Strategic Defence Review Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad 2025 Strategic Defence Review Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad 2025 © Crown copyright 2025 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/official-documents Cover image: A drone operator from 2nd Battalion The Royal Yorkshire Regiment launches a drone on Salisbury Plain as part of a ‘Recce-Strike’ live fire event (2024). Source: Corporal Rebecca Brown, MOD Crown Copyright 2024. Printed on wood-free ECF, FSC Mix 70%, and EU-Ecolabel. Contents Prime Minister’s Introduction 2 Foreword from the Secretary of State 3 Foreword from the Reviewers 9 1. Introduction and Overview 11 2. The Case for Transformation 25 3. Roles for UK Defence 35 4. Transforming UK Warfighting 42 4.1 The Integrated Force Model 45 4.2 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth 51 4.3 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education 64 5. Allies and Partners 72 Defence’s Global Relationships: The SDR’s Starting Point 82 6. Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach 86 7. The Integrated Force: A Force Fit for War in the 21st Century 94 7.1 The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent 98 7.2 Maritime Domain 104 7.3 Land Domain 108 7.4 Air Domain 112 7.5 Space Domain 116 7.6 Cyber and Electromagnetic Domain 119 7.7 Strategic Command 124 7.8 Special Forces 126 7.9 Intelligence 127 7.10 Defence Medical Services 130 7.11 Infrastructure 133 Appendix: Review Process 138 Prime Minister’s Introduction Prime Minister’s Introduction We are delivering our commitment to spend 2.5% of GDP on defence, accelerating it to 2027, and we have set the ambition to reach 3% in the next Parliament, subject to economic and fiscal conditions. This investment will end the hollowing out of our armed forces and enable the UK to step up, to lead in NATO, and take greater responsibility for our collective self-defence. But our response cannot be confined to increasing defence spending. We also need to see the biggest shift in mindset in my lifetime: to put security and defence front My first duty as Prime Minister is to and centre—to make it the fundamental organising principle of government. keep the British people safe. That is why national security is the foundation of this Our experience of the pandemic exposed Government’s Plan for Change. In this the vulnerabilities of relying on international new era for defence and security, when just-in-time supply chains and required a Russia is waging war on our continent whole-of-society response. In that spirit, we and probing our defences at home, we must drive a new partnership with industry must meet the danger head on. We must and a radical reform of procurement, creating recognise the very nature of warfare is jobs, wealth, and opportunity in every corner of our country—this is the ‘defence dividend’ being transformed on the battlefields of which we are determined to seize. It must Ukraine and adapt our armed forces and drive innovation at a wartime pace, making our industry to lead this innovation. And the UK the leading edge of innovation in we must understand that global instability NATO and equipping our forces with the affects economic security too, driving full range of conventional and technological down growth and driving up the cost of capabilities. And it must foster a collective living for working families here at home. national endeavour through which the state, business, and society unite in pursuit of the That’s why, in one of my first acts as Prime security of the nation and the prosperity Minister, I launched this Strategic Defence of its people. Review, setting the Reviewers the formidable challenge of examining how our nation should This landmark Strategic Defence Review will meet this moment. The fundamental truth is help to make this a reality. I am very grateful clear: a step-change in the threats we face to Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, General Sir demands a step-change in British defence Richard Barrons, and Dr Fiona Hill for all their to meet them. We will never gamble with our work to lead it. This Government will now national security. So I have already acted, drive a national effort to deliver it. announcing the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the Cold War. The Rt Hon Sir Keir Starmer MP 2 Foreword from the Secretary of State Foreword from the Secretary of State Delivering for Defence Since the General Election less than a year ago, we have demonstrated that we are a Government dedicated to delivering for Defence. We have announced the largest sustained increase to defence spending since the end of the Cold War, stepped up support for Ukraine, awarded Service personnel the biggest pay rise in over 20 years, signed the historic Trinity House Agreement with Germany, bought back over 36,000 military homes to The world has changed. The threats improve housing for forces families and save we now face are more serious and UK taxpayers billions, set new targets to less predictable than at any time tackle the recruitment crisis, made it easier since the Cold War, including war in for veterans to access essential care and Europe, growing Russian aggression, support under the new VALOUR system, and new nuclear risks, and daily passed through Parliament the Armed Forces cyber-attacks at home. Commissioner Bill to improve service life. Our adversaries are working more in alliance This first-of-its-kind Strategic Defence with one another, while technology is Review was launched by the Prime Minister changing how war is fought. Drones now within two weeks of the General Election. kill more people than traditional artillery in It has been externally led by George the war in Ukraine, and whoever gets new Robertson, Richard Barrons, and Fiona Hill, technology into the hands of their Armed who have worked closely with the Ministry Forces the quickest will win. of Defence to harness the best expertise from inside and outside Government to And since we began the Strategic Defence produce the first root-and-branch review of Review (SDR), the UK and our European UK Defence in 25 years. We are extremely allies have been challenged to step up on grateful for their exceptional work. European security. During the review process, 1,700 individuals, We are in a new era of threat, which demands political parties, and organisations submitted a new era for UK Defence. This Review sets over 8,000 responses, 200 companies out a vision to make Britain safer, secure at provided written contributions, over 150 home and strong abroad. senior experts took part in the Review and 3 Foreword from the Secretary of State Challenge panels, and nearly 50 meetings autonomy complementing the ‘heavy metal’ took place between the Reviewers and of tanks and artillery; innovation and our senior military figures. Members of the procurement measured in months, not years; public also toured Defence sites as part of the breaking down of barriers between a ‘Citizens’ Panel’ to offer their views. These individual Services, between the military and views are presented throughout this report. the private sector, and between the Armed Forces and society. I want to say a huge ‘thank you’ to everyone who has been involved. We set up the SDR in The SDR is the Plan for Change for Defence. this unique way to break old thinking, inject It sets out the following new ambitions: fresh ideas, but importantly, to ensure the • ‘NATO First’—stepping up on European SDR serves as Britain’s Defence Review, not security by leading in NATO, with just the Government’s. strengthened nuclear, new tech, and A New Era updated conventional capabilities. • Move to warfighting readiness— The SDR signifies a landmark shift in establishing a more lethal ‘integrated our deterrence and defence: moving to force’ equipped for the future, and warfighting readiness to deter threats and strengthened homeland defence. strengthen security in the Euro-Atlantic. • Engine for growth—driving jobs and prosperity through a new partnership with This will be achieved by the UK leading within industry, radical procurement reforms, NATO and taking on more responsibility and backing UK businesses. for European security. That’s why our defence policy is ‘NATO First’. The UK’s • UK innovation driven by lessons from strategic strength comes from our allies Ukraine—harnessing drones, data, and and, in a dangerous world, our unshakeable digital warfare to make our Armed Forces commitment to NATO means we will never stronger and safer. fight alone. But ‘NATO First’ does not mean • Whole-of-society approach—widening ‘NATO only’—and we remain committed to participation in national resilience and our allies and partners across the world, as renewing the Nation’s contract with our security is closely connected. those who serve. The SDR sets a path for the next decade and The Government—and our military chiefs— beyond to transform Defence. We will end the strongly welcome this vision and direction. hollowing out of our Armed Forces and lead This will set the strategic framework for in a stronger, more lethal NATO. We will also UK Defence. To achieve this vision, the draw lessons from the war in Ukraine, which Government will Reform, Invest, and Act. has demonstrated that a nation’s Armed Forces are only as strong as the industry, Reform innovators, and investors that stand behind them. And that technological innovation is On Day 1 in Government, we launched the vital to stay ahead of our adversaries. Defence Reform programme—the deepest defence reforms for 50 years. The SDR Importantly, it sets a new vision for how strongly endorses this programme of change our Armed Forces should be conceived—a and recognises that one cannot succeed combination of conventional and digital without the other. warfighters; the power of drones, AI, and 4 Foreword from the Secretary of State From 1 April 2025, we established a new radical reforms to the defence procurement Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ), system, which the Public Accounts set up a new National Armaments Director Committee and Defence Select Committee (NAD) to drive our defence industrial strategy, have both called ‘broken’. and gave new powers to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to command the Service Invest Chiefs for the first time. We have also ended the Levene Reforms and have replaced ten On 25 February 2025, the Prime Minister budget holders with four new budget areas announced the largest sustained increase to for tighter budget control. defence spending since the end of the Cold War—rising to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, and to These changes will strengthen Defence with 3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and stronger leadership, clearer accountability, economic conditions allow. We have already faster delivery, less waste, and better value boosted defence by £5bn this year. Defence for money. We will unlock nearly £6bn of new is now central to both our national security savings over the course of this Parliament and our economic growth. through efficiency and productivity savings, civilian workforce changes, and structural At the heart of this investment lies our total simplification. commitment to operate, sustain, and renew our nuclear deterrent, which is deployed every Defence Reform is a Parliament-long minute of every day to protect our people, programme. More improvements will nation, and way of life. The UK’s nuclear come over the next 12 months—increasing deterrent is a truly national endeavour that has integration, reducing duplication, and existed for over 60 years and sends the ultimate improving delivery. We will also introduce warning to anyone who seeks to do us harm. 5 Foreword from the Secretary of State A new £11bn ‘Invest’ annual budget has • We will ensure Defence is an engine for also been established under the NAD. This growth across the UK, by investing £6bn will fund kit for our front-line forces which in munitions this Parliament, including is affordable and grows our UK industrial £1.5bn in an ‘always on’ pipeline for base. Our new partnership with industry munitions and building at least six new and a decade of consistently rising defence energetics and munitions factories in spending will encourage more private finance the UK, generating over 1,000 jobs and to grow our world-leading scale-up and boosting export potential. dual-use tech companies. • We will commit to continuous submarine production through investments in Barrow Act and Raynesway that will allow us to produce a submarine every 18 months. This Government is endorsing the vision Through the AUKUS programme, this will and accepting all 62 recommendations in allow us to grow our nuclear-powered the SDR, which will be implemented. In line attack submarine fleet to up to 12. This with SDR findings, we are also taking further will reinforce our Continuous at Sea immediate action. Deterrent (CASD) and position the UK to deliver the AUKUS partnership with the • We will secure the future of our nuclear US and Australia. deterrent, by committing to £15bn investment in the sovereign warhead • We will build up to 7,000 new long-range programme this Parliament and weapons in the UK to provide greater supporting over 9,000 jobs. European deterrence and support around 800 jobs. • We will create a ‘New Hybrid Navy’, building the Dreadnought and • We will invest in world-leading innovation SSN-AUKUS submarines, cutting-edge in autonomous systems this Parliament warships and support ships, transforming to boost UK export potential. And we our carriers, and introducing new will invest more than £1bn to integrate autonomous vessels to patrol the our Armed Forces through a new Digital North Atlantic and beyond. Targeting Web delivered in 2027. • We will create a British Army which • We will provide leadership in NATO, is 10x more lethal to deter from the by transforming our aircraft carriers land, by combining more people and to become the first European hybrid armoured capability with air defence, air wings—with fast jets, long-range communications, AI, software, long-range weapons, and drones. weapons, and land drone swarms. • We will establish UK Defence • We will create a next-generation RAF, Innovation with £400m to fund and with F-35s, upgraded Typhoons, grow UK-based companies. next-generation fast jets through the Global Combat Air Programme, and autonomous fighters to defend Britain’s skies and strike anywhere in the world. • We will protect the UK homeland, with up to £1bn new funding invested in homeland air and missile defence and creating a new CyberEM Command to defend Britain from daily attacks in the grey zone. 6 Foreword from the Secretary of State • We will create a new Defence Exports This will deliver the best kit and technology Office in the Ministry of Defence to drive into the hands of our front-line forces at exports to our allies and growth at home. speed and, importantly, invest in and grow the UK economy. The Defence Investment • We will deliver a generational renewal of Plan will be completed in Autumn 2025. military accommodation, with at least £7bn of funding in this Parliament— The Rt Hon John Healey MP including over £1.5bn in new investment for rapid work to fix the poor state of forces family housing. Defence Investment Plan We will develop a new Defence Investment Plan to deliver the SDR’s vision. We will ensure the Plan is deliverable and affordable, considers infrastructure alongside capabilities, enables flexibility to seize new technology opportunities, and maximises the benefits of defence spending to grow the UK economy. This will supersede the old-style Defence Equipment Plan. 7 Britain’s Defence Review 8 Foreword from the Reviewers Foreword from the Reviewers When the Prime Minister and the contracted out only to our Armed Forces, good Defence Secretary asked the three of and brave as they are. With multiple threats and us—a politician, a soldier, and a foreign challenges facing us now, and in the future, policy expert—to lead, externally, the a whole-of-society approach is essential. new Strategic Defence Review, the Everyone has a role to play and a national world was already in turmoil. Russia, a conversation on how we do it is required. nuclear-armed state, had invaded and We, the Reviewers, were initially asked by brutally occupied part of a neighbouring the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary sovereign state. And in doing this it to ‘determine the roles, capabilities and was supported by China, supplied with reforms required to meet the challenges, equipment from Iran and by troops from threats and opportunities of the twenty-first North Korea, deployed in Europe for the century’. Over the past eleven months first time ever. that is what we have endeavoured to do. This report, then, is the product of the The sheer unpredictability of these and other intensive scrutiny of every aspect of Defence global events, combined with the velocity of and it has involved one of the deepest change in every area, has created alarming new and most thorough consultations on the threats and vulnerabilities for our country—and subject ever. a dangerous complexity in the world. It is a truly transformational and genuinely If anything, the geopolitical context has strategic review. It is designed to bolster worsened since we started. The challenge to deterrence by rebuilding our warfighting the free world has intensified through so-called readiness. As the old saying goes, ‘If you ‘great power’ competition and a collapse want peace, prepare for war’. of the post-Second World War consensus. The certainties of the international order we Our independent nuclear deterrent, one have accepted for so long are now being of the determining factors in the minds of our questioned—and not only by authoritarians. The adversaries, is committed to NATO and as such international chessboard has been tipped over. adds to the security of the whole Euro-Atlantic community. It is being renewed. In a world where the impossible today is becoming the inevitable of tomorrow, there can We are proposing a combination of be no complacency about defending our reinforced homeland resilience and a new country. Defence can no longer be seen as model Integrated Force, putting NATO first. 99 Foreword from the Reviewers We therefore ensure that the British people of GDP on defence in the 2030s if economic will be safer at home and more influential and fiscal conditions allow. Given that the abroad. However, we will never, in the present 2.3% (which includes significant future, expect to fight a major, ‘peer’ military investment in the nuclear deterrent, the power alone. NATO is the bedrock of our nation’s top defence priority, and other core defence, with 31 other countries committed commitments) might have forced savings in to collective security. A billion people in essential capabilities, this is good news. the Euro-Atlantic area sleep easily each We are confident that the transformation we night, protected by the mutual defence propose for the harder world we now live clause, Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. in is affordable over ten years, given these We must work hard to make sure this remains promised new resources. However, as we live the case, bolstering the Alliance through our in such turbulent times it may be necessary to approach and our daily efforts. go faster. The plan we have put forward can By ruthlessly examining every aspect be accelerated for either greater assurance of Defence, the Review challenges the or for mobilisation of Defence in a crisis. very idea of ‘business as usual’, just as We have conducted this Review with, and not our enemies too have developed and to, the Ministry of Defence and we have worked modernised. It proposes a new partnership closely with the Prime Minister and the Defence with industry, led by a powerful new National Secretary. There should therefore be no Armaments Director, to ensure our forces surprises—even if we did not seek consensus have the equipment they need—on time or shy away from being bold and radical. and on budget. Taxpayers have a right to be confident that the money they pay to keep The Review has benefited from the them safe is used wisely and appropriately. endeavours and expertise of our fellow reviewers, the ‘Defence Review Team 6’: The Review will boost the Reserves, Grace Cassy; Edward Dinsmore; re-invigorate training, tackle the troop Jean-Christophe Gray; Angus Lapsley; accommodation problems, eradicate Robin Marshall; and Rt Hon Sir Jeremy Quin. ingrained bureaucracy, and change the We have also had all along heroic assistance culture in Defence. Learning from the from a dedicated, talented, multi-departmental cutting-edge developments in use in team—drawn from within the MOD, the Armed Ukraine, the fundamental lesson for today is Forces, other Government departments, that with technology developing faster than and a cohort of international military liaison at any time in human history, our own forces, officers and civilian officials—to whom we are and the whole of Defence, must innovate profoundly grateful. at wartime pace. The hollowing out of our forces—which was the hallmark of taking Lord Robertson of Port Ellen KT GCMG a big ‘peace dividend’ after the end of the Cold War—will, over time, be reversed. General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE Dr Fiona Hill CMG We were asked to conduct our Review within the budgetary context of a transition to 2.5% of GDP.1 We acknowledge with relief that this will apply from 2027 and not later. What is also significant is the ambition to spend 3% 1 With the contribution of the UK Intelligence Community, defence spending will rise to a total of 2.6% of GDP from 2027. 10 1. Introduction and Overview 11 Introduction and Overview 1. A generational challenge demands 4. The UK’s Armed Forces must once a generational response. For the first again be able to endure in long time since the end of the Cold War, the campaigns through assured access to UK faces multiple, direct threats to its key capabilities—all underwritten by a security, prosperity, and democratic thriving industry that is ready to scale values. The world itself is beset by and sustain innovation and production volatility and deep uncertainty. as required. 2. In response, the UK, with its allies— 5. And in a decisive shift from the post-Cold especially those in NATO—must once War era, a renewed emphasis on again be ready to deal with the most home defence and resilience is demanding of circumstances: deterring also imperative, with ‘sub-threshold’ and preventing a full-scale war by activities,3 growing access to space and being ready to fight and win. Until cyberspace, and unrelenting advances in recently, such a war against another weapons systems all making it easier for country with advanced military forces adversaries to cause the UK harm, even was unthinkable. It would likely be at distance. high-intensity, protracted, and costly 6. Where previous reviews have more in every way. Moving to warfighting narrowly addressed the Armed Forces, readiness in this new era is essential. this Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 3. With rapid advances in technology delivers the ‘root-and-branch’ review driving the greatest change in how war is of UK Defence that was commissioned fought for more than a century, the UK by the Prime Minister in July 2024 in must pivot to a new way of war. It must response to this rapidly changing world. continually harness new technology and It outlines the deep reform needed ‘to think differently about what conventional ensure the United Kingdom is both ‘military power’ is and how to generate it. secure at home and strong abroad— In modern warfare, simple metrics such now and for the years to come’.4 as the number of people and platforms 7. Overseen by the Secretary of State for deployed are outdated and inadequate. Defence, the SDR was unprecedented It is through dynamic networks of in being led by external Reviewers: crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous Lord (George) Robertson; General assets and data flows that lethality2 Sir Richard Barrons; and Dr Fiona Hill. and military effect are now created, It has been conducted within the Terms with military systems making decisions of Reference set by the Government at machine-speed and acting flexibly and latterly costed within an increased across domains. 2 Where ‘lethality’ refers to the combat power (disruptive and destructive force) of the Armed Forces. 3 ‘Sub-threshold’ attacks do not always meet the legal threshold of ‘war’. They include the use of espionage, political interference, sabotage, assassination and poisoning, electoral interference, disinformation, propaganda, and Intellectual Property theft. Such attacks are often difficult to attribute to a perpetrator with certainty due to the methods used and the frequent reliance of some states on proxy actors. In this Review, we use the term ‘sub-threshold’ attack. Others may refer to ‘grey-zone attacks’ because such acts lie in the ‘grey zone’ between ‘peace’ and ‘war’, challenging the clarity of the legal distinction between the two. The term ‘hybrid warfare’ is often used interchangeably with these terms but we take this to have a more specific meaning, whereby ‘kinetic’ military action is used simultaneously with sub-threshold attacks to pursue a state’s objectives. 4 Strategic Defence Review 2024-2025: Terms of reference - GOV.UK, 17 July 2024. 12 Introduction and Overview defence budget of 2.5% of GDP from a force fit for war in the 21st century April 2027 and 3% in the 2030s, subject through the new ten-year Defence to economic and fiscal conditions.5 The Investment Plan.7 Review process, including its extensive engagement with internal and external A new era of threat expertise, is set out in the Appendix. 9. This is an important moment for the 8. In this report, we set out: UK and its allies (Chapter 2). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was • Why UK Defence needs to change, a strategic inflection point. It irrefutably considering the international and demonstrated the changing and dynamic security context in the period nature of the threat, with state-on-state to 2040 and the current state of war returning to Europe, adversaries Defence (Chapter 2).6 using nuclear rhetoric in an attempt • What roles Defence should to constrain decision-making, and the perform and where in the coming UK and its allies under daily attack years (Chapter 3). beneath the threshold of war as part of intensifying international competition. • How the Armed Forces should The conflict has also shown the power fight and how wider Defence of emerging technology to change should support that fight, with the where, how, and with what war is fought. transformation of UK warfighting Armed Forces that do not change at the delivered by an empowered and same pace as technology quickly risk adaptive workforce (Chapter 4). becoming obsolete. • Who Defence should fight alongside: the centrality of allies 10. Importantly, Ukraine is just one flashpoint and partners with which the UK can of many amid growing global instability build industrial power and common and a volatility that is exemplified capabilities, and ultimately fight and by the remarkable rate of change win (Chapter 5); and the importance in the international landscape since of a renewed connection with UK this Review was launched in 2024. society to ensure resilience and Most immediately relevant at the time of strategic depth in the event of crisis writing, this includes: negotiations for a or conflict (Chapter 6). ceasefire in the Ukraine-Russia war; the possible deployment of a ‘reassurance • The capabilities with which the force’ to Ukraine in the event of a Integrated Force should fight ceasefire; and major questions about the (Chapter 7), addressing the front-line future of European security that inevitably elements and foundational enabling follow the United States’ change in capabilities of UK Defence—creating security priorities, as its focus turns to 5 Strategic Defence Review 2024-2025: Terms of reference - GOV.UK, 17 July 2024; Prime Minister’s Oral Statement to the House of Commons: 25 February 2025. The Prime Minister also announced the intention to recognise the contribution of the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC) to the defence of the UK, with Defence and UKIC together spending 2.6% of GDP on defence by 2027. 6 This Review has considered the strategic context in the period to 2040. However, the MOD’s programming works on ten-year cycles. This is reflected in this report, which articulates a vision for Defence and a path to transformation by 2035. 7 Which will replace the Equipment Plan. 13 Introduction and Overview the Indo-Pacific and the protection of A new era for UK Defence its homeland.8 Fundamentally, the UK’s longstanding assumptions about global 12. In response to this strategic context, power balances and structures are no our Review articulates a new era for longer certain. Defence. Building on changes already underway, our vision is that, by 2035, 11. UK Armed Forces have begun the UK Defence will be: necessary process of change in response to this new reality. But progress A leading tech-enabled defence has not been fast or radical enough. The power, with an Integrated Force that Armed Forces remain shaped by the deters, fights, and wins through risks and demands of the post-Cold constant innovation at wartime pace. War era—optimised for conflicts primarily fought against non-state actors on Europe’s periphery and beyond. Although substantial Defence must be able to fulfil its and demanding, these operations also fundamental role: to deter threats to did not require ‘whole-of-society’ the UK and its allies by being ready preparations for war, home defence, for war, and to provide the definitive resilience, and industrial mobilisation. insurance policy should deterrence fail. 8 Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group, Brussels, Belgium, 12 February 2025. 14 Introduction and Overview This should be pursued as part of a • Role 1: Defend, protect, and enhance whole-of-society approach to deterrence the resilience of the UK, its Overseas and defence under which Defence Territories, and Crown Dependencies. combines its strengths with those of • Role 2: Deter and defend in the wider Government, industry, and society. Euro-Atlantic. Roles for UK Defence • Role 3: Shape the global security environment. 13. The starting point for this Review is the Government’s ‘NATO First’ policy The two enabling roles for Defence are to: (Chapter 3). There is an unequivocal • Develop a thriving, resilient defence need for the UK to redouble its efforts innovation and industrial base. within the Alliance and to step up its contribution to Euro-Atlantic security • Contribute to national cohesion more broadly—particularly as Russian and preparedness. aggression across Europe grows and as the United States of America adapts its Transforming UK warfighting regional priorities. In a shift in approach, 16. To meet the threats of today the Alliance should be mainstreamed in and tomorrow, Defence must how Defence plans, thinks, and acts. fundamentally change how it fights 14. ‘NATO First’ does not mean ‘NATO and how it supports that fight: only’. The UK should take a pragmatic rapidly increasing the Armed Forces’ approach to bolstering collective security lethality and enhancing their ability to in the Euro-Atlantic through stronger fight at the leading edge of technology bilateral and minilateral partnerships.9 (Chapter 4). Drawing on lessons from The Alliance itself recognises the the war in Ukraine and enabled by importance of working with partners organisational change under Defence outside the region—reflecting the Reform, the whole of Defence (the connection between Euro-Atlantic Armed Forces and Department of security and that of other regions such State together) should be driven by as the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. the logic of the innovation cycle— Defence must also be able to pursue able to find, buy, and use innovation, and protect the UK’s significant interests, pulling it through from ideas to front commitments, and responsibilities line at speed. outside the region, including the defence 17. At the heart of this transformation of its sovereign territory. are three fundamental changes in 15. Nevertheless, the fundamental importance approach. Defence must be: of meeting Alliance commitments and Integrated by design. For the Armed shaping deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic Forces to be more lethal than the sum every day is reflected in the enduring of their parts, they must complete the and mutually reinforcing roles that journey from ‘joint’ to ‘integrated’: Defence must fulfil. The three core designed and directed as one force Defence roles are: 9 ‘Minilateral’ refers to smaller groupings of countries. 15 Introduction and Overview under the authority of the Chief of the should be systematically accessed Defence Staff, and delivered according through a new Defence Investors’ to this design by the single Services and Advisory Group whose membership Strategic Command. Under this new includes venture capital and private model, there is no fixed force design to equity investors, while private finance be delivered by a specified date. The should be crowded in under new funding design and capabilities of the Integrated models. To set itself up for success Force, and the way that wider Defence internally, Defence should reorganise supports it, must continue to evolve existing structures to create two distinct as threats and technology do. The organisations under the National Integrated Force must be capable of Armaments Director: operating in different configurations: • A Defence Research and Evaluation as part of NATO Component Commands organisation,12 focused on enabling by design; in coalition; and as a external early-stage research and sovereign force. To deliver a step-change providing a gateway to academia. in lethality, the Integrated Force must be underpinned by a common digital • The new UK Defence Innovation foundation and shared data. Delivery (UKDI) organisation,13 focused on should be a top priority. A single ‘digital harnessing commercial innovation, mission’—to deliver a digital ‘targeting including dual-use technologies. UKDI web’10 in 2027—should enable Defence will have a ringfenced annual budget to succeed where it has previously failed, of at least £400m (Chapter 4.2). as should the creation of an expert Digital Warfighters group that can be Industry-backed. To develop a thriving, deployed alongside front-line personnel resilient innovation and industrial (Chapter 4.1). base that can scale in support of the Integrated Force, Defence must Innovation-led. Today, much of the create a new partnership with best innovation is found in the private industry. Under the forthcoming sector, while the increasing prevalence Defence Industrial Strategy and the of dual-use technologies11 has widened leadership of the National Armaments the net of potential suppliers that Director, this involves overhauling can contribute to Defence outcomes. acquisition processes from top Defence must embrace its role in to bottom: engaging industry early in seeding innovation and growth, procurement processes on desired rapidly adopting new technology to keep outcomes; ensuring that suppliers the Integrated Force at the forefront of are rewarded for productivity and for warfare. In particular, Defence should taking risks; and reducing the burden build relationships with the investors behind the innovators. External expertise 10 The digital targeting web would connect ‘sensors’, ‘deciders’, and ‘effectors’. This creates choice and speed in deciding how to degrade or destroy an identified target across domains and in a contested cyber and electromagnetic domain. 11 Technology developed for civilian use but with potential military applications. 12 Potentially retaining the Dstl brand. 13 Announced in March 2025. Government to turbocharge defence innovation - GOV.UK. 16 Introduction and Overview on potential suppliers from startups to delivering for the warfighter. Defence primes. At the heart of this partnership has significant untapped potential to should be a new, segmented approach be a new engine for growth at the heart to procurement:14 of the UK’s economic strategy. Radical root-and-branch reform of defence • Major modular platforms (contracting procurement—combined with substantial within two years). investment in innovation, novel • Pace-setting spiral and modular technology, advanced manufacturing, upgrades (contracting within a year). and skills—would grow the productive capacity of the UK economy. Defence • Rapid commercial exploitation should aim high, measuring success in (contracting within three months), with the number and scale of defence and at least 10% of the MOD’s equipment dual-use technology companies in the procurement budget spent on novel UK. Success will also see significant technologies each year. improvement in Defence productivity, competitiveness, exports, and value Exports and international capability for money, supported by the new partnerships15 should also be Defence Reform and Efficiency Plan mainstreamed into acquisition (Chapter 4.2).16 processes from the outset, with responsibility for defence exports 19. This transformation of UK Defence returned to the Ministry of Defence must ultimately be delivered by its (MOD) and a new framework people (Chapter 4.3), empowered for building and sustaining through changes in culture and ‘people’ government-to-government relationships. policies that remove red tape and Investment decisions should consider eradicate behaviour that is unacceptable associated costs to ensure they are in the workplace. Targeted intervention genuinely affordable—for example, is needed to tackle Defence’s workforce through-life upgrades, acquisition and crisis—improving recruitment through support, and attendant changes to faster, more flexible options such as infrastructure (Chapter 4.2). military ‘gap years’, and improving retention through the MOD’s planned 18. By more purposefully using its market ‘flexible working’ initiative and power and by prioritising UK-based prioritised investment this Parliament in business, Defence should also strive accommodation that falls well short of to deliver for the UK economy while the standards required. 14 Announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in March 2025. Spring Statement 2025, p. 36. 15 Such as AUKUS and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). Under AUKUS, Australia, the UK, and the US will develop conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines that are interchangeable, as well as advanced technologies such as AI, autonomous systems, cyber, hypersonic missiles, and underwater warfare. Under GCAP, Italy, Japan, and the UK will develop a sixth-generation aircraft—part of the Future Combat Air System, comprising crewed aircraft, uncrewed platforms, next-generation weapons, networks, and data-sharing. 