DRM-2023-U-036097-1Rev DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. January 2024 The Nuclear Programs of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran Authors: Anya Fink, Tim Ditter, Sarah Vogler, Elizabeth Lee, Mike Connell, Mary Chesnut, and Tim McDonnell CNA Corporation The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy asked CNA to provide an unclassified report on the nuclear programs of four countries: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. In accordance with section 1634 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, CNA’s report details the factors that influence each country’s nuclear program; the country’s nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3); nuclear program funding and budgeting; the nuclear weapons related activities of each country, including fissile material production, weapons and delivery system testing and exercises; nuclear weapons related research and development (R&D); nuclear weapons R&D sites and facilities; the human capital of the scientific and technical workforce involved in nuclear programs; and the country’s nuclear weapons inventory, capabilities, and deployment locations. CNA conducted its research using original language sources (Russian, Mandarin Chinese, Korean, and Persian-Farsi) as well as unclassified English-language resources to provide the best available insights. The paper also uses callout boxes, tables, and figures to provide additional background information and context as appropriate. Approved by: Julia Voelker McQuaid, Research Program Director, Strategy and Policy Analysis, Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Programs Division (August 2023). In accordance with section 1634 of the fiscal year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), this report covers 10 mandated topics across Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Russia: Key Findings: Because of its large arsenal of nuclear weapons, Russia poses an existential threat to the United States. In addition to a sizeable and modernizing strategic nuclear triad, Russia maintains a nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) arsenal to offset perceived conventional military inferiority against the US and NATO. In the Russia-Ukraine war, Russian leadership has used nuclear rhetoric to signal escalation risks and deter intervention. Russia is modernizing its triad and novel systems (such as Avangard, Sarmat, Burevestnik, Poseidon, Kinzhal, and Tsirkon). Rosatom manages an extensive fissile material and warhead complex. China: Key Findings: China is rapidly modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal, transitioning from a historical 'lean and effective' minimal deterrent to a 'strong system of strategic deterrence.' The PRC is developing a full triad, constructing ~300 ICBM silos, and may be considering adopting a Launch-on-Warning (LOW) posture. It possesses enough fissile material to double its arsenal and robust STEM talent pipelines. North Korea: Key Findings: Pyongyang views nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of Kim family regime survival and sovereignty under the Juche ideology. Having conducted six nuclear tests and developed diverse solid- and liquid-fuel ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, ICBMs, SLBMs), North Korea promulgated its 2022 Law on Policy of Nuclear Forces specifying conditions for preemptive nuclear strikes. Iran: Key Findings: Iran does not possess nuclear weapons nor an active nuclear weapons program (shelved since 2003 AMAD Project). However, following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has accumulated 60% enriched uranium, expanded centrifuge operations, and possesses the Middle East's largest ballistic missile arsenal. Factors Driving Russia's Program: Moscow views nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of its sovereignty and security against nuclear attack and conventional superiority by NATO. Russia maintains mutual vulnerability and parity with the United States while modernizing novel systems (Burevestnik, Poseidon, Kinzhal, Tsirkon, Avangard, Sarmat). Policies and Doctrine: Formal declaratory policy is outlined in the 2020 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence. Nuclear release conditions include reliable data on incoming ballistic missile attacks, adversary WMD use, attacks on critical command infrastructure, or conventional aggression threatening the state's very existence. Command and Control (NC3): Centralized authority rests solely with the President of the Russian Federation via the Cheget ('nuclear briefcase') system in consultation with the Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff. The early warning network integrates EKS OiBU satellites and Voronezh ground-based radars with the National Defense Management Center (NDMC). The automated/semi-automated Perimetr ('dead hand') system provides backup retaliatory command capability. Custody of warheads is managed by the 12th GUMO. Funding, R&D, Facilities, and Human Capital: Russia spends an estimated 13.5–16% of defense budget on its nuclear enterprise. Major facilities include VNIIEF (Sarov) and VNIITF (Snezhinsk) for weapon design; Mayak (Ozersk) and Siberian Chemical Combine (Seversk) for fissile materials; Votkinsk and Krasnoyarsk for