THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY From Ph.D. to PLA How Visa Policies Enable PRC Defense Entities to Tap U.S. Higher Education UNITED STATES CONGRESS Executive Summary At the beginning of the 119th Congress, the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched an investigation into six U.S. universities—University of Maryland, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Southern California, Purdue University, and Stanford University. These universities—public and private, large and small, and geographically diverse—were asked a series of questions regarding the presence and research activities of Chinese national students on their campuses. Namely, the Select Committee sought information about where these students previously studied, how their education is funded, what type of research they are conducting, and the extent of each university's institutional and faculty-level collaboration with China. What the Select Committee uncovered was deeply troubling: 1. The Biden Administration Failed to Enforce Executive Order 10043, a Ban on Chinese Nationals Who Conduct Military-Linked Research 2. American Taxpayers Are Funding Ph.D. Programs for Chinese Nationals—Even Those Linked to Chinese Military and Defense Research Universities 3. U.S. Universities Admit Thousands of Chinese Nationals with Academic Ties to the Chinese Military and Defense Industrial Base Annually 4. American Universities Maintain Close Collaborative Partnerships with Chinese Universities 5. The University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Leads by Example, Terminates Dozens of Academic Agreements with Chinese Universities The sheer scale of the problem—compounded by four years of inaction from the Biden Administration, particularly the Department of State in its role approving visas—is staggering. To begin addressing this urgent threat, the Select Committee recommends the following steps: 1. Reinforce visa screening laws to deny access to sensitive U.S. research and substantially reduce technology transfer risks. 2. Establish clear eligibility restrictions, enhanced vetting criteria, and mandatory reporting requirements to limit PRC access to sensitive technologies. 3. Impose restrictions on PRC nationals while residing in the United States to mitigate security risks. The CCP does not treat overseas study as an apolitical or purely academic exercise. Under its state-directed technology acquisition strategy, international education is viewed as a key vector for accessing cutting-edge science, engineering, and defense-related knowledge. The PRC's military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy explicitly calls for leveraging global academic exchanges to enhance its military and industrial capabilities. This strategy dates back all the way to 1950. Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the CCP entered into a landmark agreement with the Soviet Union—the 1950 Sino-Soviet Agreement on Cultural Cooperation—which facilitated extensive academic and technical exchanges between the two nations. Under this agreement, tens of thousands of Chinese students, scientists, and technicians were sent to Soviet universities, research institutes, and defense laboratories, particularly in fields critical to China's modernization such as nuclear physics, aviation, metallurgy, engineering, and military science. These exchanges played a pivotal role in jumpstarting China's technological and defense development. Many of the returnees later became core contributors to China's "Two Bombs, One Satellite" program and other strategic sectors. In return, Soviet experts were stationed in China to assist in building institutions, designing curricula, and establishing early technical infrastructure. These exchanges were not apolitical—they were ideologically framed and strategically engineered to advance the PRC's socialist industrialization. The collapse of the program in the early 1960s, following the Sino-Soviet split, marked a turning point in China's approach to foreign education and talent development, pushing Beijing to eventually reorient its international academic engagement toward the West.i,ii While international academic exchange has long been a pillar of U.S. higher education—bringing diverse perspectives, fostering global collaboration, and advancing science—it must not come at the expense of national security. Welcoming foreign students strengthens America's innovation ecosystem, but only when accompanied by clear, enforceable guardrails to mitigate exploitation by our adversaries. Nowhere is this more urgent than in the case of China. Without enhanced visa screening, institutional transparency, and technology protection measures, the United States risks training the next generation of engineers, scientists, and weapons designers—not for America's benefit, but for the advancement of the People's Liberation Army. This challenge demands coordinated action from both Congress and the Executive Branch—and the resolve to meaningfully confront Chinese malign influence in academia and protect the integrity of American higher education. THE STRATEGIC STAKES OF "FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH" The U.S. government does not award taxpayer-funded research grants for charity. When a program officer at the Defense Advanced Research Program Agency (DARPA), the Office of Naval Research, the National Science Foundation, or any other federal research agency issues a grant, the mission is clear: to promote scientific and engineering discovery that advances the