Intelligence in Theory and in Practice: Jointness in Intelligence (Issue No. 1, May 2017)

Summary

This inaugural issue of ‘Intelligence in Theory and in Practice’ is dedicated to the concept of jointness within intelligence organizations, specifically focusing on the Israeli intelligence community and broader international perspectives. It features analyses on theoretical frameworks, intra- and inter-organizational dimensions, operational-tactical integration (fusion), interstate counterterrorism cooperation, and the institutionalization of jointness through training and structural reforms.

Cover Page

Israel Intelligence Community Commemoration and Heritage Center The Institute for Intelligence and Policy Research

INTELLIGENCE IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE a journal on intelligence methodology Issue No. 1, MAY 2017

JOINTNESS IN INTELLIGENCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

5 Preface

The Theoretical Dimension 9 The Development of the Jointness Concept in Intelligence Organizations Kobi Michael, David Siman-Tov, and Oren Yoeli

The Intraorganizational Dimension 24 Intelligence Confronts Complex and Interarena Issues: The Organizational Aspect A. E., worker in the defense establishment, graduate of the National Security College 47 An Intelligence Knowledge Community as an Operative Mechanism That Provides Strategic and Systemic Flexibility to Aman Head of the Design Department in the Research Division, Aman 59 Joint Investigation Teams as a Response to the Big-Data Era: The Test of Practice O. O. - serving in Aman 81 Get Organized and Investigate Intelligence in the State of Routine Just as in the State of War! Lieut. Col. M.P., head of section of an intelligence squadron - air force

The Intelligence-Operational Dimension 92 A Sixth Era in Ground Warfare: The Intelligence Context Eran Ortal, Head of the Think Tank at the Dado Center and editor of the journal Bein Haktavim (In between the Poles)

The Interstate Dimension 108 Intelligence Cooperation against the Global Jihad Organizations S. T. - the author serves in the defense establishment

The Community Dimension 117 The Israeli Intelligence Organizations: From the “Magna Carta” Principles to Jointness Ari Shuali - a past member of the intelligence community 125 Why an Intelligence Minister, and Why Now Member of Knesset Ofer Shelah 131 How Can Jointness in the Intelligence Community Be Promoted with an Interservice Course? Shai Shabtai and Omri Gefen 139 The Changes Required in How the Western Intelligence Communities Organize in Light of the Global Terror Challenge Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser

The Issues of the Moment 144 The Wave of Terror Attacks as a Network Phenomenon: Has the “Lone Wolf Intifada” Gone Out Just as It Came In? Lieut. Col. R - until recently commander of the Hatzav unit in Aman

Remarks by the Chairman of the Israeli Intelligence Community Commemoration and Heritage Center

Dear Readers, IICC Members, and Members of the Intelligence Community,

The Israeli Intelligence Community Commemoration and Heritage Center is a single entity that views its mission, along with preserving the memory of the fallen and cultivating the heritage, as the ongoing study of the craft of intelligence, aimed at promoting the constant improvement of the intelligence establishment’s performance. This entails making the most of the accumulated knowledge and experience both of the veterans of the community and of those doing the work today, as well as learning from the knowledge about intelligence issues that is developing in other countries.

From that standpoint, I welcome the inception of the journal Intelligence—in Theory and in Practice, which focuses on intelligence methodology. This journal aims to provide a periodic forum for a professional, open, and intensive discussion of the methodological issues that are on the Israeli intelligence establishment’s agenda. Such a discussion will be held without delving into the contents of intelligence and will maintain the required strict sensitivity.

The first issue is devoted to the topic of “Jointness in Intelligence.” As an umbrella institution for all the organizations that form the Israeli intelligence community, it is natural for ITIC to give this issue priority. That, however, is not the only reason to do so. The changes in the nature of the intelligence challenges, and in the attributes of the environment in which Western intelligence operates, make it all the more essential and urgent to study this topic, as was also evident in the annual conference on intelligence and terror that we held in July 2016.

This issue of the journal will also provide a basis for dialogue with professionals in the intelligence field in other countries.

As always, the birth pangs were not easy. But thanks to the support of the heads of the services and of the Intelligence Ministry, and the devotion of the authors and the rest of those carrying out the endeavor, all of whom deserve praise and gratitude, we have produced the first issue. We plan to publish a series of additional issues along with other methodological works, which will explore the many topics that call for comprehensive treatment.

Special thanks go to Yossi Kuperwasser, who along with David Siman-Tov has converted the idea into practice, and to the director-general of the ITIC, Brig. Gen. (res.) David Tzur, who made the endeavor possible. Thanks are also extended to the Boksenbaum Neta Fund, whose contribution enables us to publish the journal.

