THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY FOX IN THE HENHOUSE: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING’S FAILURES TO PROTECT TAXPAYER-FUNDED DEFENSE RESEARCH UNITED STATES CONGRESS Over the past two years, the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and the Committee on Education and the Workforce’s (Committees) investigations revealed how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exploits U.S. universities—and gains access to U.S. government-funded research—to fuel its military and technological rise. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) funds research for the purpose of achieving technological breakthroughs to equip future warfighters. The Select Committee undertook an extensive review of DOD-funded research projects that also involved People’s Republic of China (PRC) military connections. The examples reviewed reveal a pervasive and deeply troubling pattern of U.S. taxpayer-funded research being conducted in collaboration with Chinese entities that are directly tied to China’s defense research and industrial base—many of which appear on various U.S. government entity lists—and state-sponsored talent recruitment programs. These collaborations involved research in sensitive technical domains such as hypersonics, quantum sensing, semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced materials, cyber warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and next-generation propulsion—many with clear military applications. Balancing academic freedom and open science with national security interests is important. However, unlike in democratic societies—where the norms of scientific openness are grounded in reciprocal trust, transparency, and research integrity—PRC institutions operate under a state-directed research model that is deeply politicized and subordinate to national strategic objectives, including military and economic priorities. This investigative report presents findings of research relationships with the PRC and long-standing shortcomings in DOD policies and practices to safeguard taxpayer-funded research from exploitation by China’s defense research and industrial base. This report finds the following: Recent DOD-funded Publications Reveal Continued Research Relationships with China’s Defense Research and Industrial Base. The Select Committee identified approximately 1,400 research papers published between June 2023 and June 2025, acknowledging DOD funding or research support that also involved collaboration with PRC entities, which included over 300 DOD grants. Of these, over 700 publications—or just over 50%—were conducted in partnership with entities affiliated with China’s defense research and industrial base. Continued Collaboration with China’s Defense Research and Industrial Base. Numerous DOD-funded research awards—some still active—have been conducted in collaboration with entities directly tied to China’s defense research and industrial base. Among the most concerning are partnerships involving the “Seven Sons of National Defense” Chinese universities, numerous State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) co-administered schools, national defense-designated laboratories, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), a Chinese cyber-range, and BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute)—all of which have been publicly linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and some of which appear on U.S. government entity lists due to their roles in advancing China’s military capabilities or engaging in human rights violations. Even when entities appear on the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List, the DOD 1260H List, or other federal restricted lists—and are widely recognized as supporting the PLA—DOD-funded researchers are still, in many cases, permitted to collaborate with them. This lapse reflects DOD R&E’s failure to adopt a proactive approach to prohibiting such collaborations. Recent DOD-Funded Publications Reveal Research Relationships with Entities Known to Commit Human Rights Abuses and Support China’s Mass Surveillance Apparatus. Much of the current discourse around research security focuses on the national security risks of conducting federally funded research with Chinese entities—a critically important concern. However, an equally urgent issue is the ethical aspect of research: what the research is enabling, and who we are choosing to collaborate with. The Select Committee identified multiple instances where DOD-funded research involved entities with well-documented roles in human rights abuses or direct participation in China’s mass surveillance apparatus. Why Protecting DOD-Funded Research Matters: Case Studies on How U.S. Hypersonics and Fundamental Research Advanced PLA Strategic Weapons Development. To underscore the risks of PRC collaboration involving DOD-funded research, the Select Committee identified two troubling case studies. The first involves U.S. participation in hypersonic research and development with a “Seven Sons of National Defense” Chinese university—which directly supports PLA hypersonic weapons research and development. The second concerns fundamental research on nitrogen conducted in partnership with a Chinese Academy of Sciences lab, which allegedly led to breakthroughs in high-yield explosives and contributed to advancements in China’s nuclear weapons development. Most strikingly, the Committee obtained documents attributed to the Chinese Academy of Engineering—a PRC governmental body—detailing a 12-year research partnership between a U.S. professor, who had worked on DOD-funded research for more than a decade, and a Chinese institution. The Chinese government credited this collaboration with “leading China to develop new materials and technologies for cutting-edge defense weapons and equipment, such as nanomaterial synthesis, multiscale fine structure control, as well as additive manufacturing technology and continuously narrow the technology gap with more advanced countries.” The same document specifically referenced the U.S. Navy—one of the DOD entities that funded research the U.S. professor worked on—noting: “The U.S. Navy and the Boeing Company have made full use of this technology to achieve lightweight structural materials. This key technology has profound practical significance for China’s aerospace technology development and modern defense construction. It will effectively help to facilitate industrial breakthroughs in high-end equipment and new materials.” Shortfalls in DOD Research & Engineering (R&E) Policies. Despite its critical role in funding