cyber). - Autonomous Unmanned Systems: Commercial and military unmanned aerial systems, AI swarms, UAVs, USVs, UUVs. - Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRVs): Weapons launched by ballistic missiles varying from predictable ballistic trajectories (Hypersonic glide vehicles, Anti-ship ballistic missiles). - Directed Energy Weapons: Lasers, microwave and radio frequency weapons for close-in defense, jamming, and non-lethal missions. - Electromagnetic (EM) Railguns: Naval railguns, land-based railguns, handheld railguns utilizing EM energy to strike targets up to Mach 6. Key Research Areas and Questions: 1. Program Status and Features: Level of maturity, challenges, strengths, rate of progress. 2. Motivations/Drivers: Strategic and operational motivations, prioritization within leadership and industry, interaction with U.S./allied developments. 3. Inputs: Industry, government, academia/research entities involved, critical technologies. 4. Implications and Recommendations: Strategic meaning for the U.S. and regional stability, policy and defense tools. Research Methods and Sources: - Workshops: Framing Workshop (8 August 2017) and Implications and Recommendations Workshop (5 October 2017). - Secondary Source Research: Over 500 individual sources (Chinese government/media/academic sources, international journals, U.S./foreign government reports, think tanks). - Expert Network Engagement: In-person, telephone, and email interviews with 14 in-network experts across five broad categories. Paper Structure: - Section 1: Strategic Context Shaping China’s Advanced Weapons Systems Development (Chapters 1–3) - Section 2: China’s Advanced Weapons Programs (Chapters 4–9) - Section 3: Implications and Recommendations (Chapters 10–11) Chapter 1 Key Themes and Insights: - Multi-Layered Modernization: Simultaneously pursuing transitions: land to sea (near seas protection), regional to global power projection, and informatized to intelligentized warfare. - Domain Area Competitions: Undersea competition, missile vs. missile defense, space vs. counter-space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. - Constraints: Structural economic challenges, aging demographics, rural-urban disparities, lack of combat experience since 1979. Transitions in Military Modernization: 1. Domain Area Transition (Near Seas Protection): Shifting focus from territorial defense to 'near seas protection' within the first island chain. Codified by Xi Jinping in 2013 and highlighted in the 2015 Defense White Paper. Defense budget allocations show a pronounced rise in PLAN spending (projected to increase 81.94% from 2015 to 2021, reaching $57.1B) relative to PLA ground forces. Surface combatant investments focus on Type 054A/follow-on frigates, Type 055 destroyers, Type 056 corvettes, Type 071/075 amphibious ships, and auxiliary support vessels (Type 901, Type 903, Type 904). Submarine investments include Type 094/096 SSBNs, Type 093/095 SSNs, and Type 039 conventional submarines. 2. Power Projection: Indigenously built aircraft carriers (Type 001A, Type 002 with EML), overseas logistics support (Djibouti base), expansion of Marine Corps from 20,000 to 100,000, training carrier pilots, and leveraging the Maritime Militia for 'rights protection' (weiquan). 3. Informatized to Intelligentized Warfare: Moving toward AI-enabled cognitive warfare, autonomous drone swarms, big data analytics, and cloud computing as articulated by Lt. Gen. Liu Guozhi and Maj. Gen. Wang Kebin. Critical Domain Area Competitions: - Undersea Competition: U.S. undersea advantage faces a 'valley' in SSN force levels between 2025 and 2037 (dropping to 41 boats in 2029 against a 66-boat requirement), while China builds the 'Underwater Great Wall' sensor net and expands submarine/UUV fleets. - Missile vs. Missile Defense: Development of DF-21D and DF-26 ASBMs, MaRVs, and HGVs designed to overwhelm U.S. BMD (THAAD, Aegis) and neutralize carrier strike groups. - Space and Counter-Space: China developing kinetic ASAT, co-orbital systems, cyber, and laser dazzlers to deny U.S. C4ISTAR dominance. - Electronic Warfare & EM Spectrum: Establishment of the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) in 2015, combining 3PLA (cyber/hacking), 4PLA (electronic intelligence/EW), and 2PLA (spy service) to achieve 'integrated network electronic warfare' (INEW) and information dominance. Constraints