CNA MARCH 2024 Russia and the Global Nuclear Order Nicole Grajewski IOP-2024-U-037725-Final Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. © 2024 CNA Corporation Abstract The war in Ukraine has prompted a fundamental recalibration in Russia’s approach to the global nuclear order, raising questions about its commitment to established regimes and principles governing nuclear technology. Contrary to expectations of disengagement, Russia has reinforced its role in these nuclear frameworks while challenging Western norms and interpretations. The evolution of Russia’s involvement in the global nuclear order highlights its preexisting divergences with the West on the approaches to nuclear safety, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and nonproliferation. The salience of these divergences rose to prominence following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which has resulted in Russian contestation of nuclear norms. Among the major repercussions of the war in Ukraine is Moscow’s departure from its previous policy that often compartmentalized nonproliferation from broader schisms with the West toward one that actively seeks to link these problems to the deep tensions in Russia-West relations. As part of these efforts, Russia has strategically mimicked Western actions and exploited claims of double standards to emulate policies of other nuclear powers, as seen in its policies toward the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and NATO nuclear sharing. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated Russia’s ability to challenge the global nuclear order from within—a challenge that will likely persist for the coming decades. This report is part of a series generously funded by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. CNA’s Occasional Paper series is published by CNA, but the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CNA or the client. Approved for public release. Unlimited distribution. This work was performed under Specific Authority Contract No. G-19-56503. Cover image: Rostov nuclear power plant. Rosatom. Approved by: March 2024 Colleen "Kelly" McCue, Acting Research Program Director Countering Threats and Challenges Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Programs Division © 2024 CNA Corporation Request additional copies of this document through [email protected]. TABLE OF CONTENTS Russia in the Global Nuclear Order ................................................... 1 Russia and the institutions of the global nuclear order ............................................. 2 Russia and the global nuclear order: the view from inside ...................................... 5 Past as Prologue .............................................................................. 8 Nuclear safety and security ................................................................................................... 9 Peaceful nuclear energy and safeguards ....................................................................... 13 Proliferation and counterproliferation ............................................................................ 16 The War in Ukraine: The Global Nuclear Order at an Impasse .......... 21 Weaponizing the nuclear order ......................................................................................... 22 Nuclear proliferation .............................................................................................................. 25 Mimicry and exploiting double standards .................................................................... 28 Nuclear sharing .................................................................................................................... 28 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty .......................................................... 31 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 34 Abbreviations ................................................................................. 36 References .................................................................................... 37 Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine illuminated the long profound shadow of nuclear weapons over international security. Russia’s nuclear threats have rightfully garnered significant attention because of the unfathomable lethality of nuclear weapons. However, the use of such weapons in Ukraine is only one way—albeit the gravest—that Russia could challenge the global nuclear order. Russia’s influence extends deep into the very fabric of this order—a system to which it is inextricably bound by Moscow’s position in cornerstone institutions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). From withdrawing from key treaties to stymieing resolutions critical of misconduct, Moscow has demonstrated its ability to challenge the legitimacy, relevance, and interpretations of numerous standards and principles espoused by the West. This paper scrutinizes Russia’s global nuclear approach in the context of the war in Ukraine. The first part examines Russia’s engagement in the global nuclear order, emphasizing Moscow’s empowerment through institutional privileges within the fundamental regimes and its domestic perceptions. The paper highlights how Russia’s engagement in the global nuclear order reflects broader foreign policy themes of great power status, sovereignty, opposition to Western double standards, and selective adherence to treaties. The second part of this paper examines the evolution of Russia’s interpretations of nuclear security, IAEA safeguards, and nonproliferation and highlights how Russia’s engagement with the global nuclear order has been characterized by alternating phases of cooperation and contention, often rooted in differing interpretations of the order’s rules from the West. The third part of this paper focuses on repercussions of the war in Ukraine on Russia’s actions in the global nuclear order. It assesses (a) Russia’s role in the growing disunity among the five permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the linkage of nuclear issues with broader geopolitics; (b) Russia’s contestation of established nuclear norms, presenting alternative interpretations that signal a strategic shift in international nuclear governance; and (c) Russia’s strategic use of mimicry and the exploitation of double standards to emulate the policies of other nuclear powers in regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear sharing. Through these strategies, Russia questions and contests established nuclear norms. The global nuclear order is defined as the "system of national and international practices, policies, institutions, rules, and common understandings that govern the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons." The global nuclear order can be understood through two main components: (a) regimes and formal practices, such as the NPT, IAEA, and CTBT; and (b) norms and principles associated with the use of nuclear technologies. The distinction between these two components is central to understanding Russia’s approach to the global nuclear order. Although Russia holds a vested interest in the maintenance of the regimes of the global nuclear order, Moscow has sought to challenge aspects of the normative framework. As one of the five officially recognized nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, Russia has enjoyed certain privileges within the global nuclear order beyond the mere legal recognition of its nuclear arsenal. Procedurally, Moscow holds significant sway over the global nuclear order through the ability to both challenge and recalibrate the entrenched norms and protocols that underpin the status quo. As a result of a grand bargain between the US and the Soviet Union, Moscow has been empowered by the institutionalization of privileges throughout the various regimes that govern nuclear technology, verification, and disarmament. Moscow has also benefited from its technical knowledge as a civilian nuclear energy supplier. Such a status gives Russia a significant degree of influence on the nuclear governance and evolution of its normative framework. The global nuclear order remains bound by the legacy of superpower cooperation during the Cold War. The NPT, the cornerstone of the global nuclear order, was designed by the US and the Soviet Union with the "explicit purpose…[of keeping]…nuclear material and knowledge from diffusing rapidly to potential nuclear powers." Best described as a "control-oriented regime," the NPT was crafted to enable the most powerful states to exert influence over weaker members. The NPT creates a significant differentiation between nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states, which are required to renounce nuclear weapons and are subject to stringent monitoring by the IAEA to ensure compliance. In return, they are promised access to peaceful nuclear technology and a commitment from nuclear-weapon states to move toward disarmament, a promise that has largely remained unfulfilled. The treaty’s bifurcation of states into nuclear- and nonnuclear-weapon states was a deliberate construct to perpetuate the nuclear preeminence of the US and the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited not only its nuclear arsenal but also its position in the global nuclear order’s hierarchy as a key player in shaping the norms and policies related to nuclear proliferation, disarmament, and civil nuclear cooperation. Russia—alongside the US, China, the United Kingdom (UK), and France—is recognized as having had nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT’s inception in 1968, which effectively legitimizes the country’s possession of nuclear weapons while prohibiting other signatory states from developing or acquiring nuclear arsenals. The NPT’s structure inherently reflects the asymmetrical obligations between nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states. Although disarmament remains a key pillar of the global nuclear order, this paper focuses on nonproliferation and civilian nuclear cooperation. The NPT establishes the framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the IAEA acts as a monitoring and verification body to ensure compliance with the treaty’s obligations. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, which is composed of representatives from 35 states, Russia plays a significant role in the agency’s decision-making processes and influences a wide range of policies, including nuclear safeguards, budgetary allocations, nuclear assistance approvals, and the formulation of nuclear safety standards. In the cases of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, the IAEA’s verification mandate and broader nonproliferation issues have also fallen under the purview of the UNSC, where Moscow enjoys additional sway as one of the P5. Russia’s institutional privileges within the global nuclear order are bolstered by its position as a supplier of nuclear technology and fuel through Rosatom, the state nuclear energy corporation. Rosatom has a broad scope of responsibilities encompassing the country’s nuclear power sector, including civilian nuclear activities, Russia’s nuclear arsenal, and nuclear research institutions. Rosatom is integral to Russia’s nuclear diplomacy, advancing the country’s global presence through comprehensive deals that include building, operating, and financing nuclear plants along with training international workforces. Russia is also responsible for more than 75 percent of global nuclear technology, with almost all countries that use nuclear power relying on Russia for at least part of the nuclear fuel cycle. Rosatom’s civilian nuclear cooperation with a wide range of countries increases dependence on Russia and gives Moscow an important tool to reward partners through lucrative contracts with flexible payment schemes. In addition, the NPT’s mandate to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy inherently positions nuclear suppliers, including Russia, as key controllers of nuclear technology. Article IV of the NPT acknowledges the right of all signatories to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, this access is contingent on compliance with nonproliferation obligations. Nuclear suppliers, such as Russia, can exert considerable influence over which countries receive nuclear technology, the conditions under which they receive it, and what types of technologies are permissible. Russia’s involvement in various export-control groups provides broad control over both nuclear and dual-use technologies that are critical to the development of nuclear weapons. Since becoming a founding member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1974, Moscow has been committed to controlling the export of materials and technology pertinent to nuclear weapons manufacturing. It also joined the Zangger Committee in the early 1970s, interpreting obligations under the NPT regarding nuclear-related exports. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia joined the Wassenaar Arrangement, the successor to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls system of dual-use export controls. Russia has also influenced NSG guidelines by carving out exemptions and offering broad interpretations of existing provisions. For example, Russia began constructing two reactors at Kudankulam in 2002 based on a 1988 agreement between the Soviet Union and India. Despite the NSG’s 1992 nuclear safeguards barring sales to India, Russia argued that nuclear cooperation with India was grandfathered under a prior supply arrangement and went ahead despite opposition from other NSG members. Under the NPT, the recognized nuclear-weapon states operate much like an exclusive club: the benefits of membership are closely guarded. However, within this group, there is a divergence in the approach to and interpretation of norms and rules governing nuclear weapons and disarmament reflecting the varied strategic, political, and security interests of each state. Although Russia, for instance, may diverge from the US in its interpretation of and approach to these norms, it nevertheless retains a vested interest in the continued relevance of the global nuclear order’s institutions, recognizing that its status and influence are significantly linked to its privileges as a nuclear-weapon state. Russia’s engagement with the global nuclear order intricately intertwines with its broader foreign policy objectives. Russia’s nuclear arsenal is not merely a security asset but also a symbol of its global stature and a tool for shaping international institutions governing nuclear technology, such as the IAEA and the NPT. Moscow’s dual approach to sovereignty—exemplified by its illegal actions within its so-called near abroad contrasted with a staunch defense of sovereignty on the global stage—also permeates its stance on nuclear issues. Russian positions on safeguards, nonproliferation, and nuclear safety underscore a delicate balance between respecting state sovereignty and addressing concerns about intrusive policies that might compromise national security. Russia’s leveraging of its position in global nuclear institutions reflects an astute recognition of its relative influence in shaping procedural norms and agenda-setting within these forums. However, its resistance to certain normative frameworks often stems from a perception of Western encroachment and a historical narrative of victimhood, particularly under President Vladimir Putin. Over time, Russia’s divergent positions became more acute—expressed through a concerted effort to challenge positions that it previously opposed although seldom acted upon. For Russia, the possession of nuclear weapons and its position in the global nuclear order have been inextricably tied to its perception of its "great power-ness" (derzhavnost). Official concepts and statements often emphasize Russia’s "responsibility" as one of the major nuclear powers in upholding the nonproliferation regime. Statements frequently underscore Russia’s recognition of its privileges and responsibilities in the global nuclear order despite its relatively weak economic stature and influence in the broader international order. For example, Diplomaticheskaya Sluzhba, the main textbook for future Russian diplomats, explains that Russia’s great power status is determined by its geostrategic position, nuclear potential, and status on the UNSC rather than by metrics such as economics—Moscow’s diplomacy must ensure the country’s position as an authoritative and influential member of the international community. Moscow’s statements about its importance in the global nuclear order have been accompanied by condemnations of what it sees as Washington’s double standards in adhering to the order—a trend in Russian foreign policy thinking that followed the trajectory of Russia’s broader discontent with US foreign policy. Washington’s invocation for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq as a pretext for intervention established a precedent for the "legalization of the principle of ‘illegitimacy of authoritarian regimes’" through the arbitrary policy of the preemptive use of force for the sake of regime change. Moreover, Washington’s efforts to unilaterally pursue punitive counterproliferation policies outside of the purview of the IAEA or UNSC have threatened Russia’s influence over the global nuclear order. Concerns about such threats have been reflected in Russian opposition to unilateral, as opposed to multilateral, sanctions. In general, Moscow’s preference for the UNSC or IAEA reflects the understanding of its relative influence in the deliberative processes. Russia’s positions on the global nuclear order also reflect some of its broader concerns about the defense of sovereignty and its fixation with interference. Russia’s emphasis on national sovereignty and the right to peaceful nuclear energy was highlighted in the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, which noted the imperative to respect "the right of States to determine their national policy on their own…The State itself bears responsibility for ensuring that the national nuclear safety system is efficient and reliable and determining its optimal parameters at its discretion." Russia’s discourses expanded to align with the aspirations of many developing nations for technological and energy independence. The 2023 Foreign Policy Concept expresses Russia’s opposition to using export controls as "a tool of unilateral restrictions that impede the implementation of legitimate international cooperation." The narrative is instrumentally directed to a wider audience because it echoes the long-standing concern of the Global South and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries regarding the dominance of Western powers in international decision-making processes. Over the years, Russia’s foreign policy discourse has constructed an image of Russia as a responsible nuclear power—evident in the repeated affirmation of commitments to nonproliferation treaties and international law, calls for cooperation and legal mechanisms to ensure safety and prevent terrorism, and advocacy for multilateral solutions. Even when flagrantly violating the very positions espoused in such rhetoric, Russia has framed its actions as justified responses to Western hypocrisy. Moreover, Russia’s use of rhetoric that aligns with calls for great powers to move toward disarmament illustrates a superficial effort to portray itself as a responsible actor in line with the NPT. Moscow’s foreign policy discourse serves various purposes: it legitimizes Russia’s own nuclear arsenal, counters narratives of Russia as an aggressive state, and positions the country as an essential player in international efforts to manage nuclear proliferation. The post–Cold War era marked a profound shift in Russia’s role in the global nuclear order. Although Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal, it lost its predecessor’s superpower status and faced a diminished role on the global stage. As Russia grappled with a precarious transition characterized by economic instability and political upheaval, it faced the challenge of ensuring the safety and security of nuclear materials spread across the vast expanse of the former Soviet territories. The period saw the initiation of significant, albeit complex, cooperation with the US, epitomized by the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, aimed at mitigating the threat of securing fissile materials and enhancing security measures. Similarly, the post–Cold War environment paved way for US-Russia cooperation within the IAEA, leading to successes such as the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the 1997 Additional Protocol. However, this collaboration was not without its tensions; issues of sovereignty and perceptions of dependency on the West permeated the relationship. The sense of Western encroachment and disregard for Russian security concerns intensified under Vladimir Putin, who has frequently rearticulated these paranoid sentiments throughout his nearly three-decade tenure at the helm of Russian domestic politics. With the resignation of President Boris Yeltsin in December 1999, Vladimir Putin assumed office with the desire to restore authority through state power that could maintain internal order and assert the country’s interests abroad. Early in Putin’s tenure, Russia attempted to recalibrate its policies toward the global nuclear order and establish itself as an equal partner with the US. The rising threat of WMD terrorism opened doors to new forms of cooperation and deepened the bilateral dialogue. However, this