HEARING ON "PART OF YOUR WORLD: U.S.-CHINA COMPETITION UNDER THE SEA" HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 9:15 a.m. Monday, March 2, 2026 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 430, and Webex U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 444 North Capitol Street NW, Suite 602 Washington, D.C. 20001 U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION HON. RANDALL SCHRIVER, CHAIR MICHAEL KUIKEN, VICE CHAIR COMMISSIONERS: Hal Brands Taylor Budowich Joshua Hodges Leland Miller Reva Price Livia Shmavonian Chris Slevin Hon. Jonathan N. Stivers CONTENTS Opening Statement of Chair Randall Schriver (Hearing Co-Chair) - 6 Opening Statement of Vice Chair Michael Kuiken (Hearing Co-Chair) - 10 PANEL I: U.S. NAVY'S PERSPECTIVE ON GROWING THREAT TO U.S. UNDERSEA SUPERIORITY Panel I Introduction by Vice Chair Michael Kuiken (Hearing Co-Chair) - 16 Statement of Vice Admiral Richard Seif, Commander, Naval Submarine Forces - 17 Statement of Rear Admiral Mike Brookes, Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence - 25 Panel I: Question and Answer - 31 PANEL II: CHINA'S STRATEGY AND GROWING UNDERSEA CAPABILITIES Panel II Introduction by Chair Randall Schriver (Hearing Co-Chair) - 83 Statement of Michael Studeman, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) - 85 Statement of Michael Horowitz, Director of Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania - 94 Panel II: Question and Answer - 100 PANEL III: UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC RESOURCES Panel III Introduction by Vice Chair Michael Kuiken (Hearing Co-Chair) - 153 Statement of Jason Hsu, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute - 155 Statement of Seaver Wang, Director of Climate and Energy, The Breakthrough Institute - 162 Statement of David Calhoun, Director, Baron - 172 Panel III: Question and Answer - 178 Closing Remarks - 218 CHAIR SCHRIVER: Good morning and welcome to the second hearing of the USCC 2026 Annual Report cycle. At the outset, I want to welcome relatively new Commissioner Budowich, first hearing as a Commissioner, so thank you. Let me also thank our witnesses. We appreciate all our witnesses and their statements and the preparation that went into your testimony, but particularly want to say thanks to the first panel here, folks still serving on active duty and have day jobs supporting our forces and our fleet that are in harm's way, as part of Operation Epic Fury. So thank you, in particular, for taking time out to support our work here. I also want to thank the Senate HELP Committee for allowing us the use their hearing room and the Senate Recording Studio for their assistance in livestreaming this event. All the written testimonies and the transcript of this hearing will be posted on our website, USCC.gov. Since our founding, the United States has always been a maritime nation. From the earliest days, our security and prosperity have depended on the free use of the seas, and at least since the end of the Second World War, the United States has had global responsibilities to underwrite the safety and security of the maritime commons. American sea power has ensured that the oceans remain peaceful and open to all. And that maritime order is not a nice-to-have. It is not an abstraction. More than 80 percent of global trade moves by sea. Fiberoptic cables laid on the seabed carry vast amounts of international data traffic and trillions of dollars in financial transactions daily. Today, that order is being tested. The People's Republic of China is working to reshape the Indo-Pacific in ways that advantage the PRC, and oftentimes at the expense of others, including our allies and partners. It has systematically adopted and pursued an increasingly expansive and belligerent view of its maritime interests. Inside the first island chain, we have seen China develop artificial features and militarize them. We have seen them seek to operationalize their expansive claims, and they have sought to restrict the lawful activities of other states. This competition is not confined to the surface of the ocean. Rather, China is investing heavily in capabilities designed to operate in, and potentially control, the undersea domain, an environment that has long provided the United States with a decisive strategic advantage. China is advancing a growing fleet of increasingly capable submarines, unmanned underwater vehicles, seabed sensors, and sophisticated oceanographic mapping programs. Many of these systems have clear dual-use applications, blurring the line between civilian research and military preparation. The United States retains significant advantages in the undersea domain, but its advantages erode if they are not maintained. As strategic competition with the People's Republic of China intensifies, we must ensure that this domain remains a source of strength and deterrence, not vulnerability. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and to a substantive discussion of how we safeguard America's interests in this increasingly contested domain. I will now turn the floor over to my colleague and co-chair for this hearing, Vice Chair Michael Kuiken. VICE CHAIR KUIKEN: Thank you, Chair Schriver, and I want to thank all of our witnesses for sharing their expertise with us today. There is a book by Russell Shorto called "The Island at the Center of the World." It tells the story of how, four centuries ago, Dutch settlers arrived at a wilderness island called Manhattan and built New Amsterdam, a free-trading colony that would become New York City and, eventually, one of the most powerful places on earth. Manhattan was the island at the center of the world. Today, there is a different island at the center of the world, and it is Taiwan. Consider what is powering this hearing -- the lights shining in our faces, the microphones in front of us, the cameras recording this testimony, all of them run on foundational semiconductors that almost certainly come from Taiwan. The iPhone in your pocket, the infrastructure behind whatever conversation you had with Claude or ChatGPT this morning, those run on advanced semiconductors that almost certainly come from Taiwan too. Foundational or advanced, these chips are the lifeblood of virtually everything around us. President Xi has directed the People's Liberation Army to be capable of taking Taiwan by 2027. Look at the calendar. That is 9 months away. We do not know whether capability will become intent, but we do know where the first signals will appear. Space, cyber, and the undersea domain are almost certainly the first places we will see indications and warnings as to whether Beijing intends to move. So today's hearing is, in an important sense, about Taiwan, and about the undersea domain that surrounds it, connects it to the world, and defends it from adversaries. But this hearing is about more than military competition beneath the waves. The undersea domain matters in three critical ways, and our panels today will address each of them. First, it is a military domain, and for more than 80 years, the United States has held an enduring advantage here. Our stealthy, nuclear-powered submarines provide a key pillar of deterrence. China understands this and is investing deliberately to narrow the gap. At the strategic level, Beijing has elevated the deep-sea domain to stand alongside space and cyberspace as a national security priority. This is not rhetorical positioning. It is reflected in concrete capability development. President Xi has directed the PLA submarine force to become an elite service, signaling Beijing's intent to strengthen its sea-based deterrent. Over the past 5 years, China has accelerated production of nuclear-powered submarines, launching 10 in the last 5 years compared to just 3 in the 5 years before that. China's efforts extend beyond traditional submarines. Drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, Beijing is exploring how unmanned underwater systems could offset U.S. advantages, particularly inside the First Island Chain. Last September, the PLA unveiled two new extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicles, adding to its asymmetric capabilities. Chinese researchers are also copying DARPA's UUV designs to develop a long-range armed reconnaissance capability. Second, it is an economic and communications domain, and this is the part most Americans never think about. Right now, roughly 600 fiberoptic cables, each the width of a garden hose, sit on the ocean floor. They carry 99 percent of intercontinental data. More than $10 trillion in financial transactions cross these cables every single day. That data is the feedstock of the global economy. It is what enables payments for household goods, financial transactions between New York and Tokyo, and the vast flows of information that power everything from artificial intelligence to international commerce. Anything that severs or compromises these cables is not merely a communications disruption. It is a direct threat to the circulatory system of the global economy. And China has both the means and the opportunity. Beijing has developed cable-cutting tools capable of operating at extreme depths and maintains a fleet of vessels operating near critical undersea infrastructure in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Undersea cables have connected continents for nearly 170 years, since the first transatlantic telegraph cable in 1858. The technology has evolved, but the vulnerability has only grown as our dependence on what flows through them has become near total. Third, it is a strategic resources domain. China is racing to dominate seabed mining, securing more exploration contracts than any other country and striking deals across the Pacific to tap offshore critical minerals. The resources beneath the ocean floor are vast and largely