CNS OCCASIONAL PAPER #61 · AUGUST 2024 Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities and Future Horizons Hanna Notte, PhD and Jim Lamson Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities and Future Horizons Authors: Hanna Notte, PhD Jim Lamson The views, assessments, judgments, and conclusions in this report are the sole representations of the authors and do not necessarily represent either the official position or policy, or bear the endorsement, of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, or the President and Trustees of Middlebury College. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies www.nonproliferation.org The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) strives to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis. CNS at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues. Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey www.miis.edu The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, a graduate school of Middlebury College, provides international professional education in areas of critical importance to a rapidly changing global community, including international policy and management, translation and interpretation, language teaching, sustainable development, and nonproliferation. 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Table of Contents Executive Summary _________________________________________________________ 4 Introduction _______________________________________________________________ 5 Methodology and Definitions _________________________________________________ 6 Historical Context: Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation before 2022 ___________________ 9 1990s-2000s ____________________________________________________________________ 9 2010s-February 2022____________________________________________________________ 10 Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities _____________________________ 11 Iranian support for Russia since February 2022 ____________________________________ 11 Russian support for Iran since February 2022 ______________________________________ 14 Key drivers and constraints _____________________________________________________ 17 Channels and actors____________________________________________________________ 21 Channels___________________________________________________________________________ 21 Iranian actors _______________________________________________________________________ 22 Russian actors_______________________________________________________________________ 24 Growing institutionalization____________________________________________________________ 26 Future Horizons___________________________________________________________ 27 Extrapolation of current trends, drivers, and constraints_____________________________ 27 Inventories of future needs and capabilities ________________________________________ 28 Iran's inventory of needs ______________________________________________________________ 28 Russia's inventory of needs ____________________________________________________________ 32 Scenarios and triggers of "step changes"___________________________________________ 33 Conclusion _______________________________________________________________ 34 About the Authors _________________________________________________________ 36 Appendix_________________________________________________________________ 37 Endnotes_________________________________________________________________ 46 Executive Summary Key Takeaways (1) Big leap forward. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Iran-Russia defense relationship has moved past the previous client-patron dynamic, with Iran emerging as an important provider of defense technology to Russia. Bilateral cooperation has expanded both in degree and in kind. In pre-existing areas of cooperation—such as electronic warfare, space, cyberspace, and military-to-military contacts—engagement has accelerated or deepened. Since 2022, Iran and Russia have also cooperated in entirely new areas. Those have included Iran’s provision of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), UAV production technology, and UAV training to Russia, alongside Iran’s multifaceted support for Russia’s ground war and assistance with expertise on evading sanctions. (2) The gloves are off. Since February 2022, what were historically key drivers of defense cooperation—a shared animosity toward the United States and the international order it promotes (including in the Middle East), and each side’s interest in military technology that the other side can offer—have increased in importance. Key constraints—Russia’s susceptibility to U.S. or Western pressure, causing it to limit cooperation with Iran; Russian concerns with adhering to nonproliferation norms and export control regimes; Russian reputational concerns over collaborating with Iran; Iran’s inability to pay for Russian technology; or historical mistrust—have become less relevant with Moscow’s growing dependence on Iran and its increased enmity toward the United States and Europe. (3) Growing institutionalization. Amid a general increase in numbers of mutual visits and high-level engagements among military and defense officials, Iran and Russia have taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship. Those have included work on a new strategic cooperation agreement to replace the one from 2001, forays into joint production of some weapon systems, and joint efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor and other infrastructure that should provide a further boost to defense cooperation. (4) Thinking about the future in three steps. We propose a three-step methodology to think through the contours of bilateral defense cooperation over the next three to five years. It involves a) extrapolating from current trend lines, drivers, and constraints; b) drawing up inventories of future military needs for each country and identifying the areas in which the other country could help meet those needs; and c) accounting for potential high-impact scenarios and developments that may trigger dramatic shifts in cooperation. The latter include various scenarios of war in the Middle East, the end of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, and regime change in either Russia or Iran. (5) Neither a transactional relationship nor a military alliance. Present trend lines and drivers suggest that the relationship is no longer purely transactional and will probably not lapse back into the patron-client dynamic that characterized it prior to 2022, even once the war in Ukraine ends. Iran and Russia each have specific military-technical needs that the other might help meet. That said, beyond Russia’s campaign against Ukraine, Iranian needs from Russia will be greater than Russian needs for advanced technology from Iran. Other constraints—chiefly both countries’ challenges in procuring advanced components because of sanctions, Russia’s aversion to antagonizing the Gulf Arab states, and Russia’s enduring technological superiority in key areas—will also likely continue to act as brakes on the defense relationship, precluding it from developing into a full-fledged military alliance. Introduction Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the country’s defense relationship with Iran has deepened and widened considerably. Since the summer of 2022, Tehran’s support has been critical for Moscow’s military campaign. As of May 2024, the Russian armed forces had launched at least 4,000 Iranian-designed Shahed drones against Ukraine while also benefiting from Iranian ammunition and support for Russia’s domestic drone production. Russia’s military campaign may benefit from Iranian ballistic missiles, though there is no clear evidence of transfers or their use against Ukraine yet. Finally, Iran has promised to share with Russia insights gained during its own experience in trying to circumvent and overcome the effects of Western sanctions. In return, Russia has stepped up its provision of sensitive military technology and assistance to Iran: In August 2022, Russia launched the Khayyam (Kanopus-V) imaging satellite for Iran, and it has generally stepped up its cooperation on space. In September 2023, it delivered two Yak-130 trainer aircraft to the Iranian Regular Air Force. According to the CIA, Russian technicians have been detected working on Iran’s space launch vehicle (SLV) program and other aspects of Iran’s missile programs. Commenting on this type of support, U.S. officials have raised the alarm over what they believe is an evolution to “a full-fledged defense partnership.” Yet, highly coveted items on Iran’s wish list—such as advanced fighter aircraft (Sukhoi Su-35) or advanced air defense systems (S-400)—have not yet been delivered by Russia. Potential reasons for the withholding of such assistance include a Russian caution not to antagonize its Gulf Arab partners, an inability of the Russian defense industry to produce sufficient quantities of high-end technologies for export because of the effects of sanctions, and a desire to retain some leverage amid its growing dependence on Iran. The deepening defense cooperation has unfolded against the backdrop of a growing alignment between Iran and Russia more generally. Though its origins precede the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, that alignment has greatly accelerated since, driven by Russia’s confrontation with Western states over Ukraine. Over the past two years, Russia has emerged as a de facto protector of Iran’s near-nuclear status. Enjoying Russian support, Iran became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in July 2023 and joined the expanded BRICS in January 2024. Russia and Iran have also deepened their collaboration in Syria after February 2022; this collaboration includes pushing back against the U.S. presence in the country. Russia’s growing tilt toward anti-Western forces in the Middle East—Iran and its partners and proxies in the “Axis of Resistance”—has gained further momentum since Hamas’s attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, and amid the ensuing war in Gaza. This study investigates the nature and anticipated future trajectory of the bilateral Iran-Russia defense relationship, addressing a number of questions: How is that relationship best characterized today (transactional vs. strategic), and based on what indicators? Which Iranian and Russian actors are primarily involved in military-technical cooperation, and through what channels is such cooperation being negotiated and executed? In which areas has cooperation evolved since February 2022, and what does that suggest about the future? In which areas do the two partners provide each other with intangible assistance, practicing knowledge diffusion? What are the drivers and constraints shaping the future defense relationship? What types of defense support may Iran and Russia need from each other over the coming three to five years? And which scenarios or “black swan” events may trigger sudden shifts in cooperation? This study proceeds as follows: Part 2 will provide relevant definitions and elaborate on the methodology employed and on the sources used by the authors in order to assess the current realities and future horizons of the Iran-Russia defense relationship. Part 3 will provide a brief historical overview of that relationship leading up to February 2022, characterizing it as largely transactional, one-way, and subject to clear constraints. Part 4 will detail the evolution of bilateral defense cooperation since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It will also provide an overview of the key Iranian and Russian actors involved, the channels available to both partners for cooperation (at the level of policy making and implementation), and the key drivers and constraints shaping cooperation. Part 5 will offer a methodology for assessing the future contours of Iran-Russia defense cooperation, taking into account a) an extrapolation of current observable trends, including drivers and constraints; b) an evaluation of future Iranian and Russian military needs and capabilities; and c) future scenarios and critical developments that may result in dramatic changes in cooperation. Part 6 will summarize the findings in a Conclusion. The study argues that Iran-Russia defense cooperation is evolving, having expanded in both kind and degree since February 2022 and slowly becoming more institutionalized. Present trend lines, drivers, and constraints suggest that the relationship is no longer transactional and will probably not lapse back into the patron-client dynamic that characterized it prior to 2022, even once Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine ends. That said, Iranian needs from Russia will continue to be greater than Russian needs for advanced technology from Iran. The study develops a three-step methodology to think through the contours of bilateral defense cooperation over the next three to five years. It involves a) extrapolating from current trend lines, drivers, and constraints; b) drawing up inventories of future military needs for each country and identifying the areas in which the other country could help meet those needs; and c) accounting for unforeseen scenarios and developments that may trigger nonlinear shifts in cooperation. Methodology and Definitions The following section provides relevant definitions and elaborates on the methodology employed and on the sources used by the authors in order to assess current and future Iran-Russia defense cooperation. Definitions Defense cooperation: In this report, we broadly define defense cooperation to include any collaboration that involves the transfer of weapons or military technologies, joint military training and exercises, and strategy and operations. We also consider collaboration in areas such as evading or overcoming trade sanctions and export controls, since such collaboration contributes to enhancing the defense capabilities of one or both sides. Although Iran and Russia have also cooperated in broader security areas—such as intelligence, counterterrorism, and internal security—these are not the main focus of this report. Types of diffusion: The study considers both mutual material assistance and the transfer of expertise or knowledge between Iran and Russia. Material assistance can include the transfer of hardware such as weapon systems, components, materials, equipment, and facilities. The transfer of expertise or knowledge can include the transfer of explicit and/or tacit knowledge, such as in the provision of training, technical expertise, and operational experience. Some types of diffusion, such as the transfer of production technology for weapon systems and important subsystems, involve both material assistance and knowledge transfers. Channels and actors: Channels refer to the mechanisms or pathways by which Iranian and Russian actors conduct military-technical cooperation; they can include one or more of the three main types listed below. This report makes this distinction with the view that the specific type of channel(s) being used for military-technical cooperation might have implications for detecting and analyzing the cooperation and for crafting effective policy options to address it. • Channel 1: Official, top-down: Cooperation in this channel is conducted under the framework of joint commissions and high-level meetings and is implemented according to government-to-government agreements. Importantly, this cooperation is driven by national-level requirements and then “tasked” to the appropriate organizations to implement. This channel includes cooperation on major weapon systems, technology transfer agreements, exercises, and training and education programs. • Channel 2: Officially sanctioned, low-level: Cooperation in this channel is conducted by low-level individual organizations and companies of one country that negotiate contracts