era also witnessed a significant erosion of trust, marked by a perceivable shift in US nonproliferation policy toward unilateralism. US initiatives, although aimed at preventing proliferation, were increasingly viewed as vehicles for promoting US dominance. Still, Russia actively engaged in shaping responses to nuclear proliferation crises, particularly in Iran and North Korea, but it diverged over the methods to resolve these crises. The period following the 2008 Russia-Georgia War saw an attempt to "reset" the strained relations under the Obama Administration. Russia’s support for sanctions against Iran in 2010 and progress during the 2010 NPT Review Conference were greeted with optimism. Yet this optimism was short-lived. Following the brief interregnum under Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 was characterized by an even greater effort to contest and challenge the West. The discontinuation of cooperation within the CTR program was tied to Russia’s perception of the failure to establish a more equitable partnership with the US. Within the IAEA, Russia contested US support for state-level safeguards and refused to support additional sanctions against Iran. Bilateral nonproliferation dialogue, once a field of mutual interest and cooperation, evolved into a more complex and often contentious aspect of US-Russia relations. Russian involvement in the global nuclear order has been characterized by periods of overlapping cooperation and contention, at least partly because Russia and the US have historically differed in their interpretations of the various rules of the global nuclear order. The following sections focus on this evolution of Russia’s positions within the global nuclear order through three key areas: nuclear safety and security, IAEA safeguards, and the resolution of nonproliferation crises. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia faced the challenge of ensuring the nuclear safety and security of nuclear weapons and weapons-related materials at dozens of sites across the country. Some 30,000 nuclear weapons and a vast weapons production complex were spread over four newly sovereign states. The government had difficulties paying salaries at its nuclear facilities, and it could not fund security upgrades, scrap nuclear delivery systems, or undertake new accounting measures. In response to the pervasive threats of unsecured nuclear materials, the US launched the CTR program, which facilitated US-Russia collaboration to secure and dismantle the dispersed nuclear arsenal and infrastructure. It consolidated weapons at secure sites, maintained comprehensive inventories, ensured safe handling and disposition, and found employment for thousands of former Soviet scientists with expert knowledge of WMD or their delivery systems. Simultaneously, Russia began improving its domestic nuclear governance, enacting legislation and policy frameworks to enhance nuclear and radiation safety. Although CTR was viewed as a success in the US, many in Russia viewed the cooperation as an indicator of their country’s diminished status and a sign of reliance on American help and expertise. This perception bred a degree of resentment and a lack of ownership among Russian stakeholders, occasionally impeding collaborative efforts and fostering a sense of dependency rather than partnership. The 1997–1998 Russian financial crisis precipitated a significant reliance on Washington for funds as Russia grappled with the dual challenges of ensuring security at its nuclear facilities and coping with the economic fallout. The period was marked by a heightened risk of nuclear materials being compromised, with reports of highly enriched uranium and plutonium being smuggled from across the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The illicit trafficking catalyzed the IAEA to significantly enhance its nuclear surveillance and security measures, including the establishment of specialized databases. Meanwhile, the situation within Russia was further exacerbated by the Chechen wars, raising the specter of "loose nukes," a term denoting poorly secured nuclear materials vulnerable to acquisition by terrorists or hostile entities. The fears surrounding nuclear security were not unfounded, especially after reports of Chechen insurgents burying a container of radioactive cesium-137 in Moscow’s Izmailovsky Park in 1995 and of Chechen factions engaging in reconnaissance and plotting assaults on Russian nuclear installations. In response to these escalating threats, Russia sought to establish an international framework to address nuclear terrorism. This effort aimed to fortify global nuclear security, but it also provided the veneer of legitimacy to Russia’s extraordinary domestic measures against the Chechen insurgency, which faced mounting criticism from the West. In 1996, at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Group of Seven countries and Russia in Paris, Russia proposed an international convention against nuclear terrorism. The proposal addressed gaps in the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), aiming to extend the definition of "nuclear material" and cover new threats, such as terrorist attacks against nuclear power plants and the illicit acquisition of nuclear materials for terrorist purposes. Russia and the US worked to redefine "nuclear safety" at the 1996 summit on nuclear security, expanding its scope to include the safety of civil nuclear reactors and liability for nuclear damages. During this time, Russia first proposed a mechanism within the United Nations for managing nuclear terrorism, which eventually culminated in the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. This convention provided a legal definition of nuclear terrorism and mandated the criminalization of specific offenses. The US and Russia’s dialogue on nuclear security culminated in several pivotal agreements aimed at reducing nuclear terrorism and proliferation risks. In contrast to its stance in the 1990s, Moscow sought to be perceived as an equal with the US, which would persist as a goal in Russia’s collaboration with the US on nonproliferation throughout the Putin era. In May 2002, a meeting between President George W. Bush and Putin resulted in several declarations on the adoption of immediate measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. At the 2002 Group of Eight (G8) summit in Canada, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction committed significant funds to help nations dismantle their WMD arsenals. Building on the momentum of the Global Partnership, the George W. Bush Administration introduced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in 2004, further expanding the scope of efforts to secure nuclear materials. The GTRI was specifically designed to address the risks posed by weapon-usable nuclear materials located at potentially vulnerable sites worldwide. Consistent with Russia’s desire to cooperate as an equal with Washington, Russia and the US launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2006, which brought together 89 partner states and 6 international organizations participating as observers to foster a common understanding of the challenges posed by the threat of nuclear terrorism. Russia’s concern for sovereignty and secrecy—a legacy of its experience in the 1990s—manifested in its policies. During international negotiations and amendments to nuclear security conventions, Russia sought to ensure that agreements recognized that the primary responsibility for securing nuclear materials, protecting facilities, and combating nuclear terrorism rests with individual states. Russia promoted such a position during negotiations on the Amendment to the CPPNM in 2005, which strengthened standards for the protection, storage, and transportation of nuclear materials within participating states. Russia pushed to include "respect for the sovereignty of the state, its full responsibility for ensuring the physical protection of nuclear materials and installations on its territory." Despite Russia’s emphasis on the role of national governments in ensuring the security of nuclear materials and facilities within their territories, Moscow supported the US call for excluding military actions from the Amendment, including the stipulation that the CPPNM did not apply to the actions of foreign military forces, even if they caused damage to nuclear installations of another country. Moscow and Washington’s cooperation on nuclear security also eroded because of broader political issues. In 2012, the Kremlin rejected a US proposal to renew the CTR agreement, citing Russia’s increasing financial contributions to the dismantlement of nuclear and chemical weapons in accordance with its international obligations. It noted a disagreement with "American partners" on "the form and the basis for further cooperation," including the need to develop "other, more modern legal frameworks." Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin reached an agreement to continue US-Russian nuclear security efforts, which operated under the 2003 Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation and a related protocol signed on June 14, 2013. Under the new framework, the US continued most of its nuclear security–related work but ceased joint efforts with Russia pertaining to the dismantling of missiles, bombers, and chemical weapons. Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the political situation grew tense, and Moscow announced that it would no longer accept Washington’s assistance to secure stockpiles of nuclear material on Russian territory. In 2016, Russia announced its withdrawal from the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, a bilateral arrangement aimed at reducing surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The decision was attributed to what Russia perceived as hostile actions by the US. As discussed later in this paper, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine introduced a complex layer to Russia’s approach toward nuclear safety and security, particularly highlighted by its forceful occupation of a Ukrainian nuclear power plant and related military operations. The pattern of Russia using its privileged position in the nuclear order to advance its interests on nuclear security issues is also evident in its approach to peaceful nuclear energy and safeguards. Moscow and Washington have disagreed over interpretations of IAEA safeguards, which are a set of technical measures designed to verify that states are fulfilling legal obligations to use nuclear material and technology solely for peaceful purposes. Although Russia has generally supported the IAEA safeguards as a tool for promoting nuclear nonproliferation, it has opposed Western-backed efforts to pursue more intrusive verification measures, seeing them as a means of interference. Russia has employed a more flexible approach to international legal obligations, potentially leveraging ambiguities in treaty language or asserting unique interpretations to support its policy positions or those of its allies. The evolution of IAEA safeguards in the 1990s, notably the introduction of the Additional Protocol, was significantly influenced by Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program, which underscored the need for more robust measures to detect and prevent such covert operations. Adopted in 1997, the Additional Protocol enhances existing agreements by granting the IAEA broader access to member states’ nuclear and related facilities, requiring more detailed state declarations of nuclear activities, and implementing advanced environmental sampling techniques. Russia supported these measures to fill the gaps in previous safeguards and deter future clandestine nuclear activities. For example, Moscow applied pressure on Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol in 2003 and even applied for it for its own enrichment conversion facilities. Russia and the US have exhibited starkly divergent perspectives on the best methods to encourage other countries to adopt the Additional Protocol and on the protocol’s role in relation to a state’s right to peaceful nuclear energy. Although US policy typically conditions nuclear cooperation with states on the ratification of the Additional Protocol, Russia does not mandate its commercial partners to adopt the protocol as a prerequisite for cooperation. Russia staunchly opposed President George W. Bush’s proposition to limit access to nuclear technology among countries that had not ratified the Additional Protocol and to exclude consistent violators of the NPT from the IAEA. Russian experts criticized the notion of denying nations the right to access peaceful nuclear energy cooperation under the NPT. Moreover, Moscow harbored concerns about potential conflicts between the US and "problematic" states unwilling to relinquish their nuclear capabilities to international oversight. With the Additional Protocol, Russia often emphasizes the need to balance the IAEA’s verification rights with respect for state sovereignty and confidentiality of sensitive information. Russia’s position is that the Additional Protocol constitutes "the highest standard of verification of compliance" with the NPT but that it "is strictly voluntary, and any coercion as to the signing of an additional protocol is completely inappropriate." In an outgrowth of Russia’s concern about Western efforts to undermine the sovereignty of the West’s adversaries, Moscow has said that the US push for stricter controls and oversight mechanisms impinges on national sovereignty. Moscow’s opposition to conditioning civilian nuclear cooperation on the ratification of the Additional Protocol manifested in practice through Rosatom; Russia has been more willing to take risks by pursuing contracts with states that had dubious records in terms of the implementation of IAEA safeguards and ratification of the Additional Protocol. This willingness is partly because Russia’s state apparatus has often supported Rosatom as a form of diplomacy but also because autocratic states are less prone to domestic opposition over contracts with potential proliferation risks. For example, Moscow was willing to pursue Egypt’s El Dabaa project even though Cairo neglected to sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol and faced IAEA scrutiny in the past for violating its safeguards agreement. Part of Russia’s willingness to cooperate with states such as Egypt and Bangladesh reflects commercial interests through Rosatom. In the early 2010s, the State-Level Concept in IAEA safeguards was introduced as an evolution in the approach to nuclear verification aimed at enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards implementation. Under this concept, the IAEA assesses the entirety of a state’s nuclear activities and related capabilities, considering its nuclear fuel cycle, the specific nature of its nuclear facilities, and its overall nuclear history and compliance record. This holistic assessment allows a more tailored application of safeguards that reflects the unique characteristics and risks associated with each state’s nuclear program. From 2011 onward, there was a noticeable shift in Russia’s approach to IAEA safeguards—a change that could be attributed to broader trends in Russian foreign policy objectives and priorities. Moscow was increasingly vocal about the politicization of the IAEA, condemning the perceived use of the nuclear nonproliferation regime to justify largely unrelated policies, such as the war with Iraq in 2003. Russia’s objections to the state-level safeguards concept concerned the transparency of the IAEA Secretariat with respect to third-party information provided by states, which could lead to safeguards-specific decisions. Russia’s concern has been that the IAEA’s use of information from Western intelligence agencies will make the agency basically an arm of Western intelligence. Moscow has even accused Washington of calling for a more comprehensive safeguards regime as a pretext to violate the sovereignty of US adversaries. The State-Level Concept first became a topic of debate among the member states at the 56th General Conference, held in September 2012. During the conference, Russia stated that "technical parameters" should dictate the IAEA’s approach to safeguards. In criticizing the concept, Russia said, "the notion of a State-level approach to safeguards appeared to be increasingly infused with political considerations." At the same conference, the Russian delegation accused the Secretariat of "taking a selective approach to the implementation of General Conference resolutions" and of making decisions about safeguards approaches "behind closed doors." Russia perceived discrimination in the application of safeguards and was concerned that the "selective approach" could unfairly target certain nations while overlooking others. Russia’s concerns about the use of third-party intelligence in the IAEA’s assessments was heightened after the IAEA’s report on Iran’s nuclear program in November 2011. The Russians interpreted the November 2011 report as an indication that the safeguards system was increasingly influenced by political biases for political pressure because it relied in part on intelligence provided by third-party states to assert that Iran had carried out activities related to nuclear weapons. Russia repeatedly emphasized the need to ensure that changes in verification activities were based on technical analysis and not influenced by external political factors. Over time, Russian discourse about the politicization of IAEA safeguards grew progressively more prominent. Russia began underscoring the primary role of IAEA safeguards as verifying states’ nonproliferation commitments under the NPT, stressing that these safeguards should be implemented with full respect for state sovereignty. Moreover, Russia invoked the need to "ensure its impartial, depoliticized and technically sound application" of safeguards, stating that "safeguards should not be a pretext for discrimination against certain countries with regard to the exercise of the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." Likewise, a recent report from the PIR Center highlighted the politicization of, and unfair approach to, safeguards issues, contrasting the IAEA’s reactions to Iran with its reactions to Japan. As discussed in the next section, although Russia publicly condemns the politicization of IAEA safeguards, its actions in Ukraine indicate a willingness to use nuclear safety and security issues as instruments in its political objectives, undermining the credibility of its advocacy for a depoliticized and impartial application of international nuclear safeguards. Even when working toward the common goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Moscow and Washington have diverged over approaches to resolving proliferation crises. In contrast to US policy to curtail civilian nuclear cooperation with potential proliferators, Russia has often defended a state’s right to nuclear energy—contingent on IAEA oversight. Similarly, Moscow has exhibited caution toward forceful measures for noncompliance, preferring diplomatic solutions, as exemplified by its advocacy for dialogue and negotiation rather than sanctions or the use of force. When endorsing coercive actions, Russia has stressed the role of the UNSC as the sole legitimate authority to mandate force. This stance was firmly articulated in the 2005 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery, which states that the UNSC is the "only international body authorized, if necessary, to take decisions on the implementation of coercive measures against states in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." During the Bush Administration, Russia exhibited concern that US counterproliferation strategy allowed various sanctions, including preventive measures, and even the use of force against countries suspected of illegally acquiring or proliferating WMD technologies. Russia was particularly averse to the notion of "rogue states" (gosudarstva-izgoi), popularized during the George W. Bush Administration, which Moscow considered an effort to impose "standards of legitimacy" on states and justify the use of force. The issue of rogue states was connected to Russia’s broader grievances about strategic stability after the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 under the pretext of enabling the deployment of missile defense systems to target rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. Russia frequently dismissed US concerns about nonproliferation as overstated and embodying Washington’s double standards that concealed political, military, and commercial interests. Yet, until recently, Russian disagreements about the veracity of US concerns did not preclude cooperation. Instead, as a means of providing alternative solutions, Russia contributed to nuclear nonproliferation initiatives, proposing the establishment of international uranium enrichment centers within its borders, like its facility in Angarsk, and offering to repatriate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from Soviet-era reactors in other countries. These efforts not only elevated Russia’s status as a key nuclear supplier but also addressed the issue of oversight for countries’ fuel cycles and fissile materials. Even while expressing opposition to Washington’s policy on proliferation, Russia cooperated with the George W. Bush Administration on WMD policy. In 2003, Moscow expressed reservations about the legality of the US-proposed Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which advocated