08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page i SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page ii ALSO BY JOHN PRADOS Hoodwinked:The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War (ed.) Inside the Pentagon Papers (ed., with Margaret Pratt Porter) The White House Tapes:Eavesdropping on the President (ed.) Lost Crusader:The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby Operation Vulture America Confronts Terrorism (ed.) The Blood Road:The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War President’s Secret Wars:CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf Combined Fleet Decoded:The Secret History of U.S. Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II The Hidden History of the Vietnam War Valley of Decision:The Siege of Khe Sanh (with Ray W. Stubbe) Keepers of the Keys:A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush Pentagon Games The Soviet Estimate:U.S. Intelligence and Soviet Strategic Forces The Sky Would Fall:The Secret U.S. Bombing Mission to Vietnam,1954 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page iii SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY THE SECRET WARS OF THE CIA JOHN PRADOS Ivan R. Dee Chicago 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page iv SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY. Copyright ©2006by John Prados. All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or portions thereof in any form. For information, address: Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 1332North Halsted Street, Chicago 60642, a member of the Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group. Manufactured in the United States of America and printed on acid-free paper. www.ivanrdee.com The paperback edition of this book carries the ISBN 978-1-56663-823-4. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: Prados, John. Safe for democracy : the secret wars of the CIA/ John Prados. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-56663-823-4(cloth : alk. paper) 1. Intelligence service—United States. 2. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. 3. United States—Foreign relations. I. Title. JK468.I6P715 2006 327.1273—dc22 2006006269 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page v To a More Perfect Union 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page vi 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page vii Contents Acknowledgments ix Foreword xiii Major Figures in the Book xvii Acronyms Used in the Book xxxi 1 The Gamut of Secret Operations 3 2 The Cold War Crucible 28 3 The Secret Warriors 42 4 “The Kind of Experience We Need” 58 5 The Covert Legions 78 6 Bitter Fruits 97 7 Adventures in Asia 124 8 “Acceptable Norms of Human Conduct Do Not Apply” 145 9 Archipelago 162 10 The War for the Roof of the World 184 11 “Another Black Hole of Calcutta” 204 12 The Bay of Pigs: Failure at Playa Girón 236 13 Cold War and Counterrevolution 273 14 The Secret War Against Castro 298 15 War in Southeast Asia 337 16 Global Reach 366 17 The Southern Cone 396 18 From “Rogue Elephant” to Resurrection 431 19 The Mountains of Allah 467 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page viii viii Contents 20 The Reagan Revolution 493 21 Bill Casey’s War 507 22 Project Democracy 539 23 Full Circle 572 24 The Struggle for Control 606 25 Safe for Democracy 640 Notes 649 ANote on Sources 675 Index 679 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page ix Acknowledgments MANY PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS contributed to the making of this book. My work on it began as a fellowship project of the International Center for Ad- vanced Studies of New York University. I thank NYU and ICAS for their belief in and support of this initiative. I am especially indebted to my colleagues and friends at the National Security Archive, where I am a senior fellow. Aportion of the research was underwritten by a grant from the Gerald R. Ford Library Foundation. I am grateful to them as well. Aspecial thanks goes to all those ed- itors on assorted other projects on which I have worked who patiently endured delays at various points so that this manuscript could move to completion. Speaking of editors, Ivan R. Dee’s vision, suggestions, and deft hand added im- measurably to this book, and I also thank Jason Proetorius and everyone who contributed to its production. This work would not have the depth and scope that it does without the in- sights of those who spoke to me or exchanged correspondence, so I wish to ex- press my appreciation to all those interviewees who helped educate me on these matters. Certain reviewers of my earlier biography of William E. Colby chose to select out some of the individuals whom I acknowledged as an excuse to damn the entire work. For this reason, as well as because some interviewees wished to re- main anonymous, I do not mention anyone by name. But all should know how thankful I am to them. For assistance with documentary research I extend great thanks to the staffs and archivists of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); and the Harry S Truman Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, John F. Kennedy Li- brary, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Richard Nixon Library Project, Gerald R. Ford Library, and Ronald Reagan Library, all of NARA. My special appreciation goes to John Taylor, Herbert Pankratz, Moira Porter, Michele DeMartino, David Humphrey, Regina Greenwell, Nancy Smith, Linda Seelke, Ted Gittinger, Shan- non Jarrett, Irene Lonedo, Karen Holzhausen, and Donna Lehman. Some of these excellent archivists have moved up, on, or retired during the long years I have 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page x x Acknowledgments been following these subjects, but I am proud to have worked with each of them. In addition I am grateful to the staff and archivists of the Library of Congress and to the staffs of Columbia University, New York University, George Washington University, and Wheaton Regional libraries. For specific help with particular doc- uments or tips on materials, I thank Anna Kasten Nelson, Malcolm Byrne, Mario del Pero, Peter Kornbluh, and William Burr. For a brief moment in the 1990s and until 9/11 the Central Intelligence Agency made an effort to open its files to the American people. Its Historical Re- view Program declassified a number of documents central to the story. The CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence produced a number of documentary collec- tions, some of which contained useful material. The Center sponsored more than a dozen conferences where the subjects of these collections were considered by (mostly former) intelligence officers and scholars together. I was asked to speak at several of these meetings. But since September 11 these initiatives have ground al- most to a halt, as have most CIA document declassification efforts. This de- plorable state of affairs bodes ill for the effort to build an American consensus on the need for intelligence and the future of the CIA. Having said that, let me hasten to add my appreciation for the efforts of the Kennedy Assassination Records Commission. Due to Americans’intense interest in the events of the Kennedy assassination, for another brief moment in time the declassification shoe was on the other foot, and U.S. government agencies faced a board with the statutory responsibility to put information before the public. The results of its review have enabled us to move the discussion of U.S. covert oper- ations against Cuba to a whole new level. I also wish to express my indebtedness to my own National Security Archive. The sustained efforts of the Archive to pe- tition for the release of records through the Freedom of Information Act and other declassification avenues have opened up material relevant to almost every aspect of American foreign policy. The Archive’s physical collection of docu- ments, and its collaboration with other institutions in hosting conferences that brought together historians and participants within a document-rich context, are a great source of knowledge. The Archive’s work in putting these materials be- fore the public in the form of microfiche collections of primary source material, document readers, and electronic briefing books accessible on the internet, makes available a rich vein of research. Even this book can barely scratch the surface of that material. Many acute analysts of American policy, intelligence, and national security have exchanged ideas and suggestions or helped me sharpen my thinking. Some of them are mentioned above, but I also wish to thank Kai Bird, J. Kenneth Mc- Donald, Stephen Coll, Mary Nolan, Gregory Treverton, Jeffrey Richelson, Gerald K. Haines, Marilyn Young, Andrew Bacevich, Phillip Deery, Michael Warner, Timothy Naftali, Lloyd Gardner, Svetlana Savranskaya, James Bamford, Richard L. Aldrich, Maria Eleonora Guasconi, Loch Johnson, Walter LaFeber, Max Hol- land, Richard K. Betts, and Thomas Blanton. For reading and editing the manu- script I am deeply indebted to Ellen Pinzur. For putting up with me during this 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xi Acknowledgments xi lengthy process I thank my daughters Danielle and Natasha. All these persons added value to the book. For its errors and omissions I alone am responsible. J. P. Washington,D.C. July2006 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xii 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xiii Foreword PUBLIC OPINION POLLS in many countries today portray the United States as the greatest threat to world peace on the globe, worse than terrorism or any other na- tion. This is an unfamiliar role for a country that has consciously articulated—and advanced—over many decades the notion that democratic values are the solution for many of the world’s ills. How strange it is that Americans, fond of the vision of the nation’s exceptionalism as seen in the image of the City on a Hill, their de- mocracy the admiration of the world, should find themselves an object of the world’s fears. The City is supposed to be a place of wonder and delight, even a state of grace. Its values are worth emulating, its freedom an example of achieve- ment for all. The Founding Fathers articulated the vision well, and at some point Ameri- can leaders translated that ideal into a mission to bring its values to the world. President Woodrow Wilson enshrined the mission into a policy to implant democ- racy and self-determination among peoples everywhere. His successors in the presidency, every one, have continued and enlarged that quest—which has led America into a variety of foreign adventures, with widely varying motives, ac- complishments, and failures. Those who fear America worry that the adventures themselves have supplanted the quest for democracy as the real content of United States policy. Critics of this policy argue that American presidents have pursued their prox- imate goals, defined in terms of U.S. power, while cloaking them in the language and trappings of universalist desire. This is not a new argument—and, one may hope, not a correct one. But at the moment millions of people in many lands be- lieve it, or something very like it. Their fears, and the extent of them, bode ill for American purpose in the world as well as for the feelings of Americans about their country and their government. One way to look at the world’s fears of America is to review U.S. actions on the world stage, where a major policy tool has been the secret operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), created after World War II. The agency quickly became the locus of open and covert efforts that have engaged many nations across 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xiv xiv Foreword the globe. Because of the secrecy of most CIAactivities, it has been exceedingly difficult for historians and observers to evaluate them. Even today information about the CIAremains scattered, shrouded in misinformation, is poorly understood, or has remained inaccessible to researchers. The “need to know” has been used by government bureaucrats to restrict knowledge to a few, even in the case of events long past. Nevertheless an appraisal has become possible and is long overdue. In the sixty years since the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency, presidents have continually harnessed the agency in service of their foreign policy goals. Three decades ago the “problem” of the CIAappeared to be the agency’s status as a “rogue elephant”—unsupervised, tearing about the globe, acting at whim. By now it is evident that the agency and its cohorts were in fact respond- ing to presidential orders. This seems to make it much more urgent to attempt to tell the story of exactly what the CIAhas accomplished. What has the agency con- tributed toward the success of larger U.S. policy goals, and the global quest for de- mocracy? Perhaps the problem is more one of the “rogue” president than it is about an out-of-control Central Intelligence Agency. The control and oversight of United States intelligence needs to be examined in specific contexts where the overseers concern themselves with covert operations. In the past the question of oversight has been viewed as one of congressional supervision of the intelligence commu- nity, but we can now see this is an inadequate approach. The truth is that White House mechanisms for control and supervision of intelligence activity predate those instituted by Congress. Each branch of government has had its own objec- tives and degree of success, or lack of it, in overseeing the CIA. Existing studies of presidential or congressional oversight ignore key facets of the problem and do not take into account the most recent developments. And CIAattempts to pursue operations beyond the limits of the oversight system highlight the need for fresh examination. The oversight question must not only be examined in much greater detail but must be reframed as a competitive process between two branches of government. Safe for Democracy does that. While it is impossible to say where oversight is headed, we can show where it has been and why it has generally not worked. This book surveys Central Intelligence Agency covert actions on four conti- nents. In the most recent version of their dictionary of terms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff define a “covert operation” as one planned or conducted so as to conceal the identity of the sponsor or permit a denial of involvement. To that category the U.S. military adds the “clandestine operation,” defined as one in which emphasis “is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor.” Special operations are covert or clandestine, are carried out by military forces, and may combine elements of both varieties. All these form part of our terrain of inquiry. Aside from labels based on secrecy, covert actions may also be viewed along functional lines. The several types include political action, in which the objective is to influence opinion-makers or the politics of nations; psychological warfare 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xv Foreword xv and propaganda, which are tactical tools in many actions; support for military op- erations, an intermediate category between traditional covert action and military special operations—which consumes an increasing fraction of CIA effort; and paramilitary operations, which are covertly coercive. Safe for Democracy exam- ines activities along this entire spectrum. This book contributes important new detail to our understanding of many CIAoperations, including those in Italy, Korea, Poland, Iran, Guatemala, Hungary, China, Tibet, the Philippines, Indonesia, Syria, Iraq, Cuba, Bolivia, the Congo, Ghana, Vietnam and Laos, Kurdistan, Chile, Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua; and it provides a first-cut view of actions in Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, and other most recent activities. Whenever possible I have related all these events to specific pres- idential decisions expressed through White House control mechanisms and mod- erated by congressional oversight procedures. To prevent the work from growing completely unmanageable, the secret wars in Vietnam and Laos have been treated in less detail than is possible—they could easily consume an entire book by them- selves—and the war against terrorism has been placed to one side except where it impinges directly upon our main subjects. The conclusions of this inquiry tend to bear out the critics. American under- cover actions have resulted in upheavals and untold suffering in many nations while contributing little to Washington’s quest for democracy. Despite considerable inge- nuity, technological wizardry, operational flexibility, and an impressively compe- tent cadre of secret warriors, the results of covert operations have been consistently disappointing. Yet the very drive to maintain and use these capabilities has had con- sequences—often unforeseen—both for America’s image around the globe and for constitutional control of the United States government by its own people. Secret warriors are known to argue the unique reasons for failure in specific actions but— except in secret studies unknown to the public until now—to resist broad overall evaluation. This book, however, does not stop short. Its content is not speculation, idle rumination, mindless ideology, or uninformed criticism. The evidence gathered in these pages is broad and deep. Covert operations have been a negative factor in the American pursuit of democracy throughout the world. I have written on these matters earlier in Presidents’Secret Wars,a book pub- lished in the mid-1980s, and in fact the present work began as a revision of that book. Time had passed, and an updating seemed appropriate. But preparations for the project quickly revealed that a mere revision would be inadequate—sources have multiplied, the understanding of what constitutes a covert action has widened, and the terrain has shifted in other ways as well. The 1980s public con- cern about the CIAas rogue elephant obscured a great deal about the impact of agency operations on American foreign policy goals. Much of what we knew then has been modified by fresh evidence. It seemed to me clear that the entire subject needed to be recast in terms of what matters today. Asteady stream of newly declassified secret documents and a parade of mem- oirs of former CIAofficials has enriched the record. Many things that once had to be inferred or addressed on the basis of interview material can now be described 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xvi xvi Foreword from hard evidence. Further interviews have extended the envelope. Throughout this book pseudonyms for CIAofficers have been replaced with real names where possible; actual code names of operations are supplied; project costs, assigned per- sonnel, and other details are revealed. The mountain of new detail on CIAopera- tions ranges widely, from the recollections of participants to the dates and contents of headquarters decisions, White House deliberations, and the proceedings of key meetings. Thus while some measure of text remains unchanged, most of Safe for Democracyis brand-new. It is the closest we can come at this juncture to a defini- tive history of U.S. covert operations. I have also widened the scope of the inquiry to include a larger slice of CIA political and propaganda activity, which was deliberately excluded from the ear- lier work. Thus the agency’s interventions in elections in a number of countries, its association with at least one major U.S. domestic controversy, and its active propaganda programs are explored in some detail. So are the initiatives of both presidents Bush (though with less detail on the younger) and those of the Clinton era. This treatment is coupled with another major theme already alluded to: a sys- tematic examination of the functioning of White House control mechanisms for covert operations, and an attempt to contrast them with congressional oversight ef- forts. Finally, for the first time this book examines covert operations from a for- eign policy perspective and places them solidly within the context of American diplomacy. The story of the secret wars is an important component of the American ex- perience in the years since World War II. It is also a feature of the histories of those many lands where the secret warriors plied their trade. Neither the Cold War years nor the present era can be properly understood without taking this story into ac- count. The time has come for taking stock, and that evaluation may begin here. 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xvii Major Figures in the Book (comprising primarily senior CIA officers,government officials,foreign individu- als,and intelligence officers who appear at more than one point in the narrative) JAMESL. ADKINS: Paramilitary specialist who served with the Hmong in Laos and rose to lead the Nicaraguan Operations Group during the contrawar. PRINCE TURKIAL-FAISAL: Chief of Saudi Arabian intelligence for two and a half decades, Prince Turki cooperated on several CIA projects, most notably Afghanistan and Nicaragua, before becoming Saudi ambassador to London and later to the United States. RICHARDALLEN: National security adviser to President Reagan. ROBERTAMORY: Deputy director for intelligence at the CIA, 1953–1962. MANUEL ARTIME: Cuban exile leader at the Bay of Pigs, and again in the mid- 1960s after being released from a Cuban prison, when he took part in a CIA project to create a new exile force. GEORGE AURELL: Far East Division chief for the CIA, supervising covert action projects in Burma and China; station chief in the Philippines during political action there in the late 1950s. HOWARDT. BANE: CIAclandestine services officer who had roles in the Tibet proj- ect and, as station chief in Ghana, in CIAAfrican operations. TRACY L. BARNES: Among the original secret warriors, Barnes served with the OSS and joined the Psychological Strategy Board staff, then later the CIA, playing major roles in covert operations in Guatemala and against Cuba. JOSE BASULTO: Cuban exile fighter who continued efforts against Castro for decades after the CIAgave up. RICHARD M. BISSELL: Special assistant to Allen W. Dulles, Bissell developed the U-2 and SR-71 aircraft for CIA, managed development of reconnaissance satellites, and played an increasing role in covert actions from Guatemala through the Bay of Pigs, rising to head the Directorate of Operations. 