Towards Fusion Energy: The UK Government’s response to the consultation on its proposals for a regulatory framework for fusion energy Consultation conducted 1st October 2021 – 24th December 2021 June 2022 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy The UK’s Fusion Strategy was published last year and set out how the UK aims to support the development of fusion energy for commercial industrial use over the next two decades. Since then, we have already seen real progress. In December 2021 the Joint European Torus – the most powerful fusion facility in the world and operated here in the UK – smashed its own fusion energy record, producing 59 Megajoules of sustained fusion energy. By the end of 2021 the global private fusion sector had raised over $4bn, a $2bn increase on 2020. In April 2022 UK company First Light Fusion achieved fusion using its globally unique ‘projectile fusion’ approach. Now is the time to take another step forward. As set out in the Prime Minister’s Taskforce on Regulatory Innovation (TIGRR), the UK is helping to lead the global field of fusion regulation. Responses to our 2021 consultation on our proposals for regulating fusion energy in the UK were received from around the world. Input from UK and international experts has been invaluable in helping the Government to reach a decision on how to regulate this rapidly evolving, cutting-edge technology. After our careful review of the feedback received, the Government can now confirm that future fusion energy facilities will be regulated under the legal framework already in place for fusion. While the hazard and complexity of fusion energy facilities will be greater than current research facilities, we remain confident that existing regulations in the UK will be able to uphold safety standards in a proportionate way. We are also clear that the fundamental differences between nuclear fission and fusion mean that it would be disproportionate and unnecessary to incorporate fusion energy facilities into nuclear regulations. The Government will now move to implement its proposals on fusion regulation, using the Energy Security Bill to remove any residual uncertainty in the current legal framework. We believe that the decisions in this document – based on the best available evidence and now supported by regulators, the fusion industry and other experts – are the right ones to help move safely and determinedly towards fusion energy. George Freeman MP Minister for Science, Research and Innovation Contents Foreword — 5 1. Background — 7 2. Overview of responses and the Government’s decisions — 10 3. Analysis of Consultation Responses — 21 Annexes — 43 Annex A. Consultation Responses — 44 Annex B. Technical Annex — 45 Annex C. Health and Safety Executive regulation of complex facilities with multiple hazards — 57 UK Fusion Strategy – Towards Fusion Energy Fusion is the process that occurs at the centre of stars. It is the source of light and heat emitted by the Sun. Fusion energy technologies seek to harness this process and generate low carbon, secure and effectively unlimited energy on Earth. Fusion energy is expected to play an important role over the longer term to decarbonise global energy production. The science and engineering involved in fusion energy is now progressing rapidly. The UK is widely recognised as a world leader in the most promising fusion technologies. The UK hosts the Joint European Torus (JET) which in February 2022 announced a breakthrough in fusion energy research, achieving record levels of sustained fusion energy production. The UK Government published its Fusion Strategy in October 2021. This expanded on the aim in the Prime Minister’s 10 Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution and the Energy White Paper, which is for the UK Government to build a world-leading UK fusion industry which can export fusion technology around the world in subsequent decades. The Fusion Strategy describes the Government’s approach to delivering this mission. Designs for fusion energy facilities are being developed by research organisations and private companies around the world, targeting deployment in the 2030s and 2040s. One such plan is the UK Atomic Energy Authority’s (UKAEA) STEP (Spherical Tokamak for Energy Production) programme, which aims to build a prototype fusion power plant in the UK by 2040. Consultation on the Government’s proposals for a regulatory framework for fusion Fusion energy facilities will need to be regulated appropriately and proportionately in the UK to maintain public and environmental protections, provide public assurances and enable the growth of this low carbon energy industry. The Government wants fusion developers to be able to plan with confidence and the public to understand the basis for the UK’s approach to the regulation of this emerging technology. In October 2021 the Government published the Green Paper: Towards Fusion Energy, outlining its proposals for a regulatory framework for fusion energy in the UK. The consultation, which ran between October and December 2021, provided an opportunity for the public, industry, academia and other fusion stakeholders to share knowledge and offer views. The Government’s proposals aim to enable the safe and rapid deployment of fusion energy power plants, promoting innovation while maintaining human and environmental protections. In the Green Paper, the Government sought views on the following broad areas: • Whether the existing regulatory framework for fusion will be appropriate and ‘fit for purpose’ over the next 20-30 years, and whether an alternative approach and/or regulator may be more appropriate. • Whether existing regulatory provisions should be amended and