and advancing U.S. innovation in emerging and dual-use technologies for the warfighter, DOD R&E has not established consistency for research security, due diligence, compliance and monitoring, or uniform access to necessary data and tools across the Department. This has resulted in fragmented and uneven practices among its components and funding entities. • Despite the enactment of Section 1286 (1286 List) of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and further prohibitions in the FY2025 NDAA, DOD R&E has not meaningfully updated its risk framework or enforcement protocols. For example, DOD has added only a small fraction of China’s known talent recruitment programs and defense-designated laboratories to the 1286 List, even though both government and private sector analyses have identified many more. • DOD R&E does not currently prohibit research relationships on fundamental research with entities DOD has designated as national security threats under the DOD 1260H List—rendering the list functionally meaningless and undermining its own research security framework. Additionally, DOD does not currently prohibit research relationships with entities on other U.S. government restricted lists (such as the BIS Entity List or the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Sanctions List), nor with other publicly documented organizations, including SASTIND co-administered universities, state-owned defense conglomerates, national defense–designated laboratories, and components of China’s intelligence and security apparatus. • DOD R&E’s Risk Matrix, as currently implemented, suffers from fundamental structural and operational deficiencies that render it ineffective at identifying, mitigating or prohibiting high-risk activities and/or collaborations with foreign entities. • DOD components responsible for research security lack uniform access to both tools and relevant internal grant data, undermining their ability to conduct holistic and rigorous reviews of individuals under consideration. • To date, DOD R&E has not established a standardized training program for conducting research security due diligence assessments across all DOD components. • DOD components currently do not share their research security risk assessments with one another, even when evaluating the same individuals or institutions. • Not all DOD research security offices have access to their own component’s grant records. • DOD does not currently conduct post-award compliance or monitoring of grants—even in cases where risk mitigation measures were required. • The DOD has not taken a clear policy position—within its risk matrix or broader research security framework—on engagements with foreign entities that pose ethical and human rights risks. • DOD does not currently incorporate Section 117 foreign gift and contract disclosure data into its framework for grant proposals and submissions. • DOD R&E has not established a centralized or standardized proposal submission portal for fundamental research awards across the Department. • DOD R&E’s current policy does not scrutinize foreign students working on DOD-funded research unless they are designated as a “covered individual” or key personnel. • Under the current DOD R&E Risk Matrix, if an individual files a patent in a foreign country of concern—such as China—either prior to filing in the United States or on behalf of that foreign country, even when the invention is based on U.S. government-funded research, such behavior is treated merely as a discouraged factor, not a prohibited one. Unprotected Research: Fueling the PRC’s Rise. While global collaboration in scientific and engineering research is essential to advancing innovation and solving shared challenges, the PRC has systematically weaponized this openness. Despite these risks, some within DOD maintain that if research is deemed “fundamental”—and is neither controlled nor classified—it should remain open. This position disregards the reality that such openness enables exploitation and targeting by China, particularly in defense-relevant fields with clear military applications. This can undermine U.S. national interests and security and enable the exploitation of DOD-funded research in critical technology areas. Through a state-directed apparatus that includes talent recruitment programs, military-civil fusion policies, and extensive use of foreign partnerships, China has exploited international research cooperation to acquire sensitive technologies and technical know-how to directly compete in technology areas and warfighting capabilities with the United States. These efforts advance the PRC’s strategic goals of economic dominance, technological superiority, and military modernization—often at the expense of U.S. national security and technological leadership. What was intended as open scientific exchange has, in many cases, become a conduit for the transfer of taxpayer-funded innovation into the hands of a dangerous strategic adversary. Failing to safeguard American research from hostile foreign exploitation will continue to erode U.S. technological dominance and place our national defense capabilities at risk. The time for passive risk tolerance is over. American taxpayer dollars should be used to defend the nation—not strengthen its foremost strategic competitor. * * * Select Committee on the CCP Chairman John Moolenaar is therefore introducing the Securing American Funding and Expertise from Adversarial Research Exploitation Act of 2025 (SAFE Research Act), which: • Prohibits federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) research funding to researchers who collaborate with foreign adversary-controlled entities that pose a national security risk. • Prohibits DOD funding to universities that partner with foreign adversary-controlled entities that pose a national security risk. • Requires enhanced disclosures of foreign adversary collaborations, travel, and affiliations from foreign adversary entities. The SAFE Research Act is attached to this report. We look forward to working expeditiously to pass this legislation and have President Trump sign it into law. This is not a new problem. As far back as 1999, alarm bells have been ringing across the U.S. government regarding research security threats within academic settings. That year, Congress released the U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China report (the “Cox Report”) after a bipartisan investigation led by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA). The Cox Report concluded that the PRC had engaged in systematic efforts to acquire U.S. military and dual-use technologies through