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xviii xviii Major Figures in the Book GEN. WILLIAM BOYKIN: An operator for Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta during the Iran hostage rescue mission, Boykin’s career with Special Forces continued through the second Bush administration. THOMAS BRADEN: Special assistant to Director Allen Dulles and creator of CIA’s International Organizations Division. WILLIAM V. BROE: Latin American Division chief who supervised the effort to keep Salvador Allende from assuming the presidency of Chile, Broe’s later actions helped create the legal case against Richard Helms for perjury before Congress on this same matter. JOHNA. BROSS: Longtime CIAofficer involved with European operations, man- aging the DO for Allen Dulles, and senior adviser to Bill Casey. WINTHROPBROWN: American ambassador to India during the first part of the Ti- betan operation, and to Laos at the inception of the secret war there. DAVIDK. BRUCE: After gaining an intelligence background by heading OSS oper- ations in the European theater, Bruce became a professional diplomat and ad- viser to presidents. He served as ambassador to London during the CIAop- eration against Guyana, and worked with the PFIAB. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: National security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, 1977–1981. WILLIAM BUCKLEY: Paramilitary specialist who worked on Eastern Europe, the Bay of Pigs, Laos, and Pakistan; station chief in postwar Laos; deputy chief of counterterrorism staff until sent to Beirut as station chief, where he was kidnapped in 1984and died under interrogation a year later. MCGEORGEBUNDY: National security adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1961–1966. ADM. ARLEIGHBURKE: Naval officer who served as chief of naval operations and arranged cooperation for Indonesia and the Bay of Pigs; Burke also became a member of the Taylor Board that reviewed the conduct of the Cuban oper- ation. FORBES BURNHAM: Guyanese political leader who benefited from CIAcovert op- erations carried out between 1962and 1964, and continuing agency political action until 1968. GEN. CHARLESP. CABELL: Seconded from the air force, Cabell served as deputy di- rector of central intelligence under Allen Dulles, 1953–1961, and had impor- tant roles in covert operations in Indonesia and Cuba. FRANK CARLUCCI: Exposed to covert action as a young diplomat in the Congo, Carlucci rose through work at many government agencies until being brought directly into intelligence work as deputy director of central intelli- gence in the Carter administration; he remained concerned with this activity in the Reagan-era Pentagon, and then as national security adviser to Presi- dent Reagan. HARRYL. CARR: British intelligence officer who directed covert operations against Russia in the Baltic and cooperated with CIA’s efforts in these areas. GEORGECARROLL: Covert operations specialist who worked in the CIAproject in Iran and later became baron heading the Far East Division. 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xix Major Figures in the Book xix PHILLIPCARVER: Clandestine services officer who transferred to the analytical side of the CIAafter his cover was blown in an abortive coup in South Vietnam; Carver became the agency’s senior officer on Vietnam affairs. WILLIAMJ. CASEY: Aveteran of OSS operations, Casey made his fortune in busi- ness and served briefly on President Ford’s PFIAB; he headed Reagan’s 1980 political campaign organization and was rewarded with appointment as di- rector of central intelligence. FIDELCASTRO: Revolutionary leader, then dictator of Cuba, who became the tar- get of many CIAoperations. GEORGE W. CAVE: Clandestine services officer who opened the CIA station in Afghanistan in 1957, headed stations in Iran and Saudi Arabia, ran a unit to support the Iran hostage rescue mission, was deputy chief of NE, and headed a policy coordination staff. In retirement Cave became involved in the Iran- Contra affair. HAROLD CHIPMAN: Covert operations specialist who worked on Cuban projects and Vietnam. DUANER. (“DEWEY”) CLARRIDGE: Clandestine services officer from the Near East and South Asian tribe, Clarridge served in Nepal, India, and Turkey, led the CIAstation in Rome, then the Latin America Division and the Counterterror- ism Center. CLARKM. CLIFFORD: Adviser to Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson, Clif- ford helped draft the law that created the CIA, served on the PFIABfor some years, and was secretary of defense in 1968. RAYL. CLINE: Officer who held both operational and analytical posts at CIA, Cline served as chief of station on Taiwan during Chinese and Tibet operations, headed the Directorate of Intelligence during Mongoose and the Cuban Mis- sile Crisis, and later led the State Department’s INR. THOMASC. CLINES: Paramilitary specialist who worked on Cuba operations and in Laos; in retirement became involved with “private benefactors” covert oper- ation with Nicaraguan contras. CHARLESG. (“CHUCK”) COGAN: Moving between African and Middle Eastern as- signments, Cogan was station chief in Jordan and headed the NEdivision; he was involved in covert operations in the Congo, the Iran hostage crisis, and Afghanistan. WILLIAM E. COLBY: Director of central intelligence during the critical congres- sional investigations of the 1970s, Colby had risen through CIAranks, work- ing on Soviet operations, the Italian political action, Vietnamese operations, and general Asian activities. MILESCOPELAND: Covert operations specialist for the CIAin the Middle East, es- pecially in Egypt and Lebanon. THOMAS G. CORCORAN: Washington lawyer who represented Civil Air Transport when it was acquired by the CIA, and United Fruit in preparations for the CIAaction in Guatemala. ALFRED T. COX: An experienced covert operator, Cox oversaw CIA’s interests in Civil Air Transport, served as chief of base in Hong Kong and on the para- 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xx xx Major Figures in the Book military staff at headquarters before and during the Bay of Pigs, and led the Miami station at the beginning of Project Mongoose. JAMES M. CRITCHFIELD: CIAofficer who had a major role in the creation of the German intelligence service, helped establish its connections with the CIA, and then moved into CIAMiddle Eastern operations. WILLIAMJ. DAUGHERTY: An agency hostage taken in Iran during his first tour, with his cover blown Daugherty served in headquarters management positions on covert operations staffs. ROBERT K. DAVIS: Clandestine services officer who arranged cooperation of Guatemalan authorities with the CIA’s effort to train anti-Castro exiles to in- vade Cuba; he later served as chief of station in Peru. PEERDESILVA: Operations officer who managed CIAinitiatives against Russia in the Far East, served in Austria, and headed CIA stations in South Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand, then became the first CIAspecial assistant for Vietnam Affairs. JOHNDEUTCH: Director of central intelligence in the mid-1990s. JOHNJ. (“JACK”) DEVINE: An operations officer in Chile during the CIAcovert ac- tion there, Devine rose steadily, leading the agency’s Iran operations group, its Afghan task force, stations in three Latin countries, Rome and London, and the Latin America Division, and served as associate deputy director for operations. LAWRENCE R. DEVLIN: Twice served as CIA’s station chief in the Congo, also as chief of station in Laos and head of the Africa Division. GEN. JAMES H. DOOLITTLE: Air force general who reviewed court activities for President Eisenhower, then served for many years on the advisory boards PBCFIAand PFIAB. ALLEN W. DULLES: Akey figure in CIAhistory, Dulles served with the OSS, ad- vocated creation of a peacetime intelligence agency, became deputy director for operations, then deputy and director of central intelligence and led the CIAthrough the Eisenhower years and into the Kennedy administration. JOHN FOSTER DULLES: Lawyer and diplomat, brother of Allen, Dulles served as secretary of state under President Eisenhower and played a larger part in covert operations than previously acknowledged. RALPH A. DUNGAN: Political adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson whose special interest in Latin America led to his posting as ambassador to Chile, where he became involved in CIAprojects. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS: Chief of the CIA’s Office of Security, Edwards became in- volved in assassination plots against Fidel Castro. RUDY ENDERS: Paramilitary specialist and boatman, Enders made his mark as a maritime officer with the Miami base on Cuban operations; later in the Viet- nam War he rose to a senior field officer and by the 1980s headed CIA’s Spe- cial Activities Division, where he played a major role in the mining of Nicaraguan ports during the contrawar. JACOB D. ESTERLINE: An important figure in CIALatin American operations, Es- terline was deputy chief of the task force that carried out the Guatemala 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxi Major Figures in the Book xxi covert operation, and led the task force that carried out the Bay of Pigs; he served as chief of station in Panama and deputy chief of the Western Hemi- sphere Division, and headed CIA’s Miami base. DESMONDFITZGERALD: Aprimary figure in covert activities from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s, FitzGerald rose to head the CIADirectorate of Operations. JOHNKENNETHGALBRAITH: American ambassador to India who opposed the CIA project in Tibet and helped President Kennedy decide to restructure this en- deavor. ROBERT M. GATES: Officer from the analytical side of the CIAwho rose through the ranks to become deputy director for intelligence, then DDCI under Bill Casey; he left to become deputy national security adviser during the first Bush administration but returned as director of central intelligence until re- tiring in January 1993. LLOYDGEORGE: Far East Division chief for the CIAduring the Korean War. JUSTINF. GLEICHAUF: ACIAanalyst, Gleichauf ran the refugee reception center in Miami that interviewed Cuban exiles for intelligence purposes. GEN. ANDREW GOODPASTER: Staff secretary to President Eisenhower, Goodpaster became a key figure, with Gordon Gray, in helping the president keep track of CIAactivities. GORDONL. GRAY: Akey figure in U.S. intelligence history, Gray served as secre- tary of the army, helped establish the Special Forces, led the Psychological Strategy Board, consulted for President Eisenhower, became Eisenhower’s national security adviser, and worked on the PFIABfor more than a decade. ERNESTO(“CHE”) GUEVARA: Argentinian doctor and early Castroite leader in Cuba, Guevara attempted to export revolution to Africa and Latin America and be- came a special target of the CIA. ALBERTHAKIM: Iranian businessman who helped with the Hostage Rescue mission and later became involved in a series of ventures with Richard V. Secord that ensnared them in the Iran-Contra affair. SAMHALPERN: Covert operations specialist with the CIA’s Far East Division, later executive assistant to the deputy director for operations. COL. ALBERTHANEY: Chief of station in Korea during the Korean War, Haney later headed the task force that carried out the Guatemala covert action project. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN: Adviser to presidents and U.S. diplomat, Harriman as- sisted Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson, attempting to negotiate an end to the AIOC crisis in Iran in the early 1950s and the civil war in Laos in the early 1960s, both of which formed episodes in the secret war. JOHNL. HART: Acovert operator in the classic CIAmold, Hart worked on Soviet op- erations, headed the Tibet branch of the FE Division during that operation, and later served as station chief in South Vietnam at the height of the war there. WILLIAMK. HARVEY: Covert operations specialist who led the CIAbase in Berlin through much of the 1950s, returned to headquarters to run the agency’s as- sassinations unit, then headed the task force that carried out Project Mon- goose and later the agency’s station in Rome. 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxii xxii Major Figures in the Book JOHN HASEY: Operations specialist in Laos who built ties to Gen. Phoumi Nosa- van, complicating U.S. policy, and then worked briefly in the Congo. COL. JACKHAWKINS: Marine officer seconded to CIAas chief of the paramilitary branch of the task force that carried out the Bay of Pigs invasion; later deputy to the head of the Pentagon office responsible for cooperation with the CIA. HENRY D. HECKSCHER: A major figure in CIA operations, Heckscher served in Berlin during the 1953riots there, worked on the Guatemala covert operation, and headed CIA stations engaged in covert operations in Laos, Japan, and Chile. RICHARDM. HELMS: Akey figure in CIAhistory, Helms rose through the ranks of OSS and SSU to CIA, heading the German Division, the Operations Direc- torate, and the intelligence community as a whole for Presidents Johnson and Nixon. PAULB. HENZE: Apsychological operations specialist, Henze worked as an analyst and deputy division chief for Radio Free Europe, a case officer and station chief in Turkey and Ethiopia, and on the Brzezinski NSC staff. ADM. ROSCOEH. HILLENKOETTER: Director of central intelligence from the Berlin Blockade to the onset of the Korean war, Hillenkoetter presided over the cre- ation of the OPC and its integration into the CIAsytem. PAUL HOLDEN: Chief pilot for Civil Air Transport’s detachment assisting the French in Indochina, Holden went on to fly for the CIA in its Indonesia project. RICHARD HOLM: Aparamilitary officer who served in Asia and Africa, notably in Hong Kong, Laos, and the Congo; later he led the Counterterrorism staff, sta- tions in Brussels and Paris, and advised on the Directorate of Operations post–Cold War reorganization. FRANK HOLOBER: A Far East Division officer, Holober worked on operations against mainland China and led the task force carrying out the CIAproject in Tibet. LAWRENCE HOUSTON: General counsel to the CIAfrom its inception through the early 1970s, his cautionary views on the legal authorities for covert opera- tions were never adequately taken into account. GEN. JOHNE. HULL: Army general who advised CIAanalysts in the early 1950s; trusted by President Eisenhower and appointed second chairman of the PBCFIA. E. HOWARD HUNT: Among the major figures in CIApolitical action, Hunt played roles in psychological warfare and covert operations in Albania, Guatemala, and Cuba, headed agency stations in Latin America, and became involved with the Nixon White House in the Watergate scandal. FRED IKLE: Undersecretary of defense for policy in the Reagan-era Pentagon, Ikle’s hard-line views contributed to the Casey covert action offensive. ADM. BOBBYRAYINMAN: Officer with a long background in naval intelligence, In- man had been an attaché in Sweden, was involved with the Pueblo affair, headed naval intelligence, and had been deputy director of DIAbefore head- 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxiii Major Figures in the Book xxiii ing the NSA, from which he was appointed to become deputy director for central intelligence. C. D. JACKSON: Apropaganda and psychological warfare expert, adviser to Presi- dent Eisenhower, and executive for the Time-Life Corporation; he conducted the review that led to the termination of the Psychological Strategy Board. WILLIAMH. JACKSON: Participated with Allen Dulles in an important early review of U.S. intelligence operations, then served as deputy director of central in- telligence under Walter B. Smith, helping with the creation of the Directorate of Operations. CHEDDIJAGAN: Guyanese political leader who became the target of CIAcovert op- erations, 1962–1964. ROBERT J. (“RED”) JANTZEN: Clandestine services officer who worked in India and Singapore; legendary as station chief in Thailand, Jantzen also led the CIAsta- tion in Canada and in retirement became associated with the Nugan Hand Bank. GORDON L. JORGENSEN: Senior clandestine services officer who led stations in both Laos and South Vietnam, among others. THOMASH. KARAMESSINES: Among the first generation of CIAofficers and an as- sociate of Richard Helms, Karamessines led CIA stations in Vienna and Athens, then rose to deputy director for operations, the post he held during the National Student Association affair, at the high point of the Vietnam War, and during the Chilean covert action. COL. JAMES KELLIS: Detached from the air force to CIA, Kellis worked in covert operations in Greece and Korea and other Far East Division activities. GEORGE KENNAN: Professional diplomat whose work furnished the basis for the U.S. Cold War doctrine of “containment,” and who made important contri- butions to the creation of the OPC. JAMESR. KILLIAN: Scientist and adviser to President Eisenhower, Killian had a key role in the early development of the U-2aircraft, on the basis of which he was appointed first chairman of the PBCFIA. JOSEPH CALDWELL KING: Headed the CIAoperations division for Latin America from its creation through the Kennedy administration. LYMAND. KIRKPATRICK: Amover in the creation of the Directorate of Operations, Kirkpatrick served as executive assistant to Walter B. Smith, chief of the Of- fice of Special Operations; as CIA’s inspector general his evaluation of the Bay of Pigs failure would be highly controversial. HENRYA. KISSINGER: Though Kissinger would have a peripheral Cold War role as a consultant to the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, he had a quite direct role in intelligence activities as national security adviser, 1969–1975, and secretary of state, 1973–1977. E. HENRY (“HANK”) KNOCKE: An officer from the technical intelligence side of CIA, Knocke had been special assistant to McCone and Helms; he led ana- lytical staffs and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, was CIAliaison to the Rockefeller and congressional investigations, and finally became deputy director for central intelligence. 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxiv xxiv Major Figures in the Book WILLIAM LAIR: Paramilitary specialist with long service in Thailand, Lair proved instrumental in enlisting Thai help for the CIAproject in Laos, where he su- pervised Hmong operations until the late 1960s. PATLANDRY: An agency paramilitary specialist, Landry conducted field missions during the Indonesian operation and later played a vital role in Laos as deputy, then chief of the unit that ran the Hmong partisan army. GEN. EDWARDG. LANSDALE: Air force officer detached to CIAand later in Penta- gon assignments cooperating with the agency, Lansdale had primary roles in CIAcovert operations in the Philippines, South Vietnam, and China. BRIAN LATELL: Agency analyst on Latin American affairs whose reports on Haiti became controversial for the CIA. JAMESR. LILLEY: Clandestine services officer who served in the Far East, in par- ticular Hong Kong, was deputy chief of station in Laos, and became the first CIAstation chief in Communist China, to which he returned as U.S. ambas- sador. FRANKLINA. LINDSAY: Agency officer who headed the European Division of OPC and the DO, left to become a corporate executive, and headed a consultant study on covert operations for the Nixon administration. JAYLOVESTONE: Akey CIAlabor operative. JOHN MACGAFFIN III: Among the CIA’s Middle East specialists, MacGaffin worked against Soviet spies in Beirut and elsewhere, ran the agency’s base in New York, became chief of a post–Cold War Central Eurasian Division and then associate deputy director for operations before moving to the FBI as an intelligence adviser to its director. GEN. JOHN MAGRUDER: Led secret operations for the OSS and later was chief of the Strategic Services Unit; Magruder played a formative role in the creation of the CIAand later served as Pentagon representative on the board super- vising the Office of Policy Coordination. HUBERMATOS: ACuban leader who later turned against Fidel Castro, believing he had betrayed the revolution; he was imprisoned for two decades and after his release made common cause with anti-Castro exiles, including involvement in the CIAcontrawar against Nicaragua. ROGERMCCARTHY: Paramilitary officer who worked on many projects in the Far East, including China, Indonesia, and Tibet; worked as a trainer on Saipan and later headed the CIA’s Tibet task force. GEN. ROBERTA. MCCLURE: Founder of peacetime psychological warfare organi- zations within the U.S. Army. JOHN A. (“ALEX”) MCCONE: Senior official under Presidents Eisenhower—for whom he led the Atomic Energy Commission—then Kennedy and Johnson, whom McCone served as director of central intelligence; he returned to in- dustry, joining the board of the ITTCorporation, and played a further covert action role when the CIAacted in Chile. ROBERTC. (“BUD”) MCFARLANE: Aformer Marine lieutenant colonel, McFarlane was detached to serve on the NSC staff under President Ford, returning later 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxv Major Figures in the Book xxv as deputy and then national security adviser to President Reagan. After leav- ing government he became involved in the Iran-Contra affair. JOHNN. (“JACK”) MCMAHON: With a background in technical intelligence, McMa- hon early worked on U-2 operations, on reconnaissance satellites, and on electronic interception before becoming an administrative coordinator, serv- ing on the Intelligence Community Staff, then as deputy director for opera- tions; he rose to deputy director for central intelligence. STEWART METHVEN: Covert operations specialist who first recruited Vang Pao in Laos, later worked on irregular warfare projects in South Vietnam and headed the CIAstation in Zaire during the Angolan project. CORD MEYER: An agency political action specialist, Meyer headed psychological operations staffs or CIA’s International Organization Division from the mid- 1950s to the early 1970s, paying special attention to activities of the “Ra- dios,” then served as station chief in London. ROBERT MURPHY: American diplomat, PBCFIA member, and adviser to President Eisenhower. ROBERTJ. MYERS: Astation chief for the Office of Special Operations on Taiwan during the Korean War years, Myers rose to deputy chief of the Far East Di- vision early in the Vietnam War. GAMALABDELNASSER: Egyptian army officer who took power in a 1952coup and cooperated with the CIAearly on, only to become a target later as the U.S. opposed his efforts to create a multinational Arab movement and an alliance of nonaligned countries. PAULH. NITZE: American official who succeeded George Kennan as head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and remained at the center of na- tional security decisions until the Reagan administration. JAMESNOEL: Clandestine services officer who became the last CIAstation chief in pre-Castro Cuba and later ran networks for the Bay of Pigs task force. OLIVER L. NORTH: Marine officer detached for service on the Reagan NSC staff who became a prime mover in the Iran-Contra affair. ROBERT OAKLEY: American diplomat whose political-military work repeatedly brought him into the arena of CIAoperations in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Somalia. CARMELOFFIE: Controversial character in early operations by the Office of Policy Coordination, CIAEuropean activities, and later its labor operations. THOMASA. PARROTT: Officer detailed from the CIAto the NSC staff to handle staff work for the 5412Group and its successors, the Special Group (Augmented) and the 303Committee. WILLIAM B. PAWLEY: Businessman and friend of President Eisenhower, Pawley used his Latin American networks to participate in CIA covert actions in Guatemala and Cuba. JACKPFEIFFER: An agency historian, Pfeiffer later conducted extensive classified research to compile the CIA’s four-volume official history of the Bay of Pigs. 