Fiscal Year 2025 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Summary

This report to Congress presents the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) 25-year plan to sustain and modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without underground explosive testing. It details ongoing life extension and modernization programs, production infrastructure recapitalization, key science and computing capabilities, workforce initiatives, and long-term budget and fiscal estimates.

Cover Page

Fiscal Year 2025 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary Report to Congress September 2024 National Nuclear Security Administration United States Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585

Message from the NNSA Administrator

The U.S. nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of the Nation’s security, a source of assurance for our allies, and has been an essential contributor to global stability for more than 75 years. The credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile, demonstrated through the world-class science and engineering capabilities of the nuclear security enterprise, is likewise central to the United States’ strategic posture. Among the highest-priority missions of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) is to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile, a function the men and women of the enterprise have discharged faithfully since the Manhattan Project.

Although the global security landscape is more dynamic today than in recent years, our nuclear deterrent remains effective. This continuity in our posture is a testament to the agility of the nuclear enterprise and the headroom built into the U.S. strategy of deterrence. Nonetheless, evolutions are occurring within the enterprise, both in response to the deteriorating international security environment and in anticipation of developments that may implicate our nuclear posture. These adaptations are layered upon ongoing modernization programs to contend with aging weapons and infrastructure and provide for the enduring performance of the stockpile.

The Fiscal Year 2025 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary (FY 2025 SSMP) describes how DOE/NNSA will sustain the stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing across the laboratories, plants, and sites that comprise the nuclear security enterprise. The report outlines plans to fulfill the requirements to produce a minimum of 80 plutonium pits per year; achieve the First Production Units of the W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP), W87-1 Modification Program, and W93 warhead; maintain production of the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alteration 370 warheads; establish a program of record for the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear; and execute the B61-13 program.

DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform its diverse missions depends on modern, flexible, and resilient facilities and infrastructure capable of servicing the stockpile for the next 50 years or more in the face of disruptions to operations or evolving military needs. In coordination with our Department of Defense partners, we are modernizing the stockpile and our infrastructure simultaneously. Infrastructure investments will support continuous production of nuclear materials, high explosives, and non-nuclear components. In the past year, we met 100 percent modernized warhead delivery to the Nation’s warfighters, but the enterprise’s capacity to deliver in the future depends on successful completion of infrastructure projects.

No less critical to the reliability of the stockpile is the workforce of the nuclear security enterprise—the cadre of scientists, engineers, machinists, craft and trade workers, and program managers whose technical skill is matched only by their dedication to our national security. DOE/NNSA is taking aggressive steps to attract and retain a workforce qualified to maintain today’s deterrent and design the systems of tomorrow.

For more than 75 years, the scientific achievements of the nuclear security enterprise have revolutionized the world by expanding the limits of human knowledge while laying the foundations of national and global security. This proud heritage continues today. From the fusion breakthroughs at the National Ignition Facility to the deployment of El Capitan, the world’s fastest supercomputer, the enterprise boasts an extraordinary reservoir of technical talent and creativity. With consistent support from Congress, DOE/NNSA will continue its long tradition of fulfilling the United States’ nuclear deterrence mission, delivering innovative solutions to meet present and future challenges.

Pursuant to statute, the FY 2025 SSMP is provided to Congressional defense and appropriations leadership.

Sincerely, Jill Hruby Under Secretary for Nuclear Security Administrator, NNSA

Executive Summary

The Fiscal Year 2025 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2025 SSMP), including its classified annex, describes the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) program to maintain a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear stockpile over the next 25 years. DOE/NNSA publishes the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) annually, either as a detailed report or summary, in response to statutory requirements to support the President’s Budget Request to Congress for Weapons Activities.

In partnership, the Department of Defense (DoD) and DOE/NNSA plan and manage weapons modernization needs to meet the nuclear deterrent objectives outlined in the 2022 National Security Strategy (White House), the 2022 National Defense Strategy (DoD), and the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (DoD).

