E·xecutive Summary During the period of approximately 10-16 November 20041 the Nimitz ·carrier Strike Group (CSG) was operating off the western coast of the United States in preparation deployment Arabian Princeton several occasions for their to the Sea. . The USS on Vehicles around detected multiple Anomalous Aerial (AAVs) operatingln and the vicinity of the CSG .. TheMV s would descend f'very rapJdly" from approximately 60,000 feet down to ap·proximately 50 feet in a matter of s·econds. They would then hover or stay stationary on the radar for a short time and depart at high velodties and turn rates. On 14 November after again the AAV , the USS Princeton ·detecting I took the opportunity of having a flight of two F A-18Fs returning from a trainin:g missio.n to further .investigate the AAV . The USS Princeton took over control of the I F A·lBs frorn the .E-2C Airborne Early Warning aircraft and vectored.i n the A .. 18s ~/ for intercept leading to visual contact approximately one mile away from the AAV , which was reported to be 4'an egg or a 1Tic Tac' .shape with a discernable elonga~e·d midline horizontal .axis" .. It was #{solid whiteJ smooth:. with no edges. It was or "uniformly colored no nacelles, pylons, wings.)' It was approximately ·46 feet with 1 in length. The F A-18Fs radar could not obtain a 'lock' on the AAV; however it could ·be tracked while stationary and at slower spee·ds with·t he Forward Looking Infrared • I (FLIR). The AA Vd id take evasive actions upon intercept by the F A-18 an acceleration aerodynamic, and demonstrating advanced (G), propulsion capa·bility. The AAV did not take any offensive action against the c·SG; howeverj ·csG given its ability to operate unchallenged in close vicinity to the it demonstrated the conduct undetected reconnaissance leaving the CSG a potential.to with limited -ability to detect track, and/or engage the AAV. As·sessments Key • The Anomalous Ae.rial Vehicle (AAV) was no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any forei.gn nati·on. . • The AA exhlbited low multiple V advanced observable characteristics at radar bands rendering US radar based engagement capabilities ineffective. • Th·e AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift • The AA advanced capability the V exhibited propulsion by demonstrating remain variation ability to stationary with little to no in altitude transitioning " to horizontal and/or vertical velocities far greater than any known aerial vehicle to no visible with little signature. • The AAV possibly demonstrated the to 'cloak' or to ability become invisible the human eye or human observation, • The AA V possibly demonstrated a highly advanced capability to operate completely advanced undersea undetectable by our most sensors. • , ., ... Stril<e (CSG ... ll.) Nin1.itz c:arrier GrOUlJ ~ . The following events took place dul"ing deployn1ent preparation of the Nin1itz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) dur·ing the n1onths of Novetnb-er and December 2004 in the SOCAL Operating Area off the coast of California an·d Mexico. The CSG was con1prised of the following ships and subtnarine: USS Nin1itz (CVN-68), USS Princeton (CG-59)., USS Chafee (DDG-90), USS IMiiggins (.DDG-76), and the USS Louisville (SSN-724). The Nin1itz was hon1e to Carrier Air Wing 11 (CVW-11) con1prised ofVMFA-232 (USMC F/A-18C), VFA-14 (F/A-18E), VFA-41 (F/A-18F)., VFA-94 (F/ A-18C), VAQ-135 (EA-6B), VAW -117 1-IS-6 (11-60), and VRC-30 (E-2C)~ only Det 3 (C ... 2A). The participants in the events surrounding the detection and intercept of the AAV are the USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-4·1. USS .i'ri'ncetoi1 (cG .. 59) USS Princeton (CG-59) is a Ticonderoga ... class cruiser guided-tnissile cruiser serving in the United States Navy. . Arn1ed with naval guns and anti-air, anti-surface, and anti .. subtnarine missiles, plus other weapons, she is equipped for surface..-to .. air, surface .. and anti-subn1arine warfar·e. She also is the· ho1ne of two Seahawk LAMPS to~surface Ill helicopters. 'fhe was the first Ticonderoga ... c]ass cruiser to carry the Pt~inceton upgraded AN/SPY-lB radar systen1. 