commercial and academic channels. It highlighted serious failures in U.S. export control and counterintelligence systems and documented how China used scientific exchanges and university research collaboration to gain access to sensitive technologies in fields such as aerospace, materials science, and high-performance computing—all critical to PLA modernization. [1] Beyond the Cox Report, DOD has long been aware that the PRC actively targets U.S. critical technology areas within academia to divert research and accelerate its military modernization. In 2006, a Duke University lab—funded by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)—developed a prototype “invisibility cloak” that could deflect microwave beams and conceal objects from detection. Ruopeng Liu, a Chinese Ph.D. student on the project, encouraged collaboration with a Chinese lab, which Duke faculty approved. By 2009, Liu co-published advanced cloaking research with a Chinese lab, extending the technology to broader wave frequencies and faster production. Unbeknownst to Duke, however, Liu allegedly transferred proprietary research and intellectual property to China. Duke lost significant licensing, patent, and royalty opportunities, and was preempted from publishing its own groundbreaking findings. By 2018, Chinese state media reported the mass production of metamaterials for stealth applications, likely to be used on J-20 fighter jets. The production line is reportedly under Chinese military control and directly linked to the Chinese defense industry. [2] This case drew national attention when NBC News aired a full segment titled How a Chinese Student Allegedly Stole Duke University Tech to Create a Billion-Dollar Empire. [3] It was also featured as a case study in the 2017 book Spy Schools: How the CIA, FBI, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Universities. [4] [Figure 1 - Ruopeng Liu Holding Alleged Invisibility Cloaking Materials] [5] In 2012, the foundational book Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization was published. Utilizing extensive Chinese language primary source documents, this work remains one of the most detailed and authoritative accounts of how the PRC systematically acquires foreign technology to advance its economic and military power. The authors demonstrate that China’s technology-transfer apparatus is state-sponsored, centrally coordinated, and strategically integrated into its national development programs and broader modernization agenda. The book also documents how the PRC exploits academic relationships to divert human and intellectual capital in support of its technological and military advancement. [6] Despite historical examples showing how academia’s research and intellectual capital have been targeted to advance China’s economic and military objectives, the DOD has lacked the urgency to establish robust frameworks, policies, and due diligence to safeguard America’s future warfighting capabilities from direct exploitation by the PRC’s military and broader technology transfer apparatus. Balancing academic freedom and open science with national security interests is important. However, relying on this as a justification for unguarded international collaboration fails to understand and account for the distinct nature of the PRC’s research and technology ecosystem. Unlike in democratic societies—where the norms of scientific openness are grounded in reciprocal trust, transparency, and research integrity—PRC institutions operate under a state-directed research model that is deeply politicized and subordinate to national strategic objectives, including military and economic goals. Academic and scientific activity is tightly controlled by the CCP, exemplified by China’s decision to restrict foreign access—including by U.S. institutions—to its largest academic publication database, the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). [7] Furthermore, research that does not align with state ideology is often censored, rejected, or suppressed. Transparency in research methods, data sharing, and institutional intent is limited, especially in sensitive or dual-use fields. China’s engagement with the global scientific community is often non-reciprocal: while China benefits from access to open research systems abroad, it restricts comparable access at home. Most critically, the PRC explicitly weaponizes access to foreign innovation—through both informal and formal collaboration and legal, illegal, and extralegal acquisition—as a means of advancing its strategic economic, technology, and military objectives. This divergence from global academic norms creates significant risks for open research environments and underscores the need for greater scrutiny and safeguards in international scientific collaboration with China. In fact, over the years, the Chinese government has implemented a series of statutory policies and administrative directives explicitly designed to target and acquire foreign intellectual capital, advanced technology, and scientific know-how: • The then-Ministry of Personnel (now known as the Ministry of Human Resources & Social Security) “Plan for Working with Overseas Scholars in the Personnel System during the Ninth 5-Year Plan” (中华人民共和国人事部. 关于在“九五”期间在人事制度中开展与海外学者合作的若干意见) details a plan to encourage technology transfer from ethnic Chinese scholars overseas. [8] • The “Notice on Trial Work to Organize and Develop the Model Construction of National OCS Pioneering Parks” (关于组织开展国家海洋工程先导区示范工程建设试点工作的通知) details and outlines the establishment of safe haven development zones in China for returnees bearing foreign technology. [9] • The “Opinions on Building a Green Channel for the Return to China of High-level Overseas Educated Talent Aboard” (人事部等部门关于印发《关于建立海外高层次留学人才回国工作绿色通道的意见》的通知) outlines a plan to facilitate recruitment and immigration of foreign S&T talent. Ethnic Chinese born abroad are considered “returnees.” This document further outlines China’s need to target overseas talent to return to China to leapfrog economic and social development. Furthermore, the document states, “For high-level overseas talents who are temporarily unable to return to China, encourage them to serve the motherland through various appropriate methods such as part-time work and cooperative research, so as not to seek where they are, but to seek what they need.” [10, 11] • According to an official Chinese government directive jointly issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Public Security—titled “Circular on the Release of Opinions on Encouraging Overseas Chinese Scholars to Serve the Country by Multiple