nation's health, prosperity, and welfare, and secures the national defense. This means pushing the boundaries of scientific understanding while cultivating innovations that can transition into applied technologies that strengthen America's security and global leadership.iii The universities investigated by the Select Committee—University of Maryland, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Southern California, Purdue University, and Stanford University—broadly defended their decisions to allow Chinese nationals to participate in federally funded research, as well as their ongoing partnerships with Chinese institutions. One university told the Select Committee through counsel that "the research funding it receives from national-security-related departments or agencies (e.g., the Department of Defense) is all tied to research that is deemed fundamental or open." While this framing may offer legal cover, it mischaracterizes the strategic intent behind U.S. government research investments—particularly those from the Department of Defense (DOD). Fundamental research refers only to the intent to publish results without restriction to the maximum extent possible—it does not mean the research is free from national security risk. China's military-civil fusion system actively exploits open-source science, turning even basic findings into weapons advancements. Case studies—numerous are outlined in the Select Committees investigative report Fox in the Henhouse: The U.S. Department of Defense Research and Engineering's Failures to Protect Taxpayer-Funded Defense Research—already show DOD-funded "fundamental" research fueling PLA programs in hypersonics, explosives, and AI. In short, labeling research as "fundamental" does not make it harmless—it makes it more easily exploitable. It is neither speculative nor controversial to say that research supported by U.S. national security agencies is intended to preserve and expand U.S. defense capabilities. Consequently, when universities admit students who previously studied at—or concurrently hold faculty positions with—Chinese military universities, and when they allow research collaborations with entities tied to the Chinese military, including those already designated on U.S. government blacklists, they risk directly advancing Beijing's military and technological ambitions. While such collaborations may fall within the legal definition of "fundamental research," legality is not the same as sound strategic judgment. The real value in research partnerships lies not just in what is eventually published in open journals but in everything that happens behind the scenes: raw data exchange, joint lab access, iterative experiments and prototyping, pre-patent discoveries, and early insight into emerging capabilities. These are the intangible advantages that can accelerate an adversary's military development—particularly when the collaborating entity is aligned with China's defense industrial base. Finally, the Committee recognizes that the U.S. Department of State (State) is the lead federal agency responsible for issuing visas to foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States. State is responsible for the first and most important vetting of any foreign national attempting to study in the United States by conducting visa interviews, background checks, and making eligibility determinations in accordance with U.S. immigration laws and national security directives. During the course of the Committee's research security investigations, university officials told the Committee that they rely on State's determination of granting a visa to assess if there are any national security risks. KEY FINDINGS 1. The Biden Administration Failed to Enforce President Trump's Executive Order 10043, a Ban on Chinese Nationals Who Conduct Military-linked Research On May 29, 2020, President Trump signed Executive Order (EO) 10043, titled the Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants of Certain Students and Researchers from the People's Republic of China. The EO cited national security concerns stemming from the CCP's "wide-ranging and heavily resourced campaign to acquire sensitive United States technologies and intellectual property, in part to bolster the modernization and capability of its military, the People's Liberation Army." EO 10043 specifically suspended the entry of any Chinese national applying for an F or J visa to pursue graduate-level research in the United States, who "either receives funding from or who currently is employed by, studies at, or conducts research at or on behalf of, or has been employed by, studied at, or conducted research at or on behalf of, an entity in the PRC that implements or supports the PRC's 'military-civil fusion strategy.'" The EO's rationale was that Chinese authorities use a subset of students—primarily postgraduate students and postdoctoral researchers—as "non-traditional collectors" of sensitive information, embedding them in U.S. academic institutions and research centers to gain access to critical technologies with potential military applications. These activities were seen as central to China's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) policy, which seeks to systematically blur the line between civilian innovation and military advancement. The EO from President Trump's first term targeted individuals affiliated with China's "Seven Sons of National Defense"—a group of elite Chinese universities known for their deep ties to the PLA and central role in military research and development. As one