ADVANCED CAPABILITIES DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NUCLEAR CHALLENGES The Growing Capabilities of Strategic Competitors and Regional Rivals 2024 This report is available online at www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications For media and public inquiries about this report, contact [email protected] For more information about the Defense Intelligence Agency, visit DIA’s website at www.dia.mil Information cutoff date: 15 August 2024. Cover image: An SS-27 ICBM travels through Red Square as part of a May 2023 Military Parade. Source: AFP DIA_C_02CMI_A This report contains copyrighted material. Copying and disseminating the contents are prohibited without the permission of the copyright owners. Images and other previously published material featured or referenced in this publication are attributed to their source. Global Nuclear Landscape was first published in early 2018 to address the nuclear programs of China, Russia and North Korea, and nuclear developments in Iran. This second edition, titled Nuclear Challenges: The Growing Capabilities of Strategic Competitors and Regional Rivals, provides an updated, unclassified overview of the nuclear programs of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The United States continues to face challenges from strategic competitors and regional rivals who have and are developing new nuclear-capable delivery systems. The threats from more advanced cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and other novel delivery systems, coupled with growing nuclear arsenals, are threatening U.S. military advantages. Since Russia expanded its war on Ukraine in February 2022, Russian leaders have employed rhetoric evoking Russian nuclear weapon capabilities in order to influence Western action. Beijing continues to outfit hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos built to support the largest nuclear expansion in Chinese history. North Korean forces remain active, performing simulation drills to load and launch nuclear weapons to threaten the United States and its allies in the region; in 2022, they performed more than 150 missile tests. Tehran continues to stockpile enriched uranium far in excess of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) limits—shortening the time that Tehran would require to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for a single nuclear device, should Tehran decide to do so. In addition to ongoing state nuclear programs, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction-applicable goods, knowledge, and technology continues to be a focus area for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Specialized procurement networks (and potential state-to-state cooperation) can provide procurement pathways for dual-use goods, materials, technologies, and expertise for weapons of mass destruction programs and their delivery systems. The proliferation of delivery systems include both countries of concern, such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and other countries interested in acquiring these technologies. These networks remain resilient and adaptable in the face of a robust international framework of sanctions, export controls, and other prohibitions which limit the purchase or transfer of weapons of mass destruction, including applicable goods, to specific countries or entities. Such efforts directly support the advancement, development, expansion, and survivability of weapons of mass destruction capabilities around the world. Selected Nuclear Capable Delivery Systems Chinese Nuclear Military Capability: - Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ALBM): System Deployed - Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs): System Deployed - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): System Deployed - Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs): System Deployed - Medium-Ranged Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs): System Deployed - Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs): System Deployed Russian Nuclear Military Capability: - Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs): System Deployed - Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles: System Under Development - Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs): System Deployed - Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs): System Deployed - Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABMs): System Deployed - Antiship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs): System Deployed - Antisubmarine Weapons (ASWs): System Deployed - Close-Range Ballistic Missiles (CRBMs): System Deployed - Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles (CDCM): System Under Development - Depth Charges: System Deployed - Gravity Bombs: System Deployed - Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs): System Deployed - Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs): System Deployed - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): System Deployed - Nuclear-Armed, Nuclear-Powered Underwater Vehicles: System Under Development - Nuclear-Powered Ground Launched Cruise Missiles: System Under Development - Ship-Launched Cruise Missiles (SCLM): System Deployed - Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs): System Deployed - Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs): System Deployed - Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs): System Deployed - Torpedoes: System Deployed North Korean Nuclear Military Capability: - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): System Under Development - Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs): System Under Development - Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs): System Under Development - Medium-Ranged Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs): System Deployed - Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs): System Deployed - Close-Range Ballistic Missiles (CRBMs): System Under Development Countries with mature nuclear weapons programs are increasing stockpiles and/or program capabilities. Russia, China, and North Korea are modernizing their legacy stockpiles by incorporating advanced technologies to penetrate or avoid missile defense systems. Countries are also developing nuclear weapons with smaller yields, improved precision, and increased range for military or coercive use. China: Beijing has far surpassed earlier growth estimates assessed in 2018, and is currently exceeding 500 deliverable nuclear warheads in its stockpile. By 2030, we estimate that China will have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads—most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging the continental United States. China probably also seeks lower-yield nuclear warhead capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot deliver. For example, China is increasing its stockpile of theater-range delivery systems, such as the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). Approximate Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles (2018 vs. 2024): - China (2018): 200 warheads | China (2024): More than 500 warheads - Russia (2018): About 1,500 deployed strategic warheads; up to 2,000 non-strategic warheads | Russia (2024): About 1,550 deployed strategic warheads; up to 2,000 non-strategic warheads (President Putin announced Russia would suspend participation in New START on 21 February 2023). Russia: Over the past 4 years, Russia has maintained the largest foreign nuclear stockpile in the world. Moscow maintains about 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as well as a force of heavy bombers which are capable of carrying long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) counting rules, the heavy bombers count as one warhead each, but each bomber is capable of carrying eight or more air-launched cruise missiles. Russia also maintains a stockpile of up to 2,000 nuclear weapons which are designed to be incorporated into delivery systems with ranges shorter than those laid out in the New START treaty; these are commonly referred to as non-strategic nuclear weapons. North Korea: North Korea has demonstrated the capability to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and continues to increase the stockpile of these materials to support its nuclear weapons program. In early 2021, Kim Jong Un laid out a 5-year defense plan that emphasized developing tactical nuclear weapons, and further highlighted the importance of developing "smaller and lighter nuclear weapons," and "ultra-large nuclear warheads." Iran: Currently, Iran almost certainly does not have nuclear weapons and has agreed not to seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons. However, since 2019, Iran has exceeded several of the JCPOA's limits, including the limits on the quantity and enrichment levels of its uranium stockpile, the locations where Iran enriches uranium, the number and types of enriching centrifuges, and the research and development with uranium metal. Delivery Systems: Strategic competitors and regional rivals to the United States continue to develop new nuclear weapon-capable delivery systems. These new systems often have longer range, better accuracy, and in some cases, a greater capability to defeat missile defenses. China: The PLA Rocket Force is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle capabilities and general force growth. The PLA Rocket Force also continues to grow its inventory of road-mobile DF-26 IRBMs, which can conduct both conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval targets. China has also fielded two more Type 094 JIN-class submarines for a total of six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)—providing a capability for continuous peacetime deterrence patrols. Beijing has established a nascent air leg of a nuclear triad with the H-6N bomber which is capable of both aerial-refueling and carrying a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile. In addition, China’s test of a global-range nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) in July 2021 has demonstrated its technical ability to field a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). Russia: In early 2018, President Putin announced new advanced nuclear weapons he claimed were capable of evading current U.S. countermeasures. These weapons were the Sarmat ICBM, Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, Kinzhal hypersonic missile, Skyfall nuclear-powered cruise missile, and the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater vehicle. Both the Sarmat ICBM and the Avangard fall under the auspices of New START. Additionally, Russia is currently developing new ballistic missile submarines and has armed its heavy bombers with high-precision cruise missiles. Moscow continues to support the SSC-8 ground-launched, intermediate-range, nuclear-capable cruise missile program. North Korea: North Korea established the Strategic Force (previously known as the Strategic Rocket Forces) in 2012 and has described this organization as a nuclear-armed ballistic missile force. The Strategic Force includes units operating SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs, each of which represent a nuclear-capable system class as stated by North Korea. North Korea continues to violate UN Security Council Resolutions and conducts launches of ballistic missile systems. In 2022, North Korea conducted dozens of missile tests—including its first IRBM and ICBM launches since 2017—to accelerate long-term missile and nuclear research and development (R&D) goals. In 2022, North Korea also indicated that the army performed drills to simulate the loading and launching of nuclear weapons in order to