Anton Hahn European Sky Shield Initiative and its Impact on European Ballistic Missile Defence ISPK Policy Brief No. 12 February 2023 ISPK European Sky Shield Initiative and its Impact on European Ballistic Missile Defence Das Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Kiel gGmbH (ISPK): Das ISPK ist als eigenständiges Forschungsinstitut der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel angegliedert und trägt mit seiner Arbeit zum sicherheitspolitischen Diskurs in Deutschland bei. Es leistet interdisziplinäre, policy-orientierte Forschung und agiert undogmatisch und überparteilich. Das Institut widmet sich der universitären Forschung und Lehre, der Beratung von Politik, Wirtschaft und Medien, politischer Bildung sowie der Förderung des akademischen Nachwuchses. Die Themenschwerpunkte liegen dabei auf der Konflikt- und Strategieforschung, auf asymmetrischen Herausforderungen wie z.B. dem Terrorismus und der Analyse und Bewertung sicherheitspolitisch relevanter Entwicklungen in den Bereichen deutsche und europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, internationale Sicherheitsarchitektur, Stabilisierung gescheiterter Staatlichkeit sowie maritimer Sicherheit. Kontakt zum Autor: Anton Hahn Wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft, ISPK [email protected] Anton Hahn European Sky Shield Initiative and its Impact on European Ballistic Missile Defence ISPK Policy Brief Nr.12 Kiel, 15. Februar 2023 Lektorat: Kira Frankenthal Olha Husieva Impressum: Hrsg. von Dr. Stefan Hansen Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Kiel gGmbH (ISPK) Holstenbrücke 8-10 24103 Kiel ISPK.uni-kiel.de Die veröffentlichten Beiträge mit Verfasserangabe geben die Ansicht der betreffenden Autoren wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die des Herausgebers oder des Instituts für Sicherheitspolitik. © 2023 Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Kiel gGmbH (ISPK). Bildnachweise finden sich am Ende Under the impression of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the following massively changed security and defence landscape in Europe, German chancellor Olaf Scholz expressed the will to strengthen Europe's "foreign, security and defence policy structures"1 in his keynote address on European Policy at Charles University Prague in August 2022. In particular, he acknowledged the lack of air defence capabilities on the European territories and proposed a commonly built air defence system with European partners in order to contribute to regional security2. Then, on October 13th, when NATO defence ministers were meeting in Brussels, fifteen European countries agreed with a Letter of Intent to cooperate closely in the field of short-, medium- and long-range air defence, creating the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI). Accordingly, three different air defence systems shall be acquired and implemented into NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS)3. With this remarkable political process underway, on the one hand, and the extensive use of tactical ballistic missiles (e.g. Iskander-M) by Russia in its war against Ukraine, on the other hand, as well as the continuing nuclear threats posed by the Kremlin4, this Policy Brief takes a closer look at the current Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD (also called Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)) in Europe, its political implementation, setup and current challenges. Against this backdrop, the implications of the newly founded ESSI on European BMD will be illustrated to provide a first classification of this Initiative. Ballistic missiles can be defined as "a rocket-propelled self-guided […] weapon […] system that follows a ballistic trajectory to deliver a payload from its launch site to a predetermined target"5. Another broader and excluding take on this subject comes from the United States Department of Defence6, understanding ballistic missiles as "[a]ny missile which does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated". Though the term "ballistic missile" offers a categorization for a variety of different weapon-systems (as presented in the following), the overriding aspect, common to all of which, is their ballistic trajectory, following an "elliptical"7 flight geometry8. The flight phases of such missiles can be distinguished more generally into three phases. First off is the boost phase. Here, the rocket boosters accelerate the ascending missile. This process takes approximately three to five minutes. After the rocket motor has flamed out and has been separated from the missile, the midcourse phase, taking place outside the Earth's atmosphere, begins. Despite not being propelled anymore, the rocket still uses its previously gained momentum to climb further, losing speed gradually before topping out at the highest altitude within the trajectory. In this section, taking about twenty minutes, the missile travels at speeds of up to 24,000 km per hour. After having reached the highest point, the re-entry vehicles (warhead(s)) that have been separated from the rocket are then descending towards earth again once they have aligned themselves with the intended target. When reaching the atmosphere, the third phase – the terminal phase – begins. Taking just about one minute of time, the re-entry vehicles are free-falling