untapped. Seabed mining as an arena of competition is both old and new, but the economic opportunity below the ocean floor will undoubtedly become a focal point of economic statecraft in the coming years and decades. Together, these three dimensions -- military, economic, and strategic resources -- represent a coordinated effort by China to challenge what has long been a decisive American advantage. Beijing is working simultaneously to close the military gap, compromise the communications infrastructure, and dominate the resources. Maintaining American advantage across all three will require sustained attention, investment, and strategic clarity. To help us understand these challenges, we have assembled three panels of witnesses today. Our first panel will offer perspectives on the growing threat to U.S. undersea military superiority. Our second panel will examine China's strategy and growing undersea capabilities. And our third panel will address undersea infrastructure and strategic resources. With that, I will turn the floor over to our first panel, and Randy is giving me the things I need to say before that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. PANEL INTRODUCTIONS BY VICE CHAIR KUIKEN VICE CHAIR KUIKEN: Today we welcome Vice Admiral Richard Seif, Commander of U.S. Naval Submarine Forces, and Rear Admiral Mike Brookes, Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence. As I just said, they will offer their perspectives on the growing threat of U.S. undersea superiority and explain how the Department is preparing for China's efforts to challenge U.S. presence. And with that I will turn it over. Thank you. STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL RICHARD SEIF, COMMANDER, NAVAL SUBMARINE FORCES ADMIRAL SEIF: Chairman Schriver, Vice Chairman Kuiken, and honorable members of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, thank you for the opportunity to discuss an issue central to United States national security in the Indo-Pacific, the undersea domain and the military advantages long provided the United States and our allies. For decades, the United States undersea forces have been a quiet, often unseen foundation of deterrence and wartime leverage, a force able to operate where other forces cannot, to persist where others cannot remain, to create doubt through stealth, speed, agility, and fire power, and to deliver decisive effects without warning. On any given day, our Navy has nuclear ballistic missile submarines, guided missile submarines, and fast-attack submarines at sea around the world, today over 20 submarines, all unlocated, all deterring aggression and creating uncertainty for any adversary. Most importantly, those submarines are manned by highly trained, battle-ready sailors, and I am certain that those men and women, those sailors, are always ready, and they are a true advantage. The undersea edge provides stability and has helped preserve a free and open regional order in the Indo-Pacific by complicating any adversary's plans for coercion or aggression. Going forward, that advantage will be tested. China is investing heavily in capabilities intended to reduce U.S. stream of action in the Western Pacific through a larger and more modern and capable submarine force, stronger antisubmarine warfare capability and capacity, and expanded sensing and targeting networks in key maritime approaches. The undersea domain delivers four strategic benefits for the United States. Deterrence. Undersea forces are the most survivable leg of the nation's nuclear arsenal. This is the capability that most contributes to deterring strategic attack. Similarly, conventionally armed submarines provide credible undersea combat power and lethality, raising uncertainty for an aggressor, making conflict less attractive and escalation riskier. Stealth and survivability. Across the spectrum of competition and conflict, submarines can gather intelligence, monitor adversary activity, and hold targets at risk while remaining difficult to detect, target, or defeat. Our speed and agility provide strategic benefit as a force multiplier, as adversaries know that we could literally be anywhere, any time. As a World War II commander, Admiral Charles Lockwood famously said, to put a finer point on it, "It is always the factor of the unknown that instills fear in the enemy and leads the way to victory." Power projection. Submarines provide prompt, precision-strike options with little warning and impose costs without requiring large, visible force packages. Sea denial and sea control. Undersea forces can threaten an adversary's surface ships, logistics, and maritime commerce, often at times and places of our choosing. And our endurance allows us to create that factor of unknown to carry out these missions for months at a time and anywhere in the world. China's strategic aim is increasingly clear, to make U.S. intervention and regional conflict slower, costlier, and