forceful measures to prevent WMD from reaching hostile regimes, including forced searches of suspect vessels. Moscow eventually relented and joined the PSI in 2004. However, Russia sought to ensure that the US did not include the PSI in UNSC resolutions related to nonproliferation issues because Russian diplomats considered references to terms such as "interdictions" as a pretext for the use of force. For example, Russia produced the first draft of UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which mandated states to establish legislative frameworks for WMD nonproliferation and create a monitoring committee. During the deliberations over UNSCR 1540, Russia blocked US efforts to include references to "interdiction" for noncompliance, diminishing the direct authority for PSI activities that the resolution might have provided. Moscow exhibited more restraint on the interpretations of UNSCR 1540’s mandate to pursue punitive actions. Russia remained cautious about empowering the 1540 committee’s more proactive and intrusive measures, such as visits to evaluate the domestic needs of a state to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Russia instead advocated that seeking assistance should be a sovereign decision of each state. Russia, like most of the international community, does not recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. This position aligns with Russia’s commitment to the NPT and its broader goal of maintaining the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. In the 1990s, Russian diplomacy played a marginal role in issues in the Korean Peninsula. In response to North Korea’s declaration of withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, Russia suspended ongoing cooperation with North Korea in the nuclear field and supported international efforts to resolve the issue. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea, North Korea’s Soviet-type graphite reactors were to be replaced with American light-water reactors. Russian experts expressed concerns that the true reason behind US and Japanese pressure on North Korea was competition for the atomic technology market. Moscow began playing a larger role in North Korea in the early 2000s. Russia was a key participant in the six-party talks (2003–2009), aimed at dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program through negotiations involving North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, and the US. Russia consistently pushed for a step-by-step approach, advocating for a combination of incentives, such as economic aid and security guarantees, and gradual denuclearization, emphasizing the importance of dialogue over isolation. Before North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, Russia was hesitant to endorse sanctions, preferring diplomatic engagement and often acting as a counterbalance to the more stringent measures proposed by the US and its allies. However, the 2006 nuclear test marked a significant shift. Russia supported UNSCR 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea. Russia continued to back further rounds of sanctions following subsequent nuclear tests and missile launches by North Korea in 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017. These sanctions included arms embargoes, trade restrictions, and financial sanctions. The war in Ukraine prompted a major change in Russia’s relationship with North Korea. Russia played a much larger role in the Iranian nuclear program than in the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Russian diplomatic sway over the Iran nuclear program was strengthened by its technical ability and willingness to support cooperative measures on ensuring the civilian nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Starting in the early 1990s, Russia pursued civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran through the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, which reflected Moscow’s wider understanding of the right to civilian nuclear energy, the importance of safeguards, and efforts to strengthen export control laws. During this time, Russia rebuffed US concerns about Iran’s clandestine activities, which Russian diplomats considered overstated. Even after the 2002 revelations of Iran’s covert nuclear program, including uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz and weapons-grade plutonium production facilities in Arak, Russia consistently defended Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. During the George W. Bush Administration, to protect its business interests, Moscow pressured Tehran to agree on the return of spent fuel to Russia to quell US concerns about Iran’s ability to convert spent fuel from Bushehr into weapons-grade plutonium. Russian cooperation was crucial to international efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. From 2006 to 2010, Russia supported UNSC sanctions on Iran even though it sought to water down the language and shield its own economic interests. Moscow employed a two-pronged approach, utilizing both diplomatic efforts to weaken sanctions and its nuclear cooperation with Iran as leverage to elicit concessions from the US in secondary areas. Russia lobbied for the exemption of civilian nuclear energy and existing cooperation in light-water reactor technology, such as that used in Bushehr, in UN sanctions resolutions. Moscow proposed amendments to soften resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program, short of wielding its veto power. Moreover, Russia’s technical "delays" over the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant—its flagship civilian nuclear project in Iran—reflected a commitment to ensuring the civilian nature of Iran’s nuclear program. In essence, Moscow used delays in the construction and supply of fuel for Bushehr to pressure Iranian cooperation with the IAEA. Russia used Iran as a "bargaining chip," which allowed Moscow to elicit US reciprocity on the removal of Rosoboroneksport sanctions and the ratification of a 123 agreement for closer cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the nuclear sphere. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia exhibited a strategic compartmentalization of its foreign policy that enabled progress on specific issues, such as the Iran nuclear talks. Russia maintained a constructive role throughout the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations, offering diplomatic solutions that addressed key contentious issues, such as setting the 300-kilogram threshold for low-enriched uranium stockpiles, developing the mechanism for snapback sanctions on Iran, and finding solutions for the conversion of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. Following the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal, Russia continued to denounce "maximum pressure" while pressing Tehran to return to the JCPOA enrichment limits and to ensure IAEA oversight. However, after initiating the war in Ukraine, Russia’s priorities for its war effort prompted a reevaluation in foreign policy priorities, with nonproliferation taking a backseat to its needs for artillery and drones from Iran. Russia’s past position served as a prologue for its more aggressive behavior following its invasion of Ukraine. In many areas in which divergences existed, Russia shifted to actively opposing and blocking efforts using its procedural power to obstruct processes. On nonproliferation issues, Moscow has shown a notable shift from cooperating—albeit with different approaches—to vacillating between acquiescence and obstruction. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine poses a unique dilemma for the nonproliferation regime because of Ukraine’s past as a nuclear state. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself in possession of a significant portion of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons, ranking third globally in terms of nuclear arsenal size. A period of prolonged negotiations ultimately led to the transfer of Ukrainian nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for negative security assurances from three nuclear-weapon states—the US, the UK, and Russia—in an agreement known as the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. Under this agreement, signed in 1994, the signatories offered assurances against the threat or use of force against Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political independence to incentivize Ukraine’s accession into the NPT as a nonnuclear-weapon state. In 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine were in contravention to the promises of the Budapest Memorandum. Subsequently, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) further challenged the promises set out in 1994. Meanwhile, throughout the war in Ukraine, Russia’s implicit and explicit nuclear threats appear to have greatly undermined the principles of the global nuclear order. Russia’s fundamental challenge to this order has prompted serious questions about its commitment to the regimes and principles that have governed nuclear technology. Leveraging its status as a nuclear power, Russia has exerted pressure to shape the policies and actions of the IAEA, thereby altering the course of international nuclear oversight and governance. Moscow’s infringement of Ukrainian sovereignty has had implications for nuclear latency and the resolution of proliferation crises. Disunity among the P5 means that a solution to pressing nonproliferation challenges is unlikely, especially because Russia’s war effort requires military supplies from Iran and North Korea. Despite the shift in foreign policy priorities, Russia continues to assert its role within the framework of the NPT while simultaneously challenging the validity, applicability, and interpretations of several key facets of the global nuclear order. Its normative contestation is characterized by efforts to cast doubt upon, or offer alternative interpretations to, the foundational principles and agreements that underpin the global nuclear order. This approach is not merely a matter of differing perspectives; it signifies a calculated attempt to redefine the norms and standards of nuclear governance. By doing so, Russia seeks to create an environment in which international nuclear norms are subject to exceptions based on one’s status as a nuclear-weapon state rather than being upheld as universal and inviolable standards. Russia’s incursion into Ukraine represents a blatant violation of the commitments enshrined in the Budapest Memorandum, undermining the foundational tenets of nuclear security and safety. The occupation and subsequent unilateral annexation of Ukrainian nuclear facilities raise critical concerns regarding the stewardship, ownership, and operational responsibility of these