This is our issue, and I invite all of us to contribute to the issues that will follow it.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Zvi Shtauber Chairman of the IICC

Preface

Dear Reader,

Before you is the first issue of the journal Intelligence - in Theory and in Practice. It is an outcome of the idea that the Israeli Intelligence Community Commemoration and Heritage Center, as a joint body for the entire intelligence community, should and can contribute to developing a methodological conversation on intelligence practice. The name of the journal reflects the notion that in the course of intelligence practice a methodology emerges, and hence it is the practitioners who have the greatest interest and ability to develop the intelligence theory that, when applied, will foster the continuing development of knowledge about intelligence methodology.

The main target audience of this journal is the Israeli intelligence community, to which most of the authors belong, with an emphasis on the active community, as well as supporters of intelligence in Israel and abroad. The journal is meant to enable those who have engaged in intelligence work in the past and the present - many of whom are concerned with questions of intelligence methodology, possess great knowledge, and want to share this knowledge with their professional environment - to initiate processes of improvement in the practice of intelligence.

Fortunately, it was easy to find authors to grapple with the methodological issues, and to gain the support of the heads of the organizations. We also expect to receive ideas from members of the intelligence community for topics that are worth addressing in the upcoming issues. We aim to devote each issue to a single major topic. The first issue explores the topic of jointness from an intelligence perspective.

The issue opens with an article by Dr. Kobi Michael, a veteran of the HUMINT division of Military Intelligence (Aman), David Siman-Tov of the Institute for the Study of Intelligence, and Oren Yoeli, a veteran of Unit 8200. This article addresses the theoretical aspects of the idea of jointness in intelligence, as derived from the concept of jointness in the military and business worlds. Originally written at the Institute for National Security Studies, the article explores the theory in relation to several test cases in the United States and Israel and outlines the processes involved in adopting the concept of jointness, the obstacles to implementing these processes, and the ways of coping with these obstacles.

Three articles focus on the intraorganizational dimension. The first is a work summary that was prepared, within the framework of the National Security College, by E. A., who serves in the defense establishment. He considers how intelligence organizations have dealt in recent years with the changes in intelligence challenges fostered by the changing environment in which these organizations operate, and finds that these changes accord with the accepted organizational theories. He discusses the role of jointness as an approach that has already been adopted by the organizations as a way to improve the response under these circumstances. He also considers the need to strengthen jointness and the ways to implement the necessary changes in the face of the natural resistances to such changes.

Lieut. Col. N., head of the processing department at the Research Division of Military Intelligence, proposes the idea of the intelligence-knowledge communities as a basis for a new organizational concept that could create a common space for knowledge development among research and collection personnel. This concept could enable Military Intelligence to overcome one of the major impediments, namely, the need to alter organizational structures so as to promote jointness as a tool for improving the intelligence response.

Two articles address the interorganizational dimension. One was written by A. A., who serves in Military Intelligence. It describes, as an extension of the concept presented in the article on the knowledge communities, the experience with interorganizational jointness in the intelligence community in recent years. In this framework a concept of developing deductive and cross-systemic knowledge, aimed at adapting intelligence practice to the “big data” phenomenon, was tested experimentally. The second article, authored by Lieut. Col. M. P. who is head of the air force’s Intelligence Division, proposes implementing the organizational jointness between the air force and Military Intelligence, which has been part of intelligence-operational practice during emergency conditions, under routine conditions as well. This is based on the notion that supporting practice is a central purpose of intelligence.

In the intelligence-operational domain, Col. Eran Ortal, head of the operational-thought team at the Dado Center, presents an intelligence by-product of a document he wrote on the future concept of land warfare. It focuses on the transition from jointness to fusion, which he views as required by the changes in the challenges and in the military-operational environment that are fostered by technological developments.

Concerning the interstate dimension, S. T., who until recently served in the defense establishment, describes the characteristics of jointness when dealing with the challenge of global terror, and outlines ways of coping with the obstacles to implementing cooperation at such a level.

Several articles address the intercommunity domain. In the first of them Ari Shuali, a past member of the intelligence community, portrays the community’s development and calls for enhancing jointness as an organizing principle of the relations between the intelligence services. The second article is by Member of Knesset Ofer Shelah, a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee’s subcommittee for intelligence and special services. He discusses the need for an intelligence minister with sufficient powers to enable civilian supervision of the intelligence community and improve its practice, including in the field of intelligence assessment. A bill addressing this issue was recently submitted for discussion in the Knesset and rejected. Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai, who served in Military Intelligence for many years and in his last post was commander of field security, together with Omri Gefen, director-general of the Gavim Group, describe the change of format in recent years in the interservice course and how it has become a tool to promote jointness in the community. Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, who was head of the Research Division of Military Intelligence, then presents the changes that, in his view, are required in the organization of the Western intelligence communities in facing the developing challenges including that of worldwide terror.