Means” (人事部、教育部、科技部、公安部、财政部关于印发《关于鼓励海外留学人员以多种形式为国服务的若干意见》的通知)—the Chinese government explicitly outlines a framework to mobilize overseas Chinese students, including those who remain abroad, to advance the strategic interests of the state. The document encourages overseas students to hold part-time technical, consulting, or honorary roles in Chinese universities, state key laboratories, research institutes, and enterprises; enter into cooperative research agreements with Chinese institutions that can be executed remotely or through short-term visits; and establish “cooperative development bases” in China or abroad to facilitate technology transfer. It further directs students to use foreign laboratory access, equipment, and funding to support domestic technology development; accept and conduct commissioned research projects for Chinese entities while abroad; and file patents in China for discoveries made at foreign institutions. The policy also encourages recruiting foreign experts to participate in research activities in China, commercializing proprietary technology through Chinese enterprises, forming overseas consulting firms to support Chinese interests, and establishing intermediary platforms abroad to market Chinese products and open international markets. [12, 13] • The “Homeland-Serving Action Plan for Overseas Chinese” (海外华人服务祖国行动计划) outlines and enables ethnic Chinese abroad, “temporally unable to return,” to “serve the country by multiple means.” A 2018 analysis claims 18,000 people participated in more than 7,000 cooperative projects. [14] • The “Planning Guide for Manufacturing Talent Development” (制造人才发展规划指南) is a joint plan to import “1,000” foreign experts able to make “breakthrough” improvements, via talent programs and other venues such as “famous overseas companies.” [15] • The “Plan to Build a National Technology Transfer System” (建立国家技术转移体系的计划) outlines a comprehensive guide to China’s technology transfer system with, the acquisition of “high-level overseas talent” emphasized. [16, 17] • The “13th Five-year Plan for S&T Military Civil Fusion” (“十三五”科技军民融合发展专项规划) provides details on crossover for civilian and military technology supported by a range of foreign outreach initiatives. [18, 19] The PRC government’s own statutory records and administrative directives—publicly available and issued by official state organs—leave no ambiguity about the PRC’s intent to systematically acquire foreign technology, intellectual property, and scientific know-how through academic and research collaborations. These policies constitute a formal, state-sanctioned blueprint for strategic technology transfer, detailing how China leverages overseas students, foreign-trained experts, state-directed talent programs, and joint research platforms to channel innovation back into its military-civil fusion (MCF) ecosystem. Anchored by national security mandates such as the 2017 National Intelligence Law, this architecture is not limited to hardware acquisition but is explicitly designed to absorb and divert human and intellectual capital into China's broader strategic apparatus. What often appears as benign academic engagement is, in reality, a deliberate and structured effort to exploit the openness of democratic research systems—frequently without host institutions recognizing the downstream risks—to fuel the PRC’s goals of technological self-sufficiency, economic dominance, and military modernization. Furthermore, accusations that the U.S. government is acting in a discriminatory or racist manner toward Chinese researchers must be viewed in proper context. The statutory and administrative policies outlined previously in this report demonstrate that it is the PRC itself that deliberately targets, leverages, and exploits individuals of Chinese ethnicity or heritage to advance its technology transfer and research objectives. It is Beijing—not Washington—that compels its own people, through pressure, inducement, and Chinese laws to engage in activities that ultimately trigger U.S. investigative actions. The United States does not target individuals for who they are—it targets the malign activities the PRC compels them to undertake. Over the past two years, the Committees investigated the PRC’s exploitation of U.S. research institutions to fuel its military and technological rise, analyzing thousands of academic and government records, conducting extensive open-source research, and engaging directly with universities across the country. Last fall, the Committees published a joint report, CCP on the Quad: How American Taxpayers and Universities Fund the CCP's Advanced Military and Technological Research, [20] revealing how taxpayer-funded research fuels China’s military ambitions through individual research collaborations and university-level partnerships with individuals and institutions in China—and specifically with China’s defense research and industrial base. [Footnote a: Any PLA organ, “Seven Sons of National Defense” (国防七子) university, “Seven Sons of Ordinance (Arms) Industry” (兵工七子) University, schools co-administered by the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, defense-designated laboratories, state-owned defense conglomerates, and the intelligence and security apparatus.] Individual Research Relationships: American researchers—many funded by the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and National Science Foundation (NSF)—enabled major PRC advancements in nuclear technology, artificial intelligence, robotics, and quantum computing. [21] This practice is troublingly widespread: over 8,800 USG-funded research papers between 2014 and 2024 had PRC coauthors, and thousands were directly tied to China’s defense industrial base. [22] DOD funds research for the purpose of achieving technological breakthroughs to equip future warfighters—in other words, all DOD-funded projects are potentially dual-use. [Figure 2 - Taxpayers Funded Thousands of Potential Dual-Use Research Publications Coauthored with PRC-Based Individuals: Graph showing publications from 2014 to 2024] These collaborations span AI, microelectronics, advanced materials, space and aerospace, and military-use technologies like hypersonics, nuclear physics, and directed energy. The vast majority of these DOD-funded publications are collaborations on advanced research related to dual-use, critical, and emerging technologies. [23] Some of this research has direct military applications—such as high-performance explosives, tracking of targets, and drone operation networks—that the PLA would use against the U.S. military in the event of a conflict. [24] [Figure 3 - DOD-Funded PRC-Coauthored Papers Advanced China’s Knowledge of Strategic Technologies (2014-2024)] Joint Institutes: U.S.