CNA SEPTEMBER 2024 Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears Russia's Political-Military Establishment Debates Credibility of Nuclear Threats and Potential Nuclear Employment Anya Fink, Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez, and Cornell Overfield with contributions by Stephanie Stapleton DRM-2024-U-038138-1Rev DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. © 2024 CNA Corporation Abstract Moscow's nuclear weapons doctrine, posture, and strategy are at an inflection point. Russian political leadership have repeatedly invoked and signaled with nuclear weapons to deter a direct US or North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention into the war in Ukraine. Some Russian nongovernmental expert elites have advocated for a nuclear strike on Europe coupled with a shift to a preemptive nuclear doctrine, while others within the Russian military expert community have proposed more aggressive signaling with nuclear forces as well as changes to the strategic operations system. This report examines the ongoing debates in Russia about the ineffectiveness of nuclear weapons threats among three stakeholder groups: high-level political officials, the military-analytical community, and nongovernmental experts. The paper examines the potential implications of these debates for Russia's nuclear policy and posture. The concluding section discusses implications for US and allied forces. This document contains the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report should not be construed as representing the official position of the Department of the Navy. Approved by: September 2024 David Knoll, Research Program Director Countering Threats and Challenges Program Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Programs Division This publication was funded by the Russia Strategic Initiative, U.S. European Command. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or the United States government. Moscow's nuclear weapons doctrine, posture, and strategy are at an inflection point. Historically, Russia has leveraged its nuclear arsenal to maintain its great power status, deter nuclear and significant conventional attacks, manage escalation, and threaten nuclear employment in combat in response to existential risks. Since February 2022, Russian political leadership has repeatedly invoked and signaled with nuclear weapons in its efforts to deter the US and NATO from directly intervening in the war in Ukraine and to compel a cessation of Western military aid to Kyiv. In tandem with this signaling, Russian experts and military analysts have debated the effectiveness and credibility of Moscow's nuclear messaging and discussed whether Russia may need to implement measures to restore nuclear signaling credibility. This study focuses on the views of three groups: (1) high-level political officials within the Kremlin; (2) a small circle of military planners and scholars in Russian Ministry of Defense institutes, referred to as 'the military-analytical community'; and (3) civilian experts who provide alternative perspectives. Russian officials, civilian experts, and military analysts generally agree that Russia's nuclear signaling in Ukraine has not achieved all its desired goals. Both military and civilian experts suggest more assertive measures to restore credibility, including: - Revisiting or withdrawing from arms control agreements - Changes or clarifications to Russia's public nuclear doctrine - Nonnuclear measures such as threats to conventionally strike weapon depots in NATO territory, air and naval patrols, or no-fly zones - Nonverbal nuclear measures such as exercises, nuclear tests, demo-nuclear explosions, and demonstrations of combat readiness. While most Russian officials, including Putin, have publicly reiterated adherence to existing doctrine, actions such as the deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus demonstrate evolving postures. The report concludes that the US and its allies should not entirely dismiss Moscow's nuclear signaling and must prepare for more explicit forms of signaling. Introduction - 1 Theoretical framework - 2 Describing key stakeholder communities - 3 Methodology - 4 Exploring potential changes to Russia's nuclear policy and posture - 6 Russian Political Leadership - 7 Role and effectiveness of nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine war - 8 Declaratory nuclear policy - 14 Nuclear posture - 17 Military Analyst Perspectives - 21 Declaratory nuclear policy - 22 Nuclear posture - 28 Civilian Expert Perspectives - 34 Role and effectiveness of nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine war - 35 Declaratory nuclear policy - 37 Nuclear posture - 41 Summary and Implications - 45 Summary of key themes - 45 Tracking the discussions - 49 Implications for the US and allied forces - 50 Appendix: Key Concepts - 53 Abbreviations - 55 References - 56 Building on past CNA work on the Russian military's views regarding escalation management, this study draws on open-source Russian-language data to explore how Russian leadership, the civilian expert community, and the military expert community view the use of nuclear threats during the war in Ukraine and to discuss the implications for Russian nuclear policy and posture. Theoretical framework: Using Alexey Arbatov's 2010 framework on the unique dynamics of defense policymaking in Russia, this study segments Russian viewpoints into three stakeholder groups: 1. Russian Political Leadership: High-level government officials with ultimate decision-making authority held by President Vladimir Putin. 2. Russian Civilian Experts: Academics and think tank analysts who provide alternative information and engage in global debates. 3. Military Analysts: Scholars and officers at Ministry of Defense (MOD) institutes, the General Staff, and service academies who formulate military theory and operational art. Table 1. Data Sources: - Leadership views: Over 200 speeches, articles, and media coverage items (Feb 2022–Nov 2023). - Civilian expert views: 60 articles, reports, and interviews (Feb 2022–Nov 2023, expanding 2019–2024). - Military expert views: 50 articles from the General Staff journal Military Thought (Voennaya Mysl'). Table 2. Components of Nuclear Policy and Posture: - Declaratory Policy: Formalized public doctrinal statements about intended use. - Capabilities: Types, numbers, and basing locations of weapons. - Employment Plans: Scenarios and operational concepts for weapon use. - Nuclear Command and Control (NC2): Civilian/military relationships and predelegation. Since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian political leadership, led by Vladimir Putin, has consistently claimed commitment to Russia's established nuclear doctrine (codified in the 2020 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence). Russian officials have