1 A l\l/SPY-~ 1 ·The AN/SPY-1 is an advanced, auton1atic detect and track, Inultifunctional phased array radar. This high-povvered ( 4 MW) radar is able to perfor1n search, track and 1nissile guidance functions sin1tiltaneously \"'ith a capability of over 100 targets. It is a n1ulti-function capable of phased-array radar search, auton1atic detection, transition to track, tracking of ait and surface targets, and n1issile engagen1e.nt support cotnputer-controlJed phased array can concentrate energy where it is l~he range needed .. The operator can boost the and resolution in a particular directi.on fron1 four arrays without blinding the ship to threats another side. The fixed of "SPY" send out beatns of electrotnagnetic en e r-gy in all directions sh11tdtaneously, continuously providing a search and tracking capability for hundreds of target at tbe san1e tin1e. . The unique SPY-1 multi-function phased array radar systen1 replaces nun1erous conventional ind·ependent sensors and is designed for the n1ost challenging environments and Jnissions, including long .. range volutne fire search~ control-- quality tracking and ba1listic n1issile defense. SPY-l's S-band frequency range pern1its optin1um perforn1ance in aJ1 .. weather operations and the ability to all radar functions whHe simultaneously providing proven S-band perfor1n n1ajor 1 http:/ fen.wikipedia.orgjwiki/USS_Princeton_(CG-59) ' w - - - - - · · ·- ~ - ____ _ .. ._ __ ......_ ....~ --------- ' I ~ mid-course guidance for setni ... active rnissiles, such as the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, SM-2 and SM--3.2 The USS Princeton was part of the Nilnitz Carrier Battle during the period of Group~ approxilnately 10. .. 16 Novetnbet. . 2004 whHe co1npleting Tailored Ships Training Availability (TS'rA) .in preparation for their deploytnent to the Arabian Sea. During COMPTUX, which is intertn·ediate level training for elen1ents of the Nilnitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) prior to the deploy1nent, the Princeton on several occasions detected multipJe AAVs operating in and around the vicinity of the location shown in Figure 1. The Fire Control Officer, and his technician, FCCS initially thought the contacts were part of the COMPTUX exercise. According to Senior Chief the AAVs would descend a very high altitude fro~ into the scan volurne of the AN/SPY-1 at a high velocity. The top of the scan volu1ne would put the AAV s at higher than 60,000 feet. The AAVs would descend "very rapidly" fron1 approxin1ately 60,000 feet down to approxin1ately 50 feet in a 1natter of seconds. Tl1ey would then hover for a short time and depart at high velocities and at turn rates den1onstrating an advanced. acceleration (GJ capability. Senior Chief . c·ontrol added that based on his experience, which .is 17 years as a Fire on Aegis cruisers, the AAV exhibited Ballistic Missile Characteristics in reference to its appearance) velocity, and indications on the radar. Since the radar· was in the n1ode to handle Air Intercept of conventional,a ircraft it never o·btained an. accurate track of the AA Vs and was quickly by the radar n1eaning it was elin1inated by ~·dropped'" the con1puter to redu·ce the atnount of clutter on the radar, as any other false targe t is handled. If the radar were set u.p in a tnode for Ballistic Missile tracking they likely would have had the capability to track the AAV. They vvere detected three separate tin1es during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico. The Tactical Air Officer on board the Princeton could not identify the radar contact and given the h.igh speed and .altitude was perplexed. The Meteorological Officer (.METOC) on board the Princeton provided a briefing that discussed a high altitude weather pheno1nena where ice crystals can for1n and be detected by the AN/SPY-1 .. On 14 Novetnber 2004, after again detecting an AAV took the I opportunity of two F A-18s airborne in the vicinity to task the1n for airborne reconnaissance of the · AAV~ E·-2C ~iavJkeye The Gru1n1nan E-2 1-Iawkeye is an