or purchase orders with entities of the other country to acquire specific components, materials, or expertise. This cooperation is thus driven by the requirements of these individual entities and the programs they are implementing, whether driven by the Channel 1 cooperation or unrelated to it. The transfers under these low-level deals are approved by the exporter country’s export control authorities. • Channel 3: Not sanctioned, illicit: Cooperation in this channel includes cases in which assistance provided by organizations, companies, and individuals skirts the supplier country’s export controls without the government’s knowledge, as well as those in which the government is aware of the unauthorized export but turns a blind eye. The actors are the Iranian and Russian organizations and key individuals that negotiate, oversee, and implement military-technical cooperation. One can distinguish between two main levels of actors: • Political/command level: Relevant mainly to Channel 1, this level includes the higher-level Iranian and Russian political, military, and economic actors that are involved in the overall crafting of national policies and strategies and in negotiating and overseeing bilateral defense cooperation. • Implementation level: Relevant to Channels 1-3, this level includes the specific military, defense-industrial, and other organizations that conduct the actual cooperation. Cooperation at this level can include meetings of individual organizations, as well as joint working groups and specialized committees that operate under the framework of the Iran-Russia high-level joint commissions and agreements. Methodology for assessing future trajectories The main purpose of this report is to help analysts and policymakers think through the nature and future horizons of Iran-Russia defense cooperation over the next three to five years. To achieve this, it suggests three main components: • An extrapolation of current trends, drivers, and constraints: We assume that areas of potential future cooperation can be identified based on current (reported or suspected) Iran-Russia defense cooperation, as well as the key drivers and constraints affecting such cooperation today. • An evaluation of future Iranian and Russian needs and capabilities: We assume that future Iranian and Russian military-technical needs represent one key driver of future cooperation. The report presents “inventories” of important Iranian and Russian needs, as well as the capabilities (strengths) of the two countries in key areas. These inventories can help analysts and policy makers think about what kind of assistance Russia may seek from Iran (that is, where Russian needs and Iranian capabilities “match”), what Iran may seek from Russia (that is, where Iranian needs and Russian capabilities “match”), or what areas they may pursue jointly, either to benefit from advantages they both enjoy, or to jointly address shared needs. • An analysis of future scenarios and triggers for “step changes”: Lastly, we take into account that certain developments—such as war in the Middle East or regime change in either Iran or Russia—may trigger abrupt but significant (that is, nonlinear) step changes in cooperation. Sources The research for this project was predominantly grounded in Russian- and Persian-language primary and secondary sources (for example, official statements, press reporting, expert analysis, and relevant social media). These were augmented by Western media reports and analyses that capture important details from government and military sources or investigative journalists, that Iran and Russia have not publicly disclosed. In April 2024, the authors also convened a virtual workshop with 15 subject-matter experts on Russia’s and Iran’s defense sectors and militaries in order to vet initial findings and discuss the analysis and methodology. Insights generated during the discussion informed this report on a not-for-attribution basis. Caveats The analysis in this report comes with a few caveats: First, Iran-Russia defense cooperation is evolving in the context of a bilateral economic and political relationship that has blossomed since February 2022. Important economic developments have included the intensified pursuit of trade routes and infrastructure (such as the North-South Transport Corridor and the Rasht-Astara railway line) and efforts to connect both countries’ payment systems, among other measures. This report, however, will narrowly focus upon defense—especially military-technical—cooperation and will mention broader economic measures only insofar as they are relevant for context. Second, while much of Iran-Russia defense cooperation is bilateral in nature, the two countries are also cooperating on defense matters in various multilateral fora. The SCO, of which both are members, occasionally liaises on defense issues, and Iran and Russia have also conducted trilateral maritime drills with China. This report, however, will focus on bilateral defense cooperation. Historical Context: Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation before 2022 Russian assistance since the 1990s has played an important role in improving Iran’s current military capabilities, through both officially sanctioned support and, to a lesser extent, unofficial help from individual Russian companies and experts. Over the past decades, Iran-Russia military-technical cooperation experienced ups and downs or “turbulence” (por-faraz va nashib) and was mostly one-way—that is, Russian diffusion to Iran. It was constrained at times by at least three key factors: Russian political decisions to limit or halt cooperation (often as the result of U.S./Western pressure, sanctions, and incentives); technical problems, such as issues with Russian provision of maintenance and spare parts; and financial problems, such as Iran’s inability to pay. Despite claims by Iranian officials over the years that the bilateral relationship was “strategic” in nature, it remained in fact largely “transactional,” with some calling it a “marriage of convenience.” (For the purpose of this report, a transactional Iran-Russia relationship is one that is based on discrete, narrowly scoped, and shorter-term cooperation that can be disrupted relatively easily by disputes between the two countries, domestic politics, or by pressure from outside actors such as the United States. In contrast, a strategic Iran-Russia relationship includes longer-term cooperation across a broad range of defense and other security areas that can weather the ups and downs in the countries’ bilateral relationship or domestic politics, and can resist pressure from outside actors.) 1990s-2000s After its establishment in 1979 and during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran received very little military assistance from the Soviet Union, which supported Iraq at the time. After the end of the war, Tehran and Moscow improved relations and increased military cooperation, concluding a series of major arms deals between 1989 and 1991. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Iranian defense officials perceived a “golden opportunity” (forsat-e talai) in the 1990s for Iran to acquire advanced Russian technologies. During the 1990s and 2000s, Iran purchased an extensive array of conventional weapons from Russia across the ground, naval, and aerospace domains. These transfers included tanks and related production technology; anti-tank missiles; armored vehicles; submarines; torpedoes; combat aircraft; air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air missiles; helicopters; and radars. Iran also reportedly tried to purchase the Tu-22M “Backfire” bomber but was unsuccessful. Limitations on Russian cooperation with Iran emerged during the mid- to late 1990s with U.S. and Western pressure and incentives. In 1995, U.S. Vice President Al Gore signed a secret agreement with Russian Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, calling for an end to all Russian sales of conventional weapons to Iran by the end of 1999. Russia also joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) that same year. However, with the election of Vladimir Putin as president in 2000, the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement was canceled, and military cooperation increased. In 2001, Iran and Russia signed a military cooperation agreement and a 20-year agreement on mutual relations and principles of cooperation. During the 2000s the two sides held regular meetings at the defense minister level and of the Iran-Russia Joint Defense Commission. Iran also sought Russian assistance in missile technology. In the 1990s, according to former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Russian government stated its willingness to provide long-range missile technology, including assistance in increasing the accuracy of Iran’s ballistic missiles and in transferring intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology and rocket engines for missiles with a range of 4,000 kilometers (km). By the end of the 1990s, Iran had received assistance from numerous Russian companies and individuals, including technical expertise in developing the engine for the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), components related to the Soviet SS-4 ballistic missile and its RD-214 engine, missile guidance technology, missile-related materials, and missile-related training and education. In the 2000s, Iran sought the 9K720 Iskander-E and 9K79 Tochka-U short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), as well as the P-800 Yakhont and P-700 Granit anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), but these systems probably were not transferred. In the area of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) technology, Iran reportedly sought production technology, expertise, chemical weapons precursors, and dual-use biotechnology from Russian entities during the 1990s. In addition to military transfers, Iran sought various nuclear technologies from Russia and in 1992 concluded agreements on peaceful nuclear cooperation. During the 1990s, Iran negotiated with Russia for assistance in building nuclear power plants and a heavy-water nuclear research reactor, and also for technology related to nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as those for uranium mining and milling, uranium conversion, and uranium enrichment. In addition, Iran received technical training in Russia for its nuclear experts and reportedly obtained assistance from an individual Russian expert in nuclear weapons design. Iran also pursued space cooperation with Russia during the 1990s and 2000s, including on satellite development and Russian space launches. However, due to Russian halts to cooperation and other problems, Iranian officials viewed cooperation with Russia and its other foreign partners as a “bitter experience” (tajrobeh-ye talkh). Owing to international pressure, Russia cut back its space cooperation with Iran in the late 2000s. 2010s-February 2022 The year 2010 marked a low point in Iran-Russia defense cooperation, given Russia’s support for UN Security Council-mandated sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program, as well as Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s decision to suspend the delivery of S-300 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to Iran. The two sides entered a new phase of cooperation with Vladimir Putin’s return as president in 2012. Cooperation was further boosted with Russia’s entry into the Syrian civil war in September 2015. In 2015, Tehran and Moscow signed a new military and defense cooperation agreement, under which they would accelerate cooperation in military-technical fields. That same year, they also created a High Commission on Technology Cooperation that included committees on space and aviation. The two sides also held high-level meetings and conducted cooperation within the framework of their Joint Military Cooperation Commission. During the 2010s, especially the latter part of the decade, Iran and Russia negotiated and implemented cooperation in several areas, including the naval, ground, and air defense sectors as well as in strategic and operational areas. Tehran’s ambitious wish list for Russian support reportedly included combat aircraft, helicopters, the Yakhont supersonic ASCM, frigate-class surface ships, and submarines. Actual transfers included S-300 SAM systems (which were finally provided in 2016), radars, and jamming systems. The two sides also continued to cooperate in the nuclear domain, with Rosatom providing assistance to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant project. They reinvigorated space cooperation, including through an agreement that foresaw Russian assistance in developing and launching imaging and communications satellites, Iranian access to Russian satellite images, and Iran’s use of Russian GLONASS satellite navigation data for missile targeting during Iran’s ballistic missile strike in 2020 against U.S. military bases in Iraq. While Iran-Russia defense cooperation had been largely one-way through the 1990s and 2000s, Russia started showing interest in acquiring limited military-technical support from Iran in the mid-2010s. Following a Russian visit to Iran and negotiations with Iranian military officials in 2013, the two sides agreed to cooperate on development of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), and Russia reportedly sought technology transfer from Iran to produce long-range UAVs. In addition, in 2016, Iran allowed Russia to briefly use one of its air force bases to conduct air strikes in Syria and to use Iranian airspace to conduct cruise missile strikes against targets in Syria. Notwithstanding these sporadic Russian turns to Iran for support, the bilateral military-defense relationship largely remained characterized by a patron-client dynamic prior to February 2022. (For a summary, see also Table A1 in the Appendix.) Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities Iranian support for Russia since February 2022 Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, which started in February 2022, marked a watershed for Iran-Russia military-technical cooperation. In the months immediately preceding the invasion, Iran and Russia had already vowed to deepen and expand their defense relationship. In January 2022, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited Moscow, where he discussed plans for a 20-year strategic document for long-term (including defense) cooperation with President Putin. During the visit, President Raisi stated that Iran’s armed forces had made their choice in favor of Russian weapons and military equipment. Russia and Iran also held a meeting of their Joint Military Cooperation Commission in late 2021 to boost defense cooperation. After February 2022, Iran emerged as a critical supporter of Russia’s Ukraine campaign, both in the aerospace and ground domains, thereby ending the patron-client dynamic that had characterized the relationship for the better part of three decades. Most consequentially for its military campaign, Iranian combat UAVs improved Russia’s ability to suppress Ukrainian air defenses and to conduct long-range strikes on military and nonmilitary targets, forcing Ukraine to spend critical resources on air defenses. Since August 2022, Iran has transferred complete UAVs belonging to at least five different families to Russia: Mohajer-6 armed UAVs (at least three crashed or were shot down from 2022 to May 2024), Shahed-129 armed UAVs, Shahed-191 armed UAVs, Shahed-131 (Geran-1) and Shahed-136 (Geran-2) suicide UAVs, Shahed-238 jet-powered suicide UAVs, and Shahed-107 suicide UAVs (which belong to the Shahed-101 family). There have also been reports about potential deliveries of Shahed-101 suicide UAVs and about Russian interest in the longer-range Arash-2 suicide UAV. In late 2023, according to reports, Russia agreed to purchase anti-drone defensive systems from Iran. These reports may have been referring to the “hunter-killer” UAVs designed to destroy enemy drones that were shown to Russian engineers on a visit to Iran in April 2023. Since Russian operators were reportedly trained on Iranian Ababil-3 reconnaissance drones, it is also conceivable that Iran has provided those systems to Russia. Besides transferring complete UAV systems to Russia, Iran has also assisted its partner in indigenizing the production of UAVs on Russian and, possibly, Belarusian soil. Satellite imagery of the Alabuga drone factory in Russia’s Tatarstan region, taken in November 2023 and analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security, revealed significant activity at the factories where Shahed-136s had been assembled since midsummer 2023. Russian documents obtained by the Washington Post in August 2023 described plans for Russia to manufacture 6,000 Shahed-136s by the summer of 2025. Files released by an Iranian hacking group in February 2024 further indicated that Russia was seeking to license-produce several other types of Iranian drones, including two variants of a “236” drone—one powered by a turbojet engine, and one with a “seeker” powered by a piston engine—and the Shahed-107. Moreover, the documents suggested that Russia would try to produce up to 10,000 Shahed-136s per year. Several of the documents also described an April 2023 visit by a delegation of Russian engineers to Iran to watch a demonstration of a new jet-powered UAV (variants included the MS-237, Shahed-238, and Shahed-236), of which Russia agreed to purchase more than 600, with most of the systems to be produced in Russia with Iranian components and help. (As of May 2024, Russia was reportedly using Shaheds built entirely in Russia rather than systems transferred from Iran.) Iran-Russia co-production arrangements have also entailed joint work on new kinds of UAVs, including on a new engine for the Shahed-136 variant to increase its speed and range. Finally, Russian operators have received UAV training and assistance with use from Iranian instructors in Russia, Crimea, Belarus, Ukraine, and Syria. While the impact of Iranian UAVs has already been painfully felt by Ukraine, the prospect of Iranian deliveries of ballistic missiles to Russia has remained unconfirmed thus far—but it has alarmed both Ukraine and its Western partners. Reports of negotiations between Moscow and Tehran over the procurement of Fateh-110 (300-km range) and Zolfaghar (700-km range) solid-propellant SRBMs date back to at least the fall of 2022. Subsequent reporting suggested that Iran planned to wait until October 2023 and the expiration of missile-related provisions under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 before transferring missiles to Russia, or that Tehran would send missiles in modified versions that would be compliant with Resolution 2231. Rumors over prospective missile deals intensified again in fall 2023 and on the back of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s visit to Tehran, where his delegation toured an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) defense exhibition and was shown Iranian ballistic missiles, such as the Ababil, and cruise missiles, such as the Paveh land-attack cruise missile (LACM). Following the expiration of missile-related provisions under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, U.S. officials voiced concern on several occasions that Iran was finally preparing to provide Russia with Ababil close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs) and Fateh-110 SRBMs. Addressing the issue in January 2024, U.S. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated that Iran-Russia negotiations over CRBMs—possibly referring to the Ababil—were “actively advancing,” though the United States had not yet detected any Iranian deliveries. Subsequent media reports claimed that Iran had transferred 400 Fateh-110-family ballistic missiles to Russia in four shipments via the Caspian Sea and using aircraft. Though the U.K. defense secretary confirmed the shipment in March, there has been no concrete evidence of the transfer of the missiles or their use against Ukraine to date. While Iranian UAV and (possible) missile deliveries to Russia have caused considerable international furor, Iran’s support for Russia’s ground war in Ukraine has received less attention. That support has, however, been significant. During the first year of the war, Iran sent more than 300,000 artillery shells and one million rounds of ammunition to Russia. Iran’s deliveries have included various types of artillery shells (for example, 122 mm artillery shells, 115 mm and 125 mm armor penetration shells, and various types of high explosive rounds). Russia also received various types of small-arms ammunition from Iran for use in weapons such as pistols, assault rifles, and machine guns. Iranian assistance for Russia’s ground war has included 40 mm grenades for grenade launchers, 107 mm anti-tank rockets, mortar bombs, artillery rockets (for example, Iranian Arash 122 mm high-explosive fragmentation rockets, and 130 mm and 152 mm rockets), helmets and body armor. Iran has also provided Russia with glide bombs, a type of weapon that has proven instrumental to Russia’s more recent advances against Ukraine. Iran has developed several families of glide bombs for delivery by aircraft, so it is unclear which types Iran has transferred to Russia; however, most recently, reports have emerged of Iranian supplies of Qaem-5 UAV-delivered guided bombs to Russia. Finally, Iran has assisted Russia’s war effort in more indirect ways—sharing expertise and experience on how to circumvent or overcome the effects of sanctions and export controls—though the details are difficult to assess relying on open-source data. Having professed their intent to cooperate in this domain on multiple occasions, Iran and Russia signed a joint declaration “on ways and means to counter, mitigate and redress the adverse impacts of unilateral coercive measures” in December 2023. As of May 2024, the two countries were developing cooperation to counter Western sanctions and adopt joint strategies to neutralize the effects of Western sanctions. When considering Iranian assistance to Russia in this area, it is useful to distinguish between support that enhances Russia’s ability to evade sanctions and export controls (for instance, through illicit procurement strategies) on the one hand, and support aimed at helping Russia overcome the effects of sanctions through “strategic adaptation”—that is, learning and adaptation that affects national and military policy making, such as how states use their resources—on the other. This can include, for instance, the reverse engineering of foreign systems and critical technologies. Starting with techniques for evading sanctions, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif stated in December 2018 that “if there is an art we have perfected in Iran, it is the art of evading sanctions, and we can teach it to others for a price.” Since the 1980s, Iran has refined its strategies to evade trade sanctions and export controls, such as operating illicit procurement networks—including the use of foreign intermediaries and brokers, intelligence officials, and embassy officials based overseas—and employing deceptive techniques such as layered transactions, false end users, front and cover companies, and transshipment through third countries. Russia’s continuously high reliance on foreign inputs for its defense production suggests that it may benefit from such Iranian expertise on illicit procurement. A recent article in the Russian daily newspaper Kommersant, for instance, addressed U.S. sanctions on Russian airline Pobeda and quoted Russian experts suggesting that the company should follow tactics used by Iran’s Mahan Air. There are also reports that Russia may be benefiting from the use of Iran's illicit procurement networks, including an Iranian front company—Generation Trading FZE, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—to procure UAV components. Some analysts, however, have noted that Russia is already highly capable when it comes to skirting trade sanctions and export controls, having honed its craft over decades. These analysts doubt that there is much that Russia can learn from Iran. With regard to strategies for overcoming the effects of sanctions, it is conceivable that Russia may benefit from Iranian advice on “strategic adaptation” in select areas. Indeed, Iran has decades of experience in increasing the self-sufficiency of its defense production and reducing reliance on foreign suppliers—for instance, through “domestication” (bumi-sazi) of weapon systems and their critical technologies through technology transfer, reverse engineering, “parts manufacture” (ghateh-sazi), and other methods. Russian analysts have certainly taken note of successes and problems with import substitution in the Iranian defense industry. Russian support for Iran since February 2022 Russia has reciprocated in various ways for the unprecedented military support it has received from Iran. Since February 2022, Russian officials have professed their desire to develop military-technical cooperation and strengthen the combat potential of the Iranian armed forces on numerous occasions. In doing so, they have consistently asserted that any such efforts would fully comply with Russia’s obligations under international law. Over the past year, Moscow and Tehran have also repeatedly stated that their conclusion of a new strategic partnership treaty is imminent. In spring 2024, Iranian officials and media described the country’s military cooperation with Russia to include areas such as counterterrorism; tactical cooperation and operations such as moving toward the formation of a bilateral defense coalition; military training; joint exercises in the Caspian Sea, northern Indian Ocean, and Sea of Oman; participation in defense exhibitions; scientific, research, cultural, and sports cooperation; port visits; and the exchange of delegations at the level of defense ministers, chiefs of general staff of the armed forces, and force commanders. Besides intensifying such military-to-military engagement, Russia has lent assistance to Iran’s traditional (air, air defense, ground, naval) and asymmetric capabilities: It is in the area of advanced conventional weaponry that Iran has perhaps made the most progress in terms of checking off items on its long-standing “wish list” from Russia. Viewing foreign purchases as a “shortcut” (rah-e miyanbar) to complement Iran’s domestic research and development (R&D) and production efforts, Iranian defense officials have long sought billions of dollars’ worth of military equipment from Russia, including combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and radars. In November 2023, Iran’s deputy defense minister announced that Tehran had finalized a deal with Moscow for Su-35 fighter jets, Yak-130 training aircraft, and Mi-28 attack helicopters. To date, only the Yak-130 have been delivered. While there have been no known deliveries of Russian air defense systems to Iran since 2022, an Iranian delegation toured the NPP Start factory in Yekaterinburg, which produces mobile launchers and other components for anti-aircraft batteries (including the S-400), in March 2023. Israeli defense planners, in particular, have also been alarmed by Russian electronic warfare assistance to Iran. Russia has provided Iran with GPS denial and jamming capabilities, sharing lessons from its own use of electronic warfare in Syria. Iran is presently producing and deploying Cobra V8 jamming vehicles, which some analysts assess to be Iran’s version of the Russian 1RL257 Krasukha-4 (seen in commercial satellite imagery at Bandar Abbas in January 2024). The Krasukha-4 is considered to be one of Russia’s most sophisticated electronic warfare systems, designed to jam airborne or satellite-based fire control radars (such as JSTARS and AWACS) and possibly capable of GPS spoofing or jamming. Iran unveiled the Cobra V8, developed by the Defense Ministry’s Iran Electronics Industries (IEI), in September 2023, claiming that the system can intercept, analyze, and jam enemy radar signals to protect against air and missile attacks. While there is no hard evidence, it is not inconceivable that Iran received and reverse engineered the Krasukha-4 over the past decade. Russian assistance with production technology may well have extended to other areas of conventional weaponry. In recent years, Iran has produced the AK-133 assault rifle, apparently a licensed copy of the Russian AK-103. The start of its production was announced in 2017, shortly after Iran had officially announced the purchase of the first batches of AK-103. In 2022, Israeli defense sources also claimed that Iran was hoping Russia would not only sell it several warships, but also help it design more bespoke naval capabilities commensurate with Iran’s operational requirements. Iran has denied any interest in the joint production of warships with Russia but has not ruled out the pursuit of joint research. In the aviation domain, Iran and Russia have announced their intent to cooperate on overhauling and manufacturing airplanes and helicopters. In early 2023, Russia was training Iranian pilots on Russian fighter aircraft. In March 2024, Iran selected 40 MiG-29 pilots to start training on the Russian Sukhoi Su-35; some, according to reports, would undergo training in Russia, while others would do so in Iran using the Yak-130 trainer aircraft. There are also indications of Russian assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile program. In 2023, CIA director William J. Burns stated on at least two occasions that Russian technicians were working on Iran’s missile and SLV programs. Politico, citing unnamed diplomats, reported in April 2023 that Iran was conducting secret talks with Russia’s state-owned chemical producer FKP Anozit (and China) to purchase ammonium perchlorate (AP) for solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Several reports have also suggested an Iranian interest in Russian technology for hypersonic missiles, yet without providing concrete evidence that such assistance has indeed materialized. U.S. intelligence has indicated that Iran may be seeking Russian help for its nuclear program, specifically nuclear materials and assistance in nuclear fuel fabrication. Representatives of Rosatom and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) have interacted frequently, and Iran has started participating in projects at St. Petersburg’s Konstantinov Institute of Nuclear Physics, which is part of the Kurchatov Institute research center. That said, there is no evidence of Russia directly assisting Iran in areas relevant to producing a nuclear weapon. Rather, as indicated earlier, Russian support for Iran’s high nuclear latency has materialized mostly in the form of diplomatic backing. Another area in which Russian assistance to Iran has intensified since February 2022 is space. In August 2022, Russia launched the Khayyam (Kanopus-V) imaging satellite for Iran. Three months later, Iran stated it planned to manufacture the Khayyam-2, -3, and -4 satellites with Russian help. In December 2022, the two countries concluded an agreement on space cooperation relating to the manufacture of remote sensing and communications satellites, the creation of a laboratory infrastructure, assembly, launch base, and satellite testing, as well as the dispatch of an Iranian astronaut to the Russian space station. According to further Iranian news reports, Russia committed to launching additional Iranian satellites, jointly developing a scientific research satellite with Iran, and providing technical assistance in developing imaging satellites. In February 2024, Russia launched an Iranian-developed imaging satellite into orbit. Against