AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINA’S ANTI-SATELLITE AND SPACE WARFARE PROGRAMS, POLICIES AND DOCTRINES

Summary

This report by Dr. Michael P. Pillsbury presents an extensive assessment of Chinese open-source writings and doctrines concerning anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities and space warfare strategies from 2003 through 2006. It identifies thirty specific Chinese recommendations and concepts—ranging from kinetic kill vehicles and directed energy beam weapons to covert space warfare and GPS disruption—designed to exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. space architecture. The study provides recommendations for U.S. policymakers, highlighting the strategic implications for military preparedness, deterrence, arms control dialogues, and export control policies.

Title Page

AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINA’S ANTI-SATELLITE AND SPACE WARFARE PROGRAMS, POLICIES AND DOCTRINES

Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission by Michael P. Pillsbury, Ph.D.

Report submitted to the Commission by the author on 19 January 2007

Disclaimer The research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Commission to support its deliberations, and to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Laws 106-398, 108-7, and 109-108. This report is based on information obtained by Dr. Pillsbury using open source documents.

Placement of this report on the Commission’s Web Site does not imply an endorsement by the Commision or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in the report.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

PART 1. OVERVIEW … 7 INTRODUCTION … 7 SUMMARY OF CHINESE RECOMMENDATIONS ON SPACE WEAPONIZATION … 9 NDU Book 2001 - Space War … 10 NDU Book 2002 - On Space Operations … 11 NDU Book 2005 - Joint Space War Campaigns … 11 Exerpts from Journals and Articles … 12 CURRENT US VIEWS ON CHINA’S ASAT POLICY … 15 PRESENT LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF CHINESE ASAT CAPABILITY … 18 China Denies Developing Anti-Satellite Laser [2006] … 18

PART 2. THIRTY CHINESE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPACE WEAPONS … 21 COVERT SPACE WEAPONS … 21

• NDU Book 1 on Space War – Covert Space Weapons [2001] … 21 SPACE OPERATIONS … 23
• NDU Book 2 on Space Operations [2002] … 23 ATTACKS TO DETER … 23
• NDU Book 3 on Space Warfare Campaigns – Attacks to Deter [2005] … 23 CONSTRUCTING SPACE-BASED FIRE NETWORKS … 23 ASAT FROM SHIPS AND SUBMARINES … 24 ORBITAL MISSILES TO ATTACK EARTH TARGETS … 30 PLASMA ATTACK AGAINST LOW-ORBIT SPY SATELLITES … 36 SATELLITES DESIGNED WITH STEALTH … 37 SPACE ELECTRONIC JAMMING … 38 SIX STUDIES ON JAMMING US CLASSIFIED DATA LINKS [JTIDS ] [2005] … 39 TEN STUDIES OF KINETIC KILL VEHICLES [2005] … 41 SATELLITE ATTACKS ON EARTH TARGETS [2005] … 44 R&D ON FUTURE BEAM WEAPONS FOR ASAT MISSIONS … 45

PART 3. IMPLICATIONS TO GOALS OF A US-CHINA DIALOGUE ON SPACE WEAPONS . 48

PART 4. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY … 49

DOCUMENTARY APPENDIX … 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHINESE SOURCES … 54 Military Journals with Little Space Content … 54 List of 80 Chinese Space Journals & Websites … 55 BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SPACE ARMS CONTROL … 71 THE AIRBORNE LASER NARROWS ITS BEAM … 73 TOWARD A NEW LASER ERA … 73 US AEROSPACE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDING TRENDS … 75

Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The first two parts of this study present the results of a survey of Chinese writings that discovered 30 proposals that China should acquire several types of anti satellite weapons. Many foreign observers have mistakenly claimed that China is a pacifistic nation and has no interest such weapons. The Director of the US National Reconnaissance Office Donald Kerr confirmed a Chinese laser had illuminated a US satellite in 2006. These skeptical observers dismissed that laser incident, but then appeared to be stunned by the reported Chinese destruction of a satellite January 11, 2007. China declined to confirm the event, but many foreign governments immediately protested,¹ including Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada and Britain, while Russia’s defense minister suggested the report may not be fully accurate.

A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, while declining to confirm the incident, said other countries should not be alarmed. A US NSC spokesman said China fired a missile to destroy an orbiting weather satellite, making it the third country after the United States and the former Soviet Union to shoot down anything in space. If confirmed, the test would mean China could now theoretically shoot down spy satellites operated by other nations.

Parts 3 and 4 of this study recommend policy measures the US and other nations may consider. The ten measures are:

1. Possible US Countermeasures – Awareness, Assessing Damage, Forensics, Counter Strikes Of the thirty Chinese proposals, one set would be particularly challenging to US military vulnerabilities in a crisis. In each of their books, Chinese Colonels Li, Jia and Yuan all advocated covert deployment of a sophisticated antisatellite weapon system to be used against United States in a surprise manner without warning. Even a small scale antisatellite attack in a crisis against 50 US satellites [assuming a mix of targeted military reconnaissance, navigation satellites, and communication satellites] could have a catastrophic effect not only on US military forces, but of the US civilian economy. It is not clear from US open sources how rapidly—if at all—United States could launch “spare” satellites to replace a few dozen that had been incapacitated in orbit by a Chinese attack. US sources refer to many [very expensive] countermeasures such as maneuvering satellites in orbit to escape destruction, using constellations of small satellites, rapid replacement with spares, and even prompt counter strikes on the Chinese launchers.²

A second set of Chinese concepts proposed in these open source writings would also be particularly challenging. Many of the concepts recommended include both jamming and attacking ground stations, rather than the permanent destruct ruction of US satellites. In both cases, the Chinese authors imply the United States may lack the “forensic” ability to know which nation had neutralized US space systems through covert attack, jamming or destruction of ground stations by missile or Special Forces raids. The US Defense Department currently has put before Congress various proposals for enhancing situational awareness of space attack, but the ultimate approval of multiple-year funding is unknown.

2. Implications of Dialogues with These ASAT Authors It is important that the US establish with the Chinese the serious importance to which we assign this published, detailed advocacy of Chinese weaponization of space. Access to ASAT specialists in China has been impossible in the DOD exchange programs in the past decade, according to some observers, because China prohibits ASAT experts from participating in the exchanges at all. The 3 NDU authors cited may never have visited the US, and, as started, seem unaware of the Congressional restraints on US space programs.

3. Detecting the Signatures of Future Chinese ASAT, impact of proposals on US policy decisions An implication for the US intelligence community of these Chinese proposals would be the feasibility of identifying the developmental “signatures” of the recommended covert systems through normal intelligence collection. It may be difficult and probably impossible to detect the manufacturing and testing of many of the components that are proposed. The authors make clear in many of the recommendations that the acquisition of the systems and even their deployment are to be done covertly in a manner that cannot be detected by United States until the moment of their use by China in a crisis. Plasma attack, attacks on GPS, use of stealthy satellites, penetration and destruction of ground stations, jamming based on deceptive transmissions that imitate US signals, experimental units that can be converted in a crisis, ASATs fired from submarines — all these concepts could potentially be concealed in advance of their use unless their signatures were anticipated. By definition, the Chinese government would deny the existence of such covert programs. Indeed, consideration must be given to the possibility that active duty colonels have been permitted to publish such proposals as an effort to influence US thinking regarding the potential vulnerabilities and lack of effectiveness of possible space based national missile defense components, thus discouraging their development and acquisition.

4. Concerns of Japan, India, European Union and Russia to Chinese ASAT In terms of multilateral diplomacy and US alliances, one might ask whether other nations in addition to the United States have any concerns about these proposals and recommendations. The question would be whether China in the future may be the subject of pressure from the international community in addition to the United States.

5. Verification and On Site Inspections of an ASAT Agreement? With respect to US arms control policy, some advocates such as Congressman Ed Markey have proposed that we re-think the question of refusal to negotiate or discuss the Chinese proposal to the UN conference on disarmament in Geneva on a non-verifiable agreement against weaponization in outer space. If such an agreement explicitly permitted American National missile defense and was verifiable with on-site inspection, it might merit negotiation. After all, China has accepted 100 visits by the inspection organization of the chemical weapons ban, so the precedent exists of China’s accepting on-site inspections for international arms control agreements. Of course, the ban will be reciprocal so the United States would be compelled to accept inspections potentially of sensitive facilities under the control the national reconnaissance organization which manufactures highly classified US satellites and space systems.

6. Inference of Chinese Determinations of US Space Weapons activities and plans With regard to future Sino-American exchanges and dialogue, one might ask what precisely are the catalysts or red lines that China seems to be suggesting will compel it to initiate the acquisition and deployment of space-based systems including antisatellite weapons. This issue is significant because an effort to engage China in a dialogue on space weapons would be futile and even naïve if the decision has already has been made by Chinese leaders because of their misperceptions of existing US policies and programs.

7. China’s Proposed Space Weapons Ban and Current US Missile Defenses In terms of understanding Chinese motives for a proposal in 2002 for a space weapons ban, that is, a decade after Chinese authors first recommended ASAT development, it is useful to keep in mind the relevant chronology. The American arms-control community has actively advocated a ban on space weapons systems since at least 1999, as can be seen in the appendix [Bibliography on Space Arms Control]. It seems possible therefore that China’s proposal in Geneva in 2002 may have been stimulated by three or more years of observing US arms-control community proposals for space weapons bans.

If this hypothesis is correct, it helps to explain why China permitted the publication of three rather provocative books in 2001, 2002, and 2005 by military officers’ with their proposals for covert deployment of antisatellite weapons directed at US assets. The publication of these books and other explicit recommendations advocating future antisatellite programs may have been authorized as part of a larger design to influence the US policy debate in the Congress and the media. One goal would be to oppose the extensive proposal by Senator Sam Nunn for a national missile defense system of 100 interceptors. If China essentially is threatening to deploy a robust ASAT system in the decade or two ahead, it makes a powerful case against even the current modest 20 interceptor system of in the present program.

8. Space-related Export Controls and Further Restrictions on Deemed Exports There are substantial export control issues involved in any US decision to oppose or impede China’s potential acquisition of antisatellite systems. We might ask whether more restrictive technology transfers on China could head off Chinese development of some or all of the antisatellite systems listed in the proposals identified in open sources. For example, nanotechnology laminated surfaces, miniature rocket motors; quick launch space vehicle propulsion, and directed energy technology (especially advance performance lasers), precision space guidance systems, and various bilateral technology exchanges such as the current program of the National Science Foundation for cooperation in remote sensing will become areas to examine for additional technology transfer restrictions. It would be a major project to identify and design new export controls on US technologies related to anti- satellite weapons acquisition and deployment.

9. PACOM and STRATCOM Role in Educating the PLA on Consequences of China’s Use of ASAT The US Department of Defense has extensive exchange programs in its “theater engagement plans” and may wish to play a greater role in deterring Chinese development of space weapons. Both Strategic Command and Pacific Command may wish to consider in their discussions on track one and track 1.5 whether to include information about the consequences of an attack on US military satellites in a crisis as part of their routine presentations on US defense policy and strategy to the Chinese.

10. China’s Friends May Still Dismiss Chinese ASAT Ambitions For Lack of Evidence It is difficult to rely on Chinese open source literature as the sole source for a persuasive strategic warning that vulnerable US military command, communications and sensitive national intelligence systems may all be in jeopardy in the decade ahead.

If we know little about how space warfare may unfold because it has never happened, is it wise to dismiss the probative value of Chinese open source recommendations on the grounds that no one has yet seen China start to manufacture, test, exercise, and write doctrine for real space weapons? It would seem that open source materials containing recommendations for future ASAT concepts deserve more attention than to be completely dismissed, just as they cannot be considered to be completely definitive.

At a minimum, these writings suggest the need for a more assertive US engagement effort with the authors and their organizations. At a maximum, these writings suggest a major misperception by at least the authors and possible the Chinese leadership that US efforts to “weaponize space” are decades away, if the US Congress ever permits such efforts at all.

¹ Hong Kong AFP January 19, 2007 ² For a Unclassified list of countermeasures, see “Space Systems Survivability,.” Uri Ra’anan and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, eds., International Security Dimensions of Space, Hamden CT, Archon Books, 1984, pp 87-93.