16 Prime Minister’s Oral Statement to the House of Commons: 25 February 2025. 17 Introduction and Overview 20. The focus must be on maximising the Strengthening deterrence through effectiveness of the ‘whole force’:17 alliances and partnerships • To fulfil the roles set out in this 21. The UK must bolster collective Review, there is no scope for reducing security and create strategic depth by the number of highly trained and actively investing in its relationships equipped Regulars across all three (Chapter 5). Finite resources mean the Services, even as the forces move UK cannot be everything to everyone. It to a much greater emphasis on must prioritise its approach, informed by autonomy. Overall, we envisage the roles outlined in Chapter 3 and using an increase in the total number of the full range of tools available to it. Regular personnel when funding allows. This includes a small uplift in 22. Bilateral agreements and capability Army Regulars as a priority. partnerships—with the United States and European NATO Allies— • Increasing the number of Active offer a powerful tool through which Reserves by 20% when funding to strengthen relationships and allows (most likely in the 2030s) and Euro-Atlantic stability. The same is reinvigorating the relationship with the true of minilateral activity, including Strategic Reserves. through the Joint Expeditionary Force, • Reshaping the Civil Service workforce E3, and E5 formats,18 supplemented by with an emphasis on performance, implementation of the UK-EU Security productivity, and skills, reducing costs and Defence Partnership. AUKUS and by at least 10% by 2030. the Global Combat Air Programme must • Releasing military personnel in be developed as exemplars of capability back-office functions to front-line collaboration and a powerful signal of roles and automating 20% of HR, the UK’s ambition to bring partners Finance, and Commercial functions from different geographic regions closer by July 2028. This should be a together in support of collective security. minimum first step. Doubling down on support to Ukraine in pursuit of a durable political • Reforming training and education settlement is critical, as is learning from so that it is much more adaptive its extraordinary experience in land to operational lessons, ensures warfare, drone, and hybrid conflict. managed risks can be taken in military training, and creates greater capacity Home defence and resilience: and flexibility through developing a a whole-of-society approach single virtual environment. Civilian qualifications and education provision 23. A renewed focus on home defence should be used where possible to and resilience is vital to modern increase efficiency and to reduce the deterrence, ensuring continuity in barriers between Defence, industry, national life in a crisis (Chapter 6). and wider society. Reconnecting Defence with society 17 Incorporating the Regular and Reserve forces, civil servants, and contractors. 18 The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is UK-led and comprises nine other members: Denmark; Estonia; Finland; Iceland; Latvia; Lithuania; the Netherlands; Norway; and Sweden. The E3 is a format for diplomatic cooperation between France, Germany, and the UK, while the E5 is a format for diplomatic cooperation between France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the UK. 18 Introduction and Overview should be the starting point, as part 25. The Government must also be able to of a national conversation led by the achieve a sustainable and effective Government on defence and security. transition to war if necessary. A new This can be achieved in part through Defence Readiness Bill should provide expanding Cadet Forces by 30% by the Government with powers in reserve 2030 (with an ambition to reach 250,000 to mobilise Reserves and industry should in the longer term) and working with the crisis escalate into conflict. It should Department for Education to develop also facilitate external scrutiny of UK understanding of the Armed Forces warfighting readiness. among young people in schools. The Integrated Force: a force fit for 24. A more substantive body of work is war in the 21st century necessary to ensure the security and resilience of critical national 26. The essential task is to transform the infrastructure (CNI) and the essential Armed Forces, restore their readiness services it delivers. The MOD should to fight, and reverse the ‘hollowing explore, with wider Government, a ‘new out’ of foundational capabilities deal’ for the protection and defence of without which they cannot endure CNI that is rooted in partnership with in protracted, high-intensity conflict private-sector and allied operators. To (Chapter 7). support this, the Royal Navy should play a new leading and coordinating role in securing undersea pipelines, cables, and maritime traffic. 19 Introduction and Overview 27. The UK must continue to dedicate of Defence. This shift towards AI and its independent nuclear deterrent autonomy should exploit the parallel to NATO (Chapter 7.1), adapting its development of a common digital alliances, industrial base, and military foundation, a protected Defence AI capabilities to ensure it can continue Investment Fund, and an initial operating to deter the most extreme threats. The capability for a new Defence Uncrewed UK will need a full spectrum of options Systems Centre established by to manage escalation as part of NATO, February 2026. delivered by its nuclear and conventional 30. The Armed Forces should accelerate forces in combination. Defence should their transition to a ‘high-low’ mix of commence discussions with the United equipment—for example, through: States and NATO on the potential benefits and feasibility of enhanced UK • The Royal Navy’s ‘Atlantic Bastion’ participation in NATO’s nuclear mission. concept for securing the North Further investment in conventional Atlantic for the UK and NATO and deep precision strike and Integrated its plans for hybrid carrier airwings Air and Missile Defence would increase (Chapter 7.2). options for deterring and responding to high-impact threats. • The Army’s ‘Recce-Strike’ model for land fighting power, aiming to deliver 28. Senior Ministers must drive efforts a ten-fold increase in lethality.19 This to sustain the nuclear deterrent as new model should underpin the Defence’s top priority and as a ‘National transformation of the two divisions Endeavour’. The programme to replace and Corps Headquarters committed the sovereign warhead is critical and to NATO’s Strategic Reserves Corps will require significant investment this (Chapter 7.3). Parliament. Confirming the intended • The RAF’s development of the numbers of SSN attack submarines Future Combat Air System—a would provide clarity on the required sixth-generation, crewed jet operating build capacity and tempo for all with autonomous collaborative nuclear-powered submarines. To secure platforms (Chapter 7.4). the long-term future of the nuclear deterrent, the Government should start 31. With the Integrated Force fighting as work in this Parliament to define the one across all five domains, greater requirement for the successor to the attention must be given to the space Dreadnought class submarine. and cyber and electromagnetic (CyberEM) domains:20 29. An immediate priority for force transformation should be a shift • Assured access to operate in, from, towards greater use of autonomy and through space underpins UK and Artificial Intelligence within the security and prosperity. The MOD UK’s conventional forces (Chapter 7). should invest in the resilience of As in Ukraine, this would provide military space systems, with a focus greater accuracy, lethality, and cheaper on space control, decision advantage, capabilities—changing the economics and capabilities that support 19 Measured against a conventional armoured brigade model. 20 Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum are now treated as a single military domain (Chapter 7.6). 20 Introduction and Overview ‘Understand’ and ‘Strike’ functions. A 33. Where some past reviews have focused reinvigorated Cabinet sub-Committee on front-line equipment at the expense should set the UK’s strategic of foundational capabilities, we have approach to space, maximising sought to redress this balance. We synergies between the UK civil space recommend a focus on: sector and clear military needs • Empowering Defence Intelligence (Chapter 7.5). as the functional leader of all defence • The CyberEM domain is similarly intelligence organisations—pursuing essential to securing and operating in common priorities and standards, all other domains and is fundamental underpinned by a new Defence to the digital targeting web. Intelligence charter, and, in time, fully Hardening critical Defence functions interoperable with the UK Intelligence to cyber-attack is crucial. Defence Community (Chapter 7.9). must move to a more proactive • Rebuilding Defence Medical footing in this domain. A new Services, cohering disparate defence CyberEM Command—established medical resources and initiating a within Strategic Command—should sprint review with the Department emulate Space Command in ensuring of Health and Social Care to ensure domain coherence, rather than personnel needs can be met in directing execution. An initial operating peacetime and in war (Chapter 7.10). capability should be established by the end of 2025 (Chapter 7.6). • Restoring the Strategic Base21 from which the Armed Forces 32. Under Defence Reform, Strategic deploy: delivering a Defence Command will be responsible for Infrastructure Recapitalisation Plan delivering, at the direction of the new by February 2026 to address years Military Strategic Headquarters, many of underfunding and identify ways to of the joint enablers and specialist maximise the value of the estate as a capabilities for the Integrated Force— national asset (Chapter 7.11). from Defence Intelligence to the • Targeted investment in joint Integrated Global Defence Network, support enablers and munitions. Defence Medical Services, and Special Defence should maintain an ‘always Forces and Special Operations Forces. on’ munitions capability, laying the UK Special Forces—the ‘tip of the industrial foundations for production spear’—represent a working model of to be scaled up at speed if needed. the Integrated Force, leading the way This should be complemented by the in innovation of new technologies and further development of novel directed systems across all domains. Defence energy weapons (Chapter 7). must continue to enhance its Special Forces, ensuring UK sovereign choice by maintaining this strategic capability at the very highest level. 21 The network of infrastructure (airports, seaports, warehouses, mounting centres, preparation bases), ‘movement assets’ (such as trains and shipping), and activities to transport troops and materiel. 21 Introduction and Overview The transformation imperative 36. We are acutely aware that words such as ‘transformation’ have been used 34. Prudent sequencing is needed to before in defence reviews but the ensure the Armed Forces have what intention has seldom been delivered. they need, when they need it, within A key factor in success in the coming the resources available and to achieve years will be Defence Reform. Where the best possible return on investment. the SDR states what Defence must do This includes being ready to accelerate in the next decade and beyond, Defence efforts to transform the Armed Forces Reform will ultimately determine how, and restore readiness should conditions and how successfully, it is delivered. deteriorate further, or to mobilise UK To support implementation, we have Defence rapidly in the event of a crisis. identified key interventions and deadlines In this new and uncertain era, nobody to further catalyse progress where in should be surprised if it became the past it has been slow and lacked necessary to transform further and faster. accountability. The MOD will necessarily take this work forward in creating 35. There is no reason to delay in detailed implementation plans—an changing fundamentally how Defence essential part of the department taking works, however, leveraging Defence ownership of the Review’s findings Reform—the ongoing programme of and recommendations. organisational and cultural change (Box 1)—as a driver for reform across the Department of State and the Armed Forces. Unlike other departments in Government, the MOD does not control the timetable for confrontation and conflict. ‘Events’ and the UK’s adversaries do. Bold and decisive action is needed. ‘Business as usual’ is not an option. 22 Introduction and Overview Box 1: Defence Reform: setting Defence up for success The purpose of Defence Reform is to establish robust and streamlined governance, clearer accountabilities, and faster decision-making processes across the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces. The starting point is the restructuring of Defence under four areas (Figure 1). Figure 1: Responsibilities of senior officials and military personnel under Defence Reform 23 Introduction and Overview We strongly endorse the organisational change launched by the Defence Secretary and pursued under Defence Reform. As it progresses, it should focus on: • Supporting a ‘One Defence’ mindset • Ensuring the role of the National through career management Armaments Director is focused on structures that reward behaviour engaging with industry and international and action accordingly, with NATO a partners to progress the Government’s primary consideration. More radical defence industrial and exports agenda. options to break down single Service This will require delegating authority siloes, such as joint promotion boards for acquisition management and other or central career management, should elements of the work of the National be explored. Armaments Director Group. • Delivering a step-change in • Supporting the continual adoption the department’s financial and of new technologies, in particular programme management. As the Artificial Intelligence (AI), that will enable Principal Accounting Officer, the Defence to take leaps forward both Permanent Under-Secretary must in how it fights and the productivity retain primary responsibility for with which it delivers. The MOD must financial planning and must be able engage in the implementation of the AI to account for the department’s Opportunities Action Plan,23 led by the financial position, even as other Department for Science, Innovation and senior leaders are given greater Technology, wherever possible. financial authority within their We have primarily taken our lead from, respective areas of responsibility. or worked with, the Defence Reform Further streamlining programme and team on the most effective organisational project approvals might be achieved structures for governance and delivery through full implementation of the within Defence. However, in this report, industry-standard ‘three lines of we occasionally make suggestions on defence’ model for risk assurance.22 roles and responsibilities for consideration Incorporating HM Treasury and the as the Defence Reform programme is Cabinet Office Commercial Function developed further. in this model offers the basis for an improved working relationship. 22 Where the portfolio or programme manager is the first point of risk assurance (or ‘line of defence’), the internal approvals board is the second point, and the National Audit Office provides the third point of assurance through external scrutiny. 23 AI Opportunities Action Plan, 13 January 2025 – GOV.UK. 24 2. The Case for Transformation 25 The Case for Transformation 1. The UK is entering a new era of The strategic context to 2040 threat and challenge. The world is more volatile and more uncertain than 5. The environment in which Defence must at any time in the past 30 years and it is operate in the coming years is shaped by changing at a remarkable pace. two major and accelerating trends: 2. The UK and its allies are once again • Growing multipolarity and directly threatened by other states intensifying strategic competition with advanced military forces. between states—and with non-state The UK is already under daily attack, actors—for political, military, with aggressive acts—from espionage economic, and technological power. to cyber-attack and information As part of this competition, states are manipulation—causing harm to society seeking to reshape the rules-based and the economy. State conflict international order that has governed has returned to Europe, with Russia international relations since the demonstrating its willingness to use Second World War.24 The clear shift military force, inflict harm on civilians, in US security priorities underlines and threaten the use of nuclear weapons how urgent and different managing to achieve its goals. More broadly, strategic competition now is. the West’s long-held military advantage • Rapid and unpredictable is being eroded as other countries technological progress that drives modernise and expand their armed strategic competition and continually forces at speed, while the United States’ changes how armed forces must be (US) security priorities are changing, as organised, equipped, and fight. its focus turns to the Indo-Pacific and to the protection of its homeland. 6. These trends will interact with a backdrop of persistent transnational 3. This is only one part of the picture, challenges, including: however. In this more complex world, the UK must deal with a wide array of • Climate change and environmental challenges to its security, prosperity, degradation, which: are creating new and values at the same time. It must geographical realities and competition also be ready to absorb and respond to for resources; are driving migration, surprises and shocks, recognising that instability, and more frequent it cannot prevent or protect against all humanitarian disasters; and demand risks and threats. military adaptation for operations in more extreme weather conditions. 4. Previous reviews have recognised the Of particular importance to Defence rapid deterioration of the international is the likelihood that the Arctic and security environment. However, the High North will be ‘ice-free’ each speed of change in Defence has not kept summer by 2040, providing access to pace with the threat or the scale of the more actors and creating a new site challenge. The imperative for a shift in for competition within the UK’s wider approach is clear. neighbourhood. 24 The ‘rules-based international order’ is the set of laws, rules, norms, and institutions established since 1945 to enable international cooperation in areas such as security, trade and development, human rights, arms control, and technology standards. 26 The Case for Transformation • The enduring threat of terrorism. 9. Managing competition between The threat posed by overseas terrorist states—and the potential for groups is rising again, demanding escalation to crisis and conflict— attention and resources.25 Daesh will be more challenging. States such and al-Qa’ida have evolved, while as Russia are intentionally blurring the state support is increasing some lines between nuclear, conventional, terrorist groups’ capabilities, including and sub-threshold threats, complicating in cyberspace. the ability of the UK and its allies to manage potential escalation and • Uneven global demographic miscalculation. Technology creates new change, which is altering global paths for escalation by creating new power balances and driving domestic ways to disrupt and coerce, for example, and regional instability, including in cyberspace and space. States through migration, urbanisation, and non-state actors are ever-more and new demands on governments aggressive in using sub-threshold for employment and social activities to seek advantage. welfare support. 10. At the other end of the spectrum, 7. Confronting any one of these challenges nuclear-armed states like Russia and is difficult. Confronting them China are putting nuclear weapons at simultaneously poses a huge test for the centre of their security strategies, the UK and for Defence. increasing the number and types of weapons in their stockpiles. The coming Growing multipolarity and decades will be defined by multiple strategic competition and concurrent dilemmas, proliferating and disruptive technologies, and the 8. Intensifying strategic competition will erosion of international agreements make it more difficult for the UK and organisations that have previously and its allies to shape the world helped to prevent conflict between and events in their interests. Regional nuclear powers. Strategic stability will settlements and solutions may be be challenged, with new and more necessary as it becomes harder for complex pathways to escalation states to achieve common goals at the that the UK and its allies will need to global level. The relationship between address. Allied assurance will become the US and China will be a key factor more complicated as others may be in a more multipolar world marked incentivised to develop nuclear weapons by ‘great power’ competition and in of their own. which global power is more widely—if unevenly—distributed across regions and countries. This competition is not just among states: terrorist organisations, organised crime groups, proxy actors and partner groups, and powerful private actors all seek to shape the geopolitical environment to their advantage. 25 The Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 killed seventeen British nationals: the single largest loss of British life from a terrorist attack since 2017. The Houthi targeting of Red Sea shipping has demonstrated the vulnerability of global supply chains to threats from non-state actors. 27 The Case for Transformation 11. Russia: an immediate and pressing • The unprecedented diversification threat. Russia’s full-scale invasion of and growth of its conventional and Ukraine makes unequivocally clear its nuclear missile forces, with missiles willingness to use force to achieve its that can reach the UK and Europe. goals, as well as its intent to re-establish • More types and greater numbers of spheres of influence in its near-abroad nuclear weapons than ever before, and disrupt the international order to the with its arsenal expected to double to UK and its allies’ disadvantage. While 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. the Ukraine conflict has temporarily degraded Russian conventional land 13. Iran and the Democratic People’s forces, the overall modernisation and Republic of Korea (DPRK): regional expansion of its armed forces means it disruptors. Iran will continue to conduct will pose an enduring threat in key areas destabilising activities across the region, such as space, cyberspace, information including sponsoring proxies and operations, undersea warfare, and partners such as Hamas, Hezbollah, chemical and biological weapons. the Houthis, and Iranian-aligned Iraqi Russia’s war economy, if sustained, militias. Its escalating nuclear programme will enable it to rebuild its land presents a risk to international security capabilities more quickly in the event and the global non-proliferation of a ceasefire in Ukraine. architecture. The DPRK will likely pursue further nuclear modernisation to 12. China: a sophisticated and persistent guarantee regime survival and coerce challenge. China is increasingly its neighbours. Both countries are leveraging its economic, technological, developing missile programmes with and military capabilities, seeking to growing reach, and they continue to pose establish dominance in the Indo-Pacific, a direct threat to the UK in cyberspace. erode US influence, and put pressure on the rules-based international order. 14. Continued alignment and new Chinese technology and its proliferation sources of hostility. China and Russia to other countries is already a leading have deepened their relationship and challenge for the UK, with Defence likely there will continue to be grounds for both to face Chinese technology wherever strategic and opportunistic alignment and with whomever it fights. China is with Iran and the DPRK. However, likely to continue seeking advantage the dynamics of these relationships will through espionage and cyber-attacks, be conditioned by differing interests and and through securing cutting-edge longstanding mistrust. They will likely Intellectual Property through legitimate continue seeking to draw others into and illegitimate means. It has also their transactional networks in pursuing embarked on large-scale, extraordinarily a variety of objectives. As global power rapid military modernisation across its dynamics change, it will be important forces. This includes: to scan for new threats, including from emerging ‘middle powers’ that may be • A vast increase in advanced platforms hostile to UK interests. and weapons systems, such as space warfare capabilities. 28 The Case for Transformation Rapid and unpredictable will enable a broader range of state technological change and non-state actors to develop and possess them. This will have significant 15. Rapid advances in technology implications for deterrence and offer both opportunity and risk, escalation management, as well as for changing the global distribution of the UK’s freedom of manoeuvre across power. Emerging technologies are land, sea, air, and space. It will also already changing the character of change the economics of defence, with warfare more profoundly than at any low-cost weapons being used to damage point in human history. Progress will or exhaust expensive military capabilities. continue across a range of technologies Technological advancements are whose collective impact will be highly outpacing the development of regulatory unpredictable (Box 2). frameworks to govern many of the most potentially disruptive technologies. 16. Warfare will be shaped by an evolving The UK’s competitors are unlikely to mixture of high- and low-end military adhere to common ethical standards in capabilities.26 The widespread availability developing and using them. of commercial, off-the-shelf capabilities 26 For example, widely available cheap attack drones are already used by states in combination with advanced missiles to overwhelm air defences. 29 The Case for Transformation Box 2: Technologies that are redefining warfare Advantage on the battlefield will not come from a single technological advance but from the combination of existing capabilities and a range of emerging technologies that include: • Artificial intelligence (AI), machine • Quantum. Advances in quantum learning, and data science, computing offer the potential to improving the quality and speed of break encryption, making secure decision-making, the resilience of communications much more difficult. digital networks, and operational Quantum technologies have the effectiveness. Forecasts of when potential to reduce dependence on Artificial General Intelligence27 will satellite-based GPS, which may be occur are uncertain but shortening, vulnerable to interference. with profound implications • Cyber threats that will become harder for Defence. to mitigate as technology evolves, • Robotics and autonomy, with armed with AI, quantum technology, and the forces increasingly using uncrewed increasing dependence on satellite and autonomous capabilities to communications likely driving the generate mass and lethality. most disruptive changes to the cyber threat landscape. • Enhanced precision weapons that mean targets can be struck • Engineering biology that creates the with greater accuracy from ever potential to enhance the capacity of greater ranges. the armed forces through advances in medicine, healthcare, and wellbeing, • Directed energy weapons, such possibilities for new energetic and as the UK’s DragonFire, which have explosive materials, as well as avenues the potential to reduce collateral for enormous harm in the shape of damage and reliance on expensive new pathogens and other weapons ammunition. of mass destruction. • Hypersonic missiles, which, travelling at over five times the speed of sound, may offer greater range and greater ability to evade defences. • Space-based capabilities that enable all aspects of modern operations. States are rapidly developing ways to disrupt military and civilian assets in and from space. 27 Where AI matches or surpasses humans’ ability to understand, learn, and apply knowledge across a range of situations unaided. 30 The Case for Transformation What does this mean for the critical national infrastructure, testing its vulnerabilities as an open economy UK and for Defence? and global trading nation (Figure 2), and challenging its social cohesion. 17. Defence must prepare for a much Changes in the strategic context mean more difficult world of heightened that UK Defence must plan on the basis competition, more frequent crisis, and that NATO Allies may be drawn into war conflict that sees conventional military with—or be subject to coercion by— attacks combined with intensified another nuclear-armed state. With the sub-threshold aggression (Box 3) and US clear that the security of Europe is potentially with threats to use nuclear no longer its primary international focus, or other weapons of mass destruction. the UK and European Allies must step up The UK is already subject to daily their efforts. sub-threshold attack, targeting its Box 3: Potential effects of war on the UK’s way of life Based on current ways of war, if the UK were to fight a state-on-state war as part of NATO in 2025, it could expect to be subject to some or all of the following methods of attack: • Attacks on the Armed Forces in the • Attempts to disrupt the UK economy— UK and on overseas bases. especially the industry that supports the Armed Forces—including through • Air and missile attack (from cyber-attack, the interdiction of long-range drones, cruise, and maritime trade, and attacks on ballistic missiles) targeting military space-based CNI. infrastructure and critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the UK. • Efforts to manipulate information to undermine social cohesion and • Increased sabotage and political will. cyber-attacks affecting on- and offshore CNI. 31 The Case for Transformation Figure 2: UK daily life: overseas dependencies and threats 32 The Case for Transformation The state of Defence today War’s large standing force of over 311,000 Regular personnel has fallen to 18. The starting point for this Review just over 136,000, with only a small set is a UK military with innumerable of forces ready to deploy at any given strengths, respected worldwide for moment and the rest held at varying its dedication and professionalism. levels of readiness. Defence spending The UK remains at the forefront of NATO reduced in parallel, from 4.1% of GDP efforts to safeguard the Euro-Atlantic in 1989 to 2.3% today. against growing Russian aggression in all domains, providing the ultimate guarantee of UK and Allied security in declaring its nuclear deterrent to We do need to put more the Alliance. The Armed Forces are a into our defences because vital and agile instrument in achieving otherwise it won’t be long Government priorities: securing NATO’s before something more front line in Estonia and Poland; significant happens and we airdropping aid for the Palestinian people will think it should’ve been into Gaza; helping to defend Israel against Iranian air attack; protecting more of a priority international shipping lanes in the Red —Citizens’ Panel member, Sea; defending the UK against persistent Rollestone Camp cyber-attack; and enhancing UK relationships with its allies and partners in support of collective security. 21. This trajectory of declining investment 19. Defence also remains an integral has been made more acute in recent part of the UK economy and wider years by additional financial pressures, society, supporting 440,000 high-quality including inflation and currency jobs across the country and driving fluctuations following the Covid-19 social mobility through the training it pandemic and Russia’s full-scale offers to Armed Forces personnel and invasion of Ukraine. Positive efforts to civil servants, including thousands of improve military personnel’s salaries and apprentices. Examples of innovation buy equipment designed to meet future excellence within Defence demonstrate threats have added further pressure on its ability to deliver cutting-edge departmental finances. capabilities to warfighters and the 22. More fundamentally, Defence’s wider potential to deliver greater economic ways of working remain suited to growth across the UK. a peacetime era, with innovation 20. However, Defence is still largely stifled and bureaucracy consuming shaped by the operations of the precious time and effort. The result is post-Cold War era, primarily conducted an organisation that is not currently against non-state opponents. The size optimised for warfare against a ‘peer’ and readiness of the Armed Forces military state:28 declined as the threat posed by the Soviet Union receded. The Cold 28 A ‘peer’ adversary is a country that can match the UK’s military capability and/or that of its allies. 33 The Case for Transformation • A focus on ‘exquisite’ capabilities The case for transformation has masked the ‘hollowing out’ of the Armed Forces’ warfighting 23. The Armed Forces have begun the capability. Stockpiles are inadequate, essential process of transformation in further reduced by the important response both to this changing context and necessary transfer of materiel and to lessons from the war in Ukraine. to Ukraine. The Strategic Base lacks However, they remain fundamentally capacity and resilience following shaped by the risks and demands of the years of underinvestment. Medical post-Cold War era, when successive services remain optimised for Governments reasonably sought to counter-terrorism operations and maximise the ‘dividend’ offered by lack the capacity for managing a peace in Europe. mass-casualty conflict. 24. The MOD, wider Government, and • Procurement systems and industry must be better prepared Defence’s relationship with for high-intensity, protracted war. industry have not materially The sweeping and rapid changes to the changed since the Cold War. international security environment mean Risk reduction and consensus it is not enough to change only how decision-making are prioritised over and with what the Armed Forces fight. productivity and innovation at the To deter threats through being ready pace of technological change. Export for war, the whole of Defence must opportunities are too frequently an change how it supports the Armed afterthought in planning. Optimism Forces as part of a more flexible about equipment cost and timelines policy response: deterring attacks that for delivery means the Equipment blur the lines between competition and Plan is consistently over-budget and conflict across all domains, harnessing outdated capabilities remain in the the very best technologies at wartime field for too long. Defence struggles pace, and drawing on support from to prioritise science and technology across Government, industry, society, spending and exploit innovation and allies. The following chapters chart for operational advantage. It is the course of this transformation. insufficiently prepared for the digital battlefield, lacks scale and resilience in data flows, and carries intolerable levels of cyber risk. • Poor recruitment and retention, shoddy accommodation, falling morale, and cultural challenges have created a workforce crisis. The numbers of UK Regulars and Reservists have been in persistent decline (by 8% since 2022 for the Regular Armed Forces). The shortfall impacts disproportionately on the skills most critical to UK advantage, as it does for allies and partners. 34 3. Roles for UK Defence 35 Roles for UK Defence 1. The fundamental role of the Armed • Build national resilience to attacks Forces is to deter threats so that and shocks, enhancing the UK’s fighting a war—in defence of the UK, ability to withstand and recover the Overseas Territories and Crown quickly and to deny adversaries Dependencies, and allies—is not potential benefits. Infrastructure necessary. It must be unequivocally that is critical to the UK economy clear to potential adversaries that the and way of life must be protected. UK and NATO have the ability and Re-establishing credible national will to fight. preparations for war, home defence, and industrial mobilisation 2. The UK last faced a direct military threat is a priority. from a highly capable state adversary • Nurture strong relationships with during the Cold War. Since then, it has allies. No state can address all these relied largely on an expeditionary challenges alone. Together, the UK approach to disrupt potential threats and its allies have greater economic, before they could reach Europe. military, and diplomatic influence than In parallel, the UK has guarded against any of their potential adversaries— the possible re-emergence of more individually or combined. significant threats through its nuclear deterrent and membership of NATO. 4. Defence plays a central role in this This is no longer sufficient. The dynamic whole-of-society approach. It is a key nature of today’s threats (Chapter 2) instrument of Government: home to the presents a vastly more complex UK’s nuclear deterrent, multi-domain security challenge. conventional and Special Forces; and sole provider of highly specialist 3. As the Prime Minister has stated, capabilities that are vital to national navigating this environment demands security, such as counter-terror an integrated, whole-of-society and counter-chemical, biological, approach to deterrence and defence. radiological, and nuclear expertise. Most importantly, the Government To achieve maximum effect in support must be able to act and adapt with of Government objectives—whether in agility to create doubt and dilemmas for war or during periods of heightened adversaries and to maintain escalation competition or crisis—it must seamlessly dominance—detecting and attributing direct these forces across domains29 attacks, choosing when and how to and with allies, drawing on partners respond, and being able to sustain across Government, industry, and that response and escalate again if wider society. necessary. To achieve this, the UK will need to: • Increase its options for threatening retaliation—whether developed nationally or with allies—to convince a potential adversary that the cost of its actions will outweigh the potential benefits. 29 The five domains are maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. 