A1nerican all-weather, aircraft carrier-based tactical Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft The twin turboprop aircraft was designed and developed in the 1950s by Gru1nn1an for the United States Navy as a replacement for the E ... l Tracer. The United States Navy aircraft has been 2 http:/f www.globalsecurity.org/Inilitary jsystemsjshipjsysteJns/an-spy-1.httn ' .. ' ·~" ' " I' " progressively updated with the latest variant, the E-20, first flying in 2007. Th.e -...... -_.:/ ~ 1-lawkeye provides alJ .. airborne early warning and con1Inand and control \A~eather functions for the carrier battle group. Additional 111issions include surface surveillance coordination, strike and interceptor controL search and rescue .guidance and colnJnunications relay. An integral cotnponent of the carrier air w.ing, the E-2C uses con1puterized sensors to provide early warning, threat analysis and control of counteraction against air and surface targets. It is a high-wing aircraft ' with stacl<ed antennae elelnents contained in a 24-foot (7 .. 3 m) rotating don1e above the fuse1age .. 3 The AN/ APS .. 145 Airborne Survei11ance Radar is the 1nost reliable, cost.-effective, high-.power advanced early warning radar available. This sophisticated syste1n is the latest in a long 1ine of airborne early \1\/arning systen1s fron1 Lockheed Martin .. Over 100 E-2C's have been con1pleting nearly 100 percent of their tnissions, day in and day out, for n1ore- than decades. The AN/APS-145 carries on the tradition, t\t\lo • adding several significant featutes found in no other airborne surveillance radar.4 • tligh-poV\'er UI1F Doppler radar that utilizes a rotating antenna within a circular rado1ne n1ounted atop the aircraft. Range is greater than any airborne surveilJance radar in the world Will n1onitor and track more than 20,000 targets shnultaneously • Sophisticated jain avoidance and ECCM techniques assure unparalleled perforn1ance in dense EMI and jan1n1ing env·ironments • Adaptive signal processing provid-es superior target detection and tracl<ing in con1pJex target environ1nents • Adapts to dynatnic operating conditions auto1natically over varied terrain wlth no operator intervention On 14· Nove1nber 2004, LT E-2C NFO, was in VAW-117 and airborne during the contact. Additionally, he was the squadron1 avionics division officer and S would be responsible for any and aJl RADAR recordings, etc ... Unfortunately ·in the E·-zc, it is not routine to have kind of recording engaged unless it is pre any coordinated which is typically only used during airborne testing of new capabilities, etc. .. There was no recording of this event. LT was flying as the Air Control Officer (ACO) on the n1ission where the AAV I vvas observed by the flight ofF A-18s. He was controlling the Fj A-18s that were 3 http:/ jen.wikipedia.orgfwiki/E-2C , http:/f www.1ocl<heedtnartin.con1/pt·oductsj APS145 jindex.htn1I ~t • flying as part of their worl< ups prior to deployn1ent. lie did not see the object on his z radar (ra\¥ video) until the USS Princeton directed the contact and gave the E. .. the general direction to steer its radar. . LT initial1y thought the return was a wave because in a high sea state (4 or greater) the E-ZC RADAR can actual1y detect the waves. Additionally, the target was so lovv and the return was so faint that ·with·out fron1 the inputs the USS Princeton the return would have been n1issedjignored. This was even n1ore interesting because the USS .Princeton initially reported the target to be at 20,000 feet MSL. Due to the intern1ittent radar return fron1 the target, 15~000- velocity vvas unavailable. A.Jtho.ugh initially requested by the USS Princeton to at.ten1pt a track of the object, the USS Princeton took control of the and the E-2C Alrborne but ren1ained F/A:~18s • vvas no .longer involved in the contact or controL 'fhe fighters were being controlled by the USS Princeton for the duration of the contact and intercept. The E--2 aircrew on board n1onitored the Air Defense Control (ADC) Net during the contact puzzled while listening to all of the n1erge ca1Is co1ning over the net (typical of you \~hat \¥ouJd hear during the Airborne Intercept of an fighter). It was obvious there enen1y vlas sornething out there and the fighters \Vere taking it serious.ly. I F Airborr1e Reconnaissance of .the AAV A~l8 I ·This section provides the debrief of the F A-18 pilots and weapon systen1· operators (ws·os) fron1 VFA.