Occasional Paper Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies The Tempest Programme: Assessing Advances and Risks Across Multiple Fronts Trevor Taylor with Isabella Antinozzi The Tempest Programme: Assessing Advances and Risks Across Multiple Fronts Trevor Taylor with Isabella Antinozzi RUSI Occasional Paper, November 2022 Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies 191 years of independent thinking on defence and security The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank. Its mission is to inform, influence and enhance public debate on a safer and more stable world. RUSI is a research-led institute, producing independent, practical and innovative analysis to address today’s complex challenges. Since its foundation in 1831, RUSI has relied on its members to support its activities. Together with revenue from research, publications and conferences, RUSI has sustained its political independence for 191 years. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Whitehall London SW1A 2ET United Kingdom +44 (0)20 7747 2600 www.rusi.org RUSI is a registered charity (No. 210639) The views expressed in this publication are those of the author, and do not reflect the views of RUSI or any other institution. Published in 2022 by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-Commercial – No-Derivatives 4.0 International Licence. For more information, see <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>. RUSI Occasional Paper, November 2022. ISSN 2397-0286 (Online); ISSN 2397-0278 (Print). Contents Executive Summary v Introduction 1 I. Capability Requirements 7 II. Technology 9 Propulsion and Power Generation 9 Integrated Sensors and Non-Kinetic Effects (ISANKE) and Integrated Communication Systems (ICS) 10 Weaponry and Protection 11 Airframe and the Platform 12 Enabling Skills 14 III. The Government–Industry Relationship 17 IV. International Partners 19 Japan 19 Italy 21 Sweden 23 Assessment of Collaboration 23 V. Cost Control and Digitisation 27 Conclusion 33 About the Authors 37 Executive Summary THE TEMPEST PROGRAMME, within the envisaged Future Combat Air System (FCAS), is of multi-dimensional importance, involving British military capability, advanced technology development, operational independence, international standing and relationships, economic prosperity and long-term defence industrial capability. Four years after the announcement of the programme, this paper is to assess the national and international progress on Tempest on five fronts: capability requirements; technology; government–industry relations; international partnerships; and cost control and digitisation. The first of the five areas of central progress involves the generation of prudent and relevant requirements that match aspiration with the funds, time and technology available, bearing in mind the capabilities of potential adversaries, the demands of the need to deter and the scale and duration of any potential future conflict. The second area focuses on the need to generate technological progress across the aircraft’s power and propulsion system, its avionics, sensors and data systems, and its missiles and other effectors. Essentially, this requires de-risking activities to control the technology hazards inherent in a project of this nature – as well as the training and employment of a cohort of competent digital technology workforces. Third, based on lessons learned from previous programmes, the government has opted to pursue Tempest using highly collaborative relationships with the UK private sector. Four key lead firms (BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, Leonardo UK and MBDA Missile Systems) were identified at an early stage, with over 580 other UK firms and academic institutions having since joined the wider supply chain in collaboration with Team Tempest partners. If open, transparent and honest relationships and a shared appreciation of risks can be maintained among these entities, the outlook for the project will remain positive. This openness will clearly need to be reconciled with a tight security system to protect the programme from external threats. [1] Fourth, because this was never going to be solely a UK project, collaborative relations with other governments will be of central importance, with Italy, Japan and Sweden having evolving links to the programme. The paper provides a summary of developments and the state of affairs in autumn 2022. Finally, the successful delivery of Tempest will require breaking the trend of major intergenerational cost increases in real terms for combat aircraft (which incidentally is a trend that marks other major military platforms). The UK has the ambition of at least levelling this cost increase curve and is stressing the importance of pace of delivery in the project. Central to success in this aspiration is a realistic, de-risked requirement set, and the widespread application of digital engineering and what is sometimes referred to as Industry 4.0. This also implies significant changes in the way that the Ministry of Defence’s own safety and digital-verification authorities operate. --- 1. See Larisa Brown, 'Secret War over RAF’s New £2bn Jet with a "Virtual Co-Pilot"', The Times, 24 September 2022. Introduction 'The combat air strategy highlights the importance of air power in delivering our national security, but also the Government’s vision for a strong, prosperous and influential Global Britain, underpinned by a world-leading combat air sector. Combat air has a vital role to play in the UK’s national security, defence industrial capacity and international influence.' — Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace, House of Commons, 19 July 2022 [2] DURING THE FARNBOROUGH International Airshow in 2018, then Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson launched the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Combat Air Strategy, re-affirming the government’s commitment to the combat air sector, laying out a clear vision for the UK to remain at the leading edge of this sector and providing a clear roadmap to achieve this. Alongside the launch of the strategy, the MoD unveiled ‘Tempest’, a concept for a multi-role sixth-generation fighter aircraft, and committed to it £2 billion of government and industry funding up to 2025 through a newly formed Combat Air Acquisition Programme (CAAP). [3] This is part of a budget of more than £10 billion over the next 10 years, although the ultimate amount invested will depend on key programme choices and on the role of international partners. [4] In 2018, the Future Combat Air System Technology Initiative (FCAS TI) was established, which runs from 2018–26 and will mature the technologies and skills needed for the future combat air system. The central pillar of FCAS TI is ‘Team Tempest’, a co-funded partnership between government (UK MoD and the RAF’s Rapid Capability Office) and industry partners (BAE Systems, Leonardo, MBDA and Rolls-Royce) which are working together, and with several hundred supplier companies and other organisations including universities, to align incentives and stimulate investment to drive the required pace and affordability. This partnership between the MoD and industry also forms an integral part of the MoD’s Defence, Security and Industrial Strategy (DSIS). The work of the FCAS TI initiative is fully embedded in the FCAS Acquisition Programme (FCAS AP) which was initiated in 2021. The MoD awarded a contract initially worth £250 million for ‘Concept and Assessment’ work to be carried under the umbrella of the FCAS AP to enable major programme choices by 2024. At the moment, we are in the FCAS AP Concept and Assessment phase running alongside the FCAS Technology Initiative, with the next UK formal gate not due for another two years. [5] The extensive work currently being undertaken is intended to reduce risk and generate a viable strategy for moving forward to what multiple stakeholders will regard as a successful outcome. For an overview of how the FCAS TI and FCAS AP timelines run and interact, see Figure 1. Figure 1: FCAS Timeline - 2018 to 2025: FCAS TI (Demonstrator First Flight by 2027) - 2021 to 2080+: FCAS AP - 2021–2025: Concept and Assessment - 2025–2035: Development (Demonstrator First Flight by 2027, Entry into Service 2035) - 2035–2050: Production - 2050–2080+: Sustainment and Spiral Upgrade (Source: Diagram supplied by BAE Systems.) The purpose of this paper is to assess the national and international progress on Tempest to date. First, this requires an analytical framework which addresses the areas of central importance for the future of the project, namely: capability requirements; technology; government–industry relations; international partnerships; and cost control and digitisation. These five areas of particular importance have been recognised as such by the parties involved, and they also reflect experience with other major projects. Evidence on these five elements was collected from published governmental sources, corporate publications and authoritative media sources using desk-based research. Semi-structured interviews were held over a period of four months with governmental and private sector sources. The initial findings were debated and discussed during a closed-door session with subject-matter experts from government, industry and academia. On the basis of the evidence collected, it appears there are grounds for optimism, with industry and government working at unprecedented collaborative levels. Importantly, however, significant risk remains and activities planned for the next few years will be crucial to the understanding of and reduction of risk. Although the government announced clear ambitions for an international future combat air system – Tempest – in the 2018 Combat Air Strategy, it must be stressed that hard governmental commitment to this project will not occur unless a second Outline Business Case is available by late 2024 (see Table 1 for past and envisaged steps and processes). [6] This will be a project clearly in the Category A space and, accordingly, it will need approval for its second Outline Business Case and then Full Business Case from the top levels of government, including the Treasury. [7] These choices will depend on perceived gains, assessments of the risks involved and of the ongoing viability of the programme – and, as such, this project has no guarantees. Table 1: The Steps Towards Tempest Initial Operating Capability - 2018: UK launches technology acquisition programmes for FCAS. | Funding: £2 billion committed by government for multi-year expenditure. Industry to contribute £800 million of its own funds. - Early 2021: Government approval of Outline Business Case 1 for Tempest. - Mid 2021: Outline Business Case 1 allows establishment of the concept and assessment phase of a formal acquisition programme. | Funding: An initial £250-million contract placed with BAE Systems as the systems engineering programme integration lead company acting on behalf of the four main partners.