Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastructures

Summary

This comprehensive report evaluates the potential catastrophic effects of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack on the critical national infrastructures of the United States. It details vulnerabilities and interdependencies across key sectors including electric power, telecommunications, banking and finance, petroleum and natural gas, transportation, food, water, emergency services, space systems, and government operations. The Commission provides actionable technical and policy recommendations for national preparedness, infrastructure hardening, and rapid recovery planning.

Title Page & Metadata

Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack

Critical National Infrastructures

Commission Members: Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. Mr. Earl Gjelde Dr. William R. Graham (Chairman) Dr. Robert J. Hermann Mr. Henry (Hank) M. Kluepfel Gen Richard L. Lawson, USAF (Ret.) Dr. Gordon K. Soper Dr. Lowell L. Wood, Jr. Dr. Joan B. Woodard

April 2008

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 ISBN 978-0-16-080927-9

Preface

The physical and social fabric of the United States is sustained by a system of systems; a complex and dynamic network of interlocking and interdependent infrastructures (“critical national infrastructures”) whose harmonious functioning enables the myriad actions, transactions, and information flow that undergird the orderly conduct of civil society in this country. The vulnerability of these infrastructures to threats — deliberate, accidental, and acts of nature — is the focus of greatly heightened concern in the current era, a process accelerated by the events of 9/11 and recent hurricanes, including Katrina and Rita.

This report presents the results of the Commission’s assessment of the effects of a high altitude electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack on our critical national infrastructures and provides recommendations for their mitigation. The assessment is informed by analytic and test activities executed under Commission sponsorship, which are discussed in this volume. An earlier executive report, Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) — Volume 1: Executive Report (2004), provided an overview of the subject.

The electromagnetic pulse generated by a high altitude nuclear explosion is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences. The increasingly pervasive use of electronics of all forms represents the greatest source of vulnerability to attack by EMP. Electronics are used to control, communicate, compute, store, manage, and implement nearly every aspect of United States (U.S.) civilian systems. When a nuclear explosion occurs at high altitude, the EMP signal it produces will cover the wide geographic region within the line of sight of the detonation. This broad band, high amplitude EMP, when coupled into sensitive electronics, has the capability to produce widespread and long lasting disruption and damage to the critical infrastructures that underpin the fabric of U.S. society.

Because of the ubiquitous dependence of U.S. society on the electrical power system, its vulnerability to an EMP attack, coupled with the EMP’s particular damage mechanisms, creates the possibility of long-term, catastrophic consequences. The implicit invitation to take advantage of this vulnerability, when coupled with increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, is a serious concern. A single EMP attack may seriously degrade or shut down a large part of the electric power grid in the geographic area of EMP exposure effectively instantaneously. There is also a possibility of functional collapse of grids beyond the exposed area, as electrical effects propagate from one region to another.

The time required for full recovery of service would depend on both the disruption and damage to the electrical power infrastructure and to other national infrastructures. Larger affected areas and stronger EMP field strengths will prolong the time to recover. Some critical electrical power infrastructure components are no longer manufactured in the United States, and their acquisition ordinarily requires up to a year of lead time in routine circumstances. Damage to or loss of these components could leave significant parts of the electrical infrastructure out of service for periods measured in months to a year or more. There is a point in time at which the shortage or exhaustion of sustaining backup systems, including emergency power supplies, batteries, standby fuel supplies, communications, and manpower resources that can be mobilized, coordinated, and dispatched, together lead to a continuing degradation of critical infrastructures for a prolonged period of time.

Electrical power is necessary to support other critical infrastructures, including supply and distribution of water, food, fuel, communications, transport, financial transactions, emergency services, government services, and all other infrastructures supporting the national economy and welfare. Should significant parts of the electrical power infrastructure be lost for any substantial period of time, the Commission believes that the consequences are likely to be catastrophic, and many people may ultimately die for lack of the basic elements necessary to sustain life in dense urban and suburban communities. In fact, the Commission is deeply concerned that such impacts are likely in the event of an EMP attack unless practical steps are taken to provide protection for critical elements of the electric system and for rapid restoration of electric power, particularly to essential services. The recovery plans for the individual infrastructures currently in place essentially assume, at worst, limited upsets to the other infrastructures that are important to their operation. Such plans may be of little or no value in the wake of an EMP attack because of its long-duration effects on all infrastructures that rely on electricity or electronics.