employed nuclear signaling to deter direct NATO military intervention and to prevent or slow lethal Western aid. Key aspects: - Preemptive Strikes: Putin discussed the possibility of adopting US concepts of 'disarming' or 'preventive' strikes with hypersonic missiles in December 2022, though he reaffirmed adherence to Russia's retaliatory-meeting doctrine. - Territorial Integrity: Nuclear rhetoric was explicitly used to deter attempts to encroach upon Russian territory, notably following the annexation of four Ukrainian regions and regarding Crimea (statements by Dmitry Medvedev). - Belarus Deployment: Russia signed agreements to deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, mirroring NATO nuclear sharing. - Arms Control Suspension: Russia suspended participation in New START and revoked its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), while committing to observe quantitative limits and test only if the US tests first. Military analysts writing in Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought) focused on maintaining strategic deterrence and updating the strategic operations system. Key themes from the military analytical community: 1. Role of Strategic Deterrence: A. K. Mar'in (General Staff Academy Research Center) emphasized that strategic deterrence must integrate military and nonmilitary instruments across conventional, nuclear, and informational domains to counter US 'forceful compellence.' 2. More Assertive Declaratory Policy: Analysts from the 27th MOD Research Institute (Sukhorutchenko, Borisenko, Shlotov) argued that Western leaders have lost fear of nuclear escalation and called for clearer, more assertive doctrinal language regarding red lines and consequences. 3. Evolution of Strategic Operations: Fazletdinov and Lumpov highlighted the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) in the emerging 'strategic deterrent forces operation,' preparing for multi-domain threats and surprise conventional counterforce strikes by the US/NATO. 4. Nuclear Signaling and Operational Art: Authors like Nogin and Tikhonov from the Strategic Rocket Forces Academy advocated for dynamic, demonstrative actions—such as raising readiness levels, demonstrative preparations, and potential demonstrative single nuclear strikes—to restore signaling credibility. Russian civilian analysts engage in broad debates regarding the effectiveness of nuclear threats and strategic stability. Key debates: - Karaganov Debate (June 2023): Sergey Karaganov published a controversial proposal titled 'A Difficult but Necessary Decision,' advocating that Russia lower its nuclear threshold and prepare for preemptive nuclear strikes on NATO countries (such as Poland) to 'break the West's will' and prevent a global thermonuclear war. - Rebuttals and Pushback: Major figures including Dmitry Trenin, Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, Konstantin Bogdanov, and Dmitry Stefanovich strongly pushed back against limited nuclear use, arguing it would not compel the West to back down but would likely trigger massive NATO conventional retaliation, catastrophic escalation, and international isolation. - Valdai 2023 Discussion: At the Valdai Discussion Club in October 2023, Putin publicly addressed Karaganov, stating he saw no need to change Russia's nuclear doctrine, though the civilian debate continued into 2024. - Nonnuclear and Nonverbal Measures: Civilian experts debated measures such as conventional strikes on Western weapons convoys, drone no-fly zones in the Black Sea, and demo-nuclear tests to augment credibility without initiating nuclear war. Summary of Key Themes: 1. Mixed Success: Russian elites broadly acknowledge that while nuclear signaling prevented direct NATO troop intervention, it failed to stop incremental Western military aid to Ukraine. 2. Divisiveness on Limited Nuclear Use: While civilian analysts like Karaganov argued for limited nuclear employment, political leadership and military scholars largely rejected or avoided public advocacy of limited strikes. 3. Push for Restoring Credibility: Both military and civilian circles propose a menu of actions to enhance credibility, including demonstrative military exercises, doctrine revisions, deployment to Belarus, and exiting arms control regimes. Implications for the US and NATO Allies: - NATO and US forces should expect continued and potentially more explicit Russian nuclear signaling, especially during critical battlefield transitions in Ukraine. - The deployment of dual-capable systems (Iskander-M) and nonstrategic warheads to Belarus demands careful nonproliferation scrutiny and allied coordination. - Western decision-makers must maintain prudent judgment, recognizing that Russian strategic culture combines military threats with broader informational and political compellence tools. Russian escalation management decisions follow three conceptual steps: assessing the conflict phase, determining escalation management tools, and establishing whether conditions for nuclear use are met. Table 4. Conflict phases and types in Russian military doctrine: - Military danger: Potential conditions that could lead to a threat. - Military threat: Real possibility of military conflict. - Armed conflict: Limited scale interstate or internal armed violence. - Local war: Limited political-military goals between specific states. - Regional war: War involving multiple states from a single region. - Large-scale war: Coalition war demanding full societal and material mobilization. Figure 3. Escalation Management Spectrum: - Peacetime: Demonstration of possession of force; nonmilitary measures. - Military Threat: Indirect and direct threats; demonstration tests and readiness increases. - Local War: Probing use of forces; grouped precision strikes; threats to use nuclear weapons. - Regional War: Moderate use of force; single/grouped use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). - Large-Scale / Nuclear War: Retaliation and intensive use of force; mass use of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) and NSNW. Abbreviations: CTBT - Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IMEMO - Institute of World Economy and International Relations MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOD - Ministry of Defense NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization NC2 - Nuclear Command and Control NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSNW - Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons SNF - Strategic Nuclear Forces WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction About CNA: CNA is a nonprofit research and analysis organization dedicated to the safety and security of the nation. It operates the Center for Naval Analyses—the federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) of the Department of the Navy—as well as the Institute for Public Research.