Part 1. Overview: Introduction

PART 1. OVERVIEW

Introduction The US China Commission requested this survey of open source literature from the period 2003 through 2006 to identify internally generated Chinese perceptions, polices and proposals for possible programs related to antisatellite weapons and space warfare. The focus of this survey is the identification of specific internal Chinese proposals or recommendations regarding exploitation of US military vulnerabilities in space. The survey can be considered exhaustive and drew from all Chinese language material including Chinese professional military or aerospace technical journals and texts available through open source. Source books and articles were selected for attention in this survey if the source could be considered “mainstream” in development of Chinese policy and doctrine, and if they explicitly recommend that China should pursue one or more specific options or programs.

Electronic searches of Chinese bibliographies by using terms like antisatellite weapon or space weapons generated hundreds of other “hits”, but most of these items were purely descriptive of US and Russian programs and did not contain specific recommendations for future courses of action by China. Some common elements appear in several of the sourceworks cited here, indicating that these proposals and recommendations are representative of a consistent thread of policy development within China. Given the exhaustive scope of this survey, it is probably also a valid assumption that the authors cited here are principals in the discussions related to space warfare doctrine and development and are the primary proponents of the aggressive approaches which they advocate.

Twenty articles and three books published during the target period were selected as significant. From these books and articles, thirty specific recommendations for strategies or specific Chinese space weapons to employ against US vulnerabilities were identified and translated. Brief summaries of the thirty recommendations are provided below. Each is dealt with in detail in Part 2. The following conclusions may be made from this report:

• While China has publicly assumed a leadership position in international activities to ban space weapons, there is an active group within China not only advocating the weaponization of space but also putting forth specific proposals for implementation of a Chinese space based weapons program. • The individuals authoring the source works cited herein represent the Chinese space war “hawk” group and may constitute the bulk of it, although the extent to which these proposals are being accepted sympathetically is not known. • The recommendations cited in this report are courses of action being proposed publicly within China. Common threads of logic and approach, shared assumptions, use of similar expressions in key areas, and the scope of the work represented are indications of collusion among these individuals and possibly of organization. • There may be covert activity in the development of space weaponry and space warfare plans which is not represented in open source literature, in fact the literature suggests that this might be so. • Chinese development and deployment of systems and doctrines for space warfare may be partially in response to a perceived US threat, but US resistance to weaponization of space seems irrelevant in the articles cited. • Chinese attitudes toward weaponization of space have been widely studied by the US, and several models have been proposed, based at least partially on consideration of some of the documents cited in this report. Other than common source material, these models share little and are even contradictory. • There is an immediate opportunity for diplomatic action to forestall an inappropriate Chinese response to a perceived US threat and to engage elements of the Chinese policy forming community in productive and mutually beneficial confrontation. • There are profound military preparedness implications associated with Chinese public advocacy of pre-emptive or deterrent attacks on specific US targets, both military and civilian, both independently and in support of theater combat operations.

This open source literature survey found no assertion that China currently possesses any type of ASAT weapons, or that the government of China has ordered the production of any such weapons. However, an unattributed interview in October 2006 at the Zhuhai air show that appeared in a Chinese owned newspaper bluntly stated China has such weapons now. This unusual article may be examined in the Documentary Appendix of this survey.

The books and journals selected in this survey support what earlier US authors have already concluded – that China is, at a minimum, interested in conceptual research on how to assess US vulnerabilities in space and how to destroy US satellites, but that China today possesses no such systems.

China has assumed a leadership position in proposing bans of spaced based weapons, so advocacy of future space based weapons systems by Chinese authors may be seen as a contradiction. While the likelihood of Chinese hypocrisy, deception, or merely lack of uniform policy implementation must be considered, an aggressive analysis of US space vulnerabilities and possibly even covert systems development by the Chinese may be considered consistent with a Chinese view that the weaponization of space by the US is inevitable, requiring a counterstrategy. The Documentary Appendix contains the full text of an unusually insightful article in a Hong Kong journal close to the PLA that explains this apparent contradiction in Chinese space policy. In 2002 China proposed a draft treaty to ban space weapons, but the US dismissed it as insufficient and unnecessary. The Hong Kong journal suggested that China will indeed have to develop and deploy space weapons to be ready as soon as [but apparently not before] the US proceeds with its own space weapons. The most recent US official position opposing the Chinese proposal is the August 2006 national space policy, and a more detailed speech by Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph December 12, 2006 that rejects the kind of agreement China proposed. [Joseph’s speech is in the Documentary Appendix.] China has begun to characterize space testing by the US of some non-weapon systems as “space weapons,” perhaps implying that China considers that the US has already crossed the line of the “inevitable” weaponization of space.

The US China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2006 report proposed a dialogue with China on space issues. The Report not only suggested that China may be developing the means to attack US space satellites, but also discussed a wide range of economic security issues including exports, jobs, and technology controls related to the US aerospace industry. The US media has been covering many of the economic security issues involved, such as the declining competitiveness of the US aerospace industry and whether hi tech export controls should be relaxed to permit NASA to cooperate with China in space exploration.

The China Commission recommended that “Congress direct the Administration to engage in a strategic dialogue with China on the importance of space surveillance, the military use of space, and space weapons. Such a dialogue should include strategic warning and verification measures.” The Commission report also stated “China’s military space doctrine is opaque, but some experts believe [emphasis added] that among the goals for the PLA’s space program is obtaining space-related information dominance and the ability to disable its opponents’ space assets in order to disrupt their space-based information and navigation systems in the event of conflict…. With regard to the second space objective, there is evidence suggesting that China ‘‘is developing the capacity to deny … [the use of space] to others … [and has] at least one ground-based laser anti-satellite research and development program underway[emphasis added].”

Summary of Chinese Recommendations on Space Weaponization (List 1-30)

This study will present Chinese proposals published in the last few years to attack US space satellites and to use space weapons to defeat US military forces. When considering these Chinese concepts of future space warfare, it is important to appreciate that the Chinese state their civilian space program and their civilian economy will be the foundation for space warfare. This linkage between civilian and military space development programs places the issue in the context of economic security as well as military security. In 2001, Congress created a 12 member Commission which recommended attention to aerospace, but a GAO study in 2006 reported limited progress. There is a major workforce crisis in the aerospace industry.³ Over 600,000 scientific and technical aerospace jobs have been lost since 1998, and these losses, coupled with pending retirements, represent a loss of skill, experience, and intellectual capital to the industry. The positive impact of the aerospace industry on the U.S. economy is significant, with the industry estimating $170billioninsalesandapproximately625,000peopleemployedin2005.TheimportanceofthisindustrytotheU.S.economywillcontinuetogrowinthefuture.TheU.S.aerospaceindustryconsistentlyshowsaforeigntradesurplus—reaching$31 billion in 2004. Aerospace exports constituted 6.9 percent of the total value of U.S.-exported merchandise in 2004. It provides the foundation for US military space activities. The federal government is involved in many aspects of aerospace, such as national security, space exploration, and related R&D. NASA and Defense are major federal agencies most significantly involved in aerospace activities. Trends in aerospace R&D are described in an appendix 6.

All of the recommendations cited here are oriented to the future, some as far ahead as 2025, and thus are consistent with the putative position that China will never be the first to weaponize space. Chinese authors appear generally to assume that the US, on the other hand, is intent on weaponizing space. Interestingly, these authors universally fail to acknowledge the consistenetly successful struggle of the arms control-minded members of the US Congress to block funding for space weapons during the past decade or more.

If the recommendation of the USCC for a strategic dialogue with China on space is accepted by Congress and the President, such a dialogue may be profitably supplemented with an exchange program that would include the authors of these thirty proposals to encourage them to modify their perceptions of that the US intends to deploy space weapons. The documentary appendix to this report contains two articles with interviews of the US Air Force that make clear space weapons are at least two decades away from deployment, even in the unlikely event that the US Congress permits funding. The US may be placed in an awkward position if China procedes with an aggressive policy toward space weaponization while the US remains passive. Equally undesirable may be an expensive and counterproductive space weapons race. Open dialogue, active understanding of respective positions and progress toward treaty based bans on specific verifiable space related activities may be the most expedient course.

The summary below provides each of the thirty numbered recommendations in direct quotation. Key words of each proposal are placed in boldface type for clarity. Part 2 provides longer exerpts and details. Appendices provide details on source documents, a larger bibliography on Chinese space related literature, listings of comparable non-Chinese sources of weaponization of space, and related non-Chinese articles.

Summary of Chinese Recommendations on Space Weaponization:

1. Basic space combat capability
2. Destroy or temporarily incapacitate all enemy space vehicles above our territory
3. Civil-use technology that can also be used in military applications
4. Land-based anti-satellite weapons and anti-satellite satellites
5. A space experimental unit and a national research and command center
6. Counter United States’ missile defense systems
7. “Assassin’s mace” weapons (shashoujian) with space attack capability
8. Construction should be carried out secretly
9. “Assassin’s mace” space weapons
10. Develop space for combat support
11. Maintain our good international image [by covert development]
12. Space strike weapons concealed and launched only in crisis
13. Missiles [which] require less launch preparation time
14. Emergency/crisis launch units
15. Formulation of precise emergency/crisis launch plans
16. Surprise attacks in space [and] on information sources, command and control centers, communication hubs, including use of ground troops
17. Sea-based anti-satellite platform
18. Submarine launched Chinese ASATs
19. Attack GPS with anti-satellite satellites
20. Attack GPS with high energy laser weapons
21. Attack GPS with high altitude weather monitoring rockets
22. attack [GPS ground] stations using missles or troops
23. Orbital ballistic missiles
24. Plasma Attack against Low-Orbit Spy Satellites
25. Stealth satellites
26. Reconnaissance systems that resist jamming
27. Jamming [to] disable US command and control in wartime
28. Kinetic Kill Vehicles
29. Satellite Attacks on Earth Targets
30. Directed Energy or beam weapons

³ Source: GAO Report to the Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, “U.S. Aerospace Industry Progress in Implementing Aerospace Commission Recommendations, and Remaining Challenges” September 2006, GAO-06-920.

Part 1. Overview: Summaries of Three NDU Books & Articles

NDU Book 2001 - Space War Colonel Li Daguang in his book Space War published by NDU in 2001 makes at least 8 proposals, which are echoed to some extent in two other NDU Press books by Colonel Yuan and Colonel Jia which each offer an additional 3 recommendations on future space weapons.

1. “The planning of space weapons development can be divided into two stages with the first stage covering from now until 2010. In the first stage we must strive to make our space weapon systems possess support and safeguard capabilities as well as basic space combat capability….They should also have a certain combat capability in space, particularly in regards to defensive capability.”

2. “In the second stage, we should build on the foundation of the first stage by further improving our offensive and defensive capability of space weapon systems. In particular, the offense capability in space should, if necessary, be capable of destroying or temporarily incapacitating all enemy space vehicles that fly in space above our sovereign territory.”

3. “We should combine military and civilian technology and integrate peacetime and wartime facilities. Space equipment is costly to develop and maintain, so it is important to have civil-use technology that can also be used in military applications.”

4. “In the near term, the key developments should be anti-satellites weapons including land-based anti-satellite weapons and anti-satellite satellites.”

5. “A space experimental unit and a national research and command center must be established.”

6. “When needed, this experimental center could be turned into a military space operational command center or the highest command headquarters. Specifically, these organizations should focus on countering the United States’ missile defense systems as well as countermeasures related to the integration of Taiwan into these systems.”

7. “In addition, to meet the requirements of defeating the United States in a war over Taiwan; the PLA should have “assassin’s mace” weapons (shashoujian) with space attack capability.”

8. “Considering certain constraints from the international society, the construction of such a unit [for space weapons experiments] should be carried out secretly by keeping a low profile.”

NDU Book 2002 - On Space Operations Colonel Jia Junming echoes many themes found in Li Daguang’s earlier book Space War. Space War and Space Operations are in turn consistent with the bolder proposals in the third book, Integrated Space Campaigns.

9. Jia advocates space weapons for China, calling them “assassin’s maces.”

10. Jia recommends a two phased approach: “For our country, in phase one, 2000-2015, we must develop space for combat support. In phase two, 2015 to 2030, then develop “limited space deterrence and “assassin’s mace” space weapons.”