In the chapter on current issues, Lieut. Col. R., former commander of the Hatzav unit, offers his insights on the wave of knife-terror attacks based on a survey of the social networks. He presents the thesis that this is a phenomenon of the networks, a kind of “fashion” that suddenly emerges, continues, peaks, and subsequently fades and disappears, with no explanation having been found so far regarding the way in which it erupted or the reasons that it disappeared. This thesis may suggest a need for new collection and research tools that will shed light on network phenomena of this kind.

What can be learned from the extensive consideration, in this issue and elsewhere, of the topic of jointness in intelligence? What is jointness? It involves strengthening and deepening the aspects of cooperation between different components of the intelligence endeavor as a whole, to the point of blurring the original organizational identity and creating new intelligence sources of authority. Such a process challenges the way in which intelligence organizations are structured, thus fostering tensions and incurring organizational, human, and practical obstacles to its implementation. A situation of that kind augments the natural tensions that exist in all interorganizational activity between specialization and professionalization, between commitment to the cross-organizational task and commitment to the organization itself. Indeed, it is clear that, the more that the tasks and the environment change, the more organizations that were established in the context of certain tasks and of a certain operational environment lose their relevance.

The low level of intraorganizational and interorganizational coping with the need to remain relevant despite the changes involves making specific organizational changes, along with developing practices and mechanisms for cooperating and fusing knowledge. However, in many cases this level is already insufficient and one must move to a higher level of change - namely, jointness. This is the ultimate attempt to preserve the organization’s identity as a body responsible for professionalism while also generating new frameworks that integrate different professional fields, with the aim of creating a new specialization that is relevant to the response required by the task.

Seemingly it is clear that today, in light of the changing nature of the challenges - regarding the attributes of both the environment and the technology - enhancing jointness is both required and facilitated in all the domains of intelligence practice: within organizations, between them, and between the intelligence establishment and its consumers, political and operational. In the past, the lack of jointness fostered crises that illustrated the need for it; the use of jointness has produced not a few achievements. Overcoming the obstacles requires, first and foremost, a systemic perspective and leadership at every level.

Among the topics worthy of consideration that we suggest exploring: promoting jointness in force building and training so as to enable, to the extent necessary, the effective implementation of jointness in the hour of need; ways to promote jointness between research and collection by establishing joint organizations in the community; and the role of the intelligence consumers in shaping the intelligence response that they require.

The articles in this issue are more a kind of appetizer for discussing and pondering - in the community and in its organizations - the concept of jointness and its different interpretations.

Acknowledgments We thank all the authors who have contributed their time and energy out of an inner passion to develop the knowledge and the ideas that this issue offers, as well as the heads of the organizations who supported the idea and gave encouragement to their personnel. Special thanks are due to the chairman of IICC, Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Tzvika Shtauber, who initiated this endeavor, and to Brig. Gen (res.) David Tzur, director-general of IICC, which made the publication of this issue possible. As mentioned, we will be happy to receive responses and ideas for topics to explore in the following issues, as well as proposals for articles.

With best wishes for a rewarding reading experience, Yossi Kuperwasser and David Siman-Tov

The Theoretical Dimension: The Development of the Jointness Concept in Intelligence Organizations (Kobi Michael, David Siman-Tov, Oren Yoeli)

The Development of the Jointness Concept in Intelligence Organizations Kobi Michael, David Siman-Tov, and Oren Yoeli

Introduction The concept of jointness, which has become widespread in recent decades in military, intelligence, and civilian establishments, represents change in organizations’ modes of activity in complex and challenging environments. Jointness occurs in environments characterized by networks, that is, by numerous connections between the various actors. Cooperation preserves the distinct organizational frameworks, their powers and areas of responsibility; jointness, however, is a process of fusion that creates new organizational configurations and a synergy that is greater than the sum of all the existing capabilities. Usually organizations are not inclined to jointness. In a reality of crisis and competition, however, in which they find themselves threatened and susceptible to failure, they will likely become unable to produce an effective response to the threats and challenges, and that can increase the preference for jointness.

This article focuses on jointness in the intelligence field in light of the development of new concepts, which in recent years have led to the breakdown of walls of compartmentalization between the intelligence organizations. Such walls, along with prestige struggles and rivalries, were among the factors that prevented jointness in the past. The new concepts have also fostered the development of patterns of jointness between intelligence organizations and military forces that are aimed at accomplishing complex tasks, and, subsequently, patterns of jointness with organizations from the civilian sector.