-PRC joint institutes are entities based in China that pair American universities with PRC institutions and serve as key technology transfer points. These joint institutes operate under PRC law, are run by Chinese-majority boards, and are aligned with the CCP’s national strategy, including its military buildup. Many joint institutes are with universities that are part of China’s defense research and industrial base. [25] In 2019, FBI Director Christopher Wray warned before Congress: “The use of nontraditional collectors, especially in the academic setting—whether it’s professors, scientists, students… It’s across basically every discipline. And I think the level of naivete on the part of the academic sector about this creates its own issues. They are exploiting the very open research and development environment that we have and that we all revere, but they are taking advantage of it…” [26] In 2019, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released a landmark report titled Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans. The report outlined how the PRC exploits academic openness and U.S. taxpayer-funded research to divert critical and emerging technologies directly to China’s defense research and industrial base. [27, 28] That same year, Congress enacted Section 1286 of the FY2019 NDAA—which mandated a DOD initiative to protect national security research and academic institutions from undue foreign influence and security threats. [29] In 2019, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) developed the China Defense Universities Tracker, a publicly accessible database cataloguing Chinese institutions connected to China’s defense entities and engaged in military and security-related science and technology research. Funded in part by the U.S. government, the ASPI tracker draws extensively on Chinese-language sources to assess risk levels associated with partnerships and collaborations. [30] The ASPI tracker also identified Chinese universities engaged in academic-to-academic partnerships with U.S. institutions. Furthermore, the ASPI tracker provides a critical resource for policymakers, universities, and governments worldwide in recognizing how the PRC exploits academic partnerships to advance its defense and intelligence objectives. This issue has been recognized, written about, analyzed, and well-documented for years—including through congressional roundtables and public hearings. [31-37] Yet, over the years the U.S. government, including the DOD, has continued to allow research to be conducted with known Chinese military and defense associated entities. To this day, DOD R&E has largely refused to take proactive measures to strengthen and enhance prohibitions on research relationships that pose national security or ethical risks—despite the years of knowledge, public discourse, and existing U.S. government entity lists with numerous Chinese entities listed. Accordingly, Congress enacted binding prohibitions through the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, signed into law in January 2025. The NDAA explicitly prohibits any DOD-funded research from being conducted in collaboration with entities listed under Section 1286 of the FY19 NDAA, which includes a range of research institutions affiliated with the Chinese military and defense industrial base. The Committee’s Current Investigation: Following the release of CCP on the Quad, the Committee continued to examine DOD-funded research. The Committee performed an analysis of publications from June 2023 to June 2025 and identified approximately 1,400 research papers acknowledging DOD funding or research support that also involved collaboration with PRC entities. We sought to further examine DOD-funded research based on findings uncovered in the Committee’s CCP on the Quad report and DOD policies surrounding research security. The analysis examined bibliometric data and also involved in-depth investigations into the Chinese entities affiliated and co-authors—identifying links to China’s defense research and industrial base, uncovering hidden institutional affiliations, exposing participation in Chinese talent recruitment programs, flagging researchers involved in classified or military projects, and revealing likely end-user activities to trace where diverted technology and know-how ultimately end up. This assessment relied primarily on Chinese-language sources of information. The Select Committee identified approximately 1,400 research papers between June 2023 and June 2025, acknowledging DOD funding or research support that also involved collaboration with PRC entities. Of these, over 700 publications—or just over 50%—were conducted in partnership with entities affiliated with China’s defense research and industrial base. [38, 39] The collaborations span sensitive DOD research areas such as advanced materials, high-strength alloys, optical and photonic devices, and ballistic impact research—all of which have clear military applications. These are the very technology domains where the United States seeks to maintain a strategic edge. The mere fact that DOD entities are funding research in these fields reflects a strategic interest in advancing technologies tied to warfighting capability and national defense. These are precisely the technology areas where the United States must maintain a strategic edge, and yet they are being compromised through collaborative research with entities aligned with China’s defense research and industrial base. [Graphic: Approximately $2.5 billion in DoD-funded research was identified in publications from June 2023 to June 2025 involving China. At least 21 F-35 jets—each costing approximately $110 million—could have been purchased instead.] The case studies outlined below represent only a sample of the publications identified during the timeframe examined. These case studies reveal a pervasive and deeply troubling pattern of U.S. taxpayer-funded research being conducted in collaboration with Chinese entities that are directly tied to China’s defense research and industrial base—many of which appear on various U.S. government entity lists—and state-sponsored talent recruitment programs. These collaborations involved research in sensitive technical domains such as hypersonics, quantum sensing, semiconductors, AI, advanced materials, cyber warfare, ISR systems, and next-generation propulsion—many with clear military applications. Several publications explicitly acknowledged support from or access to Chinese defense-designated laboratories, military