36 Roles for UK Defence A ‘NATO First’ approach to 7. The defining principle of this Review is therefore ‘NATO First’ (Box 4). This deterrence and defence demands a different approach from that taken since the end of the Cold War. 5. Collective security, underpinned by The Alliance must be the starting point formal alliances and partnerships, for how the Armed Forces are developed, is a force multiplier for the UK’s organised, equipped, and trained in deterrence and defence. At the forefront order to contribute to deterrence in the of the UK’s many valuable alliances is Euro-Atlantic, shaping the environment NATO, which has brought peace to the and potential adversaries’ thinking Euro-Atlantic for more than 75 years. every day. This approach will require Under Article V of NATO’s founding treaty, organisational and cultural change within the UK would always expect to fight a Defence and across Whitehall, given ‘peer’ military adversary alongside Allies. the vital support provided by other But the Alliance provides more than just Government departments. Efforts to strength in numbers in the event of a crisis. deepen bilateral and minilateral It provides a unique forum for collective relationships should similarly be geared action and industrial collaboration in the to strengthening Europe’s security Euro-Atlantic, and facilitates agreement architecture (Chapter 5). on global issues and partnership with countries beyond the region. 6. There is an unequivocal need for the UK to redouble its efforts within the Alliance and to step up its contribution to Euro-Atlantic security more broadly— particularly as Russian aggression across Europe grows and as the United States of America (US) adapts its regional priorities. Box 4: What does ‘NATO First’ mean for UK Defence? Defence will be integrated with NATO by design. This demands that NATO is: • Foremost in how Defence plans. • The foundation of how Defence The UK should prioritise its ability to thinks: mainstreamed through policy, contribute to NATO plans (including doctrine and concepts development, for defending the UK), which education, and talent management. should be at the heart of capability • Embedded in how Defence acts: development and force design. ensuring national activity prioritises The UK must play a leading role in and enhances NATO objectives and developing Alliance plans, standards, integration. This includes operations, and verification. exercises, industrial strategy, and defence engagement activity. 37 Roles for UK Defence 8. As NATO renews its own approach to to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence, the UK must: military capabilities and to improve burden-sharing between Europe and • Back up its commitment to Article V Canada on the one hand and the by putting NATO at the heart US on the other. of how it plans to fight in the • Meet civil defence and resilience Euro-Atlantic area. The UK should planning obligations under Article III prioritise its ability to fight as part of of the NATO founding treaty to NATO strategic and operational plans, strengthen deterrence and assure actively support their development, the UK’s ability to project power in and contribute leadership within support of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic the command structures that will and beyond.30 The UK must also execute them. This must continue to ensure it can provide military and be underwritten by the UK’s nuclear civilian Host Nation Support to NATO, deterrent, assigned to the defence of including in times of crisis and war. NATO and adapted as nuclear threats to the Alliance increase. • Support NATO’s development in areas critical to warfighting. • Put NATO at the centre of its This should include: leading the force development, with a focus way in new concepts; encouraging on shaping and meeting ambitious NATO to reflect priority defence and NATO Capability Targets designed dual-use technologies in capability 30 Article III of NATO’s Washington Treaty states that Parties to the Treaty ‘separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.’ 38 Roles for UK Defence planning processes; and influencing Core defence roles standards and operating practices accordingly. Drawing on experience, 10. The Review has identified enduring and expertise, and capabilities developed mutually reinforcing roles that Defence through national and minilateral must fulfil to deliver the outcomes set activity—for example, as part of the by the Government within the resources Joint Expeditionary Force—would available. They have informed our further support NATO-wide innovation. recommendations on the transformative Engaging with and leveraging the methods and capabilities in the chapters work of NATO’s UK-based innovation that follow. In alignment with a NATO organisations31 would be mutually First approach, under Role 1 and beneficial in pursuing this goal. Role 2 effort and resources are focused on defence and deterrence in the • Engage fully in NATO-led efforts to Euro-Atlantic, centred on home defence strengthen transatlantic industrial and resilience. Role 3 uses all Defence cooperation as a central plank of levers—as part of a cross-government collective deterrence and defence, effort—to defend where the UK must with NATO an increasingly important and to shape the environment in favour convenor and standard-setter. of national interests where it can. Influencing NATO standards and Delivery of all three roles will depend on adopting them by default is key. capabilities deployed in the space and 9. A ‘NATO First’ approach does not cyber and electromagnetic domains as mean ‘NATO only’. The Alliance itself well as common foundational enablers. recognises the importance of working It is intended that the UK Special Forces with partners such as the Indo-Pacific would also contribute to delivery of Four32—reflecting the connection all three roles where needed, as part between Euro-Atlantic security and that of a Defence-wide effort to deliver of other regions such as the Middle crisis response, whether in the UK, East and Indo-Pacific. The UK also has the Euro-Atlantic, or beyond. significant interests, commitments, and 11. To meet the most significant responsibilities beyond the Euro-Atlantic. threats facing the UK, the roles for These include: the defence of UK Defence are: sovereign territory; the UK’s status as one of five permanent members of the Role 1: Defend, protect, and United Nations Security Council; the enhance the resilience of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance;33 and flagship capability partnerships AUKUS UK, its Overseas Territories, and the Global Combat Air Programme. and Crown Dependencies All are critical to UK and allied security • The nature of today’s threats mean and to shaping the international security Defence must once again have environment. credible plans for defending UK home territory as part of NATO, rooted in improved national resilience 31 NATO Innovation Fund and DIANA (the Defence Innovation Accelerator in the North Atlantic). 32 The Indo-Pacific Four are Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. 33 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US. 39 Roles for UK Defence (Chapter 6)—a NATO Article III • The Review recommends the Middle obligation. The Armed Forces must East and the Indo-Pacific as the next also be able to defend and protect priority regions after the Euro-Atlantic the Overseas Territories and Crown for Defence engagement. The growing Dependencies and be ready to deploy links between Russia, China, Iran, and globally to support British nationals the Democratic People’s Republic overseas during crises. of Korea complicate calculations of deterrence and escalation Role 2: Deter and defend in management across regions. the Euro-Atlantic Enabling Defence roles • Defence must contribute daily to deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic, with 12. There are two further enabling roles for a force optimised for warfighting to UK Defence that are fundamental to the protect and defend NATO territory delivery of Roles 1–3. These roles make and Allied populations against the UK stronger and the Armed Forces attack, underpinned by the UK’s better able to deter and defend. They nuclear deterrent. The UK must are explored throughout this Review in apply its strengths in support of greater detail. These enabling roles are: the Alliance, enhancing deterrence by driving modernisation. This role Develop a thriving, resilient defence responds directly to the UK’s Article V innovation and industrial base commitment under which the security of one Ally is the security of all, and • To support a move to warfighting, under which the UK would always the UK’s defence innovation and expect to fight a ‘peer’ military industrial base must be able to adapt adversary alongside NATO Allies. and surge to meet emerging priorities and demands (Chapter 4.2). A new Role 3: Shape the global partnership with industry is essential security environment to ensure the Armed Forces are permanently connected to innovation • Defence must shape the global and that industry can scale up security environment in favour of production at speed to sustain larger the UK’s interests, supported by and longer campaigns. Investing in the prioritised use of all the levers the capabilities and technologies that available to it, as part of a wider will drive UK operational advantage Government effort (Chapter 5). Military will in turn create broad-based deployments beyond the Euro-Atlantic economic growth across the country. should be used to retain deeper and broader ‘match fitness’ of the Armed Contribute to national Forces, developing and demonstrating preparedness and cohesion warfighting leadership, innovation, and human and technical capabilities. • Defence’s core roles can only be To ensure such deployments do credibly achieved if supported by not detract from delivery of Roles 1 a whole-of-society effort to build and 2, the Armed Forces must national resilience and preparedness be able to return at speed to the for crisis or conflict (Chapter 6). Euro-Atlantic if necessary. Defence must play its part in this, communicating clearly with the 40 Roles for UK Defence public about the threats facing the maintain an active presence across UK and what is involved to deter and the four nations of the Union and step defeat them, and working across up its efforts to recruit and retain a Government to address potential workforce that represents the whole vulnerabilities that might be exploited of British society to harness the best by adversaries. Defence must talent the country has to offer. Recommendations: 1. While Defence plays a central role in protecting the UK’s security, prosperity, and values, the nature of today’s threats means it cannot do this alone. To ensure the UK can act with the necessary agility in deterring adversaries in competition, crisis, and conflict, the MOD must work with wider Government to: • Increase options for retaliation in response to an attack—or the threat of attack— on the UK and its allies. • Build national preparedness and resilience, ensuring the UK can withstand attacks and recover quickly. • Nurture a robust strategic culture, ensuring senior leaders and officials across Government are equipped with the knowledge, skills, and intellectual framework to understand the nuclear dimensions and escalation risks of today’s strategic environment. This should be regularly exercised and tested through wargames and table-top exercises. • Rebuild the relationship with, and better utilise, the intellectual base outside Government to support long-term adaptation in deterrence and defence policy, working with industry, think tanks, and academia to ensure there is a thriving network of expertise and debate. • Cohere these efforts with close allies, developing and exercising mechanisms for political decision-making in response to crises, especially where they fall short of war. 2. A ‘NATO First’ policy is essential as the UK steps up its contribution to Euro-Atlantic security. This demands a different approach from that taken since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance should be mainstreamed in how Defence plans, thinks, and acts. Defence must establish a roadmap for delivering this deeper interoperability with NATO Allies and for leading the way on shared approaches and standards by January 2026. Implementation should commence no later than July 2026. 41 4. Transforming UK Warfighting 42 Transforming UK Warfighting Vision for UK Defence by 2035: A leading tech-enabled defence power, with an Integrated Force that deters, fights, and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace. 1. This Review charts a new era for 4. Lessons from the war in Ukraine and Defence, restoring the UK’s ability organisational change under Defence to deter, fight, and win—with allies— Reform are both critical starting points. against states with advanced military The whole of Defence—the Armed forces by 2035. This vision could Forces and the Department of State be achieved more quickly should together—should be driven by the logic circumstances demand it and should of the innovation cycle: more resources be made available. • Find it: Defence must be able to 2. The measure of military effectiveness seed early-stage research and today is not solely the number of people, identify external innovation that will vehicles, planes, and ships fielded by keep the UK’s Armed Forces at the the Armed Forces. Military power is leading edge of technology, using increasingly generated and assessed its purchasing power to shape the in terms of: commercial market. • Buy it: Defence must be able to • How quickly the Armed Forces pull innovation through from ideas and industry can innovate and to the front line at speed, getting operationalise technology that new capabilities into the hands is developing faster than ever in of warfighters and creating the human history. conditions for the market to invest, • How effectively the Armed Forces experiment, and scale. use networked assets—increasingly • Use it: for maximum impact, Defence dominated by uncrewed and must continually develop its people’s autonomous platforms—to create skill set, adapt its organisation, and agility, lethality, mass, and endurance. exploit a common digital foundation 3. As described in Chapter 2, the UK to which all software-enabled Armed Forces have begun the necessary assets connect. process of change in response to this new 5. With dual-use technology increasingly reality. But progress has not been fast central to military advantage, Defence or radical enough, limited to important should more purposefully use its but small-scale experimentation and market power to create economic the acquisition of a small number of growth—prioritising UK-based valuable capabilities. To meet the threats businesses without losing the benefits of of today and tomorrow, Defence must competition—while also delivering for the fundamentally transform how it warfighter. Success in embedding the works: changing how it fights and innovation cycle will also see significant how it supports that fight. improvement in Defence productivity, 43 Transforming UK Warfighting competitiveness, exports, and value • Industry-backed: developing a for money, maximising the return on thriving, resilient innovation and the resources available to it, supported industrial base that can scale by the new Defence Reform and innovation and production in support Efficiency Plan. of the Integrated Force (Chapter 4.2). 6. At the heart of this transformation are 7. This diagnosis is not new. But Defence three fundamental changes in approach. has not yet made the organisational Defence must be: and cultural change necessary for success. Pressing on with ‘root and • Integrated by design: delivering branch’ reform to what Defence does a digitally integrated combat force and how—supported by the acquisition that is more lethal than the sum of its of select digital capabilities—offers parts and interoperable with NATO the potential for rapid improvements (Chapter 4.1). in the Armed Forces’ lethality. With • Innovation-led: rapidly adopting new adversaries’ intentions and capabilities technology to keep this Integrated changing so significantly, and with Force at the forefront of warfare technology changing warfare so quickly, (Chapter 4.2). ‘business as usual’ is no longer an option. The time for action is now. Recommendation: 3. Defence must transform how it works to become a leading tech-enabled defence power, with an Integrated Force that deters, fights, and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace. To drive this transformation, Defence must more systematically ensure that its efforts deliver both for the warfighter and for the UK economy—with the forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy an important opportunity to embed radical reforms. Success will require the MOD to develop an understanding of the relationship between its military competitiveness and the performance of the defence innovation and industrial base. As a starting point, the MOD should establish and track metrics for: • The lethality of the Armed Forces. • Productivity within Defence and, separately, of industry. • The national economic impact of Defence spending and procurement (including departmental research and development spend), especially within the defence and dual-use technology sectors. 44 The Integrated Force Model 4.1 The Integrated Force Model 1. The UK has long been at the forefront Integrated by design of efforts to deliver a combat force that is ‘joint’ and ‘multi-domain’. However, 3. The key features of the Integrated in practice, the single Services have Force are: largely evolved separately in terms of design, equipment, and training— • A single force design that delivers creating siloes. The result is a force a more lethal and agile combat force. that joins up only on the battlefield: The UK’s nuclear, conventional, and the effectiveness of the Armed Forces Special Forces are connected in a on operations is determined by the unified effort, with non-nuclear force capabilities available to each Service elements designed and directed by at the point of deployment, rather than CDS as one force to achieve the as the result of joined-up planning goals set by the Secretary of State. and delivery. This coherent combat force trains and fights across domains under a 2. For the Armed Forces to be more single vision, drawing on the unique lethal than the sum of their parts, they strengths and expertise of the single must complete the journey from ‘joint’ Services and Strategic Command. to ‘integrated’, inverting the model so CDS is responsible for the readiness that authorities for design and delivery and endurance of the Integrated flow top-down from a single point of Force, supported by the Service military authority. This step-change in Chiefs. In designing this unified approach is dependent on the elevation force, CDS must balance investment of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) between front-line capabilities under Defence Reform as the head of and the foundational enablers that the new Military Strategic Headquarters sustain the force in protracted, (MSHQ) with command over the high-intensity warfare. Service Chiefs. The Services must • A common set of foundational be integrated in planning, readiness, enablers. The full range of deployment, and procurement. And this supporting activity and capabilities34 Integrated Force must be underpinned are delivered according to a single by the common digital foundation and scheme set by CDS and the MSHQ. shared data that are central to today’s Delivery of this design is directed by software-defined warfare. CDS and led by the Service Chiefs. It is supported by the new National Armaments Director (NAD), whose remit incorporates defence innovation, procurement, support, infrastructure, and Defence Digital. 34 Such as training, exercises, infrastructure, logistics, medical services, intelligence, stockpiles, and munitions. 45 The Integrated Force Model • Digital enablement at its core. 5. Where previous reviews have established A common digital foundation of data, a fixed force design to be delivered by Artificial Intelligence (AI), synthetic a specified date, this Review instead environments, and networks connects advocates a model of constant people and platforms across all innovation of the Integrated Force at domains, and with allies and partners. wartime pace, delivered through a new This gives the Integrated Force agility, partnership with industry (Chapter 4.2). speed of manoeuvre, and effective This ensures that commercial innovation targeting to outmatch opponents. and the ability to scale and sustain supply is built into how the Armed Forces • Collaboration with other are conceived and operate. Under Government departments this model, there is no end state for in real time, not least the UK the Integrated Force: its design and Intelligence Community,35 to achieve capabilities—and the way that wider maximum effect in response to Defence supports it—must continue to national security challenges. evolve as threats and technology do. 4. To fulfil the roles for Defence outlined in Chapter 3, the Integrated Force Digitally enabled integration must be able to operate in different configurations. It should be: 6. Digital integration is essential to achieving a step-change in lethality. • Integrated into NATO by design (Box 4 Data and digital systems are the in Chapter 3), capable of operating as fundamental underpinnings of all modern part of NATO Component Commands military capabilities, making them more while still drawing on the UK’s capable, resilient, and lethal. They are common enablers and other elements integral to developing a force dominated of the Integrated Force, such as the by AI, uncrewed, and autonomous UK Intelligence Community. systems, and in preparing the ground for the profound potential impact of Artificial • Capable of integration when General Intelligence. They can no longer operating in coalition, including as a be viewed as a capability choice to be leading framework nation36 and as weighed up against traditional military a contributing partner. platforms, like missiles, ships, or tanks. • Capable of operating as an They require priority funding and delivery. integrated, sovereign force when needed. This will particularly apply in meeting the UK’s responsibilities to the Overseas Territories. 35 Comprising the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), and GCHQ. 36 Providing the organisational leadership, military enablers, and many force elements for an operation, into which partners ‘plug’ specialised capabilities. 46 The Integrated Force Model Urgently fix the foundations • Robust cyber security. Legacy systems should be retired to reduce 7. There are pockets of excellence working the currently intolerable levels of towards this vision across Defence.37 cyber risk carried by Defence. However, Defence’s digital transformation • Embracing open architectures has been hindered by the loss of central and shared technical standards, funding, lack of defined and consistently from standardised drone hardware applied standards and architecture, ports to universal communications and a persistent shortage of key digital and AI protocols. Simplicity is key. skills within the Armed Forces and Civil Service. • Treating data as a strategic asset, with protected computing and data 8. Defence should be ruthlessly infrastructure, and assured data flows focused on delivering the core from allies and the UK Intelligence digital platform for the warfighter. Community. Appointing a data/ The Chief Information Officer (CIO) AI lead within each procurement must have clear authority to establish capability portfolio (Chapter 4.2) and supervise common technical would ensure that data and AI are standards, including those related to considered through the full lifecycle cyber security and data management. of new capabilities. With the CIO defining the core platform and standards at the ‘centre’, exploitation primarily shifts to the edge: front-line personnel can experiment and create Invest in the people … they the digital applications they need at have to understand the tech. speed, feeding their insights back into You can build it and buy it, but the central design. Delivering the core they need to be able to use it platform requires: —Citizens’ Panel member, • Concentration on the core RAF Waddington enterprise capabilities: resilient and secure communications networks, an assured data fabric,38 and the 9. To maximise the benefits of cutting-edge ability for users to consume services technology and of the common digital and exploit AI and autonomous architecture, Defence must also capabilities in real time, in any make a concerted effort to develop location, and at scale. This requires the necessary digital, AI, cyber, and rapid progress in delivering the electromagnetic warfare skills that Secret Cloud.39 are central to modern warfighting. 37 Particularly in the Special Forces. Projects ASGARD (Army), EVE (Royal Navy), and NEXUS (RAF) are also using digital and data innovations to connect forces on the ground, in the air, or at sea with other networked assets to provide machine-speed decision support for reconnaissance and strike. 38 Data fabric is a sophisticated system that enables the efficient management and integration of large amounts of data across multiple sources. It is vital for informed decision-making and strategic planning in an increasingly digital world, where data is produced and stored in diverse locations and formats. Just as a well-designed transport network ensures smooth and efficient travel, a data fabric connects and harmonises different data sources, allowing for a comprehensive and coherent view of the data landscape. 39 A secure and scalable platform for storing and sharing information classified at Secret. 47 The Integrated Force Model 10. Establishing a dedicated Digital A single digital mission: the digital Warfighter group would allow targeting web Defence to deploy digital and conventional warfighters on 11. A clear, unifying mission would enable operations side-by-side, maximising Defence to succeed where it has opportunity for rapid learning and previously failed, catalysing progress adaptation. The Digital Warfighters would in laying the foundations. Establishing a exploit technology such as sensors, new digital ‘targeting web’ (Box 5 and AI-powered systems, and drones to Figure 3) would have this catalytic effect achieve a decisive advantage: analysing while ultimately enhancing the Armed battlespace data in real time, predicting Forces’ precision and lethality at scale threats, optimising operational strategy, and reach. With the MSHQ providing the speeding up decision-making, and central demand signal for this new web, improving communication and integration digital leaders should be held to account across domains. This new group should for implementation. An external Advisory exemplify best practice for recruitment, Panel should be established to support retention, and training: attractive to those the vision and mission delivery. who would not typically see Defence as a career option; benefiting from flexible opportunities within structured career streams; and a cohort of Regular, Reserve, civilian, and industry personnel. 48 The Integrated Force Model Box 5: The digital targeting web Informed by lessons from Ukraine, the digital targeting web would connect ‘sensors’, ‘deciders’, and ‘effectors’. This creates choice and speed in deciding how to degrade or destroy an identified target across domains and in a contested cyber and electromagnetic domain. For example, a target might be identified by a sensor on a ship or in space before being disabled by an F-35 aircraft, drone, or offensive cyber operation. Informed by AI and supported by a common synthetic environment, the targeting web epitomises how the Integrated Force must fight and adapt. Its very existence contributes to deterrence. Figure 3: Illustration of the digital targeting web 49 The Integrated Force Model Recommendations: 4. The Government should implement the Integrated Force model to achieve full integration within Defence, delivering a more agile and lethal combat force. To ensure accountability for the continual adaptation of the Integrated Force over time, Defence should: • Submit an annual statement to the Secretary of State on force design that identifies what has changed. • Undertake an annual evaluation of the effectiveness of the Integrated Force model, measured through demonstrable improvements in: availability of assets; sustainability; pace of exploitation; rates of experimentation through to adoption; NATO interoperability; and speed of decision-making. 5. Digital integration is essential if the UK Armed Forces are to significantly increase their lethality. The MOD should (a) protect digital spend as a no-fail priority and (b) embed a culture of constant innovation with a target of minimum annual shift of 10% expenditure from current to next-generation capabilities on its enterprise digital platforms and services. To ensure accountability for delivery: • Progress in establishing the fundamental capabilities of a core common platform—under the authority of the Chief Information Officer—should be reported to the Secretary of State on a quarterly basis. • Progress should be catalysed through a single digital mission: to deliver a digital targeting web in 2027, requiring access, in whole or in part, to a Defence-wide Secret Cloud, with a minimum viable product available in 2026. • The MOD should report to the Secretary of State by July 2026 on assurance of critical data flows, with a plan for scaling up dissemination and exploitation of data in warfare and across Defence. • A new Digital Warfighter group should be established, with appropriate recruitment and pay freedoms, by July 2026. This new group should allow Defence to deploy digital and conventional warfighters on operations side-by-side. 50 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth 4.2 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth 1. Innovation and industrial power are Current MOD processes stifle adaptation central to deterrence and decisive and productivity, imposing unattractive factors in war. The conflict in Ukraine timelines, requirements, and costs on provides a stark reminder of the smaller companies. Innovation cycles imperative of maintaining sufficient increasingly happen in days and weeks, inventories of munitions and spares, not months and years. Yet for projects the fast replenishment and resupply by valued above £20m, it takes 6.5 years on industry, and a rapid, continual cycle average for a contract to be awarded. of innovation between industry and 4. To deliver our vision for UK the front line. Defence, business as usual is no 2. Today, much of the best innovation is longer an option. Through the UK’s found in the private sector, while the support to Ukraine, we have seen increasing prevalence of dual-use what effective joint working between technologies has widened the net of the MOD and industry looks like. potential suppliers that can contribute Processes designed for peacetime to Defence outcomes. There is a deep have been revolutionised to enable range of partners outside Defence delivery at speed. Defence must that it must work to bring in alongside now mainstream these practices, its prime contractors, from technology transforming acquisition processes and innovation startups and scale-ups,40 and making sure through-life support to small and medium-sized enterprises, is considered from the outset. private investors, and the trade unions 5. Defence also has significant untapped and their members, who are the potential to be a new engine for workforce without which a step-change growth at the heart of the UK’s in industrial productivity would not economic strategy. It already makes a be possible. vital contribution to the UK economy. 3. Defence has a crucial role to In 2023/24, the MOD spent c.£29bn with play in developing the thriving UK industry.41 Defence exports were and resilient base that underpins valued at £14.5bn in 2023. Defence warfighting competitiveness and supports 440,000 jobs across the readiness (Chapter 3). But it is stuck UK and over 24,000 apprenticeships, in Cold War-era procurement cycles with significant economic and social and relationships with industry. benefit (Figure 4).42 Yet it can go further. 40 A ‘scale-up’ company is one that has moved beyond the startup phase, having proven its business model. 41 MOD regional expenditure with industry 2023/24 - GOV.UK. 42 Military apprenticeships starting in 2018/19 delivered a gross economic benefit of around £600m by 2023/24. Measuring the Net Present Value of Further Education in England 2018-19 - GOV.UK. 51 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth 6. Radical root-and-branch reform of the productive capacity of the UK defence procurement—combined economy, ensuring that Defence with substantial investment in investment delivers both for the innovation, novel technology, advanced warfighter and for the economy. manufacturing, and skills—would grow Figure 4: The nationwide defence industry 52 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth 7. To succeed, Defence must be more • Maximising existing MOD purposeful in its approach to industry. investment in research and It is uniquely positioned to use its buying development (R&D)—some power to support economic growth, £2.6bn in 2023/24.44 This should be given its significant market size, its ability supported by collaboration with the to purchase at scale through coordinated Department for Science, Innovation procurement, and a constantly evolving and Technology (DSIT), Department need for technology. Prioritising for Business and Trade, UK Research UK-based business, Defence should and Innovation (UKRI), and the aim high: success should be measured Advanced Research and Innovation in the number and scale of deep tech Agency to ensure taxpayer-funded suppliers in the UK in areas such as research supports Defence priority Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomy, problem sets. Expert science and advanced manufacturing, quantum, and technology (S&T) and innovation space—with high-Intellectual Property voices must be heard at the top (IP) companies delivering leading-edge table in MOD to shape the strategic capabilities for Defence while creating vision for this investment and high-skilled, high-paid jobs and driving support its delivery. exports in software, IP, and equipment. • A concerted effort to unlock private capital and expertise. 8. The forthcoming Defence Industrial Private-sector interest in the defence Strategy provides an important sector is growing but barriers to opportunity to drive the necessary private investment remain. Defence radical reform. It should clearly lay out must develop better relationships how the MOD and industry must evolve, with, and understanding of, the with leadership provided within Defence financial services sector. New by the new Defence Growth Board43 and funding models should be explored the National Armaments Director (NAD). to make defence innovators a more attractive proposition for private Seeding innovation capital, reduce the cost of finance for and growth defence companies, and increase the ability to pool capital with allies. 9. Defence must embrace its unique • A cross-government initiative to market position—including the power of develop regional clusters45 for its role as a ‘first customer’ for startups— specific technologies and to stimulate to seed innovation and growth. A more place-based growth, from cyber in comprehensive and ambitious approach Manchester to AI in the North East should include: of England and marine autonomy in Plymouth. The partnership to develop Barrow-in-Furness (Box 6), home to the UK’s nuclear deterrent, 43 Spring Statement 2025, p. 19. The board will co-chaired by the Defence Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer. 44 Net expenditure. MOD departmental resources: 2024 – GOV.UK. 45 A regional cluster is a geographical concentration of interconnected businesses, supported by universities and research institutions, built around specialist knowledge, expertise, and experience. 53 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth offers a useful model for local-national partnerships that combine national and regional funding and expertise to develop local strengths. Consideration must also be given to the defence industries across the devolved nations—Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—when taking forward these plans. • Creating a pipeline of skills and creative talent that will help Defence and industry to deliver cutting-edge capabilities while developing the foundations for economic growth. The MOD should work with the Department for Education, DSIT (including directly with UKRI), and universities to invest in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and other specialist skills. Box 6: Developing towns and regions through local-national partnership: Barrow-in-Furness Launched in 2024, the Plan for Barrow recognises the town’s critical importance for maintaining the UK’s nuclear deterrent. Through more than £200m of government investment over the next ten years, ‘Team Barrow’—a partnership between the Government, Westmoreland and Furness Council, and BAE Systems—will address historic underinvestment and high levels of deprivation, helping to regenerate and revitalise the area to the benefit of Defence, the local community, and the local economy. Team Barrow is a model of cross-government collaboration. Alongside the MOD and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Departments for Transport, Education, Business and Trade, Work and Pensions, and Health and Social Care are all playing a crucial role through funding or supporting initiatives. These include improved transport connectivity, additional homes and new public spaces, revised education offers, support to local businesses, and plans to alleviate skills shortages. 54 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth 10. Delivering this more ambitious • Harnessing commercial innovation. approach will require the MOD to A new UK Defence Innovation set itself up for success internally. organisation (announced in March There is a distinct difference between 2025)48 should provide the mechanism seeding early-stage scientific research by which Defence quickly finds and (from basic principles to lab testing) and then buys innovative commercial shaping the commercial sector through products and services from the collaboration and contracts. Success UK and allied countries, including in these two undertakings depends on dual-use technologies. By connecting different ways of working, skills, partners, external innovation with Defence and networks. Defence must treat them procurement, this organisation should separately, reorganising existing act as an engine for growth in the teams to create two new structures defence and dual-use technology (Box 7). These teams’ agendas should sectors. It will have a ringfenced be cohered as core elements of the annual budget of at least £400m.49 new National Armaments Director Group, coalescing around thematic and technological missions that in turn align with capability plans and industrial We should be investing in sectors.46 These new departmental brains, minds, and innovation. organisations should focus on: You’ve always got to leverage your strengths • Seeding early-stage scientific research. A new Defence Research —Citizens’ Panel member, and Evaluation (DRE) organisation— HM Naval Base Portsmouth created as an evolution of the current Dstl and Defence Science and Technology teams47—should 11. Under this revised model for S&T and act as a gateway to academia and innovation, the Chief Scientific Adviser research institutions across the (CSA) in the Department of State will UK and allied countries, leveraging continue the essential role of providing Government-funded, world-class S&T science policy guidance and connecting more effectively to make it worthwhile externally with the Government’s for universities to invest in long-term CSA network, universities, and other capacity- and capability-building. scientific institutions. The MOD should routinely draw on the available S&T and innovation expertise to inform procurement decisions. 