The ability to recover from this situation is an area of great concern. The use of automated control systems has allowed many companies and agencies to operate effectively with small work forces. Thus, while manual control of some systems may be possible, the number of people knowledgeable enough to support manual operations is limited. Repair of physical damage is also constrained by a small work force. Many maintenance crews are sized to perform routine and preventive maintenance of high-reliability equipment. When repair or replacement is required that exceeds routine levels, arrangements are typically in place to augment crews from outside the affected area. However, due to the simultaneous, far-reaching effects from EMP, the anticipated augmenters likely will be occupied in their own areas. Thus, repairs normally requiring weeks of effort may require a much longer time than planned.

The consequences of an EMP event should be prepared for and protected against to the extent it is reasonably possible. Cold War-style deterrence through mutual assured destruction is not likely to be an effective threat against potential protagonists that are either failing states or trans-national groups. Therefore, making preparations to manage the effects of an EMP attack, including understanding what has happened, maintaining situational awareness, having plans in place to recover, challenging and exercising those plans, and reducing vulnerabilities, is critical to reducing the consequences, and thus probability, of attack. The appropriate national-level approach should balance prevention, protection, and recovery.

The Commission requested and received information from a number of Federal agencies and National Laboratories. We received information from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, the National Communications System (since absorbed by the Department of Homeland Security), the Federal Reserve Board, and the Department of Homeland Security. Early in this review it became apparent that only limited EMP vulnerability testing had been accomplished for modern electronic systems and components. To partially remedy this deficit, the Commission sponsored illustrative testing of current systems and infrastructure components. The Commission’s view is that the Federal Government does not today have sufficiently robust capabilities for reliably assessing and managing EMP threats.

The United States faces a long-term challenge to maintain technical competence for understanding and managing the effects of nuclear weapons, including EMP. The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration have developed and implemented an extensive Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship Program over the last decade. However, no comparable effort was initiated to understand the effects that nuclear weapons produce on modern systems. The Commission reviewed current national capabilities to understand and to manage the effects of EMP and concluded that the Country is rapidly losing the technical competence in this area that it needs in the Government, National Laboratories, and Industrial Community.

An EMP attack on the national civilian infrastructures is a serious problem, but one that can be managed by coordinated and focused efforts between industry and government. It is the view of the Commission that managing the adverse impacts of EMP is feasible in terms of time and resources. A serious national commitment to address the threat of an EMP attack can develop a national posture that would significantly reduce the payoff for such an attack and allow the United States to recover in a timely manner if such an attack were to occur.

Acknowledgements

The Commission is pleased to acknowledge the support of its staff, whose professionalism and technical competence have contributed substantially to this report:

Dr. George Baker
Dr. Yvonne Bartoli
Mr. Fred Celec
Dr. Edward Conrad
Dr. Michael Frankel
Dr. Ira Kohlberg
Dr. Rob Mahoney
Dr. Mitch Nikolich
Dr. Peter Vincent Pry
Dr. James Scouras
Dr. James Silk
Ms. Shelley Smith
Dr. Edward Toton

The Commission additionally acknowledges the technical and scientific contributions of Dr. William Radasky, Dr. Jerry Lubell, Mr. Walter Scott, Mr. Paul F. Spraggs, Dr. Al Costantine, Dr. Gerry Gurtman, Dr. Vic Van Lint, Dr. John Kappenman, Dr. Phil Morrison, Mr. John Bombardt, Mr. Bron Cikotas, Mr. David Ambrose, Dr. Bill White, Dr. Yacov Haimes, Dr. Rebecca Edinger, Ms. Rachel Balsam and Mr. Chris Baker. The Commission also acknowledges the cooperation and assistance of Ms. Linda Berg; Dr. Dale Klein (former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense [Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Matters]); the leadership of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and its Commission liaison, Ms. Joan Pierre; Dr. Don Linger, Senior Scientist at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Dr. David Stoudt of the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren; Dr. Michael Bernardin of Los Alamos National Laboratory; and Dr. Tom Thompson and Dr. Todd Hoover of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

We also acknowledge the cooperation of the Intelligence Community (IC).

The Commission was ably supported by the contracted research activities of the following organizations: the National Nuclear Security Administration’s laboratories (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory), Argonne National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, the Institute for Defense Analyses, Jaycor/Titan, Metatech Corporation, Science Applications International Corporation, Telcordia Technologies, Mission Research Corporation, and the University of Virginia Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems.