After presenting the concept of jointness in its broad contexts, we will survey the development of the concept in intelligence organizations, with an emphasis on the Israeli case. In an attempt to expand the existing theoretical foundations, the article’s third section offers a theoretical discussion of the concept of jointness. In discussing the topic, the article addresses these questions: · What is jointness and why did the need for it emerge? · What are the interactions between the characteristics of jointness? · What are the conditions for implementing jointness, and what are the obstacles to doing so? · How is jointness manifested in the intelligence world, and what are the different patterns of jointness in this world?

The Development of the Concept of Jointness in the Military Context The idea of merging capabilities developed in the U.S. security establishment at the end of the 1970s. During the 1980s this came to be called jointness. The concept referred to actions, operations, and organizations in which some of those who participated belonged to two or more military branches. By the 1980s the command structure of the American forces was decentralized among five branches, which operated completely independently with regard to developing battle doctrines, equipping themselves, and developing manpower. Struggles over budgeting were waged between the different staffs, which sometimes led to impractical budgetary allocations based on the large advantage of a certain force, and caused an overall increase in the defense budget. When one of the branches encountered a problem of resources, it preferred to address it by lobbying Congress instead of sharing and utilizing existing resources that had already been developed in other branches.

In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed. It aimed to address the various difficulties and problems described above. The act brought about major changes in the structure of the U.S. armed forces, which were based on a strengthening of jointness, and transferred the authority and responsibility for force buildup from the commanders of the branches to the heads of the combined staffs. New geographic commands and a special forces command were established. In 1991 a U.S. military doctrine was first published that dealt with the idea of jointness in detail and comprehensively, in the context of implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The doctrine set guidelines for the armed forces on how to implement jointness in various domains so as to achieve maximal efficiency.

The publication and application of the doctrine led to the establishment of several research centers that dealt with developing joint strategies, battle plans, and training. The lessons of the First Gulf War, in which shortcomings of jointness between the different forces emerged, along with disparities between the written doctrines that emphasized separate activity and the interfaces that required a high level of jointness, became a catalyst for developing common doctrines that promoted the concept of jointness.

Theoretical Developments of the Concept of Jointness Zvi Lanier, who developed the idea of jointness in military organizations, defined it as “creating a new systemic capability that is based on fusing the unique assets of the different actors and that entails a deeper connection than coordination or cooperation.” Lanier ranks the joint activities hierarchically according to their quality and the extent of their systemic influence in the military context. He points to the need to distinguish between coordination, cooperation, and jointness, with each of these interfaces characterizing a different level of interaction.

Lanier defines coordination as “a level of interface that enables the achievement of systemic efficiency through the standardization of the processes.” An example is coordination during a battle between a holding force and a strike force, entailing the coordination of time, space, and power. Lanier locates the concept of cooperation one level above that of coordination. He maintains that to achieve systemic effectiveness (relevance), coordinated systemic thinking is not enough. Although it enables the forces to operate effectively, it gives no guarantee of achieving the desired effect on the enemy. Every campaign has specific unique features, and every enemy requires unique systemic understanding. In “common systemic thinking,” cooperation is an interface in which the opposing system’s logic is conceptualized.

Above the concepts of coordination and cooperation, Lanier locates the concept of jointness. In his view, the purpose of jointness is to ensure that systemic effectiveness is maintained even amid the changing reality. Because the external system exists in an incessantly changing environment, relevance can be preserved only through a dynamic system in which all the levels are involved in the process of knowledge development. The new knowledge emerges in the encounter between the different entities and fosters an ongoing organizational transformation.

Because the space in which knowledge is created exists at the friction points between the entities, in a vacuum that is beyond the perceptual reach of any single entity, it is known as the “no man’s cognitive zone.” It is the knowledge created in this space that, Lanier asserts, constitutes the “joint systemic thinking.”

Today, in both the U.S. army and the IDF, definitions of jointness are influenced by the above-described conceptual developments and constitute main components of these armies’ concepts. This is especially true for the U.S. army, which, since the beginning of the 1990s, has regarded jointness as a central element of its strategy while distinguishing between aspects of the concept and its implementation. The IDF’s definition similarly distinguishes between jointness as an action, or a process resulting from an action, and jointness as a concept and an organizational culture.

The Dimensions and Stages of Jointness At the basis of the strategic learning process is an abstract thought process. In it, through joint thinking of all the combined actors in the process, the conceptual framework and set of joint concepts are formulated, also enabling ongoing joint thinking about the practical implications of the new conceptual framework. At this stage the existing paradigms are challenged, updated, or replaced and a new vision emerges. This new vision seeks to transcend resource limitations because it assumes that reality can be influenced and changed, and because it challenges the organization to think about solutions that go beyond those limitations. Thus a concept is simultaneously one of the aspects and one of the outcomes of jointness. The encounter between the different actors in the process of formulating the concept fosters the emergence of new knowledge in domains that initially were outside the organizational domains of thought (the no man’s cognitive zone).