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxvi xxvi Major Figures in the Book DAVIDA. PHILLIPS: An agency psychological warfare specialist, Phillips was im- portant in radio propaganda during the Guatemala and Cuba operations, and headed CIAstations in Latin America and the task force that carried out the 1970covert action in Chile. ADM. JOHNPOINDEXTER: Deputy, then national security adviser to President Reagan. THOMASPOLGAR: AEuropean operations specialist for CIA, Polgar worked in Ger- many in the early 1950s and on Hungarian operations, and headed stations in Latin America and South Vietnam, where he became the last CIAstation chief. ALLENPOPE: Air force pilot who joined Civil Air Transport for its airlift support- ing the French in Indochina, Pope flew for the CIA project in Indonesia, where his shootdown essentially terminated the operation. LUISPOSADACARRILES: Cuban exile fighter initially with the Bay of Pigs; respon- sible for bombings in Mexico City and of a Venezuelan airliner, and a parti- cipant in the “private benefactor” airlift in Nicaragua. ANTHONY(“TONYPO”) POSHEPNY: CIAfield officer who worked on covert opera- tions in Indonesia and Tibet and became an agency base chief in Laos. RAFAEL QUINTERO: Anti-Castro Cuban exile, active from before the Bay of Pigs through Project Mongoose and the Artime Brigade, right through to the 1980s contrawar against Nicaragua. MANUEL(“MANOLO”) RAY: Cuban exile politician at the Bay of Pigs and in Pro- ject Mongoose. JOHNREAGAN: Paramilitary officer who served in Korea, Japan, on the Tibet proj- ect, in Vietnam, and headed the station in Pakistan at the outset of the Afghan project. ROBERTREYNOLDS: Miami base chief for the Bay of Pigs operation. JOHN H. (“JOCKO”) RICHARDSON: CIA covert operations specialist, Richardson headed agency stations in Austria, South Korea, and South Vietnam, and had a key role in the antecedents to the military coup in which Ngo Dinh Diem was killed. STEPHENW. RICHTER: Clandestine services officer who worked with Iranian agent networks and, as chief of the Near East Division, presided over covert oper- ations in Iraq in the mid-1990s, later rising to head a DO technology man- agement group. WILLIAM A. (“RIP”) ROBERTSON, JR.: CIA field operator or contract officer in Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, Project Mongoose, and Vietnam. FELIX I. RODRIGUEZ: Cuban exile fighter and CIAcontract officer; starting from before the Bay of Pigs, Rodriguez worked for the agency on Project Mon- goose, in Bolivia, in Vietnam, and on Nicaraguan “private benefactor” oper- ations from El Salvador in the 1980s, where he also was a consultant to the Salvadoran air force. KERMIT (“KIM”) ROOSEVELT: An early covert operations expert, Roosevelt spe- cialized in the Middle East and played key roles in Egypt and Iran, and as a DO official had some involvement in Guatemala. He retired to work for oil companies. 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxvii Major Figures in the Book xxvii HARRYS. ROSITZKE: An important Cold War covert operations manager, Rositzke headed the CIA’s Soviet Bloc Division during actions against Russia and later oversaw the Tibet operation as station chief in India. WALTW. ROSTOW: Psychological warfare consultant to PSB, later deputy national security adviser and State Department Policy Planning chief 1961–1966, and national security adviser 1966–1969. DEANRUSK: Secretary of state for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1961–1969. JOSE(“PEPE”) SANROMAN: Cuban exile brigade commander. NESTOR SANCHEZ: A Latin America specialist, Sanchez served as deputy station chief in Guatemala during the CIAoperation there and was with the Miami station during Mongoose, serving as case officer for a Cuban operative in one of the Castro assassination plots; he led CIA stations in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Madrid before heading the Latin America Division; in 1981 he moved to the Pentagon with Frank Carlucci, becoming deputy secretary of defense for Inter-American affairs, with a role in the Nicaraguan secret war. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.: Historian and adviser to President Kennedy, espe- cially on Latin American affairs, Schlesinger had roles in covert operations against Cuba and Guyana. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER: An official whose background lay in defense analysis, Schlesinger served briefly as director of central intelligence in 1973 before being appointed secretary of defense. GEN. RICHARDV. SECORD: Air force special operations expert with important roles in the Laotian paramilitary operation and the Iran hostage rescue, and later a “private benefactor” in the Nicaraguan contra operation and the sale of weapons to Iran. TONYSFORZA: Clandestine services officer who served in Cuba before Castro, in Mongoose, with the CIAstation in Mexico City, and undercover during the Chilean project that led to the assassination of Gen. René Schneider. THEODORE (“TED”) SHACKLEY: Clandestine services officer who rose through the agency to become associate deputy director for operations; Shackley ran Pol- ish operations from Berlin base, went to Miami station to lead field opera- tions for Project Mongoose, headed the CIAstations in Laos and South Viet- nam, and the Chilean destabilization operation as chief of the Latin America Division. GEN. WALTER BEDELL (“BEETLE”) SMITH: Army general who led the CIA from 1950to 1953, creating the Directorate of Operations by merging the OPC and OSO; supervised the OPC during its major covert actions. ANASTASIOSOMOZA: Nicaraguan director who collaborated with the CIAon covert operations in Guatemala and against Cuba. ADM. SIDNEYW. SOUERS: First director of central intelligence under President Tru- man, later his first staff chief for the National Security Council. EDWARDA. STANULIS: Former army officer and CIAparamilitary expert, Stanulis planned initiatives to counter Fidel Castro, then became a senior officer on the task force that prepared the Bay of Pigs operation. 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxviii xxviii Major Figures in the Book JOHN H. STEIN: An officer who served in Zaire at the end of the CIA operation there, became chief of station in Cambodia during the war, then in Libya, and later rose to become deputy director for operations. ADLAI E. STEVENSON: U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis. GORDON STEWART: OSS and SSU veteran, longtime chief of CIA operations in Germany, leader of the DO’s foreign intelligence staff, later a senior agency estimator and the CIA’s inspector general. GEN. RICHARD G. STILWELL: Headed CIAFar Eastern operations during the Ko- rean War period and proved instrumental in the agency’s acquisition of its first air proprietary; Stilwell also played an important role in the evolution of U.S. Special Forces. JOHN STOCKWELL: Paramilitary specialist who served in Vietnam and Laos and later led the CIAtask force for the Angolan project. RICHARDF. STOLZ: Aclandestine service officer who specialized in Russian oper- ations, Stolz worked in Germany and Bulgaria, led stations in Moscow, Rome, Yugoslavia, and London, and headed the Soviet Division; he came out of retirement to lead the Directorate of Operations. HOWARD STONE: ACIAcovert operations specialist, Stone worked on the Iranian coup project, headed the agency’s station in Syria attempting to mount a sim- ilar initiative, and later became station chief in Nepal during the final phase of the Tibet project. ADM. WILLIAMO. STUDEMAN: An intelligence specialist who had headed that de- partment for the navy, Studeman became deputy and briefly acting DCI dur- ing the interregnum between James Woolsey and John Deutch. GEN. MAXWELLD. TAYLOR: Army general and chief of staff in the late 1950s, Tay- lor later became a key adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, heading the board that reviewed implementation of the Bay of Pigs operation, and chairing the Special Group (Augmented) until he left to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ADM. RUFUS L. TAYLOR: Deputy director of central intelligence under Richard Helms, Taylor had headed naval intelligence and had a long background in communications intelligence. GARFIELD THORSRUD: Air operations specialist for the CIA, Thorsrud played im- portant roles in CIAprojects in Indonesia and Tibet, and headed airfield op- erations for the Bay of Pigs. HANSV. TOFTE: Covert operations specialist in China, Korea, Guatemala, and later deputy chief of CIADomestic Contact Division. B. HUGHTOVAR: Clandestine services officer who led the CIAstation in Indone- sia at the time of the 1965 coup there, and later the station in Laos at the height of the paramilitary effort there. RAFAELTRUJILLO: Dictator of the Dominican Republic, Trujillo became the object of CIAplanning for a covert operation in 1960–1961. GEN. LUCIEN K. TRUSCOTT: Deputized from the army as CIADirector Walter B. Smith’s special representative in Germany, Truscott had a key role in Euro- 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxix Major Figures in the Book xxix pean operations through the early and mid-1950s and served as trou- bleshooter for President Eisenhower. BRONSON TWEEDY: Old-line CIAofficer who supervised the Congo operation as Africa Division chief. THOMASA. TWETTEN: Clandestine services officer who served in Cairo, headed the station in Jordan, the Office of Technical Services, was deputy and then chief of the NE Division, and associate, then deputy director for operations, retir- ing as station chief in London. ALULMER: Operations officer with wide experience, Ulmer headed CIAstations in Vienna and Madrid, and the Far East Division, supervising covert opera- tions in Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines. GEN. HOYT S. VANDENBERG: Air force general who directed the Central Intelli- gence Group and managed the creation of the CIA. TONY VARONA: Cuban exile politician active during the Bay of Pigs project and later CIAanti-Cuban efforts; he involved his organization in plots to assassi- nate Castro. JOHNWALLER: Covert operations specialist who worked in the Near East Division primarily, including in Turkey and on the coup project in Iran; deputy chief of the Africa Division during key operations of the 1960s and later the CIA’s inspector general. GEN. VERNONA. WALTERS: By virtue of his linguistic abilities, Walters long hov- ered at the edges of intelligence work, executing special missions for many presidents before Nixon made him deputy director of central intelligence; as President Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, Walters again played a role in the Casey covert action offensive. JUDGE WILLIAM WEBSTER: A career lawyer who was FBI chief when President Reagan selected him to be director of central intelligence. EDWARDWELLES: Congo task force chief. DAVIDWHIPPLE: CIAfield officer who served in Europe, Africa, and the Far East for almost three decades. WHITING WILLAUER: An official of the CIA proprietary Civil Air Transport, Willauer was appointed ambassador to Honduras to help with the Guatemala operation and later served as State Department overseer of the CIA’s Cuba task force. EDWIN WILSON: Covert operations specialist whose commercial deals in retire- ment became a U.S. headache. DONALD H. WINTERS: Deputy chief of station during the CIAoperation in Chile, Winters rose through the ranks as a Latin American specialist; he had a role in the Nicaraguan secret war as station chief in Honduras, then Panama. FRANKG. WISNER: Founder and head of the Office of Policy Coordination, he di- rected the transition to the Directorate of Operations, then led CIAcovert op- erations through the late 1950s. Subsequently chief of station in London. R. JAMESWOOLSEY: Alawyer with little intelligence background except as a con- gressional staffer or U.S. negotiator, Woolsey’s appointment as DCI was po- litically opportune for President Clinton. 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxx 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxxi Acronyms Used in the Book ABN Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (organization of anti-Communist groups) AF CIAAfrican Division AFL American Federation of Labor AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organiza- tions AFSCME American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees AID U.S. Agency for International Development AIFLD American Institute for Free Labor Development AIOC Anglo-Iranian Oil Company AMCOMLIB American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism AOG CIAAfrican Operations Group (Angola task force) ARC U.S. Air Force Air Resupply and Communications Wing ARDE Nicaraguan contrapolitical/military group (Alianza revolucionaria democrática) BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BDPS Lithuanian partisan movement (Bendrasis Demokratinio Pasi- priesinimo Sajudis) BNE CIABoard of National Estimates BNL Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (Italian bank) BOSS Bureau of State Security (South African intelligence service) CAT Civil Air Transport (CIAproprietary) CATF CIACentral America Task Force CCRAK Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Korea CDNI Committee for the Defense of National Interests (Laotian political movement) CDP Christian Democratic Party (Chile) CI Counterinsurgency CIA U.S. Central Intelligence Agency CIC U.S. Counter Intelligence Corps 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxxii xxxii Acronyms Used in the Book CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group CIG U.S. Central Intelligence Group CORDS U.S. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (pacifica- tion unit) CPPG NSC Crisis Pre-Planning Group CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CTC CIACounterterrorism Center DCI CIADirector of Central Intelligence DDCI CIADeputy Director of Central Intelligence DDI CIADeputy Director of Intelligence DDO CIADeputy Director for Operations DEA U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration DGI Cuban government intelligence service (Dirección general de in- teligencia) DI CIADirectorate for Intelligence DIA U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency DNI U.S. Director of National Intelligence DO CIADirectorate for Operations DP Displaced Person DRA Democratic Republic of Afghanistan DRE Cuban exile group (Directorio revolucionario estudiantil) DRVN Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) EXCOM Executive Committee of the National Security Council EXCOMAIR CIAExecutive Committee for Air Proprietaries EXIM U.S. Export-Import Bank (international trade finance unit) FAR Cuban government armed forces (Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias) FBI U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation FDN Nicaraguan contraarmed force (Fuerza democrática nicaraguense) FDR Franklin Delano Roosevelt FE CIAFar East Division FECOM U.S. Far East Command FLI Front for the Liberation of Iran FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese acronym) FOG U.S. Foreign Operations Group (a military clandestine unit) FRD Cuban exile political front (Frente revolucionario democrático) FSLN Nicaraguan Marxist political party (frente sandinista de liberación nacional) G-2 Military intelligence (U.S. Army, also Cuban government intelli- gence) HMS Her/His Majesty’s Ship HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ICJ International Court of Justice IG CIAInspector General INA Iraqi National Accord (Allawi exile faction) 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxxiii Acronyms Used in the Book xxxiii INC Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi exile faction) INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State Department intelligence unit) IOB Intelligence Oversight Board IOG CIA Iraq Operations Group (also Iran Operations Group at a dif- ferent time) ISA U.S. Intelligence Support Activity (a military clandestine unit) ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistani military intelligence agency) ITT International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation IVAG U.S. International Volunteer Air Group JACK Joint Activities Commission Korea JCS U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff JFK John Fitzgerald Kennedy KGB Soviet intelligence and security service (Russian acronym) KHAD Afghan Government secret police agency (Afghan acronym) LBJ Lyndon Baines Johnson LCI Landing Craft Infantry (amphibious ship designator) LS Lima Site (Laotian Airstrip designator) LSD Landing Ship Dock (amphibious ship designator) MACSOG MACVStudies and Observation Group MACV U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology MNR Bolivian political party (Movimiento nacional revolucionario) MON CIAMemorandum of Notification (presidential finding) MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese acronym) MRR Cuban exile group (Movimiento de recuperación revolucionario) NATO North American Treaty Organization NE CIANear East Division (of the Directorate for Operations—Near East and Africa until 1959) NESA CIANear East and South Asian Division (of the Directorate of In- telligence) NHAO U.S. Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office NIA U.S. National Intelligence Authority NIC CIANational Intelligence Council NID National Intelligence Daily (CIApublication) NIE CIANational Intelligence Estimate NIO CIANational Intelligence Officer NIST National Intelligence Support Team (community-wide) NKVD Soviet intelligence and security service (Russian acronym) NLF National Liberation Front (Vietnam) NLHX Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Xat) NOG CIANicaraguan Operations Group NSA National Student Association 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxxiv xxxiv Acronyms Used in the Book NSA U.S. National Security Agency NSAM National Security Action Memorandum NSC U.S. National Security Council NSDD National Security Decision Directive NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum NSPG NSC National Security Planning Group NSSM National Security Study Memorandum NTS Russian exile group (Natsionalno Trudovoi Soyuz) NVDA National Volunteer Defense Army (Tibetan rebel movement) OAS Organization of American States OCB NSC Operations Coordinating Board OPC CIAOffice of Policy Coordination ORIT Latin American labor group (Organización regional inter-Americano de trajabadores) OSO CIAOffice of Special Operations OSO U.S. Department of Defense Office of Special Operations OSS U.S. Organization for Strategic Services OUN Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Ukrainian acronym) PARU Police Aerial Resupply Unit (Thai Special Forces) PBCFIA President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities PDF Panama Defense Forces PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan PERMESTA Indonesian rebel movement (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta) PFIAB President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board PLA People’s Liberation Army (Chinese armed forces) PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PNC People’s National Congress (Guyanese political party) PP CIAPolitical and Psychological Warfare Staff PPP People’s Progressive Party (Guyana) PRC People’s Republic of China PSB NSC Psychological Strategy Board PSI Public Services International RFE U.S. Radio Free Europe RIAS Radio in the American Sector (U.S. radio outlet in West Berlin) RIG NSC Restricted Interagency Group RL U.S. Radio Liberty RLG Royal Laotian Government SACSA U.S. Special Assistant (to the Secretary of Defense) for Counter- insurgency and Special Activities SAD CIASpecial Activities Division SADF South African Defense Forces SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SAM Surface to Air Missile SAOG CIASouth Asia Operations Group (Afghanistan task force) 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 1:36 PM Page xxxv Acronyms Used in the Book xxxv SCC NSC Special Coordinating Committee SDECE French intelligence service (Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage) SEAL Sea-Air-Land soldiers (U.S. Navy special forces) SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SGU Special Guerrilla Unit (CIAcombat unit of Hmong warriors in Laos) SIS Secret Intelligence Service (British intelligence service, aka MI-6) SNIE CIASpecial National Intelligence Estimate SOE Special Operations Executive (British) SOF Special Operations Forces SOG Special Operations Group (Unconventional warfare command Korea) SPG CIASpecial Procedures Group SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence SSU U.S. Strategic Services Unit STTGI Stanford Technology Trading Group International (a Secord-Hakim company) TUC Trades Union Council UCLA University of California, Los Angeles UF United Front (Guyanese political party) UN United Nations UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese acronym) UNO Nicaraguan contrapolitical front (Unión democrática nicaraguense) UNPFK United Nations Partisan Forces Korea UPA Ukrainian Partisan Army USAF United States Air Force USIA United States Information Agency USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WEI Western Enterprises Incorporated (CIAcover agency on Taiwan) WH CIAWestern Hemisphere Division WIGMO Western International Ground Maintenance Organization WIN Polish partisan movement Freedom and Independent (Wolnosc I Niepodleglosc) 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxxvi 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxxvii Astanding force . . . is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale, its consequences may be fatal. On any scale, it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. Awise nation will combine all these considerations; and whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties. —James Madison, The Federalist, No. 41 08_692_01_FM.qxd 11/24/08 10:48 AM Page xxxviii 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 1 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 2 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 3 1 The Gamut of Secret Operations THREE DECADES LATER, Jack Kennedy’s man apologized. What had happened at the time had been deadly serious, so serious that, in order to get an ally to go along, the United States had threatened an invasion of another enemy that would have led to nuclear war. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not quite kill Cheddi Jagan but did its best to put him out of business. Jagan, the prime minister of British Guiana, headed for independence as the nation of Guyana, had raised hack- les in Washington. The CIAhad orders to get rid of him. In the early 1960s this attempt at regime change, filtered through America’s Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union, was the latest in a long series of CIA covert operations. Jagan became both victim and exemplar. “We misunderstood the whole struggle down there,” Arthur M. Schlesinger reminisced in 1994. Pres- ident John F. Kennedy’s court historian and private adviser had made Latin Amer- ica one of his special interests. Guyana became Schlesinger’s special mistake. Of course Schlesinger had help. In fact he had initially held a relatively re- laxed view of Jagan as Guyanese leader. The CIAseemed more pessimistic. In an intelligence estimate issued in March 1961, the agency, looking ahead to elections in the South American country, concluded that Jagan’s political party “will proba- bly succeed in winning the right to form the next government.” The CIAfurther concluded: “Jagan himself is not an acknowledged Communist, but his statements and actions over the years bear the marks of the introduction and advice the Com- munists have given him.” Further, “Jagan’s US-born wife, who exercises very strong influence over him, is an acknowledged Communist.” The only bright ele- ments lay in the U.S. intelligence belief that Jagan, to preclude interference in Guyana’s move toward full independence, would not immediately lead the coun- try toward the left and would hesitate to do so later. President Kennedy’s National Security Council (NSC) assessed the Guyana situation a few weeks after the disastrous CIAfailure in the April 1961Bay of Pigs operation, a covert attempt to invade Cuba. They feared Guyana succumbing to the same dark forces as Fidel Castro. Significantly, the task of figuring out what to do about Guyana rested with the same officials responsible for U.S. policy on Cuba. 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 4 4 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY Guyana began as a British rather than an American problem. Unable to sustain its empire following World War II, Great Britain responded to rising nationalism by granting increasing self-government and then independence to many of its colonies, Guyana among them. Europeans had arrived there about 1620, settling on the coast and leaving indigenous peoples in the interior. The Dutch West India Company held on to the territory until 1796when it fell to the English during the Napoleonic wars. In 1814 Guyana was ceded to England by treaty. The Dutch, Portuguese, and English brought in African slaves, and in the 1830s the British also introduced indentured workers from India. By the 1950s the “East Indians,” as they were called, had become the dominant population at about 46 percent of the total, with Africans the next largest group at 36 percent. Cheddi Jagan came from East Indian stock. Sugar and rice were Guyana’s main products. The country had a classic plan- tation economy, with large British corporations controlling most of the production, and plantation workers poorly paid and restive. Their energy fueled Guyanese pol- itics. Born in 1918, the eldest of eleven children of a cane cutter, then a driver, from a village outside the capital, Georgetown, Cheddi Jagan saw the depredations of Big Sugar through his father’s eyes. Cheddi graduated from Northwestern Univer- sity in the United States and became a dentist. He used his income to put other fam- ily members through college. Attracted even then to progressive causes, Cheddi met Janet Rosenberg at a political event in Chicago. In 1943they married. Once a member of the Young Communist League, Janet Jagan had, if anything, stronger views than Cheddi’s. When the Jagans returned to Guyana they thought themselves destined to organize the workers. In 1947Cheddi Jagan won election to a consul- tative council advising the British governor. Three years later he and Janet were founders of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), the first mass political party in the country and for a time the multiracial exponent of Guyanese nationalism. Cheddi Jagan campaigned constantly for better working conditions and wage increases from the Sugar Producers Association, representing the corporations that controlled the plantations. The corporations’efforts to keep Jagan off their planta- tions only increased his appeal to the workers. Great Britain, committed to fostering self-government in Guyana, in 1953 permitted an election for an assembly and cabinet. British officials convinced themselves during this early period that Cheddi Jagan was a Communist. When he won, Jagan formed a government; Janet Jagan, also elected, became deputy speaker in the assembly. Cheddi argued that British measures were insufficient and pressed for full autonomy. After barely four months in office, the British dismissed Jagan’s cabinet and in 1954imprisoned both Cheddi and Janet for half a year. That merely increased their popularity. British hopes of dampening Guyanese sympathy for Cheddi Jagan hinged on creating alternative political movements. One materialized in 1955 when Forbes Burnham, another founder of the People’s Progressive Party and its former vice chairman, formed a new People’s National Congress (PNC). The PNC drew 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 5 The Gamut of Secret Operations 5 mostly African Guyanese support and ended the former PPP monopoly. In new elections in 1957, however, Jagan’s party won the most votes and returned him to the cabinet, though not as prime minister. Business interests formed another polit- ical party in 1960, the United Front (UF), but this stood primarily for minority Por- tuguese and had little chance for electoral success. The next election occurred in August 1961. Washington wanted to employ the CIA to forestall a Jagan victory. By now the British were less convinced that Cheddi Jagan was a political extremist and acquiesced in his participation. In late May, U.S. officials met with the British to agree on a program of action, but Lon- don refused either a joint operation or unilateral American action. Kennedy’s sec- retary of state, Dean Rusk, wrote to his British colleague Lord Hume, “We are not inclined to give people like Jagan the same benefit of doubt which was given two or three years ago to Castro.” The British foreign secretary replied that any action would only make things worse, that London had no grounds to resume direct rule as it had done in 1953, and that Jagan had not been so difficult since his return to government in 1957. In the 1961election the PPPwon eighteen of the twenty-four seats in the assembly; there was now no alternative to Cheddi Jagan’s becoming prime minister. In writing about not giving the Guyanese leader any benefit of the doubt, Dean Rusk referred subtly to a CIAinitiative. In August 1961, within days of the election, the State Department sent President Kennedy a proposal that involved two tracks: open cooperation with the Guyanese in hopes of inducing Prime Min- ister Jagan to align with the West, but a CIAcovert political action against Jagan if he did not. Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles figured prominently in the group who hammered out this strategy. At this early stage, Arthur Schlesinger actually helped keep the CIA out of the act, objecting that the covert initiative could easily get in the way of the overt policy of assistance. President Kennedy sided with Schlesinger. Asecond round of talks with the British took place in London in early Sep- tember. Ambassador David Bruce led the American team, with CIA, technical as- sistance, and State Department officers to help. Among them sat William C. Bur- dett, Washington’s point man on Guyana policy. The CIA’s senior officer in London at the time, station chief Frank G. Wisner, the agency’s former director of operations, also participated. Bruce received instructions to minimize the impor- tance of the covert track if necessary, telling the British the project was only a plan, that any specific move would be subject to high-level U.S. consideration—but to get British approval. Secretary Rusk told Bruce, “We should keep in mind [the] possibility Jagan is [a] Communist-controlled ‘sleeper’who will move to establish Castro or Communist regime upon independence.” The British again rejected a se- cret operation. Arthur Schlesinger saw Dean Rusk’s cable to Ambassador Bruce and objected—the term “sleeper” had very specific meaning in the spy business, he told one of Rusk’s top aides, and no one, Schlesinger noted, had suggested that Cheddi Jagan was a disciplined agent or pretending to be someone else. 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 6 6 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY Prime Minister Jagan, perfectly aware that American officials viewed him with suspicion, knew Guyana needed foreign aid. Jagan sought a meeting with Kennedy to plead his case directly. He traveled to Washington and saw JFK in the Oval Of- fice on October 25, seeking to allay U.S. fears. Cheddi Jagan described himself as a socialist who believed in state planning but political freedom for all Guyanese. Then Jagan made his pitch for aid. Kennedy avoided talk of dollar numbers. The American record notes that Jagan “was evasive on all ideological and doctrinal is- sues.” In his biography of Kennedy, Schlesinger adds that Jagan made a serious faux pas, saying he admired the Marxist journal Monthly Review, and further raised JFK’s hackles with a television appearance in which he refused to criticize the So- viet Union, leaving “an impression of either wooliness or fellow-travelling.” In the wake of Cheddi’s visit there would be no new help for his country. The policy of overt cooperation languished until January 1962, when President Kennedy ordered the State Department to send a survey mission to Guyana to pre- pare an expanded technical assistance effort, an extension of a program begun un- der President Dwight D. Eisenhower. But Kennedy took no action on another ini- tiative, a road-building project that represented by far the largest element of contemplated U.S. aid. Amonth later violent riots erupted in Georgetown. Starved of funds, Jagan’s government had proposed tax increases plus tight spending controls. Protests en- sued. A general strike began on February 12, degenerating into vandalism and looting. Four days later, when police fired on rioters, killing two, all hell broke loose. The situation assumed a racial character as rioters aimed at stores owned by East Indians in the center of Georgetown, while the opposition parties and those trade unions that catered to the African population maneuvered to take advantage. Jagan could have mobilized East Indian laborers from the plantations to fight the brawlers but instead asked the British governor for security assistance. London de- ployed a battalion of troops, some flown from Jamaica, about half direct from the United Kingdom, reinforcing the company normally on duty in Guyana. From the prime minister’s residence, Red House, a beautiful nineteenth- century structure in the colonial style, Jagan could see the devastation. Whole blocks of downtown Georgetown burned to the ground. Jagan later told a British diplomat, as relayed to the Americans, that he thought leaders of the United force and CIAofficers had fomented the riots. Prime Minister Jagan asked for a United Nations inquiry but ultimately settled for an investigation by British Common- wealth officials. Jagan’s charges that the CIAfomented the 1962 riots have been widely re- peated but on balance should be rejected. Over the succeeding weeks assurances were given—by the CIAto President Kennedy, by the State Department to other officials, and by the United States to Great Britain—that the spooks had had noth- ing to do with this tragedy. It is suggestive that Edward Lansdale, a political ac- tion expert monitoring CIA operations simultaneously under way against Cuba, asked agency officers a few months later why they figured they could provoke a general strike in Cuba when the CIAitself admitted its inability to carry off labor 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 7 The Gamut of Secret Operations 7 actions elsewhere in Latin America. The CIAhad some influence over Guyanese trade unions as a result of its early work in this area (about which more in a mo- ment) and had given a little money to anti-Jagan unions, but the covert action proj- ect for Guyana had yet to be approved and there is no other indication of U.S. ac- tivity at this time. What is true is that U.S. officials used the Georgetown riots as an excuse to write off Cheddi Jagan. On February 19, with smoke still rising from the ruins in Georgetown, Dean Rusk sent a strong demarche to the British foreign secretary declaring it “mandatory” that “we concert on remedial steps.” Rusk thundered, “I must tell you now that I have reached the conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan.” Rusk saw the Guyanese leader as espousing a “Marxist-Leninist policy” paralleling Castro’s. Ominously, Rusk ended, “It seems to me clear that new elections should now be scheduled, and I hope we can agree that Jagan should not be allowed to accede to power again.” There remained dissenting voices within the Kennedy administration, how- ever. One was Adlai E. Stevenson, Washington’s ambassador to the United Nations. When Stevenson learned of the Rusk letter to Lord Home he wrote the secretary— and sent a copy to JFK—that British stalling on Guyanese independence would simply strengthen Jagan. American involvement would be impossible to conceal over time, Stevenson argued, while disclosure would substantially damage the U.S. position in Latin America and its carefully nurtured reputation for anti-colonialism. What was more, “the damaging effect of such disclosure would be magnified if the U.S. involvement were of the character which might be inferred from the last sen- tence of your letter.” Stevenson ended by asking to be briefed on CIA plans for Guyana. Lord Alec Hume was no more persuaded. The foreign secretary’s reply to Rusk declared that Great Britain would not go back upon its course of bringing the colonies to independence, and certainly could not gain from failing to pursue that course in the single case of Guyana. Hume met Rusk’s declaration head on: “You say that it is not possible for you ‘to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan’and that ‘Jagan should not accede to power again.’How would you suggest that this can be done in a democracy?” Even within the CIAthere were sometimes less hysterical voices. Participants at the CIAdirector’s morning staff meeting on February 26listened as officials re- ported three Cuban merchant vessels en route to Guyana laden with weapons. Within a day CIA analysts were able to prove the report false. No evidence of Cuban arms shipments anywhere in Latin America would emerge for another year. At the White House, Arthur Schlesinger warned JFK that both the CIAand the State Department had the notion that the president had made a firm decision to get rid of Jagan. On March 8, 1962, President Kennedy signed a directive, a Na- tional Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), explicitly stating that no final deci- sion would be taken on Guyana policy until after a British survey mission, con- versations with London, and answers to Kennedy’s specific questions. The NSAM 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 8 8 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY was unusual in that the White House addressed it directly to CIADirector John McCone, Rusk, and so on, not as a single document circulated to the entire top level of the U.S. bureaucracy. It was also striking in that where NSAMs typically or- dered action, this one mandated inaction. Also, many Kennedy-era NSAMs were signed in his name by national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, but the presi- dent signed this one himself. Aweek later Secretary Rusk talked with the British in Geneva. In his report Rusk noted that London did not exclude action but was not willing to go down that road until overt possibilities were exhausted. “For [the] present,” Rusk admitted, “I do not believe covert action with or without [the] British is indicated.” Rusk ended by asking the department to use diplomatic channels to ask the CIA’s Frank Wisner to desist for the time being. One thing President Kennedy demanded as a prerequisite for his decision had been an analysis of the possibilities and limitations of action. On March 15 the State Department completed an extensive policy paper. Its third option specified “a program designed to bring about the removal of Cheddi Jagan.” Analysis in the paper indicates the project clearly envisioned “covert U.S. political action” and that British acquiescence (at a minimum) would be necessary. State recognized negative factors, conceding Adlai Stevenson’s point that the United States must be prepared to pay heavily in world public opinion “if evidence were presented show- ing any U.S. covert activities.” Even without such evidence, Russia and Cuba could be expected to make the most of allusions to earlier CIAoperations in Latin America to diminish U.S. “credibility as a supporter of the principle of noninter- vention.” The Guyana paper framed Anglo-American conversations in Washington, where the British survey mission reported its results. At the March 17 meeting, Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson took pains to say the United States feared chaos and a Communist government, insisting on the need to work closely to avert catastrophe—code words to convince London to acquiesce in U.S. action if not rise to the occasion themselves. Reprising Dean Rusk’s cautions of a month earlier, Johnson indicated that Washington saw Cheddi Jagan in the same light as Fidel Castro, saying, “We do not intend to be taken in twice.” The British, on the other hand, reported that Guyana’s large sugar corporations were not wor- ried and mentioned that two of the biggest had no wish to become involved polit- ically. One, the Bookers Group, “probably considered Jagan to be the best leader of the lot.” The State paper and the Washington talks became the basis for the delibera- tions of a shadowy unit called the Special Group, the highest U.S. government unit dealing with covert operations. When the Special Group met on March 20, Guyana was the third item on its agenda. The Group refined a CIAproject proposal next sent to the British. London’s resistance to covert action weakened over time. When President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met in May 1962, the British agreed to special arrangements for consultations with Washington on Guyana. At 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 9 The Gamut of Secret Operations 9 informal secret talks the Americans presented their action program. Macmillan still rejected the most energetic measures but decided he could abide some CIAef- forts to manipulate Guyanese politics. By June, Arthur Schlesinger had told Pres- ident Kennedy that “an independent British Guiana under Burnham (if Burnham will commit himself to a multiracial policy) would cause us many fewer problems than an independent British Guiana under Jagan.” Schlesinger intended his policy advice to guide Kennedy’s decision on the covert action that Washington spooks advocated. The Central Intelligence Agency carried out many kinds of activities. Ones that aimed to influence the domestic affairs of other states were known as “political action.” The Guyana project would be a po- litical action. Avariety of tactics might contribute to this kind of operation. The