new provisions introduced, to ensure that the associated hazard and risks are effectively managed by the fusion sector and to provide clarity and certainty for industry and the public. • How the regulatory framework and related policy areas should evolve as fusion technology is developed. Objectives for a successful regulatory framework for fusion energy The Government considered the following three objectives as the means by which to assess whether the current framework is appropriate and/or whether new or amended regulatory provisions are required. Each is based on a core theme that is critical to the Government’s thinking on fusion regulation: safety, transparency and innovation. - Safety: Maintain human and environmental protections, in a way that is proportionate to the hazards and risks involved - Transparency: Ensure transparency to enhance public assurance - Innovation: Make the UK the best place in the world for commercialising fusion energy through enabling regulation that offers certainty to fusion developers and investors The Government is clear that the regulatory framework for fusion must continue to be based on the best available evidence and technical expertise, particularly given that fusion is a developing technology. It must also uphold clear separation between the regulators and fusion developers, whilst recognising that appropriate engagement between regulators and fusion developers is necessary for the regulatory framework to be effective. Devolution As set out in the Green Paper, the Government wants to maximise the scientific and economic potential of fusion energy in a way that levels up opportunity right across the country. The UK Government has concluded that the existing regulatory framework for fusion would be appropriate for a fusion energy facility, and that a fusion energy facility would not need to be developed on a nuclear site. Currently, the only major fusion experimental facilities in the UK are in England. The Government hopes that the conclusions set out in this paper will be used by the Devolved Administrations in considering any changes to policies or regulations related to fusion that are devolved. The Government stands ready to collaborate on fusion regulation with the Devolved Administrations. All decisions in this document are for England. Some will apply across the UK. Nuclear regulation is reserved to the UK Government. Environmental protection is devolved to each administration in the UK with health and safety regulations reserved except in Northern Ireland. Planning is devolved to each administration except in the case of Wales where planning for facilities generating over 350 MW of energy is reserved. A. Overview of responses received 58 written responses were received. BEIS intends to continue engagement with many of those who responded, as well as key stakeholders who were not able to respond to the consultation. Table 1: Categorisation of the 58 respondents to the consultation - Industry (energy, engineering, or technology company): 9 - Private Individual: 9 - Academic: 8 - R&D Organisation: 6 - Fusion Company: 6 - Regulator: 5 - NGO: 5 - Local Authority (includes local enterprise partnerships): 4 - Industry Body: 3 - Unknown: 3 (43 responses UK-based, 3 US, 1 Canadian, 1 German, 1 Pan-European, 1 China, 8 unknown) B. The Government’s decisions and next steps 1. Current UK regulators of fusion R&D facilities will retain responsibility for fusion. Hazard Assessment: The Government's assessment shows that the overall hazard profile will be comparable with other facilities regulated by the Health and Safety Executive and environmental regulators in the UK, such as a large chemical plant. Most respondents noted the significant inherent differences between traditional nuclear fission and fusion (no chain reaction, no meltdown risk, no high-level radioactive waste). Implications for Regulators: The Government is confident regulators can build necessary capability. HSE provided supplementary information (Annex C) regarding regulating complex facilities with multiple hazards. 2. This regulatory approach will apply to all planned fusion prototype energy facilities in the UK. While keeping aspects under review, the Government decided not to set a formal comprehensive review every 10 years to avoid introducing uncertainty for developers. 3. The Government will legislate to make clear in law the regulatory treatment of fusion energy. The Government will use the Energy Security Bill to amend the Nuclear Installations Act (1965) (NIA65) to explicitly exclude fusion energy facilities from the regulatory and licensing requirements under NIA65. 4. Broader Next Steps: - Maintaining independence between regulators and developers. - Accounting for diversity of fusion technologies (inertial, magnetic, aneutronic). - Development of fusion-specific guidance. - Regulating supplementary systems, infrastructure, critical materials (e.g., lithium). - Considering financing and decommissioning requirements. Summary of proposals and next steps: 1. Regulatory Justification of Fusion: - Why necessary: Operation of fusion reactors for energy production is not currently a "justified activity". - Proposals: UKAEA's STEP programme should develop and submit an application for the operation of fusion energy facilities to be a justified activity, working with wider industry. - Intended outcomes: Fusion energy production becomes a justified practice and permissible use of ionising radiation. - Decision/Next Steps: The STEP Programme is now preparing an application. UKAEA will engage with industry in coming months. 