As distinct from conceptual jointness, organizational jointness is manifested in interfaces and joint work between organizations. It includes joint organizational structures, joint work procedures, and an organizational climate (“ecology”) that enables several organizations to operate synchronically while fully utilizing the capabilities of each organization and creating a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, and that facilitates the promotion of common objectives. Organizational jointness is also required for force building with regard to training manpower and devising organizational infrastructures. Those aspects lead to efficient utilization of the organizations’ resources and capabilities as a regular and systematic pattern of addressing the complex challenges that face them. Organizational jointness is especially evident at the planning stage, within the paradigmatic conceptualized framework. At this stage the learning is not “complex learning”; it focuses on assimilating new information into existing frameworks of thought.

Organizational jointness facilitates identifying the organizational areas in which changes are needed. Such changes can lead to the establishment, dismantlement, or merging of organizational structures, to defining new functions or new professional concepts that influence the work configuration of the existing personnel, and to discerning the required environmental components for creating a joint ecology. Organizational jointness is also needed for the stage of performance and implementation of the plans that were formulated at the planning stage. The performance stage is an essential component of organizational jointness because it represents the test of relevance in meeting the challenges. At this stage, too, the learning that is conducted is “simple learning”; it involves adapting the means and modes of activity to the given challenge and on the basis of an existing concept/paradigm.

Figure 1 represents the aspects of jointness (conceptual and organizational) as they are manifested in a learning process:

Performance -> Simple learning -> Implementing the action
Planning -> Action plan -> Organization -> Conceptual jointness / Organizational jointness
Complex learning: Concept formulation / Vision <-> Concept, logic <-> Organization
Organization elements: Organizational structure, Roles, Work procedures, Environment (organizational ecology).

The Transition from Crisis to the Relevance and the Importance of Organizational Ecology Jointness can be framed as a process that begins from a crisis, evolves into a conceptual, organizational, and operative development, and leads to improving the organization’s relevance to the challenges that exist in the setting of its activity. The success of the process is also conditional on the ecology of the organization and of its environment.

First Stage: Crisis Crisis is the factor that fosters organizational processes that facilitate developing jointness as a concept and as a mode of activity. The literature defines crisis as a situation in which a change appears following a sudden event, or as a change that is pronounced in tendency, direction, or time. In such a case the situation must be reassessed; the threats, values, and goals of the involved actor must be reconsidered. The change can occur in an internal or external environment, and the threat pertains to high-priority goals or basic organizational values. The crisis begins with a sense of “strategic helplessness,” which manifests the organization’s relevance gap regarding the challenges of its environment - that is, an inability to cope with new problems and devise a response to the challenges based on the organization’s existing concept, resources, and capabilities.

Second Stage: Systemic Learning After recognizing the crisis the organizations have encountered, or because of the desire to avoid a possible crisis, complex learning processes are required that aim at designing the relevant conceptual framework for activity. These are necessary because simple learning processes, which were meant to enable the adaptation of modes of activity based on an existing concept, were unable to prevent the relevance gap that emerged because of the irrelevance of the existing concept. When the thought and learning processes are conducted jointly by several actors from different organizations, out of an understanding that each organization’s learning infrastructure and paradigm are insufficient in themselves to develop significant insights, then these processes can be defined as conceptual jointness.

The learning process reexamines the organization, its goals, the effect it seeks to achieve, and the environment within which it operates. Organizational jointness can emerge as a possible direction for solving the crisis that has occurred in the process, though not the only direction. If a joint solution is to be advanced, it must be perceived as potentially providing a joint benefit (payoff) that is greater than the benefit that will be yielded by separate, nonjoint activity.

Third Stage: Organizational Processes and Organizational Ecology The success of the procedures and the action plan that are formulated on the basis of the new concept is affected by some characteristics and conditions in the organizational and interorganizational ecology. These include work norms, dynamics that the organizations generate, trust between the players, as well as the degree of autonomy that is allowed for the work levels. Even though there can be cases where the processes of incubation of the organizational ecology begin from the bottom up, the completion and institutionalization of a new organizational ecology must be carried out from the top down. Without the support, encouragement, and inspiration of the organization’s managerial level, a new organizational ecology cannot be designed. Jointness is possible only when information flows freely between and within the organizations. Therefore, the management level must grant the work levels autonomy to develop joint interfaces and create an open and free information flow in the interorganizational space. The sides that take part in the joint interface will agree to take the risk when they have expectations of positive behavior by the partners, and no expectations of negative behavior by those partners. Trust is a function of expectations and of readiness to take risks. In a situation where the sides do not have a common history, they do not know what to expect from the other side, and the point of departure for their relations will be neutral. Such a situation requires a gradual building of trust, which is achieved through the strengthening of positive behaviors and their reciprocation.