the backdrop of this intensification in Russian defense assistance to Iran, the latter has extracted military-technical benefits from Russia’s war against Ukraine in two additional ways: First, Russia has provided Iran with Western-origin military technology captured on the battlefield in Ukraine. Such technology has, at a minimum, included a British NLAW anti-tank missile, a U.S. Javelin anti-tank missile, and a U.S. Stinger anti-aircraft missile. It must be assumed that Tehran will study such technology to develop countermeasures or to reverse engineer the technology. Second, Iran is learning technical and operational lessons from Russia’s use of missiles and UAVs (including Iranian ones) in Ukraine, including insights about Western air defenses. The evolution of Russia’s use of drones and missiles over the course of its military campaign should have further enriched such Iranian learning. In Ukraine, Iranian UAVs have been tested against a broad range of defensive assets, including Western and Russian SAM systems and electronic warfare capabilities. Iranian drones have complemented more expensive long-range cruise and ballistic missiles in complex heterogeneous attacks, generating additional lessons for Iranian defense planners. Specific Iranian insights may relate to how Russia “shadows” drones in Ukraine—that is, mirrors an adversary UAV’s flight path with its own UAVs to evade defenses. According to some reports, Russia shares assessments of weapons used against Ukraine’s NATO-equipped forces with Iran in real time. In light of this knowledge diffusion, some analysts were quick to suggest that Iran’s large drone and missile salvo against Israel on April 13, 2024, resembled Russian strike packages used against Ukraine. However, while Iran may have gleaned operational and technical insights from Russia’s campaign, it had already developed and emphasized (in statements, exercises, and operations) well before 2022 the operational principles that characterized the April 13 attack. In September 2019, for instance, the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF) conducted strikes against Saudi Arabian oil facilities with a mix of approximately eighteen Shahed suicide UAVs and seven “351” LACMs. In January 2021, IRGC-ASF Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh stated that after years of experience, a new capability was created in the IRGC-ASF by combining missiles and drones in hybrid operations (amaliyat-e tarkibi). A final area in which Russia assistance to Iran has intensified against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine relates to ties with Tehran’s partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance. Prior to February 2022, any Russian political contacts with or security assistance to such groups were sporadic (perhaps with the exception of Iran-backed groups in Syria, with which Russia collaborated more intensively from 2015). After February 2022, Moscow relinquished several key positions in central and eastern Syria to Iran-backed militias and to Hezbollah, while also ramping up intelligence sharing with Iran-backed militias and supplying Hezbollah with anti-ship missiles via Syria. In addition, Russia gave a green light for Iran to upgrade Syria’s air defenses. Such support provided a major boost to these groups’ operational capabilities, enabling them to target U.S. interests in eastern Syria with increased frequency and precision. After October 7, amid its general anti-Israel tilt, Russia stepped up electronic jamming from its Hmeymim base in western Syria, disrupting Israel’s commercial air traffic. According to Iranian news outlets, Hezbollah struck Israel’s Meron air control base with Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles in January 2024, suggesting that Moscow may have been funneling arms to the militant group. U.S. officials warned that the Wagner Group may provide air defense systems to Hezbollah. There were also reports in October 2023 that Tehran and Moscow had agreed on assisting the IRGC Quds Force in bypassing Israeli countermeasures against the smuggling of Iranian weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah. As the Gaza war continued amid an intensification of Israeli strikes against Iran-linked targets in Syria, Russia’s Hmeymim base reportedly emerged as a Russian-protected hub for Iranian weapons and technology transfers to Syria and Lebanon. Although not a focus of this report, Iran and Russia have also cooperated on intelligence and counterterrorism matters. This has included a 2023 security-intelligence cooperation agreement—including the areas of counterintelligence, intelligence sharing, and countering cyberattacks—as well as cooperation on counterespionage, digital surveillance, monitoring and disrupting cell-phone communications, counterterrorist combat operations, and plans to adopt joint strategies to deal with piracy and to address “emerging threats.” Since 2022, Russia has upped its cyber assistance to Iran, providing its partner with digital surveillance capabilities. Cyberattacks against targets in Israel have increased significantly since October 7, 2023, and Israeli sources assume that such attacks, emanating from Iran or actors associated with it, have benefited from advanced Russian cyber capabilities. Key drivers and constraints Iran-Russia defense cooperation, as detailed above, has been shaped by a number of key drivers and constraints that have evolved since February 2022. An analysis of these drivers and constraints is useful in anticipating future horizons of the defense relationship. We define drivers and constraints as that set of factors that shape—by motivating/enabling or inhibiting/disincentivizing—Iran-Russia military-technical cooperation. Such drivers and constraints can be political, military, legal, economic, financial, technical, reputational, or organizational in nature. Some may predate 2022, whereas others are new; some of them may be shaped by actions of the United States or its allies, while others are immune to outside pressure. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the key drivers and constraints shaping the Iran-Russia defense relationship, information on since when they have been present, how important they are today, and why. Table 1. Drivers of Iran-Russia defense cooperation - Driver: Russia-Ukraine war as new opportunity | Type: Multiple | Present since: February 2022 | Assessed importance: High | Additional information: Similar to the “golden opportunity” that Iran perceived in the 1990s. - Driver: Shared animosity vis-à-vis the United States and U.S./Western-led international order; shared interest in decreasing U.S. military presence in Middle East | Type: Political, Military | Present since: Russia: At least since 2012; Iran: Long-standing | Assessed importance: High (increasing importance since February 2022) | Additional information: --Divsallar: “Common threat perceptions” are one of the two main “pillars of security convergence” for Russia and Iran. --Smagin: Russia and Iran are “drawing ever closer, united in their opposition to the United States.” - Driver: Iranian interest in Russian technology, expertise | Type: Military, Technical | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: High | Additional information: Driven by Iran’s asymmetric military strategy as well as by its longer-term efforts to modernize its “traditional” military capabilities. - Driver: Russian interest in Iranian technology, expertise | Type: Military, Technical | Present since: 2010s, but mostly since February 2022 | Assessed importance: High | Additional information: Driven mostly by Russia’s needs for its military campaign against Ukraine and less by its military strategic needs and view of future warfare. - Driver: Rise of Iranian hardliners | Type: Political | Present since: 2000s, especially since 2018 | Assessed importance: High | Additional information: --Geranmayeh/Grajewski: “A significant factor pushing Iran to support Russia’s war in Ukraine is the rise of hardliners and the deep state in monopolising decision-making.” - Driver: End of restrictions per UNSCR 2231 (2015) | Type: Legal, Political, Technical | Present since: October 2020 (arms imports and exports); October 2023 (ballistic missile technology) | Assessed importance: Medium | Additional information: --Iranian Defense Minister Hatami, October 2020: “Many countries have approached Iran since last year, and we conducted a series of negotiations…Without a doubt, we will sell far more than we buy.” --Regarding reports of Iranian transfers of ballistic missiles to Russia, unnamed Iranian official, February 2024: “There is no reason to hide it. We are allowed to export weapons to any country that we wish to.” - Driver: Vladimir Putin as president | Type: Political | Present since: 2012 | Assessed importance: Medium | Additional information: --Kozhanov: “The beginning of a new period in Russian-Iranian relations was marked by the return to the Kremlin of President Vladimir Putin in 2012.” - Driver: Geographic proximity | Type: Additional | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: Medium | Additional information: Enables shipping of relevant items via the Caspian Sea; new trade routes being developed. - Driver: Problems with the quality and quantity of North Korean transfers to Russia | Type: Additional | Present since: Recent | Assessed importance: Unclear | Additional information: Reports of quality problems with North Korean artillery shells and missiles shipped to Russia; might push Russia to seek even more Iranian munitions and missiles. Table 2. Constraints inhibiting Iran-Russia defense cooperation - Constraint: International and national export controls, trade controls | Type: Technical, Legal, Political | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: High | Additional information: Complicating Russia’s and Iran’s ability to procure sensitive technologies from third parties; exacerbating Iranian and Russian S&T, industrial, and supply chain weaknesses and vulnerabilities. - Constraint: Iran’s emphasis on self-sufficiency | Type: Contextual | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: Medium | Additional information: Iran wants to minimize its reliance on Russia (or any other foreign supplier), which may limit some types of cooperation. Iran will still seek advanced weapons and technologies in select areas, especially for capabilities it cannot produce itself and especially if it can obtain production technology and training. In 2020, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif said that “although Iran’s armed forces seek to achieve self-sufficiency, Tehran can still benefit from military cooperation with Moscow.” - Constraint: Limits in Iran’s capability to assimilate or integrate advanced, state-of-the-art weapons/equipment | Type: Military, Technical | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: Medium (for advanced Russian systems) | Additional information: This might delay or disrupt Iran’s assimilation of advanced Russian weapons such as combat aircraft and SAM systems and require long-term Russian support. - Constraint: Iran’s inability to pay | Type: Economic, Financial | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: Medium (declining importance) | Additional information: March 2024 DNI threat assessment: “Budgetary constraints will slow the pace and scale of [Iran’s conventional weapons] acquisitions.” However, while Iran’s inability to pay was an important constraint on occasion in the past, it may be less important now that it can barter or conduct arms trade with Russia via credit. - Constraint: Russia’s membership in multilateral export control regimes / nonproliferation treaties | Type: Legal, Political | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: Medium (less important since February 2022) | Additional information: This might limit what technologies Russia might transfer to Iran. However, this constraint will be less important if Moscow relaxes its export controls on transfers to Iran. - Constraint: Russia’s relations with GCC, Israel | Type: Political | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: Medium (still important, at least for GCC) | Additional information: Russia has previously been reluctant to supply Iran with high-end systems, given concerns over antagonizing Israel or the GCC states. In the CNS expert workshop in April, several participants argued that Russia’s ties with Saudi Arabia/UAE will likely cause Russia to continue to exercise some caution. - Constraint: Historical mistrust | Type: Contextual | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: Medium (anecdotal evidence that of decreasing importance) | Additional information: Commenting on the visit of an Iranian delegation to the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in February 2023, Russian defense analyst Yuri Lyamin noted that the head of the IRGC Aerospace Force’s Research and Self-Sufficiency Jahad Organization participated, which “speaks of a very high level of trust between the parties.” - Constraint: Russia’s relationship with the United States; U.S./West use/threat of sanctions | Type: Political | Present since: 1990s | Assessed importance: Low (since February 2022) | Additional information: --Geranmayeh/Grajewski: “Previously, the West managed to negotiate with Moscow to isolate Tehran, but this is clearly not possible now given Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.” --Past examples: 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement; Moscow’s halt to the transfer of the S-300 SAM in 2010. - Constraint: Russian concerns with international backlash | Type: Reputational | Present since: Constant | Assessed importance: Low (since February 2022) | Additional information: Today, Moscow is likely less concerned with international criticism for providing assistance to Iran. - Constraint: Russian bureaucratic politics | Type: Bureaucratic, Legal | Present since: Constant | Assessed importance: Low (less important with greater institutionalization of defense relationship) | Additional information: Ali Abdollahi, deputy chief of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff: “I see very good prospects and directions for the development of bilateral cooperation. Of course, some of Russia’s internal rules are very demanding, but I think that it is possible and necessary to find the necessary solutions in order to speed up this cooperation.” - Constraint: Russian concerns with giving Iran access to advanced military technology | Type: Multiple | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: Unclear | Additional information: Iran might reverse engineer Russian weapons, systems, components, equipment (for its own use and for transfers and exports). - Constraint: Russian sense of enduring military-technological superiority | Type: Military, Technical | Present since: Long-standing | Assessed importance: Unclear (anecdotal evidence) | Additional information: In the CNS expert workshop in April, several participants argued that Russia’s defense establishment continued to look down upon Iran as a defense partner, suggesting that this attitude will continue to limit the depth and breadth of future cooperation. Channels and actors Channels During the 1990s and 2000s, Iran-Russia defense cooperation was guided in large part by high-level agreements and joint military cooperation commissions (Channel 1). However, lower-level Iranian entities also reportedly sought and received assistance and expertise from individual Russian entities and individuals—for example, missile and CBW technology—either approved by Moscow (Channel 2) or that skirted Russian export controls (Channel 3). Reported missile technology transfers from Russian entities and individuals to Iran in the 1990s that either avoided Russian export controls or that Russian authorities ignored are an example of cooperation conducted through Channel 