on Modernization: - Economic: GDP growth slowing, debt overhang, shadow banking crackdown. - Demographics: Rapidly aging population, severe rural-urban educational and cognitive gaps (half of rural 8th graders scoring <90 IQ). - PLA Recruitment & Integrity: Rising medical check disqualification rates (up to 56.9%), academic fraud in research institutions. - Lack of Combat Experience: No major military conflict since 1979 war with Vietnam. Chapter 2 Key Themes and Insights: - Defense Industrial Base: Jane's ranks China's defense industrial base as the most advanced in the Asia-Pacific (ranking 8th globally with a 3.75 score in Market Potential Index). - Two-Level Reforms: Domestically focused restructuring (consolidation, mixed ownership reform, private sector entry) and externally focused technology acquisition (acquisitions, joint ventures, international academic partnerships). - Science & Education: Massive STEM graduate expansion (4.7M in 2016 vs 568K in U.S.), but challenged by academic integrity issues, fake peer reviews (59.5% of global retractions for fake peer reviews from China), and lack of systems engineering depth. - S&T Drivers & Successes: Driven by sense of vulnerability and high top-down funding. Successes include quantum encryption (QUESS satellite, Jinan Project network), supercomputing (Sunway TaihuLight), deep-sea submersibles (Haidou-1, Qianlong 2), and hypersonic wind tunnels (JF12, FD-21). Structural and Systems Integration Challenges: - Fractured corporate structures among state-owned defense enterprises (AVIC, CASC, CASIC, CSSC, CSIC, CETC, NORINCO). - Persistent difficulty in systems engineering and complex integration (e.g., aero-engine development under AECC, FADEC integration, powder metallurgy). Civil-Military Integration (CMI): - Codified in 12th/13th Five-Year Plans and 2015 Defense White Paper. Creation of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development chaired by Xi Jinping in 2017. - Promotion of 'spin-on' commercial technologies in AI, 3D printing, robotics, SATCOM, and big data to circumvent Western export controls. International Technology Acquisition & Corporate Deals: - Foreign acquisitions: AVIC's acquisitions (FACC, Epic Air, Continental Motors, Cirrus, Thielert, Align Aerospace, AIM Altitude); CASIC/HiWING's acquisition of Luxembourg sensing firm IEE; Kuang-Chi Group investments in UK (Gilo Industries) and Israel. - Joint ventures and research ties: CETC partnership with University of Technology Sydney; CASC/CALT collaboration with Strathclyde University; GE-AVIC avionics JV for C919; Rockwell Collins-CETC JV. Chapter 3 Key Themes and Insights: - Fourth Industrial Revolution: China views emerging technologies (AI, robotics, big data, additive manufacturing, quantum) as opportunities to leapfrog the U.S. and redefine military-technical competition. - Policy Frameworks: 'Made in China 2025' (launched 2015) and 'Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan' (released July 2017) outlining a three-stage roadmap to AI supremacy by 2030. - Commercial Leaders ('BAT'): Baidu (leading AI R&D, Deep Learning Technology Lab, DuerOS), Alibaba (DAMO Academy, cloud AI), and Tencent (Seattle AI lab, WeChat data scale). - S&T Ecosystem: AI hubs in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen. Heavy investment in robotics (purchased 90,000 industrial robots in 2016). Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (Three Phases): 1. Phase One (2017–2020): Keep pace with advanced global levels; focus on big data, swarm intelligence, autonomy; core AI industry reaching RMB 150B ($22.65B) and related fields RMB 1T ($151B). 2. Phase Two (2020–2025): Achieve leading level in AI research; primary engine for economic transformation; core AI industry reaching RMB 400B ($60.4B) and related fields RMB 5T ($755B); establish legal/ethical frameworks. 3. Phase Three (2025–2030): Become world's premier AI innovation center; embed AI across defense and society; core AI industry reaching RMB 1T ($151B) and related fields RMB 10T ($1.51T). Key Levers and U.S.