Chapter 1. Infrastructure Commonalities

SCADA Systems: SCADAs (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) have emerged as critical and growing elements of a quietly unfolding industrial revolution spurred by the computer age. The accelerating penetration of SCADA systems, along with digital control systems (DCS) and programmable logic controllers (PLC), as critical elements in every aspect of every critical infrastructure in the Nation, is both inevitable and inexorable. High-altitude EMP focuses attention toward potential vulnerability of these systems with vastly expanded consequences.

Testing and Vulnerability: Testing of representative control systems in a bounded wave simulator demonstrated that every system tested failed when exposed to simulated EMP environments. Ethernet cables showed significant transient coupling (100 to 700 A). Historical incidents such as the 1999 Bellingham pipeline incident, 2000 Carlsbad pipeline incident, 1994 Pembroke refinery incident, and late 1980s Netherlands EMI pipeline incident demonstrate that small disruptions in SCADA/control systems can cause massive explosions, ruptures, and outages.

Recommendations:

Conduct research to better understand infrastructure system interdependencies and interactions, including interdependency modeling.
Expand cyber security initiatives for SCADA systems to address vulnerability to electronic assault, such as EMP.

Chapter 2. Electric Power

The functioning of society and the economy is critically dependent upon the availability of electricity. Essentially every aspect of American society requires electrical power to function. No infrastructure other than electric power has the potential for nearly complete collapse in the event of a sufficiently robust EMP attack.

Vulnerabilities & Components:

Generation: Power plants are vulnerable to E1-induced control system and sensor failure. Black-start generation is limited and required for restoring the grid from collapse.
Transmission: Step-up transformers and large high-voltage transformers (>=345 kV) are critical, custom-built, manufactured almost exclusively offshore, with lead times of 1 to 3 years. E3 induced ground-induced currents (GIC) can saturate transformers, causing massive thermal damage.
Distribution: Vulnerable to E1-induced insulator flashovers and transformer explosions.
Synergistic Effects: E1 disables protective relays and microelectronics; E2 follows like widespread lightning strikes bypassing broken protectors; E3 induces massive quasi-DC currents that burn out unprotected transformers.

Recommendations & Initiatives:

Protect high-value assets (large transformers, generation controls) through hardening and switchable neutral grounding resistors.
Ensure dedicated survivable emergency communications for system operators.
Expand battery and on-site generation at key substations and critical fueling facilities.
Develop intelligent islanding and asynchronous regional connections (such as HVDC/back-to-back DC ties) to prevent cascading blackout across entire NERC interconnections.
Increase black-start units with EMP-hardened controls and on-site fuel.
Establish replacement equipment stockpiles and modular emergency transformers.

Chapter 3. Telecommunications

Telecommunications links all sectors of society. An EMP attack would disrupt or damage electronic circuits across civilian telecommunications networks.

Key Findings:

Cellular networks are less robust than landline networks due to higher susceptibility of cellular base station equipment and limited battery/generator backup (typically 4 to 72 hours).
Call attempts will spike dramatically (4 to 12 times normal), causing immediate call blocking and network congestion.
Critical services like GETS (Government Emergency Telecommunications Service), WPS (Wireless Priority Service), and TSP (Telecommunications Service Priority) are essential for emergency response.
Loss of commercial power lasting weeks will lead to exhaustion of backup generator fuel and widespread communication outages.

Recommendations:

Ensure critical NS/EP services incorporate EMP survivability as packet-switched/IP and softswitch technologies are deployed.
Improve long-term power resilience for critical telecom facilities and cellular base stations.
Expand NCS role under 47 CFR Part 215 to address multi-infrastructure interdependencies.
Implement EMP reporting mechanisms and regular tabletop exercises.

Chapter 4. Banking and Finance

The financial services industry processes trillions of dollars daily (e.g., Fedwire, CHIPS, ACH, SWIFT, NYSE, NASDAQ) and is entirely dependent on electronic systems, telecommunications, and reliable power.

Key Findings:

Modern banking lacks manual, paper-based fallback mechanisms capable of handling modern transaction volumes.
An EMP event disabling electronic networks would halt economic activity, freeze credit/debit/ATM transactions, disrupt clearing and settlement, and destroy consumer confidence, potentially forcing a barter economy.