Jointness must be evident in the work norms and in an environment that supports information sharing, the development of contacts, and joint processes in which the workload is divided among several parties. The perception of jointness is influenced by the extent of autonomy provided to the workers who operate under the organization’s aegis in a joint framework. Experience has shown that in cases where workers enjoyed autonomy, it was easier to build a work environment of trust between the sides, and hence also to foster an ability to work jointly.

Jointness requires organizations to cede, to some extent, their original identity and create a new professional identity for a task. Therefore, along with the many advantages of networked organization in facing networked challenges, it is important to prevent a dissociation between the original professional identity of the individuals in the new organization and their mother organization, which is well familiar with their training, advancement, and professional identity.

Jointness in Intelligence Bodies The development of jointness in intelligence agencies results from learning from similar processes in the military and business worlds, and also from major changes in the nature of the intelligence challenges along with the technological advances that have enabled these changes. For example, Brig. Gen. Itai Brun, who served as head of the Research Division of Israeli Military Intelligence, describes these changes: ‘The centrality of information technology in our era plays a leading role…. In such a world one can gather information in a quantity and of a quality that were not possible in the past, and one can analyze and process the information in time constants that were not possible…. The new world generates a flood of information, leading to competition with other information and knowledge providers and exposing weak points.’

Changes in the technological environment and in the intelligence challenges have fostered changes in the nature of intelligence work and in the outputs that are expected from it. Intelligence organizations are required to monitor “hidden” entities and incriminate them, and must also track emergent processes, which are not based on any prior planning or even on any definition of a clear goal by the decision-makers on one of the sides. Likewise, the time constants for dealing with events have shortened substantially for those working in intelligence (for example, as a result of weapons whose use does not require special preparation, such as high-trajectory weapons), while because of the information revolution, intelligence personnel must cope with considerably greater magnitudes of information and knowledge than in the past.

According to a senior government official who is close to the Israeli intelligence community (speaking in a closed intelligence forum), recent years have witnessed an attitude change in this community. In the context of the change, organizational measures have been taken that integrate several organizations, a new concept has been instilled of “breaking down the walls” between intelligence gathering and research, and joint intelligence spaces have been created that grant access to each partner according to his needs.

Mechanisms That Foster Jointness in Intelligence: Management Frameworks of the Intelligence Establishment A milestone in the history of Israeli intelligence, intended to promote jointness, was the establishment in 2007 of the Operations Division of Military Intelligence. A response to the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, it was a modern incarnation of the Collection Division. The unit’s purpose is to generate better contact between the different bodies in Military Intelligence, and better contact between intelligence and the operational field echelons. The Operations Division is meant to serve as a kind of operational headquarters for all the entities in Military Intelligence. It has been given authority to manage the operations of the special divisions that are subordinate to Military Intelligence, allocate intelligence-gathering resources according to the changing intelligence picture, and to guide joint processes. The lessons of the Second Lebanon War led the division to formulate a new concept of compartmentalization, which has enabled faster and higher-quality assimilation of intelligence among the combat forces. Another domain that helps promote jointness is that of training.

In the era of the cybernetic revolution, technological changes significantly affect the ecology that is required to maintain jointness between different intelligence bodies. The changes that have occurred in the fields of management and information systems have fostered new challenges for the intelligence bodies along with new opportunities. This is evident in the emergence of new domains of discourse between research and collection personnel through the networked space. Examples are “Wiki” platforms that are based on the concept of Wikipedia - an open encyclopedia in which the articles are written and edited by the users, who contribute according to their expertise - or platforms based on a social network where various parties deal with a particular issue, contributing their interpretations and special insights. The discourse on the intelligence social network removes obstacles related to the participants’ organizational affiliation or rank, which usually play a role when the discourse is not networked. In this context American researchers have put forth the concept of a “joint intelligence environment” that has the characteristics of the social networks, and that includes virtual encounters, the joint writing of “live documents” (which can be constantly updated), blogs, and so on.