towards the point of impact, reaching speeds of at least 3,000 km per hour9. Classification of Ballistic Missiles: - Close Range Ballistic Missile (CRBM): 50-300 km - Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM): 300-1000 km - Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM): 1000-3000 km - Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM): 3000-5500 km - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM): > 5500 km Travelling far ranges, ballistic missiles deliver relatively heavy payloads, which can either be of conventional nature or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (biological, chemical, and nuclear). Furthermore, they can be launched from air-, sea- (submarines, vessels), or land-based (silos, road-mobile vehicles, and trains) launch platforms. Much like the great variety of launch assets and effectors carried, ballistic missiles can also be differentiated by their range, as presented in the figure above.10 Overall, four factors can be identified as to what makes ballistic missiles challenging to intercept. First, because of their high travelling speeds, they can cover significant areas within a short period. This gives the respective interceptor station in question a fairly short reaction time – just a small window of opportunity to exploit the right interception geometry for the best possible firing solution. Second, the speed of ballistic missiles does not only demand the same from its interceptors but also their ability to hit very precisely and to be highly manoeuvrable. Third, the process of a ballistic missile travelling through different altitudes requires a multiple-layered defence that has the ability to cover lower altitudes within the atmosphere and those in orbit. Fourth, speaking of the demanded interceptor's precision, this is particularly important since the re-entry vehicles to be intercepted are of relatively small size. Additionally, ballistic missiles have decoys at their disposal to overcome air-defences. In brief, missiles can, for example, carry re-entry vehicle decoys that are designed to distract BMD from other carried, actual warheads, as well as jamming devices to hamper the detection of BMD sensors (e.g. interrupting radar detectability or infrared sensors). The same purpose can also be achieved through passive countermeasures like stealth technologies. These may be used to prevent or constrain the adversaries' target acquisition capabilities11. Thus, overall ballistic missiles are a diverse field of different types of weapon systems that are, due to their flight characteristics, difficult to defend against. 3.1 Political Background Current ballistic missile defence in Europe is organised within the framework of NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS), which allocates land- and sea-based air defence systems against all kinds of air-based threats and shields the whole NATO territory. It is implemented into the command structure of NATO HQ Allied Air Command in Ramstein (AIRCOM)12. However, it has been a long road to this contemporary solution. Following Europe's and the United States' (US) shift in security interests towards North Africa and the Middle East in the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, the fear of uncontrollable proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMDs, to countries like Iran, Iraq or North Korea arose. In an attempt to shield parts of NATO territory against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) was created in 2005. On the technical side, this included the deployment of sea-based Aegis defence systems from the United States and ground-based air defence systems by the European members (like Patriot or Sol-air moyenne portée/Terrestre (SAMP-T)). However, the latter would only be able to intercept incoming ballistic missiles with a range of 1,000 km in lower interception layers13. On the conceptual side, ALTBMD should give the institutional superstructure to develop a strategy and strengthen cooperation between national armed forces14. But with the lack of capabilities in the field of anti-long-range ballistic missiles and the only partial security provided to parts of Europe, the concept of ALTBMD was going to be modified at NATO's 2010 Lisbon summit. There, a broader, more comprehensive approach towards BMD was decided, covering the whole European NATO territory against all types of ballistic missiles. Therefore, ALTBMD became incorporated into NATINAMDS (former NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS)). To achieve the desired aim of the newly proposed BMD, a "multi-layer principle of the envisaged architecture, according to which different defence systems were to be able to act in different interception layers against ballistic missiles of all ranges"15 shall be established. The command structures to enable such interconnection of different weapons systems, each serving within its own capabilities, have already been put in place in 2005 with the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme Management Organization (ALTBMD PMO). It aimed to merge "battle management, communications, command and control and intelligence […] early warning sensors, radars and various interceptors"16. To organise the structural transition of this project, Interim Capability Step 1 (InCa 1), which saw the introduction