most obvious was to recruit—usually for pay—persons of influence in the target nation. Such opinion makers could include politicians, businessmen, labor leaders, and journalists—especially the latter two: labor leaders because they could put bodies in the street on demand, journalists because their stories in the print or broadcast media could sway people’s beliefs. Barrages of such press coverage could be targeted to shape opinion, and if intelligence operatives had good enough connections, they could concoct the stories themselves, taking CIA’s carefully crafted lines of argument and drumming them in by repetition. Judicious dollops of CIAmoney could help form or advance political parties and finance candidates at election time. When subjects were aware of the role of American intelligence, they could be said to be “witting.” Unwitting persons were those deliberately kept in the dark about the CIArole in what they were being asked to do. American intelligence op- eratives could pretend to be of other nationalities—a “false-flag” approach. But even if they revealed their true colors they would usually not identify themselves as CIAofficers—they would be under “cover.” The CIAcommand center in any country was called a “station,” located within the U.S. embassy and headed by a station chief. An important station, or one with far-flung activities, would direct “bases” in other places within the country. Stations were typically staffed by offi- cers under “light” cover—people supposed to be diplomats, commercial officials, or military rather than spies. Even deeper cover, undercover, were officers who pretended to have no connection with the U.S. government whatsoever. These per- sons were under “nonofficial cover.” The Guyana operation would be conducted primarily by officers under nonofficial cover. The persons they recruited, agents or assets, evidently were mostly aware of the CIAorigins of the plots they were car- rying out. Agents were always left unwitting of CIApurposes, of course, but in a political action like Guyana, over time these became rather transparent. The object was, as Arthur Schlesinger put it, to ensure that the government of an independent Guyana took the coloration that Washington desired, right down to who was in charge of it. To make that happen the CIAused agents of influence to create propaganda and place news that it wanted, labor agents to 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 10 10 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY produce a visible opposition, and political agents to oppose those who the CIA decided were enemies of its desired outcome. Guyana would be a full-spectrum political action. The Central Intelligence Agency suffered through tumult even as it began to focus on Guyana, for these were the months after its disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. There had been investigations, postmortems, a National Security Council policy review—every kind of inquiry. A generation of CIA leadership had been swept away, except, oddly enough, the agency’s Western Hemisphere chief, the man who would have ultimate command of the Guyana project. Col. Joseph Cald- well King would be the go-to guy. King had spent his entire career in Latin Amer- ica, doing studies on the Amazon water basin for Nelson D. Rockefeller before and into World War II, as an entrepreneur, and as a special agent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. As entrepreneur, spurning contrary advice, King had opened a condom factory in ultra-Catholic Brazil, and made a considerable profit. Later he sold the plant to Johnson & Johnson and acquired stock that became ever more valuable as the company’s stake in Latin America mushroomed. King be- came its vice president, selling in Argentina and Brazil. His military rank seems to have been honorific. In the early postwar period, when the FBI had been in charge of intelligence on Latin America, King joined the Bureau. In the late forties that role had been taken over by the new CIA, and King transferred to the agency. He soon became chief of its Western Hemisphere Division. When the agency over- threw the government of Guatemala in 1954, King was there. Wags called him “Je- sus Christ,” and he styled himself “JC,” perhaps to assuage his anxiety at showing poorly next to the corps of Ivy Leaguers who dominated the CIA. King presided over the early part of the U.S. imbroglio in Cuba, when in fact the United States had been “taken in” the first time, as the Kennedy people kept telling the British. King escaped blame for the Bay of Pigs because it had been managed at a level above his pay grade, leaving him out of the loop. Some recall that officials feared his strongly conservative politics might skew the project. The Colonel had nonetheless been an advocate for ousting Castro, and in 1962 he saw Guyana as an opportunity to build a wall against fidelista influence extended into South America. King’s branch chief for this venture, a capable lieutenant, was Virginia H. Hall Goillot, among the most senior women in CIA’s clandestine service. She had to be at that time, an era exceedingly difficult for women at the agency. Hall had lost a leg in World War II, then parachuted into France to work with the resistance, her prosthesis strapped to her body. She won the Distinguished Service Cross for that. In 1950 she married Paul Goillot, an OSS comrade with the resistance. She joined the CIAin 1951, originally as a branch officer for Western Europe, design- ing stay-behind networks for France. On the paramilitary staff in 1954she too had worked on the Guatemala operation and had gone on to plan projects for South- east Asia. Despite her experience and her medals, the legendary Hall had needed 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 11 The Gamut of Secret Operations 11 eleven years to obtain a one-level promotion to field grade. For the Guyana proj- ect she would have an important role. On Guyana, Hall wrestled with the need to build capabilities inside the coun- try. In early 1962the CIAhad no station in Georgetown and lacked direct contact with Jagan’s opponent, Forbes Burnham. Hall recruited a Guyanese psychiatrist whose brother was an aide to Burnham. She sent CIAofficer Joseph B. Smith to Barbados one weekend that February to meet the agent and his brother. Smith in- structed the aide in tradecraft, including secret writing skills that Burnham’s as- sistant could use to pass information. The Burnham link was made. For this project there could be no question of resorting to a quasi-military op- eration or mounting a coup d’état. Guyana had no armed forces to draw into the game, and Cheddi Jagan’s popularity remained such that, even after the George- town riots, no possibility existed for armed resistance, which in any case the British army would be bound to fight. The broad strategy was evident from the be- ginning: require an election, carry out a political maneuver to reduce Jagan’s chances, then do everything possible to influence the outcome. The CIAhad ap- propriate resources, including labor and international organizations. These took the lead in the scheme. The Directorate for Operations* controlled the CIA’s clandestine service and had the twin missions of espionage and covert operations. The Western Hemi- sphere Division and J. C. King worked for the Directorate for Operations (DO). So did the Covert Action Staff, locus of the agency’s political warfare experts and its labor activists. By early 1962the DO had a new boss, as did the CIAitself. The deputy director for operations, a professional intelligence officer, was Richard M. Helms, also not tarred by the Bay of Pigs because he had been careful to stay out of it. At one of their first meetings, new CIAdirector John McCone told Helms he would be the “man for Cuba.” Because Cuba, by then seen as a dangerous exporter of revolution throughout Latin America, monopolized CIA effort, McCone’s re- mark became shorthand for special attention to the hemisphere. Helms readily conceded that Central America and the Caribbean had been neglected ever since the creation of the agency. The demand for a Guyana covert action lay squarely within that framework, alongside a more ambitious project pursued directly against Cuba. These were among Helms’s first projects as director of the DO. Planning for Guyana depended upon a fresh Special National Intelligence Es- timate (SNIE) prepared by CIA analysts in April 1962. This study looked at the Georgetown riots and concluded that racial conflict was likely to continue as the ba- sic factor in Guyanese politics. That offered DO operators an obvious cleavage to exploit. The British were not about to resume direct rule, which estimators projected * Created in 1951, this part of the CIAwas known until 1973as the Directorate for Plans in order to disguise its true function. Further, the unit’s abbreviation followed the job title of its chief, the deputy director for plans (DDP). In 1973this unit was retitled the Directorate for Operations (DO), the iden- tity it retains today, and is headed by the CIA’s deputy director for operations. To avoid confusion in this book, this element of the CIAwill be called the Directorate for Operations throughout. 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 12 12 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY might triple their expenditures for the Commonwealth country. The analysis found L. Forbes Burnham, leader of the opposition PNC party, to be an “advocate of ex- tremist measures in government.” Jagan himself could not be determined to be a Marxist, and the SNIEassessed he would probably follow a policy of nonalignment in a postindependent Guyana. Both conclusions flew in the face of Washington’s ra- tionale for this operation, and both attracted little attention. Also ignored were the SNIE’s warnings about Burnham’s leadership weaknesses and the potential dangers of a government under his control. But the judgment that Burnham’s party had “vir- tually no following” other than among “Negro ranks” held key importance. In the 1961elections Burnham had polled 41percent of the votes. From an operational viewpoint the problem was to increase Burnham’s at- tractiveness, cooperate with third-party movements such as the United Front, in- duce them into coalition with his PNC, and thus create possibilities for overcom- ing Jagan’s popularity among the majority East Indian population. Ameasure that could substantially improve this picture would be to persuade the British to create an electoral system based upon proportional representation, in which minority votes in districts that would otherwise be won by Jagan’s PPPwould still count to- ward seating the opposition. In June 1962 the Directorate for Operations hatched a plan. A CIA memo- randum to the Special Group and the NSC staff director for intelligence, William H. Brubeck, summarized the concept. Aide Arthur Schlesinger, favorably im- pressed with Burnham on a Washington visit in May, told JFK in a June 21memo, a week after the CIApaper, “I agree that the evidence shows increasingly that Ja- gan’s heart is with the Communist world.” On July 12 Dean Rusk recommended a program to Kennedy premised on the Jagan-as-Communist thesis. In a covering note forwarding Rusk’s memo, plus intelligence reports to the president, national security adviser McGeorge Bundy commented that a case against supporting Jagan existed, but the proposed tactics were murkier. “In par- ticular,” Bundy noted, “I think it is unproven that the CIAknows how to manipu- late an election in British Guiana without a backfire.” Schlesinger too joined the chorus, telling JFK the plan made him nervous, especially with prospects rated at less than fifty-fifty, asking, “Does CIA think they can carry out a really covert operation—i.e., an operation which, whatever suspicions Jagan might have, will leave no visible traces which he can cite before the world, whether he wins or loses, as evidence of U.S. intervention?” John McCone answered in a short paper on July 20, satisfying President Kennedy. Resistance evaporated. But the British hurdle had yet to be surmounted. Kennedy met British am- bassador Sir David Ormsby-Gore at Hyannis, Massachusetts, on July 21 and 22. He raised the Guyana question, telling the Crown’s representative he wanted to know if Britain envisaged new elections, which “would provide opportunity for [a] government of different complexion to come to power through democratic process.” On July 25 CIAdirector John McCone saw the President’s Foreign In- telligence Advisory Board for a general review of the agency’s covert financial support to political parties. McCone not only touched on the CIA’s thoughts re- 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 1:40 PM Page 13 The Gamut of Secret Operations 13 garding Guyana, immediately afterward he discussed CIA labor operations and their relationship to American union groups, which would furnish the shock troops for the Guyana project. Meanwhile Mac Bundy followed up Kennedy’s sally with his own British counterpart, cabinet secretary Lord Hood, on August 6. Bundy emphasized ur- gency and warned against bogging down in endless talks. Kennedy accepted a pro- posal for a team of four officers from Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) to come to Washington a week later. On August 8 CIA’s Helms and State’s Alex Johnson agreed to bring matters to a head, forcing consideration of Guyanese po- litical factors. Great Britain ultimately accepted the CIAproject proposal and con- sented to provide SIS support. London’s most important contribution came in the fall of 1962 when the British set the date for a preindependence election in Guyana, later inducing the political parties to accept a formula for proportional representation in the national assem- bly. This improved Washington’s odds for a favorable outcome. When NSC staffer Carl Kaysen told Mac Bundy the latest news on October 5, he noted about Guyana, “I think you know about the most interesting development here.” Now it was up to the CIAand SIS to get the ball rolling. The agency had long- standing ties to the American Federation of Labor (AFL), had played a central role in the 1949creation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (Organización regional inter- Americano de trajabadores or ORIT) in 1951, and the AFL’s American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). During the fifties ORIThad been the most active in Guyana, encouraging that land’s Trades Union Council to follow an anti-Communist line. But something more was needed. The ICFTUhad a London-based affiliate, a sec- retariat for unions of government workers called the Public Services International (PSI). From 1958the CIAhad also had a relationship with the American Federal of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the PSI’s U.S. member, and the following year AFSCMEset up a Latin American office for PSI. That unit became the cover for, and was headed by, CIAofficer William H. McCabe, who liked to hand out cigarette lighters bearing the PSI logo and had photos of himself distributing food to Latin American peasants. McCabe had three years invested in labor work in Latin America, including in Guyana, where the CIAtried to sustain the labor unions op- posed to Jagan. McCabe had been in Georgetown throughout the 1962riots. Those who wondered at his apparent lack of union background were told McCabe was a PSI favorite. The PSI began offering advice to the Guyanese Trades Union Council, headed by East Indian Richard Ishmael, attendee of an AIFLDtraining course in Front Royal, Virginia. As a percentage of unionists, in the years before these events more Guyanese went through the AIFLDprogram—which included lectures on the dangers of communism—than citizens of any other Latin American nation. With the British-mandated elections still far in the future, the CIA and SIS could build their project patiently. Records indicate expenditures for Guyana began 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 1:40 PM Page 14 14 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY in November 1962. That coincides with a program begun by AIFLD to build more than five hundred houses for Ishmael’s Trades Union Council at a cost of $2 mil- lion. The agency’s progress report circulated in mid-January 1963. Sending this to Kennedy for his weekend reading on January 26, Mac Bundy noted, in his precise handwriting, “It moves, moderately.” Consular representatives reported that Jagan had the upper hand. But Burnham’s party conducted almost no organizational ac- tivity. Efforts to discredit Jagan included the United Front surfacing a document, the text of his “secret address” to a 1956 party conference. In the speech Jagan de- nounced associates just as Khrushchev had done in his secret talk to a Soviet party congress that year. The maneuver was designed to characterize Jagan as a Stalinist. Dissension among the ranks pleased the CIAand the United Front. At the interna- tional level the United States and the British acted to complicate economic difficul- ties by closing markets for Guyanese exports, primarily rice. By April 1963Jagan’s financial distress had become so serious that he wrote to Kennedy asking about the U.S. aid (promised as early as 1958) for road, drainage, and irrigation projects. On April 15 Cord Meyer, responsible for CIAlabor operations, briefed the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, including Guyana among his subjects. The centerpiece would be the general strike begun by the Trades Union Council with CIAsupport. Triggered by Jagan’s introduction of a labor bill that would have given the government some powers over the unions, the strike contin- ued for eighty days and became the biggest in Guyanese history. Prime Minister Jagan calculated that the Trades Union Council would ex- haust its strike fund in a month, after which the government could have its way. But Richard Ishmael met secretly with AFL-CIO officials, almost certainly in- cluding William McCabe, before declaring the strike. The foreigners promised help. The historians Robert Waters and Gordon Daniels have uncovered a sheaf of cables from McCabe and others reporting in great detail, and AIFLD paid salaries of eight Guyanese labor “interns” throughout the strike. The AFL-CIO alone spent $800,000. American documents reported by Waters and Daniels identify this as Operation Flypast. Later investigations by British journalists concluded the CIAhad furnished strike pay for the workers, distress funds, travel expenses for leaders, plus money for propaganda and a daily fifteen-minute radio broadcast. The agency funneled the money through the Gotham Foundation, which provided grants to AFSCME, Mc- Cabe’s parent organization. Gene Meakins, a labor specialist, worked directly for the Trades Union Council, providing advice and editing radio scripts and a weekly newspaper. (Ex-agency officer Phillip Agee maintains that Meakins was a CIA man, though Meakins denies it. On the other hand, Meakins also claims that Mc- Cabe, well established as a CIAemployee, had been nothing more than a dedicated labor organizer.) ACIAofficer, perhaps Meakins, actually participated in talks be- tween dockworkers and the government. There were physical attacks on government officials, including Janet Jagan, minister of the interior. Richard Ishmael was identified in police reports as a mem- 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 15 The Gamut of Secret Operations 15 ber of a terror ring that plotted arson and bombings at government buildings (Forbes Burnham, also named in police reports, was acquitted when placed on trial). Troops of the elite British Coldstream Guards had to be called out to protect the unloading of Cuban freighters bearing food and a Russian merchant vessel loading export merchandise. Trying to maintain an image of evenhandedness, the British could not deny this assistance. On June 21President Kennedy reviewed the state of play. John McCone and Richard Helms attended for CIA, and Helms took notes. According to the notes, Helms opened with a briefing on the strike, commenting on Jagan’s tough position with the Trades Union Council. Kennedy would provide aid to Guyana if it helped the CIA project, and anticipated another conversation with Prime Minister Macmillan. “It was clear,” Helms wrote, “that the President regards British Guiana as the most important topic he has to discuss with the Prime Minister.” Dean Rusk flew to London in advance of the meeting, his goal to make clear that the British must not leave behind “a country with a Communist government in control,” that London must unseat Jagan before independence. On June 30 Kennedy and Macmillan met at Birch Grove, England. Kennedy warned— twice—that the effect of having a Communist Guyana in addition to Cuba “would create irresistible pressures in the United States to strike militarily against Cuba.” This is astonishing. Barely seven months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which had brought the world close to nuclear war, a massive World War III be- tween the United States and Russia, John Kennedy was threatening to start that war after all and place the onus for it on the British Crown. The United States had made a public pledge not to invade Cuba as a consequence of the Missile Crisis. Aggressive overt action of this sort would reactivate the Russian guarantees to Castro that had made the crisis so dangerous. To do that on the excuse of the ex- istence of the Jagan government in Guyana would have been both disproportion- ate and foolish. The British could have seen through the subterfuge and turned Kennedy down. Instead they played straight, and the meeting concentrated on how to put a Forbes Burnham–led coalition in power. Intriguingly, William McCabe met with the Guyanese unionists within a day of the Kennedy-Macmillan decisions. The first piece in the new maneuver was for London to provide that propor- tional representation would be the guiding formula in the upcoming Guyanese election. The British took that action in the fall of 1963. Cheddi Jagan’s letter to Kennedy having gone unanswered, Jagan called in the American consul in Georgetown to say that