-China Dynamics: - Talent recruitment and repatriation: Active recruitment of top Chinese AI scientists from U.S. institutions (e.g., Andrew Ng, Lin Yuanqing, Qi Lu, Yu Dong). - Data Scale & Entrepreneurship: Massive mobile user base (700M+ smartphone users, 963M WeChat users) without strict privacy barriers, powering machine learning algorithms. - Investments in U.S. Startups: Chinese VC investment of $700M across 51 U.S. AI startups, bypassing CFIUS jurisdiction through minority stakes and seed funding. - Research Volume vs Quality: China leads in deep learning publication volume and citations, but lags behind U.S. in H-index, foundational core concepts, and non-self-citations. Chapter 4 Key Themes and Insights: - Strategic Value: Advanced weapons systems support A2/AD, power projection, and intelligentized warfare, targeting vulnerabilities in U.S. military power. - Prioritization Timeline: - Short Term (5–12 years): 1) Counter-space, 2) Unmanned systems, 3) MaRVs/HGVs, 4) Directed energy, 5) EM railguns. - Long Term (early 2030s): Autonomous unmanned systems and AI will switch with counter-space to become the top priority. - Industrial Landscape: Dominated by CASIC and CASC academies, complemented by CETC, AVIC, NORINCO, CSIC, CSSC, and university research institutes. Key Organizations Involved across Programs (Table 16 & 17): - CASIC Academies: 1st Academy (Microsatellites, precision strike), 2nd Academy (Anti-missile interceptors, air defense), 3rd Academy (Cruise missiles, YJ-12, KD-20), 4th Academy (Direct-ascent ASAT, KT-2, DF-21), 6th Academy (Solid propulsion), 9th Academy/Base 066 (Ballistic missiles), Base 061 & Base 068 (Components, materials). - CASC Academies: 1st Academy/CALT (Ballistic missiles, HGV sub-systems via 10th Research Institute), 4th Academy (Solid motors, hypersonics), 5th Academy/CAST (Satellites, remote sensing), 6th Academy (Liquid propulsion), 7th Academy (Guidance, space), 8th Academy/SAST (Missiles, satellites), 9th Academy (Aerospace electronics), 11th Academy/CAAA (Aerodynamics, UAVs like CH-4/CH-5, hypersonic wind tunnels). Chapter 5 Key Themes and Insights: - High Stakes: Space is vital for U.S. C4ISTAR; Chinese counter-space aims to blind, deafen, and disrupt U.S. precision-strike capabilities. - Four Primary Capabilities: 1. Direct-Ascent ASAT Missiles: SC-19 (tested in 2007 against FY-1C satellite, and 2010 mid-course test), DN-2 (tested in 2013 to 30,000 km near-GEO altitude), DN-3 (tested in 2015 and 2017), air-launched ASAT concepts. 2. Co-Orbital ASAT Weapons: Small maneuvering satellites (BX-1 in 2008 near ISS, BX-2 in 2016), robotic arm grapple satellites (Shiyan-7, SJ-15, Aolong-1 'space debris collector'), satellite refueling (Tianyuan-1), and GEO inspector satellites (Shijian-17). 3. Directed Energy ASAT: Ground-based laser dazzlers used against U.S. satellites in 2005 and 2006; 5-ton space-based chemical laser proposals by Changchun Institute of Optics; radio frequency/microwave weapons. 4. Cyber ASAT: Computer network operations targeting satellite ground stations and communication links. - Ancillary Technologies: Hyperspectral imaging satellites, QUESS quantum communication satellite. - U.S. Initiatives & Countermeasures: U.S. KE-ASAT history, SM-3 satellite shoot-down (2008), X-37B space plane, GSSAP space situational awareness satellites, CHIRP infrared sensors, and resilience concepts including disaggregation, microsatellites, and Micro-PNT (GPS-independent navigation). Chapter 6 Key Themes and Insights: - Rapid Growth & Market Leadership: China dominates commercial drone markets (DJI holds ~70% global share) and is a leading exporter of armed military UAVs (CH-4, Wing Loong). - Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs/UCAVs): - MALE/HALE: Wing Loong I & II (AVIC/Chengdu), CH-4 & CH-5 (CASC/CAAA), Cloud Shadow (AVIC), Tian Yi, BZK-005, Divine Eagle, Xianglong. - VTOL & Tactical: AV500W (AVIC helicopter), QY-1/V750 (CASC), Ziyan Infiltrator, BH-series (Aero-Starloop modular VTOL), SW-6 (carrier-launched mini-UAV), Mysterious Bee (CETC). - Novel & Amphibious: U650 amphibious drone (UVS Intelligence Systems), CH-T1 / GEUAV (ground-effect anti-ship UAV). - Swarm Technology: CETC successfully tested a record-breaking 119-UAV autonomous swarm in June 2017, demonstrating advances in swarm intelligence, distributed task allocation, and cognitive operations. - Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs): - CASC USV family: B850 (high-speed patrol), A1150 (hydrographic survey), C1500 (ASW with dipping sonar/torpedoes), D3000 (30m autonomous oceanic combat trimaran with CIWS, missiles, torpedoes). - Private Sector: SeaFly-01 (Beijing Sifang Automation, carbon-composite stealth