Patterns of Jointness in Intelligence The patterns of jointness can be characterized by two variables: the operative environment and the nature of jointness. These two characteristics enable one to posit a typology of four prototypes. The first variable can be portrayed as an axis, one end of which represents the classic intelligence operative environment, while the other end represents a mixed or multifactorial operative environment (in which intelligence is only one of the actors). In the intelligence operative environment, intelligence methodology and intelligence concepts are utilized, and there is little or no compartmentalization. In the mixed operative environment, however, intelligence is one actor out of several that operate with different methodologies and have different organizational identities. Intelligence must then adjust to external rules of the game, adapt itself to them conceptually and operationally, and uphold the rules of compartmentalization. The second variable can be portrayed as an axis where one end represents the conceptual nature of jointness, while the other end represents the organizational nature. A crossing of the axes of the variables creates a matrix that represents four prototypes of patterns of intelligence jointness: · The first prototype represents conceptual jointness, which involves joint thinking and learning about the intelligence endeavor by several actors from a variety of intelligence organizations, and the formulation of other intelligence concepts. · The second prototype also involves jointness frameworks for thinking about and designing the campaign, but in this case the intelligence organizations constitute a single actor out of a group of actors, and the emphasis in the joint thinking and learning process is on developing knowledge about the effort as a larger whole. · The third prototype represents intraorganizational jointness, which is conducted between the frameworks for research, collection, cyber, and technology. This jointness is linked to the essence of the intelligence activity, and it is what enables intelligence to fully utilize its capabilities. · The fourth prototype represents jointness between intelligence and nonintelligence systems and organizations.

The Israeli Case and the Test of Dealing with Palestinian Terror Since the beginning of the new millennium, Israel’s Military Intelligence (Aman) and General Security Service (Shabak) have been at the forefront of the struggle against Palestinian terror. The crisis Israel underwent in countering the suicide terror of the Second Intifada led to the development of intelligence and operational jointness at a very high level of effectiveness, which has been activated since that time both in routine and in war. During the long years of conflict with the Palestinians, Aman changed from an entity that helped with decision-making, formulated strategy, and planned military campaigns to a significant operational tool that focuses on resolving operational issues as a primary task.

In the 1990s the Israeli intelligence community’s prevailing approach to relations between Aman and the Shabak was a sort of “Magna Carta.” To a large extent it represented a contrast to the jointness approach, since it set boundaries of responsibility between the intelligence services, defined domains of activity and prerogatives, and did not seek to create a joint domain of action. After a few years of jointly struggling against terror, which were described as “years of mass arrests and targeted thwarting,” the branches of the community drew closer to each other, particularly Aman and the Shabak. An atmosphere of trust and closeness began to develop between them, much unlike the atmosphere of dispute that had characterized their relations until then.

Yuval Diskin, then deputy head of the Shabak, led the “joint thwarting approach,” which utilized intelligence and operational capabilities to carry out targeted thwarting. Under his leadership the Shabak eliminated the compartmentalization between its territorial units. The terror organizations crossed territorial boundaries, necessitating a focus on the Palestinian system as a whole. Diskin also developed channels of dialogue and coordination with the main SIGINT unit of the Intelligence Corps (Unit 8200) and included its representatives in the command rooms of the Shabak, using SIGINT to achieve operational results. He took a similar tack regarding IDF operational units that served in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza, and also regarding the air force. Removing obstacles of compartmentalization, and maintaining a joint presence in the command and control rooms, created an atmosphere of trust and openness along with a common language that helped develop and instill a joint consciousness among the organizations. The integration of forces in the internal and external environments of the intelligence organizations, the linking of intelligence organizations and operational units, enabled new operational achievements. Subsequently Aman and the Shabak were able to develop jointness at a high level, based on fusing information between all the collection and research agencies so that a “target bank” of high magnitude and quality was created. The three recent rounds of warfare in the Gaza Strip (in 2008, 2012, and 2014) provide an example.

A pattern of interorganizational jointness allowed utilizing the required information to create a target bank of great precision and quantity. The concept of jointness between intelligence actors and operational-combat forces was also manifested in the Canopy of Fire project - the IDF’s version of the idea of targeted thwarting that was developed by the Shabak. As part of the project, intelligence personnel and personnel from the Artillery Corps or the air force operate in joint attack cells to destroy cells seeking to fire rockets and antitank weapons and to thwart infiltrations by terrorists.

Summary and Main Points In recent decades significant changes have occurred in the concept of jointness and in the ways in which it is applied in practice. At the beginning of the 21st century, jointness became a more significant tool for intelligence communities. This change was fostered by transformations in the security environment in which these communities operated, crises that beset the intelligence community when the nature of intelligence challenges underwent a change, and technological and cultural developments. Jointness refers to a complex and multidimensional interface between entities, which by its nature entails learning processes at different levels and is made possible by an appropriate organizational culture and a supportive environment. The realization that intelligence work can be made more relevant and efficient by jointness is not always intuitive. Jointness is enabled only under unique conditions in which organizations must share responsibility with each other and demonstrate an understanding of this need. The challenges that have arisen for the organizations, and the crises that have affected them as a result, have exposed them to gaps in their relevance and have become factors leading to jointness.