46 From Technology Readiness Levels 1 to 9, which represent the development stage of technologies, from lab testing of an idea (level 1) through to the technology in use on operations (level 9). 47 The department may wish to retain the Dstl brand for this more focused organisation. 48 Government to turbocharge defence innovation – GOV.UK. The leader of this new organisation should have an appropriate title for external engagement, such as ‘Chief Innovation Officer’. 49 Spring Statement 2025, p. 18 – GOV.UK. 55 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth Box 7: Finding and steering early-stage research and commercial innovation The new Defence Research and Evaluation organisation should work with academic and research institutions to: • Design and deliver an early-stage • Empower the Scientific Adviser science and technology (S&T) network to ensure evidence-based research portfolio with strong decision-making and scientific advice programme management, aligned is adopted across Defence and work with National Armaments Director closely with the Front Line Commands priorities, and drawing on consultation under the leadership of the National with internal and external partners. Armaments Director. DRE should share problem sets with • Enhance allied and NATO scientific academia and research institutions efforts, including shaping and to develop their understanding of the participating in international, classified problems facing Defence. research where this aligns with National • DRE’s internal research should Armaments Director priorities. robustly prioritise a small number • Horizon scan for early advancements of national security issues where in S&T that could shape long-term sovereign ownership and skills are defence capabilities and identify where crucial, supported by partnership with Government can spur and shape the one or two universities to develop market through proof-of-concept expertise and talent.50 The central, contracts. dominant effort should be on: • Revisit key priorities regularly, cutting ° Chemical and biological defence.51 projects that are not delivering and This is the essential and urgent ensuring headroom in the budget for activity. emerging themes. ° Novel and unconventional • Develop closer relationships across weapons systems, including the S&T ecosystem, especially with energetic and explosive materials. universities. This should include ° Counter-terrorism technology establishing thematic experts working and manufacturing, including with universities, the UK Intelligence specialist munitions. Community, and others in Government across areas of national priority. ° Maintenance of unique testing capabilities, such as Porton Down laboratory.52 This potentially requires contributions from other Government departments, given its utility beyond Defence. 50 Given security requirements, it is likely that only one or two universities or small clusters will provide the relevant training and expertise. 51 The Atomic Weapons Establishment will continue to steward early-stage scientific research on behalf of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (Chapter 7.1). 52 Porton Down laboratory is an exemplar of Defence’s critical, world-leading capabilities, as evidenced by its role in identifying the military-grade nerve agent, Novichok, used by Russia in attempted assassinations in the UK in 2018. 56 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth • As a subset of these relationships, universities to invest in long-term forge ‘anchor partnerships’ with capability-building. These institutional a small set of trusted universities relationships should be reviewed every to leverage Government-funded, five years and adapted to ensure world-class S&T more effectively, relevance to Defence priorities. and to make it worthwhile for The new UK Defence Innovation organisation should shape and draw on external innovation expertise to: • Find existing full, partial, or ‘good • Build relationships with other enough’ commercial solutions, Government departments, especially including dual-use technologies— with the Department for Business and sharing problem sets with industry, Trade and the Department for Science, not specifications. Innovation and Technology. This should include delivering the Defence Industrial • Drive the adoption of innovation by Strategy and ‘Scan’ activities under the connecting innovators to Defence AI Opportunities Action Plan. procurement teams co-located in the National Armaments Director Group • Pivot to ‘outcomes-based’ partnerships and accessing protected funding for with: rapid commercial exploitation. ° Startups, scale-ups, and spinouts, • Identify where it could stimulate the creating the current and next waves market as a ‘first customer’. of technology products and services. • Coordinate a significantly streamlined ° Innovation organisations, private set of innovation hubs (across equity, venture capital, and other the Front Line Commands) and investors within the UK and NATO innovation challenges (under the member states. Defence and Security Accelerator) in alignment with Defence’s priorities and in support of innovation-led startups and scale-ups. • Be responsible for developing regional clusters and supporting local-national partnerships—using locally based staff to build understanding of local business sectors. 57 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth A new partnership Segmentation would increase the range of suppliers available to Defence with industry by tailoring processes and timelines to the type of acquisition, supplier, 12. Under the NAD’s leadership and the and risk involved. Protecting the budget forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy, for rapid commercial exploitation Defence must overhaul its acquisition (the third segment) would ensure that processes to improve productivity high-tempo innovation is not squeezed and create a new partnership with out by investment in major platforms, industry, moving away from the more reliably unlocking private finance.55 customer-vendor relationship and Commercial practices must be updated creating the conditions under which through routine use of more flexible, high-IP companies can scale and grow. evergreen contracts.56 Routine access This requires a more intelligent approach: to digital twins57 and predictive models (simulations) would also reduce the time • Engaging industry early in the from concept to delivery. procurement process on desired outcomes and problem-solving. 14. Service-agnostic capability portfolios • Ensuring that suppliers are rewarded that pool funding and expertise for for their productivity and for taking technology areas would further support greater risk in their investments. agile procurement and embed common standards across the Integrated Force. • Removing barriers to collaboration, In-year funding flexibility would allow especially for smaller companies. the NAD to move resources where they 13. At the heart of this partnership should were most needed within a portfolio. The be a segmented approach to costs and processes for both acquisition procurement53 (Figure 5) that builds and through-life support should be on the Integrated Procurement Model54 incorporated into each portfolio to ensure and recent changes to the Defence affordability and improve readiness. Equipment & Support Operating Model. 53 Announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in March 2025. Spring Statement 2025, p. 36 – GOV.UK. 54 The Integrated Procurement Model – GOV.UK, launched in April 2024, seeks to accelerate the delivery of military capability across the Armed Forces. 55 Acquisition processes for the ‘rapid commercial exploitation’ segment should build on the experience of the Future Capability Team in Defence Equipment & Support. 56 An ‘evergreen’ contract automatically renews itself after the deadline or expiration date. For software procurement, the Commercial X approach—using a new framework to accelerate procurement for micro or small business—could be scaled up to enable a faster cycle of testing and development before buying at scale. 57 A digital twin is a virtual representation of an object or system that accurately reflects the physical object. It is updated using real-time data. The digital twins, models, and data should adhere to standards defined by the MOD’s Chief Information Officer (Chapter 4.1). 58 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth Figure 5: Market segmentation for smarter procurement 59 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth Bolstering exports and 16. Exports and capability partnerships must be considered in procurement capability partnerships decisions from the outset. A new approach to exports will drive the UK’s 15. If we fight together, we should build market share, boost capabilities, and together. It is no longer affordable for strengthen growth. Most importantly, NATO Allies, especially within Europe, to it will underpin the long-term health of develop their own exquisite capabilities the defence sector. Defence exports are at low production volumes. The existence about more than just trade undertaken of more than 165 land platforms across by private companies. Success is based NATO illustrates the scale of the problem. on long-term relationships between Defence exports and international Governments and militaries. The MOD capability partnerships—such as must once again assume responsibility AUKUS and the Global Combat Air for developing both the capabilities Programme (Box 8)—provide a potential for export and the relationships that solution, offering economies of scale underpin them. To enhance export and mass, new paths to innovation and opportunities, the UK should develop economic growth, interoperability with a new framework for an enhanced allies, and a stronger collective defence government-to-government mechanism industrial base. They underpin the UK’s alongside ongoing, post-sale relationships and ultimately strengthen military-to-military collaboration. collective security (Chapter 5). The National Armaments Director must have the ability to increase coordination and collaboration with allies (in and outside NATO), including through agreeing common standards and greater collaboration on R&D. Box 8: International collaboration in action: AUKUS and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) AUKUS and GCAP will deliver next-generation capabilities for the UK Armed Forces through collaboration with close allies. Under AUKUS, Australia, the UK, and the US will develop conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines that are interchangeable, as well as advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber, hypersonic missiles, and underwater warfare. Under GCAP, Italy, Japan, and the UK will develop a sixth-generation aircraft—part of the Future Combat Air System, comprising crewed aircraft, uncrewed platforms, next-generation weapons, networks, and data-sharing. But these programmes deliver more than cutting-edge military capabilities. It is estimated that, at its peak, the AUKUS attack submarine programme will have more than 21,000 people working on it at UK sites, with the work generating an additional 7,000 skilled roles. The AUKUS nations’ ITAR exemption and reciprocal export control arrangements by the UK and Australia have had a beneficial impact in enabling allies to collaborate. GCAP supports over 3,500 UK jobs, sustaining a skilled workforce for the UK’s combat air industry. 60 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth Robust prioritisation in upgrades, acquisition and support, and attendant changes to infrastructure. acquisition decisions When assessing potential investments, the Secretary of State must have 17. A robust Balance of Investments access to assured data as well as (BOI) process is vital if the MOD is to detailed analysis of through-life costings prioritise capabilities for acquisition and the affordability of the proposed effectively, making trade-offs between capability within the overall Defence departmental objectives. To ensure portfolio. Authority for deletions from the the new Defence Investment Plan programme should rest with the National (the successor to the Equipment Armaments Director in conjunction with Plan) is genuinely affordable, the BOI the Service Chiefs, providing combined process should consider associated advice to the Secretary of State. costs—for example, through-life Recommendations: 6. To boost private investment in the defence and dual-use technology sectors, and to support new entrants and innovation, the MOD should develop a dedicated strategy for the financial services sector by March 2026. Important starting points include: establishing a Defence Investors’ Advisory Group whose membership includes venture capital and private equity investors; and exploring alternative funding and financing models for Defence programmes and projects. 7. By December 2025, the MOD should establish a revitalised system for science and technology and innovation that more directly responds to the annual problem set provided by the MSHQ to the National Armaments Director (NAD). The MOD should reorganise existing structures into two new organisations under the National Armaments Director Group: • A Defence Research and Evaluation organisation, focused on enabling external early-stage research. Highly expert Defence researchers should serve as affiliated faculty to partner universities, starting in the 2026–27 academic year. • The UK Defence Innovation organisation, focused on harnessing commercial innovation, including dual-use technologies. These two organisations should work in collaboration with the Chief Scientific Adviser. The NAD should set ambitious targets for pull through and scaling, reporting quarterly to the Secretary of State on these efforts. 61 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth Recommendations: 8. The MOD must establish a new partnership with industry that maximises internal and industrial expertise, accelerates acquisition processes, manages risk and cost, and engages a wider set of suppliers. Greater agility and productivity should be delivered through service-agnostic capability portfolios and a segmented approach to procurement: • Major modular platforms (contracting within two years). • Pace-setting spiral and modular upgrades (contracting within a year). • Rapid commercial exploitation (contracting within three months). This segment should benefit from protected funding, with at least 10% of the MOD’s equipment procurement budget spent on novel technologies each year.58 This new approach to market segmentation and capability portfolios should be established by March 2026. 9. To ensure long-term accountability for delivery: • Two productivity Key Performance Indicators should be agreed for the National Armaments Director—one focused on departmental productivity (for which accountability should be shared with the Chief of the Defence Staff), and one externally focused on supply chain productivity. • Senior Responsible Owners of service-agnostic capability portfolios and acquisition programmes for major modular platforms should remain in post for at least five years, without disadvantage to promotion. 10. By April 2026, the MOD should develop a package of support for its industrial partners that removes barriers to collaboration and drives better, more cost-effective results: reducing by at least 50% the burden of Defence Standards and Conditions; working across Government to amend the Single Source Contract Regulations; reforming regulations, Intellectual Property handling, and security clearance requirements; and providing access to intelligence, data, and test and evaluation sites. 11. The MOD should establish a mechanism for assessing the full implications of largescale capability partnerships with allies, including in NATO. This should be supported by a multilateral capability plan with NATO Allies that identifies capabilities for joint procurement, agrees common standards, and drives interoperability. Delivery would be enhanced by mutual recognition of well-founded test and evaluation regimes across the Alliance, saving time and money. 58 Spring Statement 2025, p. 18 – GOV.UK. 62 Innovation and Industry: A New Approach for Deterrence and Growth Recommendations: 12. The UK must establish the necessary conditions for boosting defence exports and joint capability partnerships under the leadership of the National Armaments Director. This should include: • Clear governance, accountability, and streamlined processes. Responsibility for UK Defence and Security Exports should be transferred from the Department for Business and Trade to the MOD. The MOD should coordinate with other relevant departments to achieve its export goals. • A new framework for building and sustaining government-to-government relationships, including through ongoing military-to-military collaboration, with a view to delivering export opportunities for UK businesses. • A review of export licensing policies. This should include considering how to improve prioritisation and provide clarity to industry and international partners. 13. The MOD must have a robust Balance of Investment process in which the Secretary of State has access to detailed analysis of through-life costings and the affordability of the proposed capability within the overall Defence portfolio. To support this: • The MOD’s Cost Assurance and Analysis Service must have ‘open book’ access to data and the authority and independence to provide regular advice to Ministers, including on overall budget affordability. • The MOD must digitise acquisition and support processes as soon as funding allows. 63 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education 4.3 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education 1. People are fundamental to UK High-level workforce Defence and to delivering the planning and development transformation set out in this Review. Defence has, in many ways, a good offer: compelling starting salaries, purposeful 3. Defence needs a dynamic ‘blend’ of work, skills training and education, Regulars, Reserves, and civil servants prestige, and the opportunity to see to give it the mix of skills, experience, the world. The Armed Forces are rightly and strategic depth required for the respected for their skill, professionalism, threats of this era. This blend will need and dedication worldwide. At a time to evolve over time as threats, warfare, when strategic depth in the Defence and technology evolve. This demands workforce is increasingly important high-level workforce planning and to deterrence, it must now meet the development in support of Defence longstanding challenge of recruiting and outcomes that is ‘whole force’, retaining new generations with different outcome-focused, and skills-based: requirements—a challenge shared by putting the right people in the right roles many UK allies and partners. Defence and using the range of tools available to must also free its workforce from the red meet changing need, including through tape and risk aversion that inhibits action recruitment and retention efforts, greater at all levels of the organisation. harnessing of industry skills in select areas, and a focused training and 2. Initiatives underway within the MOD education offer. are an important start in addressing these challenges. To succeed, 4. To fulfil the roles set out in this Review, however, Defence must be more there is no scope for reducing radical in unleashing innovation and the number of highly trained and productivity in pursuit of its central equipped Regulars across all three purpose: to deter through being ready Services, even as the forces move to to fight and win wars. This chapter takes a much greater emphasis on autonomy existing initiatives as its starting point. (Chapter 7). Increasing the total Its recommendations are aligned with number of Regular personnel should the goals of the 2023 Haythornthwaite be prioritised when funding allows, Review59 but are the priority for catalytic likely in the next Parliament. Care and change in creating a ‘One Defence’ attention must be given to roles occupied approach to people, training, by Regulars away from the front line. and education. They deliver these roles with pride and skill but it potentially weakens UK fighting strength, allowing operational skills and training to atrophy. 59 ‘Agency and agility: Incentivising people in a new era’, 2023 – GOV.UK. 64 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education 5. The diversity of knowledge, skills, 7. The opportunity and need to improve experience, and behaviours that productivity and efficiency cannot be Reserves bring from their outside ignored, however.60 MOD Civil Service jobs are an invaluable strength. costs should be reduced by at least We anticipate it will become necessary to 10% by 2030. Accelerating efforts increase the UK’s Active Reserve forces to harness Artificial Intelligence by at least 20% when funding allows, (AI), automation, and augmentation most likely in the 2030s. In the meantime, technology would enable military to restore mass and resilience in a crisis, personnel (some 5,000) and civil Defence must make much better use servants in roles in Human Resources, of the resources available by urgently Finance, and Commercial functions reinvigorating how it engages with the to move into front-line roles and reduce Strategic Reserve (ex-Regulars who have administrative costs. This will result in a a mobilisation obligation, Chapter 6) and smaller Defence Civil Service over time improving recruitment and retention but the focus should be on productivity, within the Active Reserves. We support not headcount. the MOD’s work to simplify the structures 8. Additionally, conducting a baseline and types of Reserves, amplify the review of all Head Office and Staff visibility and recognition of their roles, and Headquarters roles would identify make it easier to scale specialist skills and which substantially benefit from being mobilise them en masse if required. To undertaken by military personnel, with a support this work, the department should: view to releasing a significant number • Better publicise the ‘specialist’ to operational roles (in line with the roles available in the Reserves approach taken by allies and partners). (such as lawyers, engineers, and Service Leavers, employed as Reserves cyber specialists) and ensure their or civil servants, are a suitable substitute capability, skills, and advice are made in the limited areas where military available to the whole workforce. experience is required and where the use of technology is not an option. • Protect time, funding, and equipment for Reserves in the training Fixing recruitment and retention programme, gaining efficiencies and scale by aligning Regular and Reserve 9. The MOD faces a longstanding specialisations and roles. recruitment and retention crisis. Young people today want different things from 6. Civil servants are central to Defence their employers, including more flexibility outcomes and must be treated as and hybrid working. They expect to such. Defence must invest with purpose change jobs multiple times throughout in the Civil Service it needs—reshaping the their careers. Critically, they also have workforce with a focus on performance, fewer connections to the Armed Forces. productivity, and skills. The genuinely There is no quick fix to these challenges. integrated nature of the military and civilian workforce is a significant advantage and must not be lost. 60 The Government has committed all departments to reducing their administrative budgets by 15% by the end of the decade. Spring Statement 2025, p. 25 – GOV.UK. 65 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education 10. Long-term success depends on reconnecting society with the Armed Forces and the purpose of Defence, I was impressed the most by supported by a Government-led national the people that we’ve met—the conversation (Chapter 6). The work of professionalism, dedication, the the Office for Veterans’ Affairs is key passion, and the excitement to connecting positively with society they’ve portrayed to us and recruiting the next generation, through setting veterans up for success. —Citizens’ Panel member, This should be supported by targeted HM Naval Base Portsmouth interventions in recruitment and retention, focusing on initiatives that have the greatest impact and that attract the 12. To improve retention, the MOD widest possible range of talent. must prioritise delivering its ‘flexible working’ initiative, enabling military 11. For recruitment, the focus should be personnel to dial their commitment up on speed, drastically shortening the and down throughout their career—a period between applicants expressing major shift from current practice. Where interest and joining. A more modern, accommodation falls well short of the accommodating approach is required, standard required, it must be rapidly including through: more flexible medical improved (Chapter 7.11). Providing and fitness standards, reducing the number support towards home ownership (paid of pre-existing conditions that are a barrier off through return of service and in line to entry; and shorter commitments that give with costs for service accommodation) people a flavour of military careers, offering should also be explored. Policies that them a route in while building skills and support families—including flexible experience they can take with them for life. working and greater stability in location The Australian military’s ‘gap years’ offers and postings—should be embraced. an exciting model from which to learn. 66 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education 13. In the event of Defence returning to personnel and their families—and the enduring deployments at scale, pastoral, new Tri-Service complaints unit for the practical, and financial support for Armed Forces.61 families will be fundamental to personnel 16. Defence will not get to the heart of retention and should be accounted for the problem unless the workforce in operational planning. becomes more representative of society, A culture of empowerment harnessing all talents to deliver the strongest possible workforce.62 The MOD must take a data-led approach 14. To drive innovation and productivity, to understand and address the systemic Defence people must be empowered behavioural, structural, and leadership to deliver, cutting through bureaucracy problems that currently prevent people and addressing risk aversion. ‘People’ from progressing within, and delivering policies must be revised on the for, Defence. Work currently driven in principle of trust. Line managers must single Service siloes must be brought be encouraged to use common-sense together to make the most of good judgement within a prescribed ideas. Sustained focus by Ministers framework, rather than codifying strict and the Defence Board is needed, entitlements in thousands of pages of as well as powerful, independent policy. Technology must also play a role, oversight of delivery, accountable to including in improving counter-fraud the Secretary of State. detection (as in other Government departments and the private sector). An adaptive training and 15. Success relies on creating an education system environment in which all people can develop and deliver. Defence 17. The Defence training and education leadership must do much more to root system is in many respects highly out behaviour that is unacceptable and effective and well regarded. Institutions counterproductive in the workplace: such as the Royal College of Defence creating an environment in which victims Studies and the military academies are supported and feel willing and able to and colleges are leaders in their field. report wrongdoing; and fulfilling its duty They continually attract the next global of care to those accused of wrongdoing leaders of defence and national security, while allegations are investigated. Where underpinning alliances and partnerships. wrongdoing is proven, there must be Educational centres such as the Defence zero tolerance: those who cannot change Academy offer the opportunity for their behaviour should be dismissed— military personnel to learn alongside civil and this must be widely noticed to have servants and industry representatives, an effect. We welcome the legislation to and to develop technical skills and create an Armed Forces Commissioner technological expertise. to improve Service life—as a direct point of contact for Armed Forces 61 Fundamental changes to Armed Forces processes to better support Women in UK Defence – GOV.UK, 18 March 2025. 62 For example, women make up only 12% of Regular personnel. 67 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education 18. Defence training and education used to prepare the commander to win, should be designed to deliver incentivising learning through mistakes. innovation at speed, given this is Using NATO-validated standards by the difference between victory and default64 would free up national training failure in war. Its design should also and exercising to be much more ensure Defence trains how it will experimental by reducing the need for fight, with provision based on the multiple validations. Supplementing live following principles: training with virtual training environments would also offer greater opportunities • ‘Whole force by default’ to develop for Regulars and Reserves to learn, a shared culture and credible as well as other benefits such as the warfighting capability. Where activity ability to test concepts, undertake can be delivered by and for ‘One mission rehearsal, advance UK and Defence’ it should be, with single NATO integration, and increase Service provision only where domain export opportunities. expertise is paramount. 20. Defence should only run training • NATO First, using NATO’s exercise and education itself when it cannot programme, doctrine, and planning be obtained externally at suitable process as the basis for UK training quality and cost. Further Education and education. Where there is a valid colleges offer potential, while strategic, argument for exceptionalism, the UK outcomes-based partnerships with should seek to influence NATO to universities should bring cutting-edge adopt its own approach (noting that research into training and education. the UK already does more than any This shift in approach would be aided other Ally to develop and maintain by adopting civilian qualifications joint doctrine). and standards where there is a • Adapts at pace of changing suitable equivalent in common use— warfare and technology, applying for example, for air traffic controllers innovations and lessons from or paramedics—supplementing them operations to education, doctrine, with military qualifications only where and concepts. Current policy63 necessary. This would improve skills is not geared to truly innovative development and the entire people training approaches, instead driving ecosystem: recruitment and retention; risk-averse behaviours and levels employment for veterans; zig-zag of assurance. Addressing this is a careers between Defence and other key component of delivering the sectors; integration with industry; and innovation cycle (Chapter 4). mobilisation of the Reserves in the event of war. 19. Training policy must ensure sensible, managed risks can be taken in military training, so that they are not unduly taken on the battlefield instead, reversing a recent trend towards safety at all costs. Validation testing must be 63 JSP 822 – Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education 64 Rather than NATO-accredited validation, which will not always be necessary or available. 68 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education Foundational skills for the • Leadership, which must be taught, trained, exercised, and rewarded Integrated Force throughout the system. This is about creating leaders that adapt, enable 21. Constant innovation across Defence their teams, and reimagine the must be supported by an agile organisation, including using AI and approach to skills development within digital technologies. the whole force. Defence must press on in rolling out a simple but effective • Financial, commercial, and ‘Pan-Defence Skills Framework’,65 using programme management, including it to link workforce planning to Defence in commissioning and contract and outcomes (such as improved readiness) service management. The pursuit and to enable career mobility. Extending of professional qualifications should the Framework to industrial partners be encouraged. (incentivised through commercial • Cyber, ensuring all personnel are processes) and the Strategic and Active aware of growing cyber risks and Reserves would enable the MOD to equipped to take essential measures. understand where skills are available in • Digital, AI, and data skills, of which the supply chain, where Defence carries there is a persistent shortage but risk, and where there are solutions. an opportunity to lead in NATO if 22. Some skills are foundational Defence gets this right. The whole workforce must be equipped with the to warfighting and the modern workplace, essential to implementing the essential skills required. The need innovation cycle and becoming a more for more specialist skills should be intelligent partner to industry. Defence must addressed through the creation of a invest in the following key skills across Digital Warfighter group (Chapter 4.1). the whole force as a matter of urgency: 65 A new ‘whole force’ approach to identifying, defining, and managing the skills of Defence people and their associated roles. 69 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education Recommendations: 14. The MOD must take a ‘whole force’, skills-based approach to workforce planning to deliver Defence outcomes and meet the evolving requirements of the Integrated Force over time. In the current strategic and fiscal situation: • There should be no further reduction in the number of Regulars across the three Services. • The number of Active Reserves should be increased by 20% when funding allows. • Civil Service costs should be reduced by at least 10% by 2030. For a truly ‘One Defence’ workforce, the Reserves and civil servants should have protected access to the necessary funding, time, and equipment for training alongside Regulars. To maximise existing resources, the MOD should seek to move all Regular personnel from administrative into front-line roles and should automate at least 20% of Human Resources, Finance, and Commercial functions by July 2028. This should be delivered as a minimum first step. 15. To create a workplace where all are empowered to deliver, the MOD must: • Remove the red tape and excessive bureaucracy created by ‘people’ policy, process, and assurance. It should rewrite its ‘people’ policies in accordance with the principle of trust, starting with the top ten by May 2026. Technology should be used to make day-to-day processes such as claiming expenses and auditing easier, with positive and efficient user experience a key criterion. • Develop a plan to prioritise and address the structural, behavioural, and leadership barriers to the creation of a more representative and meritocratic workforce that resolutely delivers a more capable warfighting and deterrent force. This plan should be established by June 2026. Recommendations for independent oversight of implementation should be made by October 2025. 16. Defence must offer novel ways of entry into the Armed Forces that attract more people from a wider range of backgrounds, submitting a plan with timelines for delivery to the Secretary of State by November 2025. Options include: • Offering shorter commitments that appeal to more of society, including the MOD’s forthcoming plans for ‘gap years’. • Developing a series of Tri-Service ‘phase 0’ camps to which applicants can report within 30 days of expressing initial interest, with suitable recruits offered roles at the camps’ conclusion. • Applying medical standards that are tailored to role types, accounting for advancements in medical treatments and reflecting shorter assumed periods of service. Terms and conditions can be changed to move liability for some pre-existing conditions to the applicant, thereby enabling many more who want to join on those terms to do so. 70 ‘One Defence’: People, Training, and Education Recommendations: 17. To aid retention, Defence should explore options to support Service personnel’s aspirations for home ownership. This would strengthen the bond between those that serve and the communities that support them. It should be accompanied by an approach that reduces the frequency with which people must move to new locations if that is their preference, staying in roles longer or moving to roles in the same location. 18. To meet the changing needs of the Integrated Force, education must be ‘whole force by default, single Service by exception’. By the end of 2026, Defence must establish a career education pathway for the whole force—Regulars, Reserves, and Civil Service—designed to respond to the changing ways of warfare over time and with NATO at its heart. To drive integration, the MSHQ should: • Oversee which personnel undertake key courses at each stage of the education pathway. • Direct the delivery of staff training from the Initial Staff Course up, with single Service input. • Provide the required integrated elements of single Service courses. • Own the funding for joint education to remove the incentives for single Services to ‘opt out’. 