VII. Pakistani nuclear forces HANS M. KRISTENSEN AND MATT KORDA* According to SIPRI estimates, Pakistan possessed approximately 170 nuclear warheads as of January 2023—a small increase compared with the previous year (see table 7.8). These weapons were assigned to Pakistan’s nascent triad of aircraft, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles. The development of several new delivery systems and Pakistan’s growing accumulation of fissile material (see section X) suggest that its nuclear weapon arsenal and fissile material stockpile are likely to continue to expand over the next decade, although projections vary considerably.1 The Pakistani government has never publicly disclosed the size of its nuclear arsenal. Limited official public data and exaggerated news stories about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons mean that analysing the number and types of Pakistani warheads and delivery vehicles is fraught with uncertainty.2 The estimates in this section are based on the authors’ analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear posture, fissile material production, public statements by Western officials and private conversations with Pakistani officials. This section starts by outlining the role played by nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s military doctrine. It then describes Pakistan’s air-delivered and land-based weapons and the nascent sea-based capability. The role of nuclear weapons in Pakistani military doctrine Pakistan has been pursuing the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems as part of its ‘full spectrum deterrence posture’ in relation to India.3 This includes long-range missiles and aircraft as well as several short-range, lower-yield nuclear-capable weapon systems.4 1 See e.g. Sundaresan, L. and Ashok, K., ‘Uranium constraints in Pakistan: How many nuclear weapons does Pakistan have?’, Current Science, vol. 115, no. 6 (25 Sep. 2018); Salik, N., ‘Pakistan’s nuclear force structure in 2025’, Regional Insight, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 June 2016; and Jones, G. S., ‘Pakistan’s nuclear material production for nuclear weapons’, Proliferation Matters, 16 Feb. 2021. See also Berrier, S., Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Worldwide threat assessment’, Statement for the record, US Senate, Armed Services Committee, 26 Apr. 2021. On Pakistan’s fissile material stockpile see Kile, S. N. and Kristensen, H. M., ‘Pakistani nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2019; and International Panel on Fissile Materials, ‘Pakistan’, 31 Aug. 2021. 2 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment of sources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021. 3 Kidwai, K., Keynote address and discussion session, 77th South Asian Strategic Stability workshop, ‘Deterrence, nuclear weapons and arms control’, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), 6 Feb. 2020. For a detailed assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear posture see Tasleem, S. and Dalton, T., ‘Nuclear emulation: Pakistan’s nuclear trajectory’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 4 (winter 2019). 4 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Press release no. PR-94/2011-ISPR, 19 Apr. 2011. * The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns for contributing invaluable research to this publication. Pakistan has placed an emphasis on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons specifically in response to India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.5 In March 2022 India accidentally launched a conventional BrahMos cruise missile into Pakistani territory during a ‘routine maintenance and inspection’ exercise.6 India reportedly did not alert Pakistan during the crisis and only issued a public statement two days after the incident. Pakistan may not have tracked the missile correctly while it was in flight.7 During the incident, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Air Defence Operations Centre is reported to have suspended all military and civilian aircraft for nearly six hours and placed frontline bases and strike aircraft on high alert.8 The two countries’ initial responses to the incident suggest that regional crisis frameworks in South Asia may be far less stable than previously assumed. In October 2022 United States President Joe Biden commented that Pakistan was ‘one of the most dangerous nations in the world’ due to the lack of ‘cohesion’ in its nuclear security and command and control procedures.9 Pakistan forcefully rebutted this statement. Aircraft and air-delivered weapons As of January 2023 Pakistan was estimated to operate a small stockpile of nuclear gravity bombs. Two versions of the Ra’ad (Hatf-8) air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) were being developed to supplement this stockpile by providing the PAF with a nuclear-capable