* - July 2022: Government announces that a technology demonstrator aircraft will fly within five years. - July 2022: UK announces that it is working on a joint concept analysis of the FCAS programme. - Quarter 4 2022: Further decisions are expected to be made by the UK government regarding international partnerships. - October 2024: Government to address Outline Business Case 2. - Early 2025: Further UK contract(s) for development work to be issued. - 2027: First flight of a technology demonstrator aircraft to occur by this year. - 2027: MoD could present Full Business Case for approval. | Funding: Likely reflecting a tangible technical advance such as an Initial Design Review. - 2035: First Tempest aircraft to enter service. (* BAE Systems, 'Multi-Million Pound Tempest Funding Set to Advance the UK’s Future Combat Air Capability', 29 July 2021.) Tempest is one of three options for a Typhoon successor being held open by the MoD. The other two are to join another programme, perhaps with the US or even France and Germany, or to buy an ‘off-the-shelf’ aircraft from overseas, most obviously whatever the F-35 looks like in the timescale in question. At this point it is not feasible to contemplate what will emerge as the attributes of the Tempest aircraft in any detail, since they will reflect the interacting pressures of five factors: 1. The political and conflict contingencies that emerge as relevant given the defence policy of the day. 2. The anticipated capabilities of potential adversaries: in many areas China is already more capable than Russia, [8] but there is also the prospect of China arming Russia. 3. What capabilities the technologies of the partners can generate, at what risk, and with what cost. 4. Future operating concepts and how the British armed forces plan to fight in a future multi-domain context. 5. What funds the parties will make available. There can be real confidence that by 2035, the envisaged In-Service date for the first Tempest, the RAF will begin to need replacements for even the improved Typhoons that will be in service. Furthermore, without a new major project in the next five years, the UK’s industrial capacity for the design and development of combat air systems will be eroded and dissolved for commercial reasons. Once a defence industrial capability to develop and produce complex systems in a specific area has been given up, rebuilding it would be risky, time-consuming and very expensive, given the prohibitive cost of trying to rebuild the capital assets and the knowledge, skills and capabilities. [9] This underlines the significance of the development work that will be carried out mid-2025 to mid-2035. The current phase, however, is still of concept and assessment and it can be seen to require advances in a coordinated fashion on five clear but interacting fronts: capability requirements; the technology domain; government–industry relationships; international collaborative links; and cost-onshoring control. A previous paper by the present author asserted the prudence of the cautious approach being pursued by multiple Tempest stakeholders, [10] and now is a timely opportunity to review challenges, activity and progress in these key dimensions. Figure 2: Key Elements of the Tempest Programme - Capability requirements - International cooperation - Government–industry relations - Cost control - Technology (Propulsion and power; Avionics, sensors and data; Missiles and other effectors; Airframe and platform; Enabling skills) (Source: The author.) --- 2. Hansard, House of Commons, 'Combat Air Strategy Update', Written Statements, 19 July 2022, Column 33WS, <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2022-07-19/hcws228>, accessed 28 October 2022. 3. Ron Matthews and Rashid Al-Saadi, 'Organisational Complexity of the Eurofighter Typhoon Collaborative Supply Chain', Defence and Peace Economics (2021), DOI:10.1080/10242694.2021.1987022, p. 11. 4. Hansard, 'Combat Air Strategy Update', Column 35WS. 5. Ministry of Defence (MoD), 'UK Builds Momentum on Combat Air Programme with Demonstrator Set to Fly Within Five Years', press release, 18 July 2018, accessed 20 September 2022; Hansard, House of Commons, Written Answers, 9 October 2017, accessed 29 September 2022. 6. See also MoD, 'Investment Appraisal and Evaluation, Part 1: Directive', JSP 507, 14 January 2022; HM Treasury, 'Guide to Developing the Project Business Case', 2018. 7. HM Treasury, 'Public Spending – The Accountability Framework', Guidance, 24 August 2021; HM Treasury, Treasury Approvals Process for Programmes and Projects, PU 3205 (London: The Stationery Office, 2022). 8. World Bank, 'High-Technology Exports (Current US$) – China' and 'Russia', September 2022. 9. John Louth and Trevor Taylor, 'A Defence Industrial Strategy for the UK', RUSI Occasional Papers (April 2018), p. 18. 10. Trevor Taylor, 'Gambling Responsibly and the UK Tempest Programme: Experiences, Risks and Opportunities', RUSI Occasional Papers (November 2020). I. Capability Requirements WHILE, AS NOTED, it would be premature to articulate multiple specific requirements, the MoD has said that it is looking for a next- (sixth-) generation capability – namely, something more advanced in some dimensions than the F-35. [11] The MoD is also clear that it sees the core platform as part of a wider air power system with which Tempest must exchange information and perhaps commands on a significant scale. That ‘air system’ is potentially enormous and relates to the wider military aspiration for high-quality and wide-ranging knowledge about the battlespace, summed up by the phrase ‘multi-domain integration’. [12] Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace put it in these terms: '[W]e are exploring how our future capability could be more than a traditional combat air platform, but the vital connected heart and mind of an integrated combat air system. … The core platform would be one vital element of a broader combat system that links seamlessly with other units in the air, on land and at sea, bringing these together to maximise effect.' [13] Tempest is also expected to carry a wide range of weapons, including the potential for novel systems involving lasers and perhaps directed energy systems as well as missiles (there has not been any public mention of whether Tempest should be able to carry such a traditional weapon as a cannon). [14] The integration of missiles on to conventional aircraft is an established area, while reconciling the need for the shapes of an aircraft to minimise their observability with the need to accommodate missiles within the airframe is a more novel challenge. The integration of directed energy weapons, including lasers, within an aircraft is a new challenge with obvious implications for fire control and for the engines that must serve as both power generation and propulsion systems. The need for joined-up activity among Leonardo, MBDA and Rolls-Royce, as well as BAE Systems, is apparent. The requirements set that emerges is likely to lie somewhere on a spectrum, at one end of which lies a drive for something that matches the most of what technology might offer and is comparable to that being pursued by the US. At the other end is a minimum threshold requirement which specifies something that could deal with the anticipated systems of what is judged to be a likely adversary, at an acceptable human and material cost: in simple terms, something more effective than that operated by an adversary. Pursuing equivalence with the US looks like a route to financial problems on a significant scale. The US secretary of the Air Force told Congress in the summer that the Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft was likely to cost ‘multiple’ hundreds of millions of dollars per unit. It is envisaged as working with multiple uncrewed systems which themselves may prove expensive. [15] A compromise would be to target the ‘good enough’ option of the capacity to deal with contemporary adversary capabilities (most obviously Russia) at an acceptable cost. This can be conceived as what some in industry are calling a minimal viable product. However, sitting alongside this standard should be emphasis that the platform must constitute an ‘open system’ capable of modification and upgrade with very limited disruption to the wider platform as a whole. It could thus evolve through life to keep pace with technology advances and unforeseen developments in the threat space. Targeting the ‘good enough’ option plus a capacity for modification would also increase exportability of the final platform. In large equipment programmes there is a wider trend in recent years towards ever more complex and ‘exquisite’ designs whereby each unit could almost be its own prototype with limited opportunities for economies of scale and limited potential for exports. [16] Both for government and industry, export potential is a key aspect of the combat air programme. Besides providing return on investment, if there are successful exports, there will be enhanced opportunity as well as pressure on the UK and its partners to push on further developments to maintain their operational and commercial edge. --- 11. Alex Hollings, 'Tempest: Everything We Know about the UK’s 6th-Gen Fighter', National Interest, 17 December 2020; Airforce Technology, 'Tempest Future Combat Air System (FCAS) Aircraft, UK', 2 August 2022. 