facilities. Since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has persistently disregarded the principles and norms of nuclear safety and security, including the safe operation of Ukrainian nuclear power plants. In the first hours of the invasion, Russia seized and subsequently looted the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, using the site as a staging ground for its attempt to capture Kyiv. That same month, a Russian missile struck a radioactive source facility outside of Kyiv. Despite being aware of the nuclear risks in Ukraine stemming from its military activity, Russia also conducted repeated strikes against a radiological storage facility near Kharkiv in June 2022 and against the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant in September 2022. In March 2022, Russian military forces attacked and successfully seized the ZNPP—an act unprecedented in the history of warfare. The armed seizure of the plant and the fighting that took place around it for months afterward caused episodic losses of off-site power, which is critical to the safe operation of the plant. Repeated shelling in the vicinity of the ZNPP has not only endangered the physical integrity of its reactors and associated infrastructure but also led to several instances of power disruptions, critically threatening the essential cooling systems for both the reactors and the spent fuel pools. The operation of the plant under military occupation poses unique safety challenges because Ukrainian personnel managed the facility under duress, potentially compromising operational safety standards and increasing the risk of human error. In addition, Russian personnel systematically mistreated the Ukrainian staff at the ZNPP, sometimes through unwarranted detention and other times by subjecting them to mental and physical abuse, which degraded their ability to safely operate the facilities. Russian shelling at Zaporizhzhia also runs counter to Moscow’s repeated claims that it is committed to nuclear safety, including past statements that attacks on nuclear power plants are illegal. The situation at the ZNPP starkly highlights the difference between traditional nuclear security measures, which are primarily aimed at preventing acts of sabotage and terrorism, and the actual requirements for defending nuclear facilities against military assaults in a conflict situation. Historically, the focus of nuclear security has been on enhancing the physical protection of facilities, safeguarding sensitive materials, and preventing unauthorized access or theft. Russia, as discussed previously, endorsed these measures, which are typically designed to counter threats from non-state actors or insiders, not organized military forces. Moscow has unilaterally subsumed the ZNPP into a Russian state enterprise, which brings into question who is responsible for the plant’s safety and how international norms can be enforced when a state forcibly takes control of a nuclear facility in another sovereign nation. The CPPNM, ratified by Russia, obliges parties to ensure the safe management of nuclear installations and criminalizes the sabotage of nuclear facilities by non-state actors. According to the CPPNM, the responsibility for nuclear safety rests entirely with the holder of the relevant license and ultimately with the state that has jurisdiction over the nuclear installation. With the plant now under Russian control, there is a disturbing dissonance between legal obligation and the on-ground reality of forced occupation as Moscow has asserted its role in the responsibility for safety. Russia’s stance and actions concerning the ZNPP and its interactions with the IAEA are aimed at consolidating control over annexed territories, legitimizing its jurisdiction over the ZNPP, and countering international scrutiny. Russia has taken a critical stance toward IAEA’s Board of Governors and its General Conference, accusing these bodies of overstepping the IAEA’s mandate through their resolutions concerning Ukraine. Moscow has repeatedly proclaimed that the ZNPP resides on "Russian territory and under Russian jurisdiction," a claim that directly contradicts international recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty. Moscow has also asserted that it "ensures the safety and security of all its nuclear facilities, including the ZNPP, in accordance with national legislation and international obligations" and described "attempts to dictate to US the safety parameters of the functioning of Russian nuclear facilities as interference in internal affairs and actions hostile to [Russia]." By insisting on its jurisdiction over the ZNPP and framing international concern as an intrusion, Russia is seeking to consolidate its annexation efforts and counteract international condemnation. Moreover, Russia has deflected the blame onto the Ukrainian military. Via information circulars to the IAEA, Russia has consistently emphasized the perceived threats to nuclear security posed by Ukrainian military actions around the ZNPP and its neighboring city, Enerhodar. In August 2022, Moscow used its presidency of the UNSC to hold a debate that accused Ukraine of endangering the security of the ZNPP through its military actions. Russia has also complicated the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ), established in September 2022 to assess physical damage to the ZNPP, the functionality of the plant’s safety and security systems, and the working conditions of the ZNPP’s staff. On numerous occasions, Russia has obstructed ISAMZ access to the ZNPP and repeatedly denied it permission to inspect specific reactors and turbine halls. For example, in July 2023, the ISAMZ effort to inspect for explosives at the ZNPP was hindered as Russian authorities denied the inspectors entry to Units 3 and 4, potential sites for these materials. Russia has also frequently opposed calls for the demilitarization of the ZNPP, claiming that only security personnel were present at the ZNPP and that demilitarization would lead to Ukraine’s forceful occupation. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have not only destabilized the region but also had far-reaching implications for the global nuclear order. The undermining of established norms and the manipulation of international mechanisms for national gain pose a profound challenge to the future of nuclear security and safety. The war in Ukraine has illustrated the stark dichotomy in the privileges between nuclear- and nonnuclear-weapon states. For nonnuclear-weapon states, the erosion of trust in security assurances could potentially recalibrate their security calculus toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a sovereign safeguard. Russian aggression against Ukraine, a nonnuclear state that gave up its nuclear arsenal under the Budapest Memorandum, has raised questions about the effectiveness of such security assurances. In addition, some have argued that the war in Ukraine serves as a cautionary tale about the potential risks associated with forgoing nuclear capabilities in exchange for security assurances from other powers. In Asia, countries such as Japan and South Korea, which heavily rely on US negative security commitments, have heightened concerns about their security in the face of nuclear threats. For South Korea, discussions about enhancing the country’s own nuclear deterrence capabilities or seeking more robust nuclear deterrence arrangements with the US eventually culminated in the Washington Declaration. Meanwhile, Iran has shown a greater tendency to leverage its nuclear developments with little concern about collective efforts at multilateral sanctions. At the same time, the ability to resolve future nuclear proliferation challenges is fraught with challenges among the nuclear powers themselves. Russia’s actions and the ensuing polarization have fractured the erstwhile semblance of unity among nuclear-weapon states. Beyond specific state aspirations, the growing disunity within the P5 makes resolving future nuclear proliferation crises much more challenging. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has vetoed UNSC resolutions on North Korea and has shielded Iran from international scrutiny. The current disunity may potentially embolden other states, either proliferators or those considering proliferation, by demonstrating the limitations of international mechanisms in enforcing compliance and resolution. Within the IAEA, Russia has strategically utilized the Board of Governors as a platform to rationalize and defend its actions in Ukraine while breaking consensus with China on major resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program. After invading Ukraine, however, Russia acquiesced to Iran’s nuclear activities and spoiled Western efforts to roll back Iran’s nuclear program. In June and November 2022, Russia voted against Board of Governors resolutions about Iran’s intransigence over past nuclear activities and inspections. Iran subsequently escalated the situation by disconnecting IAEA cameras at nuclear sites, facing no protest or expressions of concern from Russia, which instead blamed the IAEA for provoking Tehran. The NPT review process was also victim to the polarization. The Tenth Review Conference of the NPT concluded without achieving consensus on a final comprehensive document, primarily because of dissent from Russia. This impasse stemmed from Russia’s opposition to the draft summary prepared by the conference presidency, a document that needed unanimous approval for adoption. The outcome echoed the precedent set by the 2015 Review Conference, marking it as the second consecutive instance in which the conference failed to yield a substantive outcome document. Speaking in Main Committee III, Russia argued that any paragraph on Ukraine, however "nominally neutral," would "destroy any chance for consensus" and, therefore, the best solution would be to delete all such paragraphs. Subsequently, during the preparatory process for the Next Review Conference, Russia aligned with Iran and China on impeding progress on Western initiatives. Russia’s lessons from the war seem not to be about the implications of nuclear latency but rather about the effect of latency on weakening US power. Dmitri Trenin, a member of Russia’s influential Foreign and Defense Policy Council, explained that "the weakening of the NPT is an important factor undermining American hegemony…the states upon which the US exerts pressure for nonproliferation—North Korea and Iran—are political adversaries of the US and increasingly close partners of Russia." Trenin dismissed the idea of "collaborating with Washington" on Iran and North Korea as "unthinkable," especially because of Washington’s support for Ukraine. He argued that rather than providing "direct support" for Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear or missile