stand-off capability at ranges of 350–600 kilometres.10 Neither version had been operationally deployed as of January 2023. Pakistan has several types of combat aircraft with performance characteristics that make them suitable as nuclear-delivery platforms, including the Mirage III, the Mirage V, the F-16 and the JF-17. However, no official sources have confirmed their nuclear-capable roles. Given this significant uncertainty, SIPRI assesses that the Mirage III and possibly the Mirage V are 5 On the doctrine—under which India looks to maintain the capability to launch large-scale conventional strikes or incursions against Pakistani territory at a level below the threshold at which Pakistan would retaliate with nuclear weapons—see Kidwai (note 3); and Saalman, L. and Topychkanov, P., South Asia’s Nuclear Challenges: Interlocking Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States (SIPRI: Stockholm, Apr. 2021). For a US diplomatic assessment of India’s ‘Cold Start’ strategy see Roemer, T., US Ambassador to India, ‘Cold Start: A mixture of myth and reality’, Cable New Delhi 000295, 16 Feb. 2010, via WikiLeaks. Although Indian officials had previously denied the existence of the Cold Start doctrine, India’s chief of the army staff acknowledged its existence in an interview in 2017. Unnithan, S., ‘“We will cross again”’, India Today, 4 Jan. 2017. 6 Korda, M., ‘Flying under the radar: A missile accident in South Asia’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 4 Apr. 2022. 7 Korda (note 6). 8 Bhatt, M., ‘The curious case of a misfired missile’, DNA (Mumbai), 14 Mar. 2022. 9 Khan, Z., ‘Pakistan hits back at Biden’s “dangerous nation” comment’, AP News, 15 Oct. 2022. 10 For further detail on the Ra’ad ALCM see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Pakistani nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2021, p. 387. Table 7.8. Pakistani nuclear forces, January 2023 All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors. Type/designation | No. of launchers | Year first deployed | Range (km) a | Warheads x yield b | No. of warheads c Aircraft d: 36 launchers | 36 warheads - Mirage III/V: 36 e | 1998 | 2 100 | 1 x 5–12 kt bomb or Ra’ad ALCM (in development) f | 36 Land-based missiles: 126 g launchers | 126 warheads - Abdali (Hatf-2): 10 | 2002 | 200 | 1 x 5–12 kt | 10 - Ghaznavi (Hatf-3): 16 | 2004 | 300 | 1 x 5–12 kt | 16 - Shaheen-I/IA (Hatf-4) h: 16 | 2003/2022 | 750/900 | 1 x 5–12 kt | 16 - Shaheen-II (Hatf-6): 24 | 2014 | 2 000 | 1 x 10–40 kt | 24 - Shaheen-III i: – | [2023] | 2 750 | 1 x 10–40 kt | – - Ghauri (Hatf-5): 24 | 2003 | 1 250 | 1 x 10–40 kt | 24 - Nasr (Hatf-9): 24 | 2013 | 70 | 1 x 5–12 kt | 24 - Ababeel: – | . . | 2 200 | [MRV or MIRV] j | – - Babur/-1A GLCM (Hatf-7) k: 12 | 2014/[early 2020s] | 350/450 | 1 x 5–12 kt | 12 - Babur-2 GLCM l: – | . . | 900 | 1 x 5–12 kt | – Sea-based missiles: - Babur-3 SLCM: – | [2025] | 450 | 1 x 5–12 kt | – Other stored warheads m: [8] Total stockpile: 162 launchers | 170 m warheads . . = not available or not applicable; – = nil or a negligible value; [ ] = uncertain SIPRI estimate; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile; GLCM = ground-launched cruise missile; kt = kiloton; MIRV = multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle; MRV = multiple re-entry vehicle; SLCM = sea-launched cruise missile. a For aircraft, the listed range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to flight profile, weapon payload and in-flight refuelling. b The yields of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are not known. The 1998 nuclear tests demonstrated a yield of up to 12 kt. Since then, it is possible that boosted warheads have been introduced with a higher yield. There is no open-source evidence that Pakistan has developed 2-stage thermonuclear warheads. c Aircraft and several missile types are dual-capable—that is, they can be armed with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Cruise missile launchers (aircraft and land- and sea-based missiles) can carry more than 1 missile. This estimate counts an average of 1 nuclear warhead per launcher. Pakistan does not deploy its warheads on launchers but keeps them in separate storage facilities. d There are unconfirmed reports that Pakistan modified for a nuclear weapon-delivery role some of the 40 F-16 aircraft procured from the United States in the 1980s. However, it is assumed here that the nuclear weapons assigned to aircraft are for use by Mirage aircraft. When the Mirage IIIs and Vs are eventually phased out, it is possible that the JF-17 will take over their nuclear role in the Pakistan Air Force. e Pakistan possesses many more than 36 Mirage aircraft, but this table only includes those that are assumed to have a nuclear weapon-delivery role. f The Ra’ad (Hatf-8) ALCM has a claimed range of 350 km and an estimated yield of 5–12 kt. However, there is no available evidence to suggest