Key pillars and initiatives highlighted include:

  • Maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the current nuclear deterrent.
  • Modernizing weapons and production infrastructure, including achieving a minimum production rate of 80 plutonium pits per year across Los Alamos National Laboratory and Savannah River Site.
  • Advancing science, computing, and high-energy density physics, marked by fusion ignition achievements at NIF and the arrival of exascale computing (El Capitan).
  • Addressing human capital challenges through targeted recruitment, training, and retention initiatives across the nuclear security enterprise.

Chapter 1: Strategic Context for Managing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The international security environment continues to destabilize due to geopolitical events and the actions of strategic competitors (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran). To ensure deterrence and assurance commitments remain strong, DOE/NNSA and DoD share coordinated responsibilities.

DOE/NNSA is authorized under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the NNSA Act (50 U.S. Code § 2401 et seq.) to manage the nation’s nuclear stockpile.

The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review defines three pillars for a resilient enterprise:

  1. Improved DoD-DOE/NNSA coordination and integration via the Nuclear Weapons Council.
  2. Production-based resilience to scale capabilities (plutonium pits, secondaries, non-nuclear components, uranium processing).
  3. Science and Technology Innovation Initiative to accelerate technology maturation.

Table 1-1 & Table 1-2 summarize the current stockpile types (W78, W87-0, W76-0/1/2, W88, B61-3/4/7/11/12, B83-1, W80-1) and active life extension / modernization programs (B61-12 LEP, W88 Alt 370, B61-13, W80-4 LEP, W87-1 Mod, W80-4 Alt-SLCM, W93).

Chapter 2: Stockpile Management

Stockpile Management encompasses five major subprograms:

  1. Stockpile Sustainment: Performs maintenance, surveillance, limited life component exchanges (LLCs: gas transfer systems, power sources, neutron generators), and annual assessments.
  2. Stockpile Major Modernization: Executes Life Extension Programs (LEPs), Modifications (Mods), and Alterations (Alts) following Phase 6.X and Phase X processes.
  3. Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD): Disassembles retired weapons, reclaims parts and materials, and disposes of legacy components.
  4. Production Operations: Sustains base manufacturing capabilities, equipment availability, calibration, and supply chain across enterprise production sites.
  5. Nuclear Enterprise Assurance (NEA): Mitigates subversion risks to digital systems, hardware, operational technologies, and supply chains supporting nuclear weapons.

Chapter 3: Weapons Activities Capabilities that Support the Nuclear Security Enterprise

This chapter details the seven core capability areas required to accomplish the stockpile mission:

  1. Weapon Science and Engineering: High Energy Density (HED) physics, plasma physics, materials science, actinide science, high explosives/energetics, and hydrodynamic/subcritical experiments (e.g., at JASPER, DARHT, PULSE, NIF, Z, LANSCE).
  2. Weapon Simulation and Computing: High Performance Computing (HPC), Integrated Design Codes (IDCs), exascale systems (El Capitan), and advanced machine learning (AMLI).
  3. Weapon Design and Integration: Nuclear explosive package design, engineering analysis, radiation-hardened microelectronics (MESA), environmental testing, and surety technologies.
  4. Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing: Re-establishing plutonium pit production (LAP4 at LANL and SRPPF at SRS to achieve 80+ pits/year), Uranium Modernization (UPF at Y-12), Domestic Uranium Enrichment (DUE), Depleted Uranium Modernization, Lithium Modernization (LPF at Y-12), Tritium Management (Watts Bar irradiation and SRS processing), and High Explosives (HESE and HESFP at Pantex).
  5. Weapon Component Production: Non-nuclear component manufacturing at KCNSC (KC STEP and KCNExT), power sources, neutron generators, and additive manufacturing.
  6. Weapon Assembly, Storage, Testing, and Disposition: Assembly/disassembly throughput at Pantex, tester recapitalization, and staging/storage.
  7. Transportation and Security: Secure Transportation Asset (STA) fleet recapitalization (MGT, PHOENIX armored tractors, Boeing 737 replacement) and Safeguards & Security (Caerus physical security system, CUAS, insider threat prevention).