China expert observed, "it would be more accurate to describe [these universities] as defense universities than as civilian universities," noting that the universities regard themselves "parts of the defense system."iv Shortly following the EO, the Trump Administration revoked over 1,000 Chinese student visas due to the individuals' links to the Chinese military. Upon taking office, the Biden Administration never rescinded the policy. The Select Committee's investigation revealed, however, that the Biden Administration failed to enforce the policy. In its review of just six U.S. universities, the Committee identified Chinese graduate students who had previously attended a "Seven Sons of National Defense" university—precisely the category of individuals the EO was intended to block. In addition, the investigation uncovered thousands of Chinese nationals affiliated with other PRC universities that are either explicitly Entity-Listed by the U.S. government or have well-documented ties to China's military and defense-industrial base. 2. American Taxpayer Dollars Fund Ph.D. Programs for Chinese Nationals The Select Committee's investigation revealed that thousands of Chinese nationals pursuing doctoral degrees at U.S. universities are being funded—directly or indirectly—by the American taxpayer. One university disclosed that "of these 1,139 [Chinese] graduate staff appointments, it is the case that 515 were paid via sponsored programs from federal, state or private grants or contracts. Of these 515 Chinese students, 402 were paid from federal grants or contracts." • Of these 402 Chinese nationals funded by American taxpayer dollars, 205 were in the College of Engineering and 107 were in the College of Science, including disciplines like Aeronautics, Nuclear Engineering, and Computer Science. Over 400 Chinese nationals—enough to crew two Arleigh Burke-class U.S. Navy destroyers—are conducting sensitive research at just one U.S. university, all at the expense of hardworking American taxpayers. Another university told the Select Committee that the primary source of funding for 1,115 of its 2,580 Chinese graduate students is through an assistantship. According to the National Science Foundation, "[m]any full time-graduate [research assistantships], fellowships, and postdoc appointments are supported with funding from research grants and contracts awarded by federal agencies." At another university, information provided to the Select Committee revealed that half of the Chinese nationals pursuing PhDs are actively involved in federally funded research projects. And despite the fact that Chinese nationals make up over 20 percent of the university's PhD population, the university told the Committee that only "0.2% of [our] PhD degree programs' net tuition revenue comes from Chinese national students." At this university, Chinese nationals are benefiting from taxpayer-funded research opportunities while contributing virtually nothing in tuition revenue. Universities often defend the admission of large numbers of graduate students from foreign adversaries, particularly China, by claiming that these students pay higher tuition and thereby subsidize opportunities for Americans. But the data provided to the Committee demonstrates the opposite. In reality, many of these students are not paying full freight. Instead, their studies are financed through a mix of federal research grants, state and institutional subsidies, and university-backed assistantships—all funded, directly or indirectly, by the American taxpayer. Additionally, every funded position filled by a Chinese national student represents a potential opportunity denied to an American student who could be contributing to the nation's workforce and innovation base. Rather than subsidizing American talent, universities are displacing it—while simultaneously advancing the ambitions of a foreign government openly hostile to U.S. interests. In effect, American taxpayers are footing the bill to provide STEM education, hands-on lab access, and cutting-edge research opportunities to Chinese nationals—who in many cases are directly linked to Chinese military institutions. This is not a case of foreign students helping to underwrite the education of Americans—it is quite the opposite: U.S. taxpayers and research institutions are underwriting the training of young men and women from our greatest adversary. 3. U.S. Universities Admit Thousands of Chinese Nationals with Direct Ties to the Chinese Military Annually In a review of the six American universities the Committee requested "a list of all universities that Chinese national students at your university previously attended." Each university provided a list of hundreds of Chinese universities that their current students—some of them in federally-funded research programs today—had previously attended. At every university the Select Committee surveyed, students from China's top military and defense research universities—including institutions tied to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and China's defense industrial base—were currently part of the student body. Many of these Chinese universities are on U.S. government blacklists, and their students are studying advanced fields like artificial intelligence and quantum science, often funded by American taxpayers. Bringing in foreign students can enrich our campuses with diversity of ideas and perspectives. But we cannot allow our universities to become training pipelines for individuals already connected to foreign militaries. When those students return