that the Ra’ad has been deployed and it is therefore not included in the operational warhead count. In 2017 the Pakistani military displayed a Ra’ad-II variant with a reported range of 600 km. It was test flown for the first time in 2020 and several additional flights will be needed before it becomes operational. g Some launchers might have 1 or more missile reloads. h It is unclear whether the Shaheen-IA has the same ‘Hatf-4’ designation as the Shaheen-I. i The designation for the Shaheen-III is unknown. j The Pakistani military claimed in 2017 that the Ababeel can deliver multiple warheads using MIRV technology, but does not appear to have provided any further information since then. k Pakistan has been upgrading its original Babur GLCMs to Babur-1As by improving their avionics and target-engagement systems to hit both land and sea targets. The range of the original Babur is listed as 350 km by the US Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, while Pakistan claims that the range of the improved Babur-1A is 450 km. l The Babur-2 GLCM is sometimes referred to as the Babur-1B. m In addition to the c.162 warheads estimated to be assigned to operational forces, SIPRI estimates that c. 8 warheads have been produced to arm future Shaheen-III missiles, for a total estimated stockpile of c.170 warheads. Pakistan’s warhead stockpile is expected to continue to increase. Sources: Pakistani Ministry of Defence, various documents; US Air Force (USAF), National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, various years; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, various years; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ‘Nuclear notebook’, various issues; and authors’ estimates. the most likely to have a nuclear-delivery role. The Mirage III has been used for developmental test flights of the nuclear-capable Ra’ad ALCM, while the Mirage V is believed to have been given a strike role with Pakistan’s small arsenal of nuclear gravity bombs.11 At the end of 2022 Pakistan had more than 100 operational JF-17 aircraft and had plans in place to acquire around another 188 JF-17s to replace the ageing Mirage III and Mirage V aircraft.12 When the Mirage aircraft are eventually phased out, it is possible that the JF-17 will take over their nuclear role in the PAF and that the Ra’ad ALCM will be integrated on to the JF-17.13 Land-based missiles As of January 2023 Pakistan’s nuclear-capable ballistic missile arsenal comprised an estimated 126 short- and medium-range systems. Pakistan has deployed four types of solid-fuelled, road-mobile short-range ballistic missile: the Abdali (also designated Hatf-2), the Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), the Shaheen-I/IA (Hatf-4) and the Nasr (Hatf-9). The dual-capable Ghaznavi was test launched twice in 2021, after which the PAF listed its range 11 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2022 (Routledge: London, 2022), p. 297; and Dominguez, G., ‘Pakistan test-launches longer-range variant of Ra’ad II ALCM’, Janes, 19 Feb. 2020. For further detail on the nuclear capability of the F-16s see Kristensen, H. M. and Kile, S. N., ‘Pakistani nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2020, p. 370. 12 Aamir, A., ‘Pakistan to boost air strike power with 50 enhanced fighter jets’, Nikkei, 6 Feb. 2022. 13 ‘Ra’ad ALCM: The custodian of Pakistan’s airborne nuclear deterrence’, PakDefense, 6 Dec. 2020; and Pakistan Strategic Forum, ‘Update on Pakistan: “JF-17 Thunder’s integration with RA’AD II ALCM”’, 8 July 2020. as 290 km.14 The Shaheen-IA, an extended-range version of the Shaheen-I, was test launched twice in 2021—once to a range of 900 km.15 While the Shaheen-I was displayed at the 2021 Pakistan Day Parade, it was replaced by the Shaheen-IA at the 2022 parade, potentially indicating the latter system’s deployment.16 Notably, the Abdali—Pakistan’s oldest ballistic missile type—was not displayed at the Pakistan Day Parade in either 2021 or 2022 and has not been tested since 2013, perhaps indicating that the missile is being superseded by newer systems. The arsenal also included two types of operational medium-range ballistic missile: the liquid-fuelled, road-mobile Ghauri (Hatf-5); and the two-stage, solid-fuelled, road-mobile Shaheen-II (Hatf-6).17 A longer-range variant in development, the Shaheen-III, has been test launched at least three times—in 2015, 2021 and April 2022—but was probably not yet deployed as of January 2023.18 This missile has a claimed range of 2750 km, making it the longest-range system that Pakistan has tested to date. The Ghauri, Shaheen-II and Shaheen-III were all displayed at the Pakistan Day Parade in 2022. The Pakistani government has claimed that the Ababeel (a variant of the Shaheen-III under development) could deliver multiple warheads, using multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology, but its last test launch was in 2017 and its status remained unclear as of January 2023.19 14 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted a training launch of surface to surface ballistic missile Ghaznavi’, Press release no. PR-141/2021-ISPR, 12 Aug. 2021; and Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan today conducted a successful training launch of surface to surface ballistic missile Ghaznavi, capable of delivering nuclear and conventional warheads up to a range of 290 kilometers’, Press release no. PR-19/2021-ISPR, 3 Feb. 2021. 