11. Covertness – “[Our future space weapons program] should be low profile and ‘intense internally but relaxed in external appearance [nei jin wai song]” to maintain our good international image and position “

NDU Book 2005 - Joint Space War Campaigns 12. Colonel Yuan Zelu, proposes an orbiting network of space strike weapons which will be concealed and launched only in a crisis or “emergency’ in order to deter the US with limited attacks on US space assets in order to “bring the opponent to his knees” and to deter US actions. Yuan writes “Space-based attack networks are made up of the network systems of the various strike platforms that are in orbit. International space law prohibits this kind of weaponry deployment and even though space-based directed energy weapons and space-based kinetic energy weapons and other space-based weapons are successfully going through research and development, they still cannot be rapidly deployed in orbit. “

13.. “For these reasons, emergency/crisis launchers to organize the network will become the necessary option for constructing a space-based strike network in wartime. First, one must research, develop, and test equipment for new types of astronautic carrier vehicles… and require less launch preparation time in order to greatly reduce launch preparation times and increase the rapid reaction capabilities of space launch units and flight units.

14. Second, emergency/crisis launch units must be set up.

15. Third, complete war preparation [warning] systems should be established… to guarantee that on the day that it receives launch orders it will immediately be able to launch space-based fire platforms into orbit and complete its networking tasks in the shortest amount of time. Fourth, scientific and precise emergency/crisis launch plans must be formulated.”

16. Surprise attacks in space for huge psychological impact on the opponent’s policymakers.” In future military struggles, space shock and awe strikes will occur when other means of space deterrence have proven ineffective and will be the final step made in order to achieve the goal of deterrence. If a space shock and awe strike is still ineffective, then it means that space deterrence activities should be wholly abandoned. For these reasons, the execution of space shock and awe strikes must involve the prudent use of troops, thorough command, and strict control in order for them to bring an opponent to its knees through a combination of deterrence and combat.

Therefore, when space army commanders are organizing and commanding space shock and awe strike activities, they should focus on mastering the following four points: First, the painstaking selection of strike objectives. The goal of a space shock and awe strike is still to deter the enemy, not to provoke the enemy into combat. For this reason, the objectives selected for strike must be few and precise. Points of support and key points within an enemy’s operational system of organization should be selected. For example, strikes should be carried out on important information sources, command and control centers, communication hubs, and other objectives. This will shake the structure of the opponent’s operational system of organization and will create a huge psychological impact on the opponent’s policymakers.”

Exerpts from Journals and Articles 17. Professor Liu Huanyu of the Dalian Naval Academy: advocates “Sea-Based Anti-Satellite Platforms” “China is in urgent need of new effective defense forces. Constrained by its national resources, the broad goals of economic development, and the international environment in the area, it is impossible and unnecessary for China to develop large scale aircraft carriers…..What China needs now is an effective capability to intervene on the ocean, which means a new sea power. The sea-based anti-satellite platform is a major component of the new sea power and must be given a high priority. If this new avenue is explored as soon as possible, China can hopefully improve its sea power dramatically within 10 years

18. Liu recommends that submarine launched Chinese ASATs may be superior to surface ships.

Chen Xuejun and Lang Daqiang in their “Methods for Defeating GPS”ask “So what is the Achilles heel of GPS? And reply “An analysis of the working principles of GPS reveals three major weaknesses.

19. Attack GPS with anti-satellite satellites – several options.

20. Attack GPS with high energy laser weapons – several options.

21. Attack GPS with high altitude weather monitoring rocket – the space pellets option.

22. A GPS system cannot position or navigate without a ground control system. Once the ground control is damaged, it would no longer be able to accurately guide or navigate long range weapons. Therefore, submarine launched missiles or long range weapons can be used to attack these [GPS ground] stations, or the Special Forces may be trained to effectively infiltrate and destroy the stations.

23. Zhao Ruian advocates orbital ballistic missiles, “a new-concept strategic ballistic missile is a multi-task, multi-role attack weapon capable of implementing random orbit transfer from earth orbits and can serve the function of an intercontinental ballistic missile, an anti-satellite weapon, and an orbital bomber weapon. For China’s national security, it is undoubtedly important to study the development status of space weapons in the world and to investigate the ideas and related technologies of orbital ballistic missiles.”

24. Plasma Attack against Low-Orbit Spy Satellites is Feasible [2005]⁴ This article addresses “the effectiveness of using plasma to disrupt low-orbit reconnaissance satellite operations and proposes a scheme for using plasma against satellites. Analysis of satellite charging and discharging effects and mechanisms in a plasma environment indicates that plasma damages low-orbit satellites

25. “There is a great deal of work to do to develop a stealth satellite. In this paper, the optical signatures of a satellite and its stealth related issues were preliminarily explored. A number of schemes were proposed. The rationality and feasibility of these schemes need to be jointly investigated with relevant experts.”⁵

26. Space Electronic Jamming [2006].”Reconnaissance systems must also be able to counter jamming and release effective jamming. Otherwise, the space-based reconnaissance system does not possess survivability in a modern warfare environment. “

27 Six Studies on Jamming US Classified Data Links [JTIDS] suggest a clear focus on disabling US command and control in wartime. Authors are from Electronic Warfare Institute, Xian Electronic Science and Technology University, Xian, the School of Telecommunication Engineering, Xian University, Department of Electronics and Information Engineering, HUST, the Electronic Engineering Institute of the PLA (Hefei),

28. Ten Studies of how to develop Kinetic Kill Vehicles by technical authors from the School of Automation, Beijing University of Aviation and Aerospace; Harbin Institute of Technology; Second Research Academy of China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation [CASIC] Academy of Equipment Command & Technology, Beijing Aerospace Automatic Control Institute, and the Northeastern Polytechnic University, College of Astronautics.

29. Satellite Attacks on Earth Targets [2005]. The greatest advantage of a space-based ground attack weapon system is its high speed and short reentry time. It is extremely difficult for the enemy to intercept such a weapon. It requires a more powerful high performance computer on board. In order to minimize the initial error, it is preferable to launch the war capsule at a larger angle of reentry. The guidance algorithm will produce a better effect and the point of impact will be more accurate.

30. Research on Beam Weapons Proposals. Since at least 1995, more than 20 authors have detailed their research on Directed Energy or beam weapons as part of a larger class of weapons known to the Chinese as “new concept weapons” (xin gainian wuqi), which include high power lasers, high power microwaves, railguns, and particle beam weapons. Most authors are affiliated with five institutes: Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (lasers; adaptive optics); Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (adaptive optics); Institute of Optoelectronics (adaptive optics); Dalian Institute of Chemistry and Physics (lasers); China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) and the Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy) which has developed and tested China’s nuclear warheads.

⁴ Author is an assistant professor at the College of Astronautics, Northwestern Polytechnic University, and holds a Doctorate in plasma applications. ⁵ Li Yubo,(Institute of Electronic Engineering, Hefei, Anhui 230037, ChinaLi Yubo is a lecturer at the Institute of Electronic Engineering, engaged in research on computer and optoelectronic detection.

Part 1. Overview: Current US Views on China’s ASAT Policy

CURRENT US VIEWS ON CHINA’S ASAT POLICY

A wide range of views exists among US scholars about China’s possible intentions and capabilities with respect to space weapons and ASATs, which is understandable in light of the limited evidence available from open sources. This survey of Chinese open sources and the identification of thirty recommendations may assist in resolving some of these differences, but only much greater Chinese transparency would resolve them all.

One point on which everyone appears to agree is that the US military is extremely vulnerable in space and should develop plans for defense of its space assets.⁶ Everyone appears to disagree on the precise goals, pace, current capabilities and relationship between Chinese arms control proposals and their publicly stated R&D programs. Most agree that the US is highly vulnerable for over a decade. In 1996, Gen Thomas S. Moorman, USAF, former Vice CSAF and commander, Air Force Space Command, stated, “Desert Storm … was a watershed event in military space applications because for the first time, space systems were both integral to the conflict and critical to the outcome of the war.⁷

1. An early study by Mark Stokes in 1999 concluded that the open source literature “does not provide any clear indication that the Central Military Commission has directed the defense industrial complex to move toward ASAT testing or production stages. Technical writings do, however, clearly point to conceptual assessments on various ASAT systems and related technologies.”

No author has challenged Stokes’ conclusion, but there is a range of American opinions on closely related issues of China’s plans and capabilities to deploy space weapons.

2. According to Ioannis Koskinas, China recognizes U.S. dependence on space assets and is bolstering its counterspace capabilities. He cites the DOD’s 2004 report on Chinese military capabilities, stating “the PRC realizes that the US is so dependent on space and, thus, it remains interested in counterspace capabilities that can deny or degrade America’s ability to react to a PRC-Taiwan conflict.”⁸

3. Theresa Hitchens sees China reacting to the US in pursuing space weapons to counter American space dominance: “….[M]uch of China’s interest in space seems to stem directly from concerns about American military activities in space. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, China’s worries about protecting its space-based assets are due to concern about American development of missile defenses and future American global dominance as a result of American space power.”⁹

4. Yoshihara and Martel argue that China views space power as the key to economic modernization. “China’s obsession with national prestige, which forms the backdrop for its commercial and military interests, also animates the country’s space policy. The PRC government has long boasted about its status as one of the few major space-faring nations.”¹⁰

5. Robert Antonellis and William Murray conclude China’s space program is driven by a desire for national prestige: “Beijing views U.S. military power in the Pacific as an impediment to China’s aspiration of becoming the dominant regional power. Beijing is modernizing and expanding China’s military capabilities not only to keep an increasingly independent Taiwan in line, but also to effectively deny the U.S. military the ability to operate against China or its interests in Asia. Chinese military planners have realized that area denial operations require the conduct of space-based surveillance and the other dual-use benefits of space technology. The Dragon is eyeing the moon because the Dragon is also eyeing us.”¹¹

6. China could provide space services to adversaries of the U.S., according to David Thompson: “However, without global land, sea, or air capabilities, the military impact of China’s space programs is likely to be limited to defense of China’s homeland and support of regional activities undoubtedly pointed at Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, Tibet, and other areas of similar proximity and sensitivity to China. In a conflict, China also could assist nations allied against the US by providing launch support, ASAT activities, ISR data, and similar services.”¹²

David Thompson also suggests that China views space power as the key to counter U.S. strength: “For example, in 2000 the PRC Defense Minister said that space-power is viewed as the key to China’s planning to supplant the United States. PLA doctrine would deny the advantages of space to the US, seeking to leverage space for China’s own advantage.”¹³

7. Colonel Clayton Chun identifies the concern that China may be willing to sell its space technology to US adversaries: “China’s threat as a space power goes beyond its own capabilities. The Chinese export their technology, selling their ballistic missile assets and space launch capabilities.”¹⁴

8. According to Steven Lambakis, a 1994 U.S. Navy war game showed that China could devastate the US by attacking our space assets: “Some instruction on these points may be found in a simulated war against the People’s Republic of China conducted at the Naval War College in the spring of 1994. The war game, set in the year 2010, was a part of the Pentagon’s ongoing study of the revolution in military affairs. In the scenario, Beijing provokes the U.S. Navy into patrolling China’s shores, luring vulnerable aircraft carriers and other surface ships within range of precision-guided cruise missiles. The Chinese begin their ambush by attacking U.S. satellites, which confounds American targeting abilities and precludes any significant counter-offensive by the U.S. Navy. The Chinese also use space-based assets to enhance the effectiveness of their own forces. U.S. players in this war game were routed, their forces hit before they could throw up adequate defenses.”¹⁵

9. France and Adams believe that China is developing space power capabilities to counter U.S. conventional strength, not as a response to U.S. space weapons: “Contrary to the views of space sanctuary and space arms control advocates, fear of an emerging US capability to destroy Chinese satellites is not the primary catalyst behind Beijing’s counterspace moves. Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential US-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race. Two other motivations play a much greater role in cultivating China’s desire for counterspace weapons: to counter the space-enabled advantage of US conventional forces; and to guarantee the viability of Chinese nuclear forces in the face of emerging American missile defenses.”¹⁶

France and Adams assert that China already possesses both the intent and “growing capability” to threaten U.S. space assets: “China possesses both the intent and a growing capability to threaten US space systems in the event of a future clash between the two countries. The PLA’s development of ASAT weapons is primarily not a reaction to US space control initiatives. It is driven instead by very practical considerations of regional security and influence, and the desire to conduct asymmetric warfare against a superior foe if conflict arises. First, Beijing seeks to offset the dominance of US conventional forces by exploiting their dependence on space borne information assets. Second, China hopes to guarantee the viability of its nuclear deterrent by holding the critical space-segment of American missile defense systems at risk. Both of these goals are deeply rooted in the issue of Taiwanese reunification and the potential for armed conflict over the status of the island. China’s growing capability to attack American satellites could play an important role in a future military confrontation over Taiwan.”¹⁷

10. Many authors note that China appears to have enjoyed remarkable cooperation and technical assistance in its civil space program from Russia, France and Germany, but no one details its role in China’s progress.¹⁸ China’s own Space Activities Report in 2006 cites remarkable progress with many partners.