12. See Ian Reynolds, 'Seeing, Knowing and Deciding: The Technological Command Dream that Never Dies?', War on the Rocks, 13 July 2022. 13. Hansard, 'Combat Air Strategy Update', Column 33WS. 14. Ashish Dangwal, 'Jolt for British Tempest? FCAS Partner Italy Shows Interest to Join Japan’s Next-Gen Fighter Jet Program', Eurasian Times, 14 April 2022. 15. Stephen Losey, 'Future NGAD Fighter Jets Could Cost "Hundreds of Millions" Apiece', Defense News, 28 April 2022; Valery Insinna, 'Pentagon Inspector General has Questions about the Air Force’s Sixth-Gen Fighter', Breaking Defense, 27 September 2022. 16. Lucia Retter et al., 'Persistent Challenges in UK Defence Equipment Acquisition', RAND Corporation, 2021, p. 5. II. Technology FOR TEMPEST TO succeed, it must push forward the boundaries of some current technologies, and the four core industrial partners cover the key (but not all) areas of technological and engineering advancement that will be needed. Propulsion and Power Generation Enhanced performance will be demanded of the engines, which obviously are a key factor shaping range and speed but will also be required to generate significant electric power for use by sensors and perhaps effectors on the platform. In response, at the end of 2021 Rolls-Royce announced it would be working with Japanese IHI Corporation to develop and deliver a future fighter engine demonstrator. The joint engine demonstrator programme, which is currently underway, is meant to bring together complementary British and Japanese technologies that will drive cleaner, next-generation power and propulsion for both nations’ future fighter requirements. [17] Moreover, Rolls-Royce has developed a demonstrator engine (Orpheus) which will support the rapid development, demonstration and production of key future engine capabilities. [18] The Orpheus engine demonstration is intended to prove process as well as provide a potential route to market in this area. In addition to considering established factors such as minimising heat generation and maximising range and fuel economy, the company is working on integrating an electric power generation module into the core line of the engine which will massively increase the amount of electric power available on the aircraft. [19] These initiatives fit into Rolls-Royce’s plans to minimise the carbon footprint of its engines, with efforts to use sustainable aviation fuel, exploit hydrogen fuel and even adopt all-electric engines. It is important to note, however, that how much of this will find its way into Tempest is still very uncertain given the thrust levels required of combat aircraft. [20] Integrated Sensors and Non-Kinetic Effects (ISANKE) and Integrated Communication Systems (ICS) The future battlespace will be complex, and pilots will have to be aware of their surroundings more quickly and at longer ranges than before. To unlock situational awareness, the Tempest core platform will need a range of active and passive sensors and defensive aids that are multipurpose, dealing with monitoring airspace and both the land and water below. Leonardo in the UK and in Italy are working together on a number of projects with Elettronica in Italy including joint assessment of potential architecture of a common Integrated Sensing and Non-Kinetic Effects (ISANKE) and Integrated Communications System (ICS). [21] ISANKE is a spider’s web of capabilities that sits across an airframe. [22] In contrast to traditional individual federated sensor systems, ISANKE is a fully integrated network of multi-functional radio frequency (RF) and electro-optic (EO) sensing and non-kinetic effect nodes. In addition to ISANKE, the Tempest core platform will be equipped with a fully ICS comprising multiple tactical communications and secure datalink systems. ICS is the network that enables information to be exchanged rapidly across a Tempest formation to harness ISANKE fusion capabilities. [23] A major area where a requirement should be matched with cost and feasibility involves the extent to which the data from sensors will be integrated on-board to ease the load on human decision-makers. Choices will need to be made about the extent to which the Tempest platform will be enhanced by off-board sensors, most obviously from whatever ends up replacing the originally envisaged LANCA (Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft)/Mosquito UAV; satellite data and material from other platforms such as Wedgetail must also be taken into account. Tempest will appear in an era of aspiration for multi-domain operations. Data and its collection, analysis, communication, exploitation and protection are intended to be a core and innovative feature of Tempest and will have to be addressed in envisaged collaborative arrangements. This is already an established agenda item among the IT and digital leads for the four companies in the UK and the MoD. Data will need analysis and processing on board the aircraft (that is, edge computing), but will also need to be passed to an external cloud or multiple cloud facilities, such as the Nexus data platform and the Raven virtual communications node trialled by the RAF’s Rapid Capabilities Office. [24] As a result of this new type of information architecture being adopted, protection against cyber threats will be vital [25] and is part of current efforts by industry partners. [26] The RAF website provides hopes for the Tempest platform, seeing it as a highly informed and equipped element in a larger network: 'The Tempest operator will be able to think and act two to three steps ahead of their adversary because of the advanced and highly-integrated sensors, non-kinetic effects, and communications systems. This huge advantage will allow them to take the fight to the enemy and deliver a range of missions including team defence and surveillance. All of these systems will be highly-integrated, and designed to work seamlessly together, unlike current fighter jets that tend to be separate pieces of equipment, such as separate radar and electro-optics. Operators will be able to make decisions with more confidence because they are not relying on single sensors. Instead, multiple types of sensors will work in concert to gather information which is automatically cross-checked and cross-referenced by the Tempest system. Tempest will constantly mine and coordinate data from multiple sources, such as other aircraft, to provide extremely reliable and useable information, that can in turn be shared with other aircraft in a "combat cloud".' [27] Weaponry and Protection Weaponry must be a key area of a combat aircraft, and the period since the Second World War has seen the move from guns and unguided bombs through to unguided rockets and then to guided bombs and precision missiles. As attention turns to the Tempest era, laser and directed energy weapons appear to be likely candidates for being built into the platform, enabled by electricity from the engines. The aircraft also seems likely to need effectors that will deny adversaries useful access to the electromagnetic spectrum as well as enabling the platform itself to operate freely. Electronic jamming systems obviously consume electric power, reinforcing even further the case for robust power generation. There is no easy answer to issues of the relationship between missiles and airframe in an era of stealth technology. Externally carried missiles, as is well known, negate any stealth attributes of the airframe. In simple terms, which missiles (if any) should be designed to fit within a specified airframe, and to what extent should an airframe be specified to accommodate particular weapons? The MoD, companies and international partners are well aware of these issues, and the cooperative, partnered nature of Team Tempest is viewed as the best way of addressing them. Whatever is decided, it can be asserted with confidence that it should be more straightforward technically and politically to integrate UK missiles on to a UK airframe than it has been to integrate such missiles on to the F-35 or the Apache helicopter. Airframe and the Platform All of the above needs to be accommodated and integrated within a physical container that will shape the aircraft’s maximum and minimum speeds, turn rate, range, visibility to sensors and so on. The more fuel, weapons and sensors the aircraft carries within its skin, the larger it will need to be. Indeed, the mock-up model displayed in 2018 suggested that the eventual product could prove to be large for a combat aircraft. Also under the platform heading, there is a need to address the integration of all systems, including that of the machinery, with the pilot. Given the possibility of it (eventually) being uncrewed, it seems unlikely that Tempest will have a two-person crew. Thus, which decisions and activities will have to be undertaken by the pilot, how much help the pilot will receive from the machines and what tasks will be left entirely to machines are significant questions to be answered. As noted, the system as a whole should be designed and developed for frequent upgrades to be introduced as easily as possible. Technology and potential adversaries do not stand still, and the Tempest system will be required to adjust to changes in both threats and opportunities before and after 2035. This has implications for many traditional acquisition practices and reflects the wisdom of the MoD and industry working closely together. Engineering language often uses terms like ‘modularity’, ‘open systems’ and ‘plug-and-play’, but actual implementation of such ideas requires both a deep understanding of the whole system, including source codes, and the installation of key facilitators such as standards and interfaces. This is not a new target for the UK military air sector which has been developing and adopting