Recommendations:

Financial institutions and regulatory bodies (FRB, SEC, OCC, Treasury, DHS) must develop robust EMP contingency plans.
Protect and verify backup data storage, clearinghouse operations, and data transmission integrity against EMP.
Ensure financial market core settlement organizations have geographically dispersed, EMP-resilient backup sites with independent power and telecommunications.

Chapter 5. Petroleum and Natural Gas

Petroleum and natural gas account for over 60% of domestic energy consumption, distributed via over 180,000 miles of interstate natural gas pipelines and 55,000 miles of large oil pipelines.

Key Findings:

Both infrastructures depend on SCADA systems, remote telemetry, and electric power for pumps, compressors, and safety valves.
EMP disruption of SCADA and process control would cause automatic or emergency shutdowns of oil refineries and pipeline operations to prevent ruptures and explosions.
Natural gas delivery is just-in-time; loss of gas pipelines will quickly shut down gas-fired electric power generation plants.

Recommendations:

Establish EMP-hardened standards for pipeline SCADA and distributed control systems.
Create a national spare parts inventory for long-lead pipeline and refinery components.
Establish geographically separated backup control centers and provide emergency onsite generation at key pumping/fueling facilities.

Chapter 6. Transportation Infrastructure

Transportation includes railroads, trucking/automobiles, maritime shipping, and commercial aviation.

Key Findings & Test Results:

Railroads: Signal controls and track circuits are vulnerable to latching upset and damage at low-to-moderate fields (1 to 15 kV/m). Modern diesel-electric locomotives rely on electronic control computers.
Automobiles & Trucks: Lab testing showed engine stalling at fields above 25-30 kV/m (affecting ~10-15% of vehicles) and widespread nuisance electronic upsets, which could trigger massive highway gridlock and collisions. Traffic light controllers malfunction at fields as low as 1 to 5 kV/m.
Ports: Container cranes rely on commercial electric power with no backup; loss of power stops loading/unloading.
Commercial Aviation: Aircraft fly-by-wire and navigation systems have lightning protection but untested EMP survivability margins. Loss of air traffic control (ARTCC) electronics and radar networks would ground air traffic.

Recommendations:

Develop EMP protection modules for traffic controllers and railroad signal systems.
Conduct systematic EMP assessments of locomotives, aircraft, and air traffic control centers.
Harden port crane power backup and logistics database recovery systems.

Chapter 7. Food Infrastructure

Modern food production, processing, and distribution are almost entirely mechanized, electrified, and rely on just-in-time logistics.

Key Findings:

Less than 2% of the U.S. population produces the food for the nation, enabled entirely by advanced technology, fertilizers, electric irrigation, and automated machinery.
Supermarkets carry only a 1- to 3-day supply of food, depending on regional warehouses (which hold ~30 days of supply) and continuous trucking.
Loss of refrigeration and transportation would cause massive food spoilage within days, leading to potential starvation, hoarding, and social breakdown in urban areas.

Recommendations:

Expand federal emergency food stockpiles (including MREs and grain processing capabilities).
Amend the Stafford Act to include national emergency food distribution and preservation plans during long-term infrastructure failures.
Prioritize power and fuel allocation to food preservation, refrigerated warehouses, and distribution networks.

Chapter 8. Water Infrastructure

Modern water supply and wastewater treatment rely on electric pumps, SCADA controls, and continuous chemical treatment (filtration, flocculation, chlorination).

Key Findings:

Gravity feed alone is insufficient for modern urban centers and high-rise structures; high-lift electric pumps consume tens of megawatts.
An EMP attack collapsing the power grid or disabling SCADA systems will halt potable water delivery and wastewater treatment within hours to days.
Consequences include rapid dehydration, public health epidemics from untreated sewage and contaminated surface water, loss of firefighting capabilities, and urban evacuation.

Recommendations:

DHS and EPA must include EMP in national water infrastructure protection policies.
Enhance onsite emergency power and manual bypass capabilities for water treatment and pumping facilities.
Encourage public water stockpiling and personal purification preparedness.

Chapter 9. Emergency Services

Emergency services encompass 9-1-1 call centers (PSAPs), police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and the Emergency Alert System (EAS).