11. Kevin Pollpeter notes in a Rand Study that Chinese authors all state that the weaponization of space is “inevitable.” This is significant as a catalyst for China’s stated “defensive” interest in developing future space weapons. Pollpeter cites passages from Li Daguang’s Space War extensively.¹⁹

12. One of the strongest assertions is the study by Philip Saunders and colleagues in 2002. Their views are significant and well worth excerpting at length: “A number of analysts, including some in the U.S. defense and intelligence communities, believe that China has the technical capacity to rapidly develop effective counter-space capabilities. However, China’s technical ability to develop and deploy advanced space weapons such as ASATs is uncertain….China still lacks a number of capabilities that would be required for a viable ASAT program. …Although open source information clearly indicates Chinese interest and scientific research in ASAT weapons and technologies, the available evidence is insufficient to determine if China has an active program to develop and deploy ASAT weapons. …. Although the Chinese have a strong strategic motivation to pursue asymmetric programs such as ASAT weapons, serious questions remain about their technical capabilities and political will to undertake such a costly program. China has been extremely vocal in international fora with regards to the demilitarization of outer space and is a strong proponent of a multilateral treaty banning space weapons, indicating internal pressures may exist that could slow progress towards ASAT development and deployment. This seems to signal that Beijing, although interested for strategic reasons in counter-space and ASAT capabilities, is not keen to enter an expensive and potentially open-ended space race. Given China’s limited space capabilities and stated interest in preventing an arms race in outer space, Beijing’s ultimate commitment to developing ASAT weapons remains ambiguous.”

⁶ Gen. Lance Lord, Commander, Air Force Space Command, quoted in Louis Arane-Barradas, “Civilian Sector the Biggest Space Customer,” Academy Spirit, 24 February 2006. ⁷ AFDD 4, Space Operations Doctrine, 10 July 1996; George W. Bradley III, “A Brief History of the Air Force in Space,” High Frontier 2, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 7. ⁸ Ioannis Koskinas, “Space Warfare Foolosophy: Should the United States be the First Country to Weaponize Space?.” Air & Space Power Journal, January 2005. ⁹ Theresa Hitchens. “Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization.” Disarmament Forum. 2003, p. 18. ¹⁰ Yoshihara, Toshi and William C. Martel. ” Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race,” Washington Quarterly. Autumn 2003. ¹¹ Antonellis, Robert and William S. Murray. “China’s Space Program: The Dragon Eyes the Moon (and Us).” Orbis. Fall 2003, pp. 645-652. ¹² David J. Thompson, China in Space: Civilian and Military Developments. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, August 2001. ¹³ Ibid. ¹⁴ Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. ¹⁵ Steven Lambakis, “Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond,” Orbis, Summer 1995. ¹⁶ Martin E.B. France and Richard J. Adams. “The Chinese Threat to US Superiority.” High Frontier Journal, Winter 2005, p. 18. ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 21. ¹⁸ Andrey Kirillov, “China to Buy Russian Equipment for Manned Space Missions,” Itar-Tass, March 14, 1995; Les Echos, January 29, 1997; Zhongguo Hangtian, June 1996; Zhongguo Hangtian Bao, October 3, 1994. ¹⁹ Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002.

Part 1. Overview: Present Level of Development and Deployment of Chinese ASAT Capability

PRESENT LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF CHINESE ASAT CAPABILITY

One important question is whether there is a covert ASAT program today as part of a secret plan to develop space weapons. Such a program would not be revealed in this survey of open source material, and in fact the proposals translated in part 2 could be construed as “cover” for such a current program, or the authors are simply not aware of such a hypothetical current clandestine ASAT program. Three recent Chinese denials in 2006 merit our close attention.

China Denies Developing Anti-Satellite Laser [2006]

We quote in full an article by a reporter in the US, Zhong Xiang: “China Says South Pole Radar Station Only For Scientific Studies but US Military ‘Worried‘“²⁰

“China is attempting to set up a high frequency radar station at the South Pole Zhongshan Station, to be used to probe and research the space environment of the polar region. Yet this purely scientific project has attracted the “attention and concern” of the US military. A February 2 report in the US publication, World Tribune states experts within the US military worry this effort by China is to “sabotage US spy satellites.” In the article entitled “China Radar at South Pole Could Sabotage US Satellites,” the World Tribune gave a description which bordered on outright fabrication. According to the analysis of US security specialists, China’s establishing a high frequency radar station at the distant South Pole is for military aims. Because US reconnaissance satellites pass over South Pole air space several times, if the radar emits an anti-spy light beam, it could jam or sabotage them. Last year, the Defense Department’s report on China’s military strength pointed out that China is presently researching and building an anti-satellite system (ASAT). Although China has officially stated its high frequency radar station will be used for the observation of the spatial environment of the South Pole, in the eyes of US military specialists China’s space plans are all connected with military applications. Responding to the censure of the United States, Chinese military experts say China’s establishing a high frequency radar station at the South Pole will be used for scientific research. Its power will be very low, and its influence on the ionosphere very small. Additionally, the United States, England, and South Africa all have similar radar installations at the South Pole. It is “preposterous in the extreme” to link China’s radar installation with the sabotage of US spy satellites and the so-called Chinese “anti-satellite plan.”

A second article denies the recent laser attack story:²¹ “The US military journal, Defense News, says in an article it published on its website the other day that China attempted to use high-energy laser to interfere with US satellites flying over China’s airspace and “blind” them. The fact is that China is pursuing the policy of using the space peacefully at a time when many other countries are scrambling for space supremacy; and that the United States’ exaggeration of China’s counter-satellite technology is only an attempt to seek an excuse to justify its development of space weapons.

“US Vilifies China for Using Laser To Blind US Satellites “In the article, “China Attempts To Blind US Satellites with Laser,” the author cited an anonymous source as saying that over the past several years China tried to use high-energy land-based laser many times to test the ways to blind US satellites whenever they flew over China’s airspace. The article adds that it was unclear how many times China has conducted these tests and whether the tests were successful.

“The fact is that the information about China using laser to blind US satellites is entirely a conjecture. Because of China’s policy of using the space peacefully, China is against militarization of the space. Besides, striking satellites with laser is a high-tech undertaking that requires enormous investments. Moreover, attacking another country’s satellites certainly will trigger international disputes. Thus, there are many factors — policy, capital, technology and diplomatic — that constrain China’s development of this capability. The truthfulness of the information is therefore questionable. However, when we look at the situation of the United States, its dedication to seizing space supremacy and extending the battleground to the space is an indisputable fact. According to the latest databank of satellites that the US “Union of Concerned Scientists” has made public, the United States has 413 of the 811 assorted satellites now circling the earth — or over half of all the satellites. In addition to launching satellites from time to time, the United States has also been studying the development of anti-satellite weapons. In recent years it has come up with the policies and the budgets for building a “military sky force,” regarding satellite offense and defense as vital capabilities that US armed forces must possess in the future. ….

“Countries Are Scrambling for Developing AntiSatellite Weapons “Many countries in the world are now developing their anti-satellite weapons. The “Transformation Flight Plans” [zhuan xing fei xing ji hua] that the US Armed Forces made public in January 2005 listed all the key projects for future space weapons, such as land-based laser anti-satellite weapons, air-launched anti-satellite missiles, and air-based directed energy weapons. Russia is also not far behind. It has developed the concept of anti-satellite weapons long time ago and has been hard at work in studying the development of new conceptual weapons.

“All these anti-satellite weapons are still at the research/development and testing stage. These weapons have yet to be deployed in the space. However, as we can observe from the trend in the United States, the Bush Administration is ready to promulgate a new national space policy to pave the legal way for deploying weapons in the space. Once the United States begins to follow this path, militarization of the space will be inevitable. By that time mankind’s dream of using the space peacefully will be shattered and the space will inevitably become another killing field of mankind [Emphasis added]. ”

²⁰ Beijing Xinhua Wang WWW-Text in Chinese 07 Feb 06. ²¹ Zhang Mingqi: “Tactics for Handling Satellites,” Beijing Huanqiu Shibao 28 Sep 2006 p 8.

Part 2. Thirty Chinese Recommendations for Space Weapons: NDU Books 1, 2, and 3

PART 2. THIRTY CHINESE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPACE WEAPONS

Covert Space Weapons

• NDU Book 1 on Space War – Covert Space Weapons [2001] Space Warfare is written by a professor at the PLA’s NDU who received a bachelor’s degree in engineering from the PLA Zhengzhou Mapping Institute in 1983 and a master’s degree in strategic studies from NDU in 1998. He teaches courses on military technology and equipment. Colonel Li appears to call on the Air Force not the Second Artillery to take the lead in space warfare.

“Since its establishment 50 years ago, our Air Force has gained tremendous achievement in its modernization process. However, our Air Force modernization drive and development lags behind the world military trend. It is important to acknowledge this. We need to establish in the Air Force the notion of controlling air and space.”²²

Meeting the challenges of space warfare requires the development of new technology. The author continues: “Based on the needs of national security and our nation’s space development, the planning of space weapons development can be divided into two stages with the first stage covering from now until 2010. In the first stage we must strive to make our space weapon systems possess support and safeguard capabilities as well as basic space combat capability. In addition, they can complement our operations on the ground, sea and air and at the same time provide effective surveillance, monitoring, early warning, communications, navigation, and positioning support to our combat units. They should also have a certain combat capability in space, particularly in regards to defensive capability.” [p. 415]

Colonel Li advocates that China should wait until the second stage [2010-2025] for the really important preparations: “In the second stage, we should build on the foundation of the first stage by further improving our offensive and defensive capability of space weapon systems. In particular, the offense capability in space should, if necessary, be capable of destroying or temporarily incapacitating all enemy space vehicles that fly in space above our sovereign territory.” [p 415]

The author then gives a five-step plan for developing the nation’s space warfare ability, one key part on which depends on obtaining foreign cooperation. “Fifth, combine military and civilian technology and integrate peacetime and wartime facilities. As space equipment is costly to develop and maintain, it is important to have civil-use technology that can also be used in military applications. The dual use nature of space technology allows space development to adapt to the military-civilian compatible model of development. Therefore, the development of space technology must serve military missions as well as national economic development.

Colonel Li Recommends an Experimental Space Force Unit “In addition to technology development, the PLA must change its internal structure to better meet the challenges of space warfare. A space testing unit and a national research and command center must be established. These will be the organizational and leading bodies of China’s future space operations that will be responsible for the uniform coordination of command and control of all forces related to the building of space forces. Its main mission should consist of three aspects.

First, to guide the strategy for developing space operations by planning and coordinating the development of space technology and to organize and guide the research and study of space warfare theories as well as top level design and system building.

Second, these organizations will lead and organize the development of space weapon systems. They will also study how to adapt current space technology to military applications and plan and coordinate the preparations for building a future space unit.

Third, they will be in charge of studying the military application of China’s current military space forces and its training and management, which includes the uniform management and maintenance of current space weapon systems. When needed this center could be turned into a military space operational command center or the highest command headquarters.

Specifically, these organizations should focus on countering the United States’ missile defense systems as well as countermeasures related to the integration of Taiwan into these systems.[Emphasis added.]

Assassin’s Mace In addition, to meet the requirements of defeating the United States in a war over Taiwan; the PLA is urged to possess weapons that can act as “assassins maces” (shashoujian) with space attack capability. Therefore, China must construct a small, yet elite space operational testing unit as soon as possible. The goal and purpose of forming this unit is to explore, assess and implement space warfare concepts and to accumulate experience to implement space deterrent and operational capabilities. This will also act as the foundation of a future space unit….”

Colonel Li writes that considering international opposition to the weaponization of space, the construction of a space force should be carried out covertly: “Military space force development and application is a complex project involving a multitude of units inside and outside the military that has a high degree of difficulty and a long development span with the necessity for a high degree of command and control as well as a high degree of sensitivity. Considering certain constraints from the international society, the construction of such a unit should be carried out secretly by keeping a low profile. We should also use our military’s current space equipment and institutions and avoid large-scale institutional change to maximize the effect by using the least investment.”