of "a planning tool to build the most effective defence design for specific scenarios or real deployments"17, was put in place in early 2010. The second transition phase, Interim Capability Step 2 (InCa 2), was to enable "shared situational awareness"18 and became operational by the end of 2010. Technically, the now-modified ALTBMD was made possible by the US in 2009 with its so-called European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Its purpose was to strengthen NATO's southern flank in the context of increased confrontation with Iran. Distinguished into four phases (the fourth one was cancelled in 2013), the US built two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland (planned to be in service by 2022) as well as Romania (operational since 2016) and deployed four Aegis-capable ships to Spain. Additionally, numerous sensors, different missile types for Aegis (Standard Missile (SM)-2, SM-3, SM-6) and software saw ongoing modifications19. Overall, in 2018 NATO members were able to provide defence capabilities against ballistic missiles at all interception levels20. 3.2 Strategic importance of ballistic missile defence At this point, it is worth noting that the substantial amount of contribution by the US to NATO defence capabilities, in particular with regard to high-altitude BMD, was only made possible by its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 2002 under the Bush administration. The ABM Treaty was founded in 1972 with the former USSR and later continued with Russia. In short, it contained the limitation of 100 interceptors per country stationed at one site, halting further development of new technologies in this field and prohibiting the deployment of early-warning radar sites (EWR) outside of one of the contract participants' soils. The reason for weakening one's defence capabilities lies within the ability of ballistic missile defence to inhibit the adversaries' nuclear second-strike competencies (also called "the 'ragged second strike' problem")21. Because if superpower A were to attack superpower B in a first strike, then the already hit one (B) could not respond in kind since its retaliatory strike would have been intercepted in flight by A. This would not only mean a shift of the strategic balance of nuclear weapons in favour of the nation whose ballistic missile defence is the most effective but also a disruption of the deterrence effect. Such one is only in place "if the two superpowers remained mutually vulnerable to each other's nuclear forces", hence bringing stability22. So, on a strategic level, BMD is functioning as a means to deny the enemy access to one's territory. This concept of "Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)" describes forces "that contribute to denying an adversary's forces access to a particular region or otherwise hinder freedom of manoeuvre"23. In 2002 when the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty, the Bush administration saw no relevance to this arrangement with Russia after the Cold War had ended24. Back then, the US instead aimed to protect itself and its allies against states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. However, with the new emerging threat that arose from Russia's aggression against Ukraine accompanied by the extensive use of short-range ballistic missiles as well as repeated nuclear threat messages, the relevance of BMD not only towards "rogue states" but also against Russia again, has increased. 3.3 Mechanisms of European Ballistic Missile Defence As indicated previously, BMD is comprised of different air defence systems, each acting according to its capabilities within a broader network comprised of a variety of effectors, creating a multi-level defence architecture. In the theatre of defence – for the interception of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase (see figure below) – NATO has access to different national air defence systems (e.g. SAMP-T or Patriot Advanced Capability- 2/3 (PAC-2, PAC-3)). In between the theatre- and European NATO Missile-Defence, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is placed for intercepting short-, medium-, and intermediate ballistic missiles in their terminal phase (in contrast to systems mentioned afore, both within and outside the atmosphere) with a range of about 150–200 km25. Above this layer, the ship-based Aegis system and ground-based Aegis Ashore sites, which are not only part of European NATO Missile Defence but also of the US' Homeland Missile Defense, come into play for defending against ballistic missiles of all ranges in their midcourse or terminal phase in either endo- or exoatmospheric environment. This variety of capabilities comes from the different missile types that Aegis uses. While the SM-2 and SM-6 are applied against targets in their terminal phase and are already endoatmospheric, the SM-3 can intercept missiles in orbit. The Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) is part of the US Homeland Missile Defence and not subject to NATO BMD planning (although this idea has existed but was suspended with the creation of EPAA26). All of these weapon systems use hit-to-kill vehicles, meaning they neutralise the target by kinetic energy. However, there have also been attempts to detect and intercept ballistic missiles through directed energy (laser weapons) by refitting a Boeing 747 with a laser beam for interception27. Other, more modern suggestions went on to equip drones with laser applications. Though this idea has turned out to be "not practical or feasible", according to the US National Academy of Sciences28. 