Project Pyramid since 2012. This has produced a composite single statement of user need which states: ‘to enable delivery and maintenance of UK Technology Advantage, the user requires a core mission system that is: Resilient against Obsolescence; Scalable; Exploitable; Flight Certifiable; Security Accreditable; Configurable; provides Utility across a range of mission requirements; and incorporates Future Growth potential’. [28] Still, modularity can involve some rather basic preparations. A little-noted feature of Typhoon was that, although not designed explicitly for ground attack, its airframes and wings were designed to be strong enough to carry the larger weapons load needed to meet air and ground attack roles. A similar attribute marked the Hawk ‘trainer’, which could later be adapted to have air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities. Besides airframe strength, some spare space inside the aircraft facilitates upgrades and further development, as does, as noted, the availability of surplus electric power. Ben Wallace, secretary of state for defence, told Parliament in July 2022 that: '[W]e are designing a capability with truly 21st-century characteristics. These include an open systems architecture that will allow modularity and rapid upgrade, the exploitation of machine learning to augment and support human operators, and the use of digital networks and data to ensure operational advantage.' [29] A further technological issue concerns the extent to which technologies and subsystems going into Tempest could be initially developed and incorporated sooner or later into Typhoon updates in the case of the UK. While technological risk never disappears, clearly active advances are being pursued and progress is being made. At the Farnborough International Airshow, the MoD’s director of future combat air, Richard Berthon, spoke alongside industrial representatives on the significance of Tempest, and a government press release confirmed substantial progress on many fronts: - Rolls-Royce Defence has delivered a new gas turbine demonstrator engine, known as Orpheus, designed, built and tested in under two years to prove innovative technology developments for FCAS. Working with international partners, Rolls-Royce have also agreed the next stage of the full-scale engine demonstrator programme. - BAE Systems has used digital transformation to design and build a representative military fast jet fuselage, demonstrating how innovative technologies can transform the design and manufacturing capability for Tempest. Commercial robots were adapted and utilised, and 65% of the parts were guided into location using automation. - Leonardo UK and Japan’s Mitsubishi Electric have agreed the concept for a radar technology demonstrator called JAGUAR, first unveiled in February, following the completion of joint concept work and feasibility studies earlier this year. - Leonardo has also revealed ongoing bilateral work to support the future electronics on-board the FCAS programme. Leonardo in the UK and in Italy are working together on a number of projects with Elettronica in Italy including joint assessment of potential architecture of a common Integrated Sensing and Non-Kinetic Effects (ISANKE) and Integrated Communications System. The work is complementary to ongoing collaboration with Japan on 6th generation sensor capabilities, an area in which Italy will soon be involved. - MBDA unveiled its concept for a weapon effects management system, to aid the coordination of all available weapons in the battle space using Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning enhanced software. [30] The secretary of state has told the House of Commons that ‘[t]here have been impressive developments in many technology areas, including power and propulsion, airframes, sensors, open mission systems, communications, and weapons integration’. [31] The government has also announced that a ‘next generation flying demonstrator’ will be flown within five years – thus by 2027. [32] The flying demonstrator will be a piloted supersonic aircraft testing a range of new technologies including integration of stealth compatible features. [33] Given the gap since the design and development of Typhoon (which first flew in 1997) this demonstrator will also make clear the extent of the revival of the industrial capability. As is discussed below in Chapter V on cost control, the more that digital design and aircraft performance modelling can be used to forecast performance accurately, the more capabilities and processes the demonstrator aircraft will be able to validate quickly and inexpensively. Enabling Skills The success of the programme depends on developing the next generation of engineers and technologists possessing the new skills necessary for the digitisation of the programme which, in turn, will be vital for cost control (see Chapter V) and the protection of the system against electronic and cyber threats. Knowledge and skills are recognised in Team Tempest and in partner countries as both a significant challenge and a major opportunity to improve the national suitably qualified and experienced personnel workforce overall. Thus, a new recruitment and skills initiative known as Generation Tempest has been launched to attract the younger generation to pursue STEM careers and provide upskilling opportunities across the UK. The Tempest partners will need to recruit, upskill and retain a large number of people. Sustaining and developing skills can be particularly difficult when there are long gaps between programmes (more than 20 years in the case of UK combat air), when the number of young people drawn to education in science, technology and mathematics is limited, when very specific knowledge and skills are needed and when sectors other than defence seek to attract those with numeracy skills. [34] So far, industry has been actively recruiting hundreds of apprentices and equipping them with novel, digital-age training programmes. [35] BAE Systems alone intends to recruit 1,000 engineers across its combat air programmes including Tempest, [36] with other companies having comparable activities. [37] Leonardo, for instance, is planning to increase its apprentice recruitment and industrial placement provision by 50% in 2023 alone. [38] Similarly, when it comes to R&D for Tempest, private investment has been significant, with the main companies involved having collectively invested £800 million. [39] While it is sometimes argued that the private sector does not invest enough of its own money in the R&D associated with new defence, the importance of company investment in the preparation of personnel and in the development of R&D partnerships and projects can be easily overlooked. [40] For the development of the next-generation combat air capability, harnessing UK science and engineering skills must continue to be a priority. Indeed, workforce and skills represent critical enablers for effective programme delivery. However, it should be recognised that digital engineering requires significant upfront spending on both people and computer technology, implying that it should have a place in the overall business case for Tempest. --- 17. Rolls-Royce, 'Rolls-Royce To Develop Joint Future Fighter Engine Demonstrator with IHI', press release, 22 December 2021. 18. Rolls-Royce, 'Orpheus', accessed 20 September 2022. 19. Author interview with Rolls-Royce officer, London, 2020. 20. Rolls-Royce, 'Fuel Cells and the Quest for Green Power', 2021; Tom Pegden, 'Rolls-Royce Signs Green Tech Partnership with Qatar Foundation', Business Live, 3 November 2021. 21. ADS ADVANCE, 'Generation Tempest Launched', 27 July 2022. 22. Leonardo, 'Leonardo UK and Mitsubishi Electric Embark on Next Stage of UK-Japan Fighter Jet Sensor Programme', 18 July 2022. 23. Information provided to the authors by industry partners, London, 5 October 2022. 24. RAF, 'RAF Rapid Capabilities Office Demonstrates New Technologies Developed with Industry Partners', 12 March 2021. 25. Brown, 'Secret War over RAF’s New Fighter'. 26. Leonardo, 'Building Cyber Resilience across Tempest', 9 March 2022. 27. RAF, 'Team Tempest: What We Do: The Tech', accessed 11 October 2022. 28. MoD, 'Pyramid Programme', 1 October 2021. 29. Hansard, 'Combat Air Strategy Update', Column 33WS. 30. MoD, 'UK Builds Momentum on Combat Air Programme with Demonstrator Set to Fly Within Five Years'. 31. Hansard, 'Combat Air Strategy Update', Column 35WS. 32. Ibid., Column 34WS. 33. MoD, 'UK Builds Momentum on Combat Air Programme with Demonstrator Set to Fly Within Five Years'. 34. Retter et al., 'Persistent Challenges in UK Defence Equipment Acquisition', p. 7; Matt Bassford et al., Sustaining Key Skills in the UK Military Aircraft Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021). 35. PwC, 'Assessment of the Expected Economic Impact of the Tempest Programme (2021–2050)', May 2021, pp. 35–37. 36. Alexandria Slater, 'BAE Set to Hire 1,000 Engineers for Tempest Programme', Lancashire Telegraph, 1 August 2022; Leonardo, 'Generation Tempest'. 37. RAND Europe, 'Vision on Defence-Related Skills for Europe Today and Tomorrow', European Commission, 30 October 2019. 38. Information supplied directly by the company to the authors. 39. Sylvia Pfeifer, 'Industry Retools to Build Britain’s New Tempest Combat Aircraft', Financial Times, 17 June 2021. 