3. Unrelated to Russia, two other prominent examples involved Iran’s illicit acquisition of Kh-55 cruise missiles from Ukraine in 2001 and Iran’s unsuccessful attempt to illicitly obtain Kh-31 cruise missile components, similarly from Ukraine, in 2018. Since the 2010s and especially after February 2022, most—if not all—bilateral military-technical cooperation appears to have been discussed, negotiated, and implemented via Channel 1 through the Iran-Russia Joint Military Cooperation Commissions and in high-level bilateral meetings at the levels of presidents, national security council heads, defense ministers, chiefs of general staff, and other high-level military and defense-industrial officials. This channel includes what Iranian officials refer to as “defense diplomacy” (diplomasi-e defai) and “technology diplomacy” (diplomasi-e fanavari). Channel 1 also includes Iranian and Russian participation in defense exhibitions and conferences in their countries. Channel 2 (low-level, approved cooperation) appears to be less important, but probably would be more difficult to detect, especially in open sources; as will be shown later, it may increase in the future, should the defense relationship undergo further institutionalization. With Russia’s declining commitment to export control and nonproliferation regimes, illicit cooperation (Channel 3) should become less salient because exporters would not need to find ways to skirt controls that the government is not enforcing. The agreements that have guided Channel 1 cooperation since 2022 have included the 2015 military and defense cooperation agreement mentioned above, a 2023 security-intelligence cooperation agreement, a 2023 agreement on improving cooperation between the two sides’ ground forces, and a 2024 memorandum of understanding (MOU) to increase cooperation in unspecified “strategic” areas. During 2021-2024, the two sides have worked to finalize a strategic long-term (20-year) cooperation agreement—to include military and military-technical cooperation—that will replace the 20-year cooperation agreement from 2001. As of mid-June 2024, this process was on hold due to unspecified issues faced by Tehran, but both sides appeared confident that it would soon resume. Iranian delegations have also held bilateral meetings with Russian counterparts when attending the annual Moscow Security Conference and “Army” Forum. The Iran-Russia Joint Military Cooperation Commission reportedly meets every year in Tehran or Moscow and determines the annual programs of bilateral defense cooperation. Assuming it operates similarly to the two countries’ Joint Economic Cooperation Commission and High Commission on Technology Cooperation, the Joint Military Cooperation Commission probably addresses issues such as negotiating road maps for long-term cooperation, including specific projects to implement; creating specialized committees and working groups (co-led by Iranian and Russian officials) that negotiate agreements and MOUs on specific topics of cooperation; concluding contracts to implement the projects; and reviewing the status of agreed areas of cooperation and addressing any problems. Iranian actors The Iranian actors are the organizations (and key individuals linked to them) that are involved in negotiating, overseeing, and implementing military-technical cooperation with Russia, either at the higher political/command level or the implementation level. (See also Figure A1 in the Appendix.) Iranian political/command-level actors: This level includes the higher-level Iranian political and military actors involved in the overall crafting of national policies and strategies, and in negotiating and overseeing military-technical cooperation with Russia via Channel 1. Cooperation at this level can include meetings of political and military leaders as well as Iran-Russia joint commissions. Key Iranian political/command-level actors that are likely involved in Iran-Russia defense cooperation—either captured in reporting or suspected based on their organizational functions—include the following: • Office of the Supreme Leader: As the ultimate decision maker in Iran and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would make the top-level decisions regarding Iran-Russia defense cooperation, with inputs from key defense and foreign policy advisors. In 2019, Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Mohammad Bagheri stated that Khamenei attached special importance to the development of relations with Russia. • Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS): The SCNS, which has a Defense Committee, determines and coordinates Iran’s defense-security policies—approved by the supreme leader—and would likely approve and coordinate high-level policy and strategy related to Iran-Russia defense cooperation. The SCNS secretary—previously Ali Shamkhani and currently Ali Akbar Ahmadian—has held discussions with his Russian counterpart in recent years to expand security cooperation, and SCNS officials have been involved in negotiations with Russia on weapons transfers. • Office of the President: The death of President Ebrahim Raisi (and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian) in May 2024 and the subsequent surprise election of reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian to the presidency on July 6 likely will not significantly impact Iran-Russia defense cooperation, since the supreme leader, SCNS, and high-level military officials are the most important strategic decision makers on these matters. While President Pezeshkian may enjoy leeway to pursue modest economic reforms and social liberalization, and while it cannot be excluded that Iran under him may seek to revive diplomacy on the nuclear dossier and sanctions relief with the West after the November 2024 U.S. presidential elections, Iran's regional policy and its alignment with China and Russia are unlikely to fundamentally change. • Defense Ministry: Although the defense minister is technically part of the president’s cabinet, the Defense Ministry is for all intents and purposes a military organization and official member of Iran’s armed forces, according to Iranian laws. The ministry, which is responsible for supporting Iran’s armed forces, oversees the various organizations that conduct R&D and production of weapons and equipment and that would be involved in implementing cooperation with Russia. • Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters (KCHQ): The AFGS and its direct counterpart, the KCHQ, are the highest-level military organizations in Iran, reporting to the supreme leader. The AFGS is responsible for policymaking, administration, and coordination for all of Iran’s armed forces, including on military strategies and plans as well as defense science and technology (S&T), research, and production activities. In this role, the AFGS would likely oversee and coordinate operational and technical aspects of Iran-Russia military cooperation. The KCHQ is the country’s highest operational command of the armed forces, including command of crisis and wartime operations, other military operations, and military exercises. In this role, the KCHQ would likely be involved in operational aspects of Iran-Russia military cooperation. • IRGC and Artesh: As Iran’s two parallel military combat organizations, the IRGC and Artesh have been involved in various aspects of military cooperation with Russia. The IRGC and Artesh oversee their parallel combat forces—air, air defense, naval, and ground—and the IRGC also controls its paramilitary Quds Force. The two organizations also oversee their own Research and Self-Sufficiency Jahad Organizations (RSSJOs) that are involved in weapons R&D and production, separate from the Defense Ministry. For a detailed overview of these political/command-level actors, see also Table A2 in the Appendix. Iranian implementation-level actors: This level includes the lower-level military, defense-industrial, and other organizations that have been reported or assessed to conduct defense cooperation with Russia. Cooperation at this level can include meetings of individual organizations as well as joint working groups and specialized committees under the framework of the high-level Iran-Russia joint commissions and agreements. Key actors that might be in involved in Iran-Russia cooperation—either captured in reporting or suspected based on their organizational functions—include: • Office of the President: Entities under the Office of the President have conducted cooperation with Russia, including the Department (Vice President) for S&T and Knowledge-Based Economy, the AEOI, and the ISA. • Defense Ministry: Several Defense Ministry departments and organizations have been involved in military-technical cooperation with Russia and several more could work with Russia, depending on the future scope of cooperation. These entities include departments related to research, industries, and international affairs, as well as the Defense Ministry’s defense-industrial organizations that would collaborate on UAVs, ballistic missiles, and other weapons and technologies. • IRGC and Artesh: The IRGC Aerospace Force and its RSSJO have reportedly collaborated with Russia—including on Iranian UAV transfers and training as well as negotiations on ballistic missiles—and other IRGC and Artesh organizations could work with Russia on operational and technical issues, depending on the future scope of cooperation. • Private companies: Iranian knowledge-based (danesh-bonyan) companies have worked with Russia on space technology—for example, to have Russia launch privately developed Iranian satellites—and others could work with Russia in key technologies such as UAV or cruise missile engines as cooperation develops. For a detailed overview of these implementation-level actors, see also Table A3 in the Appendix. These Iranian implementation organizations execute work under contracts finalized as part of cooperation established under Channel 1. However, they can also conclude contracts and orders with Russian companies to purchase technologies that support Iranian R&D and production programs (unrelated to the higher-level cooperation) under Channel 2, separate from the Channel 1 cooperation. With increasing defense ties and a possible loosening of Russian export controls on sensitive technologies to Iran, we could see an expansion of such Iranian purchases from Russian companies to support Tehran’s own weapons programs. Russian actors The Russian actors are the organizations (and key individuals linked to them) that are involved in negotiating, overseeing, and implementing military-technical cooperation with Iran, either at the higher political/command level or the implementation level. (See also Figure A2 in the Appendix.) Russian political/command-level actors: This level includes the higher-level Russian political and military actors involved in the overall crafting of national policies and strategies, and in negotiating and overseeing military-technical cooperation with Iran via Channel 1. Key Russian political/command-level actors that are likely involved in Iran-Russia cooperation—either captured in reporting or suspected based on their organizational functions—include the following: • Presidential Administration: The president of the Russian Federation is the ultimate decision maker in Russia and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and would make the top-level decisions regarding Iran-Russia military cooperation, with inputs from his key military, defense, and foreign policy advisors. • Ministry of Defense: The Ministry of Defense plays a key role in negotiating and overseeing defense cooperation with Iran. In September 2023, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu led a Russian delegation to an IRGC defense exhibition in Tehran, underscoring the ministry’s role in weapons procurement from Iran. • Ministry of Foreign Affairs; other ministries: The Russian Foreign Ministry is involved in negotiating, deciding, and overseeing aspects of military-defense cooperation with Iran. For instance, it is involved in talks on the planned long-term strategic cooperation agreement. Similarly, it signed the “Declaration on means of counteracting and compensating for the negative consequences of sanctions” with its Iranian counterpart in December 2023. Overall, however, the Foreign Ministry’s role in shaping defense cooperation has probably decreased since February 2022, given the reduced focus on ensuring compliance with international export controls and nonproliferation norms. Russian ministries involved in the Joint Economic Commission with Iran may also be involved in cooperation that has military dimensions and implications for defense cooperation. The Joint Economic Commission has 20 working groups, on topics such as transport, information technologies, trade and investment, and science and education. Cooperation in specific areas can also involve other ministries. Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media, for instance, liaises with Iran on cooperation in the field of AI. Russian implementation-level actors: This level includes the lower-level military, defense-industrial, and other organizations that have been reported or assessed to conduct military cooperation with Iran. Key implementation actors that might be in involved in Iran-Russia cooperation—either captured in reporting or suspected based on their organizational functions—include the following: • Ministry of Defense: The Ministry of Defense is key to cooperation with Iran not only at the level of political decision making but also implementation. Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin is responsible for bilateral defense cooperation with Iran (among other countries) and has led Russian delegations to discuss military-technical cooperation with Iranian counterparts. • General Staff of the Armed Forces: Russia’s chief of the General Staff is involved in overseeing operational aspects of military cooperation with Iran. Valery Gerasimov gained considerable experience in coordinating with Iran during Russia’s military campaign in Syria from September 2015. Gerasimov and Iran’s AFGS chief (or their deputies) have met on various occasions to discuss military cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries. • Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC): The FSMTC is the federal executive body responsible for control and oversight in the field of military-technical cooperation between Iran and Russia. Led by Dmitry Shugaev, the FSMTC is managed by the president and subordinate to the Defense Ministry, which coordinates and controls its activities. • Rosoboronexport: Rosoboronexport is Russia’s official state intermediary for the export and import of military and dual-use products, technologies and services. It is part of Rostec State Corporation, a Russian state-owned defense conglomerate. A Rostec representative office operates in Iran. Its stated mandate is to “ensure the interests of Rosoboronexport” in Iran. • State and private companies: Various subsidiaries of Rostec are likely involved in military-technical cooperation with Iran. Those include, among others, Kamaz, Uralvagonzavod, and United Aircraft Corporation. Other companies include Almaz Antey, Tactical Missiles Corp., and United Shipbuilding Corp. Growing institutionalization We observe a trend of growing institutionalization in contacts between these various Iranian and Russian actors. Indicators of this trend include a general increase in numbers of mutual visits and high-level engagements; work on a new strategic cooperation agreement to replace the one from 2001; forays into joint production of weapon systems; and joint efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor, which will provide an infrastructural boost to defense cooperation. Importantly, should Iran and Russia further institutionalize their defense relationship—especially with expanding military-technical cooperation—this may lead to an expansion of activity, both under Channel 1 and Channel 2. With the increasing scope and depth of defense cooperation, there may be more contracts between Iranian and Russian companies that are driven by Channel 1 top-down cooperation, including areas agreed upon under the high-level joint commissions and agreements. We may also see an expansion of contracts and purchase orders by Iranian companies to procure Russian technologies to support Iranian R&D and production programs that are not part of the Channel 1 cooperation. This might be enabled by Russian export control authorities allowing expanded exports of controlled technologies—such as those listed under the MTCR and WA—to Iran as part of the enhanced defense relationship. (Activity under Channel 1 and Channel 2 can be viewed as roughly analogous to the U.S. Department of Defense’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) channel versus Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) channel for exporting defense goods. FMS cooperation—similar to Channel 1—is conducted as part of an official government-to-government agreement, while DCS, like Channel 2, is done at the commercial level and approved by U.S. export control authorities.) Lastly, expansion of Channel 2 activities might also include joint Iran-Russia efforts to procure commercial and dual-use technologies from third countries such as China. Here is a notional example to illustrate this possible expansion: In a future meeting of the Iran-Russia Joint Military Commission, the two sides agree to include cruise missile cooperation as a topic on the agenda and then create a cruise missile working group under the auspices of the commission. They then agree to establish a program (and negotiate a contract) to transfer the production technology of a Russian supersonic cruise missile to Iran. The lower-level Iranian cruise missile producer tasked with implementing this program might then purchase various items (components, materials, equipment) from Russian companies necessary to support this effort. In addition—and unrelated to the commission’s work—an Iranian cruise missile producer, encouraged by the enhanced Iran-Russia relationship, might seek to purchase various items from Russian companies—such as missile engine or guidance components—to support Iran’s indigenous R&D and production programs (unrelated to Russia), with those purchases getting approved by Russian export control authorities. In that way, increased institutionalization might lead to an expansion of Iranian procurement activity under Channel 2, both that driven by Channel 1 cooperation and that driven by the needs of Iran’s internal programs. Future Horizons Extrapolation of current trends, drivers, and constraints The review of military-technical support that Iran and Russia have provided to each other since February 2022—when augmented with the assessment of drivers and constraints—suggests certain trend lines going forward. In other words, one way of thinking about the future contours of Iran-Russia defense cooperation is to extrapolate from current trends, assuming that those will continue unless major developments interfere. Iran-Russia defense cooperation since February 2022 has been characterized by a number of key trends: • Expansion of cooperation into new areas (changes in kind): Since 2022, Iran and Russia have cooperated in entirely new areas. Those have included: Iran’s provision of UAVs, UAV production technology, and UAV training to Russia; negotiations to transfer Iranian ballistic missiles; Iran’s provision of expertise to Russia on evading and overcoming sanctions; and Iran’s provision of ammunition, artillery shells, rockets, and glide bombs to Russia. • Acceleration of cooperation in existing areas (changes in degree): In some areas in which Iran and Russia already used to engage prior to 2022, cooperation has accelerated or deepened (compared to the 2000s and 2010s). Those have included: electronic warfare, space, cyber, military-to-military engagement, and possibly Russian support for Iran’s missile programs. • End of patron-client dynamic: The Iran-Russia military-technical relationship is no longer marked by a patron-client dynamic, since Iran has emerged as an important source of material support and expertise to Russia. • Growing institutionalization: Iran and Russia have taken steps to institutionalize their defense relationship, as detailed in the previous section. Some steps driving growing institutionalization were initiated after February 2022, while other efforts have been underway since the mid-2010s. Moreover, as became evident in the overview of historical drivers and constraints shaping the bilateral defense relationship, key drivers have increased in importance since February 2022. Those have included a shared animosity vis-à-vis the United States and the international order it promotes (including in the Middle East), and mutual interest in military technology that the other side has to offer, among others. Meanwhile, some of the key constraints previously affecting the defense relationship have arguably decreased in importance since February 2022. Those have included: Russian susceptibility to U.S. or Western pressure, causing it to limit cooperation with Iran; Russia’s concerns with adhering to nonproliferation norms and export control regimes; Iran’s inability to pay for Russian technology; and historical mistrust. That said, certain constraints—chiefly both countries’ supply chain vulnerabilities due to export controls and sanctions; Russia’s aversion to antagonizing the GCC, and possibly Russia’s enduring technological superiority in key areas—may continue to act as brakes on the defense relationship. Neither a transactional relationship nor a military alliance We suggest that, barring significant developments or “black swan” events—such as regime change in either Iran or Russia, or the outbreak of a Middle Eastern war engulfing Iran—these trend lines, drivers, and constraints should continue to characterize the bilateral defense relationship over the coming three to five years. Enduring constraints should preclude the formation of a full-fledged military-strategic partnership and especially a military alliance. That said, present trend lines suggest that the relationship is no longer purely transactional and will probably not lapse back into the patron-client dynamic that characterized it prior to 2022. An additional indicator that suggests that the defense relationship has exceeded transactionalism is the occurrence of non-quid-pro-quo engagements. Tehran has already accrued considerable non-military benefits from its provision of drones to Russia—such as support for its accession to the BRICS and SCO and Russia’s diplomatic shielding of Iran’s high nuclear latency—that make the relationship more than just transactional from Iran’s perspective. Inventories of future needs and capabilities In addition to extrapolating from current trend lines, it is possible to conceive of the future defense relationship as being shaped by Iranian and Russian anticipated military needs (including needs that may not shape weapons procurement, defense production, or military planning and force posture today, but may do so in the future, given Iranian or Russian assessments of the future of warfare). This section presents “inventories” of important Iranian and Russian needs, as well as their capabilities (strengths) in key areas. These inventories can help analysts and policy makers think about what type of assistance Russia may seek from Iran in the future (that is, where Russian needs and Iranian capabilities “match”), what type of assistance Iran may seek from Russia (that is, where Iranian needs and Russian capabilities “match”), or what areas they may pursue jointly, either to benefit from advantages they both enjoy or to jointly address shared needs. Iran’s inventory of needs In drawing up an Iranian inventory of military-technical needs for the coming three to five years, we focus on those areas that would be of greatest concern to the United States and its allies: • Weapons and technologies that would enhance Iran’s asymmetric strategy and capabilities, especially those important to deterring or fighting the more likely conflicts with the United States and Israel in the aerospace and naval domains. These include capabilities important for Iranian retaliatory missile/drone strikes against U.S. or Israeli military bases or other targets, air defense against U.S. or Israeli air strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear or other sensitive facilities, a missile/drone-based conflict with Israel, and a naval conflict with the United States in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman. • Weapons and technologies that Iran might transfer to its Axis of Resistance partners—especially Lebanese Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, and Iraqi militias—that could threaten U.S. and allied security interests. Over the past decades, Iran has worked to refine its asymmetric strategy and associated capabilities to enhance its deterrence and warfighting capabilities vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. Especially since the 2010s, these efforts have included an increased role for offensive capabilities—especially IRGC missiles and UAVs. In 2016, Supreme Leader Khamenei called for an increase in offensive capability (tavan-e tahajomi) on the grounds that it was Iran’s “inalienable right” to ensure its security by increasing both offensive and defensive power. With this focus, most of the assessed technical and operational needs going forward would be for Iran’s Defense Ministry—for R&D and production—and the IRGC, for operational use, as well as for its own R&D and production. However, some needs may also apply to the Artesh, especially in niche areas related to its emerging long-range strike capabilities and key elements of its air, air defense, and naval forces that support Iran’s asymmetric strategy. To minimize its reliance on Russia, Iran in most cases will probably prefer receiving Russian transfers of technology and expertise that enhance Iranian domestic R&D and production programs, rather than complete systems. However, Iran will likely seek complete systems from Russia in limited cases—including advanced aircraft and missiles—especially when Iranian officials assess that Iran would not be able to develop such systems domestically. Also, Iran can attempt to acquire production technology for the systems or reverse engineer the purchased systems and their key subsystems. While not a focus of this report, in addition to bolstering its asymmetric capabilities, Iran for decades has also worked to modernize its “traditional” military forces across the board (for example, Artesh ground, naval, and air forces) and almost certainly will continue to do so—albeit as a lower priority—including with Russian help. We group Iranian military-technical needs into three main areas: 1. Long-range strike (against land and naval targets): Iran might seek assistance from Russia to improve key technical and operational elements of Iran’s targeting cycle (“kill chain”) for long-range strikes with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, uncrewed aerial and naval systems, and even glide bombs. This might include seeking enhancements to its identification and analysis of potential targets; real-time targeting (detection, identification, tracking) of mobile targets; enhancing the survivability of its launch operations; evading or penetrating adversary air and missile defenses; overcoming enemy electronic warfare/jamming; more accurately striking targets; and post-strike damage assessment. Iran may also seek advanced technologies—such as seekers, guidance and control components, and engines—to improve the capabilities of its missiles and UAVs. Also, over the years, Iranian officials have identified important technical and operational parameters for long-range strike weapons, which provide hints about the type of support Iran may seek from Russia. (See “Key Technical and Operational Parameters Driving Iranian Needs for Long-Range Strike” in the Appendix.) Iran will probably seek to apply lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, either observed from afar or obtained through direct interactions with Russian officials. These may include technical and operational insights from Russia’s successes and failures in long-range strikes against Ukraine and the performance of Iranian and Russian systems against Western-made air and missile defenses. These lessons might also include Russian insights from its employment of waves of missiles/UAVs from multiple platforms and locations; standoff air launches of cruise missiles, air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs), and glide bombs; and combining types, routes, and trajectories of different strike systems. 2. Air defense: Iran might seek assistance from Russia to improve key technical and operational elements of its “air defense cycle” (cherkheh-ye padafand-e havai) to protect its nuclear facilities as well as military, defense-industry, and other sensitive sites from a U.S. or Israeli air attack. This might include seeking Russian advanced SAMs, radars, or their associated technologies, to improve key areas of Iranian air defense capabilities to detect, identify, track, and engage air-based targets such as U.S. and Israeli stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and UAVs. Iran might also seek to apply Russian tactics and acquire Russian technologies related to electronic warfare to protect itself from U.S. or Israeli air attack. 