2. Fusion and the definition of a nuclear installation: - Why necessary: Definition of "nuclear installation" could be clearer to remove risk of inconsistency. - Proposals: Legislate to confirm fusion energy facilities are not legally defined as nuclear installations. - Intended outcomes: Provide clarity on overall regulatory regime in the UK. - Decision/Next Steps: Energy Security Bill will amend NIA65 to explicitly exclude fusion. 3. Planning process for a fusion energy facility: - Why necessary: Currently assumed planning process in England would be inefficient. - Proposals: Develop a National Fusion Policy Statement (NPS) to align with Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects. - Intended outcomes: Establish a more efficient planning process. - Decision/Next Steps: Publish plans for Fusion NPS in coming months. 4. Fusion and Third Party Liabilities: - Why necessary: No existing requirement to hold specific insurance provisions for third party claims. - Proposals: Consider whether and how to introduce an appropriate liability regime. - Intended outcomes: Ensure third party costs are met while insurance remains proportionate. - Decision/Next Steps: Government concluded some form of liability regime is appropriate; will publish details in due course. 5. Regulatory Engagement: - Why necessary: No formal process for design phase engagement. - Proposals: Regulators consider options for formalised engagement processes and guidance. - Intended outcomes: Ensure compliance, build capability, reduce commercialisation costs. - Decision/Next Steps: Support regulators to develop fusion-specific engagement processes and guidance over 2-3 years; refine scope definitions. 6. Public Engagement: - Why necessary: No explicit obligation for developers to engage public on designs to enhance transparency. - Proposals: Regulators consider additional consultation opportunities; developers engage transparently. - Intended outcomes: Maximise public confidence. - Decision/Next Steps: Existing framework provides broadly sufficient opportunity, but developers expected to engage fully and transparently. 7. Cyber Security: - Why necessary: Developers not legally required to adhere to specific cyber security regulations for energy/nuclear installations. - Proposals: Consider proportionate cyber security regulations. - Intended outcomes: Ensure safe and secure operation. - Decision/Next Steps: Develop options based on consultation responses and publish in due course. 8. Nuclear Safeguards: - Why necessary: Tritium is not defined as source/special fissionable material by IAEA; international obligations need compliance. - Proposals: Keep under review, assuming Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) would be responsible. - Intended outcomes: Uphold UK compliance with international treaties. - Decision/Next Steps: Develop options on safeguards and publish details in due course. 9. Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning: - Why necessary: Uncertainty on waste volumes and classification, though no High Level Waste produced. - Proposals: Keep policy under review. - Intended outcomes: Ensure waste is minimised and handled safely; safe decommissioning. - Decision/Next Steps: No changes directly required to regulations; premature to set firm expectations on waste classification. 10. Export Controls: - Why necessary: No set guidance/framework for fusion technology generally. - Proposals: Work with experts to consider guidance. - Intended outcomes: Enable export while promoting best practice. - Decision/Next Steps: Develop options around export controls. 11. Regulatory Capacity and Capability: - Why necessary: Regulators need to build technical capability over coming decades. - Proposals: Regulators monitor sector growth and build specialist expertise. - Intended outcomes: Ensure effective regulation. - Decision/Next Steps: Support regulators to build capability and capacity. Analysis of Consultation Questions: Question 2: Expected hazards of future fusion power plants - Feedback: 63% agreed (31/49), 27% disagreed (13/49), 10% didn't know (5/49). - Government decision: Maintains conclusion that fusion hazard does not warrant nuclear site licensing; accident scenarios represent bounding cases. Question 3: Maintain existing regulatory approach - Feedback: 61% agreed (31/51), 29% disagreed, 10% didn't know. - Government decision: Maintain existing regulatory approach via HSE and EA/SEPA. Question 4: IRR 2017 and EPR 2016 framework proportionality - Feedback: 56% agreed (27/48), 19% disagreed, 25% didn't know. - Government decision: Maintain IRR 2017 and EPR 2016 as foundations. HSE introducing new consent authorisation process requiring safety assessments and specialist radiation inspections. Question 5: Consideration under Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (ONR licensing) - Feedback: 63% (30/48) said fusion should NOT be considered nuclear installations under NIA 1965, 19% said it should, 19% didn't know. - Government decision: Fusion energy facilities will not be considered nuclear installations under NIA 1965. Question 7: Legislative approach to clarify nuclear site licence exemption - Feedback: 57% agreed (27/47), 28% disagreed, 15% didn't know. - Government decision: Legislate via Energy Security Bill to exclude fusion from NIA 1965. Question 6: Regulatory Justification of Fusion - Feedback: Strong support for application based on 'generation of net energy'. - Government decision: STEP programme will prepare an application on behalf of sector. Questions 8 & 9: National Fusion Policy Statement (NPS) - Feedback: 71% agreed (34/48) to establish Fusion NPS. - Government decision: Proceed with establishing Fusion NPS. Questions 10-13: Third Party Liability Regime - Feedback: 60% (28/47) believed third party liability