15 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted successful flight test of Shaheen-1A surface to surface ballistic missile’, Press release no. PR-199/2021-ISPR, 25 Nov. 2021; and Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted successful flight test of Shaheen-1A surface to surface ballistic missile, having a range of 900 kilometers’, Press release no. PR-59/2021-ISPR, 26 Mar. 2021. 16 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan Day Parade: 23 March 2022’, ISPR Official, YouTube, 24 Mar. 2022; and Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan Day Parade: March 2021’, ISPR Official, YouTube, 25 Mar. 2021. 17 United States Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2020 (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2020), p. 25; and Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted successful training launch of surface to surface ballistic missile Shaheen-II’, Press release no. PR-104/2019-ISPR, 23 May 2019. 18 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Shaheen 3 missile test’, Press release no. PR-61/2015-ISPR, 9 Mar. 2015; Jamal, S., ‘Pakistan tests nuclear-capable Shaheen-III ballistic missile’, Gulf News, 20 Jan. 2021; and ISPR spokesperson (@OfficialDGISPR), Twitter, 9 Apr. 2022, <https://twitter.com/OfficialDGISPR/status/1512710884518359042>. 19 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Press release no. PR-34/2017-ISPR, 24 Jan. 2017. The US Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center also describes the 2017 test as involving ‘the MIRV version of the Ababeel’. US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017 (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, June 2017), p. 25. On the Ababeel see also Kile and Kristensen (note 1), p. 335. In addition to expanding its arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles, Pakistan has continued to develop the nuclear-capable Babur (Hatf-7) ground-launched cruise missile, with an estimated range of 350 km.20 The Babur has been test launched about 12 times since 2005 and it has been used in army field training since 2011, indicating that the system is probably operational. An upgraded version, with a claimed range of 450 km, is known as the Babur-1A and was featured in the 2022 Pakistan Day Parade.21 A version known as the Babur-2 (sometimes referred to as the Babur-1B) has a claimed range of 900 km and was tested most recently in December 2021.22 Sea-based missiles As part of its efforts to achieve a secure second-strike capability, Pakistan has sought to create a nuclear triad by developing a sea-based nuclear force. The Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is intended to establish a nuclear capability for the Pakistan Navy’s three Agosta-90B diesel–electric submarines.23 Pakistan test launched the Babur-3 in 2017 and 2018.24 20 US Air Force (note 19), p. 37. 21 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations, ‘Pakistan Day Parade: 23 March 2022’ (note 16); and Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Press release no. PR24/2021, Pak conducted successful launch of Babur cruise missile—11 Feb 2021(ISPR)’, ISPR Official, YouTube, 11 Feb. 2021. 22 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted a successful test of an enhanced range version of the indigenously developed Babur cruise missile’, Press release no. PR-142/2018-ISPR, 14 Apr. 2018; Gupta, S., ‘Pakistan’s effort to launch 750km range missile crashes’, Hindustan Times, 23 Mar. 2020; and Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted a successful test of an enhanced range version of the indigenously developed Babur cruise missile 1B’, Press release no. PR-222/2021-ISPR, 21 Dec. 2021. 23 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Press release no. PR-10/2017-ISPR, 9 Jan. 2017; and Panda, A. and Narang, V., ‘Pakistan tests new sub-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile. What now?’, The Diplomat, 10 Jan. 2017. 24 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted another successful test fire of indigenously developed submarine launched cruise missile Babur having a range of 450 kms’, Press release no. PR-125/2018-ISPR, 29 Mar. 2018. Reports of a ship-launched cruise missile test in 2019 might have been for a different missile. Gady, F.-S., ‘Pakistan’s Navy test fires indigenous anti-ship/land-attack cruise missile’, The Diplomat, 24 Apr. 2019.