19. Training and education must be adaptive to operational lessons, innovation, and research. The MOD must rewrite the relevant policy by January 2026, empowering those who deliver training to revise courses at speed and consulting them in the policy’s design. The department should also: • Develop a single virtual training environment that is integrated into Defence’s common digital architecture, drawing on existing resources where this is beneficial. Procurement programmes must embed a requirement for a synthetic wrap and virtual training that is good enough to reduce reliance on live training. • Adopt civilian qualifications and standards where possible and use civilian providers for education and training where it is available at a similar cost or less. A review of current standards, qualifications, and in-house training should be completed by the end of 2025. Where there are significant barriers to progress, the MOD should work with the Department for Education, other relevant Government departments, and industry to develop a plan to overcome them. 20. Defence must invest in foundational leadership, financial, commercial, and technology skills across the civilian and military workforce. This should include: the flexibility to reward the development of expertise in specialist areas, including through pay and promotion freedoms; and developing a two-way secondment programme with a focus on short-term, informal schemes that are effective and can be delivered quickly. A plan for delivery should be developed by March 2026. 71 5. Allies and Partners 72 Allies and Partners 1. Alliances and partnerships are in this era of strategic competition. The the bedrock of global stability and US is facing a major strategic challenge, are even more important to the with two near-peer nuclear competitors UK in the context of growing risk in the form of China and Russia. The UK and uncertainty (Chapter 2). They should work with it to maximise the are essential to the Integrated Force relationship’s potential as a force and the ability to deter, fight, and win: multiplier in renewing deterrence: delivering combined strength through modernising their respective military interoperability; pooling financial and forces; leveraging the UK’s niche technological resources to innovate, with capabilities and overseas bases; military and economic benefits; building connecting the Euro-Atlantic with key allies industrial and supply chain resilience; and in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen collective mitigating geographical disadvantages. security in both regions; and building collective defence industrial capacity. 2. The UK should bolster collective security by actively investing in 4. There is enormous potential these relationships, taking as its for expanding industrial and starting point the relationships set out technological collaboration with the in the next section (‘Defence’s Global US in particular. Bilateral technology Relationships’) as well as the UK’s collaboration is already unmatched, membership of international bodies such with the UK participating in more as the UN Security Council, the Group US-led technology projects for military of 7 (G7), and NATO. Defence has a lot advantage than any other country.66 to offer, from the operational capabilities Defence should explore how to boost of its Armed Forces to its professional the mutual benefits of this investment, military education establishments. These developing deeper collaboration in areas efforts should be coordinated with other such as autonomy, Artificial Intelligence departments, most notably the Foreign, (AI), electromagnetic warfare, modelling, Commonwealth and Development and simulation. An important channel Office (FCDO), to maximise Defence’s for this is AUKUS, which provides a unique and powerful contribution to the singular opportunity to develop military Government’s ambitions and approach to advantage and thriving innovation and international relations. Finite resources industrial bases with close allies. mean the UK cannot be everything to everyone. Defence will need to NATO Allies in Europe prioritise its approach, informed by the roles outlined in Chapter 3 and using the 5. Greater political and military leadership full range of levers available to it. by European Allies within NATO is the best way to meet the challenge posed The United States of America by Russia. In support of the UK’s NATO First approach, bilateral agreements 3. The United States of America (US) is with Allies in Europe are a particularly the UK’s closest defence and security ally, powerful tool through which to create reflecting a longstanding and common strategic depth, strengthening the interest in contributing to global security Alliance and stability in the Euro-Atlantic: 66 The UK contributes to more US Coalition Warfare projects and Foreign Comparative Testing with the US than other countries, in addition to a broad portfolio of multilateral and bilateral technology programmes. 73 Allies and Partners • The MOD should build on the 2010 • The negotiation of a new defence Lancaster House Treaties67 with agreement with Norway, building France and the landmark 2024 Trinity on the 2024 Joint Declaration House Agreement68 with Germany on the Norwegian-UK Strategic as the basis for increasingly close Partnership, offers potential for co-operation: developing shared enhancing bilateral interoperability outlook, cutting-edge capabilities, on NATO’s Northern Flank, as well burden-sharing arrangements, and as cooperation on protecting critical industrial capacity and growth. undersea infrastructure and countering hybrid threats. • The new UK-Poland Treaty will provide the basis for an even closer • The UK should continue to deepen relationship, with the two countries and adapt its relationship with working together to bolster NATO’s Italy—a crucial bilateral partner Eastern Flank, tackle disinformation on NATO’s Southern Flank and and hybrid military threats, and contributor to security in the with defence industrial cooperation Mediterranean—through the Global anchored in air defence and complex Combat Air Programme, conducted weapons cooperation, as well as jointly with Japan, and deepening the export of Type 31 (Arrowhead) interoperability between the two frigates to Poland. countries’ Carrier Strike Groups. 67 Lancaster House Treaties – GOV.UK. 68 Trinity House Agreement – GOV.UK. 74 Allies and Partners • Turkey remains a key NATO and Ukraine bilateral Ally for the UK, with strong military integration and defence 8. This is a once-in-a-generation industrial collaboration. As an inflection point for collective security influential G20 member located at in Europe: securing a durable political the crossroads between the Black settlement in Ukraine that safeguards Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and and Africa, Turkey is imperative to UK future security is essential to deter security interests across Europe and Russia from further aggression across on NATO’s flanks. the region. The UK is doubling down on its support to Ukraine, stepping up its 6. Minilateral action with Allies— international leadership, and sustaining especially with the E3, E5, and Joint its unprecedented commitment of £3bn Expeditionary Force (JEF)—should in military support to Ukraine every year also be used to bolster European for as long as it takes (Figure 6). security. Defence should continue working with its Allies to develop the 9. The UK should explore further ways JEF as a capable and willing coalition to sustain Ukraine’s defence industrial committed to improving NATO’s capacity and its security—for example, deterrence posture in Northern Europe by increasing joint ventures between and the High North. The goal should be to the UK and Ukraine’s defence industries generate and embed new approaches to and, once the immediate conflict is collective deterrence within the Alliance. over, supporting Ukraine in accessing The UK should also consider building new markets for its defence industry, relationships with allies with interests including for servicing and modernising or capabilities that could add value to legacy Soviet equipment in use by UK Defence and where the UK has a third countries. Defence should also credible offer to make, such as with learn from Ukraine’s extraordinary Black Sea NATO Allies. experience in land warfare, drone, and hybrid conflict in developing its 7. To complement the UK’s NATO First own modern approach to warfighting. approach and enhance cooperation between NATO and the European Union (EU), the MOD should support implementation of the UK’s Security and Defence Partnership with the EU. The EU is a defence and security actor of increasing significance, whose unique regulatory and financial levers can complement NATO’s role as the primary guarantor of European security— as demonstrated by the European Commission’s recent proposals for the rearmament of EU member states.69 69 European Commission, ‘Press statement by President von der Leyen on the defence package’, 4 March 2025; Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, March 2025. 75 Allies and Partners Figure 6: UK support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 • Focus Defence investment in Beyond the Euro-Atlantic those relationships that offer the greatest strategic advantage 10. Defence must work bilaterally without detracting from deterrence and through NATO to bolster the efforts, warfighting, and capability capabilities of its allies and partners development in the Euro-Atlantic. in other theatres of importance to • Be the partner of choice the UK, notably the Middle East and the for exports and capability Indo-Pacific. This involves a combination partnerships (Chapter 4.2) to of security assistance, capability develop next-generation capabilities, partnerships, and trade. The UK’s bolster resilience in production offer should: capacity, and secure supply chains. 76 Allies and Partners • Draw on cross-government and and partnerships as circumstances external expertise, especially in change, supplementing the deeper academia and industry. This includes and more focused relationships set using small, flexible teams of out in this chapter. military and/or civilian technical 11. The UK should build on its relationships experts to support partners in in the Middle East, bolstering security specialist areas such as cyber, space, and developing long-term trade intelligence, and counter-hybrid opportunities and technology and warfare without diverting capability partnerships across the region operational personnel. to further economic growth. The Middle • Use impactful but low-cost East is significant to UK security and activities that offer a ‘spread prosperity due to its position as an artery bet’ against unpredictable future of global trade and its role in global developments by maintaining energy supplies. The UK’s footprint in understanding of partner countries the region and increased investment in and global complexities. Examples strategic defence partnerships supports include high-level ministerial the Government’s economic growth engagements, intelligence-sharing, agenda. UK trade with members of the export opportunities, training and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)70 is education offers, and technology currently valued at £57bn a year and collaboration. There is great value in the region accounts for over £5bn in investing in even the thinnest web of defence exports each year—the single wider relationships so that the UK largest UK market. can draw on existing collaboration 70 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 77 Allies and Partners 12. The Indo-Pacific is strategically New Zealand, and Singapore to promote important to the UK as a global cooperation and interoperability in the economic and political powerhouse region. Ministerial engagements and and arena of increasing geopolitical defence activity should be used to tension. Growing Chinese assertiveness enhance export opportunities. UK activity is a key driver of regional and global in the Indo-Pacific and around the world instability. In particular, China’s military must continue to be underpinned exercises around Taiwan risk dangerous by the Five Eyes intelligence escalation in the Taiwan Strait, while its alliance—a critical element in the aggressive actions are fuelling tension defence and security of its five members in the South China Sea. Defence can since the Second World War. Defence contribute to wider Government efforts should work with partners across to defend and shape international Government to support the Five Eyes’ rules and norms in the region through role in tackling current and future threats, strengthening regional partners and including through intelligence-sharing, protecting freedom of navigation. capability development, and operational It should maintain military-to-military coordination. channels of communication with China to 15. To ensure maximum effect within deepen mutual understanding and avoid limited resources, the UK must pursue miscalculation and inadvertent escalation improved burden-sharing with in the event of a crisis. European partners in the Indo-Pacific, 13. AUKUS, with Australia and the US, and identifying where and how the UK can the Global Combat Air Programme, most effectively contribute to security with Japan and Italy, are flagship and stability in the region. examples of capability partnerships that strengthen allies and collective Building relationships through security in both the Euro-Atlantic and the UK’s global network Indo-Pacific—a powerful signal of the UK’s ambition to bring partners from different 16. The UK’s global network serves geographic regions closer together. an important purpose in delivering Bolstered by joint military exercises, Defence’s core roles (Chapter 3). these partnerships send strong deterrent Defence must build and sustain messages to adversaries by delivering relationships to enhance its understanding transformative technology for modern, of regional and global dynamics and high-intensity warfighting. They also drive to mitigate risks. To develop these innovation and export opportunities for relationships and protect UK interests, all countries involved. The UK must Defence should use the full range of make every effort to ensure these levers available, which should be set out two partnerships are exemplars of in a new Defence Diplomacy Strategy. successful capability collaboration. 17. We support the ongoing work to 14. Defence should continue to create a single Integrated Global invest in the Five Power Defence Defence Network (IGDN, incorporated Arrangements with Australia, Malaysia, 78 Allies and Partners into Figure 7),71 consolidating Defence’s as providing a base at a strategic overseas network (people, places, location at the western entrance technology) under one command and to the Mediterranean to provide giving Defence greater agility and reach. critical support to UK—and allied— The network must be managed in a way military objectives. that delivers the most significant and • Protecting the joint UK-US base on meaningful effect in achieving UK and Diego Garcia as a bulwark of regional Defence goals. and global security. This should be achieved through the May 2025 deal 18. The UK’s Overseas Bases remain with Mauritius (supported by the US) a critical element of the IGDN in under which the UK will maintain full defending UK sovereign territory, control over this vital base, ensuring shaping UK interests, supporting its operational sovereignty well into global crisis response, and enabling the next century. enduring relationships and cooperation between the UK and partner nations.72 19. To maintain strong ‘understand’ and As circumstances and technology change, ‘engage’ functions, international it is important to adapt the bases to defence engagement should be a ensure they are sized for purpose and safe distinct military and civilian career and secure to operate while meeting the stream, creating a more professionalised commitment to defending UK sovereign and informed workforce and developing territory. Many of these Overseas Bases understanding of specific regions. are located in UK Overseas Territories, A dedicated training programme should which support a wide range of security be formed in collaboration with the capabilities. Sovereignty over the FCDO, universities, and think tanks. Territories must be protected against all Incentives to retain knowledge and challenges so that, for those who live in expertise should include pathways to the Territories as British nationals, their senior appointments that recognise right of self-determination is upheld. international engagement postings. This includes: • Maintaining a defensive military posture in the Falkland Islands, South We’re collaborating with Georgia and the South Sandwich other countries all the time Islands, and other British interests, in defence and that needs including upholding the Antarctic to be spoken about more … Treaty system. It makes me feel we’re in a • Maintaining the UK military presence better place because that in Gibraltar, including for maritime collaboration is reassuring force protection operations, upholding the sovereignty of British —Citizens’ Panel member, Gibraltar Territorial Waters, as well Rollestone Camp 71 The IGDN includes the Defence Attaché network, Overseas Bases, training estates, Loan Service Personnel, Advisers, Liaison/Exchange Officers, British Defence Staffs, Global Strategic Hubs (the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, Gibraltar, Germany, Oman, Kenya), Support Units, and personnel in NATO’s Command and Force Structures. 72 These include Bahrain, Brunei, Kenya, Oman, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of Cyprus. 79 Allies and Partners Figure 7: Defence’s overseas footprint 80 Allies and Partners Recommendations: 21. The MOD should co-ordinate with other Government departments and agencies to prioritise the use of the defence instrument in support of UK defence and wider foreign policy. It should do so based on a new Defence Diplomacy Strategy to be completed by December 2025. 22. The UK should seek closer bilateral relations with NATO Allies to strengthen collective security in the Euro-Atlantic, developing cost-effective means of delivering priority capabilities and strengthening Europe’s collective industrial base. 23. The MOD should explore further opportunities to bolster the UK’s ironclad commitment to Ukraine. Options include industrial collaboration and—once the immediate conflict is over—developing Ukrainian access to new markets that shore up its defence industry as well as its future security. 24. The UK should ensure AUKUS and the Global Combat Air Programme are exemplars of co-innovation and industrial collaboration between allies. Underscoring its commitment to success, the UK should double down on both pillars of the AUKUS agreement, using Pillar 2 to test and develop a template for future technology partnerships. 25. To support the development of the Integrated Global Defence Network, the MOD should: • Complete a review of its principal elements by April 2026, optimising Defence’s overseas footprint for delivering its core roles (Chapter 3). This should be worked through in close coordination with the One HMG platform managed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.73 • Develop a military and civilian career stream for international defence engagement, creating deep understanding of regions of interest to the UK. Pathways to senior appointments should include completion of at least one international posting (with an emphasis on NATO), giving Defence access to a pool of deep expertise for more effective engagement across the world. 73 ‘One HMG’ incorporates all UK Government overseas property and associated corporate services known as the ‘Platform’. 81 Defence’s Global Relationships: The SDR’s Starting Point Defence’s starting point for implementing the approach to alliances and partnerships set out in Chapter 5 is a network of robust relationships that delivers global reach for the UK as part of its wider foreign and security policy. Euro-Atlantic The UK’s defence relationship with France is fundamental to its security. The 1995 Chequers Declaration stated that there is no The UK’s defence relationship with the situation in which a threat to a vital interest United States of America (US) is unlike of one is not a threat to both. This remains any other. The strength of the partnership true in 2025. As nuclear powers with highly is borne of generations of UK and US capable militaries and global footprints, the defence personnel tackling global challenges UK and France share a unique responsibility together. With around 900 military personnel for European and global security. The and civil servants across 30 US states, the relationship benefits from important and UK ensures it is ready to operate with the US distinctive features: nuclear cooperation; a from ‘Day 1’ of major operations. Likewise, shared industrial base in complex weapons; the US bases over 10,000 forces at six RAF and the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. sites across the UK, providing US forces with Germany’s approach to security and access to Europe and beyond. Regular joint defence since Russia’s 2022 invasion of exercises—such as those in the Indo-Pacific Ukraine, in combination with the Bundestag’s with the US and Australia in 2023 and with March 2025 vote to allow increased the US and Japan in 2025—sustain close and borrowing for defence spending, creates valuable interoperability. However, it is the opportunities for enhanced partnership. speed and willingness to act when collective These opportunities are embodied in the security interests are threatened that has 2024 Trinity House Agreement. Common cemented this relationship, as demonstrated to both France and Germany is the shared by the joint US-UK response to persistent ambition to deliver conventional deep Houthi attacks on international shipping in precision strike capabilities, collaboration on the Red Sea. which can deliver an important contribution The relationship is more than purely ‘military’ to European strike capability through the in nature. The defence sector is vital to the ELSA programme,74 while underpinning the UK and US economies. The UK’s Foreign E3 relationship. Military Sales portfolio with the US is valued at more than $18.6bn. The F-35 programme also has strong industrial benefits for the UK, with approximately 15% of the value of each aircraft produced in the UK. 74 The European Long Range Strike Approach, a multinational effort to enhance Europe’s defence systems by the 2030s. 82 The UK’s close partnership with Estonia (British Army Training Unit Suffield),76 driving and Poland—and its commitment to innovation through next-generation test and deterring Russian aggression along NATO’s evaluation facilities. Eastern Flank—is demonstrated through The accession of Sweden and Finland to Operation CABRIT, under which a British NATO means the UK can work with Joint Army brigade is held at readiness in the UK Expeditionary Force (JEF) partners— and deploys its fighting power to reinforce which includes other key allies such as the permanently-based UK battlegroup that Denmark, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the helps to secure NATO’s flank in Estonia and Netherlands, Estonia, and Norway—to provides a reconnaissance capability in support and complement NATO operations. Poland. The UK and Estonia recently agreed The JEF recently began tracking potential a new defence roadmap and signed a joint threats to undersea infrastructure and declaration that will see the UK’s 4th Light monitoring the Russian shadow fleet. The Brigade Combat Team held at high readiness initiative highlights the potential for JEF to trial from July 2025. This means that thousands of the use of innovative technologies to boost troops will be on standby to deploy to Estonia collective security in Europe. at short notice. In 2025, the RAF will take part in a NATO Air Policing mission in Poland. The UK’s defence relationship with The UK-led DIAMOND initiative, of which Romania continues to expand following the Poland is a member, will improve NATO’s recent signing of a new treaty on military Integrated Air and Missile Defence through cooperation. Greece is a key ally for the UK enhancing networked air defence systems in the Eastern Mediterranean, facilitating UK across Europe.75 operations across Europe and the Middle East. The Republic of Cyprus is a key The UK and Norway’s close bonds regional partner with which the UK enjoys are built on shared geography and close cooperation on defence, security, history. This partnership is typified by and regional stability. The UK retains the Norway’s commitment to joining the 2025 Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and deployment of the UK Carrier Strike Group. Dhekelia, which are strategically important Under NATO’s Operation Baltic Sentry to and maintained in accordance with the enhance maritime surveillance, the UK and 1960 Treaty of Establishment. The UK Norway are also working together to protect is committed to the UN’s peacekeeping critical undersea infrastructure, with the UK mission, recognising its role in maintaining contributing Rivet Joint and P-8 Poseidon stability on the island. maritime surveillance aircraft. As a member of the Five Eyes intelligence community, and a key NATO Ally in the Arctic, High North, and North Atlantic, Canada remains vital in assuring transatlantic security. The UK and Canada are exploring opportunities to build on a 50-year history of British Army training at BATUS 75 Current members of the DIAMOND initiative are France, Germany, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the UK. 76 Home to one of the largest training estates on which the British Army operates. 83 Middle East Defence continues to maintain the capability to mount, or contribute to, limited interventions in support The UK enjoys some of the deepest, of international counter-terrorism broadest, and oldest relationships in the operations, such as ongoing defence Middle East of any European nation. The support to counter-Daesh operations. Gulf provides essential access and basing, Over the past decade, the RAF has enabling the UK to support international conducted over 10,000 aerial sorties over Iraq security and freedom of navigation—critical and Syria as part of an international effort for domestic energy security and seaborne to halt the spread of Daesh and suppress trade. The UK Armed Forces are in turn its recovery, while over the past year, a natural partner for the six countries of British aircraft and warships have protected the Gulf Cooperation Council, offering international maritime trade in the Red Sea world-class military education and training, from Houthi attacks. and access to the UK industrial base and key equipment programmes, in support of The Indo-Pacific longstanding military partnerships. The UK has proven itself a dependable The UK’s relationships with Australia, partner with a shared commitment to regional Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New and global stability. The joint defence Zealand are vital to regional and global industrial and military partnership with Saudi security, developed bilaterally, minilaterally, Arabia builds on the longstanding bilateral and through NATO. The UK continues to relationship, while Defence continues to join operations and exercises with these key develop its relationship with the United partners, including through the deployment Arab Emirates. Joint Air Squadrons with of HMS Tamar and HMS Spey to the region. Qatar are central to bilateral collaboration, Their permanent presence in the Indo-Pacific with the potential to expand into land and helps to promote maritime security and other domains. The UK’s ties with Oman are provide humanitarian assistance and disaster enduring, with scope for further development relief. These types of deployments are through joint training and logistic capabilities supported by the UK’s permanent military to support greater regional integration. presence in Singapore, which plays a crucial The Naval Support Facility in Bahrain role in enhancing collaboration with Five enables the UK’s persistent maritime Power Defence Arrangements countries and presence in the Middle East, underscored by in supporting the British Army’s presence the UK’s commitment to join the US-Bahrain in Brunei. As with other Commonwealth Comprehensive Security Integration and countries, the UK recognises the integral and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA). The UK valued contributions by Nepal, with Gurkhas benefits greatly from its long relationships making up 8% of the British Army. with Kuwait and Jordan, and from continued cooperation with Egypt and Iraq, which remain key regional security partners. 84 The UK has an enduring and dynamic Rest of the world partnership with Australia, underpinned by a modern Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty. The broad partnership ranges from Africa is the focus of intense competition as cutting-edge capability collaboration, its economies grow, with growing Russian including through AUKUS, to exports of and Chinese influence and exploitation equipment such as Thales’ 2087 sonar. of instability across the continent for their Japan is a close and significant partner in own ends. The UK continues to support the region, shown by collaboration—with strategic partners in Africa, promoting Italy—to develop the next generation of peace and stability through focused defence combat aircraft and joint exercising under education, training, and capacity-building, Exercise Vigilant Isles. The UK Carrier Strike and addressing ‘upstream threats’ to UK Group will sail to Australia in 2025, visiting interests. This includes tackling threats posed Japan as part of its deployment, in a further by terrorist organisations and other non-state demonstration of UK commitment to regional actors through established relationships stability and security and to upholding the with Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana, and international order. with Somalia. Recognising the role that India plays on the The UK continues to recognise the global stage, the UK continues to develop importance of strategic dialogue with the bilateral defence relationship across partners in Latin America—primarily Brazil a range of shared interests, including and Chile—to promoting peace, security, in the Indian Ocean region and through and prosperity in the region. The Caribbean capability cooperation. The February 2025 is particularly important, given the UK’s announcement of the UK-India Defence obligations to the defence and security of its Partnership represents an important next Overseas Territories. The UK continues to step for bilateral defence cooperation, provide humanitarian and disaster relief as focusing on next-generation weapons in a priority when necessary. the critical area of air defence. The UK’s As one of the largest financial contributors to Defence Roadmap with Indonesia underpins UN peacekeeping operations, the UK has wider Government efforts to develop enduring deployments of around 250 military a comprehensive bilateral partnership. personnel to locations such as Somalia, The relationship with Pakistan is historic, South Sudan, and Cyprus, which see British with a shared focus on security objectives. troops working alongside peacekeepers Engagement with ASEAN (the Association from other countries, building their of Southeast Asian Nations) remains capability, and enabling the UN to deliver important, given its central role in promoting its peacekeeping mandates.77 regional stability and cooperation, as well as providing sustained engagement with key ‘middle ground’ powers. 77 UK reaffirms commitment to UN peacekeeping operations as Minister announces new funding for programmes - GOV.UK, 15 May 2025. 85 6. Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach 86 Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach 1. The UK must harbour no illusions resilience policy and home defence about the threats it faces, its planning led by the Cabinet Office.79 vulnerabilities, and the pressing Measures outlined throughout this nature of the response needed Review will contribute to this effort, (Chapter 2). In times of competition from a transformed relationship with and crisis, the ability to cope with industry and investors, to better use sub-threshold attacks or major shocks of, and connection with, the Reserves is critical to maintaining national life. and veterans across the country, In a war setting, either at home or on and developing skills and external mainland Europe, the nature of attacks relationships through Defence training on the UK will change and intensify, and education. But there is more that demanding nationwide response Defence can and must do to support and endurance. What has happened a whole-of-society approach to to Ukraine since 2022 shows what deterrence and defence. modern conflict can be like, including the ripple effects reaching far beyond Reconnecting with society the battlespace. 4. The Government must promote unity of 2. For deterrence to be credible in this effort across society, leading a national context, the Government must: conversation to raise public awareness of the threats to the UK, how Defence • Build national resilience to threats deters and protects against them, below and above the threshold of an and why Defence requires support armed attack through a concerted, to strengthen the nation’s resilience. collective effort involving—among At the core of this initiative should be others—industry, the finance sector, efforts to counter threats to information civil society, academia, education, integrity as a critical component of and communities. national cohesion. • Increase national warfighting readiness so that, if needed, 5. Defence must play its part in this work the UK can transition to, scale under one of its two enabling roles for, and sustain a war against (Chapter 3), using the publication of this a ‘peer’ adversary—an obligation Review as a catalyst. The connection to NATO under Article III of the between the UK Armed Forces and Washington Treaty. wider society is the longstanding and necessary foundation for the defence 3. The Prime Minister has made clear of the country. The Armed Forces recruit the importance of a whole-of-society from, and operate with the consent of, the approach to the UK’s security and society they serve and protect. Defence resilience to be taken forward as part is at the heart of many local communities of a new national security strategy.78 across the UK, often formed around Defence has a foundational interest in, military and industrial bases (Figure 8). and is integral to, cross-government It also plays a significant role in advancing 78 Prime Minister’s Oral Statement to the House of Commons: 25 February 2025 – GOV.UK. 79 The Cabinet Office-led Home Defence Programme will provide an additional layer of defence, security, and resilience planning, focused on alignment between military and civilian effort in a period of international hostilities affecting the UK. 87 Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach social mobility by offering diverse career • Working with the Department for pathways and education opportunities to Education to develop understanding individuals from all backgrounds. However, of the Armed Forces among young decades of fighting wars overseas and people in schools. shrinking personnel numbers have led to • Expanding the Cadet Forces, which a society with less awareness of Defence. provide skills and qualifications to young people, inform and inspire future Defence personnel—from diverse backgrounds across the Education on the part of the country—and support economic MOD is huge. They should make growth. This will benefit all four us understand what they’re nations of the UK. doing for us, and why we should • The provision of Defence training. be giving our tax money to help Inviting leaders of FTSE100, other fund what they’re doing relevant companies, and civil society organisations to attend Defence —Citizens’ Panel member, courses—either bespoke offerings MOD Corsham or parts of courses such as those offered by the Defence Academy— would increase understanding of 6. Building society’s understanding society’s role in national resilience of what the Armed Forces do and and industrial mobilisation in the event increasing their visibility is imperative. of war. This should not be seen as a This can be achieved through: profit-making exercise. It is central to the success of Defence in the new • Public engagement days. The threat environment. Reserves' Forces and Cadets' Associations will be a valuable organisation in delivering this engagement. Figure 8: Defence representation and direct industry jobs across the UK 88 Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach Protecting critical national • A wider review of legislation such as the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885, infrastructure which provides for the protection of undersea communications 7. The smooth running of daily life and infrastructure from wilful or the economy depends on critical negligent damage.80 national infrastructure (CNI) and the continuity of essential services. • The forthcoming Cyber Security State-backed cyber-attacks and and Resilience Bill—led by the sabotage campaigns already cause Department for Science, Innovation substantial disruption to UK public and Technology—which is intended services, incurring significant recovery to strengthen UK cyber defences, costs. Based on adversaries’ current ensuring that the CNI and digital doctrine, in the event of a major war the services on which the UK public UK should expect sub-threshold attacks and businesses rely are more to intensify as part of a ‘hybrid’ campaign resilient and secure. that also involves kinetic attacks on 9. In many cases, CNI operators do civilian and military infrastructure— not have the ability to protect the onshore, offshore, and in space. infrastructure they own in the face of 8. A more focused and substantive such complex and evolving threats. body of work is necessary to The MOD should explore, with wider ensure the security and resilience Government, options for a ‘new of UK CNI across the spectrum from deal’ for the defence of CNI, rooted competition through to crisis and in partnership between Defence and conflict. Accelerating and building on private-sector and allied operators of existing work, this should result in a clear infrastructure that is most critical to the definition of what is in scope as well as continuity of essential services in the the adequate protection of core elements UK. Models used by Nordic and Baltic of CNI, including those on which Defence states provide useful examples of how and wider Government rely. A priority for to incentivise, support, and work with Defence should be to articulate—as part operators to mutual benefit. To support of the Cabinet Office-led Home Defence this new deal, the Royal Navy should Programme—which elements of UK CNI take a new leading and coordinating are integral to sustaining operations and role in securing undersea pipelines, projecting force overseas, and which cables, and maritime traffic carrying the therefore must be protected in scenarios information, energy, and goods upon both below and above the threshold of which national life depends (Chapter 7.2). war. It should also support Government efforts to strengthen legislative powers— in particular: 80 Provisions under the Act for the protection of underseas communications cables have remained sufficient until relatively recent developments in threat. 