home armed with knowledge and expertise gained from America's world-leading institutions—and gaining valuable insights into the direction of technological development working on U.S. government-funded research—they often apply it to develop technologies that are ultimately used against U.S. interests. The Select Committee identified three high-risk categories of Chinese universities with direct or indirect ties to the PLA and China's defense industrial base. These categories were used to cross-reference Chinese universities listed in the records provided by the six U.S. universities. THE "SEVEN SONS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE" The "Seven Sons of National Defense" (国防七子) are China's leading defense-focused universities, whose primary mission is to advance defense research and development and drive state-directed military-civil fusion efforts. Most maintain partnerships with state-owned defense conglomerates and operate as training grounds for future military leaders, engineers, and technicians working on weapons systems and defense programs. China's "Seven Sons of National Defense" universities play a central role in developing advanced military technologies, including hypersonic weapons, unmanned systems, cyber warfare tools, and aerospace engineering, often in direct coordination with the PLA and its affiliates. Graduates from these institutions frequently enter roles within China's military, intelligence, or state-owned defense enterprises. Below is a breakdown of each of these institutions: - Beihang University (北京航空航天大学), also known as Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA): Created from merging aeronautical departments from several leading Chinese universities. Emphasizes educating talents for the Party and national construction. Added to BIS Entity List in 2001. Has nine major defense laboratories, one national key laboratory, nine state key laboratories, four national engineering centers, and over 70 provincial/ministry key laboratories. - Beijing Institute of Technology (北京理工大学): China's first defense industry university (1952). Added to Entity List in 2022. Has 34 designated defense research areas, 10 major defense laboratories, five national key laboratories, six national-defense key laboratories. - Harbin Institute of Technology (哈尔滨工业大学): Heavily involved in satellite tech, robotics, advanced materials, and network security. Added to Entity List in 2020. Operates 47 designated defense research areas, nine major defense laboratories, 12 national key laboratories, seven state key laboratories. - Harbin Engineering University (哈尔滨工程大学): Founded as PLA Military Engineering Institute. Specializes in underwater robots, ship stabilization, marine power, sonar, and nuclear simulation. Added to Entity List in 2020; 19 defense research areas, four defense labs, 150+ scientific labs. - Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (南京航空航天大学): Includes PLA-linked College of Aerospace Engineering. Added to Entity List in 2020; one national key lab, 12 ministerial key labs, 39 other labs. - Nanjing University of Science and Technology (南京理工大学): Leading weaponry and arms university; maintains PLA signals intelligence research ties. Added to Entity List in 2020; three major defense labs, 16 designated research areas. - Northwestern Polytechnical University (西北工业大学): China's top UAV research and development base. Added to Entity List in 2001; 13 major defense labs, 44 designated defense research areas. THE SEVEN SONS OF ORDNANCE/ARMS INDUSTRY The "Seven Sons of Ordnance/Arms Industry" (兵工七子) specialize in ballistics, explosives, and manufacturing technologies: • Beijing Institute of Technology • Changchun University of Science and Technology • Chongqing University of Technology • Nanjing University of Science and Technology • North University of China • Shenyang Ligong University • Xi'an Technological University UNIVERSITIES CO-ADMINISTERED BY SASTIND The State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) co-administers 58 Chinese universities engaged in military-civil fusion research. 4. American Universities Maintain Close Collaborative Partnerships with Chinese Universities Collaboration between American universities and Chinese universities takes many different forms. In some cases—such as at the University of Maryland—it involves direct faculty collaboration and formal academic agreements. In other cases—such as at Purdue University—it involves hosting visiting faculty from Chinese institutions and sending U.S. professors to China on sabbatical. Most troubling were the partnerships at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, which has established (and since terminated) joint research institutes and dual-degree programs with Chinese universities directly overseen by the Chinese government's defense and security apparatus. All three of the following examples reveal how U.S. institutions are channeling talent and cutting-edge research directly to the Chinese government, while allowing Beijing to embed itself in the heart of America's top universities. University of Maryland: Maintains at least 89 known cases of faculty collaboration with Chinese entities, 15 formal exchange agreements, and three formal research agreements. Over a quarter of Chinese national graduate students in Fall 2024 were involved in federally funded research, yet the university does not track the specific laboratories or research initiatives where paid students work. Purdue University: Employs 16 visiting faculty from Chinese universities and has six