computing infrastructure, or PRC-developed supercomputers linked to nuclear weapons development. These examples expose critical failures in post-award monitoring, potential disclosure failures, and at least in one example, a likely direct violation of federal law, including the Wolf Amendment. Case Study 1: A 2025 publication on sequential decision-making processes was funded by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Army Research Office (ARO), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The research was conducted collaboratively by researchers at the University of Texas at Austin, Arizona State University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and Beihang University. [40] Shanghai Jiao Tong University is co-administered by SASTIND, [41, 42] while Beihang University is one of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense”—a group of universities closely tied to the PLA. Beihang University was added to the BIS Entity List in 2001, due to its involvement in rocket systems and unmanned air vehicle activities. [43] According to the award, the U.S. Navy funded this research for “Attack-Resilient Mission Planning for Swarms of Autonomous Systems.” [44] The ONR grant is still in the period of performance through 2026. The ARO grant description, titled “Synthesis of Strategies for Information Integrity and Manipulation in Adversarial Environments,” was awarded with a performance period from August 2023 to August 2026. This collaboration may also violate the Wolf Amendment, which prohibits NASA and NASA-funded researchers from engaging in bilateral agreements or coordinated activities with Chinese entities unless Congress grants a waiver and the FBI certifies it. [Figure 4: Publication from Digital Science Dimensions AI Platform: On Detection of the Markov Decision Processes]. Case Study 2: A 2025 publication on thin film research—co-authored by scientists from Brookhaven National Laboratory, the University of Arkansas, the University of Science and Technology of China’s (USTC) National Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory, and the Harbin Institute of Technology’s (HIT) State Key Laboratory of Advanced Welding and Joining Materials and Structures—was funded by the Vannevar Bush Faculty Fellowship—DOD’s flagship basic research program administered by DOD R&E. [45, 46] Harbin Institute of Technology is a “Seven Sons of National Defense” university. The State Key Laboratory of Advanced Welding and Joining Materials and Structures (先进焊接与连接国家重点实验室/现代焊接生产技术国家重点实验室) is a defense-designated laboratory—overseen by SASTIND [47]—that conducts research on new materials, intelligent welding in extreme environments, precision welding of material structures, and specifically in the areas of manned spaceflight, domestic aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, large aircraft, aero-engines, superconducting accelerators, and major heavy equipment. [48] HIT’s defense-designated Defense Science and Technology Laboratory of Precision Hot Processing of Metals (金属精密热加工国防科技重点实验室) established this laboratory along with State-owned Ansteel Group. [49] HIT’s antiferroelectricity research outlined in this publication is highly relevant to radar and RF tunable devices, radiation-hardened electronics, and advanced sensors. Case Study 3: Two 2025 publications on neural mechanisms, co-authored by researchers from Washington University in St. Louis and China’s Peng Cheng Laboratory (鹏城实验室), were funded by the NSF, National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the AFOSR. [50, 51] Peng Cheng Laboratory is a Chinese state-directed research institution that operates CloudBrain-II, a high-performance AI supercomputing platform used to support large-scale computational research. [52] Peng Cheng Lab also hosts cyber ranges for industrial control systems and smart cars. [53] The lab has the 'Pengcheng Shooting Range' designed to achieve disruptive technological innovation. [Figure 5: 2025 'Peng Cheng Cup' Online Shooting Range Offensive and Defensive Drill]. Peng Cheng Lab partners with 21 universities, 13 research organizations, and 25 businesses or state-owned enterprises, including BGI, CASIC, CEC, CETC, iFlyTek, and HiSense. Case Study 4: A 2025 publication on two-dimensional materials, funded by the AFOSR and the Office of Naval Research Global (ONR Global), was co-authored with researchers from China’s National University of Defense Technology (NUDT)—a core institution of the PLA and on the BIS Entity List since 2015. [57, 58] NUDT is directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission. [59] The research on single-electron transistors and 2D materials has applications in quantum sensing, secure communications, and space-based electronic systems. Case Study 5: A 2025 publication on high-entropy alloy research was co-authored by a researcher from the University of Tennessee and researchers from two key laboratories at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU): the State Key Laboratory of Mechanical Systems and Vibration (机械系统与振动国家重点实验室) and the State Key Laboratory of Metal Matrix Composites (金属基复合材料国家重点实验室). [60] Funded by ARO and NSF. The labs acknowledge significant contributions to national defense projects, ship acoustic stealth, impact protection, spacecraft dynamics, and weapon vibration and noise control [Figure 6]. Case Study 6: A 2025 publication on quantum research funded by AFOSR was co-authored by researchers from Brown University and a postdoctoral researcher, Xiaoxue Liu, affiliated with Brown University and Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU). [65] The publication explicitly acknowledges that Liu is supported by the Pujiang Talent Program (上海市浦江人才计划). [66] Liu is affiliated with the SJTU Ministry of Education Key Laboratory of Artificial Structures and Quantum Control. [67] The Pujiang Talent Program is a municipal-level foreign talent recruitment initiative. Case Study 7: A 2024 publication on high-strength alloys research funded by ONR’s Additive Manufacturing Alloys for Naval Environments (AMANE) program was co-authored by a researcher from China’s Central South University State Key Laboratory of Powder Metallurgy (粉末冶金国防重点实验室/粉末冶金国家重点实验室). [76-78] This lab conducts research on high temperature alloys for jet turbines, ultra-high temperature carbines for hypersonic vehicles, high-entropy alloys for armor-piercing applications, and ballistic impact. In English-language publications, the words 'National Defense' (国防, Guófáng) are often deliberately omitted [Figure 7]. Case Study 8: A 2024 publication on ultrawide bandgap semiconductor devices, funded