-41 that were able to get both a visual and sensor contact with the AAV on 14 Noven1ber 2004 at approxin1ately N31 20' W117 l about 70nn1 south a~ of the Border 30 nn1 off the Baja Mexico Coast (Figure 1). Additionally U~S.jMexico the statement provided by the Con1n1anding Off1cer (C()) o.fVMFA-232. . .. . . . .. ·. ·. .. • ~. ' ' 1 : Lnc.Jtion of the /L\V dudng the F/ i\ · t H Figtu-<'~ lnh·n·(~pt ··~. . >, - a · Pilot: Lt Col USMC Lt Col Con1n1anding Officer VMFA-232J vvas flying a single" f seat F A-18C that launched fron1 the USS Nin1itz at approxilnately 1030L to conduct a Functional Check Flight of an aircraft that had recently con1pleted significant n1aintenance. noted the \¥eather that day was blue skies} no clouds,. and l~e unlin1ited visibility. After 3-0 n1inutes into his flight he received a radio cal) fro1n his air controller asking hirn to investigate an unidentified airborne contact. This was not a standard request. Additionally the contra Her asked if he had ordnance on board, \¥hich was odd since no controller had ever asked that question during a situation of identifying an contact over U.S. or International territory. unknown J~Ie responded that he had no ordnance on board. The ·controller provided vectots to the vicinity of figure l. The o,bject was reported to be at "slow speed and low altitude". While en route at approxhnately 250 knots indicated/4·00 knots groundspeed at n1ediun1 altitude (15-25.,000 feet), he gained radar contact of vvhat he believed to be I two F A-18Fs that \1\'ere approaching the AAV fron1 the west at low altitude ( SQQ .. 5,000 feet). There was no other traffic on the radar. The controller infortned hin1 to ren1ain above 10,000 feet, as there was other fighter traffic at Jovv altitude investigating the AAV. As he approached approxin1ately lSnn1 frotn the AAV descending through approxin1ately 15,000 feet. . he could see a \Vater disturbance in the ocean surface. recalled that the sea state was low (calm). At approxin1ately 5- ~Ie 10 nm a\¥ay fron1 the AAV, the controHer told hin1 to 11Skip it" and return to his operating are at Since he was close he eJected to fly over the water disturbance to try and see what was causing it. The disturbance appeared to be 50 to 100 tneters in dian1eter and close to round. It was the only area and type of whitewater activity that could be seen and ren1inded hitn of hnages of son1ething rapidly subn1erging from the su.-·face like a subn1a r in e or ship sinking. lt also looked like a possible area of shoal water where the swell was breaking over a barely subn1erged reef or island. l-Ie overflew the disturbance and turned back to the northwest As he was flying away he could see the disturbance clearing and could no longer identify the place where it occurred. He did not see any object vessel associated with the disturbance either above the surface, on the 01. . surface, or below the surface. He also never n1ade visual contact with the other fighter aircraft that vvere vectored to the location or the AAV. It is possible that the disturbance was being caused by an AAV but that the AAV vvas 'cloaked' or invisible to the human eye. Lt'Col recovered aboard the Nin1itz at approximately 1200L. l·Ie reported to the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC) and \Vas asked by his Intelligence Officer, 1st.Lt if he saw the "supersonic Tic Tac"? \'Ve questioned now Capt .. to detern1ine if he had any further infortnation but based on his position in CVIC at the tin1e he was not involved in any further discussions concerning the AAV. ··~· • u and Contact F/A -18F Intercept Visual FASTEAGLE 01 ,USN Pilot: CDR David 'Sex' Fravor, USN/WSO: LT FASTEAGLE 02 USN Pilot: LT USN/WSO: LCDR CDR Fravor, Commanding Officer VFA-41, was the pilot of FastEagle 