40. See Chapter III on industry’s funding to the FCAS Technology Initiative. III. The Government–Industry Relationship AWARE OF THE challenges involved, the MoD (and the RAF within it) and the main four industrial players have agreed to adopt a collective, partnered approach to the determination of key aspects of the project, from requirements specification through to design, manufacture and likely support. There has been no sign of the formal competitive approach in which the government side decides what it needs (the requirement) and then challenges industry through the Defence Equipment and Support agency to make offers to deliver to time and cost schedules. When in mid-2022 the author asked a senior and experienced manager of major civil and defence projects whether he would prefer a ‘good contract’ or a good relationship with a supplier, he answered without hesitation that he would opt for the latter ‘every time’. Eventually taut, equitable and realistic contracts and formal agreements will be needed, but at this stage it is important to ask Team Tempest participants how their relationships have progressed. Is there a high level of honesty and openness about issues? Do the parties have a good understanding of their partners’ needs, motivations and problems, as well as their strengths and ambitions? Are they moving towards a shared assessment of risks and a shared sense of tolerable risks? In short, how well are they acting as a team and finding that the team concept remains operable even when hitches occur? In 2021, the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy was clear about how well things were going, stating: ‘Our relationship with UK industry under Team Tempest has demonstrated the benefits of close partnership’. [41] To date, government–industry relationships within the UK appear to be holding up well, as was demonstrated at Farnborough in July 2022. Here, the MoD programme head was joined by the programme leads from the big four companies to brief the media on developments and to announce the demonstrator aircraft commitment. [42] Government–industry relations are linked to requirements setting. As such, it will be important to avoid the standard hazards encountered in defence development projects: the MoD side can be drawn to exaggerate the step-change improvements in capability that a new system will bring, in order to impress external approving bodies including the Treasury, while industry can be excessively optimistic about what it can deliver in the time and money parameters available, in order to enhance its chances of getting the work. A significant notable development after 2018 in the wider international environment was the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces. This event greatly increased the perceived threat to NATO territory and raised many questions about the definition of a revised NATO approach to deterrence. It also increased Western awareness of the possibility of a sustained conventional war in Europe, with all that would imply for stockpiles of munitions and parts, the size of fleets given likely wartime losses, and the potential for surged production of systems and subsystems. The inspector general of the Bundeswehr, General Eberhard Zorn, said in September that German forces now need a ‘cold start capability’: ‘a cold start capability means fully trained and ready personnel, including strong reserves, fully equipped with plenty of ammunition, spare parts and supplies’. [43] This reasoning could have significant implications for future combat aircraft, including FCAS. Will it create a demand for less complex aircraft than first envisaged, which can be bought in larger numbers? Will more funding have to be allocated to stocks of parts and munitions so that UK forces will be able to fight for months rather than days? In the event of growing hostility from Russia and China, will pressures grow for almost all training to be conducted on simulators so as to minimise an adversary’s chances of learning about the system? These are all questions for consideration in the rethink of the 2021 Integrated Review, should the government of Rishi Sunak choose to proceed with the update commissioned by Liz Truss. In answering these questions, close consultation with industrial partners will continue to be needed for informed and prudent choices. [44] --- 41. HM Government, Defence and Security Industrial Strategy: A Strategic Approach to the UK’s Defence and Security Industrial Sectors, CP 410 (London: The Stationery Office, 2021), p. 98. 42. MoD, 'UK Builds Momentum on Combat Air Programme with Demonstrator Set to Fly Within Five Years'; Gareth Jennings, 'Farnborough 2022: UK Launches Tempest Flight Demonstrator Effort', Janes, 18 July 2022. 43. Nicholas Fiorenza, 'Bundeswehr Must Acquire Cold Start Capability, Urges Defence Chief', Janes Defence Weekly, 15 September 2022. 44. On the Integrated Review, see George Parker, 'Liz Truss to Launch UK Defence Review as She Calls for Russian Reparations', Financial Times, 20 September 2022. See also Paul O’Neill, 'The UK’s Integrated Review at One Year – Fit for Purpose?', RUSI Commentary, 31 March 2022. IV. International Partners THE CONSTANT ESCALATION of acquisition cost [45] in the combat air domain has increased pressure for more cost-effective acquisition strategies. One policy option to address rising acquisition costs is international collaboration. In collaborative projects, partners bring a mixture of three factors: upfront capital that facilitates the funding of development and production investment; technology and expertise that reduces the risks in development and saves development effort and money; and access to their market. Regarding the latter, they agree to buy the finished product, which enables economies of scale in production and supply chains. Clearly, collaborations also bring some novel risks and complications, such as more complex governance structures often resulting in slower decision-making processes, inherent complexity of workshare arrangements and inefficient supply chain structures. Looking ahead, it is important for the international partners involved in Tempest to be able to work securely and across collaborative boundaries, promoting industrial co-creation and working closely together to avoid designing capabilities in silos. So far, the nature of international partnerships within Tempest remains fluid but, on balance, very positive. Japan The UK’s combat air relationship with Japan has matured and accelerated rapidly through a series of talks and agreements linking governments and companies, of which the latest was the Farnborough 2022 announcement that Japan is working with the UK and Italy on ‘joint concept analysis’ that seeks to ‘understand areas of shared interest and to explore potential future combat air partnership options’. [46] Even though Japan still maintains its own F-X fighter programme, Japan–UK intergovernmental agreements and corporate collaboration between relevant companies continue to make good progress. [47] Agreements and activities include: - BAE Systems talks with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries on the development of Japan’s next combat aircraft. [48] - The UK–Japan agreement to develop a new engine demonstrator, centred on Rolls-Royce and IHI Corporation. [49] The UK and Japan have also been working together on the certification processes for jet engines. [50] - The Leonardo agreement with Mitsubishi to develop a demonstrator Jaguar radar. [51] - MBDA’s well-established albeit difficult discussions on the future development of the Meteor missile for Japan and UK support for Japan’s Joint New Air-to-Air Missile programme. [52] As the above suggests, there have been significant developments in the UK–Japan defence partnership. Furthermore, a Japanese review of the country’s defence and security guidelines is due by the end of the year, and there are also reports of Tokyo’s intentions to increase the defence budget. [53] It is possible that the UK concept analysis being undertaken with Italy and Japan could lead to the merger of the UK, Japanese and Italian combat air projects into a single international venture. Should a shared programme with Japan emerge, it would be critically important for a number of reasons. First, as privately observed by a UK official, [54] Japan’s full-fledged involvement would ‘move the dial’ on affordability and scale, making cost-control and risk-bearing much more balanced. Second, it would invalidate the description of FCAS as a second ‘European’ combat air programme alongside the Franco-German-Spanish endeavour. Similarly, by potentially opening up the Indo-Pacific market, it would critically keep two markets open for combat air, which is key given the importance of pursuing exportability. Last, it could potentially pave the way for future collaboration down the line, with both the UK and Italy, between which defence synergies have also increased lately. [55] Financially and technologically, Japan is already bringing a large amount of value to the current exploratory endeavours. It has been investing in combat air technology for some years through its exploration of the Mitsubishi X2 and F.3 aircraft with an active electronically scanned array radar. [56] UK officials are struck by how quickly and smoothly activities have advanced in both the governmental and industrial spaces. [57] From an engineering point of view, industry officials explained that the Japanese have demonstrated skills that complement their UK counterparts. They also have demonstrated themselves to be very forward leaning, receptive and keen on intensifying cooperation. Here, it is remarkable how far Japan has come in so little time, moving from a cooperation on sub-systems less than a year ago, to contemplating a full-scale partnership today. The extent of progress with Japan is notable given the country’s limited experience of defence industrial collaboration. Italy Italy joined the project when it signed a statement of intent with the UK in September 2019, with a commitment to a broad range of cooperative activities. [58] Since then, Italy has been continuously enthusiastic, with commitment backed up by action. Indeed, the latest Defence Multiannual Planning Document, published in July 2022, signalled enhanced financial obligations by forecasting an increase in spending on the early stages of the programme from €2.0 billion to €3.8 billion by 2036. [59] The Italian government’s public justification for Tempest rests on what it offers for employment, STEM skills and technological advancement, especially in the field of digital engineering. Similarly, Italian industry now aspires to active participation in the research and development phases, aiming at transforming the expertise