double-M hull similar to U.S. M80 Stiletto). - Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) & Undersea Defense: - Deep-sea submersibles: Qianlong 2 (4,500m), Haidou-1 (10,767m in Mariana Trench), Haiyi sea gliders (12 deployed in South China Sea in 2017 for real-time acoustic/environmental data gathering). - CSSC 'Underwater Great Wall': Fixed seabed acoustic sensors, USVs, and UUVs networked to detect U.S. and allied submarines. Chapter 7 Key Themes and Insights: - Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs): - DF-21D: 1,550–2,000 km range, radar/optical terminal guidance with maneuverable warhead targeting carrier battle groups. - DF-26: Dual conventional/nuclear capability, up to 4,000 km range (reaching Second Island Chain/Guam). Potential air-launched variant on H-6N bombers. - Critical dependence on 'sensor-to-shooter' C4ISTAR over-the-horizon targeting networks. - Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs): - Wu-14 / DF-ZF: Tested seven times since January 2014 (six presumed successes) launched from Taiyuan Space Center, achieving speeds of Mach 5–10. - Strategic Motivations: Countering U.S. BMD (THAAD, Aegis, GMD) to secure nuclear/conventional deterrence; matching U.S. Prompt Global Strike (PGS); expanding A2/AD envelope. - Destabilizing Nature: Extreme speed, flat atmospheric trajectory, and unpredictable aerodynamic maneuverability severely compress decision timelines and invite preemption. - Ancillary Hypersonic Programs & Infrastructure: - Scramjet engines and hypersonic cruise missiles (tested in 2015). - Wind Tunnels: JF-12 shockwave hypersonic tunnel (Mach 5–9), FD-21 tunnel (Mach 10–15). - Concept Vehicles: Teng Yun (CASIC two-stage-to-orbit spaceplane planned for 2030), CASC SSTO spaceplane. - U.S. Developments: AFRL/DARPA HAWC, Tactical Boost Glide, X-51A Waverider, Army Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW), HiFIRE program with Australia. Chapter 8 Key Themes and Insights: - Capabilities Overview: High-energy lasers, high-power microwaves (HPM), and radio frequency weapons offering deep magazine and low cost per shot. - Core Applications: - Counter-Space: Ground-based laser dazzling (2005/2006 tests at 50–100 kW), space-based chemical laser proposals (Changchun Institute of Optics). - Counter-Drone & CIWS: Low Altitude Guard I & II (LAG I/II, 10–30 kW), Low Altitude Sentinel, Low Altitude Laser Defending System (LASS, 30 kW), Silent Hunter (30–100 kW, cuts 5mm steel at 1 km, exported by Poly Technologies). - Handheld/Tactical: PY131A, PY132A, WJG-2002, BBQ-905 laser rifles used by police to jam drones; miniaturization enabled by potassium fluoroboratoberyllate (KBBF) crystal breakthroughs. - Non-Lethal Weapons: WB-1 truck-mounted millimeter-wave crowd control weapon (similar to U.S. Active Denial System), potential naval variant for South China Sea maritime enforcement; NORINCO Safeguard RWS. - High-Power Microwave (HPM): Compact microwave weapon developed by Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology (Xi'an) to disable electronics on drones and missiles. - Technical Challenges: Energy storage/power generation, thermal blooming, cooling systems, atmospheric attenuation (fog, smoke), and SWaP constraints for naval/aerial integration. - U.S. Programs: LaWS (30 kW on USS Ponce), HEL MD (Boeing 50–60 kW), ATHENA / RELI (Lockheed Martin 30–60 kW), SHiELD (fighter jet pod), Seasaber (60 kW for DDG-51), Free Electron Laser research. Chapter 9 Key Themes and Insights: - Status: Least mature among China's advanced weapons programs, though backed by extensive academic research, pulsed power development, and hosting the 18th EML Symposium in Wuhan (2016). - Recent Developments: - February 2018: Images emerged of a Chinese Type 072III landing ship tank fitted with a large experimental turret and power containers, suspected to be a naval prototype railgun. - Handheld MAHEM: Reverse-engineered research at Nanjing University of Science and Technology based on compromised DARPA designs. - Type 055 Destroyers: Briefings by Rear Adm. Zhao Dengping indicating long-term plans to fit railguns and lasers on Type 055 destroyers. - Technical Challenges: Pulsed power storage/generation (pulsed alternators, 'meat grinder' circuits), barrel rail erosion/wear, plasma formation, and projectile guidance electronics capable of surviving extreme G-forces. - Adjacent EML