01. He and LT were in the lead aircraft of the first F/ A-18F se·ction airborne that day from VFA-41, call sign FastEagle 01. The flight walked, started and launched with no issue. They co:mpleted the-ir de.parture from the USS Nimitz and flew to the working area to conduct the training portion of the flight. After they completed their training the E-2C controller handed them off to the USS Princeton callsign 'Poi.son' where they re.ceived vectors via B·earing Range Altitude Aspect (BRAA ) to an unknown contact flying into the working area from the south. Poison asked what ordnance they had on board. LT told P-oison control that they ·had two captive training AIM-9Ms (CATM-9) and no other ordnance. The flight descended to between 20 .. 24,000 feet and proceeded to the contact CDR Fravor did not recall any indications via on-board sensor of the object Their aircraft was not carrying a Forward.L ooking Infrared (FLIR) pod ·onb oard. As CDR I clean Fravor remembers it, the Radar Attack Display was {no targets). Their F A lBF had an APG-73 radar and was set to the following parameters:. -Range While Search (RWS) -Range Gated High -80NM scale · CDR .Fravor and LT were attempting acquire the object visually as they heard umerge plot" from Poison. Situational awareness to the object was initially received via sporadic Link. . 16 trac]{S (Link .. 16 is a time division multiple access data~ link) vi.a an off-board sensor.. Lt .assumed that the Srensor provld'ing the .information was the USS Princetott's SPY-1 According to CDR Fravor the first radar~ indication he had of the unknown contact was a visual of a disturbance on the water below the AAV. As be scanned the area he gained a visual on the object. lt .is important to note that when asked to describe the disturbance on the water he stated that it was localized underneath the object, did.n ot appear as a trail or wake, and looked like frothy waves and foam almost as if the water was boiling. At this point CDR Fravor detached FA STEAGLEO 2, which held.a t approximately 20,000 feet, and FAS'TEAGLEOl descended to between 12-16;000 feet CDR Fravor attempted a "helmet Jock" that was unsuccessful. It is important note that CDR ~o Fravo.r was using the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System which will cue the aircraft sensors such as the radar to 'lock o·n• to what the·p ilot is looking at and it also has a ·recording capability. It may have been useful in this situation but typically because amount of the large of head movement it is not practical. CDR Fravor stated that the • • - • helmet's recording capability was rarely used therefore he did not think to use it that day. LT communicated what they were seeing with Poison control and said c·oR that he had a running dialogue on the interflight radio with FastEagle 02, Fravor stated that the object was like a Harrier." (Referring to the AV-B·B ~'holding jet aircraft which is capable of hovering and Vertical/Short Takeoff and .Landing 1 (V/STOL) via thrust vectoring.) .According to CDR the. object's shape was Fravor~ like an elongated ·egg or a 4Tic Tac' and had a discernable midline horizontal axis. However, the object was uniformly white across the entire body. It was approximately 46 feet in length. LT described it as "solld white, smooth, with no edges. It was uniform1y colored with no nacelles, pylons, or wings. ." When asked to describe the appearance, if it glowed or reflected sunlight he said, 11neither, it 1ooked like it had a white ·candy-coated .shell, almost like a wh.ite board." His report differs from CDR Fravor in that he reported the object traveling level at ap·proximately 500-1000 feet at approximately 500 knots. The object was po·inted in a north/south orientation and was moving both north & south and east & west, while maintaining a consistent altitude. These displacements, to CDR Fravor, were minor. CDR Fravor then according stated he began a descent. with the intention to take a close aboard pass with the object in an attempt to visually identify it. They began the decent as they rolled in from about lO,OOOft and approximately 