He continues: “We must understand the situation of our space force construction and focus on the possible space operational issues when resolving the Taiwan problem. Studying and developing operational models and campaign methods of real operational significance with a special focus on those that can effectively contain Air Force support for Taiwan by the United States. Judging from our country’s current space technology level and situation, we should focus on studying future space terrestrial”

Space Operations

• NDU Book 2 on Space Operations [2002] Colonel Jia Junming echoes many themes found in Li Daguang’s earlier book Space War. Space War and Space Operations²³ are in turn consistent with the bolder proposals in the third book, Integrated Space Campaigns. On page 140 of Space Operations, Colonel Jia advocates “limited” space weapons for “deterrence” and calls them “assassin’s maces.” For “our country,” he suggests that in phase one [2000-2015] China develop space for combat support and later in phase two [2015 to 2030] [p152] China should develop “limited space deterrence” assassin’s mace weapons.

His recommendations parallel those of Colonel Li on the need for a secret or “low profile” and “intense internally but relaxed externally” appearance [nei jin wai song]. [p153], which Colonel Jia explains is needed in order not to “excessively provoke other nations” and to maintain “China’s positive international image.”

Attacks to Deter

• NDU Book 3 on Space Warfare Campaigns – Attacks to Deter [2005] 1 – SHOCK AND AWE SPACE ATTACKS – [2005] Yuan Zelu, Space Warfare of the Joint Campaign, Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2005.²⁴

Constructing Space-Based Fire Networks “Space-based fire networks are made up of the network systems of the various strike platforms that are in orbit. International space law prohibits this kind of weaponry deployment and even though space-based directed energy weapons and space-based kinetic energy weapons and other space-based weapons are successfully going through research and development, they still cannot be rapidly deployed in orbit. Nor are space flight units ready to go into outer space before they are ready, in order to avoid exposing operational plans and consume operational strength. For these reasons, emergency astronautic launches to organize the network will become the necessitated option for constructing a space-based fire network in wartime. In order to rapidly construct a space-based fire network in a future joint campaign, one must accomplish the following four things.

First, one must research, develop, and test equipment for new types of astronautic carrier vehicles. The carrier rockets used today guarantee that the work will be extremely complex, that the launch preparation times will be several months in length, and that the needs of emergency astronautic launches will not be met. Consequently, research, development, and thorough equipment testing must ensure that carrier rockets, space shuttles, and other new types of aerospace craft are simpler and require less launch preparation time in order to greatly reduce launch preparation times and increase the rapid reaction capabilities of astronautic launch units and flight units.

Second, emergency/crisis launch and flight units must be set up. Space armies should set up emergency launch units and emergency flight units at a time that corresponds to the respective nation’s new space carrier research and production situation. These units will shoulder the emergency astronautic launch tasks in wartime and ensure that a nation is able to rapidly construct space-based fire networks that fit with the operational requirements of the joint campaign in space.

Third, complete war preparation systems should be established. Emergency astronautic launch units and flight units should establish a complete set of war preparation duty institutions and weaponry and equipment and operational material preparation systems in order to maintain a regulated percentage of personnel in place and a percentage of good equipment. Moreover, corresponding with orders and instructions from higher levels, this war preparation system should be placed at the ready in order to guarantee that on the day that it receives launch orders it will immediately be able to launch space-based fire platforms into orbit and complete its networking tasks in the shortest amount of time. [Emphasis added]

Fourth, scientific and precise emergency launch plans and schemes must be formulated. Space army command offices, in accordance with the number of space-based fire platforms and the delivery capabilities of the astronautic launch and flight units, should thoroughly consider the effects of an opponent’s space blockade and the weather conditions in the launch zone in order to formulate plans and schemes for multiple types of emergency astronautic launches. Moreover, adjustments must be made in a timely manner in accordance with the international political, diplomatic, and military struggle situations at the time of the war, so that the emergency astronautic launch activities proceed in a systematic manner, deliberately and not disorderly. This will guarantee that in the event of an opponent’s space blockade or strike, one is able to rapidly deliver space-based weapon platforms into a designated orbit and make up a fire network.

²² Pp 409-410 Li Daguang, Space Warfare, Beijing NDU Press, 2001. ²³ Jia Junming, On Space Operations, NDU Press, Beijing. 2003. ²⁴ Yuan Zelu, Space Warfare of the Joint Campaign, NDU Press, 2005.

Part 2. Thirty Chinese Recommendations for Space Weapons: Sea-Based ASAT, Submarines & Cruisers

ASAT from Ships and Submarines Professor Liu Huanyu of Dalian Naval Academy: “Sea-Based Anti-Satellite Platform”²⁵

“The development of military space system has enlarged the gap in sea power and posed a direct threat to sea power in the 21st century. In order for a country to intervene on the ocean, its sea power must be able to effectively suppress the function of the military space system. This paper proposes a sea-based platform to counter enemy satellites. To develop this new type of operation platform for striking the war fighting power of the enemy, this will be a historical opportunity for raising a nation’s sea power.

1. Anti-space warfare has become an important operation mission of a 21st century sea power What China needs now is an effective capability to intervene on the ocean, which means a new sea power. The sea-based anti-satellite platform is a major component of the new sea power and must be given a high priority. If this new avenue is explored as soon as possible, China can hopefully improve its sea power dramatically within 10 years.

2. The sea-based anti-satellite platform proposal

4.1 Overall requirements of sea-based anti-satellite platform The anti-satellite operation can be divided into the two levels of armed conflict and war. In a state of war there will be no constraints on the anti-missile system. In armed conflicts, the anti-satellite operation can be divided into low intensity and high intensity. Based on the maturity of anti-satellite missiles and their impact, there can be the following approaches:

(1) Low intensity armed conflicts Jamming and blinding interference of surveillance satellites (including imaging satellites, electronic surveillance satellites, and ocean reconnaissance satellites), communication satellites, and navigation satellites.

(2) High intensity armed conflicts Destructive attack of surveillance satellites in medium earth orbits and low earth orbits by directed energy weapons; command jamming and blinding of surveillance satellites, communication satellites, and early warning satellites in high orbits, and jamming of navigation and weather satellites.

Anti-satellite platforms can be divided into space-based platform and conventional platform (including land, sea, submarine, and air). The attack capability of space-based platforms is better but the cost is high, the payload is small, the platform is more vulnerable to jamming, and the adaptability is poor. Also, the deployment of space-based weapons platform is currently restricted by the rules for space arms race. The high level of operation makes space-based platforms only suitable for war. To disable the space military system of the enemy in an armed conflict, only the conventional platform can be used.

4.2 Anti-satellite nuclear submarine ….Nuclear submarines are not only well concealed but can sail for a long period of time. By deploying just a few anti-satellite nuclear submarines in the ocean, one can seriously threaten the entire military space system of the enemy. In addition to anti-satellite operations, these nuclear submarines can also be used for launching low orbit tactical micro-satellites to serve as powerful real time battlefield intelligence support. The main weakness of a submarine is that it is difficult to install detection systems on a submarine. Submarines have a weak capability for autonomous searching and therefore need the support of the national space monitoring system.

4.3 Anti-satellite cruisers Surface ships built for anti-satellite operations can adopt more effective stealth technology and serve as a useful anti-satellite platform.

The main advantage of large anti-satellite ships is their strong autonomous searching capability. The platform can be equipped with not only spatial detection radar but also large scale electro-optical detection systems. The operations of anti-satellite ships are more complete and can effectively carry out electronic jamming. Anti-satellite cruisers are therefore an indispensable support force for a sea power.

3. Anti-satellite weapons

3.1 Electronic interference jamming Electronic jamming of a satellite can be divided into hardware interference and command interference. Hardware jamming refers to electronic interference of passive and active surveillance equipment on electronic surveillance satellites that can lead to the disruption of the electronic surveillance function. Command jamming refers to the jamming of the remote control and remote sensing systems of the military satellites. The operation of a spacecraft cannot take place without various commands and signals, but the communication system of all military satellites are easily jammed by the uplink and downlink. Jamming can at least greatly impair the satellite’s performance. If the remote control command signal of the enemy satellite can be intercepted and decoded, then the remote control signal can be jammed so as to prevent the satellite from receiving ground command or to even alter the motion status of the satellite to make it deviate from the correct orbit, or to make it tumble and suffer permanent damage. Command interference is a cost-effective soft-kill weapon but the command signal of the enemy satellite must be intercepted and deciphered.

3.2 Anti-satellite directed energy weapons Anti-satellite directed energy weapons include laser weapons, radio frequency weapons, and particle beam weapons.

3.2.1 Laser weapons Anti-satellite laser weapons mainly employ two types of lasers: high energy laser and low energy laser. High energy lasers have a wavelength in the 1.06 to 10.6 μm range but mainly at 2.7 and 3.8 μm, and a continuous power of 1 to 10MW. A high energy laser can effectively destroy the electro-optical detectors, the optical system, the control surfaces, solar panels, and other structures of a satellite. When the laser intensity reaches or exceeds 300W/cm2, the surface of the optical glass of the satellite’s electro-optical detector will begin to melt and the optics will fail. Generally a ground-based anti-satellite satellite laser weapon has a range of 500 - 1000km. The average power of the laser weapon should be more than 1000kW.

Low energy lasers are used for interfering with and temporarily blinding the electro-optical detectors of a satellite. For example, the CCD image transducer has a saturation threshold of only (100+/-10)mW/cm2 for lasers at a wavelength of 1.06 μm. Low energy lasers can also interfere and blind the infrared detector on early warning satellites and the electro-optical transducers on electro-optical reconnaissance satellites. Tests in the United States showed that even lasers of only tens of watts or hundreds of watts can effectively interfere with military reconnaissance satellites.

The United States, Russia, and others have made considerable achievements in the development of laser anti-satellite weapons and are technically capable of attacking satellites in low earth orbits. The “mid infrared chemical advanced laser” (MIRACL) developed by the United States Army is the world’s first MW laser with a wavelength of 3.6 - 4.2 μm and a sustainable time as long as 3000 seconds. The system uses a SeaLite Beam Director (SLBD) and has a total weight of 12,712kg. In October 1997 the laser was successfully tested in an anti-satellite experiment conducted in the White sands missile range in New Mexico. The ground-based Russian lasers at Sary Shagan have also temporarily blinded some US satellites. These results have validated the effectiveness of anti-satellite laser weapons.

3.2.2 Radio frequency weapons Radio frequency weapons refer mainly to high power microwave (HPM) weapons capable of generating extremely narrow, highly directional beam of radio frequency waves in the 100MHz to 100GHz range. When ground-based or space-based high power microwave weapons are used to attack enemy satellites, the microwave energy may be coupled through the front port (antenna) to the interior of the target satellite. Microwaves of longer wavelength may also couple through the rear port (openings and crevices in the satellite structure) to its interior. The microwave will be absorbed by the electronics in the satellite and cause great damage and disruption. In the meantime, the high temperature, strong ionization, radiation, and sound waves generated by the high power microwave can all lead to general damage of the satellite.

3.3 Hard impact weapons

3.3.1 Anti-satellite missiles Anti-satellite weapons, based on their orbit, can be divided into two types: direct ascending and orbit sharing. The orbit sharing weapon is first deployed on the orbit of the target, then approaches the target at a low speed and destroys the target. Anti-satellite missiles were developed on the basis of anti-satellite missiles and could be launched on the ground, in the ocean, and from the air. The early anti-satellite weapons of the United States were mainly nuclear weapons. The U. S. military deployed the Thor ground-based anti-satellite missiles on Johnston Island in the Pacific from 1964 to 1975, but stopped the deployment because of high cost, limited effectiveness, large collateral damage, and constraints in usage. In the 1970s the United States began developing air-launched miniature vehicles (ALMV). The ALMV, also known as anti-satellite missile, was a two-stage missile with an automatic homing warhead. The kill mechanism was by high speed kinetic energy of the direct impact by the missile. Its operation altitude was below 1000km and the missile was released in the air from an F-15 fighter. The ALMV gained operating capability in the early 1990s but the project was terminated in March 1988 due to changes in the international situation and other technical and cost factors. The United States began developing kinetic energy anti-satellite (KE-ASAT) intercept missiles in the 1990s, aimed at ocean reconnaissance satellites of the former Soviet Union, with an interception altitude of 800 - 1000km. In August 1997, a prototype intercept missile locked onto the target in a simulation test.