and skills of its workforce. This objective requires maintaining a central role in the joint venture, something that Italy has repeatedly emphasised. [60] It follows that, as discussions advance as to who is to do what, it will be important that the country gets what it feels is a reasonable share of development work based on its existing industrial competencies. In this situation, the linking role of Leonardo will be central, as it is a major player in both the UK and Italy. Specifically, Leonardo in Italy has strong capabilities in both airframe and defence electronics while Leonardo UK focuses on the electronics (ISANKE and ICS) thereby operating in a complementary rather than duplicative fashion on the Tempest front. Leonardo’s development of closer ties with Elettronica Group in Italy should also contribute to a more substantial involvement of the Italian industrial base in this endeavour. [61] However, it is important to recognise that Italy might still struggle with funding levels and industrial capacity and, as Japan’s role grows within the programme, it will be crucial to delineate a role for Italy that aligns with its aspirations but matches its resources. From London, this cooperation shows the value of working with European states in the defence industrial space, especially with Italy now increasing its investments in digital industrial capabilities. Italy’s involvement is also a source of assurance for those on the continent who do not wish to see Brexit disrupt British involvement in European defence industrial cooperation. Indeed, Italy has been among the greatest supporters of third-party involvement in EU-based collaborative defence initiatives and a strong advocate for increased industrial synergies across the Channel. Additionally, Italy’s half-century of involvement with the UK aerospace industry through Tornado and then Typhoon, and of course the centrality of Leonardo in the UK avionics and sensor sector, mean that there are long-established individual relationships among UK and Italian personnel. This experience also underlines that, despite its modest defence spending, the Italian government has in the round consistently provided the funding needed to sustain Italy’s appeal as a collaborative combat air partner. [62] Sweden The Swedish government showed early interest in the Tempest programme, but without making full commitment. [63] Saab announced the establishment of a radar-focused innovation hub with Imperial College in 2019, and a year later said that it would spend £50 million to set up an FCAS centre in the UK. [64] In spite of this announcement, by 2022 Sweden had moved to a back-seat observation role. This may reflect concerns about what the country would be able to contribute, about cost, and about whether the emerging requirements will exceed what Sweden feels are its needs. Sweden’s by-standing posture could still change, not least in light of the country’s announced accession to NATO, and the possibility remains of Swedish commitment to collaboration on a major subsystem or systems. Sweden may have hopes of a formally Swedish product such as the Saab JAS 39 Gripen and, as such, its position is currently one of holding back and seeing how the programme as well as its own security requirements evolve. It will be considering how to respond to Russian aggression, NATO membership and an increase in defence spending, especially as it relates to the future of its very capable combat air sector. As Stockholm carries out this assessment, British industry keeps having constructive conversations with Saab, recognising the value of keeping the door ajar and being ready to welcome further cooperation. [65] Assessment of Collaboration As more precise collaborative arrangements are being made, one challenge will be to avoid UK–Japan arrangements leaving Italy feeling sidelined, given the importance that Rome places on a prominent role in this endeavour. Currently, one element of the Tempest construct and partnership with Japan is that it reinforces the UK policy line of Global Britain and the UK as a player in Asia. The link with Italy is equally important, however, as it, inter alia, represents a major manifestation of UK defence industrial relationships with continental Europe in the difficult post-Brexit period. It should not be overlooked that ‘British’ defence industrial capability, as well as R&D and investment, is in some instances significantly in the hands of companies that are ultimately controlled from the other side of the Channel. Thus, there is broader security and defence value in a Tempest programme that embodies close links with continental Europe and Asia. In terms of governance, the governments of partner countries are exploring the delivery constructs that could enable the generation of a product in the timescales required. Importantly, the delivery structure will have to be international. To run efficiently, this structure should not include the protracted consultation and decision-making processes that marked Tornado and Typhoon, and this would be facilitated if there was a single, empowered international body representing the governments. The parameters within which it could act would need to be set, perhaps drawing on experience with the Organisation Conjointe pour la Coopération en matière d’Armement in Europe, which manages a range of collaborative projects including the Airbus A400M. Central to this international delivery structure will be the possibility for prompt and timely decision-making enabled by delegation of less consequential matters to more junior authorities. The creation of the documentation proving an agreed framework for such bodies will not be easy, but the identification of a problem is the prerequisite for its management. These, for instance, are important matters that should be settled before the Business Case in late 2024. In terms of workshare, it will be important to have a genuine division of labour among partner states. This means that workshare should be attributed based on the different partner’s industrial strengths and comparative advantages. [66] Grounds for optimism in this respect include the reality that all the players involved so far have significant aerospace industry experience. This is in contrast to Tornado, where Italy and even Germany were rebuilding the combat air capability that had been lost after the Second World War, and to Typhoon, where Spain was the less advanced newcomer. In principle, the existing three customers could and perhaps should leave the door open for other states to join. As noted, Sweden could change its position. The Franco-German-Spanish SCAF (Système de Combat Aérien Futur, equivalent to FCAS) project is delayed and may have stalled, and there are reliable reports of significant dissatisfaction with this project on the part of both Airbus and Dassault Aviation. [67] In 2022 it seems unlikely that the German government and industry will be content with any share in a new aircraft that the French government and in particular Dassault are likely to offer. [68] The author is reliably informed that, privately, numerous German industrial figures would much prefer to be part of a programme with the UK; Germany was, after all, central to both the Tornado and Typhoon projects. The current position is that the door remains open to Sweden, Germany and perhaps Spain, but the existing trilateral cooperation is moving forward on a range of fronts. For political, financial and technological reasons, it would be good to have Germany, in particular, involved. However, the government and industrial personnel involved in these talks are well aware that the more partners are involved, the more interests and expectations have to be reconciled and the slower decision-making can become. The existing three partners will be reluctant to unpick matters they have already settled. It is important to note that, the longer other countries delay making any firm affirmative choice, the harder it will be to accommodate their expectations. The extant FCAS schedule is determined by the need of the partners for a new aircraft in 2035 and comprises the timetabled activities needed to deliver that outcome and this critical 2035 target will be a key driver for the international collaboration model over the life of the programme. Extensive delays to accommodate the demands of would-be new entrants will be unwelcome and likely unacceptable. A slightly different area for exploration is whether valuable collaboration on important subsystems such as weapons and sensors could and should take place with countries and firms that are not collaborating on the airframe and whole system. This could be the case with Sweden but also with the French-led SCAF. Industrial links could smooth this. Rolls-Royce, as the owner of engine manufacturer MTU, has a major industrial presence in Germany. MBDA is a multinational joint venture that links the UK, France and Italy, and Leonardo, which operates in Germany, took a 25% share in Hensoldt, the prominent German radar company, at the beginning of 2022. [69] Central to subsystems cooperation is the notion that collaborative activities should not constrain the UK’s capacity to modify platforms for particular operations. Such changes were needed for Typhoon, for instance, in the Libya campaign in 2011. Other partners are likely to want their own capability to update and modify. Collaboration agreements must also address the likely wishes of partners to be able to export and the partner consent arrangements that must be defined to deal with that issue. Although the Japanese have become more relaxed and even ambitious about defence exports, at least some public sentiment in Japan would press its government towards continued caution. Finally, the collaborative dimension in this case could extend into the in-service support and upgrade phase rather than ending with the production activity. This is, after all, the phase of major defence platforms that absorbs the most funds, and as a result, economies of effort could be of great value at this stage. The need for national control of platforms has been recognised, but the partners should also explore the scope for savings and efficiencies in the in-service phase that nonetheless recognise the business needs of suppliers. If Japan is involved, the geographic distance will make such changes as common spares pools harder to justify and there is likely to be some interdependence among the countries involved arising from spare parts production. But digital models should facilitate the maintenance of common configurations and shared improvements. --- 45. Mitja Kleczka, Caroline Buts and Marc Jegers, 'Addressing the "Headwinds" Faced by the European Arms Industry', Defense and Security Analysis (Vol. 36, No. 2, 2020), pp. 129–60; Stefan Markowski, Jurgen Brauer and Keith Hartley, 'Augustine Investments and Weapons Systems', Defence and Peace Economics (25 February 2022). 