threaten the United States and its regional allies. Iran: While Iran does not have a nuclear weapon, it continues to develop ballistic missile systems to increase their accuracy and lethality. Currently, the Iranian missile force is the largest in the Middle East and serves as Iran’s primary conventional deterrent, capable of striking targets 2,000 kilometers from its borders. Iran continues to develop space-launch vehicles with boosters that could be capable of ICBM ranges if configured for that purpose. SCOPE NOTE: V EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: VIII CHINA: 1 RUSSIA: 11 NORTH KOREA: 19 IRAN: 25 GLOSSARY: 28 China is undergoing the most rapid expansion and ambitious modernization of its nuclear forces in history—almost certainly driven by an aim for enduring strategic competition with the U.S. and a goal to actualize intensified strategic concepts that have existed for decades but are now being realized. China is fielding and developing a range of new nuclear capabilities that include its largest buildup of nuclear missile silos; ground-mobile, air-launched, and submarine-launched weapons; nuclear-capable HGVs; as well as C4ISR capabilities to support a launch-on-warning posture. China probably will introduce new capabilities which carry the potential to destabilize the status quo over the next decade as it develops concepts for new systems’ use and integrates them into its broader warfighting and deterrence doctrine. Rapidly Expanding Nuclear Warhead Stockpile: China is fielding new nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any time in its history. In 2020, the DoD estimated China’s operational nuclear warhead stockpile was in the low 200s and was expected to at least double by 2030. Beijing probably accelerated its nuclear expansion as its stockpile is now more than 500 operational nuclear warheads and is on track to exceed previous projections. While China’s nuclear stockpile is well below U.S. and Russian inventories, it has not declared an end goal nor acknowledged the scale of its expansion, and continues to limit engagement in substantive arms control discussions. By 2030, we estimate that China will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads, most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging the continental United States. Most of this stockpile growth is likely to come from the following PLA Rocket Force developments: - A silo-based solid-propellant missile project likely consisting of about 300 silos. These silos are capable of fielding both DF-31 and DF-41 class ICBMs. - Silo-based liquid-propellant missile expansion; increasing the number of brigades while simultaneously increasing the number of launchers per brigade. - Mobile ICBM expansion; establishing additional mobile ICBM brigades while increasing the number of launchers per brigade from 6 to 12. - Theater capabilities expansion; establishing additional brigades of nuclear and conventional-capable DF-26 IRBMs. Nuclear Strategy and Force Posture: China’s nuclear strategy is based on PLA deterrence of an enemy first strike and counterstrike when deterrence fails, threatening retaliation against an adversary’s military capability, population, and economy. PLA planners very likely intend to avoid a protracted series of nuclear exchanges, and state that the scale and intensity of retaliatory force needs to be carefully controlled. China’s public declaratory "no first use" (NFU) policy is consistent with this approach to using nuclear force. - China’s nuclear strategy probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates the strategic effects of a nuclear strike, despite the NFU policy. Beijing probably would also consider using its nuclear force if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened the regime’s survival. Timeline of China’s Inconsistent Message and Action: - 2016: President Xi elevates Rocket Force to a service to act as a core force of strategic deterrence. - 2018: President Xi: "Our sea-based nuclear force needs to develop greatly." - 2019: China's Foreign Ministry states that all nuclear weapon states should diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines, abandon launch-on-warning strategies, and refrain from developing low-yield nuclear warheads. China's defense white paper highlights nuclear capability as strategic cornerstone and calls for enhanced strategic deterrence capability. China unveils its "triad" at its National Day Parade. - 2021: President Xi puts forward 14th Five-Year-Plan national defense requirements during a speech at the National People’s Congress, calling to accelerate the creation of high-level strategic deterrence. - 2022: China's Foreign Ministry states "On the assertions made by U.S. officials that China is expanding dramatically its nuclear capabilities, first, let me say that this is untrue." Launch-on-Warning: The PLA is implementing a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture where it would be able to, upon warning of missile strike, launch a counterstrike before an enemy first strike can detonate. PLA writings suggest multiple manned C2 organs are involved in this process, warned by space- and ground-based sensors, and that this posture is broadly similar to the U.S. and Russian LOW posture. The PRC probably seeks to keep at least a portion of its nuclear force, especially its new silo-based units, on a LOW posture, and since 2017, the PLARF has conducted exercises involving early warning of a nuclear strike and launch-on-warning responses. The PLA likely seeks a diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from lower-yield precision-strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields. This force is intended to ensure China can inflict unacceptable damage with both proportionate and overwhelming retaliatory capabilities, thus denying an adversary victory if a conflict escalates