programs, Moscow will refuse to join international pressure on Iran and North Korea. The broader decline in nonproliferation within Russian foreign policy is apparent in the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, which departs from its previous iterations by watering down language on the nonproliferation regime, replacing it with discussions about strategic stability and deterrence. Speculation about Russia’s technical assistance to North Korea since the war, alongside allegations that Russia is supplying fissile material for nuclear weapons to China, has prompted concerns about Rosatom’s technical assistance as a catalyst for proliferation. The most direct way Russia could spark proliferation is by providing technological assistance to states aspiring to develop nuclear capabilities, which could include sharing nuclear technology, expertise, or materials. Such actions would not only contravene nonproliferation norms but also significantly undermine global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The premise that Russia is seeking to deliberately enable nuclear proliferation does not align with Moscow’s broader interests or its historical approach to nuclear cooperation, which has sought to maintain influence and leverage though a country’s dependence on Russia. Even though Russia has been willing to pursue civilian cooperation with states that had imperfect safety records, Moscow has been reluctant to directly transfer enrichment technologies. Despite its noncooperative stance on nuclear nonproliferation, Russia is unlikely to be seeking to be a patron to future proliferators. Although Russia may refrain from sharing enrichment technology, Moscow may be inclined to follow the lead of the US and the UK by selling nuclear propulsion technology. Russia could also see the AUKUS submarine deal as setting a precedent, allowing it to promote its own nuclear submarine technology to interested parties in the region. Since the 1980s, Russia has been leasing nuclear-powered attack submarines to India and engaged in the transfer of expertise. Russian military expert Ruslan Pukhov even suggested that Vietnam or Algeria are potential markets: "Literally before our eyes, a new market for nuclear powered submarines is being created….Over the past 30 years, Americans have tried to prevent the spread of these technologies.…But now that the Americans have announced that they are selling such technologies, this is actually creating a new arms market—the market for nuclear-powered submarines." Whether or not Russia actively pursues the export of nuclear propulsion technology, Russia’s greater willingness to explore sensitive technology transfers should also be viewed in the context of its tendency to mirror US policy; increasingly, it is invoking Washington’s actions as a precedent for misconduct. Russia’s decisions to deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus and to revoke its ratification of the CTBT have been extensions of Moscow’s broader intransigence, which has shifted from critiquing US policy to actively mirroring it. Before the war in Ukraine, US nuclear cooperation with NATO and its stalled ratification of the CTBT were among the litany of grievances invoked by Russia about Washington’s contravention of the NPT. Russia’s mimicry has aimed to draw attention to instances in which norms are enforced selectively or inconsistently, thereby deflecting international scrutiny from its own actions. In March 2023, Russia’s move to deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Belarus mirrored NATO’s long-standing practice of nuclear sharing. The US has deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons in various European countries, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, as part of NATO’s collective defense strategy. The decision to deploy nonstrategic weapons to Belarus should be seen as an effort to mimic US policy. Russia’s intensified criticism of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements in relation to Article I of the NPT belies Moscow’s role in US and Soviet negotiations that allowed such nuclear sharing arrangements under certain conditions. During the NPT negotiations, the Soviet Union feared the establishment of a NATO multilateral force that would potentially enable nonnuclear countries to access nuclear capabilities. The US and Soviet Union sought to find mutually acceptable language to mollify Soviet demands that the NPT contain explicit prohibitions on the transfer of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear countries not just directly but through a military alliance, namely, NATO, remembering previous US attempts to nuclearize NATO through the Multilateral Force. The US and the Soviet Union reached a compromise, with the US agreeing to abandon its Multilateral Force plans in exchange for Soviet acquiescence to existing NATO nuclear sharing arrangements under the stipulation of US control over nuclear arms on allied territory. The end of the Cold War led to unilateral decisions by Russia and the US to withdraw and dismantle many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including many of those stationed in Europe under NATO’s nuclear sharing. At the 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Russia explicitly connected NATO’s expansion to the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe and broader nuclear nonproliferation issues. Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov made it clear that placing nuclear weapons in new NATO member states would provoke corresponding countermeasures from Russia. Russian warnings elicited a response from the US, with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright articulating the "three no’s" policy: no intentions, no plans, and no reasons to deploy nuclear weapons in new NATO members during peacetime. The vow to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons to new members contributed to a softening of Russia’s position, which made it possible to agree on and adopt the Russia-NATO Founding Act. Despite the grand bargain over NPT negotiations and assurances after the collapse of the Soviet Union, elites and policy-makers in Russia have continued to criticize nuclear sharing. For example, in 2004, the PIR Center published a report chastising Russian officials for neglecting to question the issue of NATO nuclear sharing and its violation of the NPT. Russia’s critique of NATO’s nuclear sharing emerged after 2015, amid deteriorating relations over the annexation of Crimea, over NATO discussions around the modernization of its nonstrategic nuclear capabilities. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned these actions as violations of the NPT, highlighting the involvement of nonnuclear NATO members in nuclear missions as a significant risk to the treaty’s integrity. At the 2020 NPT Review Conference, Russia reiterated its stance, emphasizing the need for nuclear weapons to remain within national territories to foster global security and discourage disarmament. Russia’s March 2023 announcement that it would station nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Belarus was preceded by various hints at a potential nuclear sharing arrangement. Notably, two months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko expressed readiness to host Russian nuclear weapons should NATO nuclear arms be placed in Poland. Following the invasion, Belarus swiftly amended its constitution, eliminating the prohibition on hosting nuclear arms. By June 2022, President Putin had declared plans to relocate Iskander-M missiles, capable of bearing both conventional and nuclear warheads, to Belarus and, similar to NATO’s dual-capable aircraft assigned to nuclear missions, to upgrade Belarusian Su-25 aircraft for nuclear capability. In announcing the deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, Putin justified the action as a counterbalance to long-standing US practices in Europe, asserting that this move does not contravene international nonproliferation commitments. Putin stated that "the United States has been doing this for decades....[Russia and Belarus] agreed that we would do the same without violating our international obligations on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons." Apparently, the storage facility in Belarus for nonstrategic nuclear weapons will be managed exclusively by Russia’s 12th Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry, not by Belarusian forces. Russian analysts argue that the approach reflects a significant departure from NATO’s strategy, in which weapons vaults are typically co-located with the aircraft designated to deliver them. In contrast, the Belarusian facility will function as a centralized storage site, separate from the locations of the aircraft or missiles. Russia has suggested that this centralized system underscores a fundamental difference in operational strategy: unlike NATO’s approach, in which nuclear weapons are stored alongside delivery systems for rapid deployment, the Russian model in Belarus involves storing the weapons at a discrete location. In the event of an intense crisis, these weapons would be transported from the storage facility and prepared for use, similar to the protocol followed with Russia’s internal nuclear arsenal. Russia’s 2023 announcement of the deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus directly relates to Article I of the NPT, which stipulates that nuclear-weapon states pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over them to any nonnuclear-weapon state. It also, as argued by Russia multiple times, runs counter to the Article II pledge of disarmament. By deploying nuclear weapons to Belarus, Russia is not only mirroring the very NATO policies that it previously chastised but also challenging the moral high ground often taken by NATO in criticizing Russia’s military strategies. This move can be interpreted as a form of strategic reciprocity designed to underscore the perceived hypocrisy of NATO’s stance. Like the US, Russia has been involved in the CTBT since its inception. As a crucial step toward global disarmament efforts, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear explosions, whether for civilian or military purposes, and thwarts their development through the prevention of testing vital for their advancement. Despite being a key architect of the CTBT, the US has not ratified the treaty. Russia’s decision to withdraw its ratification of the CTBT should be perceived as a deliberate act of mimicking the US position aimed at highlighting the repercussions of selective adherence to nuclear treaties by the US. Historically, Moscow viewed limits on nuclear testing as a major component of the bilateral relationship. The Soviet Union declared a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1985, and the US followed with a nine-month moratorium after tests in September 1992. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia committed to observing the moratorium as long as the US did the same, under the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which allowed on-site verifications. Eventually, the improved environment led to the negotiations for the CTBT. The US and Russia signed the CTBT on the day the treaty opened for signature at the United Nations in September 1996; however, both countries faced domestic opposition over its ratification. Whereas Russia’s internal deliberations and assessments of the treaty’s implications for Russia’s national security eventually paved the way for ratification in June 2000, the US Senate declined to give its advice and consent by a vote of 48 in favor of ratification and 51 against in 1999. Despite US delays on ratification, Russia endeavored to incorporate the CTBT into its strategic discussions with the US. This effort was evident on June 4, 2000, when Russian President Vladimir Putin and then–US President Bill Clinton signed a Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability, which included the topic of ratifying the CTBT as a key point of their dialogue. However, the CTBT’s entry into force has been impeded by nonratification of the US and other Annex II powers, countries whose ratification is necessary for the treaty to take effect because they possessed enrichment and reprocessing at the time the treaty was negotiated. Russia has been vocal in its critique of the US failure to ratify the CTBT, highlighting perceived double standards in the international community’s approach to nuclear nonproliferation. Over the years, Russian policy-makers and elites have bemoaned the US nonratification of the CTBT. Moscow State University Professor Aleksei Fenenko contended that it is challenging for Russia to be the sole nuclear power fully adhering to the treaty’s terms and conditions because among the nuclear-weapon states, Russia is the only one that both has a moratorium on nuclear tests and has ratified the treaty. Although Britain and France have ratified the treaty, they have not adopted a testing moratorium. In contrast, China and the US have not ratified the treaty but have voluntarily enacted testing moratoriums. Notably, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have neither ratified the treaty nor established any testing moratorium. Moreover, the military community remained concerned about the possibility of secret tests. Reservations about the status of the CTBT have been echoed by Russian officials who have repeatedly called upon states to ratify or sign the CTBT. At the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, Russia stated: "We are deeply concerned by the lack of any tangible progress in the CTBT coming into force. We recall that our country ratified the CTBT in 2000, and we are working hard to make it universal both in bilateral and multilateral formats." On the 25th anniversary of the CTBT, Putin released a statement: "The document, unfortunately, has not come into force. The opposition of eight states, whose ratification of the treaty is mandatory, hinders its transformation into a fully-fledged international legal instrument. It is evident that such a situation does not contribute in any way to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament." Since the war in Ukraine, Russia has departed from merely critiquing nonratification of the CTBT by Annex II countries to contemplating its own measures to withdraw ratification. In October 2023, President Vladimir Putin spoke about the possibility of withdrawing Russia’s ratification of the CTBT at a meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club. Noting that the US signed but never ratified the treaty, he suggested that Russia could "behave in a mirror manner." Several days later, the Russian State Duma, the country’s lower house of parliament, unanimously voted in favor of withdrawing the ratification of the CTBT. The Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin stated: "For 23 years we have been waiting for the United States of America to ratify the Treaty…But Washington used its double standards and irresponsible approach towards global security issues and still has not done that…The Russian Federation will do everything to protect its citizens and ensure that global strategic parity is being maintained." After the vote, Sergei Ryabkov, Russia’s deputy minister of foreign affairs, clarified that the Duma vote does not signify a withdrawal from the treaty or plans for future nuclear tests but that Russia will remain a signatory, "just as the United States has done for the past 23 years." He added that Russia will continue to transmit and receive data within the framework of the international monitoring system of the CTBT. "Parity in political and legal terms with the United States will be restored in the current segment," the diplomat noted, clarifying that this is a "significant signal to Americans and everyone else" regarding the ratification of the treaty. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that the move is being taken to reestablish strategic parity with the US. Russia has selectively repealed only Article 1 of its ratification law pertaining to the CTBT while maintaining other legislative elements. The retained provisions continue to define the Russian government’s responsibilities under the treaty, such as supporting the CTBT Organization financially, participating in the Preparatory Commission, maintaining International Monitoring System stations in Russia, and aiding in on-site inspections. By mimicking US policies, Russia is effectively turning the mirror on the US, forcing a reevaluation of the established norms and double standards in international nuclear policy. This tactic serves to critique the prevailing narrative dominated by Western powers and proposes a counternarrative in which similar actions are taken by Russia in a comparable geopolitical context. Russia’s deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus and the withdrawal of ratification from the CTBT are emblematic of a broader strategy of strategic mimicry aimed at the US. The war in Ukraine has prompted serious questions about Russia’s commitment to the regimes and principles that have governed nuclear technology. Rather than disengaging from the global nuclear order, Russia has continued to emphasize its role in the fundamental regimes of this order while challenging the validity, applicability, and interpretations of many of the norms and principles espoused by the West. Moscow’s contestation of these norms involves casting doubt on, or offering alternative interpretations of, agreements that underpin the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Russia maintains active participation and financial commitment in these regimes, underscoring its preference to shape the nuclear order from within established structures. This engagement is not passive; Russia actively influences the staffing, funding, and programmatic direction of the IAEA. It can employ procedural tactics to challenge the status quo, such as stalling decisions in the IAEA’s Board of Governors or using its veto power in the UNSC. Such actions can impede progress on crucial issues, including sanctions, inspections, and resolutions aimed at addressing nuclear proliferation concerns. Russia’s tactics suggest a strategic intent to use these regimes for agenda-setting and exerting its influence, rather than withdrawing or diminishing its role. The US should remain concerned about Moscow’s greater will to leverage these organizations for advancing its interests, often to the detriment of norms. As demonstrated prominently in recent rounds of NPT Preparatory Committees, Russia’s engagement with like-minded states represents a concerted effort to mobilize a collective front. The impasse in the NPT review process development is a clear signal that Russia intends to use its institutional power within these frameworks to its advantage, influencing decision-making processes and norm setting. Moreover, the US should be prepared for Russia to mimic or counter US policies, as seen in Russia’s nuclear weapons deployment in Belarus and its stance on the CTBT. Russia could also see the AUKUS submarine deal as setting a precedent allowing it to promote its own nuclear submarine technology to interested parties in the region, an additional attempt to mirror US actions. Russia has chosen to disengage selectively from Western-led initiatives while maintaining its participation in UN-led processes concerning WMD. An illustrative case is the 2022 review of Russia’s foreign policy by the Foreign Ministry, which disclosed Russia’s withdrawal from the PSI. Per the Foreign Ministry, Russia’s decision to cease its participation in the PSI was driven by the necessity to respond to both symmetrical and asymmetrical measures amid the "hybrid war" instigated by Western nations following the launch of its "special military operation." Rather than pursuing a linkage with broader issues, Washington should be realistic about the realization of any bilateral nonproliferation cooperation while maintaining dialogue with Russia via UN processes such as UNSCR 1540 and organizations such as the CTBT. For example, given Russia’s concerns about US subcritical nuclear tests, Washington might seek a path to address mutual apprehensions. The West should be realistic about the limitations of cooperation with Russia, especially concerning the Iranian nuclear program. Moscow’s reluctance to facilitate nuclear diplomacy with Iran and North Korea indicates a deteriorating relationship with the West. This perceived deterioration is aligned with Moscow’s strategy of diverting Western attention away from itself and toward other international issues, including those related to Iran and North Korea. Moscow appears to believe that easing concerns about an "Iranian nuclear threat" or "North Korean nuclear threat" would allow the West to focus more on Russia. From Russia’s view, an Iran under Western sanctions and an increasingly isolated North Korea would be more inclined to support Russian interests, including those related to Ukraine. As Russia continues to prioritize its own interests, including in Ukraine, the downgrading of nonproliferation in its foreign policy reflects a broader trend of assertive and strategic behavior on the global stage. The implications of Russia’s actions within the global nuclear order extend beyond the realm of nonproliferation. They raise concerns about Moscow’s broader geopolitical objectives and its willingness to leverage international organizations to advance its interests, even when such actions run counter to established norms. 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