Key Findings:

Demand for emergency services will spike drastically while operational capabilities are degraded due to computer dispatch failures, saturated telecommunications, loss of power, and fuel shortages.
Radios generally tolerate EMP fields up to 50 kV/m without physical burnout, but dispatch computers and telecommunication links fail at lower field levels (3 to 6 kV/m).
Prolonged failure of emergency services leads to social disorder and breakdown of law and order.

Recommendations:

Establish EMP immunity standards for emergency communication systems and dispatch equipment.
Develop graceful degradation protocols, manual dispatch procedures, and spare parts provisioning.
Provide backup power and fuel reserves for PSAPs, EOCs, and mobile response units.

Chapter 10. Space Systems

High-altitude nuclear detonations present severe hazards to Earth-orbiting satellites through prompt radiation (X-rays, gamma, UV, neutrons) and persistently trapped high-energy electron radiation belts (Van Allen belt pumping).

Key Findings:

Satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) are highly vulnerable to trapped radiation belts created by nuclear bursts; even low-to-moderate yield detonations can shorten operational lifespans from years to days or weeks.
The 1962 STARFISH test disabled at least 8 satellites in orbit.
High-altitude detonations can cause prompt thermomechanical shock to solar arrays, system-generated EMP (SGEMP), dielectric charging, and component latch-up.
Satellite ground control stations are vulnerable to EMP, which would prevent commanding and maintaining orbiting assets.

Recommendations:

Federal agencies must systematically assess mission criticality and risk for space assets in LEO.
Incorporate radiation hardening ab initio into spacecraft and harden satellite ground control infrastructure against EMP.

Chapter 11. Government

The Federal Government is responsible for national defense, continuity of operations (COOP), continuity of government (COG), and directing national recovery following an EMP attack.

Key Directives & Recommendations:

Executive leadership must ensure implementation of National Security Presidential Directive 51 (NSPD 51) / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (HSPD 20) under EMP conditions.
Priority must be given to survivable, robust communications connecting national leadership, regional/state authorities, and critical infrastructure sectors.
Conduct rigorous Red Team exercises, war games, and develop operational protocols for managing recovery under degraded communications and power loss.

Chapter 12. Keeping The Citizenry Informed: Effects On People

Direct biological effects of high-altitude EMP on human bodies are negligible, though individuals dependent on active medical implants (e.g., pacemakers) or life support equipment face risks from device upset.

Sociological and Psychological Impacts:

The major threat to citizens stems from indirect effects: sudden loss of power, clean water, food, sanitation, communications, and emergency services.
Analysis of historical blackouts (1965, 1977, 2003) and disasters (Katrina, Andrew, 1993 Midwest floods) highlights that communication is paramount to maintaining social order, preventing panic, and coordinating mutual aid.

Recommendations:

Establish resilient communication channels to keep citizens informed during extended blackouts.
DHS should provide public guidance and preparedness resources (e.g., via Ready.gov) for EMP and geomagnetic storm scenarios.

Appendix A & B. Charter, Activities, and Biographies

Appendix A: The Commission and Its Charter Established by Congress through Title XIV of Public Law 106-398 to assess the threat, vulnerabilities, repair/recovery capabilities, and hardening costs for U.S. military and civilian systems against high-altitude EMP attacks.

Appendix B: Biographies of Commission Members

Dr. William R. Graham (Chairman): Former Science Advisor to President Reagan, Director of OSTP, Chairman of NSR Inc.
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.: Former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Mr. Earl Gjelde: CEO of Summit Power Group, former Under/Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Interior and COO of DOE.
Dr. Robert J. Hermann: Senior Partner at Global Technology Partners, former Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
Mr. Henry (Hank) M. Kluepfel: VP at SAIC, leading cyberspace and telecommunications security expert.
Gen Richard L. Lawson, USAF (Ret.): Former President/CEO of National Mining Association, Military Assistant to the President, Deputy Commander in Chief U.S. European Command.
Dr. Gordon K. Soper: Senior executive at Defense Group Inc., former Principal Deputy ATSD(NCB).
Dr. Lowell L. Wood, Jr.: Renowned physicist, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, former LLNL scientist.
Dr. Joan B. Woodard: Executive Vice President and Deputy Laboratories Director for Nuclear Weapons at Sandia National Laboratories.
Dr. Michael J. Frankel (Executive Director): Leading authority on nuclear weapons phenomenology and effects.