riskier, and to expand China's control of contested waters, particularly within and beyond the First Island Chain. To support that objective, China is pursuing a multi-pronged undersea strategy. First, submarine modernization. China is fielding newer nuclear and conventional submarines, likely with improved sensors and weapons, and by many public accounts, steadily improving quieting and operational proficiency. Anti-submarine warfare improvement. China is expanding its fleet of ASW aircraft, surface combatants, helicopters, and undersea sensing intended to detect, localize, and track submarines operating near China's maritime approaches. Seabed and network sensing in key areas. Public reporting and Chinese industrial statements have described efforts to deploy seabed sensors and connected networks in part of the South and East China Sea, often referred to in commentary as an Underwater Great Wall. The strategic implication is not perfect undersea transparency but rather could be a narrowing of the stealth margin in specific chokepoints and operating areas. In the area of unmanned and autonomous systems, China is also investing in unmanned underwater vehicles for reconnaissance, mapping, and potentially mine warfare and counter-mine warfare, capabilities that could scale and persist at lower cost than manned platforms. The core requirement for the United States is straightforward and it is enduring. Today we must continue to deliver a battle-ready force. We must leverage our undersea advantage and deter aggression by maintaining ready, responsive, and credible undersea forces and capabilities. We must continue to deliver battle-ready sailors by giving them the tools, training, and resources they need to be successful. We must deliver the battle force of both today and tomorrow, we must grow capacity, and we must develop and integrate new platforms, technology, and capabilities to maintain our advantage and preserve undersea freedom of action in the future. As Submarine Force Commander, I am laser-focused on the following lines of effort: First, posture the fleet to deter and win by sustaining and growing submarine capacity and readiness. This includes accelerating both new submarine production and in-service submarine maintenance throughput, strengthening the industrial base, protecting operational availability, and investing in basing and infrastructure. Second, we must maintain an operational posture that preserves initiative, operating forward, complicating China's planning, and demonstrating the ability to hold key targets at risk while managing escalation and protecting sources and methods. We must continue investment in our asymmetric capabilities, expand distributed undersea sensing and counter-sensing, invest in resilient networks, fixed, mobile, and unmanned, that improve command and control, queuing and targeting, while complicating an adversary's ability to localize U.S. undersea forces. We must field robotic and autonomous systems at scale, build and employ a family of unmanned systems for ISR, payload delivery, and mine and counter-mine missions, paired with robust command and control and autonomy that works in these contested environments. And we must leverage our allies and partners, deepen allied and partner nation and interchangeability in the undersea domain, increase data-sharing, combined training, interoperable systems, and coordinated posture with allies and partners, especially those positioned along critical maritime approaches. In closing, the undersea domain remains a decisive U.S. advantage, but our margin is being tested and it cannot be taken for granted. If we invest with urgency, build capacity, and integrate with our allies and partners, the United States can maintain credible deterrence and ensure the Indo-Pacific remains free and open. Thank you. Admiral Brookes and I look forward to your questions. VICE CHAIR KUIKEN: Go ahead, Admiral Brookes. Sorry. STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL MIKE BROOKES, COMMANDER, OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ADMIRAL BROOKES: Chairman Schriver, Vice Chairman Kuiken, and distinguished members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to testify here today to discuss the national security implications of the People's Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, and their efforts to dominate the undersea domain. China views undersea warfare as an element of its naval strategy, essential to both defending its coast and projecting power across the Indo-Pacific. This capability is essential to Beijing's approach for countering the United States in the maritime domain. However, China perceives its undersea capabilities as vulnerable to the United States. This concern is driving investment in quieter submarines, enhanced operational security, seabed sensor networks, and unmanned vehicles. Further, the plan has embarked on an effort to build network capabilities in space, above the sea, on the sea, and under the sea, with all working in concert to create a comprehensive system designed to control key maritime areas and force an adversary to withdraw before they can threaten Chinese interests. China currently operates one of the world's largest submarine fleets, with 60 submarines. There are 6 nuclear-powered attack submarines that form the offensive backbone, a growing number of nuclear-powered guided missile variants for precision strikes, 6 ballistic missile submarines, ensuring nuclear deterrence, and more than 50 diesel-electric submarines, many with air-independent propulsion, extending their underwater endurance. More striking than fleet size is China's domestic submarine production capacity. Through massive infrastructure investments at several of its primary shipyards, China has more than doubled its submarine construction capability, setting up for sustained submarine growth through the 2030s and beyond. Furthermore, the submarine fleet is undergoing a fundamental transformation. China is shifting from diesel-electric to all nuclear-powered submarine construction, a strategic departure from historical patterns. This includes developing smaller nuclear submarines, roughly the size of conventional submarines, potentially filling regional patrol missions more economically than full-sized nuclear attack submarines. China's newest operational attack submarines also represent a progression forward in capability. With the ability to launch anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles, these platforms enhance China's long-range strike capability. China's ballistic missile submarines, equipped with long-range strategic nuclear missiles, can now target portions of the United States from protected waters near China. Additionally, next-generation platforms, expected by the late 2030s, will incorporate substantial advances in design and weapons. By 2027, the Chinese submarine force will likely include 70 submarines, and by 2035, continued expansion could yield approximately 80 submarines, with approximately half of those nuclear powered. Projections for the early 2040s include 20 modern attack submarines designed for operations well beyond the Second Island Chain, and 10 ballistic nuclear subs that can threaten our homeland from bastions inside China's near seas. Additionally, China has invested in unmanned underwater vehicles for over two decades, fusing military and civilian technologies. Underwater gliders collect oceanographic data, improving sonar performance, and China has revealed extra-large, unmanned vehicle concepts capable of reconnaissance, mine placement, and one-way attacks. Beijing envisions autonomous vehicles for long-range mine and ISR missions, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance, with unmanned systems operating independently or in swarms alongside manned platforms, emphasizing modular payloads, sensors, mines, torpedoes, missiles, and even deployable smaller vehicles. Central to China's strategy is what they call the "Underwater Great Wall," a seabed sensor architecture monitoring submarine activity through fixed and floating platforms. These systems gather hydrographic and intelligence data to enhance China's understanding of the undersea domain. China has also made deep-sea mineral mining a national strategic priority. Chairman Xi Jinping has championed this effort, driving major investment in mining technology, targeting minerals essential for advanced batteries, electronics, and defense applications, areas where China already dominates terrestrial supply chains. In fact, China holds more exploration contracts from the International Seabed Authority than any other nation, 5 of the 22 mining permits. We are concerned that China's deep-sea mining operations could serve dual-use purposes. The data they are collecting from mapping the ocean floor directly supports submarine warfare capabilities, that is, they are learning the sea floor's topography which helps with submarine navigation and concealment. They are gathering information about acoustic characteristics, which allows them to optimize their sonar systems. And they are identifying locations for anchoring systems, places where they could potentially deploy sensors or weapons platforms in the future. By 2040, China's undersea forces may credibly challenge U.S. undersea dominance, complicating crisis response and allied defense. China's deep-sea capabilities could threaten undersea cables and sensor networks critical for communications and military operations. Its push for deep-sea minerals could extend control of critical supply chains from land to sea. In closing, China is pursuing a unified approach, linking strategy, naval modernization, seabed infrastructure, and resource extraction. We cannot assume U.S. undersea advantages will ensure without sustained investment, innovation, and strategic