3.3.2 Electromagnetic guns Electromagnetic guns (EMG), also known as pulsed energy electromagnetic gun, can be divided into three different types: the coil gun, the orbit gun, and the reconnect gun. The coil gun was the early model of EMG; the current emphasis is on the orbit gun. The newest direction in EMG is the reconnect gun, a contact less electromagnetic launcher capable of accelerating a projectile in multiple stages. The development of EMG has been included by the United States defense department as a high priority technology project. The 90mm electromagnetic orbit gun of the United States Air Force has launched a 6kg projectile with an initial velocity of 2km/s in a test. The EMG is expected to launch 30 to 60mm projectiles weighing 5kg at a muzzle velocity of 4 to 8 km/second (giving 30 - 60 MJ of muzzle kinetic energy). However, the EMG technology today has not reached a practical level and has problems for being too bulky, too heavy, and too inefficient. With the development of superconductivity, there may be some breakthroughs in EMG technology. When the velocity of a projectile from a ground-launcher reaches 6 - 10km/s, it will be capable of directly shooting down satellites in 300 - 1000km low earth orbits.

²⁵ Jianchuan Kexue Jishu, Feb 2004. Liu Huanyu of Dalian Naval Academy.

Part 2. Thirty Chinese Recommendations for Space Weapons: Defeating GPS & Orbital Ballistic Missiles

Attacking GPS Satellites and GPS Ground Stations

These recommendations are most surprising because the three authors show no concern about the vast economic catastrophe that destroying the GPS system would bring to the world. Rather, GPS appears to be merely a US military system. Chen Xuejun, Lang Daqiang: “Methods for Defeating GPS”²⁶ first ask: “So what is the Achilles heel of GPS? An analysis of the working principles of GPS reveals three major weaknesses.

Defeating GPS at its Source: Exploiting the Weakness of the Low Orbit of Navigation Satellites The navigation satellites of the GPS system consist of 24 low orbit small satellites, distributed on 6 nearly circular orbits with an inclination angle of 55 degrees. Each orbit has 4 satellites with an average altitude of only 16,000 kilometers, roughly equivalent to one half of that of a geosynchronous satellite. This low altitude provides an opportunity to locate, jam or destroy these navigation satellites. Off the shelf telescopes, sensors, and software, including computer controlled telescopes, can all observe these satellites. Amateur astronomers can follow and photograph GPS satellites. There are many ways to attack these satellites, with the following three most representative ones:

(1) Attack with anti-satellite satellites There are two ways to attack with an anti-satellite satellite. One is by suicide attack. In a suicide attack, an anti-satellite satellite carries conventional explosive and approaches the navigation satellite. When it is near the GPS satellite, it is exploded either by remote control from the ground or by itself and takes the GPS satellite with it. The other method is to use the satellite as a weapon platform and install missile launchers or rapid firing guns on it. When the GPS satellite is within the range of the weapons on board, shots are fired to destroy the GPS satellite. The United States military estimates that more than one half of the anti-satellite tests conducted by the former Soviet Union had succeeded.

(2) Attack with high energy laser weapons High energy laser weapons can be space based or ground based. Space based high energy laser weapons have the best attack results. Laser weapons attack the GPS satellites by burning and destroying the target. Space based platforms can usually be deployed at an altitude of 1000 kilometer or more in order to reduce atmospheric attenuation of the laser beam and to ensure that the lasers have sufficient energy. Using laser weapons, the navigation satellites can be destroyed by burning from the front, the side, or the back.

(3) Attack with high altitude weather monitoring rocket An ordinary inexpensive weather monitoring rocket may carry a bomb containing a large amount of small lead shots into a designated orbit. Once exploded, the small lead shots will fly out with a relative velocity of 6.4 kilometers per second and destroy any satellite they encounter. When a few kilograms of gravel are thrown into orbit, they will attack the satellites like meteor showers and incapacitate the expensive GPS constellation.

Defeating GPS in the Middle: Exploiting the Scattered and Exposed Ground Stations A GPS system cannot position or navigate without a ground control system. Once the ground control is damaged, it would no longer be able to accurately guide or navigate long range weapons. The ground control of a GPS system consists of a main control station (located in Colorado in the United States), three feeder stations (Kwajalein in the Pacific Ocean, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and Ascension Island in the Atlantic Ocean) and five monitoring stations (Hawaiian Islands plus the four locations mentioned above). The monitoring stations are unmanned and are responsible for acquiring the satellite observation data and transfer them to the main control… Since they are widely scattered, the normal operation will be disrupted if any one part of the entire system is attacked. Therefore, submarine launched missiles or long range weapons can be used to attack these stations, or the special forces may be trained to effectively infiltrate and destroy the stations.

Defeating GPS at the End: Exploiting the Fact that Navigation Signals Are Highly Attenuated GPS subscribers achieve their positioning and navigation by relying on the wireless radio waves and navigation messages from the satellite to the orbit. Radio waves can easily be jammed; atmospheric and solar spot activities can interfere with the normal transmission. The transmitting power is usually only a few tens of watts…By covering up the encoding information transmitted by the satellite, the precision weapons guided by the GPS will lose its accuracy and miss the target. It is simple and inexpensive to build a jammer.”²⁷

Orbital Missiles to Attack Earth Targets

Author Zhao Ruian has not been identified, but his article merits lengthy quoting because of his mastery of the details of space weapons and his recommendations in “The Concept of Orbital Ballistic Missile”²⁸

“Orbital ballistic missile (orbital missile) is a new-concept strategic ballistic missile is a multi-task, multi-role attack weapon capable of implementing random orbit transfer from earth orbits and can serve the function of an intercontinental ballistic missile, an anti-satellite weapon, and an orbital bomber weapon. This new-concept strategic missile is no longer a ballistic missile in the original sense, but is a cross between a ballistic missile and a satellite; it is a ballistic missile in a satellite orbit or a satellite with weapons capability….The concept of orbital ballistic missile bears resemblance to the idea of the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) proposed by the Air Armament Center of the Eglin Air Force Base in the United States. The idea is for an orbital system under attack to launch a number of CAVs into slow Earth orbits and, when necessary, make them deviate from their orbits. Through guidance, navigation, and aerodynamic control in the atmosphere, the CAVs can release their warheads from certain geometric locations.

For China’s national security, it is undoubtedly important to study the development status of space weapons in the world and to investigate the ideas and related technologies of orbital ballistic missiles.”

In the development of strategic missiles, our thinking should be directed toward space and we should recognize that, as far as orbits are concerned, a satellite can become a missile and vice versa. Whether the warhead is nuclear or non-nuclear, kinetic or directed energy, the boundary should be knocked down and mature technologies of satellite and missiles should be integrated with new technologies of the future. Orbital ballistic missiles should be developed using the mutually interchangeable ground-based and space-based missiles, ground-ground missiles, and anti-satellite missiles. They would greatly enhance the deterrent power of strategic ballistic weapons.

The basic issues of the orbital ballistic missile system can be summarized as follows:

1. In the post booster stage and the free flight stage, the orbital ballistic missile must be able to detect, recognize, and classify incoming enemy missiles and to receive signals from early warning systems and to intercept missiles.
2. The orbital ballistic missiles must be able to track and verify the orbit of an intercepting missile, to determine whether the intercepting missile is on the collision coursed of the orbital missile, and to forecast the collision time.
3. If an interception is about to occur, the orbital missile must initiate evasive action based on ground commands or autonomous detection in a timely and accurate manner.
4. If the decision is to take evasive action, then there must also be a plan to return to the original orbit so that its munitions can accomplish its attack action according to the planned accuracy.
5. If the intercepting missile of the enemy is expected to change course, or if additional interception missile are expected, there must be plans to preserve and protect the fuel and electric power of the orbital ballistic missile.
6. If the plan for launch is cancelled, then the munitions of the orbital ballistic missile will be pushed into deep space.

²⁶ Yuan Guoxiong, Bai Tao, and Ren Zhang: “A Hybrid Reentry Guidance Method for Space-Based Ground Attack Weapon System”; Military Digest, Junshi Wenzhai, 1 Nov 04, pp 52-53. ²⁷ Zhu Rinzhong, “The Theory of GPS and Methods of Countering It,” Junshi xueshu, May 1999. ²⁸ Zhongguo Hangtian, 01 Jan 04, Zhao Ruian: “The Concept of Orbital Ballistic Missiles.”

Part 2. Thirty Chinese Recommendations for Space Weapons: Technical Studies on Plasma, Stealth, Jamming, KKV, and Beam Weapons

Plasma Attack Against Low-Orbit Spy Satellites²⁹ Professor Yang Juan stops just short of explicitly recommending plasma attacks for China, yet her enthusiasm for demonstrating the feasibility of this approach seems obvious: “This paper studies the effectiveness of using plasma to interrupt low-orbit reconnaissance satellite operations and proposes a scheme for using plasma against satellites. Analysis of satellite charging and discharging effects and mechanisms in a plasma environment indicates that plasma damages low-orbit satellites by causing arc-discharging potential differences to form on the surface of a satellite and that produces strong arc currents and electromagnetic pulses that damage solar cells, surface temperature control materials, microwave and electronic instruments on a satellite, and disrupts normal antenna operations.”

Satellites Designed with Stealth³⁰ “There is a great deal of work to do to develop a stealth satellite. In this paper, the optical signatures of a satellite and its stealth related issues were preliminarily explored. A number of schemes were proposed. The rationality and feasibility of these schemes need to be jointly investigated with relevant experts. Satellites mainly emit infrared radiation [IR] in the mid to far IR region, and reflect sunlight in the visible region.” Polyhedron designs, low emissivity surface materials, and designs mimicking space debris are explored to minimize detection.

Space Electronic Jamming³¹ “In order to occupy a place in space-based information warfare, space-borne electronic reconnaissance and countermeasure equipment should possess the following abilities: the ability to detect and locate space electromagnetic radiation sources, the ability to intercept complex space signals, and the ability to carry out electronic jamming.”

Six Studies on Jamming US Classified Data Links [JTIDS] [2005]

1. “Optimization of Spread Spectrum Code and Design of Spread Spectrum Pattern of JTIDS” (Shi Wenhui, Zhang Hui, Lai Weilin)
2. “Reconnaissance and Jamming to US Military Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL) A” (Cai Xiao, Guo Wei, Zhou Yingfang)
3. “Study of Datalink and Its Countermeasures” (Zhai Lichao, Lu Jiuming)
4. “Study of Optimal Jamming of JTIDS” (Wang Hui, Zeng Xingwen, Shen Zhenning)
5. “Study of JTIDS Signal Jamming Techniques” (Cai Xiaoxia, Chen Hong, Guo Jianlian, Wang Keren)
6. “Study of JTIDS Jamming” (Zhang Xin, Yang Shaoquan)

Ten Studies of Kinetic Kill Vehicles [2005]

1. “Simulation Modeling Research For Kinetic Kill Vehicle” (Zhang Aiyu)
2. “A Study of Kinetic Interceptor Attitude Control System Based on Feedback Linearization” (Wang Qingchao, Li Da)
3. “Concept of Kinetic Orbit Weapons and Its Development” (Wan Ziming, Yang Yuguang, Deng Longfan)
4. “Error Analysis of Orbit-transferring Velocity Increment on KKV in Space” (Ning Ziwen, Yu Xiaohong)
5. “Design of Variable Structure Automatic Pilot for KKV” (Huang Wanwei)
6. “An Investigation of a Maneuvering Long-Range Warhead’s Capability to Break Through the Antimissile System” (He Zhengchun, He Kaifeng)
7. “Preliminary Discussion on Solid Propellant Kinetic Kill Vehicle” (Zhang Hongan, Ye Dingyou, Guo Peng)
8. “Terminal Guidance Analysis of Extra-Atmospheric Kinetic Kill Vehicle” (Cheng Fengzhou, Wang Ziming, Chen Shilu)
9. “Design and Realization of Terminal Guidance’s Method for Kinetic Energy Interceptor at High Altitude” (Zhang Yasheng, Cheng Guocai, Chen Kejun)
10. “Divert and Altitude Control System for a Kinetic Kill Vehicle Using Solid Propellant” (Zhang Dexiong, Wang Zhaobin)

Satellite Attacks On Earth Targets [2005]³³ “The greatest advantage of a space-based ground attack weapon system is its high speed and short reentry time. It is extremely difficult for the enemy to intercept such a weapon. In this paper, a combination of standard trajectory guidance and point of impact prediction guidance was used to simulate the guidance of a war capsule during its ballistic reentry in order to develop a better guidance algorithm.”