350 knots to take the obJect close aboard. CDR Fravor pulled nose on and· then pulled trail (aft) of the ob_ject As they were maneuvering, the object appeared, according to CDR Fravor: 11to recognize us/' He assessed this from the.fact the object "pointed'' (realigned it's axis) in the direction of their aircraft At th·is time, according to CDR Fravor, the disturban.ce on·t he water ceased .. • As they completed this maneuver, th·e object ascended quickly and pulled lift vector on and aft of them at a supersonic speed. CDR Fravor commanded the radar through the Short Range radar set and asked for a picture from Poison. Poison in'itially going reported that the upicture was clean" (no contact) but then stated 44 1 re ·not fOU to believe this, its at your ·cAP'; meaning that the AAV had flown to their training CAP, wbf.ch was located in the southern end of the training area and had climbed to approximately 24,000 feet CDR Fravor stated that the flight attempted to locate both the object and the disturbance with no success. CDR Fravor stated that nothing was seen on the surface or subsurface and that there were no indications of the previous ·disturbance. Following the engagement, the flight rejoined and returned to the USS Nimitz. When asked how the jets functioned and if there was any indications of a system malfunction, he stated that- "the jets were brand new, less than 100 hrs on them. . They were working _perfectly.» LT when asked .. said that all ai-rcraft systems were functiot1al. That there were no tnission computer issues or avionics issues and that there was no radio or communication interference and that they had , U entry into the Link-16 network. When asked LT couldn't confirm any physiological or p.sychological feelings that were out of the ordinary, The flight met up with LT and LT 's flight in the paraloft and passed what they bad seen. The flight p·roceeded to CVIC. LT noted that the sailors in CIVC had donned tin-foil caps and wanted to know about the They reviewed the tapes and described to CIVC what they had .seen ~'UFO fli.ght~' and what the flight had done. He was not asked to sign any non~disclosure agreement and h.e. is uncertain how far up the chain the reporting went past his commanding officer. F/A. .. 18F FliR Tracking USN Pilot: -LT USN/WSO: LT Lt was a member ofVFA-41 and was the Weapons and Sensors Officer f (WSO) flying with LT They were a part of the second F A-18 F s·ection airborne that day from VFA-41. Their flight launched following the FASTEAG LB flight. The crews spoke with each other in the paraloft, discussed the object an·d that the fl ts were scheduled for the same working area. FASTEAGLE flight told LT s flight what they saw and to try to see an·d record what they could. The flight walked, started and launched. They completed their departure from the USS Nitmiz, climbed to altitude and separated to begin th-e training portion of the flight. According to LT 'it was a clear day. There were no clouds and there was a discernable horizon. The time was approximately 1500L. The flight checked with the E-2C and separated. Their jet proceeded south to the southern cap. They flew at .20,000 feet and were flying a max endurance profile at approximately 300 knots ground speed. All on boa1·d systems were functioning normally. The radar was in a standard search mode (RWS/ 80NM/4bar/ intr) and the FLIR was in L+S slave (the FLIR would point in direction of an L+S traclc:J. There was no radio or communication interference and they had ·entry lnto the Link-16 network Initial awareness of an object came via the radar. According to the radar display, the initial tracks were at approximately 30·40 nm to the south of the aircraft LT controlling the radar and FLIR and attempted multiple times to transition the radar to Single Target Track (STT) mode on the object The radar could not take a lock, the b-sweep wou.ld raster arou.nd the hit build an initial aspect vector neverstabilize·d) (w~ich 1 and then would drop and continue· normal RWS b·sweep. When asked, LT stated that there were no jamming ,cues (strobe; champagne bubblesJ "any normal EA indicationsn). It "just appeared as if the radar couldn't hack it." The radar couldn't receive enough information to create a single target track file. The FLIR, L+S pointed in direction of the·i nitial track flies as the radar in slave~ attempte.d lock. The FLIR showed an object at 0 ATA and approximately ~s.deg elevation {Figure 2). According to LT 1'the target was best guess co- • . ' . • altitude or a few thousand feet estiJnating the object to be between 15-20 ··~· belo,~/' thousand feet. The object, according to the FLIR, appear·ed stationary (Figure 3). n1oven1ent fron1 There was no discernable the object vvith the only closure being a result of the aircraft's 1noven1ent As LT watched the object it began to n1ove out of FLIR fie1d of vi-ew to the left. LT Ina de no attem-pt to slew the FLJR and subsequently lost situational awareness to the object. The Flight continued with training n1ission with no further contact with object ·• .I, rt ' .l. r ·., · t , I . f I· ' , ' ,•• " \ '• !l • t \· • · 'l , .. , . i !f~ ' ',· I ·< <;~ . . .... . ~l , ! tl I · ,. : o .... " f • , • I f o I ( . , . , . r • . '· ~, • .. . .. '-' · . LT was clear in that he couldn't confirn1 that it was the san1e o:bject as descrfbed by FASTEAGLE flight. 1-Ie never had visual, only seeing the object via the FLlR. l-Ie reaffirtned that all systen1s were functional. FoHowing co1npletion of the training p·ortion, the section returned to the ship for a norn1a1 a roach, landing and shutdown. The crew n1et in CV1C and LT debriefed ~ said that the Civc·s ection atten1pted to collect his tapes but he refused. They proceeded to their ready roon1 \!\'here they d-ebriefed with CDR Fravor and his Hight. Copies of the tapes \Vere n1ade with a set being turned into the intelligence section .. LT was not asked to sign any non--disclosure agreen1ent and he is uncertain hovl far up the ·chain the reporting went past his con1n1anding officer. When asl<ed LT couldn't confirn1 any physiologi·cal or psychological feelings that were out of the ordinary. He only expressed a feeling of confusion during the event USS L(1LAisvitle (SSN. ~~ 724) The USS Louisville USS Louisville (SSN-724) is a Los Angeles .. c]ass nuc1eat. . fast attack submarine5 She vvas operating in the vicinity of the lJSS Nin1itz as part of the . 5 http:/f en.wikipedia.org/wil<i/USS_Louisville_(SSN -724) • .. .. ·~~ • t . 7 •. ,. • • CSG during the detection and intercept of the AA V. According to former LT now a civilian working for the US Navy, who was a qualified Submarine Officer onb oard the Louisville in November 2004 during the AA V activity there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings or at anytime commander during the operations off the coast of California. The former of the USS Louisville, CAPT confirmed that there was no anomalous undersea exercise activity during this period. There was a live fire conducted by the USS Louisville during the period of and in the vicinity of the AAV sightings; however,. the weapon in use did not match the flight profile or visible characteristics of the AAV . cs-G Additionally any live tire would have been coordinated. throughout the and all air traffic would have been well aware of the launch and operation of the weapon system. Aircraft would not have been vectored for the intercept of a US Weapon in flight Based on the lack of·detection of any unidentified sonar contacts it is highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the surface of the ocean; it is possible that the AA V demonstrated the ability to be cloaked or invisible to the human eye based on pHot repo·rting of the water disturbance with no visible craft. Based on the assessme-nt of Mr. if the AA V did operate undeJWater undetected it would represent a highly advanced capability the advanced capabilicy of our sensors. given • leadership and Reporting Typically most if not all reporting on any CSG .mission related air activity is completed in CVIC by the intelligence perso:nnel. At least one pilot or aircrew member of each flight or aircraft will stop by CVIC to be debriefed by