Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment: Implications for USAF Force Presentation Authors: Miranda Priebe, Alan J. Vick, Jacob L. Heim, Meagan L. Smith Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation ISBN: 978-1-9774-0232-5 For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2959 Because of increasing air and missile threats to air bases, the Air Force is developing concepts to operate from a large number of small operating locations in a conflict with a near-peer competitor. This type of distributed air operations in a contested environment represents a significant shift in the way the Air Force has operated since the end of the Cold War. The Air Force therefore asked the RAND Corporation whether the Air Force needs to adjust how it presents forces to the joint commander. This report identifies capabilities the Air Force needs to carry out distributed operations in a contested environment. It then assesses whether the current force presentation model can provide these capabilities and how it compares with alternative models. The research reported here was commissioned by Maj Gen Brian Killough, Director of Strategic Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a FY 2018 project Distributed Operations. The 2018 National Defense Strategy instructed the services to prioritize capabilities for conflict with another great power. This gave new urgency to ongoing initiatives within the Air Force to prepare for growing air and missile threats to bases and a contested communications environment. Key areas explored in the report include: - Protecting Distributed Bases: Operating from a larger number of air bases increases targets that adversaries must attack. Ideal basing constructs include 'Stay and Fight' bases, 'Drop-in' bases, and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs). - Command and Control of Distributed Forces: Shifts toward distributed control, mission-type orders, and delegating authorities to lower echelons to cope with degraded and interrupted communications. - Sustaining Distributed Forces: Moving away from peak peacetime efficiency toward resilient combat support under attack, utilizing pre-positioned stocks, multi-skilled cross-trained airmen, and dynamic posture planning. - Force Presentation Model Implications: Traditional wing-sized deployments and centralized JAOC planning are high-risk failure points; smaller forward units with organic support, defense, and decentralized mission planning capability are needed. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) reorients the Department of Defense (DoD) away from counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and toward competition with other great powers. Unlike recent conflicts, Air Force operations would take place in a contested environment with kinetic and nonkinetic attacks on air bases and communication networks. Near-term enhancements to air base survivability depend heavily on new operating concepts supported by modest investments in deployable capabilities. Air Force concepts envision distributed operations—employing combat aircraft from a larger number of geographically separated bases. This study evaluates three main questions: 1. What capabilities does the Air Force need in order to conduct distributed operations in a contested environment? 2. Would the current Air Force FPM have shortcomings in a contested environment? 3. In what ways could the Air Force change its FPM to improve warfighting effectiveness in a high-end fight, and what would be the trade-offs? Potential U.S. adversaries, notably China, possess expanding inventories of precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles (such as SRBMs, MRBMs, and the DF-26 IRBM) capable of threatening air base runways, fuel infrastructure, and parked aircraft across East Asia and out to Guam. To counter this threat, distributed basing spreads combat assets across multiple airfields, increasing the salvo requirements for adversaries to suppress sortie generation. Three representative basing types are examined: 1. Stay and Fight Base: Sized for an enduring squadron presence (~30 days), requiring robust infrastructure, heavy active and passive defenses, and ~1,200 Agile Combat Support (ACS) personnel. 2. Drop-In Base: Sized for short rotations (up to 7 days), modest infrastructure, minimal active defenses, and ~300 ACS personnel. 3. Fighter FARP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point): Transient operations lasting hours, with support personnel delivered via cargo aircraft (e.g., C-17), relying completely on rapid relocation for protection. Communications threats necessitate operating in degraded, intermittent, and low-bandwidth (DIL) environments through line-of-sight (LOS) datalinks, airborne relays, HF radio, and courier flights. Protection against air, missile, and ground threats requires a balanced portfolio: - Hardening: Shelters and underground infrastructure. - On-Base Dispersal: Widely spacing parked aircraft and fuel/munitions caches. - Active Defenses: PATRIOT, THAAD, IFPC, and C-RAMD systems. - Rapid Recovery: Rapid Airfield Damage Repair (RADR) to quickly restore operating surfaces. - Base Ground Defense: Countering standoff (mortars, rockets, MANPADS) and penetrating ground attacks across large airfield perimeters (often 8–26 km) using integrated defense units, drones, unattended sensors, and quick reaction forces (QRFs). Centralized control and decentralized execution (CCDE) as practiced via detailed air tasking orders (ATOs) generated in a central JAOC is highly vulnerable to communications interdiction. Resilient C2 demands distributed control: - Delegating conditional authorities to sector and wing/group commanders. - Adopting mission command principles and mission-type orders based on commander's intent. - Generating local situational awareness and intelligence analysis at forward operating locations. - Training commanders to take disciplined initiative during communications blackouts. Distributed basing inherently reduces economies of scale, more than doubling support personnel requirements per fighter if operations expand across multiple sites. Key sustainment initiatives include: - Pre-positioning heavy and bulk war reserve materiel at forward sites. - Cross-training airmen across maintenance, fueling, and base defense tasks. - Establishing dynamic posture planning cells. - Utilizing specialized agile teams such as contingency response groups (CRGs) and aircraft battle damage repair (ABDR) teams. - Increasing risk acceptance regarding aircraft airworthiness certifications in contested conditions. The baseline USAF Force Presentation Model (FPM) relies on wing-sized operational units at single bases, centralized planning at the JAOC, and ad hoc deployment structures via Unit Type Codes (UTCs). For contested environments, five critical dimensions must be adapted: 1. Unit size at operating locations (moving to squadron- or flight-sized units). 2. Echelon with defense and support units (integrating combat support below the wing level into independent groups). 3. Echelon with significant planning capability (providing robust planning cells to forward echelons). 4. Echelon with multiple aircraft types (composite groupings). 5. Echelon that routinely trains together in peacetime (building habitual relationships and trust). The Air Force must deliberately sacrifice peacetime efficiency for wartime survivability. Key Findings: 1. Current USAF FPM assumptions (air base sanctuaries and reliable communications) are incompatible with high-end contested environments. 2. Survivability requires trading off peacetime efficiencies for redundant resources and forward resilience. 3. Operational and combat support communities must collaborate closely. 4. Lower echelons must be empowered and equipped to plan and execute offensive and defensive operations. 5. Political access to partner nation airfields is a critical precondition. Recommendations for USAF Leadership: 1. Determine resource and access requirements for distributed operations. 2. Simulate heavy air, missile, and ground attacks in home station training and exercises. 3. Consider creating integrated base defense units. 4. Hold regular command post exercises with communications disruptions. 5. Cross-train airmen across specialties to reduce overall deployment burdens. 6. Evaluate the wartime role of the group echelon before eliminating it in peacetime reorganization. 7. Use exercises and analytical models to test and refine alternative Force Presentation Models.