R&D on Future Beam Weapons for ASAT Missions Since at least 1990, dozens of Chinese authors have described R&D on beam weapons in various technical journals. Beam weapons include:

• X-ray Laser: Research led by China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP); prototype driver Shenguang-1 tested in 1988.
• Chemical Oxygen-Iodine Laser (COIL): Developed by Dalian Institute of Chemistry and Physics (DICP) as an 863 project.
• Laser Satellite Tracking: Ranging stations located in Wuhan, Nanjing, Beijing, Kunming, Lintong, and Shanghai.
• Anti-Satellite Lasers: Ground-based laser systems utilizing adaptive optics to blind/destroy satellite optical sensors.
• Laser Radar: CO2 lidar development led by Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics for detection and GEO satellite tracking.

²⁹ Journal of Northwestern Polytechnical University, pp 93-97. ³⁰ Hefei Guang Dianzi Jishu yu Xinxi, 01 Aug 04. ³¹ Nanjing Hangtian Dianzi Duikang, 01 Aug 06. ³³ Zhanshu Daodan Kongzhi Jishu, 01 Sep 05.

Part 3. Desirable Goals of a US-China Dialogue on Space Weapons

Part 3. Desirable Goals of a US-China Dialogue on Space Weapons

This survey of open source literature supports the USCC recommendation to Congress that the US executive branch should initiate a dialogue with China on space weapons issues. The content of such a dialogue is beyond the scope of this report. However, this survey suggests at least six broad areas in which the US could profitably exchange views with Chinese specialists. Prior to initiating such a strategic dialogue, these six areas would need careful thought.

• Reducing Chinese Misperceptions of US Space Policy • Increasing Chinese Transparency on Space Weapons • Probing Chinese Interest in Verifiable Agreements • Multilateral vs. Bilateral Approaches • Economic Consequences of Use of Space Weapons • Reconsideration of US High Tech Exports to China

Part 4. Implications for US Policy

Part 4. Implications for US Policy

This survey of Chinese open-source literature on recommendations for the future development of antisatellite weapons raises a number of policy issues.

1. Possible US Countermeasures – Awareness, Assessing Damage, Forensics, Counter Strikes One may usefully speculate what the military and economic consequences would be for the US if all thirty of these recommendations were actually funded and implemented by China. Of the thirty proposals, one set would be particularly challenging to US military vulnerabilities in a crisis. In each of their books, Chinese Colonels Li, Jia and Yuan all advocated covert deployment of a sophisticated antisatellite weapon system to be used against United States in a surprise manner without warning. The number of US satellites to be targeted and attacked was not specified by the three Chinese authors, but Colonel Yuan specified that China’s future “shock and awe” attack must be devastating enough to deter any further American military action in a crisis and “bring the opponent to his knees.” All three colonels reference the traditional concept of space attack as an “assassin’s mace weapon” that is decisive in its use of surprise.

Even a small attack could have major consequences. Chinese sources credit the United States with more than 400 satellites out of the approximately 800 satellites now currently active in space. Even a small scale antisatellite attack in a crisis against 50 US satellites [assuming a mix of targeted military reconnaissance, navigation satellites, and communication satellites] could have a catastrophic effect not only on US military forces, but of the US civilian economy. It is not clear from US open sources how rapidly—if at all—United States could launch “spare” satellites to replace a few dozen that had been incapacitated in orbit by a Chinese attack. US sources refer to many [very expensive] countermeasures such as maneuvering satellites in orbit to escape destruction, using constellations of small satellites, rapid replacement with spares, and even prompt counter strikes on the Chinese launchers.⁴³

A second set of Chinese concepts proposed in these open source writings would also be particularly challenging. Many of the concepts recommended include both jamming and attacking ground stations, rather than the permanent destruction of US satellites. In both cases, the Chinese authors imply the United States may lack the “forensic” ability to know which nation had neutralized US space systems through covert attack, jamming or destruction of ground stations by missile or Special Forces raids. The US Defense Department currently has put before Congress various proposals for enhancing situational awareness of space attack, but the ultimate approval of multiple-year funding is unknown.

2. Implications of Dialogues with These ASAT Authors All of the articles cited in this study may be dismissed by Chinese diplomatic sources as mere idle speculation by various “maverick” authors. While that may be a convenient diplomatic position, we are forced to accept the studies and recommendations as valid considering that the authors are in positions of influence within Chinese military and technology hierarchies and are employed at Chinese research institutes some of which actually manufacture space, missile and electronic systems. It is important that the US establish with the Chinese the serious importance to which we assign this published, detailed advocacy of Chinese weaponization of space. It is likely that a persuasive dialogue will not be possible solely with Chinese diplomats [or other officials assigned to deal with foreigners] and that the most effective course would be for US representatives to meet directly with some or all of these authors for discussions at their government organizations. Access to ASAT specialists in China has been impossible in the DOD exchange programs in the past decade, according to some observers, because China prohibits ASAT experts from participating in the exchanges at all. The 3 NDU authors cited may never have visited the US, and, as stated, seem unaware of the Congressional restraints on US space programs.

3. Detecting the Signatures of Future Chinese ASAT, impact of proposals on US policy decisions An implication for the US intelligence community of these Chinese proposals would be the feasibility of identifying the developmental “signatures” of the recommended covert systems through normal intelligence collection. It may be difficult and probably impossible to detect the manufacturing and testing of many of the components that are proposed. The authors make clear in many of the recommendations that the acquisition of the systems and even their deployment are to be done covertly in a manner that cannot be detected by United States until the moment of their use by China in a crisis. Plasma attack, attacks on GPS, use of stealthy satellites, penetration and destruction of ground stations, jamming based on deceptive transmissions that imitate US signals, experimental units that can be converted in a crisis, ASATs fired from submarines — all these concepts could potentially be concealed in advance of their use unless their signatures were anticipated. By definition, the Chinese government would deny the existence of such covert programs. Indeed, consideration must be given to the possibility that active duty colonels have been permitted to publish such proposals as an effort to influence US thinking regarding the potential vulnerabilities and lack of effectiveness of possible space based national missile defense components, thus discouraging their development and acquisition. Likewise, these proposals may have been allowed as a form of counterthreat against US first deployment of space weapons.

4. Concerns of Japan, India, European Union and Russia to Chinese ASAT In terms of multilateral diplomacy and US alliances, one might ask whether other nations in addition to the United States have any concerns about these proposals and recommendations. Japan, but not India or Russia has expressed concern about China’s lack of transparency in the military area that would presumably include the development of anti-satellite systems. The question would be whether China in the future may be the subject of pressure from the international community in addition to the United States.

5. Verification and On Site Inspections of an ASAT Agreement? With respect to US arms control policy, some advocates propose that we re-think the question of refusal to negotiate or discuss the Chinese proposal to the UN conference on disarmament in Geneva on a non-verifiable agreement against weaponization in outer space. If such an agreement explicitly permitted American National missile defense and was verifiable with on-site inspection, it might merit negotiation. After all, China has accepted 100 visits by the inspection organization of the chemical weapons ban, so the precedent exists of China’s accepting on-site inspections for international arms control agreements. Of course, the ban will be reciprocal so the United States would be compelled to accept inspections potentially of sensitive facilities under the control the national reconnaissance organization which manufactures highly classified US satellites and space systems.

6. Inference of Chinese Determinations of US Space Weapons activities and plans With regard to future Sino-American exchanges and dialogue, one might ask what precisely are the catalysts or red lines that China seems to be suggesting will compel it to initiate the acquisition and deployment of space-based systems including antisatellite weapons. One school of thought has been that the United States national missile defense system threatens China’s nuclear deterrent. This may be why antisatellite systems can be justified. Another view may be that the United States has in China’s view already crossed the red line compelling a Chinese decision to develop antisatellite weapons, by refusing to discuss the Chinese arms-control offer to ban space weapons and by America’s currently funded missile defense programs. This issue is significant because an effort to engage China in a dialogue on space weapons would be futile and even naïve if the decision has already has been made by Chinese leaders because of their misperceptions of existing US policies and programs.

7. China’s Proposed Space Weapons Ban and Current US Missile Defenses In terms of understanding Chinese motives for a proposal in 2002 for a space weapons ban, that is, a decade after Chinese authors first recommended ASAT development, it is useful to keep in mind the relevant chronology. The American arms-control community has actively advocated a ban on space weapons systems since at least 1999, as can be seen in the appendix [Bibliography on Space Arms Control]. It seems possible therefore that China’s proposal in Geneva in 2002 may have been stimulated by three or more years of observing US arms-control community proposals for space weapons bans. These US advocates had concerns about space weaponization that were in fact closely linked to their opposition to any US missile defense. The US arms control advocates, like the Chinese, also vehemently opposed any national missile defense and withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty. They even opposed the proposal of Senator Sam Nunn over a decade ago for GPALS, “global protection against accidental launched missiles system,” which envisioned about 100 ground-based interceptors. The current missile Defense agency description of US national missile Defense implies implicitly that 20 ground-based interceptors is the near-term ceiling. As early as 1999, Richard Garwin published his opposition to such missile defense and warned against an arms race in space. China may have decided to ally itself tactically with these American advocates in the US policy debate on missile defense by adopting their ideas against weaponization of space – even though Chinese military and technical specialists and been advocating antisatellite weapons for many years.

If this hypothesis is correct, it helps to explain why China permitted the publication of three rather provocative books in 2001, 2002, and 2005 by military officers’ with their proposals for covert deployment of antisatellite weapons directed at US assets. The publication of these books and other explicit recommendations advocating future antisatellite programs may have been authorized as part of a larger design to influence the US policy debate in the Congress and the media. One goal would be to oppose the extensive proposal by Senator Sam Nunn for a national missile defense system of 100 interceptors. If China essentially is threatening to deploy a robust ASAT system in the decade or two ahead, it makes a powerful case against even the current modest 20 interceptor system of in the present program.

8. Space-related Export Controls and Further Restrictions on Deemed Exports There are substantial export control issues involved in any US decision to oppose or impede China’s potential acquisition of antisatellite systems. We might ask whether more restrictive technology transfers on China could head off Chinese development of some or all of the antisatellite systems listed in the proposals identified in open sources. For example, nanotechnology laminated surfaces, miniature rocket motors; quick launch space vehicle propulsion, and directed energy technology (especially advance performance lasers), precision space guidance systems, and various bilateral technology exchanges such as the current program of the National Science Foundation for cooperation in remote sensing will become areas to examine for additional technology transfer restrictions. It would be a major project to identify and design new export controls on US technologies related to anti- satellite weapons acquisition and deployment.

Many other issues involving space technology transfer to China fall within the purview of the broader issues to be assessed by the newly created ”Deemed Exports Advisory Commission.” In 2004, the Department of Commerce failed to initiate a policy proposal to consider the transfer of knowledge inside United States as a “deemed export” (requiring an export license). According to a then-member of the Deemed Exports Advisory Commission, Robert Gates in interview with Defense News in October 15, 2006, Cold War standards may not be sufficient any more to protect technology.

9. PACOM and STRATCOM Role in Educating the PLA on Consequences of China’s Use of ASAT The US Department of Defense has extensive exchange programs in its “theater engagement plans” and may wish to play a greater role in deterring Chinese development of space weapons. Both Strategic Command and Pacific Command may wish to consider in their discussions on track one and track 1.5 whether to include information about the consequences of an attack on US military satellites in a crisis as part of their routine presentations on US defense policy and strategy to the Chinese.

10. Recommendations in Open Sources vs. China’s Real Intentions It is difficult to rely on Chinese open source literature as the sole source for a persuasive strategic warning that vulnerable US military command, communications and sensitive national intelligence systems may all be in jeopardy in the decade ahead. The concern might be called the “methodology for military analysis.” On one side, a number of US specialists on Chinese military affairs have been erecting a filter over the past decade that tends to belittle any Chinese open source writings. These specialists assert that a military capability must go through a long process of development before it can be considered a credible force. Antisatellite weapons would need to be researched, designed, manufactured, tested, deployed, and then have a series of operational exercises, and a clear doctrine would have to be written and disseminated, not to mention the absolute requirement for the drafting and exercising of operational plans for an antisatellite attack. These specialists add to this long list of requirements another insurmountable challenge – mere colonels at Chinese defense universities and mere aerospace engineers or other specialists in China aerospace organizations do not have the authority required to authorize and execute an anti-satellite or space weapons program. Only China’s President and the CCP Politburo and Central Military Commission has such authority, and none of those institutions has issued any recommendations to develop such weapons.