missile manufacturing; and Sevmash for nuclear submarines. Rosatom employs 330,000 personnel with targeted talent pipeline initiatives (MEPhI, Professionalitet). Forces and Capabilities: - Strategic Rocket Forces: RS-24 Yars, RS-12M2 Topol-M, RS-20V Satan, RS-28 Sarmat, Avangard HGV. - Strategic Fleet: Project 955/955A Borey-class SSBNs with RSM-56 Bulava SLBMs, Project 667BDRM Delta IV SSBNs with Sineva/Lainer. - Long-Range Aviation: Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers carrying Kh-101/102 and Kh-55 ALCMs. - Nonstrategic Weapons: Iskander-M, Kinzhal ALBM, Kalibr/Tsirkon SLCMs, and dual-capable air defense systems. Factors Driving China's Program: Originally developed in the 1950s/1960s to counter US and Soviet nuclear coercion, China's nuclear force is undergoing significant qualitative and quantitative modernization. Driven by concerns over US missile defenses, precision strike capabilities, and geopolitical competition, China is transitioning toward a 'strong system of strategic deterrence.' Policies and Doctrine: China maintains a declared No-First-Use (NFU) policy, but is expanding readiness towards Launch on Warning (LOW). Decision-making is highly centralized in the Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by Xi Jinping. Fissile Material and R&D Infrastructure: Stockpile includes ~14 tons HEU and ~2.9 tons weapons-grade plutonium, supplemented by civilian CFR-600 fast breeder reactors and Russian-supplied fuel under military-civil fusion. Core design is led by CAEP (Mianyang) and CIAE (Tuoli), while missile R&D is conducted by CASC and CASIC. Human Capital: China leads in STEM graduates and nuclear engineering departments (72 universities), supported by recruitment initiatives like the Thousand Talents Program (TTP) and elite 'Double First Class' universities (Tsinghua, USTC, Harbin Institute of Technology). Forces and Capabilities: - Land-based: DF-5A/B/C, DF-31A/AG, DF-41 ICBMs (silo and mobile), DF-26 IRBM, DF-21 and DF-17 HGV MRBMs; rapid construction of ~300 silos at Hami, Yumen, and Hanggin Banner. - Sea-based: 6 Type 094 (Jin-class) SSBNs equipped with JL-2 and JL-3 SLBMs. - Air-based: H-6N bombers with air-launched ballistic missiles; next-gen H-20 stealth bomber in development. Factors Driving North Korea's Program: Regime survival, perpetuation of the Kim family rule, and the ideological doctrine of Juche (self-reliance). The nuclear deterrent is framed as a 'treasured sword' providing national defense against US and South Korean forces. Policies and Doctrine: The 2022 DPRK Law on Policy of Nuclear Forces codifies command under the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission (Kim Jong Un) and outlines five conditions for nuclear employment, explicitly permitting preemptive use against perceived imminent leadership or strategic attacks. Fissile Material and Design Work: Yongbyon complex operates the 5 MWe graphite reactor, Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing), Uranium Enrichment Plant, and Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR). Suspected additional enrichment at Kangson. North Korea conducted six nuclear tests (2006 to 2017), claiming boosted fission, miniaturized warheads, and a thermonuclear device test at Punggye-ri. Delivery Systems and Basing: - Ballistic Missiles: KN-23/24/25 SRBMs; Nodong/Scud-ER MRBMs; Hwasong-10/12 IRBMs; Hwasong-14/15/17 ICBMs. - Submarine/Sea-based: Sinpo-class SSB, Pukguksong-1/3/4/5 SLBMs, Hwasal-1/2 cruise missiles. - Deployment: Structured in Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Rear belts across underground and dispersed mobile operating bases. Status and Factors Driving Program: Iran possesses no nuclear weapons and denies current weaponization intent, pointing to Supreme Leader fatwas against WMDs. However, it pursues nuclear hedging, regional deterrence, and technological self-reliance. Historically, weaponization R&D was conducted under the AMAD Project and SPND until 2003. Enrichment and Fuel Cycle Activities: Operating centrifuge cascades at Natanz (Pilot and commercial FEP) and Fordow (FFEP), enriching uranium up to 60% U-235 using advanced IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges. Other facilities include the UCF at Esfahan, Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), and Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. The heavy water reactor at Arak was redesigned under the JCPOA to eliminate plutonium production. Delivery Systems: Iran fields the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East (Fateh family, Shahab-3, Emad, Ghadr, Khorramshahr MRBMs), cruise missiles (Soumar, Hoveyzeh, Paveh), and space launch vehicles (Simorgh, Safir, Qased), which could provide technical foundations for longer-range delivery. Workforce and Academic Capital: Iran has robust domestic university programs in STEM and nuclear physics (Sharif University, Amirkabir, Tehran University, SBU), though it faces significant academic brain drain to Western nations. The document provides comprehensive reference tables of nuclear facilities, university rankings, and weapon system inventories across Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, along with a complete glossary of technical terms and an extensive bibliography of government, academic, and open-source references.