professors on sabbatical in China. Several visiting faculty are affiliated with institutions overseen by SASTIND, embedded in departments such as Biomedical Engineering, Electrical & Computer Engineering, Computer Science, and Mathematics. Purdue has proactively implemented new safeguard policies prohibiting foreign adversary funding, setting export control guidelines, protecting intellectual property, and restricting travel. University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC): Maintained the Zhejiang University - UIUC Joint Engineering Institute (ZJUI) and multiple 3+2 Joint Bachelor's and Master's Programs (with Donghua University, Nanjing University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Huazhong University of Science and Technology). Zhejiang University is co-administered by SASTIND and conducts research for the Ministry of State Security. 5. The University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Leads by Example, Terminates Dozens of Academic Agreements with Chinese Universities In July 2025, the UIUC informed the Select Committee that it is terminating a wide range of partnerships with Chinese universities—marking the most significant institutional course correction to date in response to the Select Committee's investigation. In a letter to Select Committee Chairman John Moolenaar, UIUC outlined a series of decisions: • Ending the flagship joint engineering institute with Zhejiang University (ZJUI), not renewing the agreement upon expiration on January 31, 2026. • Terminating 3+2, 4+2, and all other joint degree programs with PRC universities (identifying 20 Chinese partner universities). • Canceling six "priority admission" agreements with PRC universities. • Ending short-term teacher training programs with Chinese university faculty (including Sanda University and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics). UIUC's decision sets an important precedent for other American universities to protect taxpayer-funded research from being funneled into China's military-industrial apparatus. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation 1: Reinforce visa screening laws to deny access to sensitive U.S. research and substantially reduce technology transfer risks. a. Utilize existing statutory and presidential authorities such as the Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3), the Export Control Reform Act, and Executive Order 10043, which should be codified in statute, as the basis for targeted visa denials to foreign adversary nationals who present a national security risk, especially from the PRC. b. Impose limits that establish reciprocity in academic exchange programs with foreign adversary countries, especially in STEM graduate programs, while prioritizing graduate students from allied and partner nations. Recommendation 2: Establish clear eligibility restrictions, enhanced vetting criteria, and mandatory reporting requirements to limit PRC access to sensitive technologies. a. Deny visas to applicants affiliated with the PRC's defense research and industrial base, including: i. PLA institutions and organs; ii. "Seven Sons of National Defense" universities; iii. "Seven Sons of Ordnance/Arms Industry" universities; iv. National defense laboratories and research centers; v. State-owned defense conglomerates; vi. SASTIND co-administered universities; and vii. Chinese public security and surveillance entities (e.g., Huawei, Hikvision, Baidu, Tencent, and the Ministry of Public Security). b. Prohibit entry for foreign nationals participating in PRC Talent Recruitment Programs or those backed by the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC), and the CCP's United Front system. c. Apply enhanced scrutiny to visa applicants to graduate programs intending to study or conduct research in high-risk, dual-use, or emerging technology sectors (AI, quantum, advanced materials, hypersonics, biotech, aerospace, nuclear engineering, semiconductors). d. Require interagency national security review—led by DOD, DHS, and FBI—for all graduate student visa applications involving controlled fields. e. Prohibit or limit foreign nationals of foreign adversary countries from enrolling in graduate academic courses involving export-controlled technologies. f. Mandate disclosure of all past and current research affiliations, funding sources, and co-authored publications for foreign adversary nationals in sensitive STEM programs. g. Require U.S. universities to submit regular reports to the federal government on foreign adversary student affiliations, funding sources, research roles, and fields of study. Recommendation 3: Impose restrictions on foreign nationals from the PRC while residing in the United States to mitigate security risks. a. Prohibit foreign adversary nationals affiliated with blacklisted entities from participating in federally funded research projects. b. Prohibit PRC nationals from working in U.S. government-supported laboratories. c. Institute restrictions on foreign adversary visa holders in sensitive STEM programs for Optional Practical Training (OPT) eligibility. Recommendation 4: Better protect all students from transnational repression. a. Prohibit federally funded higher education institutions from recognizing student groups receiving funding from foreign adversary missions or entities. b. Strengthen criminal penalties against offenses committed in association with transnational repression. APPENDIX A: List of all 58 Chinese schools co-administered by SASTIND 1. Anhui University (安徽大学) 2. Beijing University of Chemical