3.4 EU and European countries' air defence development programmes On the European side, the lack of capabilities in exoatmospheric defence against long-range ballistic missiles remains to this day. Nevertheless, two major developments are underway to maintain Europe's contribution to BMD. First is the so-called "Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based TheatER surveillance" (TWISTER) programme, initiated by the European Council in 2019 and eventually integrated into the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). With France, Germany, Italy, Finland, Netherlands, and Spain committed, it aims to develop an air defence system that can intercept intermediate ballistic missiles within the atmosphere for sea- and land-based launch platforms29. Another promising approach comes from the European Consortium "EUROSOM", which developed the Aster-15 missile in the 1990s. It is conceptualised to encounter anti-ship missiles and aircraft. However, a project contracted in 2021 sees the development of the Aster-30 missile – a modification of Aster-15. The Aster-30 Block 1 NT specification shall be able to intercept short-range ballistic missiles in endoatmospheric conditions and could be launched from sea- and ground-based assets. This particular type of missile is furthermore to equip the French terminal system SAMP-T, hence promoting such in competition to the US Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 systems. Moreover, EUROSOM is said to develop an Aster 30 Block 2 missile that is capable of defending against intermediate ballistic missiles outside the Earth's atmosphere in their terminal phase, bringing it to a similar level as THAAD30. These systems (except for the Aster 30 Block 2), however, only modify the already existing European capabilities in Ballistic Missile Defence and leave the field in exoatmospheric defence against long-range ballistic missiles to US platforms only. This is noteworthy as, back in 2009, when EPAA was presented to the public, experts had already warned of significant European dependence on US commitment to BMD in Europe and have hence issued a call for a more redundant contribution from European NATO members to BMD in order to withstand a potential US withdrawal from this field without capability gaps31. Today, with the ESSI being on its way, it is probable that numerous European countries will expand their commitment to NATINAMDS, thus also to Ballistic Missile Defence. As mentioned afore, the main aim of ESSI is to acquire three different air defence systems with various ranges (short-, medium- and long-range) and to share the anticipated high costs solidarily. Subject to the discussion for procurement are the German IRIS-T SLM, the US Patriot system and the Israeli Arrow 332. IRIS-T-SLM is a medium-range air defence system with a range of 40 km and a maximum altitude of 25 km33. It is designed to encounter aircraft, missiles as well as, at very close distances, short-range ballistic missiles34. The Patriot system is a long-range air defence system that can intercept aircraft and missiles within the atmosphere. If Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) is to be acquired, it will defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase when inside the atmosphere35. Arrow-3, on the other hand, has a range of 2,400 km and is designed to be an exoatmospheric interceptor against all types of ballistic missiles36. To boost procurement, these systems are already available on the market and therefore do not need to be developed beforehand. This way, the capability gap in exoatmospheric defence against all kinds of ballistic missiles shall be closed while modifying existing ones37. Against the background of the newly proposed European Sky Shield Initiative, this Policy Brief analysed how ballistic air defence in Europe is set up politically, structurally and technically. As it turned out, BMD is implemented into the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System and is laid out in a multidimensional defence architecture comprised of different effectors with different capabilities that are coordinated with the help of NATO's AIRCOM. But what is about to change with the ESSI? When looking at the distribution of competencies among NATO member states, no European country provided NATINAMDS with intercepting capabilities against long-range ballistic missiles and exoatmospheric defence. Instead, such tasks were assigned to the US with their Aegis ground- and sea-based system. This lack of capabilities on the European side would not have been filled in the foreseeable future, wouldn't the ESSI have been founded (as seen in 3.4.). The fact that fifteen European nations declared their commitment to ESSI shows that Olaf Scholz's initiative struck a nerve. Beyond the capability surplus that ESSI provides NATINAMDS and Europe with, the ambition towards a more sovereign European defence architecture is manifested. At the same time, a signal of European political will to further contribute to common security within NATO is sent to the US. The leading role