he had seen Washington shift to a policy of “Jagan must go.” The prime minister warned that his ouster could lead to a takeover by the ex- tremists within his own party, saddling the United States with precisely the sort of Castroite situation it feared. Jagan then went to New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly and tried without success to meet with Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. No doubt Jagan understood the snub. Meanwhile Washington conceived a fresh idea to dilute ethnic support for Jagan. In November, barely a week before President Kennedy’s assassination in 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 16 16 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY Dallas, the State Department asked about the potential for a new East Indian–based political party, one different from Jagan’s. The CIAreplied on No- vember 26 that the most suitable candidates to lead such a movement were re- luctant to do so. In early December the agency followed up with a report that Burnham’s PNC would favor such a party but do nothing to support it. If Great Britain resumed direct rule, there would be more scope for the new party. On De- cember 6 Mac Bundy convened Helms and others and determined to pressure British and Canadian diplomats on the direct rule question. This endeavor failed. In Georgetown, Jagan’s People’s Progressive Party saw its main chance in strong showings of public support. Continuing PPPmarches and demonstrations coincided with the early 1964Panamanian revolt against the U.S. authority in the Panama Canal Zone. That too led Washington to fear for the security of Guyana. Mac Bundy advised President Lyndon B. Johnson to tell the visiting British for- eign secretary that he remained as concerned about Guyana as JFK had been. In February the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed U.S. contingency planning for military intervention in Guyana. The Chiefs expected that a battle group of ground troops could be inserted in twelve to twenty-seven hours, depending upon whether a sit- uation involved no notice or a previous alert to U.S. forces. By March pro-Jagan strikes had idled an estimated 30percent of sugar plan- tation workers. The CIAreported Richard Ishmael’s bitter complaints that his own organizers, with no protection, were unwilling to hold rallies. But on March 18the CIAreported that Jagan’s police were acting vigorously against intimidation and demonstrations. Violence increased again. By the end of April thirteen persons had died in strike-related incidents, most attributed to Jagan’s PPP or its associated Guyana Agricultural Workers’Union. One of the dead was a British citizen. Meanwhile the new-party initiative moved forward. On March 8a group an- nounced formation of a United Muslim Party. Aweek later came creation of the All-Indian League, an organization the CIAreported as “actually testing for sup- port for the eventual formation of an anti-Jagan Hindu party.” Agency undercover advisers were assigned to each party to encourage them to join forces. The CIAac- tion achieved something of an undesired coup in early June when Forbes Burnham stood up in the assembly to propose a three-party coalition government. When the United Front refused to participate, the initiative collapsed (Jagan himself had made a counteroffer, not rejecting the proposal). British authorities announced voting districts in mid-April, and voter regis- tration took place in May. The CIAprovided advice and support to the non-Jagan parties. In June the British monitor of the election certified the voter lists. The list for Georgetown contained fewer names (95percent) than in the previous election. Other irregularities eventually turned up. There would be more absentee ballots cast by Guyanese overseas—votes more open to manipulation—than there were voters on the rolls. Continuing violence frightened Guyanese and affected registrations. The CIA explored military training for some anti-Jagan activists and had a contingency plan to distribute arms. McGeorge Bundy approved it by telephone on May 7, a week 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 17 The Gamut of Secret Operations 17 after Helms proposed it. Caches of alleged PPPweapons were discovered by po- lice, but it remains unclear whether this represented another CIAploy. In late June, Jagan had to take his daughter out of school because of harassment from class- mates. Five or ten homes were burning every day, and already sixty people had died. American diplomats in Georgetown believed that even troops could not now end the violence—they were too few and it was too widespread. “No matter what I try to do,” Cheddi Jagan told U.S. consul Delmar Carlson on May 25, “I can get nowhere. I am opposed by everyone, including the CIA which I suppose is the American Government. I laid my cards on the table to Pres- ident Kennedy [in 1961], and he gave me to understand that he would help me but he didn’t and I can only conclude that he was a liar or that he was influenced to change his decision.” The Guyanese leader made yet another bid for reconciliation. He called in Carlson several times over the last days of June. Jagan worried about Forbes Burnham. “You don’t know Burnham,” Cheddi pleaded. “He’ll cut my throat.” Prime Minister Jagan again suggested a coalition. He offered to sign an in- ternational treaty to neutralize Guyana in much the same fashion as Austria from 1945to 1955. Jagan wanted to send an emissary to Washington to discuss the pro- posal, but his overture would not even be considered. The standard working group on Guyana convened at the State Department on June 30. It included Mac Bundy, Richard Helms from CIA, William R. Tyler of the State Department, and Bundy’s special assistant, Gordon Chase. The officials agreed that “a dialogue with Jagan might conceivably cool down the . . . security problem” but doubted that Jagan would make important concessions. Washington rejected the approach in early July. In Georgetown, Carlson proved reluctant to inform Jagan. The same group plus additional officials, including NSC staff director for intelligence matters Pe- ter Jessup, rejected an emissary again several weeks later. Finally Washington in- duced the British to tell the Guyanese that talks with the Americans had estab- lished that the United States saw no useful purpose in receiving an emissary. The British themselves now pressed the issue of a national unity coalition of the three parties. When Gordon Chase approached him on the matter at the end of July, Mac Bundy returned the memo with his handwritten reply: “I’d stonewall for now.” When a Jagan political opponent came to Washington toward the end of Au- gust, Gordon Chase advised Bundy that to avoid the impression of being an Amer- ican stooge, the Guyanese should not be accorded a meeting with the president. By this time the British governor anticipated that even with proportional rep- resentation Cheddi Jagan’s PPPmight emerge with a small majority of the assem- bly. Washington told the British this would be unacceptable. By late August the CIApronounced itself cautiously optimistic about the election, but in truth its po- litical analysis fell short. AState-CIAmeeting on Guyana took place on Septem- ber 8, again optimistic. Several days later, with Desmond FitzGerald sitting in for the agency, this discussion continued. Bundy pressed for a contingency paper on 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 18 18 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY measures if Jagan won. The CIAdrafted a paper not long after, and Bundy dis- cussed it with Helms and the State Department on September 17. Meanwhile in Georgetown, after months of encouragement from CIApoliti- cal action officers, Indian politician Balram Singh Rai decided to form a new Jus- tice Party. For a month or so Rai appeared to do well, but then his effort sputtered to a halt. An internal document from Jagan’s PPP, which the CIAacquired and re- ported late in August, declared that local elements hostile to the PPPhad “secured international assistance in their efforts to overthrow the government,” and that the “unity” of opposition forces “would not have availed were it not for U.S. inter- vention.” The document recommended defusing such opposition elements as the Portuguese Roman Catholics plus overtures to the United States through Canada. Forbes Burnham continued to plague all houses. He antagonized the British, remained in conflict with other opposition parties, and had a difficult time with the Americans as well. The U.S. consul in Georgetown reported to the Bundy-Helms- Tyler group on September 11 that he had tried to forge amicable relations with Burnham, but “it is tough to do so.” Said the official, “Burnham, a racist and prob- ably anti-white, remembers slights and repays them; at the same time, he takes ad- vantage of people who treat him softly.” In short, by the fall of 1964, Cheddi Jagan had offered concessions, CIA’s third-force movement had stalled, Burnham stood revealed as a treacherous ally, and the British worried that Jagan would win after all. Washington still had an op- portunity to call off the CIA. It did not do so. Senior officials remained upbeat on the prospects for electoral victory. Burnham campaign buttons produced in the United States and doubtless paid for by the agency now appeared in Georgetown. Gordon Chase told Mac Bundy that the CIA, “in a deniable and discreet way,” had begun paying party workers. Violence escalated on all sides. AJustice Party station wagon was blown up, PNC meetings were fired upon, Jagan activists were roughed up or killed. In all, the campaign season brought with it almost 200murders, a thousand persons injured, and about 15,000people (more than 2,600families) forced from their homes. The December elections did not turn out as advertised. Cheddi Jagan won 47 percent of the vote, more than either the Americans or the British expected. Burn- ham trailed by almost thirteen thousand votes in spite of overseas ballots over- whelmingly favoring him. But because Jagan did not obtain an outright majority, a coalition would have to follow. The British governor simply refused Jagan the opportunity to put one together. ACIAofficer elsewhere in South America noted in his diary on December 18, “a new victory for the station in British Guiana . . . largely due to CIAoperations over the last five years to strengthen the anti-Jagan trade unions.” The British turned to Forbes Burnham to form the government. Burnham went on to rule like a dictator until he died in office, as racist and imperious as many had feared. Guyana’s export industries of sugar, rice, and bauxite atrophied. By 1984 the wheel had come full circle and Burnham publicly accused Washington of try- ing to undermine his government by encouraging striking bauxite workers—shades 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 19 The Gamut of Secret Operations 19 of the CIAin 1963. Guyana did not have another free election until 1992. When it did, the nation elected Cheddi Jagan. Washington still had trouble coming up with a reasonable policy—Jagan had to reject an American nominated for ambassador who had been one of the labor leaders the CIAhad arrayed against him. Ironically Cheddi Jagan would die in Washington, at Walter Reed Army Hospital in 1997, while still in office. Arthur Schlesinger said in retrospect, “We misunderstood the whole struggle down there. He wasn’t a Communist. The British thought we were overreacting and indeed we were. The CIAdecided that this was some great men- ace, and they got the bit between their teeth. But even if British Guiana had gone Communist, it’s hard to see how it would be a threat.” The universe of covert operations only begins with political action. What the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency did in Guyana represents one kind of activity. Although the coordination and analysis of intelligence was the reason for the creation of the CIA, the agency derived its other identity—America’s “Cold War agency”—from these covert projects. The political action in Guyana lay at about the halfway point on a spectrum from propaganda and influence peddling to violence (quasi-war), para- military operations, and support for military operations at the upper boundary. Many within the CIAand outside it saw covert operations as a third option between doing nothing and engaging in full-scale warfare. The story of covert operations is the saga of the third option, of these kinds of initiatives, though all cannot be treated in equal detail over the broad span of the CIA’s history. The tale involves the men and women who made the operations happen; what was accomplished and what not; the impact of these activities on America’s global quest for democracy—on its foreign policy, national security, and standing in the world; and the tension between the CIA’s operations and the agency’s accountability under a democratic form of government. This set of concerns will remain whether or not the Central Intelli- gence Agency survives as an entity in the post–September 11 world, because the perceived needs for and function of covert operations will continue. Guyana was not the only CIApolitical action of its kind. Indeed it is among the least known. Of much greater renown is the agency’s political action in Italy after World War II and over the decades afterward. There were many more such efforts. Political action involves all forms of activity that might contribute to a given outcome. Mechanisms include propaganda; subsidizing political parties, la- bor organizations, cultural groups, print and broadcast media, and other agents of influence; and sowing disinformation to discredit contrary messages. Political ac- tion may be viewed as the bread and butter of covert operations. Some of these kinds of activities were also employed individually in long- term operations, such as the CIA’s efforts to broadcast freedom, as it were, into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during much of the Cold War. Such efforts comprise the lowest end of the covert action spectrum. Propaganda and psychological warfare remain at the heart of much that hap- pens in political action. Often several of these types of projects are melded into a 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 20 20 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY given operational initiative. The radio operations, for example, served a variety of different ends, simultaneously supporting various specific activities. At the global level, campaigns of several sorts may be in progress at the same time. An intermediate form of initiative is the enlistment of officials or military of- ficers in the target country to overthrow their government and install individuals more favorable to the covert actor. This fomenting of military coups d’état may in- volve aspects of political action as well as economic pressures and other more con- ventional foreign policy initiatives. At the upper end of the spectrum are paramilitary operations, the use of armed force secretly supported by the covert actor to affect events in other nations. These operations may be full-scale wars and may also feature any or all of the other tools in the covert action kit. Paramilitary operations are the most significant variety of covert action and bear the greatest risks. Over time the character of this kind of activity has changed. Today the CIAoften functions as a sort of middle- man, or comprador, engaging the services of third parties, whether they be gov- ernments, security services, ethnic or political movements, or individuals. Military special operations forces have assumed increasing importance and supplanted the CIA in roles traditionally played by agency officers. The CIA nevertheless still supports these operations, as the next case study shows. Purists might say that support of military operations is not paramilitary ac- tion, but the latter subsumes the former. Especially with the changing character of the world into the age of terrorism, military special operations have increasingly substituted for paramilitary action and must fall within the scope of this book. The growing predominance of nonstate actors today makes this element of the spec- trum inescapable. Other forms of activity have shaped covert action. Espionage provides key inputs for the secret warriors as, again, will be apparent from the next case. In- telligence analysis also provides guidance for operators. The CIA’s “Great White Case Officer,” Allen Dulles, once cited analysis as a check and balance on covert action. Strictly speaking this is not accurate, but the general point is that analy- sis establishes the dimensions of operational problems and indicates avenues of approach, as evident in the Guyana action. Parameters for covert activities are also set by congressional overseers in a process that has steadily grown more im- portant. Even at the lower end of the spectrum, covert action remains fraught with consequence for the peoples and nations involved. Covert operations have fre- quently involved transnational alliances with foreign intelligence services. These vital ties have proved critical in many instances, enough so that the saga of Amer- ican covert operations provides a window on a number of companion intelligence services. Time has transformed covert operations. Technological developments have changed the ways information moves, ideas are influenced, plans developed, spies operate. Devices have become more subtle, weapons more lethal, aircraft more ca- pable, and so on. But there will always be room for error. The unanticipated, the 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 21 The Gamut of Secret Operations 21 unexpected event has great weight, the more so since the secrecy of these activi- ties makes it difficult to apply conventional techniques when secret warriors get in trouble. That is what happened in the Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980. The news came after the party broke up—in Georgia, near Fort Stewart, unwind- ing at the conclusion of a difficult military maneuver, one that certified the readi- ness of the recently created Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta. Mod- eled on an earlier maneuver conducted in the southwestern United States, Delta did so well it earned a commendation from the White House, which had monitored the entire affair. Delta’s commander, Col. Charlie Beckwith, his top officers, FBI agents who had played terrorists in the drill, and CIAofficers who had handled the intelligence side, celebrated over beers with Defense Intelligence Agency chief Gen. Samuel V. Wilson. After the liquor the group repaired to an all-night restau- rant for a sumptuous breakfast. Beckwith finally stumbled into bed. He had hardly gotten to sleep when an aide phoned him—Iranian student radicals had taken over the U.S. embassy in Teheran, capturing the entire staff. It was November 4, 1979, the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis. Outside Washington another middle-of-the-night phone call awakened the di- rector of the Central Intelligence Agency, Adm. Stansfield Turner. He was certain he was dreaming—Turner had gotten a similar call from the CIA duty officer seven months earlier when another Teheran demonstration had overrun the em- bassy. But this was no dream. In February the Iranian revolutionary government had ejected demonstrators and restored the embassy and the freedom of the U.S. diplomatic delegation. This time they did not. The former Shah of Iran had just been permitted to come to the United States for medical treatment, and tempers in Teheran were white hot. Admiral Turner went to CIAheadquarters at Langley, Vir- ginia, to prepare for a White House meeting. To his surprise, President Jimmy Carter waited a day before gathering his top officials in the White House Situation Room. After that three-hour skull session, national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski ordered preparations for a rescue mission. Colonel Beckwith’s unit would have the lead role. He sent his deputy, Maj. “Bucky” Burruss, plus a top planner to Washington to report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). There they were told to obtain the latest information on the situation and present the concept for the mission. Moving a rescue force to Teheran posed obvious problems. The place lay far from any U.S. base, and a small American force would find it difficult to move among a teeming Iranian population, many of whom hated America as the “Great Satan.” At the White House, security adviser Brzezinski began holding daily sessions among top-level officials to deliberate on the proper course. For several months these continued without respite. Both he and President Carter kept close tabs on the progress of the rescue plan, which they kept out of the situation room brainstorm- ing. Admiral Turner began every meeting by briefing the intelligence, then talk turned to diplomacy or coercion. After a week Turner noticed that certain officials 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 22 22 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY stayed behind after the sessions and realized there were private discussions about what must be a rescue plan. Returning to his office on the seventh floor of CIA headquarters at Langley, Turner called Brzezinski, angrily objecting to being left out of the rescue planning, asking where the rescuers were going to get their intel- ligence if not from the CIA. Only then was the agency admitted to the inner sanc- tum of the rescue mission. Neither JCS chairman Gen. David C. Jones nor Colonel Beckwith liked the initial plan. Both wanted more striking power. Delta had only 120 troopers. Yet every man and pound of equipment planners inserted to give the force more depth would have to be gotten to Teheran, where the hostages would have to be freed and evacuated. The constraints were tight indeed. Just a week after the embassy seizure an air force special operations expert, Col. James H. Kyle, was summoned from his post in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to plan the air side of the mission, at first called Rice Bowl to suggest an Asian lo- cale. Kyle became deputy commander of a joint task force cobbled together to carry out the operation under army Maj. Gen. James B. Vaught. Kyle thought Ma- jor Burruss, with his lock of unruly hair, looked like the cartoon character Dennis the Menace. Beckwith himself saw Burruss like the actor Robert Redford, hand- some and rugged. Burruss emphasized that Delta needed to arrive in Teheran as a coherent unit, which ruled out any kind of parachute drop. Along-range helicop- ter flight soon emerged as the best option. Delta Force would furnish the muscle on the ground. Colonel Beckwith moved his unit to a secure training ground, the same place used to marshal his earlier validation exercise. To execute this move secretly, Beckwith resorted to hiring rental cars. President Jimmy Carter remained preoccupied with the hostages and the mission’s success. The president’s concern was well founded. An airline identi- fied with the CIAhad furnished the aircraft that flew the shah from Cairo to New York City. Although there were humanitarian reasons for Carter’s action, the for- mer Iranian dictator remained anathema to those who had become the new gov- ernment of Iran. Brzezinski had conducted back-channel talks with moderate el- ements in the Teheran government, but the revelation of these contacts only added to the anger in Teheran. Among the consequences would be the demise of the moderate Iranian government and its replacement with one dominated by re- ligious extremists. The CIAhad worries of its own. Even as controversy swirled over whether U.S. intelligence had failed to understand the revolutionary upheaval in Iran, the agency had the problem of the loss of its own people in Teheran as well as other official Americans and its offices, equipment, and records in the U.S. embassy. Be- yond that the CIAfaced the need to provide support for the rescue mission. The agency had played a major role in the shah’s Iran. Its station in Teheran when he fell had 125persons assigned, a large contingent (though dwarfed by the 10,000U.S. military personnel in Iran at the time). Americans had been evacuated, and only a tiny staff returned afterward. During the interval between the shah’s fall 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 23 The Gamut of Secret Operations 23 and the embassy takeover, the CIAresorted to unusual tactics, using both official and undercover stations. The CIAstation at the embassy, led by Thomas Ahearn, comprised just three operations officers and five persons overall. Howard Hart, with four agents, shuttled among CIAsafe houses in Teheran, not so much a sta- tion as a clandestine network. Among their notable achievements was the exfiltra- tion of “Raptor,” a senior Iranian military officer, CIA’s top spy in the shah’s gov- ernment. In the embassy takeover Ahearn and his people were captured, but Hart and his agents remained at large. They escaped and eventually turned up at agency headquarters where Hart became branch chief for Iran in the Near East Division of the Directorate for Operations. Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of central intelligence under Carter, had a different headache in the form of six other Americans. Five of them, led by Con- sul General Robert Anders, had been in a building at the rear of the embassy when Iranian students began climbing the front wall, and had managed to escape. A sixth, agricultural attaché Lee Schatz, had an office outside the compound. These Americans took refuge at the Canadian embassy, shielded by Canadian ambassador Kenneth Taylor. Getting the six out of Iran posed critical questions for DCI Turner even as Ambassador Taylor and other brave Canadian diplomats hid the Americans in their homes. The Canadians offered to help in an escape at- tempt. In mid-December Turner approved participation by the Graphics and Au- thentication Branch of the CIA’s Office of Technical Support, which had also been vital in the “Raptor” exfiltration. To test the difficulty of moving in and out of Teheran, branch chief Antonio J. Mendez carried out a covert operation of his own, creating a fake movie production company supposedly to film a motion pic- ture in Iran. Others scouted out overland escape routes while Mendez focused on open travel through Teheran’s Mehrabad airport. Even as Mendez set up his Hol- lywood company, “Studio Six Productions,” his unit aided agency officers mov- ing in and out of Teheran to prepare for the hostage rescue. Studio Six advertised in Hollywood trade publications, designed a logo, and solicited scripts (includ- ing one from Steven Spielberg) for a science fiction film set in the Middle East. Mehrabad, considered the quickest way out, became the route of choice, and Mendez and another officer flew into Teheran and prepared false passports for the escapees. They and their families left on January 28, 1980. To preclude reprisals, Ambassador Taylor left too, and Canada closed its embassy, evacuat- ing all officials from Iran. As final preparations for the escape proceeded, Admiral Turner reviewed the main rescue plan. Based upon seizing an airfield where helicopters could be refu- eled before heading to Teheran, the plan required holding that base for the dura- tion of the mission, during which the Iranians might easily discover the operation and respond. Turner thought this far too risky and claims credit for the CIA in evolving the final rescue concept. Special operations experts advised simply land- ing in the Iranian desert to establish a refueling site and launching Rice Bowl from there. “Chuck Gilbert,” a CIAaviation expert with extensive experience in Laos during the Southeast Asian war, spearheaded this effort. He had been assigned to 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 24 24 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY the Iran task force as early as November 14. Within days the CIAhad identified a site and prepared to fly a small aircraft into it to take soil samples that would es- tablish whether the desert floor was hard enough to support the weight of all the participating aircraft. Turner ordered the plane pre-positioned at Rome and went to the White House, where he sold the concept to Carter and Brzezinski. The code name for the operation changed to Eagle Claw. Intelligence remained a major sticking point. Special operations veterans of Eagle Claw condemn the intelligence as inferior and Turner as having been luke- warm at best. Turner disputes that. He later told Colonel Kyle that from the be- ginning of the crisis he spent most of his time on it. Charles G. Cogan, chief of the Near East Division, and Howard Hart would also have disputed complaints. The truth was, the CIAlacked sources in Teheran after the takeover, as Hart told the joint task force leaders. Creating fresh networks would be difficult. Admiral Turner recalled former Teheran station chief George W. Cave from retirement to lead the advance team. Much of the work focused on trying to learn about Teheran from the outside, interviewing Iranians who had left or were trav- eling, combing their accounts for anything that would shed light on the hostages. In Rome, officer Floyd Paseman saw as many as a hundred Iranians a day to mine data. Out of all that he came up with just one who had real knowledge, developed during visits home, that could be used in the rescue mission. Langley had reason to want the hostages freed—the Iranians had captured the CIAstation in Teheran. They quickly identified Thomas Ahearn as its chief and kept him in solitary confinement. Although CIArecords in Teheran had been evac- uated when the shah fell, some were returned during the summer and fall, and new papers had gone into the files, which were supposed to have been destroyed or sent out after no more than three months. But they had accumulated anyway. When the embassy fell, station efforts to destroy its files were defeated by failure of a ma- chine that reduced paper to pulp. Officers shredded documents, but the Iranian captors painstakingly reassembled them. They used these to single out William J. Daugherty, a case officer on his first tour, as another CIAperson. Danger mounted daily. The Iranians were an odd mix of student neophytes, fundamentalists, and anti-shah activists. Their slogans about the “Great Satan” were ubiquitous. Having captured sixty-six Americans in November, the Iranians released thirteen women and minority-group diplomats. But once the Iranians found Daugherty and charged two others, Malcolm Kalp and Phillip R. Ward, as CIA, the releases stopped. By then Americans had begun actual rehearsals of Eagle Claw. Navy RH- 53D helicopters were to be used for the movement, but these lacked sufficiently precise navigational gear, a failing remedied by the efforts of CIA’s Chuck Gilbert. Marine pilots were to fly the craft because navy airmen lacked experience in long- distance flights over land. Delta Force, a separate unit of Rangers for airstrip se- curity, and gasoline to fuel eight helicopters for their final stage of flight were to be delivered by MC-130transport aircraft that met them at the remote desert site. 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 25 The Gamut of Secret Operations 25 The site soon became known as Desert One. The copters would fly Delta to Desert Two, a staging base fifty miles from Teheran, then hide while the rescue took place. Colonel Beckwith and Delta Force would proceed into Teheran in trucks, free the hostages, escape in the helicopters to a third airfield to be taken over by U.S. Rangers, and the whole command would leave aboard MC-130s that returned to pick them up. Eagle Claw remained an extremely long-range mission, with the big MC-130s to fly from Egypt and the helicopters from the aircraft carrier Nimitz in the Indian Ocean. The work in Iran to make all this feasible fell to the CIA. Admiral Turner’s retiree, “Bob,” was to be the inside man. Assisted by a fake identity crafted by Mendez’s shop, Bob arrived in late December (the ease with which he transited through Mehrabad airport dictated the choice of that route for the Canadian exfil- tration). Short, compact, and rugged-looking, Bob spoke a number of languages, though not Farsi, the language of Iran. He functioned effectively as a businessman starting a construction company. In meeting Colonel Beckwith, Bob’s deliberate speech and mannerisms reminded the Delta commander of Anthony Quinn play- ing Zorba the Greek. Through Bob the CIAbought half a dozen English and two Mazda trucks and acquired a warehouse on the edge of Teheran to house them. The trucks were to be driven by Iranian agents the CIArecruited elsewhere and sent back home. One wealthy Iranian volunteer drove to Langley headquarters in a Mercedes but had no knowledge of the standard gearshifts of trucks and had to be trained stateside. Bob scouted out the Delta hide site (Desert Two) as well as the recovery airstrip to be used later. He left Teheran repeatedly to brief CIAofficials in Rome or Athens. Bob personally advised Charlie Beckwith, but Beckwith wanted all the data rechecked by someone he trusted. After the CIA rejected several Delta Force volunteers for a fresh Teheran scouting expedition, Maj. Richard Meadows asked for the assignment. Meadows became involved in the planning just a few days after the embassy seizure when Beckwith sent him to Washington to strengthen Delta’s hand. Alegendary Special Forces figure from the wars in Korea and Vietnam, Meadows now struck the CIA as an amateur with insufficient support and training—he could not master Por- tuguese for his cover identity. Admiral Turner, who saw the mission as a manifes- tation of distrust of the CIA, relented when Meadows threatened to go anyway. Strictly speaking, the Meadows mission was an egregious security error—he pos- sessed detailed knowledge of the Eagle Claw plan. But Delta’s previous lead can- didate for the reconnaissance had been Major Burruss. On March 10Turner’s deputy, Frank Carlucci, met task force chief General Vaught with the latest CIAdata. There was also the problem of whether the Desert One strip, chosen from satellite photos, could bear the weight of the big MC-130s. That could only be verified on the spot. Areconnaissance mission would also in- stall infrared runway lights that could be remotely activated to guide the aircraft landings. These were created by the CIAat the behest of Chuck Gilbert. At least three times JCS chairman Gen. David Jones, Admiral Turner, and security adviser Brzezinski appealed to President Carter to approve this preliminary mission. 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 26 26 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY At Camp David on March 22the president received his first detailed briefing on the rescue plan. General Jones emphasized that Eagle Claw would be a highly complex operation. Carter preferred to await diplomatic developments but knew preparations were necessary. Stansfield Turner had pressed for permission to make the Desert One reconnaissance since January, and now Carter approved. At Langley when he planned this expedition, Admiral Turner had been aston- ished to learn that his lead pilot, James Rhyne, had a peg leg, having lost one fly- ing for the agency in Laos. Assured Rhyne was far and away the finest CIAairman, Turner scored this in the believe-it-or-not category and moved on. Copilot Bud McBroom was also a Southeast Asia veteran. They rendezvoused in Athens with air force Maj. John Carney and picked up a DeHavilland DH-6Twin Otter modified for long range, taking it to Rome to load the CIA-designed strip lights. They went through Cairo and Masirah to Desert One, landing the night of March 31. Carney took soil samples and, aided by McBroom, installed the remote lighting. His worst problem would be orienting himself to the planned layout of the airstrip. While they were on the ground, no fewer than six vehicles drove past on the nearby highway. This was a bad omen. Asecond omen came at London’s Heathrow airport while Carney waited with his samples for a Concorde flight home—two CIAofficers ap- peared in the lounge and called out his real name, not his alias. The scout mission confirmed that Desert One could be used. On April 7Pres- ident Carter held a meeting of the National Security Council. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had opposed the foray for months, favoring UN mediation, but Carter brooked no further delay. The next day NSC staffer Gary Sick prepared a memo for Brzezinski picturing Eagle Claw as preferable to any other option. After a re- draft, Brzezinski gave it to the president. As the exhausted Vance vacationed in Florida, Carter held a further NSC session on April 11 and approved the rescue. Vance demanded a hearing on his return. Unable to dissuade the president at their encounter, the secretary resigned effective after the Eagle Claw operation. Meanwhile Major Meadows set out on the last-minute reconnaissance. He was given an Irish passport and identity as “Richard Keith.” AVirginian, Mead- ows’s Southern accent apparently struck the Iranians as Irish enough. He arrived in Teheran on April 21, three days before the scheduled start of Eagle Claw, just as Delta Force flew across the Atlantic to a staging base at Wadi Kena in southern Egypt. Meadows linked up with two Green Berets who had relatives in Teheran and were familiar with the region. They entered Iran separately and would be his drivers. There were tough moments, as when one of the men failed to stop at a roadblock and they had to talk their way past an enraged Iranian sergeant. But Meadows rechecked the Desert Two site, modified the planned hiding place, and used a satellite phone to tell Washington. At the last minute some workers showed up outside CIA’s warehouse and began to dig up the street. Suitable bribes induced them to delay the work and fill the trench in again. The Iranian agent who had originally rented the garage now fled the country—a third bad omen. The biggest question still remained—the exact location of the hostages. Just two days ahead of the operation, that was solved: the U.S. embassy chef, a Pak- 08_692_02_Ch01.qxd 11/24/08 8:52 AM Page 27 The Gamut of Secret Operations 27 istani who had taught the Iranian occupiers to cook dishes suitable for the hostages, was suddenly allowed to leave the country. Flying out of Mehrabad, by chance the man sat next to a CIAundercover officer, who connected with him and got the cook to tell what he knew, instantly conveyed through CIAchannels. Three hostages, including chargé d’affaires Bruce Laingen, were being held at the Iran- ian foreign ministry. The remaining fifty Americans were in the chancellery build- ing in the U.S. compound. Howard Hart briefed the intelligence to Beckwith at Wadi Kena just four hours before Delta was to leave for Desert One. Hart was go- ing on the rescue mission too. Beckwith asked his air officer, the born-again Christian Maj. William Boykin, to say a prayer as troopers gathered. The blessing proved insufficient to overcome negative factors that determined the outcome. Despite the best efforts of CIA’s Chuck Gilbert, who had gone with a senior airman to Diego Garcia and then to the Nimitzto check on the helicopters, one of the RH-53D choppers encountered nav- igational problems. Two more suffered mechanical failures in an intense dust storm during the flight to Desert One. There innocent Iranian passersby in a bus and trucks blundered into Delta on the ground, opening the door to a breach in Eagle Claw’s security. Following the third helicopter abort, Colonel Beckwith considered that he no longer had enough ships to proceed. The joint task force commanders de- cided to terminate the operation. Then, in a horrible accident, one of the remaining choppers collided with an MC-130 aircraft. The fire that ensued, visible for miles in every direction, destroyed both craft and killed eight Americans. Losses would have been higher except for heroic efforts by several participants to save their com- rades. The hostage rescue had failed. Iranian authorities quickly dispersed the American hostages, who would not again be together. Although Washington prepared plans for Operation Honey Bear, an expanded rescue mission, the Carter administration never again thought the in- telligence good enough and did not overcome its uncertainties regarding a military special operation carried out at such long range. Meanwhile quiet negotiations with the Iranian government led to the release of the hostages on January 20, 1981, the day of Ronald Reagan’s inauguration as President of the United States. 08_692_03_Ch02.qxd 11/24/08 8:53 AM Page 28 2 The Cold War Crucible THE MEN IN THE YARD carried submachine guns. But they didn’t threaten, just asked for food. The German farmer gave them some, and they left. No sooner were they gone than the farmer reported the incident to local authorities. The police at Wildenranna also received other reports of armed men in the woods along the Aus- trian border. Investigation quickly confirmed a band of some sort roaming the hills. Authorities at Wildenranna quickly asked central police headquarters at Pas- sau to send reinforcements to help apprehend the intruders. Thus began a dilemma for the Passau police command. The time was Sep- tember 1947in a Germany under occupation by the victorious Allied Powers. Pas- sau lay in the American sector; police there reported to U.S. military officers. The news of an armed band north of the Inn River might signal some sort of aggres- sive move by the Russians. In any case German police were under standing orders: anything to do with foreign nationals belonged in the province of the Counter In- telligence Corps (CIC) of the U.S. Army. After a Passau police official telephoned American regional headquarters at Munich, the CIC decided to organize a man- hunt in the hills. Agents drove to Waldkirchen and then fanned out toward the bor- der, joining with German police who had, by now, also equipped themselves with submachine guns. At three o’clock in the morning on September 10, one of the CIC search par- ties heard the voices of men in the forest. Soon they found the band, indeed a large group—almost forty men, sitting around a campfire, most of them singing. They wore Russian uniforms. American security officers carefully surrounded their camp and moved in. The intruders put up no resistance. In fact they relaxed considerably when they learned the men apprehending them were Americans. Investigators discov- ered the band to be organized in military fashion. In addition to submachine guns the intruders had light machine guns and hand grenades. Like their uniforms, the equipment had been manufactured in the Soviet Union, and the men spoke what sounded like Russian. The strangers were disarmed and taken to Passau, then to a CIC base at Oberursel, outside Frankfurt. There the CIC brought in Russian intel- 08_692_03_Ch02.qxd 11/24/08 8:53 AM Page 29 The Cold War Crucible 29 ligence specialists to work with the men. Thirty-five soldiers had been captured at the campsite. Four others, picked up in different places over the next few days, turned out to be from the same band. The U.S. Army put the affair under tight se- curity. The press reported some facts and more rumors. Even at this time, with Eu- rope inured to displaced persons and prisoner exchanges between East and West, armed bands in Bavaria were uncommon enough to merit notice. AUnited Press reporter went to Passau a few days after and got a garbled version of the truth: the prisoners had told the CIC they were anti-Soviet partisans from the Ukraine. But speculation abounded: the captured men were Russian deserters; Polish guerrillas; or simply well-armed bandits. Ukrainian activists in the West, such as the pseu- donymous Roman Rakhmanny in Canada, also sought access and got somewhat better information as, for that matter, did the Counter Intelligence Corps. The CIC debriefed the men for more than three weeks. Interrogators satisfied themselves that the new arrivals were in fact Ukrainian partisans, their war against Russian forces still in progress in the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and southern Poland. The rebels provided considerable information about their movement, not to mention conditions in Eastern Europe. This intelligence CIC officers in Frank- furt worked into a report they circulated on October 5, 1947. Under a leader named Khrin, reputedly one of the finest Ukrainian com- manders, that spring the band had ambushed an armed convoy of Polish troops fighting alongside the Russians, killing the Polish vice minister of defense, Gen- eral Karol Swierczewski. Later the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council had or- dered Khrin’s unit to make its way to the West in order to get the attention of the Allied intelligence services. Commander Khrin, wounded in both arms, did not make the long exodus, but his band succeeded in its mission. Detailed information on anti-Soviet partisan activities in Eastern Europe struck the Americans as an intelligence windfall. Washington, however, saw the data as more than merely an opportunity to update its political perceptions of the Soviet Union. Instead, to some U.S. officials, the advent of the Ukrainian partisans signaled a chance for secret military action against Russia. The Ukrainian move- ment offered the opening for an offensive move in the Cold War, a classic covert operation along lines made familiar during World War II. The United States was just then creating a capability to engage in secret missions of all kinds, including covert operations. Since that day in 1947, American secret wars have been carried out on almost every continent. These covert operations have involved tens of thousands of dead and wounded, thousands of native fighters, significant numbers of American clandestine agents, and even regular U.S. military forces. U.S. involvement has run the gamut from advice to arms, from support for invasions of independent nations to secret bombing in clandestine military operations; to the subsidizing of political parties, as- sociations, or individuals; to the planting of misinformation by clandestine means. 