Technology (北京化工大学) 3. Changchun University of Science and Technology (长春理工大学) 4. Dalian University of Technology (大连理工大学) 5. East China University of Technology (东华理工大学) 6. Fuzhou University (福州大学) 7. Guilin University of Electronic Technology (桂林电子科技大学) 8. Hangzhou Dianzi University (杭州电子科技大学) 9. Harbin University of Science and Technology (哈尔滨理工大学) 10. Hebei University (河北大学) 11. Hebei University of Science and Technology (河北科技大学) 12. Hefei University of Technology (合肥工业大学) 13. Heilongjiang Institute of Technology (黑龙江工程学院) 14. Heilongjiang University (黑龙江大学) 15. Henan University of Science and Technology (河南科技大学) 16. Huazhong University of Science and Technology (华中科技大学) 17. Hunan University (湖南大学) 18. Hunan University of Science and Technology (湖南科技大学) 19. Jiangsu University of Science and Technology (江苏科技大学) 20. Jilin University (吉林大学) 21. Kunming University of Science and Technology (昆明理工大学) 22. Lanzhou University (兰州大学) 23. Lanzhou University of Technology (兰州理工大学) 24. Nanchang Hangkong University (南昌航空大学) 25. Nanjing Tech University (南京工业大学) 26. North China University of Science and Technology (华北理工大学) 27. North China Institute of Aerospace Engineering (北华航天工业学院) 28. North University of China (中北大学) 29. Peking University (北京大学) 30. Shandong University (山东大学) 31. Shandong University of Technology (山东理工大学) 32. Shanghai Jiao Tong University (上海交通大学) 33. Shanghai University (上海大学) 34. Shenyang Aerospace University (沈阳航空航天大学) 35. Shenyang Ligong University (沈阳理工大学) 36. Shijiazhuang Tiedao University (石家庄铁道大学) 37. Sichuan University (四川大学) 38. Soochow University (苏州大学) 39. South China University of Technology (华南理工大学) 40. Southeast University (东南大学) 41. Southwest University of Science and Technology (西南科技大学) 42. Sun Yat-sen University (中山大学) 43. Tianjin Polytechnic University (天津工业大学) 44. Tianjin University (天津大学) 45. Tsinghua University (清华大学) 46. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (电子科技大学) 47. University of Science and Technology Beijing (北京科技大学) 48. University of Shanghai for Science and Technology (上海理工大学) 49. University of South China (南华大学) 50. Wuhan University (武汉大学) 51. Wuhan University of Technology (武汉理工大学) 52. Xi'an Jiaotong University (西安交通大学) 53. Xi'an Technological University (西安工业大学) 54. Xiamen University (厦门大学) 55. Xiangtan University (湘潭大学) 56. Xidian University (西安电子科技大学) 57. Yanshan University (燕山大学) 58. Zhejiang University (浙江大学) APPENDIX B: Chinese defense-tied universities represented in student bodies across surveyed U.S. institutions: STANFORD UNIVERSITY: - Seven Sons of National Defense: Beihang University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University. - Seven Sons of Ordnance/Arms Industry: Beijing Institute of Technology. - SASTIND-affiliated (21 institutions): Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Hunan University, Jilin University, Lanzhou University, Peking University, Shandong University, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai University, Sichuan University, Soochow University, South China University of China, Southeast University, Sun Yat-sen University, Tianjin University, Tsinghua University, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Wuhan University, Wuhan University of Technology, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xiamen University, Zhejiang University. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND: - Seven Sons of National Defense: Beihang University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing University of Science and Technology. - Seven Sons of Ordnance/Arms Industry: Beijing Institute of Technology, Nanjing University of Science and Technology. - SASTIND-affiliated (33 institutions): Anhui University, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Dalian University of Technology, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hebei University of Technology, Hefei University of Technology, Henan University of Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Hunan University, Jilin University, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Lanzhou University, Nanjing Tech University, Peking University, Shandong University, Shanghai Jiaotong, Shanghai University, Sichuan University, Soochow University, South China University of Technology, Southeast University, Sun Yat Sen University, Tianjin University, Tsinghua University, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Wuhan University, Wuhan University of Technology, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xiamen University, Xiangtan University, Xidian University, Yanshan University, Zhejiang University. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY: - Seven Sons of National Defense: Beihang University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing University of Science and Technology. - Seven Sons of Ordnance/Arms Industry: Beijing Institute of Technology, Changchun University of Science and Technology, Nanjing University of Science and Technology. - SASTIND-affiliated (28 institutions): Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Changchun University of Science and Technology, Dalian University of Technology, Fuzhou University, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hefei University of Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Hunan University, Jilin University, Lanzhou University, Nanjing Tech University, Peking University, Shandong University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai University, Sichuan University, Soochow University, South China University of Technology, Southeast University, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Sun Yat Sen University, Tianjin University, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Wuhan University, Wuhan University of Technology, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xidian University, Zhejiang University. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: - Seven Sons of National Defense: Beihang University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing University of Science and Technology. - Seven Sons of Ordnance/Arms Industry: Beijing Institute of Technology, Changchun University of Science and Technology, Chongqing University of Technology, Nanjing University of Science and Technology. - SASTIND-affiliated (40 institutions): Anhui University, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Changchun University of Science and Technology, Dalian University of Technology, Fuzhou University, Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Hebei University, Hefei University of Technology, Heilongjiang University, Henan University of Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Hunan University, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Jilin University, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Lanzhou University, Nanchang Hangkong University, Nanjing Tech University, North China University of Science and Technology, Peking University, Shandong University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai University, Soochow University, South China University of Technology, Sun Yat Sen University, Tianjin Polytechnic University, Tsinghua University, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, University of South China, Wuhan University of Technology, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xiamen University, Xiangtan University, Xidian University, Zhejiang University. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS URBANA-CHAMPAIGN: - Seven Sons of National Defense: Beihang University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Northwestern Polytechnical University. - Seven Sons of Ordnance/Arms Industry: Beijing Institute of Technology, Changchun University of Science and Technology. - SASTIND-affiliated (39 institutions): Anhui University, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Changchun University of Science and Technology, Dalian University of Technology, Fuzhou University, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hefei University of Technology, Heilongjiang University, Heilongjiang University of Technology, Henan University of Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Hunan University, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Jilin University, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Lanzhou University, Nanjing Technology University, Peking University, Shandong University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai University, Shenyang Aerospace University, Sichuan University, Soochow University, South China University of Technology, Southeast University, Sun Yat Sen University, Tianjin Polytechnic University, Tianjin University, Tsinghua University, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, University of Science and Technology Beijing, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Wuhan University, Wuhan University of Technology, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xiamen University, Xidian University, Zhejiang University. PURDUE UNIVERSITY: - Seven Sons of National Defense: Beihang University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Nanjing University of Science and Technology. - Seven Sons of Ordnance/Arms Industry: Beijing Institute of Technology, Changchun University of Science and Technology, Nanjing University of Science and Technology. - SASTIND-affiliated (28 institutions): Anhui University, Changchun University of Science and Technology, Dalian University of Technology, Fuzhou University, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Hunan University, Jilin University, Lanzhou University, Peking University, Shandong University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai University, Sichuan University, Soochow University, South China University of Technology, Sun Yat Sen University, Tianjin University, Tsinghua University, University of Science and Technology Beijing, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, University of South China, Wuhan University, Wuhan University of Technology, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xiamen University, Xiangtan University, Xidian University, Zhejiang University. i Publication, You Lan et al, Wilson Center, Caught in the Split: Chinese Students in the Soviet Union, 1960-1965, August 29, 2014. ii Hannas, W. C., Mulvenon, J. C., & Puglisi, A. B. (2013). Chinese industrial espionage: Technology acquisition and military modernization. Routledge. iii Research, Defense Advanced Research Program Agency (2025); About ONR, Office of Naval Research (2025). iv The China Defense Universities Tracker, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Nov. 25, 2019). v Beihang at a Glance, Beihang University (2025). vi Id. vii About HEU, Harbin Engineering University (2025). viii About Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (2025). ix Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2019). x Northwestern Polytechnical University, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2019). xi Id. xii Internal communication received from Purdue University, Obtained by the Select Committee on the CCP, September 19, 2025.