regime is required. - Government decision: Develop specific fusion liability regime with proportionate caps (not Paris Convention €1.2bn fission cap). Questions 14 & 15: Cyber Security Regulations - Feedback: 71% agreed (32/45) prototype plants should be subject to cyber security regulations. - Government decision: Develop tailored cyber security options. Question 16: Scope Definition for Enhanced Engagement - Feedback: 52% agreed (23/44), 23% disagreed, 25% didn't know. (Thresholds of 50 MW net capacity and 7x10^16 Bq tritium). - Government decision: Refine scope definition, incorporating thermal output rather than just electrical. Questions 17 & 18: Formal Pre-Engagement in Design Process - Feedback: 83% agreed (38/46). - Government decision: Regulators to enable formal design engagement while maintaining independent oversight. Question 19: Additional Guidance Development - Feedback: 81% agreed (38/47). - Government decision: Work with regulators and consider joint guidance document. Question 20: Public Engagement Opportunities - Feedback: 76% agreed (35/46). - Government decision: Support public engagement, categorising fusion as 'high public interest'. Question 21: Regulators Building Technical Capability - Feedback: Support for expert training, familiarisation, drawing on relevant experience. - Government decision: Support technical familiarisation programmes for regulators. Question 22: Role of UKAEA Technical Expertise - Feedback: Strong recognition of UKAEA capability, but emphasized requirement for regulatory independence (e.g. independent TSO). - Government decision: Ensure structural independence in technical support. Questions 23-26: Radioactive Waste Management & Decommissioning - Feedback: 63% agreed (25/40) that policy should reflect expectation of near-surface disposal feasibility. - Government decision: Avoid predetermining disposal routes; apply general radioactive waste policy based on hazard/activity. Question 27: Nuclear Safeguards - Feedback: 70% agreed (28/40) with proposals on safeguards. - Government decision: Keep safeguards under review with ONR. Question 28: Export Controls & Technology Licensing - Feedback: Broad support for clear export control guidance. - Government decision: Develop export control options. Question 29: Review Mechanism for Regulatory Framework - Feedback: 84% agreed (37/44) with review principle, but warned 10-year rigid review creates investment uncertainty. - Government decision: Keep under ongoing review without rigid 10-year major review cycles; confirm regulatory approach applies to all planned prototype facilities. Questions 30-34: General Knowledge and Public Support - Knowledge before reading: 84% knew a lot, 16% knew a little (Q31). - Support before reading: 94% support/strongly support (81% strongly support) (Q32). - Knowledge after reading: 87% knew a lot (Q33). - Support after reading: 92% support/strongly support (79% strongly support) (Q34). Technical Annex: Safety and Radiological Hazards in Fusion Power Plants 1. Introduction & Confinement Strategy: - Confinement is the primary safety barrier preventing release of radiological materials. - Bounding accident scenarios (Acc1 and Acc2) from the UKAEA Technology Report model worst-case hypothetical releases. 2. Tritium Properties & Biology: - Tritium (3H) is an isotope of hydrogen with a half-life of 12.3 years emitting weak beta radiation (approx. 6 mm range in air, cannot penetrate human skin). - Forms: Gaseous tritium (HT), Tritiated water (HTO), and Organically Bound Tritium (OBT). HTO is ~10,000 times more radiotoxic than HT. - Biological half-life: ~10 days for HTO, ~40 days for OBT, meaning almost all tritium is excreted before decaying. - Tokamak plasma inventory at any one moment is only a few tens of grams (~10^16 Bq), though additional inventory resides in breeding blankets, cryopumps, and fuel handling systems. 3. Key Radiological Hazards: - Tritium inventory. - Neutron-activated structural materials, dust (tungsten), corrosion products, and coolant activation. 4. Overview of In-Plant Initiating Energies & Hazards: - Fusion driver energy (plasma thermal shocks, disruptions, runaway electrons). - Magnetic energy (quench, arc faults). - Thermal energy (coolant leaks, overpressure). - Decay heat (significantly lower than fission; temperatures remain well below structural melting points in modeled accidents). - Explosive/fire hazard (hydrogen formation from metal-water reactions or fuel leaks). - Cryogenic energy (rapid expansion of liquid helium/nitrogen). - Chemical energy (chemical reactivity of beryllium, lithium, tungsten with steam/air). 5. Conclusion: Bounding calculations confirm that the unmitigated worst-case consequences of fusion facilities remain orders of magnitude lower than fission accidents and comparable to non-nuclear major industrial hazards. Annex C: Health and Safety Executive Regulation of Complex Facilities with Multiple Hazards - HSE regulates major hazards across Great Britain (offshore oil and gas, national gas pipelines, chemical manufacturing, explosives, biological agents, major infrastructure like Crossrail and HS2). - Regulatory Philosophy: Goal-setting, outcome-focused regulations (under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974) where dutyholders identify, assess, and manage risks to 'As Low As Reasonably Practicable' (ALARP). - HSE Defense-in-Depth Model: Multi-layered control measures comprising preventative barriers (reducing likelihood of loss of control) and mitigation barriers (reducing consequences of any loss of control). - HSE has substantial expertise and technical capabilities to regulate the interconnected hazards of operational fusion power facilities.