Chapter 4: Infrastructure and Operations

NNSA manages over 5,500 facilities with an average age of 48 years. Infrastructure planning utilizes the Integrated Infrastructure Planning (IIP) Team, standardized designs (STAR initiative), and streamlined acquisition frameworks (EMC2 pilot / Supplemental Directive 413.3-7).

Key programmatic and mission enabling capital line-item construction projects include:

  • HESE, HESFP, and Material Staging Facility at Pantex
  • Scorpius / PULSE Enhancements and 138 kV Power Transmission at NNSS
  • Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and Lithium Processing Facility (LPF) at Y-12
  • LAP4, CMRR, and Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility at LANL
  • SRPPF and Tritium Finishing Facility (TFF) at Savannah River Site
  • Power Sources Capability and Emergency Operations Center at Sandia National Laboratories
  • Building 23 acquisition (KC STEP) and KCNExT multi-phase expansion at KCNSC

Additionally, recapitalization, sustainment, and disposition of excess facilities (over 300 excess assets totaling 3.7 million sq ft) are systematically prioritized using the BUILDER modeling system.

Chapter 5: Budget and Fiscal Estimates

The FY 2025 President’s Budget Request for Weapons Activities is $19,848.6 million (a 3.9% increase over FY 2024 enacted levels), supporting Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) projections through FY 2029:

  • Stockpile Management: $5,140.7M (FY25)
  • Production Modernization: $5,877.7M (FY25)
  • Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering: $3,174.2M (FY25)
  • Academic Programs and Community Support: $128.2M (FY25)
  • Infrastructure and Operations: $3,299.9M (FY25)
  • Secure Transportation Asset: $371.4M (FY25)
  • Defense Nuclear Security: $1,180.0M (FY25)
  • Information Technology and Cybersecurity: $646.0M (FY25)
  • Legacy Contractor Pensions: $30.6M (FY25)

Long-term 25-year cost estimates (FY 2024 constant and then-year dollars) are detailed for major modernization programs:

  • B61-12 LEP: 8.0B then-year)
  • B61-13: 0.114B then-year)
  • W88 Alt 370: 2.8B then-year)
  • W80-4 LEP: 12.3B then-year)
  • W87-1 Mod: 15.9B then-year)
  • W93 Program: 27.6B then-year)
  • Future Strategic Land-Based Warhead: 40.7B then-year)
  • Future Strategic Sea-Based Warhead: 37.4B then-year)
  • Future Air-Delivered Weapon: 48.4B then-year)
  • Submarine Launched Warhead (W76-1/2 Replacement): 58.7B then-year)

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The FY 2025 SSMP documents DOE/NNSA’s unified roadmap to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in an increasingly dangerous and complex geopolitical threat environment. With sustained congressional commitment, DOE/NNSA will deliver modernized warheads, re-establish vital production and manufacturing infrastructure, leverage cutting-edge science and computing, and recruit and sustain a dedicated, highly trained national security workforce.

Appendices A through H Overview

The document includes technical and statutory appendices:

  • Appendix A: Requirements Mapping (Statutory compliance matrix for 50 U.S.C. § 2523, § 2538a, NDAA provisions, and committee reports)
  • Appendix B: Weapons Activities Capabilities (Definitions of science, computing, design, processing, component production, assembly, and transportation capabilities)
  • Appendix C: Workforce Retention (Demographics of 62,842 personnel, turnover trends, retirement eligibility, and pipeline initiatives)
  • Appendix D: Stockpile Responsiveness Program (Status and statutory alignment)
  • Appendix E: Industrial Base (Monitoring framework, supply chain risk factors, and interagency coordination with DoD and CFIUS)
  • Appendix F: Glossary of technical and program terms
  • Appendix G: Acronyms and Abbreviations
  • Appendix H: List of Figures and Tables