46. Jasper Jolly, 'UK to Work with Japan on Supersonic Tempest Fighter Jet', The Guardian, 18 July 2022. 47. MoD, 'UK and Japan to Develop Future Fighter Jet Engine Demonstrator', press release, 22 December 2021. 48. Akhil Kadidal, 'Japan in Talks with BAE on Development of F-X Fighter', Janes, 27 May 2022. 49. Rolls-Royce, 'Rolls-Royce to Develop Joint Future Fighter Engine Demonstrator with IHI', 22 December 2021. 50. Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, 'Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation', 2022. 51. Tony Osborne, 'Leonardo, Mitsubishi Electric Advance Joint Tempest Radar Work', Aviation Week, 18 July 2022; Leonardo, 'Leonardo UK and Mitsubishi Electric Embark on Next Stage of UK–Japan Fighter Jet Sensor Programme', 18 July 2022. 52. Andrew Chuter, 'New Warplane Sensor Team Boosts UK-Japan Defense Agenda', Defense News, 15 February 2022. 53. Kana Inagaki, 'Japan Plans Big Defence Spending Boost to Counter Chinese Threat', Financial Times, 31 August 2022. 54. Closed-door roundtable discussion with subject-matter experts, London, 28 September 2022. 55. Aeronautica Militare, Twitter post, 4 October 2022. 56. Airforce Technology, 'Future Fighter Aircraft: Contractors Slate Sixth-Generation Concepts', 24 May 2019. 57. Closed-door roundtable discussion, London, 28 September 2022. 58. MoD and Defence Equipment and Support, 'Italy Partners with the UK on Tempest', 11 September 2019. 59. Ministero della Difesa, 'Documento Programmatico Pluriennale Della Difesa Per Il Triennio 2022-2024', July 2022. 60. Reuters, 'FCAS, Tempest Fighter Jet Programmes Will Merge -Italy’s Air Force Chief', 23 November 2021. 61. Leonardo, 'Leonardo and Elettronica Together Supporting the Growth of Sovereign National Skills', 3 November 2021. 62. Isabella Antinozzi and Trevor Taylor, 'Italy in Tempest: An Equal or Equitable Partner?', RUSI Commentary, 3 October 2022. 63. Gareth Jennings, 'Sweden Firms Up FCAS Partnership with UK, but No Commitment to Tempest', Janes, 20 July 2020. 64. Saab, 'Saab Opens a Centre in the UK for Future Combat Air', press release, 20 July 2020. 65. BAE Systems spokesperson’s comment, roundtable discussion, 28 September 2022. 66. Matthews and Al-Saadi, 'Organisational Complexity of the Eurofighter Typhoon Collaborative Supply Chain', p. 5. 67. Justin Bronk, 'FCAS: Is the Franco-German-Spanish Combat Air Programme Really in Trouble?', RUSI Commentary, 1 March 2021. 68. Christina Mackenzie, 'Mired in Politics, Franco-German Next-Gen Fighter "Likely Headed for the 2050s"', Breaking Defense, 12 September 2022. 69. Leonardo, 'Leonardo Completes the Acquisition of 25.1% in Hensoldt', press release, 3 January 2022. V. Cost Control and Digitisation THE AFFORDABILITY OF crewed combat aircraft, and indeed of defence platforms in general, has long been a source of concern: it is nearly 40 years since the US industrialist Norman Augustine produced his famous prediction that, if current cost rise trends continued, in 2054 the entire US defence budget would be devoted to the delivery of a single combat aircraft, which the US Air Force, Navy and Marines would have to share. As late as 2015, he felt that his prediction remained on track. [70] The MoD’s initial target was that the Tempest development programme should be 50% quicker and 30% cheaper than Typhoon had been. [71] The scale of the target signalled that the MoD was aiming high and was intent on breaking the grip of Augustine’s Law. Developments since 2018 on the national and international front have modified that ambition to stressing the importance of affordability and pace. Also, as noted, the lessons from the Ukraine conflict could underline the value of less complex but much more numerous systems. Overall, there are reasons to hope that the Tempest team will be able to flatten or even reduce the cost increase curve that has marked the sector for so long. Cost-sharing among collaborative partners is one consideration, as is the enhanced range of expertise that can be brought to bear on problems. [72] But a more novel consideration is that digital engineering and what some call the Fourth Industrial Revolution or Industry 4.0 could enable development, production and even support costs to be much reduced. Thus, to cut costs, Tempest is being designed from the ‘inside out’, focusing on software in a bid to exploit artificial intelligence and ‘plug-in’ technologies rather than the traditional model of ‘outside-in’, where sensors and weapons would be inserted via the slow and expensive construction of hardware. [73] Ben Wallace has highlighted the importance of this approach, telling Parliament that ‘[a] digital-first approach, whereby we maximise the extent to which we design and test in the digital world, will be central to fast and affordable delivery’. [74] Just some of the considerations in this regard are as follows: - Operational simulations should assist with requirements definition early in the process, while later, as development costs clarify, they could help with the identification of small requirements increases, which have big implications for cost and time. - Enhanced computer models of a system could generate both faster and cheaper development work. From the early stages of development, digital models could enable multiple experiments and randomised control trials to be run quickly and cheaply, with eventual users and customers being involved. [75] A model-based development process of incremental improvements can be generated. Reflecting extensive industrial investments in high-performance computing, even by the middle of 2022, industry reports that hundreds of hours of test flights for the flying demonstrator had been flown by computer models, with the ambition that the role of demonstrator aircraft will be to confirm the findings of models. Over the whole programme, the time and costs of hundreds of test flights could be avoided if the safety authorities could be persuaded to accept the results of multiple simulations as substitutes for actual hours in the air. Digital validation and verification is the key engineering phrase. The MoD team has been keen to keep the Military Aviation Authority close to developments, and, clearly, parallel bodies in other countries also need to be involved. The involvement of (and readiness to consider innovative test results by) safety assurance experts will be central to limiting development costs and time. - Computerised designs could also enable advanced manufacturing techniques including robotics and additive manufacturing, in which BAE Systems’ own investments are reflected in its Factory of the Future facilities. [76] However, the digitisation effort needs to be and is being generated as an enterprise effort. Leonardo has established a networked set of data-enabled digital factories across four of its UK sites. [77] If the digital design approach is extended into the in-service phase, the building in of multiple sensors should reduce maintenance costs by bringing in true condition-based maintenance (that is, replacing something only when really needed instead of changing items on a time or usage basis). [78] The integration of digital engineering efforts with safety cases will also cause problems unless the safety authorities can be smoothly integrated into development and production processes. However, the effective exploitation of Industry 4.0 technologies for Tempest would produce lessons of value that potentially could be embraced across all UK manufacturing, not just defence. To the extent that Tempest is to be a collaborative project, the same digital engineering system will need to be agreed and implemented across all participating companies and indeed governments, as they are already aware. It is encouraging that the approach to Tempest is very different to that followed by the Joint Strike Fighter/F-35 programme but broadly in line with the knowledge-based approach to acquisition which has been specified and promoted by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) continuously since at least 2004. [79] The basis of that approach is that a programme should not be launched until the core enabling technologies are sufficiently mature. Further staged commitments should then be made first, when it has been shown that the core technologies can work together as a system and, second, when engineering work has shown the time and cost to manufacture and reliability of the finished system. The failure of the F-35 to follow this guidance was asserted and illustrated by the GAO in 2009. [80] Specifically, as Figure 3 illustrates, the level of knowledge attained at decision points consistently failed to meet the desirable levels shown by the diagonal line. Figure 3: Attainment of Product Knowledge Graph plotting Product, design and technology maturity against Acquisition Decision Points: - Development start (10/01) - DOD design review (2/06 and 6/07) - Production decision (6/07) - GAO review (1/09) (Source: GAO, 'Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs', GAO-09-326SP, Report to Congressional Committees, March 2009, p. 93.) The costs associated with both the acquisition and support of modern combat aircraft suggests that cost limits in both stages should be a driving factor in Tempest’s development, with digital engineering offering the chance to generate enhanced capability without perpetuating Norman Augustine’s insight about intergenerational cost growth. [81] Given the US experience of cost increases and growth with the F-35 family, an open-source study of what went well and what went badly with that programme could be a useful resource document for the Tempest programme. Bluntly speaking, FCAS cannot expect to survive politically in the UK if it develops a similar history to that of the F-35. [82] --- 70. Norman R Augustine, 'Augustine’s Laws and Major System Development Programs', Defense Acquisition Research Journal (Vol. 22, No. 1, January 2015), pp. 2–63; Norman R Augustine, 'Acquisition Reform: Next Steps', testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, 2015; Jan P Muczyk, 'On the Road Toward Confirming Augustine’s Predictions and How to Reverse Course', 2007. 