intelligence. I-ntelligence personnel will then take the information provided the pilot or by aircrew member and complete a mission report (MISREP). During contingency or wartime operations a MISREP is filed even if the aircrew had nothing significant to report (NSTR). On 14 November following the intercept of the AAV CDR Fravor reported to CVIC to 1 debrief with Intelligence. H·e discussed the entire mission and M V contact With LCDR the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer. According to LCDR e "wasn't sure what to do". He also stated that they take it seri,ously" ~'didn't at first; however, they had absolutely no reason to question.t he report from a very I experienced and well .. respected commanding officer. LCDR F A-18 squadron added that they likely would have not given as much attention if it came from a lesser-experienced aviator. He reported it to the Co1nmander of the Air Wing, CAPT also a highly experienced aviator but he did not take it very serious. LCDR completed an email based MIS It was submitted via email because REP~ 1 were training mission. email-based report including the the F A-18s on a The FLIR video was sent via a secure system to CAPT at 3rd Fleet Intelligence, higher echelon Finally, admitted detailed high their command. LCDR and the ..· 1eve1 of ridicule that the aircrew experienced over the next few weeks. The ~ fo11owing details were also confirtned \1\'ith CAPT he CSG-11 Senior Intelligence Officer (NZ). Capt confirrned that the CSG leadership asked hin1 if any additional reporting vvas requh"ed and he advised that since they were in a training environtnent an e1nai1 based fv11SREP to 3rd Fleet N2 was the only report When asked what he thought the AAV was he replied that he believed it required~ was part of a c.ounterdrug operation based on the .area of operations. I I" .'f: t"' :;t\· ' ·. I C • ~ !'\ r"\ .(,. l ~ l l• ~ -, f~ { ~·1·· I • r -< f'' , .. f r·•\ ol- "'f 'l· l-···--~·- 1 f.t,·• .;.~ , • . y .J. t ) .• . ........ f t -- ...... -.. . 'l'· .. ,. '1- '-.... \o .... .. ... Ill ,.; ....... -· ll " ! The Fleet N2 at the titne of the event was CAPT . CAP1." has 3rd since retired fro1n the lJS Navy and could not be located; however, his depu-ty N2 . was CAPT CAPT onfirn1ed that the MISREP was received via en1ail on or about 14 Noven1ber 2004. Since this MISREP was con1p·leted during training and preparation for deploytnent it vvas read and acknowledged by Fleet 3rd N2 but \vas not forwarded to anyone ·up the chain of con11nand. Additionally CAPT tated that it was not lil\ely archived but deleted at sotne point late r as there is no requirernent to keep these reports and it was likely in file folder with all of the other training MISREPS sent in by the CSG during deploy1nent preparation. ~·· 'fhe con1n1ander of the Nirnitz Carrier Strike Group during the intercept was Rear Adn1iral D,C. Curtis novv a Vice Adn1iral (VADM) and is com1nander of Naval Surface Forces and the Pacific Fleet's N-aval Surface Force. All of the AAV activity was reported to VADM Curtis by the Con1n1anding USS Princeton and Officer~ Con1manding Offi'.cer, VFA-41.. Based on all of the conversation with those involved and an1ong the leadership of the various con1batants w-ithin the CSG. VADl\1 c:urtis vvas a \1\!ell respected, co1npetent, and thorough Naval Officer .. There is no question in anyone's n1ind that he followed any and all regulations and guidance applicable to his con1rnand. Capt as the Director of Operations (N3) for CSG-11 at the tin1e of the intercept. Capt confirn1ed that other than the MIS REP there was no other official report or staten1ent frotn the CSG. He also stated that at tin1e did they 110 consider the AAV a threat to the battle group. Additionally they had no advanced knowledge of live fire events, US Weapons Testing or any other experin1ental aircraft operating in the area .. they had never seen anything like this before Finally~ and never again~ Adn1iral Peter Daly assun1ed comn1and of the CSG in january 2005 after the intercept and had no knowledge or involven1ent in this incident ... , ·...... .. . ~ ·