of Germany in this process is remarkable, and it provides a substantial and externally recognisable execution of the promised "Zeitenwende". Although considering the very recent announcement of ESSI, the prospects of such should still be taken with a slight grain of salt, since the sole fundament of ESSI is still only a Letter of Intent. It is a document that expresses the will of the respective nations to cooperate for the procurement of air defence systems but is not legally binding38. Regarding Germany's attempt to assert itself in its new foreign policy role, it is worth questioning why major European players in the field of security policy, like France and Poland, have not been taking part in ESSI. Poland declined to participate due to development programs for short- and medium-range air defence systems already established in cooperation with the United Kingdom. France, on the other hand, bets on the deterrence effect of its nuclear weapons. But in both cases, it seems like deeper dynamics may be at work. Because the overall mistrust in Germany as an alliance partner seems to have increased: whether because of its leading role in ESSI, which France has originally aspired to take (in correspondence with its ambition for a more autonomous European defence organisation) or the dissatisfaction with Germany's commitment to Ukraine, as it has been repeatedly criticized by Poland39. What has perhaps been planned by Scholz as a demonstration of the new obliged leadership initiative may have turned out to be a setback that led to deteriorating relationships with Germany's closest allies – France and Poland. Nonetheless, the overall impression remains that ESSI was overdue and would pose a viable benefit for European security as well as a balanced share of tasks among NATO members. But the project is still in its infancy. Therefore, it remains to be seen how the initiative will evolve. However, should the ESSI become reality, Europe would have the chance to make its skies safer. A prospect that is very desirable in view of the massive Russian air attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Footnotes: 1 Die Bundesregierung: "'Europa ist unsere Zukunft – und diese Zukunft liegt in unseren Händen'", 29.08.2022. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/europa/scholz-rede-prag-karls-uni-2079410. 2 Süddeutsche Zeitung: "Scholz regt neues Luftverteidigungssystem in Europa an", 29.08.2022. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/besuch-in-prag-scholz-regt-neues-luftverteidigungssystem-in-europa-an-1.5646970. 3 Gotkowska, J.: "Germany's European Sky Shield Initiative", 14.10.2022. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2022-10-14/germanys-european-sky-shield-initiative. 4 Eastwood, B. M.: "Iskander: The Russian Ballistic Missile Creating Chaos In Ukraine", 03.03.2022. Retrieved 22.11.2022 from: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/03/iskander-the-russian-ballistic-missile-creating-chaos-in-ukraine/. Cole, B.: "Vladimir Putin Has Threatened Nuclear War at Least 35 Times—U.K.'s Johnson", 01.07.2022. Retrieved 22.11.2022 from: https://www.newsweek.com/vladimir-putin-threatened-nuclear-war-35-times-uk-johnson-ukraine-russia-1720897. 5 Britannica: "Ballistic missile", 03.10. 2018. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.britannica.com/technology/ballistic-missile. 6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms", 2019, p. 23. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/dod-dictionary-military-associated-terms/. 7 Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance: "Ballistic Missile Basics", 14.08.2018. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-basics/ballistic-missile-basics/. 8 A subcategory of traditional ballistic missiles is so-called quasi-ballistic ones (also named semi-ballistic). Their flight path is a less high-angled elliptical curve (best imaginable as a "flattened" classic ballistic missiles trajectory). These missiles hence remain Endo atmospheric, are manoeuvrable and are able to sustain high speeds throughout their flight time. 9 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: "Fact Sheet: Ballistic vs. Cruise Missiles", 27.04.2017. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-ballistic-vs-cruise-missiles/. 10 Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance: "Ballistic Missile Basics", 14.08.2018. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-basics/ballistic-missile-basics/. 11 Czajkowski, M.: "Ballistic Missile Defence – Technology, Effectiveness and Organization – Key Issues", pp. 236, in: Politeja, vol. 50, no. 5, 2017, p. 227–264. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26564293#metadata_info_tab_contents. 12 Ibid, pp. 245. 13 Hartung, F.: "Die Raketenabwehr in Europa", 30.09.2022. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://zms.bundeswehr.de/de/zmsbw-dossier-ukraine-beitrag-hartung-5506736. 14 Czajkowski, M.: "Ballistic Missile Defence – Technology, Effectiveness and Organization – Key Issues", pp. 245. 15 Hartung, F.: "Die Raketenabwehr in Europa", 30.09.2022. 16 NATO: "INFO – Missile Defence", January 2012 p. 1. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120127_MissileDefence_en.pdf. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Kimball, D.: "The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance", March 2022. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach. 20 Ibid. 21 Koda, M.; Kristensen H.: "US ballistic missile defenses", p. 295, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 75, no. 6, 2019, pp. 295–306. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1680055. 22 Ibid, p. 296. 23 Kemp, H.: "Strategic Security in Northern Europe: The Implications of Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies in Developing Complex Threat Environments", p. 78, in: Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 14, no. 1, 2021, pp. 78–91. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26999978#metadata_info_tab_contents. 24 Koda, M.; Kristensen H.: "US ballistic missile defenses", p. 296, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 75, no. 6, 2019, pp. 295–306. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1680055. 25 CSIS Missile Defense Project: "Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)", 30.06.2021. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/thaad/; Kemp, H.: "Strategic Security in Northern Europe: The Implications of Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies in Developing Complex Threat Environments", pp. 85. 26 CSIS Missile Defense Project: "Ground-based Interceptor (GBI)", 26.07.2021. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/thaad/; Hartung, F.: "Die Raketenabwehr in Europa", 30.09.2022. 27 Larson, C.: "Forget Star Wars, the Air Force Put a Laser on a 747 to Shoot Down ICBMs", 21.05.2020. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/forget-star-wars-air-force-put-laser-747-shoot-down-icbms-156056. 28 National Research Council: "Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives", 2012, p. 65. Retrieved 28.11.2022 from: https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/13189/making-sense-of-ballistic-missile-defense-an-assessment-of-concepts; Hartung, F.: "Die Raketenabwehr in Europa", 30.09.2022. 29 Peruzzi, L.: "Naval Ballistic Missile Defence: US, European and Israeli Solutions", 30.04.2022. Retrieved 17.12.2022 from: https://euro-sd.com/2022/04/articles/exclusive/25775/naval-ballistic-missile-defence-us-european-and-israeli-solutions/. 30 Roblin, S.: "Meet Europe's Very Own Missile Defense System", 20.04.2021. Retrieved 28.11.2022 from: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/meet-europes-very-own-missile-defense-system-183143. 31 Sinjen, S./Schuchardt, D.: "NATO – Raketenabwehr – Pro & Contra", pp. 107, in: Internationale Politik, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 104–11. Retrieved 28.11.2022 from: https://internationalepolitik.de/de/nato-raketenabwehr. 32 Gamze, B.: "European Partnership in Air and Missile Defense: European Sky Shield", 2022. Retrieved 01.12.2022 from: https://www.ankasam.org/european-partnership-in-air-and-missile-defense-european-sky-shield/?lang=en#:~:text=The%20European%20Sky%20Shield%20Initiative%2C%20led%20by%20Germany%2C,air%20defense%20systems%20and%20missiles%20by%20European%20countries. 33 Europäische Sicherheit und Technik: "Germany is supplying more Iris-T SLM missiles to Ukraine", 9.11.2022. Retrieved 01.12.2022 from: https://esut.de/en/2022/11/meldungen/luft/37901/deutschland-liefert-weitere-flugkoerper-iris-t-slm-an-die-ukraine/. 34 Diehl defence: „Leben in sicherem Umfeld“, 2018, p. 10. Retrieved 01.12.2022 from: https://www.diehl.com/cms/files/Diehl_Defence_Brosch%C3%BCre2018_de.pdf?download=1. 35 Koda, M.; Kristensen H.: "US ballistic missile defenses", pp. 302, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 75, no. 6, 2019, pp. 295–306. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1680055. 36 Airforce Technology: "Arrow 3 Air Defence Missile System, Israel", 16.09.2022. Retrieved 01.12.2022 from: https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/arrow-3-air-defence-missile-system-israel/. 37 Gamze, B.: "European Partnership in Air and Missile Defense: European Sky Shield", 2022. 38 Gotkowska, J.: "Germany's European Sky Shield Initiative", 14.10.2022. Retrieved 27.11.2022 from: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2022-10-14/germanys-european-sky-shield-initiative. 39 Steger, N./Drzewiecka, M.: "Initiative ‚European Sky Shield‘ ohne Polen", 23.10.2022. Retrieved 01.12.2022 from: https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/polen-deutschland-luftabwehr-schutzschild-ukraine-krieg-russland-100.html; Gamze, B.: "European Partnership in Air and Missile Defense: European Sky Shield", 2022. Picture credits: Cover photo: Killian, M.: "ZUMA Presumed a 'Total Loss' After Falling Into Ocean, Say Offcials", 2017. Retrieved 02.12.2022 from: https://www.americaspace.com/2018/01/09/zuma-presumed-a-total-loss-after-falling-into-ocean-say-officials/. Figure 1: Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance: "Ballistic Missile Basics", 14.08.2018. Retrieved 02.12.2022 from: https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-basics/ballistic-missile-basics/. Figure 2: Missie Defense Advocacy Alliance: "Ballistic Missile Basics", 14.08.2018. Retrieved 02.12.2022 from: https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-basics/ballistic-missile-basics/. Figure 3: Hartung, F.: "Die Raketenabwehr in Europa", 30.09.2022. Retrieved 02.12.2022 from: https://zms.bundeswehr.de/de/zmsbw-dossier-ukraine-beitrag-hartung-5506736.