71. Author conversation with MoD official, September 2022. 72. Cases of Typhoon and A400M problem resolution. 73. Matthews and Al-Saadi, 'Organisational Complexity of the Eurofighter Typhoon Collaborative Supply Chain', p. 11. 74. Hansard, 'Combat Air Strategy Update', Column 34WS. 75. Airforce Technology, 'BAE Systems Chooses Wind River to Support RAF’s Tempest Programme', 27 April 2022. 76. Michael Tyrrell, 'BAE Systems’ Factory of the Future is Driving Digital Connectivity', Aerospace Manufacturing, 8 June 2021. 77. Leonardo, 'Leonardo Digital Factories Go Live Across the UK', 29 June 2022. 78. Hansard, 'Combat Air Strategy Update', Column 34WS. 79. General Accounting Office, 'Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve Weapon Acquisition', GAO-04-386SP, January 2004; GAO, 'Weapons Systems Annual Assessment', GAO-21-222, June 2021, p. 223. 80. GAO, 'Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs', GAO-09-326SP, March 2009, p. 93; GAO-04-248, March 2004, pp. 75–76; GAO-22-105128, April 2022. 81. Sébastien Roblin, 'The Air Force Admits the F-35 Fighter Jet Costs Too Much. So It Wants to Spend Even More', NBC News, 7 March 2021. 82. Refer to numerous GAO reports on F-35, including GAO-21-505T (April 2021) and GAO-21-439 (July 2021). Conclusion This paper assessed the national and international progress on Tempest in five different areas: capability requirements; technology; government–industry relations; international partnerships; and cost control and digitisation. Even though significant progress is being made on each front, a few final observations can be made: 1. The need for contractual commitments: different contract types suit different acquisition strategies and allow for different approaches to risk sharing between MoD and industry. [83] In 2022, the Concept and Assessment phase is operating under a contract which is due to be replaced in early 2025 by a Development Phase contract. In these periods, suppliers and customers have the chance to experiment and to clarify their demands and possibilities. [84] Moving forward, continuing to choose appropriate contract types will be key and transparency between government and industry at the contracting phase is central to programme performance. 2. Clear requirements: in the broadest terms, the UK and its partners should be striving for an aircraft with two key attributes. It should be capable of providing air superiority by 2035 for UK forces against envisaged adversaries and it should be readily upgradable to deal with an ever-changing threat space. 3. The need for UK control of updates: the Tempest programme underlines the importance of treating defence acquisition in terms other than just its consequences for short-notice, short-term military capability. The centrality of computing and software in the core platform and elsewhere means that fixes and upgrades will be continuous rather than ‘mid-life’ and occasional. There is also the possibility that the system will need short-notice modifications in the event of an unplanned operation, as was the case with Typhoons and the Libya operation in 2011. [85] Given the policy commitment to operational independence for UK forces, this implies that the potential for UK modifications and upgrades should be in British hands. This means that the UK will need design authority status. 4. Risk reduction not risk elimination: in two years or so, Team Tempest will need to persuade the rest of the MoD and the Treasury that, with tolerable risks, it can generate an aircraft that will offer value for money in terms of the multiple factors that are now included in the value equation. Tempest is a big challenge but an enormous opportunity: all the issues here have already been identified by governments and businesses and are being addressed. The public and the media should be reassured if there is a steady flow of incremental answers and the gradual reduction of risks. Delaying the setting of formal times, costs and performance (which essentially provide financial planners with the opportunity to fill in spreadsheets for the future) should be welcomed as prudent if the current timetable is to be sustained. 5. Political risk: clearly the Tempest programme must be viewed in light of multiple external but low-likelihood risks, including drastic changes in the UK or partners’ political situation or their macro-economic situation. Importantly, however, the more that the programme can be kept on time and on budget, the less likely it is to be derailed even by such extreme developments. 6. Progress achieved in 2022 more than matches the expectations held by stakeholders at the programme’s launch: in 2022, Tempest is not ready for firm detailed decisions about cost, time, performance or even management structure. Thus, a key question for Parliament and the interested public is whether, given the situation when the Combat Air Strategy was launched in 2018, those delivering the programme are happy today with the progress made since then in all dimensions – that is, greater clarity about what requirements may resemble, advances in the key technologies, the efficacy of government–industry cooperation, the move towards collaborative partnerships and the delivery of cost controls. For now, key stakeholders appear positive about progress to date while being fully aware of the dangers of complacency. 7. The costs of not pursuing the Tempest programme: the costs of Tempest must be assessed alongside the costs of not pursuing the project. Circumstances of cost growth and technical shortcomings could drive its abandonment, and certainly those involved must feel the multiple pressures to deliver. But the consequences of any choice to give up the project should be recognised as one of great seriousness. Those consequences would include the following: a. The extensive employment, technology and skills development benefits of the programme, including the commitments to thousands of apprentices, would disappear. A recent study by PwC has documented the anticipated scale of these benefits. [86] b. If the industrial capability responsible for the delivery of Tempest disappears, it will not be able to be rebuilt without prohibitive expense and decades of effort. c. If the RAF continues to heavily rely on US products for its air combat systems, no foreign government will see the UK as enjoying operational independence, even if a UK government could somehow persuade the British public that this was the case. Already the UK is reliant on US airborne ISR (the Wedgetail, P-8A, Rivet Joint, Protector and F-35), systems which can only be used on sustained operations that the US government of the day sees as in its interest. In this sense, diversification of partners as well as seeking equal partnership status in collaborative endeavours would be a more credible commitment to operational independence than relying predominantly on one partner with whom considerable capabilities asymmetries exist. Here, the current collaboration with Japan, combined with the UK retaining design authority, reinforces commitment to operational independence. d. The implications for the UK’s reputation and standing in Japan would extend well beyond the aerospace sector, possibly injecting distrust and uncertainty in the broader UK–Japan political and diplomatic relations. All the above means that those seeking to deliver Tempest carry a major responsibility – for the capability of the British military, for the credibility of the assertion of the UK’s capacity for independent military action, for the trustworthiness of the UK as a credible and committed partner, for the economic and social wellbeing of peoples in the UK and in partner countries, and for the UK’s overall military potency in the long term. --- 83. Retter et al., 'Persistent Challenges in UK Defence Equipment Acquisition', pp. 9–12. 84. Matthew Syed, Black Box Thinking: Marginal Gains and the Secrets of High Performance (London: John Murray, 2020). 85. Trevor Taylor, John Louth and Henrik Heidenkamp, 'Industry and the Military Instrument', in Adrian L Johnson (ed.), Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991 (London: RUSI, 2014), p. 301. 86. PwC, 'Assessment of the Expected Economic Impact', pp. 35–37. About the Authors Trevor Taylor is Director of the Defence, Industries and Society programme. Before joining RUSI, he headed the Defence Management and Security Analysis department at the Defence Academy of the UK for 12 years. Working at the interface of government and defence industry, he sits on the advisory board of MAKE Defence UK and was for six years an elected Council member of the former Defence Manufacturers Association. In 2022 he is the specialist adviser to the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee inquiry into military shipbuilding in Scotland. Isabella Antinozzi is Research Analyst in the Defence, Industries and Society programme where she researches the implementation of sectoral defence industrial strategies, including their social value aspects as well as trends in European, transatlantic and other modes of defence collaboration.