89 Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach 10. It will also be important to have war if required. For Defence, this should additional capabilities for the include maintaining up-to-date military protection of bases and CNI in the plans for home defence. In addition, event of crisis or conflict—ensuring Defence should work with the Cabinet the protection of key sites such as Office, through the Home Defence energy, food, water, telecoms, medical Programme, to: supplies, and transport infrastructure. • Articulate its requirements of civilian This should be the joint responsibility of authorities in a crisis, with priorities several organisations across Government assigned to other Government (including the MOD Guard Service departments and plans for mobilising and the UK Intelligence Community) the Reserves and industry if and industry, increasing resilience and required. We welcome Cabinet strategic depth by ensuring Regulars Office proposals to codify ‘civilian and Reserves can concentrate on assistance to military authorities’ in warfighting, not basic tasks. As part crisis and conflict as part of this work. of this, options should be explored for the development of a new force that is • Ensure UK plans are coherent modelled on the Reserves and connects with NATO planning, in line with local communities with Defence: Alliance obligations. recruited and employed locally, with • Learn from the best practice of a narrowly defined remit and training NATO Allies, particularly Nordic and commitment. This could be organised Baltic states, and apply insights under the Reserves Forces structure, led from the UK’s own experience of by the Army, and armed and equipped training Ukrainian recruits under with basic communications, weapons, Operation INTERFLEX.81 and technology such as drones. Plans must nest into the Home Defence • Establish a programme of exercises Programme and be routinely tested and to test plans for response to an assured as part of the UK’s broader armed attack on the UK and/or NATO exercise programme. Allies, including at the political and national levels. This programme Strengthening the nation’s should be used to identify emerging gaps in plans as threats and wider readiness for war circumstances change. 11. Preparation for war is crucial to an 12. The Government must have, if needed, effective response to armed attack. It can the means to prepare and respond as also help to deter an adversary from threats to the UK or its allies escalate such an attack in the first place. In such and—crucially—before crisis becomes extreme but no longer unthinkable war. Existing legislative frameworks lack circumstances, nations go to war, not the flexibility to facilitate this. New home just armed forces. The Government defence legislation, in the form of must have the necessary plans, a Defence Readiness Bill, should give powers, and personnel to achieve an the Government additional powers in effective and sustainable transition to 81 Operation INTERFLEX is the UK-led multinational operation to train and support the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 90 Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach reserve to support the mobilisation schedule data of all in-development of industry and Reserves. This could and upgrade programmes, and include measures to: a summary of assessments on programme affordability (Chapter 4.2). • Improve the preparedness of key industries, including powers to ensure 13. The Strategic Reserve—comprising sufficient supply of services, access ex-Regular personnel with enduring to CNI, and resources for Defence. legal obligations—is central to military mobilisation and must • Support the mobilisation of wider be reinvigorated. To develop and Defence, including industry and test plans to mobilise the Reserves, Reserves. the MOD should map Reservists’ • Improve the resilience of Defence’s locations and skills and make a more warfighting infrastructure (Chapter 7.11) concerted effort to engage them under by introducing plans to mobilise a refreshed veterans’ communications private and commercial assets.82 strategy. This strategy should articulate • Ensure that the UK is ready to operate the Defence offer to those who have within a NATO framework. left the Armed Forces and what Defence may need from them in the • Enable external scrutiny of the future. The MOD must also incentivise Armed Forces’ warfighting readiness Strategic Reservists’ engagement by through annual publication of key data providing appropriate levels of training such as the percentage availability (Chapter 4.3) and increased access to of all in-service programmes, volunteer roles. 82 For example, the MOD’s recent agreement with Associated British Ports widens Defence access to port facilities across the UK. 91 Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach Recommendations: 26. We welcome the Prime Minister’s launch of a national conversation on defence and security. This should be centred on a two-year series of public outreach events across the UK, explaining current threats and future trends, the role wider society must play in the UK’s security and resilience, and the rationale for investing more in defence and security as an insurance policy. Defence must play its part in this effort, with the Armed Forces becoming more visible in society. To achieve this, the MOD should: • Work with the Department for Education to develop understanding of the Armed Forces among young people in schools. • Expand in-school and community-based Cadet Forces across the country by 30% by 2030, with an ambition to reach 250,000 in the longer term. There should be greater focus within the Cadets on developing STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) skills and exploring modern technology. Defence, wider Government, and partnerships with the private sector must provide appropriate leadership, support, and funding to deliver this expansion. • Immediately give the Defence Academy and other Defence centres of training and educational excellence commercial freedoms to operate, lifting the restriction that only irreducible spare capacity can be offered externally. By February 2026, the Defence Academy should establish a plan for inviting company leaders, from FTSE100 companies and wider, onto Defence courses as appropriate. 27. Much greater focus is needed on ensuring the UK’s critical national infrastructure (CNI) is protected from attack below and above the threshold of war. Defence should more actively support the Cabinet Office in its work to set and enforce robust standards of protection and resilience for infrastructure, defining and prioritising the CNI on which Defence and wider Government relies in the first instance. A more comprehensive approach should include: • Strengthening Government powers to protect CNI where necessary, completing the process of updating existing legislation or bringing forward new legislation by the end of this Parliament (2029). • Exploring options for a ‘new deal’ for the protection of CNI in partnership with private-sector and allied operators. As part of this, the MOD should develop options for the protection of CNI in the event of crisis or conflict, including a new Reserve Force, with plans presented to the Secretary of State by December 2026. 92 Home Defence and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Approach Recommendations: 28. Alongside plans for defending the UK in the event of war, Defence should work across Government to put in place a suite of measures that would significantly improve national readiness. Important areas of focus include: • A new Defence Readiness Bill that gives the Government powers in reserve to respond effectively in the event of escalation towards a war involving the UK or its allies. The Bill should mandate annual reporting on UK warfighting readiness to facilitate external scrutiny. • Ensuring plans made under the Home Defence Programme meet Defence’s needs in the event of escalation to war, including mobilisation of Reserves and industry, and ensuring Defence has ready access to private-sector infrastructure for operations. This should be underpinned by legislation as necessary. • Stepping up engagement with the Strategic Reserve, sustained through annual training and volunteer roles. A digitised approach to Reserves management should be established by January 2027. 93 7. The Integrated Force: A Force Fit for War in the 21st Century Image copyright © TEKEVER 94 The Integrated Force: A Force Fit for War in the 21st Century 1. Our Review has so far addressed fielding newer weapons such as drones, what Defence must do, where, and advanced conventional weapons, how in response to the changing and more effective surveillance and security context and within the air defence weapons systems—all funding available (Chapters 3–6). This connected by digital networks and data. chapter sets the direction for an 3. To meet this challenge, the UK must Integrated Force that is fit for war pivot to a new way of war (Box 9). in the 21st century, identifying initial The essential task is to transform the capabilities for acquisition as part of Armed Forces, restore their readiness a continually evolving force that is to fight, and reverse the ‘hollowing out’ developed in line with our vision for of foundational capabilities without UK Defence by 2035: which they cannot endure in protracted, high-intensity conflict. Delivery will take A leading tech-enabled defence place through the new, ten-year Defence power, with an Integrated Force that Investment Plan. There are pockets of deters, fights, and wins through excellence on which to build: recent constant innovation at wartime pace. experimentation by the Services points the way for the future direction of the 2. Delivery of warfighting power has Integrated Force, while the equipment always changed with technology and programme already features some circumstances but the rate of change transformative acquisitions such as the today is unprecedented. Any conflict with Future Combat Air System. But Defence a ‘peer’ opponent in the next few years must move further and faster to increase would likely see the UK and its allies lethality while on the path to rebuilding confronting a military force capable of mass and endurance. 95 The Integrated Force: A Force Fit for War in the 21st Century Box 9: The Integrated Force: capability for war in the 21st century The goal must be to create an Integrated Force that is more lethal than the sum of its parts and skilled in warfare in different forms. This force must be as ready to fight a battle for terrain as it is to fight a battle of will at long range without boots on the ground: • Lethality, mass, and endurance are • Decisions are made and implemented increased, as crewed platforms much faster, with all elements of at sea, undersea, on land, and in the Integrated Force connected in the air are blended with a growing shared understanding and through proportion of uncrewed and a single digital targeting web, rooted autonomous collaborative platforms in a common digital foundation in agile and novel ways. (Chapter 4.1). • Highly sophisticated weapons such Common to all outcomes is the constant as long-range precision missiles offer battle to dominate all five domains. greater reach and are complemented This battle is underwritten by the with larger numbers of much less ultimate guarantee provided by the UK’s sophisticated weapons such as independent nuclear deterrent. single-use drones and shells. • Survivability in a more transparent battlespace is increased through greater dispersion, protection, and mobility. 4. An immediate priority for force the air. Having taken a generational leap transformation should be a shift forward, Defence must then stay at the towards greater use of autonomy cutting-edge of drone technologies using and Artificial Intelligence (AI) within the principles of the innovation cycle the UK’s conventional forces. As outlined in Chapter 4. in Ukraine, this would provide greater 5. Targeted investment is also required accuracy, lethality, and cheaper to rebuild joint support enablers and capabilities—changing the economics munitions across the conventional of Defence. This shift should be force, with restored stockpiles of facilitated by the parallel development munitions, parts, and fuel ultimately of a common digital foundation and dispersed across the UK and potentially digital targeting web (Chapter 4.1), to storage facilities in Europe. Defence as well as protected investment in AI should maintain an ‘always on’ munitions research and development. Uncrewed capability so that production can be scaled and autonomous systems should be up at speed if needed. It should also lay incorporated into the Integrated Force in the industrial foundations for an uplift in high numbers over the next five years. munitions stockpiles to meet the demand They should be networked with crewed of high-tempo warfare, with economic fifth- and sixth-generation assets as part benefits felt across all four nations of of a ‘high-low’ mix of capabilities, while the UK. This should be complemented these systems’ design must be tailored to by the development of novel directed the conditions in which they will operate— energy weapons to create low-cost and whether undersea, at sea, on land, or in sustainable alternatives to missiles. 96 The Integrated Force: A Force Fit for War in the 21st Century 6. Prudent sequencing of investment in Force fit for war against a ‘peer’ capabilities over the next ten years will adversary, accelerate along the path set require difficult decisions and a switch in out by this Review should international spending to new priorities. This should security conditions deteriorate further, be combined with a willingness to buy or rapidly mobilise Defence in a crisis. off-the-shelf and supplement military Flexibility in terms of sequencing and capabilities with civilian options where procurement options will also be vital necessary. This sequencing will ensure should the UK deploy troops to Ukraine that Defence can deliver an Integrated in support of a ceasefire. Recommendation: 29. Building on recent experimentation and existing acquisition plans, Defence must move further and faster to transform, moving to warfighting readiness across the Integrated Force. Priorities across the conventional elements of the Armed Forces over the next five years include: • A shift towards greater use of autonomy and Artificial Intelligence. To support this, Defence should establish an initial operating capability for a new Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre by February 2026. The MOD should also create a protected Defence AI Investment Fund to accelerate the adoption of Artificial Intelligence across Defence, prioritising the most promising use-cases. • Creating an ‘always on’ munitions production capacity, ready to scale up for higher-tempo production in the event of escalation to war. 97 The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent 7.1 The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent 1. A modernised nuclear deterrent is 2. Nuclear deterrence can no longer be the bedrock of the UK’s defence and considered separately from the wider the cornerstone of its commitment strategic environment, as described to NATO and global security. The UK’s in Chapter 2. Any future crisis or conflict nuclear weapons deter the most extreme in which the UK is engaged may include threats to national security and provide nuclear-armed or nuclear-aspiring states critical insurance against the gravest willing to use nuclear threats to compel or risks and uncertainties of the future. constrain UK and allied decision-making. For more than 55 years under Operation Ensuring the UK can continue to deter RELENTLESS, the Royal Navy has such threats and remain free from coercion operated a nuclear-armed submarine requires sustained investment across the every hour of every day—the Continuous Defence Nuclear Enterprise and in the UK’s At Sea Deterrent—to deliver this alliances, skills, and industrial base. UK important mission. nuclear policy remains unchanged (Box 10). Box 10: UK nuclear policy The foundation of the UK’s approach to deterrence remains a minimum, credible, independent UK nuclear deterrent, assigned to the defence of NATO. The purpose of the UK’s nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. The UK’s nuclear weapons are operationally independent. Only the Prime Minister can authorise their use, ensuring that political control is maintained at all times. The UK would consider using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of its NATO Allies. The UK is deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how, and at what scale it would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. The UK does not publicise figures for its operational stockpile, deployed warhead, or deployed missile numbers. This posture enhances its deterrent effect by complicating the calculations of potential aggressors and reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage. The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations. The UK reserves the right to review this assurance if the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary. To ensure that the deterrent is not vulnerable to pre-emptive action by potential adversaries, the UK maintains four Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN, Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear) so that at least one will always be on a Continuous At Sea Deterrent patrol. It is committed to maintaining the destructive power needed to guarantee that the UK’s nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction. The UK continues to keep its nuclear posture under constant review in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries. 98 The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent Deterrence and assurance: 5. As the only European country to assign its nuclear capability to the defence of working with NATO Allies NATO, the UK is well-placed to lead Europe in enhancing its contribution 3. Russia’s increasing reliance on nuclear to deterrence and assurance in the coercion will be the central challenge Euro-Atlantic. The UK must work with for the UK and its NATO Allies in the Allies to ensure NATO’s deterrence coming decades. Russia is modernising posture is fit for purpose across the and expanding its extensive set of spectrum of conflict, underpinned by nuclear capabilities, which are designed collective investment in the range of for employment at multiple levels of capabilities necessary to deter nuclear warfare. Its strategies for warfighting use at any scale. This must include rely on the threat of limited nuclear use intellectual investment to ensure that the to terminate a conflict on advantageous Alliance’s civilian and military leaders terms. China’s unprecedented nuclear understand the nuclear dimensions of expansion will place demands on US any future crisis or conflict in which their nuclear forces and the deterrence it countries are engaged. extends to the Euro-Atlantic. Potential collaboration and opportunism among 6. Although France is not a formal part of these and other nuclear challengers—of NATO’s nuclear planning structures, the the type seen in Ukraine—add further UK and France have long recognised that complexity to deterrence, escalation a threat to the vital interests of one would dynamics, and allied assurance. constitute a threat to the vital interests of the other. The UK should seek a closer 4. Partnership with the United States— relationship with its European nuclear underpinned by the 1958 Mutual Defence ally, building on the Lancaster House Agreement (recently renewed by this Treaties in areas of political, technical, Government) and the 1963 Polaris Sales and policy collaboration. Agreement—continues to be fundamental to UK and US nuclear security goals and to UK nuclear deterrence. As the US confronts the unprecedented challenge We need to have everything of facing two near-peer nuclear powers, in place in case something Russia and China, the UK must explore happens—we need that how to support the US and its NATO insurance policy Allies in strengthening extended deterrence across the Euro-Atlantic. —Citizens’ Panel member, Rollestone Camp 99 The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent A sustained commitment to Delivering the nuclear arms control, disarmament, deterrent as a ‘National and non-proliferation Endeavour’ 7. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 9. The decisions made within this (NPT) is the cornerstone of the Parliament will be crucial for non-proliferation and disarmament maintaining the UK’s independent regime and the only credible route nuclear deterrent, a complex, to universal nuclear disarmament. scientifically advanced portfolio The regime is now under strain. spanning decades. The Defence Historical structures for maintaining Nuclear Enterprise (DNE, Box 11) is strategic stability and reducing nuclear expending enormous effort to sustain risks have not kept pace with the the Continuous At Sea Deterrent and evolving security picture. Others did not to adapt its estate and capabilities, follow the disarmament progress led by with delays in decision-making and the UK and the US during the 2000s. programme delivery since the end of With the New START Treaty set to expire the Cold War leading to cost growth in February 2026, the future of strategic across the portfolio in recent years. arms control—at least in the medium The launch of a ‘National Endeavour’ term—does not look promising.83 approach to the Enterprise is beginning to drive resilience across critical enablers 8. To maintain international confidence in of the nuclear deterrent. Success will the nuclear non-proliferation regime, require persistent leadership and focus continued UK leadership within the at the highest levels of Government and NPT is imperative. A strong NATO a significant shift in mindset across all nuclear mission is also essential departments crucial to delivery. as it is one of the most significant non-proliferation tools available to assure 10. A transformed partnership with Allies that they do not need nuclear industry, building on existing efforts weapons of their own. within the DNE, is also essential. The scale of what industry must deliver to sustain and renew the nuclear deterrent is vast. The MOD must incentivise companies to prioritise nuclear activities and invest resources across the Enterprise to deliver to cost and schedule. Other factors influencing industrial productivity—including better infrastructure and a skilled workforce— must also be addressed. 83 New START, signed in 2010, places limits on the number of US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads. 100 The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent Box 11: The Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) The DNE is the partnership of organisations that operate, maintain, renew, and sustain the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The DNE’s core organisations in Government are the Defence Nuclear Organisation, Royal Navy, Submarine Delivery Agency, Atomic Weapons Establishment, and Strategic Command. The DNE is currently investing across the following areas to sustain the deterrent for as long as required: • Four Dreadnought class nuclear- • Critical elements of the DNE’s powered ballistic submarines to replace infrastructure to adapt naval bases and the current Vanguard class. The first manufacturing processes, supporting boat is due on patrol in the early 2030s. growth to sustain future fleet needs and weapons requirements. • Seven Astute class conventionally armed, nuclear-powered attack • The establishment of a Nuclear Fuels submarines (SSNs) and the design of Programme, which will re-establish a the next-generation SSN-A (AUKUS). nuclear fuel cycle for reactor fuel for defence purposes. • A replacement UK sovereign warhead (ASTRAEA), while maintaining the existing stockpile. Long-term stability in the Defence Nuclear Enterprise 11. As a multi-generational effort, the renewal of the nuclear deterrent requires long-term direction so that the MOD and industry can manage risk and improve performance and value for money over time. Clarity is needed on how this programme interacts with a wider set of demands for nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines, including the next-generation attack submarines under the AUKUS partnership. The programme to replace the sovereign warhead is critical and will require significant investment this Parliament. The Government must maintain the current financial arrangements that ringfence nuclear from wider departmental pressures to ensure stability in the nuclear portfolio. This includes funding for industrial infrastructure to mitigate risk in submarine build. Public and parliamentary support is also vital at a time when the importance, scale, and cost of the Enterprise are increasing. 101 The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent Recommendations: 30. The UK must facilitate greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. This should incorporate all domains and the entire spectrum of conflict, including high-intensity war against nuclear-armed states. Action should include: • Further investment in conventional deep (long-range) precision strike and Integrated Air and Missile Defence (Chapter 7.4) to provide the broadest range of options for deterring and responding to high-impact threats. • Strengthening NATO- and UK-led training and exercises, addressing potential escalation and conflict scenarios with nuclear-armed states. • Commencing discussions with the United States and NATO on the potential benefits and feasibility of enhanced UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission. 31. The UK must continue to champion its nuclear responsibilities while seeking to renew the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation regime, centred on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, the UK’s priorities and objectives in seeking this renewal must be realistic about the absence of willing partners in Moscow and Beijing. 32. The National Security Council (Nuclear) committee of senior Ministers should review progress on the ‘National Endeavour’ for delivering the UK’s nuclear deterrent at least twice a year. These meetings should bring together Ministers from all departments essential to its delivery. 33. The Government must take a comprehensive approach to improving industrial productivity as a key factor in delivering and maintaining the UK’s nuclear deterrent. This includes: • Ensuring it has the flexibility to incentivise industry investment in infrastructure and asset management. This should include serious consideration of amendments to the Single Source Contract Regulations. • Removing barriers to productivity that sit outside industry’s direct control. Projects such as the National Nuclear Strategic Plan for Skills and the Barrow Transformation Fund should be prioritised,84 with other Government departments committing to providing funding at the necessary pace and scale. • Exploring opportunities for legislative reform that could, in extreme circumstances, direct industry to prioritise defence nuclear requirements in the sovereign supply chain or enable compulsory acquisition of assets where necessary to protect national security. 84 The National Nuclear Strategic Plan for Skills and the Barrow Transformation Fund represent a significant package of investment in skills, jobs, and communities that are vital to meeting the UK’s growing defence and civil nuclear requirements. 102 The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent Recommendations: 34. To avoid the costs of the past, the Government must commit to not extending the life of the Dreadnought class submarines beyond their intended end-of-service dates from the mid-2050s. It should start to define the requirement for the post-Dreadnought nuclear deterrent within this Parliament. 35. To sustain long-term support for the UK’s nuclear deterrent and to ensure stability in delivering the portfolio, the Government should: • Develop mechanisms for enhanced parliamentary scrutiny—under appropriate conditions—to provide confidence that taxpayer money is being spent wisely in pursuit of the nation’s highest defence priority. • Deliver a ‘National Endeavour’ public communications campaign that conveys the fundamental importance and necessity of the deterrent. • Confirm the intended numbers of SSN attack submarines, including the next-generation attack submarines under the AUKUS partnership, as soon as possible to provide the necessary assumptions for the required build capacity and tempo. 103 Maritime Domain 7.2 Maritime Domain 1. Maritime security is a strategic imperative mix of crewed, uncrewed, and increasingly for the UK. Global trade, undersea autonomous surface and sub-surface pipelines and data cables, and vessels and aircraft; and developing offshore energy installations are next-generation capabilities such as critical for sustaining daily national life. SSN attack submarines via the trilateral However, the maritime domain is AUKUS partnership. increasingly vulnerable. Technological change and the proliferation of advanced The role of the Royal Navy conventional weapons pose increasing threats to maritime security, while 3. The purpose of the Royal Navy, in adversaries are more willing to threaten support of the roles for UK Defence set the free flow of critical commodities such out in Chapter 3, is to: as food and energy to hold the UK and its allies at risk. The Royal Navy must be • Role 1: Defend, protect, and prepared to deter maritime incidents similar enhance the resilience of the to the sabotage of the Nord Stream 2 gas UK, its Overseas Territories, and pipeline and the cutting of undersea data Crown Dependencies: delivering cables in UK and international waters. the Continuous At Sea Deterrent The Navy must also be prepared for new (CASD), the bedrock of the UK’s geographical realities created by climate defence. The Royal Navy should change, with the High North becoming also assume responsibility for more important to the UK and its NATO leading and coordinating industry Allies as it becomes more accessible. and wider Government in protecting critical undersea infrastructure and 2. To meet the demands of a new era maritime traffic. of threat, the Royal Navy must fulfil new roles and continue to evolve how it fights: moving towards a dynamic 104 Maritime Domain • Role 2: Deter and defend in the Transformation Euro-Atlantic: contributing to NATO Regional Plans through the provision 4. Transformation over time will require of: CASD; fifth-generation carrier changes in how the Navy develops its strike capability; anti-submarine workforce and training. As complex warfare, with a focus on securing systems become easier to operate with the North Atlantic through its Atlantic a smaller training burden, the Royal Navy Bastion plan (Box 12); littoral strike; should adjust its personnel balance to and Type 45 destroyers providing include greater numbers of Reservists Integrated Air and Missile Defence to generate efficiencies and release (Chapter 7.4). Regulars for front-line operational roles. As it reconsiders its training estate • Role 3: Shape the global security needs, the Navy should ensure there environment: using Defence levers is ‘capacity by design’ so that it can where the Navy can deliver the continue to provide training to allies greatest effect, including capability and partners without impacting national partnerships, exports, and training requirements. and education, enhanced by the Navy’s permanent presence and periodic deployments beyond the Euro-Atlantic. Box 12: Multi-domain integration in action: Atlantic Bastion Atlantic Bastion is the Royal Navy’s plan to secure the North Atlantic for the UK and NATO against the persistent and growing underwater threat from a modernising Russian submarine force. The UK’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities are a central aspect of European defence and are important capabilities with which to meet the Alliance’s changing needs. Atlantic Bastion uses a comprehensive and layered sensor network—operating on, above, and below the water—to create an integrated, multi-domain approach, delivered in collaboration with the RAF, Strategic Command, the UK Hydrographic Office, NATO, and commercial partners. The Royal Navy will deploy: a Type 26 anti-submarine warfare frigate force, equipped with mission bays85 to facilitate rapid upgrades and spiral development; uncrewed surface vessels; and uncrewed underwater vehicles. These capabilities will be harnessed with acoustic detection systems powered by Artificial Intelligence and integrated into the digital targeting web (Chapter 4.1)— accelerating targeting decision-making across Defence and with the UK’s allies. 85 Mission bays are areas occupying the full width of a ship that can be rapidly reconfigured for alternative missions, including as an amphibious platform for raiding or Special Forces operations. They provide flexibility in terms of a ship’s role and task. 105 Maritime Domain 5. Defence must also create the • Improve its detection capacity and its conditions for sustained innovation ability to coordinate tasks via enhanced and industrial support to the Navy. command and control through the An ‘always on’ supply line for shipbuilding development of a Global Decision is essential to retain industry skills and Support System. It should focus on the reduce the delays in delivering new ships Euro-Atlantic in the first instance. that otherwise lead to additional support • Use the Multi-Role Ocean Survey ship costs for ‘running on’ ageing platforms. and fleets of autonomous vehicles to Long-term partnering agreements with counter threats to critical undersea funding commitments over multiple years infrastructure. or decades, such as those underpinning • Maintain reaction systems through the delivery of SSN-AUKUS, would help which allies can track potential to realise efficiencies and de-risk major threats together. investments while also contributing to UK economic growth. More flexible 8. Amphibious Advance Force regulation is also needed to support operations remain a critical focus vital experimentation in areas such as for the Royal Marines Commando autonomy, including through the creation of Force, operating in some of the most regulatory ‘sandboxes’—designated areas extreme environments and offering at sea in which the Navy and industry can political choice for action worldwide. test and deploy new technologies. These operations should increasingly focus on supporting NATO Capabilities requirements, including integrating 6. The Royal Navy must continue to into the UK-led Strategic Reserve Corps move towards a more powerful but when appropriate (Chapter 7.3). cheaper and simpler fleet, developing 9. To maximise the UK’s warfighting a ‘high-low’ mix of equipment and capabilities, the Royal Navy should weapons that exploits autonomy and explore alternative approaches digital integration. Carrier strike is to delivering a balanced and already at the cutting-edge of NATO cost-effective fleet. This may capability but much more rapid progress include using commercial vessels is needed in its evolution into ‘hybrid’ and burden-sharing with NATO Allies carrier airwings, whereby crewed combat to augment the Royal Fleet Auxiliary aircraft (F-35B) are complemented by (RFA) Fleet Solid Support ships in autonomous collaborative platforms non-contested environments. The in the air, and expendable, single-use dedicated professional seafarers and drones. Plans for the hybrid carrier ships of the RFA underpin the Royal airwings should also include long-range Navy’s vital operational outputs through precision missiles capable of being fired the provision of logistics, aviation, and from the carrier deck. medical support. Its unique capabilities 7. Close coordination with the rest of sustain CASD, carrier strike, and Government, industry, and allies will amphibious operations and make be needed to protect critical undersea a critical contribution to homeland infrastructure—potentially as part of resilience. These must be maintained. a new model for Government-operator collaboration (Chapter 6). To support this, the Navy should: 106 Maritime Domain Recommendations: 36. The Royal Navy must play a new, leading and coordinating role in securing the UK’s critical undersea infrastructure and maritime traffic that is vital to daily national life. As part of this, the Royal Navy must work with wider Government and commercial partners to develop enhanced maritime surveillance through existing and novel capabilities. 37. The Royal Navy must continue its transformation in the skills, equipment, and ways of operating needed for the 21st century maritime domain as part of an Integrated Force. This should include: • Moving to a ‘hybrid’ carrier airwing, comprising crewed combat aircraft, autonomous collaborative platforms in the air, single-use drones, and, eventually, long-range missiles capable of being fired from the carrier deck. • Rapid evolution of anti-submarine warfare through the integration of underwater, surface, and airborne drones (including Protector) with Type 26 frigates, P-8 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, and SSN attack submarines. • Rapid evolution of mine-hunting to be delivered with autonomous platforms. • Exploring possible development from a Type 45 destroyer to a minimally crewed or autonomous air dominance system that could integrate directed energy weapons and enable better connectivity to other assets within the UK’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence system. 38. Given the global market for autonomous and uncrewed systems, the Royal Navy should engage with commercial partners—including private finance—and other Governments to rapidly deliver an integrated frigate force for anti-submarine warfare, comprising crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous platforms. This project— enhancing the capabilities of the Type 26—should be an exemplar of how private money is attracted to defence technology and linked to export-led opportunity under a new partnership with industry (Chapter 4.2). 39. More flexible regulation is needed to enable experimentation in areas such as autonomy. By April 2026, Defence should establish options to enhance the mandate of the Defence Maritime Regulator to allow the Royal Navy and industry to use a dedicated regulatory ‘sandbox’ to test and deploy new technologies. 