On the other side stands the fascinating work of several US historians and political scientists on the causes of war, and on the sources of intelligence failure. Thomas Mahnken argues that in many cases it has proved to be impossible for intelligence analysts to identify new weapons and operational concepts unless there own armed forces already such capabilities. Neither the Nazi German blitzkrieg nor the Japanese tactics at Pearl Harbor in 1941 were “recognized” as patterns in advance in spite of available evidence. In related studies, MIT Professor Steven Van Evera has concluded that “first move advantage” can be a cause of war. In his new book from Harvard University Press, Dominic Johnston asserts that overconfidence in one’s own [untested] military forces has also been a common cause of war in history.

Robert Jervis has warned that some types of war – nuclear warfare in particular – has never happened, so that it is unrealistic to expect to know how it may start, continue, escalate or terminate. Space warfare has never happened. No one can really know what the shape of a Chinese preemptive attack on US satellites might be like, or what the US response might be. US studies of China’s prior use of force in 1950, 1962, 1969 and 1979 have all conclude that the Chinese place high value on surprising the opponent – even when Beijing was motivated by entirely “defensive” Chinese concerns.

If we know little about how space warfare may unfold because it has never happened, is it wise to dismiss the probative value of Chinese open source recommendations on the grounds that no one has yet seen China start to manufacture, test, exercise, and write doctrine for real space weapons? It would seem that open source materials containing recommendations for future ASAT concepts deserve more attention than to be completely dismissed, just as they cannot be considered to be completely definitive.

At a minimum, these writings suggest the need for a more assertive US engagement effort with the authors and their organizations. At a maximum, these writings suggest a major misperception by at least the authors and possible the Chinese leadership that US efforts to “weaponize space” are decades away, if the US Congress ever permits such efforts at all.

These Chinese authors could benefit from studies such as Dwayne A. Day’s that conclude that “one could assemble a pretty neat comic book containing all of these over-ambitious unaffordable or just plain unnecessary military space weapons system that Air Force generals have insisted were vital….this disconnect between the speechmakers and the budgeters and operators is not something the general media understands when it reports about military space [plans].”⁴⁴

⁴³ Uri Ra’anan and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, eds., International Security Dimensions of Space, 1984. ⁴⁴ Dwayne A. Day, “General Power vs. Chicken Little,” Spaceflight, May 23, 2005.

Documentary Appendix: Bibliography of Chinese Sources

Documentary Appendix

Bibliography of Chinese Sources

Military Journals with Little Space Content (Standard military journals generally not containing articles on ASATs or space warfare):

• Logistics Studies Houqin Xueshu 后勤学术
• Military Studies Junshi Xueshu 军事学术
• Armament Equipment Technology Junxie Zhuangbei Jishu 军械装备技术
• NDU Journal Guofang Daxue Xuebao 国防大学学报
• Army Finance Jundui Caiwu 军队财务
• Military-Use Vehicles Junyong Qiche 军用汽车
• Naval Studies Research Haijun Xueshu Yanjiu 海军学术研究
• Military Economics Research Junshi Jingji Yanjiu 军事经济研究
• Modern Military Branches Xiandai Bingzhong 现代兵种
• Air Force Logistics Research Kongjun Houqin Yanjiu 空军后勤研究
• Command Journal Zhihui Xuebao 指挥学报
• Artillery Studies Magazine Paoxue Zazhi 炮学杂志
• China Military Education Zhongguo Junshi Jiaoyu 中国军事教育
• China Military Science Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 中国军事科学
• Military Finance Junshi Caiwu 军事财务
• Modern Military Xiandai Junshi 现代军事
• Nanjing Logistics Nanjing Houqin 南京后勤
• National Defense Journal Guofang Tongbao 国防通报

List of 80 Chinese Space Journals & Websites (Selected entries 1-80):

1. China Space News (Zhongguo Hangtian Bao)
2. Aerospace China (Zhongguo Hangtian)
3. Aerospace Knowledge (Hangkong Zhishi)
4. Space International (Guoji Taikong)
5. Space Exploration (Taikong Tansuo)
6. Aerospace World (Shijie Hangkong Hangtian Bolan)
7. China National Space Administration Website (www.cnsa.gov.cn)
8. Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (www.costind.gov.cn)
9. Newsletter of the Ministry of S&T (www.most.gov.cn)
10. China Aerospace Science & Technology Corporation (CASC)
11. Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST)
12. China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT)
13. China Great Wall Industry Corp.
14. Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
15. Satellite Applications (Weixing Yingyong)
16. Infrared and Laser Engineering (Hongwai yu Jiguang Gongcheng)
17. Aerospace Technology & Civilian Products (Hangtian Jishu yu Minpin)
18. Computer Engineering and Design (Jisuanji Gongcheng yu Sheji)
19. Aerospace Control (Hangtian Kongzhi)
20. Journal of Astronautic Metrology and Measurement (Yuhang Jice Jishu)
21. Journal of Propulsion Technology (Tuijin Jishu)
22. Computer Simulation (Jisuanji Fangzhen)
23. China Astronautics and Missilery Abstracts (Zhongguo Daodan yu Hangtian Wenzhai)
24. China Military and Civilian Use Technology and Products (Junmin Liangyong Jishu yu Chanpin)
25. Aerospace Industry Management (Hangtian Gongye Guanli)
26. Scientific Policy Decision (Kexue Juece)
27. Aerospace Standardization (Hangtian Biaozhunhua)
28. Quality and Reliability (Zhiliang yu Kekaoxing)
29. Chinese Space Science and Technology (Zhongguo Kongjian Kexue Jishu)
30. Journal of Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (Yaoce Yaokong)
31. Cryogenic Engineering (Diwen Gongcheng)
32. Vacuum and Cryogenics (Zhenkong Diwen)
33. Space Electronic Technology (Kongjian Dianzi Jishu)
34. Microelectronics and Computers (Weidianzixue yu Jisuanji)
35. Missiles and Space Vehicles (Daodan yu Hangtian Yunzai Jishu)
36. Guidance and Fuse (Zhidao yu Yinxin)
37. Journal of Solid Rocket Technology (Guti Huojian Jishu)
38. Spacecraft Recovery & Remote Sensing (Hangtian Fanhui yu Yaogan)
39. Chinese Journal of Aerospace Medicine (Zhongguo Hangtian Yiyao Zazhi)
40. Structure & Environment Engineering (Qiangdu yu Huanjing)
41. Aerospace Shanghai (Shanghai Hangtian)
42. Aerospace Techniques (Hangtian Gongyi)
43. Systems Engineering and Electronics (Xitong Gongcheng yu Dianzi Jishu)
44. Winged Missiles Journal (Feihang Daodan)
45. Aerospace Electronic Warfare (Hangtian Dianzi Duikang)
46. Aeronautical Manufacturing Technology (Hangtian Zhizao Jishu)
47. Control Technology of Tactical Missiles (Zhanshu Daodan Kongzhi Jishu)
48. Journal of System Simulation (Xitong Fangzhen Xuebao)
49. Chinese Journal of Space Science (Kongjian Kexue Xuebao)
50. Remote Sensing Technology and Application (Yaogan Jishu yu Yingyong)
51. Advanced Display (Xiandai Xianshi)
52. Spacecraft Engineering (Hangtianqi Gongcheng)
53. Space Medicine & Medical Engineering (Hangtian Yixue yu Yixue Gongcheng)
54. Chinese Journal of Aerospace Medicine (Zhonghua Hangkong Hangtian Yixue Zazhi)
55. Aerospace Medicine (Hangkong Hangtian Yiyao)
56. Experiments and Measurements in Fluid Mechanics (Liuti Lixue Shiyan yu Celiang)
57. Acta Aerodynamica Sinica (Kongqi Donglixue Xuebao)
58. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (Beijing Hangkong Hangtian Daxue Xuebao)
59. Journal of Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics (Nanjing Hangkong Hangtian Daxue Xuebao)
60. Journal of Vibration Measurement & Diagnosis (Zhendong Ceshi yu Zhenduan)
61. Journal of North China Institute of Astronautic Engineering (Huabei Hangtian Gongye Xueyuan Xuebao)
62. Journal of National University of Defense Technology (Guofang Keji Daxue Xuebao)
63. Journal of Remote Sensing (Yaogan Xuebao)
64. Journal of Projectiles, Rockets, Missiles, and Guidance (Danjian yu Zhidao Xuebao)
65. Journal of Vibration and Shock (Zhendong yu Chongji)
66. Vacuum Electronics (Zhenkong Dianzi Jishu)
67. Vacuum (Zhenkong)
68. Vacuum Science and Technology (Zhenkong Kexue yu Jishu)
69. Vacuum Communication (Zhenkong Tongxun)
70. Sichuan Vacuum (Sichuan Zhenkong)
71. Shanghai Vacuum News (Shanghai Zhenkong Bao)
72. Acta Materiae Compositae Sinica (Fuhe Cailiao Xuebao)
73. Journal of Engineering Thermophysics (Gongcheng Rewuli Xuebao)
74. Aerospace Materials and Technology (Yuhang Cailiao Gongyi)
75. Journal of Astronautics (Yuhang Xuebao)
76. Remote Sensing Information (Yaogan Xinxi)
77. Journal of Flight Vehicle Measurement and Control (Feixingqi Cekong Xuebao)
78. Journal of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (Guofang Keji Gongye)

References on ASAT vs. Space Defense Weapons include papers by Liu Huanyu, Du Rongsun, Liu Shaoqiu, Wang Wenfeng, Cheng Chuanhao, and Heang Zuwei.

Documentary Appendix: Bibliography on Space Arms Control & US Articles

Bibliography on Space Arms Control

• Logsdon, John M., 2001, Just Say Wait to Space Power, Issues in Science and Technology.
• Moltz, James Clay (ed.), 2002, Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military and Arms Control Tradeoffs, CNS Occasional Paper.
• Moore, Mike, 2001, Watch out for Space Command, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
• Preston, Bob, et al., 2002, Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND.
• Saperstein, Al, 2002, Weaponization vs. Militarization of Space, Physics and Society.
• Union of Concerned Scientists, 2002, Limitations and Artificialities of the Testing Program.
• Bunn, George and Rhinelander, John B., 2002, Outer Space Treaty May Ban Strike Weapons, Arms Control Today.
• DeBlois, Bruce M., 1998, Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy, Airpower Journal.
• Garwin, Richard L., 1999, Toward International Security: The Development of Space Weapons, ASAT Testing, and National Missile Defense.
• Johnson, Rebecca, 2001, Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponisation of Space, Disarmament Diplomacy.
• Proposed Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space, 1984.
• Space Preservation Act of 2002, HR 3616.
• White, Robert E., 2001, Preserving Space for Peaceful Use: A Case for a New Space Treaty.
• Russia-China CD Working Paper, 2002: Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space.
• Federation of American Scientists, World Space Guide.
• Contant, Corine and Cooper, Lawrence, 2000, The People’s Republic of China: Consolidating its Space Power.
• Gauthier, Katheryn, 1999, China as Peer Competitor?, Air University.
• Jimerson, Rebecca, 2000, North Korea: Locked in a Space Race with the World.

The Airborne Laser Narrows Its Beam By John A. Tirpak, Executive Editor (Air Force Magazine, June 2006, Vol. 89, No. 6) Highlights the shift of the Airborne Laser (ABL) program from full weapon development to a technology demonstration focused on boost-phase missile defense, discussing schedule revisions and technical challenges.

Toward A New Laser Era By Hampton Stephens Examines the Air Force’s broader directed energy master plan, tactical laser concepts (e.g., Advanced Tactical Laser for AC-130 gunships), and the timeline for combat-usable solid-state lasers (estimated 10 to 20 years).

US Aerospace Research and Development Funding Trends Source: GAO Report (GAO-06-920, September 2006) Details funding allocations, workforce dynamics, and shifts between research and development across the Department of Defense, NASA, and FAA, including trends in science and technology spending for air and space platforms (Figures 7, 8, 10).