08_692_03_Ch02.qxd 11/24/08 8:53 AM Page 30 30 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY The techniques for international coercion are not new, nor were they first developed by the United States. But American participation in World War II opened many eyes in Washington to the potential of special operations and provided a nucleus of per- sonnel well versed in clandestine methods. The Cold War became the catalyst that brought methods and men together on missions that have been sometimes spectacu- lar, often unfortunate, and occasionally surprising. Early American intelligence officers benefited from the British example. During World War II the United States created an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to perform all kinds of tasks. Under the irrepressible William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, OSS functioned globally, with major commands in the Mediterranean, northern Europe, Burma, and China. OSS teams parachuted into France, Norway, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere; blew up bridges in the Balkans; worked with partisans in Italy; and led bands of tribesmen against the Japanese in Burma. The agency’s psychological warfare experts crafted messages for enemy popula- tions. OSS officers spied out the land and supplied incisive intelligence analyses to American commanders. The U.S. military also acquired experience with secret operations during the war. Most often the military assisted operations, for example by covertly landing additional agents or supplies. The navy did this using submarines and PT boats, the air force with planes. The army actually ran guerrilla forces fighting the Japa- nese in the Philippines. The army and the Marine Corps established elite units for commando missions. The army’s 5,307th Composite Unit, better known as Mer- rill’s Marauders, played an important part in the Burma campaign, working closely with the OSS there. American psychological warfare units aimed to erode the morale of the enemy military. The Burma campaign illustrates standard procedures for later secret wars in embryonic form. An OSS formation called Service Unit Detachment 101, sent to establish a base in India, began burrowing into areas occupied by the Japanese Empire. Agents from Detachment 101infiltrated the Burmese hill country begin- ning in 1944, forged links with local Kachin tribesmen, and created a guerrilla movement against the Japanese. Weapons, supplies, and OSS officers parachuted into the jungle or were flown in by the planes of the “air commando groups” formed by the army air force. Radio broadcasts by Allied propaganda experts tried to spark hatred for Japan and hope for liberation by Allied forces working in tan- dem with the OSS and its brethren Allied agencies. The OSS slowly built up the Kachin from local spy networks to roving pa- trols of fighters to organized guerrilla units. By 1944the Kachin were fighting in conjunction with Merrill’s Marauders and British Chindit brigades. More than ten thousand Kachin were fighting a year later, including a field force of seven battal- ions, each of almost five hundred fighters, led by the OSS. Legendary U.S. intel- ligence officers like Carl Eiffler and Joe Lazarsky got their starts in this very ef- fort. Dozens of spies deep in the Japanese rear, plus about four hundred agents surveying nearby enemy positions, helped the Kachin units plan their missions. The Kachin in turn helped trap two powerful Japanese divisions during the final 08_692_03_Ch02.qxd 11/24/08 8:53 AM Page 31 The Cold War Crucible 31 Allied offensives in Burma, a brilliant climax to a very energetic campaign, the product of the efforts of just a few hundred Americans. This became a remarkable achievement. Detachment 101 mobilized a mili- tary force more than thirty times its size, and used that capability to execute highly successful operations. Awarded a Presidential Unit Citation by the United States, the only OSS element so honored, Detachment 101 entered the lists of wartime legends. Several features of the OSS tribal program are worth noting. Among them are the creation of formal units within the overall guerrilla force; the clearing of zones within the operating area to serve as local bases; the use of espionage nets to shield guerrillas and to find targets for them later; the use of outside bases for specialized training and major support; and the use of clandestine air supply and communica- tion between local and outside bases. These techniques became essential features of secret warfare tactics. This type of clandestine operation came to be called para- military. OSS also participated in the European theater under the patrician David K. E. Bruce. Teams assisted the escape of Allied airmen downed over the Continent, car- ried out commando raids, and cooperated with resistance fighters. One of the biggest OSS operations of the war came with the Normandy invasion of 1944. There the intelligence portion of the invasion plan, under the code name Sussex, called for special teams to be parachuted into France to supplement the resistance. The OSS, British Special Operations Executive (SOE), and French intelligence each contributed agents to form three-man “Jedburgh” teams sent to specific re- sistance networks. The Jedburghs parachuted in uniform but carried civilian clothes. They were backed up by Operational Groups, thirty-two-man strike teams for commando missions. More than five hundred OSS people went to the Conti- nent in this campaign, including two future directors of the Central Intelligence Agency. Bill Colby led one of the ninety Jedburgh teams in France and later an Operational Group in Norway. William J. Casey masterminded the overall OSS ef- fort to infiltrate Germany. There were also spy networks that produced other fu- ture CIA chieftains. In Switzerland the OSS nets were under Allen W. Dulles. Richard M. Helms spearheaded work in the Balkans. In later years Dulles and Helms also led the Central Intelligence Agency. The European operations proved highly successful. The OSS alone had five hundred French and almost four hundred American agents in France by the time of the invasion. More than half the Americans with Jedburgh teams received dec- orations. Resistance operations are credited with slowing the German response to the Normandy landings and furnishing the Allies with vital intelligence. Casey’s campaign got as many as two hundred agents directly into Germany, where they engaged almost entirely in espionage. In addition to the OSS, the army’s CIC had a parallel program on enemy ter- ritory through a much smaller network. This CIC activity had been under way since 1942. These army agents proved especially useful in Italy, where they helped identify Nazi efforts to penetrate pro-Allied Italian partisan groups. 08_692_03_Ch02.qxd 11/24/08 8:53 AM Page 32 32 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY World War II not only provided experience for the Americans, it formed and reinforced a certain way of thinking. The issues were black and white—to fight Hitler and Tojo, or not. Not to fight would have been an abdication of responsi- bility in the face of foreign aggression. Democracy hung in the balance against totalitarian dictatorship; President Franklin Delano Roosevelt made America the Arsenal of Democracy. After the war it became easy to transfer that Manichean hostility—and, for the intelligence types, their clandestine methods—to a newly perceived adversary. The target became the Soviet Union, or more for- mally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—erstwhile ally recast as enemy due to ideological differences that had existed since the origins of that state in 1917. This evolving hostility between the United States and the USSR did not mat- ter at first. The surrender of Japan in August 1945brought a scramble to demobi- lize the armies, one that extended to the intelligence service. The OSS had built up a strength of about thirteen thousand when President Harry Truman ordered its dis- solution on September 20, 1945. Under the new arrangement, the parts of OSS that had dealt with analytical intelligence moved to the State Department. The detach- ments of clandestine officers went to the War Department as a new Strategic Ser- vices Unit (SSU) under Brig. Gen. John Magruder, the former OSS special war- fare chief. By early 1946General Magruder’s mandate—not so much to preserve or en- large the SSU but mainly to liquidate it—had largely been accomplished. Former OSS officers who had served with the Jedburghs, the Kachin, and elsewhere went back to their homes, to law practices, to school, to the army. But Magruder also was responsible for producing fresh intelligence data. He and his deputies virtu- ally begged army senior commanders to make use of their capabilities but were largely ignored. When Col. William W. Quinn took over the SSU in 1946, it had been reduced to fewer than two hundred persons working out of seven field sta- tions in foreign countries. In addition to the SSU, the army’s Counter Intelligence Corps remained as a clandestine operations entity. Military Intelligence, or G-2, controlled the CIC. Given its role as the official intelligence branch of the army, G-2was well situated to act in Eastern Europe and against the Soviet Union because of the army’s pres- ence in Germany, Austria, and Japan as part of the military occupation of those countries. The first American links with anti-Soviet Russian emigrés were forged by G-2. In a climate in which OSS verged on being dismantled, G-2 substituted for it and the CIC assumed a steadily more active role in what it called “positive intelligence” operations. The 430th CIC Detachment, stationed in Austria, noted the shift in early 1947 when it recorded a change in emphasis from “denazification” to positive intelli- gence. In Austria the CIC operated “rat lines,” clandestine transportation systems to spirit out of the country individuals of interest to U.S. intelligence. The CIC also had its own spy networks in Russian-occupied areas, including Austria, Czecho- slovakia, and eastern Germany. It screened refugees, prepared cover stories to sup- 08_692_03_Ch02.qxd 11/24/08 8:53 AM Page 33 The Cold War Crucible 33 port its agents, and maintained relationships with other services. Al Ulmer, the SSU station chief for Vienna, had been with OSS. Once a new U.S. intelligence service emerged, the Central Intelligence Group, its first Vienna station chief, John H. Richardson, would be a former CIC man. Both were avid recruits for the Cold War crusade. The same functions were carried out by the 970th (later the Sixty-sixth) CIC Detachment, with headquarters at Frankfurt in the American Occupation Zone of Germany. As agents this unit used certain notorious former Nazis in Germany such as Klaus Barbie. The shift in American priorities could be encapsulated in the life of netmaster Gordon Stewart, who headed the CIAstation in 1948. Aformer OSS man, Stewart had come to Heidelberg to help in denazification but quickly began trolling Displaced Persons camps for sources to use against the Russians. He rode the rising wave of hostility to high office. A “Department of the Army Detach- ment,” formed to handle interagency activities, eventually furnished cover for Stewart and his officers, who took over Barbie. It was the 970th CIC that handled the band of Ukrainian partisans. On one level the partisans were identical to the masses of refugees, Displaced Persons (DPs), throughout Europe. By the fall of 1945 as many as seven million people were on the move, fleeing Soviet domination or driven from their homes by war damage. An equal number could be found in the Soviet Union or Russian- occupied Eastern Europe, and smaller numbers in the Mediterranean countries. Millions of former German soldiers joined the flow as they emerged from prisoner-of-war camps. Most were simply looking to settle somewhere safe, but many had nowhere to go and a major task for the United Nations during its early years was to house these DPs. Like the Ukrainian partisans, significant numbers of them came from lands swept by war and occupation and had information im- portant to intelligence services, not least those of the United States. Screening DPs really meant identifying who was worth debriefing and, equally important, finding angry men and women who could be harnessed for clandestine missions. The Ukrainian partisans were prime candidates. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 that signaled U.S. entry into World War II had a fundamental influence on U.S. intelligence after the war. The assault had surprised American commanders. Investigations revealed a number of items that might have alerted leaders, but no one had been responsible for gathering and interpreting data at the national level. Thus Washington drew the lesson that the United States needed some sort of organization for intelligence, and it fell to Pres- ident Harry Truman to work out the new schema. Competing plans for a peacetime intelligence agency existed even before Truman abolished the OSS. Important issues dividing proponents of the various plans included the specific functions and degree of autonomy to be accorded such an agency. Truman’s military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, favored an inter- agency group to supervise intelligence. The State Department proposed an 08_692_03_Ch02.qxd 11/24/08 8:53 AM Page 34 34 SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY arrangement that concerned only supervisory authority, which they wanted in the hands of the secretary of state. Members of the Office of Strategic Services pro- posed an independent agency but were not initially heeded. Truman took part of the advice of his Joint Chiefs when on January 22, 1946, he issued a directive establishing a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) to over- see a Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The NIA, composed of the secretaries of state, war, and navy, plus Truman’s personal representative, would monitor a di- rector of central intelligence in charge of a CIG. Truman selected trusted individ- uals for both the DCI and his representative to the NIA, and he humorously re- ferred to them as “personal snooper” and “director of centralized snooping.” Truman’s first DCI was Sidney W. Souers, a St. Louis businessman and presiden- tial crony, proud of his reserve commission and his wartime service with naval in- telligence. But Souers served only five months as director of central intelligence, though Truman convinced him to return as representative on the NIAand then the first executive secretary of the National Security Council. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower recommended Charles H. Bonesteel, a top Pentagon planner, for the DCI job. Truman instead selected air force Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Van- denberg. The president considered Vandenberg enough of a diplomat to get along with the State, War, and Navy departments. Actually Vandenberg had been a combat commander, with minimal intelli- gence experience. But he was a good organizer and began to build the Central In- telligence Group. Under Souers, CIG had operated out of a suite of three rooms next door to the White House with fewer than 250 employees. Vandenberg soon established an office for research and evaluation plus administrative organs. In June 1946he asked the National Intelligence Authority to give him responsibility for all U.S. foreign intelligence gathering, a preliminary to bringing the Strategic Services Unit back from the War Department. The proposal matched recommen- dations from an outside advisory group. Magruder’s unit thus became the Office of Special Operations (OSO). By the close of 1946there were about 800officers in OSO alone, out of more than 1,800total personnel in CIG. Between January and April 1947the last holdouts, FBI agents in Latin America, transferred to the new intelligence group. General Vandenberg had plans to expand to several thousand officers over six months. The peacetime intelligence agency grew quickly but remained a creation of the executive branch of government. The CIG had no basis in law. Already several bills dealing with intelligence matters had been proposed in Congress, and in 1946 the White House held discussions with CIG lawyers. Clark M. Clifford of the pres- ident’s staff helped draft intelligence legislation. Vandenberg pushed for the bill and wanted Truman to announce creation of the agency in his 1947 State of the Union address. The president spoke to Clifford several times, expressing some- thing close to outrage, though he went ahead with the initiative itself. Truman planned a reorganization of the entire military establishment, a proposal he sent to Congress in February 1947. Provision for the peacetime intelligence agency was included in the legislation, which became the National Security Act of 1947. 08_692_03_Ch02.qxd 11/24/08 8:53 AM Page 35 The Cold War Crucible 35 Through the 1947 law, Truman created a National Security Council to advise him on defense and foreign affairs. The separate War and Navy departments merged into a single Department of Defense, under which the air force also gained autonomy as an independent armed service. As for intelligence, the original proposal did no more than say that a Central Intelligence Agency would be formed. In the letter Tru- man sent to congressional leaders along with draft legislation, he did not even men- tion this aspect. Like the president, most congressmen concerned themselves mainly with parts of the bill unrelated to intelligence. Only late in congressional hearings did the intelligence initiative come up, and then attention centered on whether it would become some kind of secret police. Congressmen noted the lack of detail in the bill and amended it to prohibit the agency from possessing police powers. Further amendments specified responsibilities for the new Central Intelli- gence Agency. Essentially Congress returned to Truman’s January 1946directive, extracting from it almost the exact language the president had used to assign func- tions. Under the National Security Act, the CIA was directly answerable to the president through the NSC. The law gave the CIAfive duties: advising the NSC on intelligence; making recommendations on related matters; producing intelli- gence estimates and reports; performing “additional services of common concern” for the government-wide intelligence community; and “such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Secu- rity Council may from time to time direct.” This last provision has been said to convey legal authority for the conduct of secret warfare by the CIA. It should be noted, therefore, that the terms covert op- eration,clandestine operation,paramilitary operation,secret operation, and spe- cial operation, all euphemisms for secret warfare, appear nowhere in the law. Nor do the terms political action,psychological warfare,propaganda,misinformation, or disinformation. The phrase “such other functions” that appears in the 1947act sought to cover unforeseen circumstances, but even there the legislative history of the law makes clear that Congress had not contemplated international coercion. The White House privately held a more expansive view. The “other functions” were purposely not specified but were expected to include covert operations. Clark Clifford notes of the language: “I reviewed this sentence carefully at the time, but could never have imagined that forty years later I would still be asked to testify before Congress as to its meaning and intent.” President Truman signed the legislation on July 26, 1947, and the National Security Act became law. Six weeks later, on September 8, the CIG became the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA, thanks to General Vandenberg, had already become an expanding organization in search of roles and missions. It was at pre- cisely this time that American officers in Germany apprehended the band of Ukrainian partisans. The Ukrainians were looking for help. Conflict between the superpowers may not have been inevitable, but avoiding it in 1945 required more wisdom than either Russia or America commanded. Soviet