40. The Royal Navy should explore alternative approaches to augmenting the Royal Fleet Auxiliary to deliver a balanced, cost-effective fleet that maximises the UK’s warfighting capabilities. This may include using commercial vessels and burden-sharing capabilities with allies to augment assets such as the Fleet Solid Support ships in non-contested environments. 107 Land Domain 7.3 Land Domain 1. War is fought across five domains 3. Last recapitalised in the 1990s, much but people and the land they live on of the Army’s capabilities—including are at the heart of it all. Even as ways Challenger 2 tanks, AS90 artillery, and of warfare change (Chapter 2), military ammunition—have rightly been gifted force projected from the land—and to Ukraine. As the Army rebuilds, sustained by land-based resources— investment must be paired with will continue to play a fundamental role changes to how it is organised, in deterring and, if required, defeating operates, and is equipped. The Army adversaries. While land warfare remains has some capability enhancements dominated by firepower and manoeuvre, already underway, including the rapid adoption of new technologies is Challenger 3, Ajax, and Boxer. It is changing the operating environment. also taking a progressive approach in developing a new model for land fighting 2. The Army is in transition from the power (Box 13). But it must be bolder. force required for the interventions of It can deliver a ten-fold increase the post-Cold War era to a force ready in lethality by harnessing precision to play its part in NATO’s ‘deterrence by firepower, surveillance technology, denial’, requiring greater lethality, mass, autonomy, digital connectivity, and data. and endurance. It must be prepared to support a renewed focus on national resilience and global crisis response, as well as playing an expeditionary role—able to seize, hold, or retake ground, primarily in support of NATO in mainland Europe. 108 Land Domain The role of the British Army These relationships must be prioritised as part of Defence’s overall strategy 4. The purpose of the British Army, for its global footprint (Chapter 5). in support of the roles for UK Defence Transformation set out in Chapter 3, is to: • Role 1: Defend, protect, and 5. The Army will deliver essential elements enhance the resilience of the UK, of the Integrated Force as Advanced, its Overseas Territories, and Crown Reaction, and Response forces Dependencies: contributing to national for deployment under UK or NATO defence and resilience plans through command. This will be underpinned an enhanced Standing Joint Command by resilience and regeneration (UK) and its nationwide network of Joint operations in the UK: Military Commanders. In war, additional • The UK-led, multinational NATO capabilities will be required to support Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) the protection of critical national Headquarters already provides the infrastructure (Chapter 6). Corps Headquarters and two divisions • Role 2: Deter and defend in the for one of two new Strategic Reserve Euro-Atlantic: providing one of two Corps (SRCs). SRCs must be ready to Strategic Reserve Corps to NATO, execute pre-planned options tasked in line with NATO’s Regional Plans, by SACEUR to manage escalation ready to deploy rapidly from the UK (before a decision by NATO to invoke to anywhere in the Euro-Atlantic Article V) and to deploy anywhere in area. The Army must also sustain Europe. This corps will be integrated its contribution to NATO’s forward with UK and Allied capabilities across presence in Estonia and Poland. all domains as part of the Integrated • Role 3: Shape the global security Force. Consideration should be given to environment: delivering essential prepositioning ammunition and heavier ‘train, advise, assist, and accompany’ equipment in appropriately dispersed missions with key allies and partners storage facilities in Europe, supporting that unlock the greatest benefit in NATO readiness and reducing the delivering Defence’s core roles. demand for strategic movement. Box 13: Multi-domain integration in action: Project ASGARD and ‘Recce-Strike’ In increasingly complex modern warfare, Project ASGARD will enhance the Army’s ability to find (‘recce’) and destroy (‘strike’) enemy targets. It brings together digital networks and data, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and intelligence capabilities with firepower to find and strike enemy forces at greater distances than ever before across the battlespace. It will fully integrate surveillance capabilities (including cyber and space) with firepower (such as artillery, long-range missiles, aircraft, and single-use uncrewed aerial systems) via the digital targeting web (Chapter 4.1). This will provide machine-speed decision support through AI. The Army will scale and share the concept across Defence, allies, and partners so that it becomes a force multiplier. 109 Land Domain • Standing Joint Command (UK) Capabilities will oversee and command the Army’s contribution to the planning, 8. The Army will continue to need preparation, and delivery of Defence armoured platforms and attack support to UK national resilience. helicopters to confront a major state With most of the Army’s deployable adversary, fighting to take and hold capability committed to NATO, ground. Armoured platforms improve its capacity to support domestic the survivability of personnel in an resilience would be significantly increasingly transparent battlefield, reduced if it were mobilised for war. including from the rapid evolution of drones in combination with precision 6. The quality of its people is the and wide area weapons. To improve foundational strength of the British interoperability and efficiencies of scale, Army. The Army should be a mix of Defence should seek collaboration with Regular and Reserve personnel with a NATO Allies on the acquisition of key minimum of 100,000 soldiers, of which land platforms (Chapter 4.2). 73,000 should be Regular. There remains a strong case for a small increase in 9. Autonomous and uncrewed Regular numbers when funding allows (land and aerial) systems are now (accounting for the costs of additional an essential component of land people, equipment, and training). warfare, integrated with core armoured The Army must be able to rapidly platforms in a dynamic ‘high-low’ mix of expand and mobilise Reserve forces, capability. A ‘20-40-40’ mix is likely to providing strategic depth and credibility be necessary: 20% crewed platforms to the UK’s defence commitments. to control 40% ‘reusable’ platforms The Army should reinvigorate the Active (such as drones that survive repeated and Strategic Reserves, which will be missions), and 40% ‘consumables’ critical for providing contingent capability such as rockets, shells, missiles, and and access to expertise that can be ‘one-way effector’ drones. Investment in mobilised rapidly if needed. It should attack and surveillance drones should benefit from the proposed 20% increase be prioritised, along with counter-drone in Active Reserve numbers when funding systems. The Army must be able to allows (Chapter 4.3). keep pace with high-tempo innovation in drones and associated capabilities such 7. Training must be a strategic and as electromagnetic warfare (Chapter 7.6), institutional priority to restore the supported by ‘always on’ manufacturing. Army’s readiness to fight at all levels. The Army has already begun changing its approach to individual and collective training to prepare for warfighting at scale. Using advanced simulation would provide more effective and efficient training but live firing over distances of 100km or more remains essential to assuring the Army’s fighting capability. This will require partnering with allies and sharing access to suitable training facilities, especially across NATO. 110 Land Domain Recommendations: 41. The Army must modernise the two divisions and the Corps HQ that it provides to NATO as one of the Alliance’s two Strategic Reserves Corps (SRC). The SRC should be led by the Corps HQ (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps) and enabled by, and command, Corps-level capability. The first division should comprise a fully deployable Headquarters, three manoeuvre brigades with armoured and mechanised capabilities, support brigade, and associated enablers. Planning should include the integration of the Royal Marines Commando Force into the SRC when appropriate (Chapter 7.2). 42. The Army must accelerate the development and deployment of its new ‘Recce-Strike’ approach—combining existing capabilities and technologies, such as armoured platforms, with constantly evolving technology—as part of its efforts to modernise the SRC. It should be bolder in its ambition, seeking to increase lethality ten-fold. 43. The Army must evolve its mix of Regulars and Reserves, with a minimum of 100,000 soldiers, of which 73,000 are Regular. A small uplift in Regular personnel should be considered when funding allows (accounting for the costs of equipping and training these personnel), while the Army should benefit from the proposed 20% increase in Active Reserve numbers (Chapter 4.3). It should focus the current Active Reserve only on tasks that it can deliver well and with value for money. It must reconnect to its Strategic Reserve as a core aspect of military mobilisation planning (Chapter 6). 44. The Headquarters Standing Joint Command (UK) should command all UK military support to national resilience under the MSHQ and be resourced accordingly. It should also be deployed to lead wider efforts to reconnect Defence with society, as part of a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to deterrence and defence (Chapter 6). 45. Global crisis response at very high readiness in the land domain should be led by 16 Air Assault Brigade. Airborne parachute capability and capacity should remain focused on specialists and a single battalion group. 111 Air Domain 7.4 Air Domain 1. Air power is vital to the protection of the and adaptability to build greater UK and the freedom to fight and win. readiness and resilience. In doing so, Over the next two decades, the UK it should work with industry and allies to and its allies will have to compete sustain this specialist sector and exploit harder for control of the air, fighting emerging technology, including through in a way not seen for over 30 years due partnerships such as the Global Combat to the rapid development of adversarial Air Programme (GCAP). capability specifically designed to counter Western strengths. Complex aerial attack The role of the RAF and defence is becoming ever more difficult. Surveillance and air defence 3. The purpose of the RAF, in support weapon systems are becoming much of the roles for UK Defence set out in more capable. The primacy of crewed Chapter 3, is to: aircraft is being fundamentally challenged. • Role 1: Defend, protect, and 2. The Royal Air Force (RAF) offers the enhance the resilience of the UK, Integrated Force’s quickest means of its Overseas Territories, and Crown striking targets, with the flexibility, speed, Dependencies: policing UK airspace and reach to deliver effect globally. against airborne terrorism and Although the quality of RAF capability defending against state threats; and is unquestionable, its lean size reflects playing a lead role in Integrated Air the requirements of a post-Cold War and Missile Defence (IAMD, Box 14). era, centred on counter-terrorism, The UK must be able to secure its counter-insurgency, and air policing. access and advantage in, through, With the return of state-on-state and from space on a sovereign basis conflict in Europe, the RAF must and with NATO Allies (Chapter 7.5). improve its productivity, agility, 112 Air Domain • Role 2: Deter and defend in the Transformation Euro-Atlantic: contributing to NATO plans through the provision 4. The RAF needs a wide range of skills of: joint intelligence, surveillance, and talent for the technology-enabled and reconnaissance, including warfighting of today and tomorrow. airborne early warning and control Its focus should be on retaining capability; air-to-air refuelling; unique experience to build leaders and IAMD; high-readiness air forces specialists, while its plans to increase its with sufficient stockpiles; and Reserves by 50% could be enhanced advanced combat aircraft for the to make better use of specialist skills. carrier airwings. Outstanding training is needed for the RAF to remain effective but current • Role 3: Shape the global security arrangements for fast jet training are environment: supporting global inadequate, meaning UK pilots are stability through periodic operations currently sent abroad to train. and exercises with key allies and partners; and advancing UK interests through capability collaboration programmes like GCAP, identifying and developing export opportunities, shaping international defence policies through NATO, and offering training and education. Box 14: Multi-domain integration in action: Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) Capable and effective IAMD for the UK can only be accomplished as part of a NATO endeavour. As lead UK Command for IAMD, the RAF is responsible for delivering the timely, resilient, and integrated command and control (C2) that is critical to success. The tools to achieve effective C2 include: GUARDIAN, the Air Battle Management system fully integrated into the NATO IAMD C2 network; and NEXUS, a cloud-based C2 decision-making solution employing Artificial Intelligence. The RAF combat air force provides the core of UK IAMD ‘effect’ capability, with Typhoon and F-35 providing the UK and NATO with air defence against air and cruise missile attack. These platforms are also a key part of the IAMD offensive counter-air and deep precision strike capability that underpins conventional deterrence, projecting force at range from the UK to nullify threats before they are launched. The air component also contributes to UK IAMD through Protector and P8-A Poseidon aircraft which, alongside the Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyer, deliver near-continuous maritime surveillance and strike capabilities from the sea. 113 Air Domain 5. The changing nature of the threat to 7. Augmenting crewed systems with UK and allied security (Chapter 2) autonomous collaborative platforms means that RAF logistic support provides mass and capability across a arrangements must be more resilient range of tasks, including air defence, to disruption and military assault, strike, and electromagnetic attack. requiring a different approach to fighting A crewed combat air platform will remain from air bases, and deeper, more at the heart of a system-of-systems dispersed stockpiles of munitions, spare approach, particularly in airborne air parts, and fuel. The RAF is already defence to counter peer adversaries’ sharpening its approach through aircraft, until Artificial Intelligence and ‘Agile Combat Employment’: the ability autonomy reach the necessary levels of to disperse and operate aircraft from capability and trust. many locations across NATO’s area of 8. More airborne early warning and operations. This must be accelerated, control (AEW&C) aircraft and including through planning for the use of ground-based radar would enable UK commercial airfields in times of crisis the UK to maintain round-the-clock (Chapter 6). Particular attention should airborne surveillance in support of be given to contingency planning for UK and NATO offensive and defensive RAF Brize Norton, the main hub in the operations. These aircraft provide UK for much of what the RAF delivers significant advantages in warfighting, globally. Augmenting the RAF’s fleet of such as more persistent deep strike Voyager, C-17, and A400M aircraft with options. There may be opportunities civilian charter options for transporting for cost-sharing with NATO Allies people and cargo, and for air-to-air in procuring more E-7 Wedgetail refuelling in non-contested environments AEW&C aircraft. would offer greater flexibility, efficiency, and value for money. 9. The need for enduring surveillance and strike in less-contested air threat Capabilities environments will remain, particularly 6. The future of the RAF lies in in support of counter-terrorism accelerating its adoption of the latest operations. The uncrewed aircraft technology and innovation, setting Reaper and its successor Protector the pace for warfighting as the leading have been highly successful, including European air force. Control of the air in the provision of surveillance, is currently delivered by Typhoon— reconnaissance, and strike in recent undergoing a comprehensive set of Middle East operations. Protector should upgrades86—and two squadrons of the be enhanced with maritime surveillance F-35B fifth-generation aircraft. Typhoon, equipment and connectivity to give it and later the F-35, will be replaced by a wider utility. sixth-generation jet as part of the Future Combat Air System. This will consist of a combination of crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous aircraft, effectors, and multi-domain network connectivity. 86 This includes radar, defensive aids, avionics, and weapons to enhance combat effectiveness and deliver operational advantage against an evolving threat. 114 Air Domain Recommendations: 46. The RAF must stay at the leading edge of combat air’s evolution, through the transition from exclusively crewed combat air platforms to a Future Combat Air System (FCAS) with a mix of crewed, uncrewed, and increasingly autonomous platforms, integrated into the UK’s digital targeting web: • To assure the future of UK combat air, investment in autonomous collaborative platforms (ACPs) should be considered alongside investment in FCAS and the Global Combat Air Programme. The ACPs must be designed to operate in collaboration with the fourth-, fifth- and future generations of combat aircraft and to operate from the UK aircraft carriers. • More F-35s will be required over the next decade. This could comprise a mix of F-35A and B models according to military requirements to provide greater value for money. 47. The RAF must further enhance its agility and adaptability to build greater warfighting readiness by: • Maintaining E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft. Further E-7 should be procured when funding allows (taking account of infrastructure and operating costs). This may be expedited by a cost-sharing arrangement with NATO Allies. • Exploring providing Protector with a maritime surveillance capability, integrated with P-8 Poseidon maritime control and reconnaissance aircraft and Type 26 frigates. • Initiating investment in improving the foundations of the UK’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence capabilities to bolster home defence. • Augmenting the existing fleet of A400M with either more A400M, civilian charter, and/or sponsored service options, reducing routine demand on RAF air transport that does not require military capability. 48. The RAF must drive greater productivity to enhance its resilience: • RAF Brize Norton should be a high priority for investment and improvement in partnership with private finance, as part of a new partnership with industry (Chapters 4.2 and 7.11). Given it is not affordable to establish a military alternative to Brize Norton should it be unavailable for operations, alternative commercial facilities must be planned and, if necessary, legislated for under the new Defence Readiness Bill (Chapter 6). • Hawk T187 and Hawk T2 should be replaced with a cost-effective fast jet trainer. The current flying training arrangements for fast jets must be urgently revised to optimise capacity, building in maximum use of contractors and provision for training overseas students. • A review of storage and other standards is required to remove regulations that place unnecessary constraints on training and impose significant unnecessary cost in the lifecycle of highly expensive weapons. This review should be completed by June 2026. 87 The aircraft flown by the Red Arrows aerobatic display team. 115 Space Domain 7.5 Space Domain 1. Space is a critical national active and influential in the arena, infrastructure sector, a site of lowering the barriers to entry for state growing competition, and a domain and non-state actors alike and further that is central to warfighting. complicating potential governance Assured access to operate in, from, arrangements. and through space underpins the UK’s 3. Defence must improve its ability to deter security, prosperity, and daily life. threats to, and if necessary protect, its Nearly 20% of national GDP is reliant interests in space. In addition to on satellite services, while disruption acquiring select sovereign capabilities, to GPS would cost the UK economy applying the recommendations outlined an estimated £1bn a day.88 Equally, in Chapters 4.2 and 5 would deliver a space-based capabilities—such as data more ambitious approach to assuring relays and satellite communications, access to space, both on a sovereign satellite-based intelligence, surveillance basis and with NATO and other key and reconnaissance (ISR), Positioning, allies—enhancing Defence’s role as an Navigation and Timing (PNT), and missile engine for economic growth and warning and tracking—are changing strengthening collective security how wars are fought as quickly and as while delivering for the warfighter. fundamentally as they are changing the economy. 2. Effective use of space is critical to the ability of the Integrated Force to understand, communicate, move, and fight. But the domain is increasingly congested and contested. Most notably, the combined operational satellite fleets of China and Russia grew by 70% in 2019–21. Both countries have sought to weaponise space, demonstrating the capability and the will to use sophisticated anti-satellite weapons in all orbital regimes. Adversaries’ global precision weapons, guided by space-based navigation systems, already hold UK strategic capabilities at risk. There are few internationally agreed rules and norms governing space-based activities, which makes planning and acting with certainty more difficult. Commercial actors are increasingly 88 According to the 2018 Blackett Review – GOV.UK. 116 Space Domain Delivering and assuring • Supporting ‘Understand’ and ‘Strike’. A variety of space-based space-based capabilities systems—including ISR and PNT— for Defence support rapid, accurate, and effective targeting. Defence should work 4. With counterspace capabilities with the Department for Science, proliferating rapidly, Defence must Innovation and Technology (DSIT) urgently develop the resilience of to ensure Defence requirements its military space systems. Creating are reflected in cross-government redundancy in the UK's options for efforts to deliver resilient accessing space will be key, increasingly space-based PNT systems. delivered through commercial systems. 5. This should be supplemented by action Investment should be focused on three with Allies in NATO to ensure the areas without which the Integrated Force Alliance has an effective space policy, will not be able to operate effectively: doctrine, and plans.89 It should also • Space control. To support UK seek partners with which to develop the freedom of action in space, overhead, persistent ISR capability that investment should be focused on is needed for effective Integrated Air and Space Domain Awareness (such as Missile Defence in the Euro-Atlantic. Earth-based sensors), command 6. As a burgeoning dual-use sector in and control at levels of classification the UK, space offers Defence plentiful above Secret (developed in opportunity for exports as well as for cooperation with the UK Intelligence international capability partnerships. Community and allies such as the The global space economy is forecast United States of America), and to reach $1.8tn by 2035, primarily driven counterspace systems (both by commercial demand. Defence has co-orbital and Earth-based). an important role to play in shaping • Decision advantage. Satellite the UK space market and supporting communication and data relays are exports to Europe, Asia, and the Middle fundamental to the Armed Forces’ East. This would help to position the ability to understand the battlespace, UK for greater prominence within exchange information, and make and NATO alongside the United States and communicate decisions in real time. France; build relationships with allies The SKYNET 6A and 6EC satellite and partners; develop a critical industry communications programmes must for Defence; and support UK jobs, maintain operational relevance or be skills, and economic growth. supplanted by alternatives. 89 Building on existing UK membership of minilateral groupings such as the Combined Space Operations initiative (a multilateral forum for improving space cooperation and building common, interoperable, and resilient capabilities in space) and the US-led space coalition under Operation Olympic Defender (a multinational coalition formed to globally integrate military space power, enable Joint and Combined Forces, deter aggression, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in order to retain military advantage). 117 Space Domain 7. Space should be a priority technology while DSIT is the cross-government portfolio for the new National policy lead, UK Space Command Armaments Director, creating is the domain lead within Defence, closer links across the military, civil, tasked—as a joint command—with and industrial space complex, and protecting and defending UK and connecting external sources of expertise allied interests in space, and delivering and innovation with Defence’s acquisition space-based capabilities in support of and export processes (Chapter 4.2). the Integrated Force. Cross-government 9. A reinvigorated Cabinet sub-Committee90—or equivalent prioritisation for a ministerial group—should set the UK’s strategic approach to space civil-military domain to maximise policy, operational, and capability synergies between the UK 8. The UK space enterprise is complex, civil space sector and military needs. stretching across Government, Providing strategic direction for the UK commercial providers, and space sector, and for the Government’s research and academic institutions. role within it, would also enhance Within Government, responsibility private-sector confidence to invest. is further fragmented between departments and multiple agencies: Recommendations: 49. The MOD should invest in the resilience of UK military space systems with a focus on space control, decision advantage, and capabilities that support the ‘Understand’ and ‘Strike’ functions. The department should periodically review the SKYNET 6A and SKYNET 6EC satellite communications programmes to ensure this capability will be resilient and operationally relevant upon entry into service. 50. In support of Integrated Air and Missile Defence in the Euro-Atlantic, the MOD should seek partners to develop a next-generation, overhead, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. This should provide the ability to sense, warn of, and track threats in the Euro-Atlantic. 90 The National Space Council was re-established by the previous Government in 2023 but was not reconstituted after the 2024 General Election. 118 Cyber and Electromagnetic Domain 7.6 Cyber and Electromagnetic Domain 1. The cyber and electromagnetic 2. The Armed Forces’ ability to fight is (CyberEM) domain is at the heart of highly dependent on access to the modern warfare, the enabling domain electromagnetic spectrum and that integrates all others. It is the only resilience to digital service loss, domain contested by adversaries every including as a result of cyber-attack. day: the UK is in constant confrontation Achieving precision and lethality in all with adversaries in cyberspace, defending domains, at scale and reach, relies on national infrastructure that provides winning the CyberEM contest (Box 15). essential services to Government and The domain is the foundation of the new to the public, and protecting logistics digital targeting web that will enable supply chains. As in Ukraine, the first choice and speed in deciding how to blows of any conflict will likely be struck degrade or destroy an identified target in this invisible battlefield. (Chapter 4.1). For a force whose fighting power is delivered by crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous platforms working as one, action in this domain is vital to mission success. 119 Cyber and Electromagnetic Domain Box 15: Operations in the cyber and electromagnetic domain ‘CyberEM’ incorporates: • Cyberspace operations, both offensive and defensive.91 This includes technical operations against the IT networks or technology used by adversaries, seeking to make them function less effectively or cease functioning altogether. The National Cyber Force was established in 2020 to deliver offensive cyber operations in support of Defence and other national security priorities, such as tackling serious and organised crime. The role of Defence Digital in strengthening Defence’s critical functions against cyber-attack is crucial (Chapter 4.1). This is as much about educating personnel as it is about technology. • Electromagnetic warfare,92 operating across an increasingly congested electromagnetic environment. Activities include degrading command and control, jamming signals to drones or missiles, suppressing an adversary’s ability to communicate or target, and intercepting adversary communications (signals intelligence, SIGINT)—and the countermeasures that protect UK and allied forces against such activities. 3. Defence and the UK Intelligence A more proactive posture Community have made significant investments in the CyberEM domain over 4. To protect its ability to communicate and recent decades. There are pockets of operate in the face of a persistent and excellence in Defence but they risk being highly dynamic threat, the Integrated less than the sum of their parts. Defence Force must be able to fuse the also faces crucial recruitment challenges, disparate CyberEM activity of a small which should be addressed in part by number of expert organisations93 the development of the Digital Warfighter and retain the initiative in pursuit group (Chapter 4.1) and harnessing of campaign objectives, including as private-sector skills (Chapter 4.3). part of NATO operations. This requires Without change, the CyberEM a single point of authority—a new domain will remain a limiting factor in CyberEM Command as part of Strategic achieving a tech-enabled Integrated Command (Box 16)—with responsibility Force capable of outthinking and for integrating capabilities on behalf of outmanoeuvring adversaries. CDS and the MSHQ. 91 Actions in or through cyberspace that project power, creating effects that achieve military objectives (offensive) or are intended to preserve friendly freedom of action in cyberspace (defensive). 92 The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) uses energy that travels in waves and spans across a broad spectrum. We all depend on this energy to carry out day-to-day activities every hour of every day. When we tune in to a radio, watch TV, send a text message, or cook food in a microwave, we are using EM energy. Electromagnetic warfare (EW) uses directed energy to cut off access to the EMS, blocking signals between technologies and rendering them inoperable. 93 For example: the Army’s Cyber and Electromagnetic Effects Group; the Air and Space Warfare Centre; the Royal Navy’s Information Warfare Group; and Space Command. 120 Cyber and Electromagnetic Domain 5. As the domain lead, the CyberEM • Act as governance lead for cyber Command should command defensive security for the Armed Forces, within cyber operations, set Defence demand broader cyber security governance for offensive cyber operations, and for Defence provided by the Chief cohere Defence contributions to activity Information Officer. in the domain, while preserving single • Act as primary interlocutor for Service expertise and ability to act. Defence on offensive and defensive Under these strengthened authorities, cyber operations, liaising across there are important principles as Government and with allies and to how this new command should partners on these. operate. It should: • Ensure that more centralised direction • Provide a robust governance on prioritisation of, and standards mechanism through which National for, cyber, electromagnetic warfare, Cyber Force (NCF) activity is and information operations does prioritised and tasked by Defence. not impede the work of the single CyberEM Command will have Services and Director Special Forces authority to set enterprise-wide in achieving multi-domain integration operational priorities for activities in real time and at high tempo. in the domain on behalf of CDS Delivery should be left to the most and will be the point of contact for appropriate lowest level (which may the NCF. This should not affect the at times be the centre). NCF’s authorities or how it conducts operations. Where cyber effects must be aligned as part of military operations, this integration will remain the responsibility of the relevant Joint Commander, supported by CyberEM Command. 121 Cyber and Electromagnetic Domain Box 16: A CyberEM Command to cohere but not execute The CyberEM domain should be led in a similar way to UK Space Command, centralising the authorities and responsibilities for decision-making to avoid duplication and reduce inefficiency. The new CyberEM Command should act as a ‘hub’, integrating the full range of military operations and bringing coherence to how Defence understands, develops, and accesses capability with allies and industry. The CyberEM Command should: • Provide conceptual and force • Direct the content of CyberEM development insights to the education, training, and doctrine MSHQ to support it in cohering for the military. force development across the • Lead the overarching strategy Integrated Force. for electromagnetic warfare (EW) • Provide operational advice and capability development, setting oversight, including in recommending hardware and software standards priorities for future requirements in alignment with NATO, and to the MSHQ while responding to providing coherent, prioritised direction set from the centre. requirements to Military Intelligence Services (Chapter 7.9), the wider • Improve Defence coherence of UK Intelligence Community, and disparate CyberEM activity and international partners. To support this: capabilities in advance of and during conventional military operations. ° A Spectrum Coordination Office should be set up to • Set Defence demand for offensive coordinate joint electromagnetic cyber operations conducted by the spectrum operations, supporting National Cyber Force, acting as a civilian-military coordination and single Defence customer. battlespace management in a • Direct defensive cyber operations, warfighting scenario to align with including setting priorities, directing NATO’s approach. This structure tasking to supporting agencies, and could sit within CyberEM Command, allocating resources to unlock rapid providing advice to Permanent operational decision-making. Joint Headquarters and the Chief • Direct military commands to comply of Joint Operations. with Defence standards for cyber ° Individual Services should resilience set by the Chief Information be empowered to develop Officer and Defence Digital. their own EW capabilities in • Act as the principal military point accordance with standards set by of contact in the CyberEM domain CyberEM Command. for industry, wider Government, and NATO. 122 Cyber and Electromagnetic Domain 6. As the domain lead, the new command • NATO, more effectively leveraging would also act as a single military excellence found across the Armed point of contact for those seeking to Forces to support the Alliance as it engage with the Armed Forces on develops its CyberEM capabilities, CyberEM. This includes: enabling collaboration and shared understanding. • MOD policy teams and those responsible for upskilling the whole 7. Information operations95 (IO) are closely force in evolving ways of warfare. related to the CyberEM domain as part of the wider information environment, • Other Government departments— conducted in cyberspace as well as in especially the Department for the physical world, using capabilities Science, Innovation and Technology in all domains. Although IO is not as the EM spectrum policy lead— a unique function of the CyberEM to enhance spectrum-sharing domain, it is increasingly important to arrangements, create a single consider them together. Cyber tools, approach to battlespace management electromagnetic warfare, and IO are in a warfighting scenario, and develop all essential for targeting, for example. shared understanding of how to The new CyberEM command should manage potential collateral damage make it easier to cohere and coordinate caused by EM spectrum operations.94 these activities. • International counterparts, such as the armed forces of the United States and other Five Eyes partners. Recommendation: 51. By the end of 2025, the MOD should establish an initial operating capability for a new CyberEM Command within Strategic Command. This new command should emulate Space Command’s blueprint for domain coherence: cohering, but not executing, military action across cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, and with responsibility for executing offensive cyber operations remaining with the National Cyber Force. CyberEM Command should be led by an officer with domain expertise and of sufficient rank to provide functional leadership within the UK system. It must be a ‘whole force’ endeavour, with its structure largely filled by a mixture of civilians and Reserves, given that greater expertise exists in the civilian sector. The workforce should be planned and developed as part of the Digital Warfighter group (Chapter 4.1). 94 Electromagnetic spectrum operations shape or exploit the electromagnetic environment or use it for attack or defence, including to support operations in all other operational environments. Operations include but are not limited to: signals intelligence; intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance; navigation warfare; and battlespace spectrum management. 95 Information operations are central to shaping behaviours and gaining information and decision advantage, operating at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in the physical world and in cyberspace. Defence plays a strong supporting role in national strategic communications campaigns. 123 Strategic Command 7.7 Strategic Command 1. To support the Integrated Force, Strategic Permanent Joint Command will be responsible for Headquarters delivering, at the direction of the MSHQ, the following joint enablers and specialist capabilities: Defence 4. Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Intelligence and intelligence, surveillance, is part of Strategic Command. Located and reconnaissance; joint command in Northwood, it commands UK and control for targeting; the Integrated military operations around the world. Global Defence Network; the new This includes national operations CyberEM Command; Special Forces and joint and multinational military and Special Operations Forces; Defence operations. As the Armed Forces prepare Medical Services; and the Defence to deter, fight, and win against a ‘peer’ Academy.96 For these capabilities, military adversary, PJHQ should: Strategic Command will set and enforce • Focus more closely on the defence common standards and training within its of UK territory, airspace, and waters domain expertise across the whole force as an enduring concern. Its senior and under a single vision. commander—the Chief of Joint 2. In a change from previous practice, Operations (CJO)—should establish a under Defence Reform the MSHQ single view of operational requirements will now be the single ‘brain’ for the for the defence of the UK for Integrated Force, owning and directing consideration by the MSHQ (Chapter 6). strategic functions such as concept and • Provide the single UK operational capability development, force design, point of contact for NATO Joint wargaming, and integrated Balance of Force Commands and Component Investment processes and decisions, to Commands in support of NATO-led deliver better choices and options for deterrence, including through Ministers as well as more effective military warfighting operations as necessary campaigns in the future. Certain areas under NATO’s Regional Plans. of joint capability concept and warfare During Alliance operations, NATO development, such as doctrine and training, Commanders will direct the UK will remain with Strategic Command. forces assigned to them by CDS, while PJHQ will deliver and support 3. While Strategic Command will retain those forces in coordination with the its innovation team, the jHub, this unit’s Services and Strategic Command. work will be coordinated by the new UK Defence Innovation organisation • Lead on operations where the UK has (Chapter 4.2) in response to a common committed forces to support allies set of priorities for the innovation function. and partners in non-NATO settings. These forces should be commanded by CJO on behalf of CDS. 96 Under Defence Reform, Defence Support and Defence Digital will move to the National Armaments Director Group. 124 Strategic Command • Prepare for and execute national 5. Given that PJHQ plays a vital role in contingency plans for emergencies UK military operations, it must be outside the UK, such as operations resilient to physical attack (including air in support of the Overseas Territories and missile strikes) and cyber-attack. and the evacuation of UK citizens The changing intent and capabilities from overseas in an emergency. of the UK’s adversaries mean that its However, responsibility for Military Aid current location poses unnecessary risks to the Civil Authorities in response to to the assured command of future UK UK-based crises—such as a CBRN military operations, including in defence (chemical, biological, radiological, of the UK itself. nuclear) incident—should remain with the Standing Joint Commander (UK). Recommendation: 52. The vital role of Permanent Joint Headquarters in commanding UK military operations means the MOD should ensure it is more resilient to both physical and cyber-attack. 125 Special Forces 7.8 Special Forces 1. The UK’s Special Forces are the ‘tip 3. UK Special Forces already represent of the spear’ of the Armed Forces: a working model of the Integrated integrated by design and able to reach Force: leading the way in the innovation strategically significant targets in the of new technologies and systems across most challenging places, operating in all domains. They must continue to all domains, both overtly and covertly. deepen their integration with partners Defence must continue to enhance its across Government, including the UK Special Forces, ensuring UK sovereign Intelligence Community, and with allies choice by maintaining this strategic and industry, driven by the logic of capability at the very highest level. innovation cycle (Chapter 4). 2. The rapid and growing diversification 4. Wider Special Operations are not of threats demands Special Forces that confined to delivery by UK standing can deter through retaining first-mover Special Forces. The UK’s single advantage, outmanoeuvring peer Service-designated Special adversaries in support of national Operations Forces (sS SOF) provide objectives. The UK Special Forces also additional choice and resilience. play a key role in protecting the UK This expansion of forces and associated and its vital interests across a range capabilities in the near term improves of threats, with the ability to recover the UK and NATO’s warfighting ability, British citizens abroad. This includes exemplified by the UK’s contribution hostage rescue and non-combatant to, and framework for, NATO’s Special evacuation in the most demanding of Operations Taskforce 2026. This allows circumstances, as well as specialist the UK to contribute meaningfully at military capabilities to support the police NATO Level 1 with sS SOF (such as the and civil authorities. These force-driving Army Rangers), Level 2 with specialist roles (Chapter 3) continue to put a capabilities (for example, 16 Air Assault premium on the highest-end capabilities Brigade and Commando Force), within Special Forces, with the ability and Level 3 with exquisite sovereign to underwrite the UK’s covert edge. support from UK Special Forces. This is It is critical that Defence assets are critical given that NATO commitments will maintained, equipped, and held at be a core driver of Defence activity under readiness to ensure the Special the NATO First approach. Forces can always act decisively and at speed. 126 Intelligence 7.9 Intelligence 1. Demand for high-fidelity intelligence 3. The UK has access to world-class will continue to increase as the global intelligence capabilities, from Defence environment deteriorates and as threats Intelligence (DI)97 to the UK Intelligence to the UK and its allies intensify. Alongside Community (UKIC), the Five Eyes counter-terrorism requirements, there is intelligence alliance, and the UK’s now a burgeoning demand for intelligence bilateral intelligence relationships. that builds the UK’s understanding of, Within Defence, however, intelligence and supports actions to counter, state capabilities are underpowered and adversaries. In parallel, advances in fragmented. Of particular concern is technology are changing the types of the status of DI, which is dedicated intelligence needed and the speed at to meeting the needs of Defence. which it must be collated, analysed, and Although demand for its services is disseminated if it is to be relevant to increasing, there are approximately decision-making. Data volumes are rapidly 500 fewer people working in DI today expanding and must be harnessed to than in 2019 and its digital programmes enable effective decision-making, including have been subject to significant cuts through using Artificial Intelligence. and deferments. There are also barriers to interoperability between Defence 2. Meeting these changing demands in and UKIC, risking their collective times of already heightened competition capabilities delivering less than the sum is challenging. But as the UK rebuilds of their parts. its warfighting capability, it must also ensure it can prioritise resources 4. Enhancing Defence intelligence and scale capacity to meet crisis and capabilities to better meet wartime intelligence requirements. today’s threats and optimising for Conflict with a ‘peer’ military adversary warfighting—across technology, data, today would create a demand for people, and processes—is essential. intelligence that significantly surpasses The MOD should invest in DI to build that of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. its capability and capacity. In addition, Timely indicators, warnings, and Defence should maximise its existing assessments of adversary strategy and intelligence capabilities (DI, PJHQ Joint capabilities are essential for pre-empting Intelligence (J2), UK Special Forces J2, and preparing for war, including the and Royal Navy, Army, RAF and Space generation of warfighting advantage by Command intelligence, surveillance, scaling up industrial capacity. Intelligence and reconnaissance organisations) as is also a critical operational enabler and part of the Integrated Force. It should must be integrated into command and do so by establishing a single defence control, targeting, cyber operations, intelligence enterprise. This enterprise electromagnetic warfare, information should operate under the banner of operations, and force protection as part ‘Military Intelligence Services’ (MIS) with of the Integrated Force. functional leadership provided by DI. 97 Defence Intelligence is one of few intelligence organisations worldwide that carries out collection, reporting, assessment, targeting and operations, including counter-intelligence. 127 Intelligence This would reduce fragmentation of 6. Defence’s people, capabilities, and data intelligence provision within Defence, are attractive targets for hostile facilitate data-sharing, and catalyse intelligence services that are willing to go the modernisation of its capabilities beyond well-established espionage by integrating collection, reporting, norms. Robust counter-intelligence assessment, targeting, and operations. (CI) capabilities are critical for It would also enable Defence to countering these threats and for break down barriers to collaboration reassuring the UK’s allies and partners with partners across Government, that it is serious about protecting their including UKIC. equities. The MOD must create a single counter-intelligence unit that brings 5. Within MIS, DI should have functional together Defence expertise and specialist responsibility for: capabilities98 alongside UKIC investigations into human and cyber • Leading and improving all espionage and ‘insider threat’ activity. aspects of the intelligence cycle, This would ensure resources are focused including working to a coherent on protecting the most critical Defence set of priorities; setting common capabilities, at home and overseas, collection and analytical standards; against the most serious threats. The unit and improving data-sharing with would also provide a single point of UKIC through adopting common contact within Defence for industry—to data standards, handling controls, protect critical supply chains from and vetting procedures. disruption and to procure innovative • Driving improvements to intelligence technology—and for CI collaboration with capability—such as data fabric, NATO, Five Eyes, and other partners. sensors, decision-making, exploitation and targeting capabilities—and shared services within MIS. • Ensuring prioritisation and coherence in adopting critical technologies, coordinated and deconflicted with partners across Government. • Aligning architecture and standards with the Defence-wide digital network, platforms, and services for information held at above Secret. • Supporting Defence’s cyber security lead, ensuring the resilience of digital systems to cyber-enabled espionage. 98 From within the Royal Navy, British Army, Royal Air Force, and Civil Service. 128 Intelligence Recommendations: 53. Intelligence is foundational to the UK's deterrence and warfighting ability. Defence Intelligence (DI) must be equipped with the tools to attract, develop, and retain a motivated workforce. This might include pay and recruitment freedoms in line with the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC). To avoid counterproductive competition for potential applicants, Defence should work with other departments and agencies in the national security system to ensure a strong talent pipeline across Government, including through the development of: • A cross-government national security workforce strategy. • A strong training offer that nurtures critical specialist skills. • Secondments for military personnel and civil servants, including into industry, to develop expertise in emerging technologies, cyber skills, and knowledge of best practice in technology adoption. 54. Defence should cohere and maximise its expert intelligence capabilities under a single enterprise, ‘Military Intelligence Services’ (MIS), by November 2025. DI’s functional leadership of MIS should be underpinned by a new Defence Intelligence Charter that codifies its role and authorities. 55. To achieve interoperability with partners across Government, including UKIC, Defence should: • Work to develop a coherent set of intelligence priorities and timely and secure data-sharing across Government by aligning with UKIC data standards and vetting procedures. • Encourage a Government-wide review of handling processes for intelligence material to ensure it can be shared more readily in times of crisis and war. 56. By November 2025, the MOD must establish a single Defence Counter-Intelligence Unit within DI with a mandate to protect Defence from hostile intelligence services, working closely with UKIC. 129 Defence Medical Services 7.10 Defence Medical Services 1. Ensuring the health and operational A Defence–Health medical care of the UK’s Armed Forces partnership is vitally important to deterrence and defence, enabling the Integrated Force to fight and endure on operations 4. Defence must work with the Department and in conflict. A moral and legal duty of Health and Social Care (DHSC) on the part of Government, healthcare to ensure the national health is also among the top three factors in ecosystem—Defence, the NHS, and personnel retention. the private sector—has the capacity and capability to meet personnel 2. The MOD is not solely responsible for needs. The link between DMS and the delivering this care. The Defence Medical NHS extends beyond the provision of Services (DMS)99 are responsible for secondary and tertiary care. A significant primary occupational healthcare, medical proportion of Reserves work in the NHS, support, and rehabilitation during meaning that NHS pressures become conflict—with the DMS rehabilitation DMS pressures, notably in workforce service widely known for its excellence. shortages and the fragility of the global But Defence is inextricably dependent on supply chain. The reverse is also true: the NHS for the provision of secondary the deployment of Reserves in Defence and tertiary care by design.100 medical care requires careful planning given the impact on NHS staffing. In the 3. Within Defence, medical care is event of a major war, the NHS must also fragmented and has long been be prepared to deal with mass military subject to neglect and underfunding. casualties. The operational relationship with the NHS has also been de-prioritised in recent 5. To strengthen this partnership, the years. Rebuilding medical capacity departments should conduct an and capability together with the NHS, urgent sprint review, creating a shared coupled with organisational reform understanding of current capacity, within Defence, is critical if UK forces current and potential future need, and are to remain fighting fit in peacetime, shared plans for delivery. This review while preparing to meet operational should account for the priorities identified demands when at war. Through this in NATO’s recent Medical Action Plan,101 partnership, Defence can also play its rebuilding medical capabilities for part in the Government’s mission to warfighting. It should include integrated build an NHS fit for the future. crisis plans. 99 A group of military medical healthcare services, comprising single Service capabilities and a headquarters in Strategic Command. 100 ‘Primary’ healthcare is a patient’s first point of contact—for example, general practice, community pharmacy, dentistry, and eyecare. ‘Secondary’ healthcare includes planned or elective care, usually in a hospital, as well as urgent and emergency care and mental health care. ‘Tertiary’ care relates to highly specialist treatment. 101 The five priority areas of the NATO Medical Action Plan are: regulatory frameworks and legislation; workforce shortages; mass casualty planning; patient evacuation; and medical logistics. 130 Defence Medical Services 6. Increasing shared capacity is a 9. The Director General of DMS should priority. This will require investment by have responsibility for: Defence but it is not solely a question • Providing functional direction to of funding. Defence must become an the Defence medical workforce, employer of choice for medical staff including setting common priorities, (Regular and Reserves) by offering standards, and training. flexible employment, education, and training—facilitated by aligning with • Theatre-level medical units and the NHS on pay, benefits, and terms training centres. and conditions. A ‘Sponsored Reserve’ • Individual clinical training, education, model or equivalent has the potential and accreditation for both military to increase medical Reserve numbers, and civilian elements of the Defence with more personnel held at readiness. medical workforce, delivered by the Private-sector healthcare offers further Defence Medical Academy. options for supporting personnel in maintaining and recovering fighting • A single approach to the career fitness, including the significant number management and administration of all currently categorised as non-deployable. medical personnel across the Front Line Commands, including medics 7. Developing specialist clinical and paramedics. capability is also crucial to supporting the Integrated Force in crisis and The Front Line Commands should retain at war. DMS should proactively share sufficient capacity and expertise to expertise and skills with the NHS and implement technical direction from DMS private healthcare providers. Sustaining and ensure that force elements held at Defence investment in clinical research readiness are integrated into the Defence and development (R&D), working with Medical Enterprise. industry and academia, is essential. 10. To support this reform, renewed While some of this R&D may be unique attention should be given to DMS to Defence, much will have wider clinical physical and digital infrastructure value and use, including within the NHS. following a long period of neglect: over half of Defence’s medical estate is over Reforming Defence’s 50 years old and legacy IT systems are medical system unable to support today’s requirements. Investments in digitisation such as 8. Establishing a single ‘Defence Medical Project CORTISONE102 are crucial to the Enterprise’ under the functional seamless sharing of data between DMS leadership of DMS would further and the NHS. strengthen a key component of the national health ecosystem as part of the Integrated Force—cohering the single Services and Strategic Command, and the mix of military personnel, civil servants, and contractors. 102 Project CORTISONE is the DMS digitisation programme designed to appropriately record, manage, and exploit healthcare information created by DMS when delivering patient healthcare. 131 Defence Medical Services Recommendations: 57. The MOD must work closely with the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) to ensure that the Defence Medical Services (DMS) and the NHS together have capacity to meet Defence medical needs, including in the most extreme circumstances. The two departments must conduct a sprint review of system- wide capacity and capability. Ministers in the MOD and DHSC must also have direct access to information on the collective readiness of Defence, the NHS, and private healthcare to meet the demands of warfighting and other strategic health emergencies involving DMS. An independent review board, akin to the US Defense Health Board, should assure ecosystem readiness, reporting periodically to Ministers, the Defence Board, and Parliament. 58. DMS should be empowered as the functional lead of a single Defence Medical Enterprise that meets personnel’s healthcare needs in peacetime, on operations, and in war. As part of rebuilding DMS and the wider enterprise in line with NATO’s Medical Action Plan, the MOD should: • Invest in medical evacuation and medical stockpiles at a scale that matches military commitments and deployments, as well as critical capabilities like counter-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment. • Create a ‘whole force’ plan that identifies workforce requirements, incentivisation, and measures to return non-deployable personnel to fighting fitness as quickly as possible as part of an enduring approach agreed with the NHS. Strategic Command should develop this plan by March 2026. • Establish a ten-year physical infrastructure plan for Defence medical by February 2026, working closely with the Defence Infrastructure Organisation as it develops its own plan for recapitalisation across the Defence estate (Chapter 7.11). Resourcing options for medical infrastructure might include drawing on the NHS and private finance. 132 Infrastructure 7.11 Infrastructure 1. The estate is where Defence lives, The path to infrastructure works, trains, and operates in the UK recapitalisation and on bases overseas. The centrality of infrastructure to Defence outcomes has not, however, been reflected in its 3. The MOD should create a single treatment since the end of the Cold Recapitalisation Plan that establishes War. It has been serially underfunded a holistic assessment of Defence and capability planning has often taken infrastructure requirements over the inadequate account of infrastructure next decade, taking account of the requirements and costs,103 despite the department’s work under the Defence clear and important link between the two. Housing Strategy and Defence Estate Optimisation programme. This plan 2. Recent efforts to address longstanding should identify priorities and options for problems—through estate optimisation,104 investment, opportunities for maximising increasing annual expenditure from the value of the estate, estimated costs, a low base, and work to develop a and provisional timelines for delivery. new Defence Housing Strategy—are It should differentiate between the a good start. But the profound nature distinct opportunities and needs of of the challenge means these will different segments in the Defence not be enough to ensure Defence infrastructure portfolio. infrastructure is fit for purpose. Increased departmental funding 4. Homes for personnel and their over time must be accompanied families should be a priority within the by fundamentally different ways of infrastructure portfolio. Enhancing the working, implemented as a matter standard of Service Family Accommodation of priority, if Defence is to meet (SFA) and Single Living Accommodation the scale of the challenge. With the (SLA) is essential to the morale and right approach, the Defence estate retention of Service personnel, as is can, as a national strategic asset, ending the uncertainty regarding access contribute to the wider resilience and to SFA by personnel in long-term, security of the UK. non-married relationships (including same-sex couples). Years of squeezing funding for the maintenance of SFA and SLA has contributed to a crisis in recruitment and retention. Current plans for investment do not arrest the overall 103 This includes force design, people policy, training, and other Defence Lines of Development with direct implications for infrastructure requirements. 104 Defence Estate Optimisation is a £5.1bn portfolio that is moving Defence towards a more affordable estate with the right infrastructure in the right places to deliver Defence outputs. Under this programme, Defence is building modern facilities, including headquarters, specialist facilities, and accommodation, to enable unit moves that support future force design and release sites for disposal (for example, through sales or leases). 133 Infrastructure rate of decline. The Government’s 5. Parts of the estate that ultimately decisive deal to buy back thousands of support warfighting, including training, military homes offers an important operations, and support, should also be opportunity to reset the parlous state of prioritised. The Strategic Base should SFA following decades of underinvestment, be treated as a front-line capability that with benefits likely to be felt in Scotland, is fundamental to the UK’s ability to Wales, and England in particular. The defend the homeland and deploy forces MOD should reinvest the proceeds from overseas. The Recapitalisation Plan housing development on Defence land as should identify priorities for investment well as drawing in private capital. The in the Strategic Base, including where forthcoming Defence Housing Strategy operational infrastructure does not meet should consider all options, including requirements under force development redesigning and remodelling the SFA plans. It should also identify opportunities estate to deliver wider societal benefit, for mutually beneficial partnerships across increasing housing density where Government and with the private sector. appropriate while supporting the The Home Defence Programme, led by Government’s commitment to the Cabinet Office, should incorporate housebuilding. Supporting service an infrastructure ‘pillar’ to ensure the personnel’s aspirations for home Strategic Base is resilient in the event ownership should also be explored, of war (Chapter 6). as outlined in Chapter 4.3. 134 Infrastructure Maximising assets for Energy systems across Defence and the UK must be decarbonised at national goals and income the same time as meeting growing generation energy demand. Building energy infrastructure on the Defence 6. There is significant opportunity to estate and/or using it for carbon exploit the Defence estate—which sequestration would reduce the covers approximately 1% of the UK’s department’s energy bills and risk, landmass—to generate income for add to National Grid resilience, the MOD and meet the wider needs and provide income streams for the of Defence and the Government. Government. Increasing renewable Disposal may release funding for energy production on Overseas immediate use but it is not always the Bases has the potential to generate most effective way to generate revenue financial and resilience benefits. and realise value. The protective • Making sites available to startups security that shields many Defence sites and scale-ups, where possible, for makes it a particularly attractive host product testing and evaluation to for strategically important, dual-use help nurture innovation (Chapter 4.2). infrastructure—opening up the possibility of crowding-in private-sector expertise Transforming infrastructure and capital, while assuring capacity for management Defence in times of crisis and conflict. 7. As a starting point, the MOD should 8. Funding alone will not fix the identify opportunities that may longstanding problems affecting emerge through: Defence infrastructure. A fundamental change is needed in how, and how • Releasing more land for effectively, the MOD manages the building new housing across estate. Major decisions on infrastructure the UK, following the March must be based on better information, 2025 announcement of a new while delivery must be accelerated cross-government taskforce through vastly improved contract dedicated to this effort.105 management and productivity gains. • Artificial Intelligence (AI) To achieve this, the MOD should develop: infrastructure build-out. As set out • Comprehensive oversight of assets, in the Government’s AI Opportunities liabilities, rates of obsolescence, and Action Plan,106 AI data centres lifecycle costs across the estate. are critical infrastructure for training, deploying, and operating • Real-time understanding, advanced AI systems. through digitisation, of the needs across the estate. • Sustainable energy generation and carbon sequestration, using a ‘market innovation only’ model. 105 Public land unlocked for the next generation of home owners - GOV.UK, 27 March 2025. The taskforce comprises the MOD, HM Treasury, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, and Homes England. 106 AI Opportunities Action Plan, 13 January 2025 – GOV.UK. 135 Infrastructure • The legal and commercial skills driven by capability decisions should be to match industry, achieved funded as part of the relevant capability through external recruitment and programme to ensure existing plans to internal upskilling. build and maintain housing assets are not unduly impacted. • Access to deep expertise of the type found in the private sector. 10. To embed infrastructure considerations into decision-making, the Chief Executive 9. The National Armaments Director of the Defence Infrastructure Organisation must ensure that infrastructure should be a formal consultee on Defence requirements are fully integrated and Command plans. All Front Line into capability development and Command boards should establish a investment decisions, with robust and board member with responsibility for streamlined approvals and governance. infrastructure. As Defence Reform All equipment plans, including in the progresses and as the Defence Housing ringfenced Defence Nuclear Enterprise, Strategy is developed, the MOD should should be reviewed to ensure that consider whether infrastructure suitable infrastructure provision has management would be more effective if been made. Where it has not, a detailed military accommodation were managed operational plan should be devised to separately from the rest of the estate manage any shortfall within the relevant portfolio, reflecting its distinct programme budget in the longer term. requirements. Any future changes to SFA or SLA 136 Infrastructure Recommendations: 59. The MOD must deliver an overarching infrastructure Recapitalisation Plan to the Secretary of State by February 2026. The plan should identify (a) opportunities for drawing in private-sector expertise and capital as quickly as possible and (b) mechanisms for realising this potential as a matter of urgency. It should take account of the department’s existing work under the Defence Housing Strategy and Defence Estate Optimisation programme. 60. The MOD’s forthcoming Defence Housing Strategy, due later this year, must set out how it will (a) improve the overall standard of accommodation, in alignment with commercial best practice for ensuring high-quality, good-value accommodation and (b) widen eligibility for those in long-term relationships. Defence should prioritise and increase funding this Parliament for accommodation sites that are in most urgent need of repair. 61. Under the Recapitalisation Plan, the MOD must assess how best to generate income and maximise the value of its assets, adjusting the Defence Estate Optimisation programme accordingly. Where alternative use or disposal is the right option, the Defence Infrastructure Organisation must have a strategy for the risk-adjusted maximisation of proceeds, engaging actively with the private sector. Where proceeds are realised from housing development on Defence land, the MOD should ensure these are reinvested in the renewal or future development of military accommodation. Where Defence retains land, it must maximise the use of its assets, including through site development and energy generation. Cross-government and private-sector partnership is essential. 62. Long-term resolution of Defence infrastructure problems requires a highly professional approach to estate management that is digitally enabled and led by an experienced commercial and legal team. The MOD should: • Ensure that infrastructure requirements are fully integrated into capability development and investment decisions. • Ensure that Defence is making full use of a fully integrated, digital, real-time Estate Management system. • Simplify and accelerate its commercial processes by adopting industry build standards and Cabinet Office contracts for standard services. There should be no bespoke Defence contracting and build requirements except where these are critical to infrastructure protection and/or resilience in time of crisis. • Develop faster, more agile ways of working that are proportionate to the risk involved. Burdensome authorisation processes should be scrapped to avoid costly ‘stop-start’ project management. 137 Appendix: Review Process Appendix: Review Process The SDR has proceeded in three phases: The following individuals contributed to the Review and Challenge phase of the i. Information-gathering, July–September Strategic Defence Review, taking part in 2024: alongside a public call for evidence, the panel sessions. Names marked with * we commissioned departmental responses indicate Panel Chairs. to, and sought expert views on, propositions relating to UK Defence. Ms Madeleine Alessandri* ii. ‘Review and Challenge’, October– Maj Gen (Rtd) Robin Anderton-Brown November 2024: we convened 27 panels Sir Ian Andrews comprised of more than 150 experts to Cdre (Rtd) Ian Annett* test the department’s responses to our Dr Sophy Antrobus propositions. In parallel, we attended a Mr Andy Bamford* table-top exercise on current and future Brig (Rtd) Ben Barry defence capabilities with senior personnel from the MOD and the Armed Forces. Mr Adrian Baguley VAdm (Rtd) Paul Bennett iii. Decision-making and finalisation, December 2024–May 2025: the testing of Ms Anita Bernie our findings continued as we drafted the final Maj Gen (Rtd) Michael von Bertele report and finessed our recommendations. Sir Simon Bollom Engagement across Whitehall and with Mr Norman Bone allies and partners continued, including Mr Desmond Bowen* in preparation for publication. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw Throughout the process, we have engaged Ms Samira Braund extensively with allies, partners, industry, Lt Gen (Rtd) Martin Bricknell and wider society (Box 17). Our work was Prof Justin Bronk enhanced by the many contributions to the Maj Gen Jules Buczacki information-gathering phase and by working Dr Phil Budden closely with all parts of the MOD. Assessing Mr Hugh Bullock the department’s propositions collaboratively enabled a rich Review and Challenge process Ms Clare Cameron by teams of accomplished external experts. Lt Gen (Rtd) Sir David Capewell* We consider our Review was done with the Ms Grace Cassy* department, rather than imposed on it, and Mr Miles Celic many of our recommendations flow from Lt Gen (Rtd) Doug Chalmers having unlocked the rigour and creativity Prof Malcolm Chalmers* in today’s Defence leaders. We updated the Secretary of State for Defence on our Maj Gen (Rtd) James Chiswell* progress throughout, as well as the Prime Prof Michael Clarke* Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr Martin Clements 138 Appendix: Review Process Sir Jon Coles Mr Angus Lapsley* Mr Matt Collins Mr Stephen Lillie Maj Gen (Rtd) John Collyer Ms Claire Logan Mr Alex Cooper Sir Stephen Lovegrove Ms Gloria Craig HC Jane Marriott Air Cdre (Rtd) Andrew Curtis Mr Robin Marshall* Prof Tim Dafforn Prof Ciaran Martin* Dr Keith Dear Mr Brian McBride Gen Sir Christopher Deverell Mr Tom McKane Maj Gen (Rtd) Alastair Dickinson* Lt Gen John Mead Mr Edward Dinsmore* Ms Oona Muirhead Mr Brian Dubrie Prof Dame Fiona Murray* Prof John Economou Prof Tracy Myhill Maj Gen (Rtd) Angus Fay Maj Gen (Rtd) Paul Nanson HMA Edward Ferguson Prof Vipin Narang Prof Sir Lawrence Freedman Sir Robin Niblett Lt Gen (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry Ms Alexandra Notay Prof Steven Furnell Prof Anu Ojha Mr Andy Gamble Prof Sir David Omand Dr Melanie Garson Air Mshl (Rtd) Philip Osborn Ms Barbara Ghinelli Sir William Patey Mr Jean-Christophe Gray* Lt Gen (Rtd) Sir Mark Poffley* Mr Will Green VAdm (Rtd) Duncan Potts Lt Gen (Rtd) Sir Andrew Gregory Mr Conrad Prince Ms Judith Gough Sir Jeremy Quin* Ms Kate Guthrie* Mr John Raine Mr John Hanley Ms Suzanne Raine Ms Angela Henderson Mr Nick Reynolds Prof Beatrice Heuser Sir Oliver Robbins* Dr Michael Holden Mr Joe Robinson Mr Martin Howard Sir Charles Roxburgh Mr Will Jessett Air Mshl (Rtd) Peter Ruddock Lt Gen (Rtd) Ivan Jones Dr Emma Salisbury Mr Peter Jones Mr Matthew Savill Ms Sarah Kenny Dr Gundbert Scherf Maj Gen (Rtd) Seumas Kerr Ms Susan Schofield Mr Paul Kett Lord Mark Sedwill* RAdm (Rtd) John Kingwell Dame Melinda Simmons* 139 Appendix: Review Process Lt Gen (Rtd) Stuart Skeates Ms Sally Walker Maj Gen (Rtd) David Shouesmith Mr Peter Watkins Dr Dave Smith Dr Jack Watling Brig (Rtd) Mike Stone Prof Tim Watson Air Mshl (Rtd) Edward Stringer Ms Alison White* Mr Paul Taylor Mr Marcus Willett Sir Kevin Tebbit Sir Gareth Rhys Williams Air Cdre (Rtd) Steve Thornber Dr Heather Williams Maj Gen Alex Turner HMA Dame Caroline Wilson Lt Gen (Rtd) Sir Tyrone Urch Mr Dominic Wilson Prof Sir Jonathan Van-Tam* Prof Andy Wright Mr Simon Venn Sir Alex Younger Box 17: Engaging those with a stake in Britain’s Defence review Our Review has been informed by an unprecedented level of consultation: 1,700 individuals and organisations submitted over 8,000 responses. This included approximately 800 responses from within the MOD, the Armed Forces, and the veteran community. Alongside this, we received written contributions from over 30 UK allies and partners, from Australia to the US, Iceland to Japan, Norway to New Zealand. We have engaged with many embassies in London. We have also engaged deeply with NATO, including directly with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Through dialogue with Australian partners, we captured insights from Australia’s Defence Strategic Review 2023, which was similarly led externally to its Government. We received written contributions from over 200 companies in the defence supply chain and wider industry. With our fellow reviewers, the ‘Defence Review Team 6’, we have also engaged with defence industry primes, the Defence Suppliers Forum, and smaller enterprises that play a critical role in driving innovation and advancing UK capabilities. Our request for insight from the UK knowledge sector and those of allies elicited over 100 written submissions to the SDR from think tanks and academic bodies. As part of the review process, we have frequently engaged with parliamentarians, including through a debate in the House of Lords and by providing oral evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee. Select Committee Reports—such as those on readiness for war and on the implications of the Ukraine war107—have proven invaluable. In a first of its kind for Defence, a Citizens’ Panel was established in late 2024 to understand what can be ‘reasonably expected’ in the eyes of the public. Panel members drawn from a cross-section of society were taken to four MOD sites, including single Service bases and MOD Corsham, HQ Defence Digital. On each visit, panel members were briefed by Defence personnel. They also had an opportunity to ask questions and see innovative Defence capabilities. At the end of this process, the panel offered a range of perspectives on Defence. These views are presented throughout this report. 107 House of Commons Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2023–24, Ready for War?, HC 26; House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2024–25, Ukraine: a wake-up call, HL Paper 10. 140