by AFOSR, was co-authored by researchers from MIT, Cornell, University of Nebraska, and Xidian University’s State Key Laboratory of Wide Band-Gap Semiconductor Technology (宽带隙半导体技术国防重点学科实验室). [91-94] Yue Hao, a co-author, led China's military microelectronics working group and developed PMOCVD equipment registered under State-owned Assets Acceptance Number 2003XXX (redacted identifier) [Figure 8]. [95-99] Case Study 9: A 2024 publication on hydrogen detonation research, funded by ONR, was co-authored with Case Western University researchers and Qiang Xiao, a researcher at Northwestern Polytechnical University (NWPU) and Nanjing University of Science and Technology (NJUST)-State Key Laboratory of Transient Physics (瞬态物理国家重点实验室 / 弹道国防科技重点实验室). [100-106] The ONR grant title is “Water Entry of Hypervelocity Projectiles.” [107] Case Study 10: A 2024 publication on hydrogen production, funded by ARL, was co-authored by researchers from MIT and Peking University, acknowledging computational resources from TianHe-1A and TianHe-II supercomputers developed by NUDT. [108-111] Case Study 11: A 2024 publication on nanoscale optical devices, funded by AFOSR, was co-authored with researchers from CUNY, HUST, Sun Yat-sen University, Wuhan University of Technology, and the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) (中国运载火箭技术研究院)—China's largest missile and launch vehicle development base on the BIS Entity List since 2001 [Figure 9]. [112-116] Case Study 12 (Rutgers/CSRC): A 2024 publication on condensed matter physics and quantum systems, funded by AFOSR, was co-authored with researchers from Rutgers University, Flatiron Institute, and the Beijing Computational Science and Research Center (CSRC)—administered under CAEP (China's nuclear weapons complex). [117-121] Case Study 12 (Beihang Robot Swarms): A 2023 publication on robot swarms, funded by ONR Global, was co-authored with researchers from Beihang University, including Xingjian Wang, who served as Secretary-General of the Military Working Committee. [122-126] Case Study 13: A 2023 publication on strategies for moving target identification, funded by ARO and NNSA, was co-authored by University of Michigan and Lin Zhou of Beihang University, a selectee of multiple PRC talent programs. [127-129] Case Study 14: A 2023 publication on micro-ballistic impact funded by ONR was co-authored with researchers from Caltech, Iowa State, CAS Institute of Mechanics (LMFS and LNM), and CAEP Institute of Fluid Physics (IFP). CAS IOM operates the JF-12 shock tunnel reproducing Mach 5-9 conditions [Figure 10]. [130-140] Case Study 15: A 2023 publication on hexagonal boron nitride funded by ONR was co-authored with Kansas State University, NUAA, and CUST State Key Laboratory of High-Power Semiconductor Lasers (高功率半导体激光国防科技重点实验室), which developed beam-guided semiconductor laser launch systems for PLA tanks. [141, 142] Case Study 16: At least nine research projects (2023-2025) funded by ONR and AFOSR were identified involving Huazhong University of Science and Technology (HUST) / Wuhan National Laboratory of Optoelectronics (WNLO), which houses a Military Optoelectronics Research Department and is tied to CSIC's 717th Research Institute. [143-162] Case Study 17: At least three publications (2023-2025) funded by ONR Global, ONR, and AFOSR involved the State Key Laboratory of Radio Frequency Heterogeneous Integration (国家重点实验室 射频异构集成) operated by Shenzhen University, SJTU, and ZTE Corporation, led by Junfa Mao (Chief Scientist for the CMC Engineering Commission). [163-175] Case Study 18: A 2023 publication on microlaser research funded by ARO and AFOSR involved researchers from UT Dallas, NC State, and Zhitong Li from Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT)-State Key Laboratory of Information Photonics and Optical Communication (IPOC), which operates the 'Underwater Optical Network Joint Laboratory' with the PLA Naval Engineering University. [176-189] Much of the current discourse around research security focuses on national security risks, but an equally urgent issue is the ethical aspect of research. The Select Committee identified multiple instances where DOD-funded research involved entities documented to support China’s mass surveillance infrastructure and human rights abuses: Case Study 1: A 2025 genomics research publication, funded by ONR, was conducted in collaboration with researchers from BGI Research Group. BGI is listed on the DOD’s Section 1260H List and was added to the BIS Entity List in 2020 for enabling genetic surveillance and repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang (XUAR). [197-200] Case Study 2: A 2024 publication on distributed learning, funded by ONR, was conducted in collaboration with researchers from Rutgers University and Alibaba DAMO Academy. The grant runs through August 2027. Alibaba DAMO Academy is explicitly named in Hangzhou Municipal Government MCF planning documents as a contributor to surveillance-focused research (facial recognition, person re-identification across camera surveillance, panoramic image generation) [Figure 10]. [201-210] There is no justification—ethical, legal, or strategic—for U.S. taxpayer-funded research to be conducted with entities documented to have facilitated human rights abuses or support China’s mass surveillance apparatus. Case Study 1 (Hypersonics / Duke Professor & NPU): A professor at Duke University specializing in aeroelasticity and unsteady aerodynamics established a joint laboratory with the School of Aeronautics at Northwestern Polytechnical University (NPU) around 2019: the NPU–Duke Aerodynamics and Aeroelasticity Laboratory. The professor served as co-director and Consulting Professor, receiving the International Science and Technology Cooperation Award from the Chinese Society of Aeronautics and Astronautics (CSAA) [Figure 11]. Research conducted directly supported aerodynamic heating, shock reflection, and supersonic/hypersonic vehicle dynamics. Chinese collaborators (Prof. Aiming Shi and Prof. Dan Xie) have led numerous classified 'XXX' defense projects for AVIC, COMAC, and CAST. [211-249] Case Study 2 (Nitrogen Breakthrough / Carnegie Institution): A Senior Staff Scientist at the Geophysical Laboratory of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, an expert in nuclear science and high-pressure physics, held a concurrent nine-year appointment (2011-2020) at the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Solid State Physics (ISSP) in Hefei while funded by DOD (ARO, DTRA, DARPA), DOE, and NSF. Recruited into the Thousand Talents Program (2012) and awarded China's Friendship Award in 2015 [Figure 