3. Naval denial: Iran might seek Russian assistance to improve key elements of the surface and subsurface attack and defense capabilities that underpin its asymmetric naval strategy. This might include assistance to Iran’s development of improved anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, and uncrewed surface and subsurface naval systems, and possibly the purchase of more advanced Russian systems and/or their key technologies, such as propulsion. Iran might also seek advanced submarines, torpedoes, and mines and/or their key technologies. Importantly, Iran may seek improvements to its over-the-horizon (OTH) situational awareness and ability to target enemy naval vessels located in the Persian Gulf, in the Gulf of Oman, and even further out into the Indian Ocean. Russia could conceivably help Iran meet its technical and operational needs in the three areas above, given Moscow’s capabilities in long-range strike, air defenses, and naval systems, by either transferring complete systems, providing technology transfers, or sharing technical and operational expertise. For further detail on these needs, see Table A4 in the Appendix. In addition, Iran might seek Russian assistance in applying artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance the capabilities of its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, uncrewed naval systems, and electronic warfare systems. Iran’s stated interests have included using AI to enable swarming attacks with UAVs, formations of uncrewed naval systems, long-range anti-ship attacks with UAVs, hybrid (tarkibi) attacks using multiple types of systems, alteration of missile and UAV trajectories during flight, avoidance of radars and air defense sites, improving target detection and recognition, and sharing of data among strike systems. A few other areas are important to consider for potential high-impact Russian military-technical cooperation with Iran, including Russian assistance that would enhance Iran’s suspected hedging strategies and capabilities for deterrence and compellence. Also, there are low-probability/high-impact areas related to Russia assisting a potential future Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons, as discussed further below. Enhancing Iran’s hedging strategies and capabilities: Iran might seek Russian technology or expertise that would support Tehran’s suspected hedging strategies in key weapons technologies of concern, in order to enhance Iranian asymmetric deterrence and compellence. This would help Iran enhance its latent capabilities—without crossing the threshold to actual weaponization—in areas such as the following: • Nuclear hedging: Technology/expertise related to overt hedging (for example, enriching uranium or converting uranium into metal), or—less likely—related to covert hedging through nuclear weapon-relevant technology/expertise (for example, related to developing a highly reliable weapon design). • Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)/ICBM hedging: Technology/expertise related to suspected Iranian overt hedging via its SLV development, including that related to large storable liquid rocket engines and cryogenic liquid rocket engines. Although it is less likely, Iran could also seek support for covert hedging through acquiring IRBM/ICBM-specific technology/expertise from Russia such as that related to developing long-range missile re-entry vehicles. • Possible anti-satellite (ASAT) hedging: Technology/expertise important to developing direct-ascent ASAT missile systems, such as tracking satellites, upper-stage maneuverable propulsion systems, space-based seekers, and even the air launch of ASAT missile systems. Also, Iran could seek Russian technology/expertise to enable it to develop satellites able to modify their trajectories to collide with other satellites in orbit (that is, “co-orbital” ASAT systems). • Possible CBW hedging: Technology/expertise related to Iran’s suspected CBW hedging, including enhancing Tehran’s alleged “on demand” capability to produce CBW if Iranian leaders decided to do so. Russia could conceivably help Iran enhance its hedging strategies and capabilities in one or more of the areas above, given Moscow’s more advanced capabilities in the nuclear, missile, ASAT, and CBW-related sectors, whether through supplying key technologies or sharing technical expertise. Nuclear weaponization: Iran might conceivably seek Russian technology/expertise to develop and produce nuclear weapons, if Tehran decided to do so. This might include help with validating or improving Iran’s weapon design, producing highly enriched uranium components, and miniaturizing missile warheads. Iran’s inventory of strengths and capabilities While Iran continues to lag behind Russia in terms of military-technical capabilities, it has over the past decades developed its own strengths in niche areas, some of which might be of interest to address Russia’s needs. Examples include the following: • The development and production of relatively inexpensive ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs; • Expertise on reverse engineering weapon systems and their key technologies; • The transfer of production technology of missiles and UAVs to state or non-state actors; • Technical and operational insights gained from the use of missiles and drones by Iran’s military as well as its Axis of Resistance partners; and • Illicit procurement of controlled and commercial technologies. For a detailed overview of Iran’s inventory of strengths and capabilities, see also Table A5 in the Appendix. Russia’s inventory of needs In drawing up a Russian inventory of military-technical needs for the coming three to five years, we focus on two categories: first, capabilities Russia will need as it pursues a protracted military campaign against Ukraine (assuming that the war continues); and second, capabilities Russia will need based on Russian defense planners’ assessments of the future of warfare. Short-/medium-term needs for Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine While cognizant of the difficulties in analyzing Russia’s military capabilities (and gaps that would result in needs) with any precision, we assess Russia’s most acute needs for its Ukraine campaign to broadly relate, over the upcoming period, to the following domains: • Ammunition; • Ground warfare equipment (main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles); • Western-sourced industrial equipment and components (microchips; computers, electronic and optical devices; fabricated metal products, etc.); • UAVs and missiles; and • Knowledge of reverse engineering of Western systems. Russia could realistically turn to Iran to meet its needs in all of these areas except, perhaps, ground warfare equipment. As Russia ramps up its production of Iranian-designed drones at Alabuga, there is the question of whether Moscow will still need Tehran’s support on UAVs—full systems, key components, production technology, training—going forward. Indeed, Russia already enhanced the original Shahed drones it received from Iran. Moreover, Russia’s own UAV industry has undergone significant innovation over the past two years. Still, Iran’s own growing drone and missile capabilities will likely remain a source of some Russian interest—for reasons of quantity if not quality—especially with a view to obtaining joint production capabilities. While Iranian (and North Korean) SRBMs lack the precision performance that Russian SRBMs have achieved, and notwithstanding Russian improvements in dynamic targeting over the course of the Ukraine campaign, it is also conceivable that Russia may turn to Iranian missiles for replenishing inventories, depending on the future course of its Ukraine campaign. Given ongoing difficulties with reverse engineering Western systems, Russia may also benefit from Iranian assistance in this domain. Medium-/long-term needs (beyond Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine) Looking beyond the military campaign against Ukraine, we turned to Russian assessments on the future of warfare to determine Russian medium-/long-term military-technical needs. Those needs relate to the following areas: • Nuclear modernization; • Precision weapons that are faster, stealthier, longer range, and carry a higher payload (improvements sought include the use of advanced seekers, improved surface material on missiles, laser guidance, anti-jamming capabilities, sensors, and robust algorithms for precision strike); • Swarming tactics for uncrewed aircraft systems (UASs); integration of AI with UASs; counter-UAS capabilities; • AI; • Hypersonic technology; biotechnology, telecommunications, nanotechnology, quantum computing, stealth technology, laser weapons, and directed energy weapons; • Command and control; • Space. During the expert workshop conducted for the purpose of this study, there was broad agreement among participants that Russian needs from Iran will arise mostly from pressures to replenish inventories and will extend to only a few niche areas of advanced Iranian technology. Overall, Iran will likely remain inferior to Russia in the production value of weapons and advanced technology of the types listed above. There is little to nothing that Iran has to offer Russia in areas such as AI or space, for instance. That said, Russia may well turn to Iran in select areas where Iran boasts advantages—for instance, regarding technical and operational insights related to precision strike. Russia’s inventory of strengths and capabilities Russia continues to surpass Iran in terms of military-technical strengths and capabilities in many areas, some of which it might be willing to leverage to address Iran’s needs. Examples of such areas may include, in theory, support for Iran’s nuclear, ICBM, and CBW capabilities. Russia also has the capability to assist Iran with enhancing its electronic warfare capabilities. By 2024, Russia reportedly had become effective at using jamming and spoofing to counter U.S.-supplied satellite-guided missiles, rockets, bombs, and artillery shells in Ukraine. The extent to which Russia can support Iran’s ambitions in military applications of space over the medium term is an open question. While Russia tested an ASAT weapon (Nudol) in 2021 and is working on various (including laser-based) ASAT weapons, its military space program is encountering considerable challenges. Similarly, though the Russian military establishment is investing in AI research, development, testing and evaluation, international sanctions are constraining those efforts, raising questions about the extent to which Russia would be able to meet’s Iran’s needs in the area of military applications of AI in the future. Scenarios and triggers of “step changes” As argued above, the broad contours of the future Iran-Russia bilateral defense relationship can be forecast, if imperfectly, by extrapolating from current trend lines, drivers, and constraints, while also taking into account specific future Iranian and Russian military needs that the other party might be willing and able to help meet. In addition, it is worth listing future developments that may cause major disruptions in these trend lines—either by causing a breakdown in defense cooperation or, conversely, by resulting in qualitative or quantitative “step changes” in such cooperation. While studying the precise impact of each conceivable development on Iran-Russia cooperation goes beyond the scope of this study, the list below provides an overview of the types of developments that could have a significant impact and that analysts and policymakers should keep in mind: • Scenarios that could have an abrupt detrimental impact on cooperation: A considerable cooling or break in relations could result from regime change in either Iran or Russia (which appears highly unlikely today). • Scenarios that could have an abrupt beneficial impact on cooperation: o Escalation in the Middle East—for instance, a war between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah, in which Russia might provide Iran with military materiel for Hezbollah, especially assuming that the United States comes to Israel’s aid. If Israel or the United States were to take military action against Iranian territory, Russia may also increase its defense support to Iran in the aftermath (though Russia will probably not enter a Middle Eastern war directly). The scope of any increased Russian support will, however, be contingent on the ongoing demands of its military campaign against Ukraine. o Growing Chinese cooperation with both Russia and Iran (and North Korea), which could result in synergies and could fill or compensate for Russian and Iranian gaps or weaknesses, and hence produce step changes in Iran-Russia cooperation down the line. • Scenarios whose impact on Iran-Russia defense cooperation is highly contingent: The impact of an end to the Russia-Ukraine war on defense cooperation is difficult to predict, since it would depend on several factors, including the terms on which the war would end, and the status of Russia’s forces and weapons inventories at that time. Conclusion Since February 2022, the Iran-Russia defense relationship has undergone significant changes, moving past the previous client-patron dynamic and with cooperation changing both in degree and kind. In pre-existing areas of cooperation—such as electronic warfare, space, cyberspace, military-to-military contacts, and possibly Russian support for Iran’s missile programs—engagement has accelerated or deepened since 2022. Iran and Russia have also cooperated in entirely new areas. Those have included Iran’s provision of UAVs, UAV production technology, and UAV training to Russia, along with negotiations to transfer Iranian ballistic missiles and Iran’s provision of expertise to Russia on evading and overcoming the effects of sanctions. Iran’s delivery of ammunition, artillery shells, rockets, and glide bombs to Russia is also a new phenomenon. Iran and Russia have taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship. Amid a general increase in numbers of mutual visits and high-level engagements among military and defense officials, the two countries are negotiating a new 20-year strategic agreement and have made forays into joint production of certain weapon systems. Also, joint Iran-Russia efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor and other economic projects require considerable investment, including in infrastructure, that will pay off in the medium to long term and should further boost defense cooperation. What were historically key drivers of defense cooperation—a shared animosity toward the United States, or each side’s interest in military technology that the other side can offer—have increased in importance since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Key constraints—Russian susceptibility to U.S. or Western pressure, causing it to limit cooperation with Iran; Russia’s concerns with adhering to nonproliferation norms and export control regimes; Russian reputational concerns over collaborating with Iran; Iran’s inability to pay for Russian technology; and historical mistrust—have all become less relevant against the backdrop of growing Russian dependence on Iran and a shared Iranian-Russian animosity toward the West. The present trend lines and drivers suggest that the relationship is no longer purely transactional and will probably not lapse back into the patron-client dynamic that characterized it prior to 2022, even if Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine were to end. Iran and Russia each have specific military-technical needs that the other might help meet. That said, beyond Russia’s campaign against Ukraine, Iranian needs from Russia will be greater than Russian needs for advanced technology from Iran. Moreover, some enduring constraints—chiefly both countries’ supply chain vulnerabilities due to sanctions, Russia’s aversion to antagonizing its Gulf Arab partners, and Russia’s enduring technological superiority in key areas—should preclude the formation of a full-fledged military-strategic partnership and especially a military alliance. The study proposed a three-step methodology to think through the contours of bilateral defense cooperation over the next three to five years, by a) extrapolating from current trend lines, drivers, and constraints; b) drawing up inventories of future military needs for each country and identifying the areas in which the other country could help meet those needs; and c) accounting for events that may trigger non-linear changes in cooperation. Regarding future Iranian and Russia military needs, we argued that Iran would most likely turn to Russia to elicit support on weapons and technologies that would enhance its asymmetric strategy and capabilities, as well as those that it might transfer to its Axis of Resistance partners. Those include long-range strike (against land and naval targets), air defense, and naval denial capabilities. In addition, Iran might seek Russian assistance in military applications of AI, in electronic warfare, and in enhancing its suspected nuclear, IRBM/ICBM, ASAT, and CBW hedging capabilities. Russia, meanwhile, will likely rely on Iran for ongoing needs in its Ukraine campaign, including for ammunition, UAVs, potentially missiles, and expertise on or assistance with the illicit procurement of Western-sourced components. Even though Russia has successfully indigenized the production of Shahed drones (and made its own improvements), Iran’s growing drone capabilities will likely remain a source of Russian interest, especially with a view to obtaining joint production capabilities. It is also conceivable that Russia may turn to Iranian missiles, depending on the future course of its Ukraine campaign. Overall, Russian needs from Iran will probably arise mostly from pressures to replenish inventories and will only extend to select niche areas of advanced Iranian capabilities. About the Authors Dr. Hanna Notte is the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and a senior associate (nonresident) in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Her work focuses on Russia’s foreign