to the nuclear domain. Recently Fielded Capabilities and Ongoing Improvements: - Established an air leg of a newly formed triad—composed of PLA land, sea, and air forces—with the H-6N bomber capable of aerial refueling and carrying a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile. - Fielded DF-26 IRBMs, China’s first precision-strike nuclear capability. - Fielded two more Type 094 JIN-class submarines for a total of six SSBNs—providing enough capability for continuous peacetime deterrence patrols. Additionally, China has improved upon the JL-2 SLBM by fielding the more capable and longer-range JL-3, allowing China to range CONUS from protected bastion areas such as the South China Sea. - Fielded DF-31 class transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)-based road mobile ICBMs, that likely have improved survivability and lethality over previous versions. - Fielded the DF-41, China’s first road-mobile ICBM with MIRV capability. Future Nuclear Capabilities: - A new "early warning counterstrike" posture similar to launch-on-warning. - ICBM-range nuclear-armed HGVs (tested 27 July 2021, traveling 40,000 km). - Lower-yield nuclear warhead capabilities to provide proportional response options. - Technical ability to field a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). Nuclear Materials Production and Testing Activity: - Plutonium: Constructing two CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast breeder nuclear reactors at Xiapu, utilizing HEU fuel. - Reduced transparency: Ceased reporting stockpile of separated plutonium to the IAEA in 2017. - Uranium and Tritium expansion, with potential activity at Lop Nur test site. Overview: Russia is nearing the completion of the current round of modernization of its strategic nuclear forces. This has been one of Moscow’s top budgetary priorities over the past decade. It has successfully introduced new intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and long-range air-launched cruise missiles. Russia also is adding new military capabilities to its large stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), including those employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces. Russia currently has a stockpile of up to 2,000 NSNWs. History/Origin: Russia inherited its nuclear weapons program from the former Soviet Union. By 1986, the Soviet Union’s nuclear warhead stockpile reached a total of more than 40,000 warheads in its inventory. Arms Control: - Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) - Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, 1974 / 1990) - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF, 1987; U.S. withdrew in 2019 citing Russian noncompliance) - Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT; signed 1996, ratified 2000, rescinded ratification in Nov 2023) - START I (1991), SORT (2002), New START (2010, renewed to 2026; Russia suspended participation in Feb 2023 but stated adherence to central limits) Doctrine: Russia views the use of nuclear weapons as primarily for deterrence but maintains the right to use such weapons in response to existential threats. Scenarios fall into: first strike, counterstrike, and retaliatory strike. Nuclear Capability/Stockpile: Russia declared under New START on 1 September 2022: 1,549 warheads on 540 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers. In addition, an active stockpile of up to 2,000 NSNWs. Russian Nuclear Rhetoric: Beginning prior to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian leadership, including Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, emphasized nuclear escalation risks to deter NATO direct intervention. Nuclear Weapons Complex & Delivery Systems: - Rosatom manages the nuclear complex. - Strategic Rocket Force (SRF): Mix of road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs (SS-19 Mod 4 with Avangard HGV, SS-27/RS-24, RS-26 Rubezh, RS-28 Sarmat). - SSBNs: At least 10 SSBNs (Delta IV with SS-N-23, Borey-class with SS-N-32 Bulava). - Long-Range Aviation (LRA): Tu-95 Bear, Tu-160 Blackjack, Tu-160M2 resumption, and development of PAK-DA. - Hypersonics: Tsirkon hypersonic missile. Putin’s Big Six: 1. Sarmat ICBM (Satan 2) 2. Avangard HGV 3. Kinzhal (Killjoy) ALBM 4. Skyfall (Burevestnik) nuclear-powered cruise missile 5. Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater vehicle 6. Peresvet anti-satellite laser system Overview: North Korea’s national security strategy revolves around maintaining political legitimacy and deterring external attacks, alongside aspirations for regional power and reunification. It has prioritized striking adversaries with conventional- or WMD-armed ballistic missiles while threatening South Korea, regional targets, and the continental U.S. (CONUS). Key Strategic Trends: - Routinization of ballistic missile flight tests and training launches. - Expansion of numbers and types of nuclear-capable delivery systems. - Explicit rhetorical linking of nuclear warheads to ballistic missiles. History & Arms Control: - Nuclear program initiated in late 1950s with Soviet support; 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon operational in 1986. - 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. - 1994 Agreed Framework frozen and later collapsed in 2002. - Withdrew from NPT in 2003. - Six-Party Talks (2003-2007) and 2012 Leap Day Arrangement failed. Doctrine & Capabilities: - Strategic Force operates SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs. - Doctrine shifting from pure deterrence toward potential limited/tactical first use in a conflict to manage escalation. - Conducted six underground nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017 at Punggye-ri. - Tested solid-propellant systems including railway-borne SRBMs, Pukguksong SLBMs, and Hwasong-18 ICBM, as well as the liquid-propellant Hwasong-17 ICBM. Nuclear Proliferation: North Korea previously supplied Libya with UF6 via the A.Q. Khan network and provided Syria with nuclear reactor technology until 2007. Overview: Iran does not currently have nuclear weapons and has publicly agreed not to seek or develop them. However, its civilian nuclear and missile programs give Tehran the technical ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so. History: - Began in 1950s under Atoms for Peace; Tehran Research Reactor. - Undeclared program under Physics Research Centre (PHRC) and the "Amad Plan" in late 1990s, halted in late 2003. - Enrichment facilities developed at Natanz and Fordow (near Qom). Joint Plans (JCPOA): - Signed in July 2015 between Iran and P5+1 / EU; implemented in January 2016. - Following U.S. withdrawal in May 2018, Iran began exceeding limits in 2019 regarding enriched uranium stockpile quantities, enrichment levels (up to 60%), centrifuge R&D, and uranium metal production. - In 2021-2022, Iran reduced IAEA monitoring access and removed surveillance cameras. Missile Developments: - Largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East with ranges up to 2,000 km. - Proliferation of high-accuracy SRBMs, MRBMs, Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs), and Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs) with potential ICBM application. Our competitors and potential adversaries are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems. Events over the past year have emphasized the continuing importance countries place on nuclear capabilities. The ongoing growth of China into a near-peer nuclear competitor will continue to be an essential DIA focus area. The weakness exhibited by Russia’s conventional forces in their invasion of Ukraine may increase Moscow’s reliance on nuclear capabilities going forward. Both Russia and China are likely to field weapons with improved accuracy and ability to circumvent missile defense. North Korea continues to expand nuclear and missile delivery capabilities in defiance of United Nation Resolutions. Tehran is stockpiling enriched uranium far in excess of JCPOA limits while continuing to test missiles that hold much of the Middle East region at risk. As the global geopolitical environment becomes more competitive, additional countries may investigate nuclear proliferation. Growing questions about security guarantees, heightened regional pressures, and the continued development of nuclear technology and its knowledge-sharing may create a geopolitical scenario in which countries that previously had declined the pursuit of nuclear weapons reconsider their options. This dynamic possibility could create additional nuclear challenges. - Agreed Framework: 1994 agreement between the U.S. and DPRK to freeze North Korea's nuclear program. - ALBM (Air-launched ballistic missile): Ballistic missile fired from aircraft (e.g., Kinzhal). - ALCM (Air-launched cruise missile): Cruise missile launched from aircraft. - AAM (Air-to-air missile): Missile fired from aircraft to intercept aerial targets. - ASM (Air-to-surface missile): Missile fired from aircraft at ground targets. - ABM (Antiballistic missile): Missile designed to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. - ASCM (Antiship cruise missile): Cruise missile targeting surface ships. - ASW (Anti-submarine warfare): Weapons targeting submarines. - Ballistic Missile (BM): Guided during powered flight and unguided during free-flight trajectory. - CRBM (Close-range ballistic missile): Ballistic missile with range < 300 km. - Cruise Missile (CM): Aerodynamically lifted, continuously propelled atmospheric missile. - FOBS (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System): ICBM entering orbit before descending on target. - Hypersonic: System traveling at speeds of Mach 5+. - HGV (Hypersonic glide vehicle): Maneuverable body gliding at Mach 5+ at 15-50 km altitude. - ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile): Ground-based missile with range exceeding 5,500 km. - IRBM (Intermediate-range ballistic missile): Ground-based missile with range 3,000 to 5,500 km. - JCPOA: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015 Iran nuclear agreement). - LOW (Launch-on-Warning): Counterstrike launched upon detected inbound attack prior to detonation. - LRA (Long-Range Aviation): Russian bomber command. - MaRV (Maneuvering reentry vehicle): Reentry body capable of in-flight aerodynamic maneuvers. - MRBM (Medium-range ballistic missile): Ground-based missile with range 1,000 to 3,000 km. - MIRV (Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle): Multiple warheads on a single missile aimed at distinct targets. - New START: 2010 treaty between U.S. and Russia limiting deployed warheads to 1,550. - NFU (No First Use): Policy pledge not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by them. - NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty): 1968 global nuclear treaty recognizing five nuclear-weapon states. - PLA / PLAAF / PLAN / PLARF: Chinese People's Liberation Army and its Air Force, Navy, and Rocket Force branches. - RV (Reentry Vehicle): Conical payload carrying warhead through atmospheric reentry. - Road-mobile: Missiles launched from wheeled/tracked TEL vehicles. - SRBM (Short-range ballistic missile): Ballistic missile with range 300 to 1,000 km. - Silo: Hardened vertical underground missile launcher facility. - SRF (Strategic Rocket Forces): Russian ICBM military branch. - SLBM (Submarine-launched ballistic missile): Ballistic missile launched from a submarine. - SAM (Surface-to-air missile): Air defense missile launched from land or sea. - TEL (Transporter-Erector-Launcher): Mobile vehicle for carrying and erecting launch missiles. - Triad: Land, sea, and air legs of strategic nuclear delivery. - WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction): Nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.