12], Chinese state media credited his ISSP team's breakthrough on metallic nitrogen with enabling fourth-generation nuclear weapons and high-yield super explosives. He also published with HPSTAR (established by CAEP). [250-272] Case Study 3 (Materials / Chinese Academy of Engineering Document): Documents obtained from the Chinese Academy of Engineering detail a 12-year research partnership between a U.S. professor (conducting DOD-funded research) and Wuhan University of Technology (Prof. Lianmeng Zhang) [Figure 13]. The Chinese government credited the collaboration with 'leading China to develop new materials and technologies for cutting-edge defense weaponry, such as nanomaterial synthesis, multiscale fine structure regulation, and additive manufacturing techniques, to continuously narrow the technological gap.' The document explicitly noted: 'The U.S. Navy and the Boeing Company have made full use of this technology to achieve lightweight structural materials. This key technology has profound practical significance for China’s aerospace technology development and modern defense construction.' The DOD’s research security framework remains incomplete, leaving serious vulnerabilities: 1. Failure to Expand the 1286 List: Despite hundreds of talent programs and dozens of defense labs identified by CASI and open sources, DOD R&E has listed only six talent programs and six laboratories on the Section 1286 List. It still lists the defunct 'Thousand Talents Program' without reflecting its reorganization into the High-End Foreign Expert Recruitment Program. 2. Inaction on Blacklisted Entities: DOD R&E does not prohibit research collaboration on fundamental research with entities on DOD's own 1260H list, the BIS Entity List, or OFAC lists. 3. Outdated Reliance on NSDD-189: DOD frequently invokes 1985's NSDD-189 to leave all 'fundamental research' unrestricted, ignoring how the PRC repurposes basic civilian research for military applications. 4. Lack of Standardized Training and Tools: No standardized due diligence training exists across DOD components, and offices lack uniform access to commercial intelligence databases and internal grant records. 5. Lack of Inter-Agency Information Sharing: DOD components do not share due diligence risk assessments, leading to duplication and blind spots. 6. Negligible Post-Award Monitoring: DOD R&E reviews only a ~20% sample of awards, failing to verify whether mandated risk mitigations are maintained. 7. Absence of Ethical/Human Rights Standards: The Risk Matrix does not prohibit or flag research collaborations with entities enabling mass surveillance and human rights abuses. 8. Non-Integration of Section 117 Foreign Gift Data: DOD does not incorporate Higher Education Act Section 117 foreign gift/contract disclosure data into grant vetting. 9. Decentralized Grant Portals: Absence of a unified proposal submission portal prevents automated risk filtering. 10. Student Loopholes: Foreign students working on DOD grants are not scrutinized unless classified as 'covered individuals' or 'key personnel.' 11. Permissive Stance on Foreign Patents: Filing patents in China based on U.S.-funded research is treated as 'discouraged' rather than strictly prohibited. 12. Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms: The current baseline risk matrix relies on self-reporting and good-faith compliance without standard penalties for non-compliance. The Select Committee recommends the enactment of the Securing American Funding and Expertise from Adversarial Research Exploitation Act of 2025 (SAFE Research Act) and the following actions: 1. Conduct Damage Assessments on Research identified with China’s Defense Research and Industrial Base: Evaluate affected DOD grants to assess technology leakage into PRC military programs. 2. Establish a Mandatory Standardized Training Curriculum: Implement mandatory training for all DOD personnel involved in research security due diligence. 3. Standardize Database Access and Analytical Tools Across DOD: Provide uniform access to commercial, bibliometric, and government databases across all DOD components. 4. Require Grant Numbers in all Publications: Mandate explicit federal grant number citations in published research acknowledgments. 5. Codify All U.S. Government Blacklists as Prohibited Entities: Amend the risk matrix to categorically ban collaboration with entities on the BIS Entity List, OFAC list, DOD 1260H list, and others. 6. Codify and Prohibit all Research with Entities Known to be Part of China’s Defense Research and Industrial Base: Prohibit collaboration with SASTIND co-administered universities, Seven Sons of Ordnance, defense labs, cyber ranges, and security organs. 7. Establish a Mechanism to Share DOD Due Diligence Reports Across DOD Research Security and Due Diligence Offices. 8. Work with the Department of Education’s Office of General Counsel to Secure Access to Section 117 Data for Due Diligence. 9. Establish a One-Year Interagency Task Force on Adversarial Entities: Deep-dive analysis of PRC, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean entities to expand 1260H and 1286 lists. 10. Enforce Post-Award Compliance Monitoring and Spot Audits: 100% compliance monitoring on awards requiring mitigation, plus 20% random spot checks on other awards. 11. Add Intellectual Property and Patent Theft as a Prohibited Risk Factor: Prohibit patent filings in China based on DOD-funded research. 12. Create a New Category on the Risk Matrix for Ethical Issues: Heightened scrutiny and automatic disqualification for entities linked to human rights abuses and mass surveillance. 13. Congress Must Enact the SAFE Research Act: Restrict federal STEM funding for researchers/institutions affiliated with hostile foreign entities and require comprehensive 5-year foreign affiliation disclosures. 14. Establishment of the National Research Security, Integrity, and Compliance Center (NRSICC): Create a centralized executive/interagency authority funded via a 0.1% to 0.4% Research Security Due Diligence Fee on fundamental research and SBIR/STTR awards. APPENDIX A: SAFE RESEARCH ACT BILL TEXT Hyperlink: https://amendments-rules.house.gov/amendments/MOOLEN_163_xml250828161843908.pdf ENDNOTES [Citations 1-305]: Detailed citations referencing U.S. Congressional reports, Federal Register notices, Department of Defense memos, Chinese government circulars (Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Education, State Council), academic papers from Nature, Science Advances, APS Physical Review Letters, Dimensions AI bibliometric dataset pulls (June 2023 - June 2025), and investigations from ASPI, CSET, and CASI.