and security policy, Russia-Middle East relations, and Russian approaches to arms control and nonproliferation. She holds a doctorate and MPhil in international relations from Oxford University and a BA in social and political sciences from Cambridge University. Her contributions have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and War on the Rocks, among others. She is the co-author of Death Dust: The Rise, Demise, and Future of Radiological Weapons Programs (Stanford University Press, 2023). Jim Lamson is a senior research associate at CNS. His research focuses on Iranian weapons, space, and military issues, and Iran’s security and arms control policies. Prior to joining CNS, he worked for 23 years as an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, focusing on Iranian weapons and military issues, and served for more than five years in the Middle East. Before that, he worked on nonproliferation issues at CNS, the Conference on Disarmament, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and U.S. Department of State. He holds an MA in international policy studies from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, an MS in national resource strategy from the National Defense University, and he is currently pursuing a doctorate in defense studies at King’s College London. Appendix Figure A1. Iran-Russia Military-Technical Cooperation: Key Iranian Actors [Executive Branch / Military / Private Sector mapping depicting: Office of the Supreme Leader; Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS); Office of the President; Defense Ministry (MODAFL); AFGS; KCHQ; IRGC; Artesh; Private Sector companies/consortia] Figure A2. Iran-Russia Military-Technical Cooperation: Key Russian Actors [President of the Russian Federation; Ministry of Defense (General Staff, Main Operations Directorate, Deputy Defense Ministers, FSMTC, Services and Branches); Rostec (Subsidiaries, Representative Office in Iran, Rosoboronexport); Rosatom; Roscosmos; Other Russian arms producers; Other Ministries (MFA, DPMs/Joint Commissions)] Table A1. Summary of Pre-2022 Iran-Russia Military-Technical Cooperation - Conventional Weapons: Ground, Aerospace, and Naval Domains: Negotiations and Russian transfers of tanks, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, combat aircraft, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, anti-radiation missiles, helicopters, SAMs, electronic warfare (e.g., radars and jamming systems), submarines, and torpedoes; reported Iranian interest in Tu-22M bomber - Missiles: Russian low-level assistance in ballistic missile technologies; reported Iranian interest in Iskander-E and Tochka-U SRBMs, Yakhont and Granit ASCMs - UAVs: Russian interest in acquiring Iranian UAV technology and joint UAV development - CBW Technology: Iranian efforts to acquire CBW technology and expertise - Nuclear: Russian assistance in areas of nuclear power plant and research reactor, nuclear fuel cycle technologies, training, possibly weaponization - Space: Russian assistance in satellite development and space launch, reported access to Russian satellite images and to GLONASS for missile targeting Table A2. Key Iranian Political/Command-Level Actors Potentially Involved in Future Iran-Russia Military-Technical Cooperation - Office of the Supreme Leader | Selected Key Elements: Office of Military Advisors | Key Officials: Supreme Leader Khamenei; Ali Shahbazi (Head of Office of Military Advisors); Sayyed Yahya Safavi (Senior military advisor); Amir Hatami (Advisor for Artesh affairs); Hossein Dehghan (Advisor for defense industries) - Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) | Selected Key Elements: SCNS Defense Committee; SCNS Staff for Countering Sanctions | Key Officials: Ali Akbar Ahmadian (SCNS Secretary) - Office of the President | Selected Key Elements: Department of S&T and Knowledge-Based Economy; Ministry of Communications (ISA); Ministry of Science; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Intelligence | Key Officials: Mohammad Mokhber (Interim president); Isa Zarepour (Communications minister); Mohammad Ali Zolfigol (Science minister); Ali Bagheri Kani (Acting foreign minister); Esmail Khatib (Intelligence minister) - Defense Ministry | Selected Key Elements: Departments, offices, and centers involved in overseeing defense R&D, production, and international cooperation; Defense Ministry’s R&D and production organizations | Key Officials: Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani (Defense minister); Sayyed Hojatollah Ghoreishi (Deputy defense minister / head of board of Qods Aviation Industries); Mehdi Khajeh Amiri (Deputy defense minister for coordination); Said Shabanian (Assistant to defense minister for strategic affairs) - Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) | Selected Key Elements: Departments involved in military strategy, planning, defense R&D, production, international cooperation; Department of International Cooperation; Operations departments; Department of Logistics and Industrial Research; Industrial research departments; Department of Science, Research, and Technology; Department of Intelligence and Security | Key Officials: Mohammad Bagheri (AFGS chief); Abolghasem Forutan (Head of AFGS chief's office); Aziz Nasirzadeh (AFGS deputy chief); Ali Abdollahi (AFGS deputy for coordination); Mohammad Ahadi (Deputy for international cooperation); Mohsen Dareh Baghi (Deputy for logistics/industrial research); Mohammad Azizi-Delshad (Head of Office of Research and Industrial Development); Mohammad Mehdinejad Nouri (Deputy for science/research/tech); Gholamreza Mehrabi (Deputy for intelligence/security); Mehdi Rabani (Deputy for operations); Farajollah Moradi (Deputy for strategic planning); Gholamreza Jalali (Passive Defense Organization head) - Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters (KCHQ) | Selected Key Elements: UAV Assessment Group; Cyber and Novel Threats Headquarters | Key Officials: Gholam Ali Rashid (KCHQ commander); Hossein Hassani Saidi (KCHQ deputy commander); Hossein Khorram Faal (Head of UAV Assessment Group); Mostafa Izadi (Commander of Cyber and Novel Threats HQ) - Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) | Selected Key Elements: IRGC Aerospace Force, Navy, Ground Force, Qods Force; RSSJOs; IRGC Counter-Intelligence Organization | Key Officials: Hossein Salami (IRGC commander); Ali Fadavi (IRGC deputy commander); Mohammad Reza Naghdi (IRGC deputy for coordination); Amir Ali Hajizadeh (IRGC-ASF commander); Ali Balali (IRGC-ASF senior advisor); Alireza Tangsiri (IRGCN commander); Mohammad Pakpour (IRGC-GF commander); Esmail Ghani (IRGC-QF commander) - Artesh | Selected Key Elements: Artesh Air Force, Air Defense Force, Navy, Ground Force; RSSJOs; Artesh Counter-Intelligence Organization | Key Officials: Abdolrahim Musavi (Artesh commander); Mohammad Hossein Dadras (Artesh deputy commander); Habibollah Sayyari (Artesh deputy for coordination); Hamid Vahedi (IRIAF commander); Shahram Irani (IRIN commander); Kiumars Heidari (IRIGF commander) Table A3. Key Iranian Implementation-Level Actors Potentially Involved in Future Iran-Russia Military-Technical Cooperation - Office of the President | Selected Key Elements: Department of S&T and Knowledge-Based Economy; AEOI; ISA and ISRC; Ministry of Science; MFA Legal/International Affairs; Iranian embassy in Russia; Ministry of Intelligence | Key Officials: Ruhollah Deghani Firuzabadi; Mohammad Eslami; Hassan Salarieh; Reza Najafi; Kazem Jalali - Defense Ministry | Selected Key Elements: Department of International Affairs; Department of Logistics and Research and Industrial Affairs; Counter-Intelligence Organization; TRIDI; Domestication Center; SAMTA Center; SPND; MUT; AIO; AVIO (QAI, HESA, TEM); IEI (SEI); DIO (Ammunition and Metallurgical Industries Group, Rocket Industries Group); MIO; NGO; Defense attaches | Key Officials: Sayyed Hamzeh Ghalandari; Afshin Naderi Sharif; Rahim Yaghoubi; Nader Khun Siavosh; Afshin Khajehfard; Qasem Damavandian; Mehdi Gogerdchian; Hossein Aini; Hassan Parvaneh - IRGC | Selected Key Elements: Operations/Logistics/Industrial Research departments; RSSJOs; IHU; Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization; SAIRC; IRGC-ASF Center of Command and Control, Radars, and Missile Systems; Military attaches | Key Officials: Mohammad Fallah; Mahmoud Bagheri Kazemabad; Said Aghajani; Reza Shabani; Shamsoldin Farzadipur; Ali Jafarabadi; Abdollah Mehrabi; (FNU) Riyahi; (FNU) Nasr Esfahani - Artesh | Selected Key Elements: Operations/Logistics/Industrial Research departments; RSSJOs; Artesh military attaches | Key Officials: Sayyed Mahmud Musavi; Mohammad Davud Saremi; Reza Khosravi Moghaddam - Private Sector | Selected Key Elements: Iranian knowledge-based companies (Kosar Space Consortium, Omid Faza Company) | Key Officials: Hossein Shahrabi Farahani Table A4. Assessed Iranian Inventory of Needs to Support its Asymmetric Strategy - Advanced missile/UAV components and materials: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Small turbine jet engines for cruise missiles and UAVs and production technology (e.g. R95-300/MS400 domestic version): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Ramjet and scramjet engines, production technology, for supersonic cruise missiles: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Improved maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) for ballistic missiles: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Improved standoff air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) (e.g., Kh-69), standoff glide bombs (e.g., FAB-series), mating to Iranian aircraft: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (e.g., Kh-31, Yakhont): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Improved standoff air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) and anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) (e.g., Kh-59MK2, Kh-35UE, Kh-58UShKE); mating to Iranian aircraft: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Developing and improving ship-launched ballistic missiles: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) (e.g., 9-S-7760 Kinzhal) or development assistance, mating to Iranian aircraft: Long-Range Strike [X] - Bombers for standoff missile strikes against land or naval targets (e.g., Tu-22M, Su-34): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Modifying ASCMs and SAMs into land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs): Long-Range Strike [X] - Developing hypersonic missile systems and technologies (glide vehicles, warheads, propulsion, guidance/control, airframes): Long-Range Strike [X] - Developing submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Improving anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), both SRBMs and MRBMs: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Access to Russia’s satellite global positioning system (GLONASS): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Decoy missiles/UAVs (e.g., Kh-55): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Terminal phase countermeasures for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Improving long-range anti-radar missiles/UAVs: Long-Range Strike [X] - Advanced uncrewed naval systems (surface/subsurface) for long-range strikes (e.g., RK-700, BBKN Dandelion): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Improving over-the-horizon (OTH) situational awareness and targeting against naval ships: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Improved air defense radars (detect, identify, track, engage stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs): Air Defense [X] - Cruise/ballistic missile defense systems (e.g. S-500): Air Defense [X] - Space technology cycle relevant to targeting (imaging satellites, navigation satellites, satellite launches, data exploitation): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Counter-electronic warfare/jamming for missiles/UAVs: Long-Range Strike [X], Air Defense [X], Naval Denial [X] - Stealth (low observable) technology for missiles/UAVs: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Use of AI for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, uncrewed naval systems, EW: Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Increasing reliability of missiles and UAVs: Long-Range Strike [X], Air Defense [X], Naval Denial [X] - Improving operational use of long-range strike weapons (hybrid operational use): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Enhancing survivability of long-range strike forces (passive defense, underground facilities, missile silos, mobile launchers): Long-Range Strike [X], Naval Denial [X] - Advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (e.g., S-400): Air Defense [X] - Advanced combat aircraft for air defense (e.g., Su-35): Air Defense [X] - Advanced air-to-air missiles (AAMs) (e.g., Vympel R-74M, R-77-1, R-37M): Air Defense [X] - Electronic warfare: Advanced jamming/spoofing (e.g., R-330Zh): Air Defense [X] - Electronic warfare: Advanced systems (e.g., Krasukha-2 and Krasukha-4): Air Defense [X] - Acquiring Western weapons captured in Ukraine (countermeasures / reverse engineering): Long-Range Strike [X], Air Defense [X] - Russian advanced technical training/education to Iranian experts: Long-Range Strike [X], Air Defense [X], Naval Denial [X] - Submarines or submarine technology (AIP, nuclear propulsion): Naval Denial [X] - Advanced torpedoes and mines: Naval Denial [X] Key Technical and Operational Parameters Driving Iranian Needs for Long-Range Strike - Pre-strike operational strategy and preparation: Enabling retaliation; increasing range of detection; enhancing monitoring; preventing/creating surprise; punishing attacker; targeting enemy origins of attack; converting tactical success to strategic failure; reducing prep time. - Launch and flight: Hybrid operations; standoff attack; mass volume; simultaneous launch; firing while moving; 360-degree attack; multi-range firing; direction/route variation; retargeting during flight; deep strategic strike. - Terminal phase: High/low altitude attack; maneuverability/radar evasion; attacking moving targets; EW protection; pinpoint accuracy ("one shot, one target"); increasing warhead destructive power. Table A5. Assessed Iranian Inventory of Strengths/Capabilities - Nuclear: Developing nuclear fuel cycle technologies, including uranium enrichment - Ballistic Missiles: Inexpensive missile production; modular families; ASBM development; unguided rocket conversion; ship-launch conversion - Cruise Missiles: Inexpensive cruise missile production (ASCM/LACM); modular families; ASCM-to-LACM conversion; air-launch conversion - UAVs: Inexpensive UAV production; modular families (armed/suicide); anti-ship suicide UAVs - Long-Range Strike in General: Operational insights from combat use by Iran and Axis of Resistance; reverse engineering; production technology transfer - Deployment, Basing: Underground missile/drone "cities"; mobile/buried/commercial launchers; small launcher footprint - Strategy and Operations: Mass launches; hybrid strike use - Advanced Conventional Weapons: Inexpensive SAMs, anti-tank missiles, artillery rockets, and munitions; modular families - Space: Solid-propellant SLVs and critical technologies - Hedging: Latency in nuclear, IRBM/ICBM, ASAT, CBW - Defense Industries: Reverse engineering; mixed acquisition strategies; illicit procurement; tech transfer - Axis of Resistance: Supporting, training, equipping regional proxy/partner networks Selected Endnotes (1 to 227) citing primary Iranian, Russian, U.S., and international sources, official statements, defense media publications (e.g., IRNA, Tasnim, Kommersant, Tass, Wall Street Journal, Reuters, Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, CSIS, RUSI, CNAS), declassified intelligence briefings, and scholarly research on military-technical transfers, strategic agreements, and regional dynamics.