Technologies: EM aircraft launch catapults for Type 002 aircraft carriers developed under Rear Adm. Ma Weiming at the Naval University of Engineering (tested at Huangdichun airbase). - U.S. Programs: ONR 32-megajoule railgun prototypes by BAE Systems and General Atomics; shifting focus toward firing Hyper-Velocity Projectiles (HVPs) from conventional 5-inch powder naval guns and Army Howitzers (Mach 3–6.5). Key Strategic & Operational Implications: 1. Regional Geopolitical Competition: Moving beyond binary 'Cold War Redux' assumptions to recognize complex multi-actor dynamics in the Indo-Pacific; risk of allies hedging toward Beijing if U.S. technological credibility slips. 2. Opportunistic Business Culture: Bureaucratic rivalries and commercial profit motives exist alongside state direction (e.g., CASIC vs CASC market competition). 3. Technology Diffusion & Commercial Innovation: Dual-use Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies are originating outside traditional defense primes, requiring agile acquisition and counter-intelligence. 4. 'Game-Changer and Game-Leveler': Autonomous swarms and low-cost unmanned platforms allow China to control gray-zone conflicts in the South and East China Seas without triggering immediate military escalation. 5. Global Proliferation: Chinese exports of armed UAVs (to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia) and directed energy weapons erode Western export controls and build strategic partnerships. 6. Multi-Domain Saturation & Asymmetry: Simultaneous combination of HGVs, ASBMs, drone swarms, counter-space, and cyber attacks directly challenges traditional U.S. air defense and power projection doctrines. 7. Six Adjacent Areas of Innovation Required: Beyond raw technology, operationalizing disruptive capabilities requires innovation in: 1) Demand/Doctrine conceptualization, 2) Supporting infrastructure/logistics, 3) Comfort/ethics of use, 4) Business case/affordability, 5) Legal/procurement shifts, and 6) Technology design. Comprehensive Policy and Strategic Recommendations: Category 1: Upping the Competitive Game - Alliance Management & 'Quad' Collaboration: Deepen defense R&D, intelligence sharing, and joint development programs with Japan, Australia, India, and Singapore. Reinvigorate Five Eyes mechanisms focused on Chinese technology transfer. - Industry Engagement & Clearinghouse Task Force: Form a joint Congressional-Executive-Private Sector task force to serve as a trusted clearinghouse for intellectual property theft reporting, appoint Special Representatives to lead industry working groups, and educate U.S. industry on Chinese acquisition tactics. - Agile Defense Procurement: Expand DoD Other Transactional Authorities (OTAs), DIU(x) initiatives, and fast-track commercial high-tech procurement to avoid multi-year acquisition lag. - Policy & Visa Tools: Update export control frameworks to reflect commercial dual-use reality; reform student and H-1B visa policies to carefully vet incoming researchers while retaining top American-educated Chinese STEM talent. Category 2: Military and Operational Initiatives - Direct Diplomatic Engagement on Hypersonics: Initiate bilateral and multilateral talks with China and Russia to establish restraint protocols and non-proliferation norms for HGVs. - Undersea, Air, Space & EM Spectrum Dominance: Prioritize UUV development, SSN force readiness, cognitive electronic warfare, directed energy counter-drone systems, and space architecture resilience (disaggregation, microsatellites, GPS-independent PNT). - Left-of-Launch & Offset Concepts: Develop non-kinetic, cyber, and EW left-of-launch capabilities to disrupt missile launch sequences before flight. - Red Teaming & Wargaming: Establish a standing multi-disciplinary China Red Team and expand wargaming to assess cascading second- and third-order effects of advanced Chinese weapons deployments. Category 3: Strategic Intelligence and Competitive Strategies - Technology Acquisition Intelligence: Inculcate within the Intelligence Community dedicated programs to map informal ethnic and corporate networks utilized for Chinese technology acquisition. - Comprehensive China Technology Assessment Process: Mandate regular Net Assessments and dedicated sections in the Annual DoD China Military Power Report to evaluate China's defense industrial base, STEM quality, and emerging technology trajectory.