focus. Again, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak with you today and allowing me to share my thoughts and concerns on a topic that I think is vital to our nation and to our national security. I am happy to answer questions you might have. VICE CHAIR KUIKEN: Thank you, Admiral Brookes. Chair Schriver informed me that I am apparently chairing this portion of the hearing, but I am going to defer to the Chair to ask the first round of questions. CHAIR SCHRIVER: Inquired about prioritization of recommendations in a resource-constrained environment, gaps in intelligence regarding Chinese naval modernization, and training and operational proficiency compared to U.S. forces. ADMIRAL SEIF & ADMIRAL BROOKES: Highlighted priorities including the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, continuous production authorizations in the NDAA, wide-area search and sensing, scaling autonomous systems, and development of the SSN(X). Emphasized the essential role of the naval intelligence enterprise, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED), and AI algorithms to analyze massive collection data. COMMISSIONER BUDOWICH: Asked about the interplay between civilian/commercial and military activities, modernization/maintenance of legacy U.S. attack submarine classes (Los Angeles, Seawolf, Virginia), and software/AI insertion. ADMIRAL SEIF & ADMIRAL BROOKES: Clarified that Chinese maritime operations utilize civil-military fusion across research fleets and civilian assets. Detailed the 48-submarine U.S. attack fleet and ongoing rapid tech insertions (including AI/ML copilot tools). COMMISSIONER HODGES: Inquired about forward deployment access (Guam, Yokosuka, AUKUS Pillar 1 at Western Australia), undersea cable vulnerabilities, repair realities, and AI integration by the PLA Navy. ADMIRAL BROOKES & ADMIRAL SEIF: Discussed the strategic value of forward presence, noting undersea cables experience ~200 cuts globally per year (~every 36 hours) and require built-in network redundancy and rapid repair capabilities. COMMISSIONER MILLER: Asked about Chinese localization advantages across island chains and the threat of UUV proliferation. ADMIRAL SEIF & ADMIRAL BROOKES: Noted China's localized home-court advantages inside the First Island Chain ebb farther out, though China seeks global power projection and employs UUVs for ocean transparency, ISR, mine warfare, and strike. COMMISSIONER PRICE: Addressed bilateral relationships in seabed mining (Cook Islands, Kiribati) and allied integration under AUKUS. ADMIRAL BROOKES & ADMIRAL SEIF: Discussed China leveraging economic agreements for military access, and emphasized AUKUS Pillar 1 (nuclear submarines) and Pillar 2 (advanced technologies, interoperability, shared torpedoes and fire control). COMMISSIONER SHMAVONIAN: Raised workforce shortages (estimated 100,000-worker deficit), supply chain reliability, and quantum sensing/communications. ADMIRAL SEIF & ADMIRAL BROOKES: Described efforts under the Director for Submarines, advanced manufacturing parts, and competitive dynamics in quantum and AI research. COMMISSIONER SLEVIN: Questioned Sino-Russian maritime collaboration and cross-domain ASW integration with allies. ADMIRAL BROOKES & ADMIRAL SEIF: Discussed historical and current Russia-China ties, noting basic interoperability exercises and the necessity of seamless allied cross-domain ASW handoffs. COMMISSIONER STIVERS: Highlighted potential risks by 2040, private sector mobilization, and cable repair capacities. INTRODUCTION BY CHAIR SCHRIVER CHAIR SCHRIVER: Introduced Rear Admiral Mike Studeman (U.S. Navy, Ret.) and Dr. Michael Horowitz (Director of Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania). STATEMENT OF MICHAEL STUDEMAN, REAR ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY (RET.) ADMIRAL STUDEMAN: Emphasized that Xi Jinping has transformed China into the world's foremost maritime power, holding the largest navy, coast guard, maritime militia, deep-sea diving force, fishing fleet, and scientific research fleet. Highlighted China's Undersea Great Wall and Blue Water Information Network. Outlined symmetric and asymmetric undersea threats China could execute, including: 1. Cruise missile submarines expanding patrols toward U.S. home waters, Hawaii, the West Coast, and the Arctic. 2. Severing or manipulating U.S. seabed cables, sound surveillance systems, or energy lines. 3. COSCO/ghost fleet merchant ships deploying seafloor sensors or munitions. 4. Sleeper cells using commercial waterborne drones for sabotage. 5. Developing a Chinese version of Russia's Poseidon transoceanic nuclear torpedo. 6. Multi-domain ballistic missiles delivering torpedoes at long range. Noted that while U.S. experiential knowhow and technology remain superior, China's comprehensive national power and maritime industrial capacity pose significant long-term challenges. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL HOROWITZ, DIRECTOR OF PERRY WORLD HOUSE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA DR. HOROWITZ: Warned of China's consequential undersea military expansion, focusing on: 1. Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles (UUVs): China's 15-year systematic investment involving over 48 universities and 45 enterprises, fielding large and extra-extra-large UUVs (such as 40-meter designs unveiled at the Sept 2025 parade with 15,000+ km range and strike/torpedo capabilities, alongside AJX-002 and HSU-100). 2. Transparent Ocean Strategy & Sensing: Deploying multi-layered sensor networks from seabed to space, augmented by quantum sensing research to detect subtle submarine disturbances in shallow littoral waters like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. CHAIR SCHRIVER & VICE CHAIR KUIKEN: Questioned net assessment capabilities, industrial base scaling, commercial shipyard/yacht yard utilization (e.g., DARPA NOMARS, Saronic), and timelines for quantum sensing (projected 10-15 years out). ADMIRAL STUDEMAN & DR. HOROWITZ: Emphasized the need to combine open-source intelligence with classified data, overcome counterintelligence shortfalls, harden academic research labs against Chinese IP theft, and utilize commercial maritime manufacturing capacity. COMMISSIONER STIVERS, COMMISSIONER SLEVIN, COMMISSIONER SHMAVONIAN, & COMMISSIONER MILLER: Addressed allied cooperation (e.g., Australia's Ghost Shark XL-UUV), counterintelligence reform, homeland defense of Pacific territories (Guam, Compact States), commercial fleet disparities (12,000+ Chinese vessels vs. hundreds of U.S.-flagged), Chinese torpedo advances (supercavitation, YJ-19 hypersonic tube-launched missiles, edge compute), and personnel recruitment/training disparities between U.S. submariners and PLAN crews. PANEL III INTRODUCTION BY VICE CHAIR KUIKEN Introduced Jason Hsu (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute), Dr. Seaver Wang (Director of Climate and Energy, Breakthrough Institute), and David Calhoun (Director, Baron). STATEMENT OF JASON HSU, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE MR. HSU: Discussed China's gray zone campaign against subsea communications cables around Taiwan. Pointed out that Taiwan relies on 24 undersea cables carrying vital data and semiconductor supply chain communications. Highlighted recent cable cuts (Matsu Islands in Feb 2023; multiple 2025 incidents involving Hongtai 58 and Baltic Sea incidents involving Yi Peng 3). Recommended passing the Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative Act, modernizing international legal frameworks (1884 convention), expanding sanctions on IUU/proxy vessels, and establishing joint Coast Guard patrols and repair capacity with Japan. STATEMENT OF SEAVER WANG, DIRECTOR OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY, THE BREAKTHROUGH INSTITUTE DR. WANG: Highlighted dual-use overlaps between seafloor mineral recovery and naval systems (power systems, autonomous navigation, moored seabed sensors). Outlined critical mineral security opportunities (nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper from polymetallic nodules). Identified key U.S. bottlenecks: lack of full-scale nodule collector demonstrations, lack of domestic smelting/refining capacity, regulatory ambiguities under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA), and the need for environmental monitoring. STATEMENT OF DAVID CALHOUN, DIRECTOR, BARON MR. CALHOUN: Addressed China's strategic race for seabed minerals via International Seabed Authority (ISA) contracts and Pacific bilateral partnerships (Cook Islands, Kiribati). Pointed out China's patent dominance (over 1,000 patents vs. under 50 for U.S. entities) and state-backed SOE mobilization (China Minmetals, CRIMM, Beijing Pioneer/China Merchants Group). Recommended enhanced USGS monitoring, resource mapping in U.S. waters, and government-backed processing facilities. COMMISSIONER BUDOWICH, COMMISSIONER HODGES, VICE CHAIR KUIKEN, COMMISSIONER MILLER, COMMISSIONER PRICE, COMMISSIONER SCHRIVER, & COMMISSIONER STIVERS: - Mr. Hsu detailed specific severed cable routes (East Asia Crossing, Flag North Asia Loop, APCN 2, APG, PLCN, TPE), the economic and military impact of cable disruption, and the need for cloud redundancy, LEO satellite backup, and legal authority updates. - Dr. Wang and Mr. Calhoun analyzed the viability of Defense Production Act (DPA) authorities, Title III funding, Department of Defense Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) support, offshore processing partnerships (e.g., Eastern Canada, Gulf Coast), environmental standards under NEPA, and Pacific logistics hubs (such as Pago Pago, American Samoa). CLOSING REMARKS VICE CHAIR KUIKEN: Concluded the hearing and announced the next USCC hearing on March 19th regarding "China's Expanding Interests in Latin America: Development, Leverage, Coercion, and Crime." Hearing adjourned at 1:00 p.m.