Jointness is not required in every case, and there have been cases in which it was tried and did not turn out to be the best organizational solution. The test cases indicate that jointness has not always been implemented properly. Its success depends on certain elements that were defined in the article as “organizational culture” and “organizational and interorganizational climate.” Particularly important is organizational freedom, which creates a space where it is possible and also advisable to provide autonomy to the work levels. This autonomy encourages flexibility and creativity, even if it entails deviating from the familiar patterns of activity. Trust between the players is also of great importance for the success of jointness. Jointness between the different intelligence actors, and especially between intelligence actors and external ones, has mainly emerged in situations where expectations developed among intelligence personnel for positive behavior by the partners, along with a diminution of the fear of competitiveness, of excessive compartmentalization, and of other attributes of organizational culture that are impediments to jointness.

The idea of an overarching body as a factor that fosters jointness and influences the organizational culture has turned out to be significant. An overarching administration can help create a climate, a consciousness, and values of joint work.

Intraintelligence jointness is most notably manifested in the multiarena frameworks, which integrate collection and research personnel whether from the same intelligence organization or from different ones. This pattern represents aspects of conceptual and organizational jointness, from the thought and learning processes involved in its emergence to the ways in which it is implemented. In these cases jointness entails the understanding that there is a need to alter the traditional intelligence-work configuration, which is divided into different disciplines, in the direction of a task- or arena-oriented approach.

To sum up, in certain cases the concept of jointness provides a response to major issues that intelligence communities now confront. At the same time, it is not a magic solution that eliminates the need for traditional organizational concepts and structures. Implementing jointness in settings where it is required also necessitates joint force-building efforts with regard to manpower, infrastructures, media, supervision, and so on. Such efforts are essential to deriving the maximum benefit from jointness both between different intelligence forces and between them and operational organizations.

The Intraorganizational Dimension: Intelligence Confronts Complex and Interarena Issues (A. E.)

Intelligence Confronts Complex and Interarena Issues: The Organizational Aspect A. E., worker in the defense establishment, graduate of the National Security College

Introduction In recent years Israel’s strategic environment has undergone dramatic changes that have increased its complexity and dynamism. These changes, which include regional upheaval, the rising dominance of regional camps and alliances, the entrenchment of substate and transstate enemies, the effects of the digital world, the emergence of cyber, and the shifting international arena, have led the intelligence organizations to acknowledge the challenges that they must confront if they are to maintain their relevance. Among these, two stand out: the challenge of operational intelligence, which mandates providing up-to-date and precise intelligence on a covert and changing enemy; and the interarena challenge, which requires finding mechanisms for intelligence to cope with phenomena and threats that cut across borders and arenas. Grappling with these two challenges has given rise to a third challenge: the tension between professional, disciplinary, arena-focused and issue-focused specialization on the one hand, and creating an integrative intelligence picture on the other.

This article, which is based on a paper written under the guidance of Dr. Yuval Dror of Tel Aviv University, in the framework of the studies of Class 42 of the National Security College (2015-2016), focuses on the effort to address these challenges. The article examines how intelligence organizations perceive their ability to meet these challenges, and whether there are gaps between this ability and the demands of the environment. In addition, it considers the mechanisms that have been used to cope with these challenges, the degree of their effectiveness in the eyes of those engaged in the endeavor, the hindrances to utilizing them, and the existence of other mechanisms that are worth activating. The article makes use of concepts from the field of organizational theory to examine the structure and operative approach of the organizations and the change processes that have occurred in them, based on documents that summarize the change processes that have been implemented in Military Intelligence (Aman) and on interviews with past and present senior intelligence officials.

Theoretical Background: Organizational Theory Organizational theory defines and describes organizations with a focus on two main characteristics: task division and mechanisms of integration and communication. The theory maintains that congruence between the nature of the environment in which the organization operates on the one hand, and its structure and organizational paradigm on the other, is a condition for efficiency and effectiveness. The paradigm is the worldview that shapes the structure, values, policy, and actions of the organization. The Israeli defense organizations commonly use the term “operational approach” to describe an approach within this conceptual framework.

According to organizational theory, in a stable environment, organizations will be based on a mechanistic, formal, and centralized organizational structure, with a well-defined division of labor between the subunits. A dynamic environment will require the organization to adopt an organic, flexible, and changeable structure, along with autonomy for the subunits. Project-based teams will be established, and informal channels of communication will be developed so as to improve lateral coordination. In addition, the theory asserts that a complex environment requires a high level of specialization in order to process the abundant information that it produces. In a complex and stable environment, coordination between the specialists will be achieved through a standardization of specialization, while in a complex and dynamic reality, more flexible and less formal coordination mechanisms will be employed, with an emphasis on direct communication.

The need for specialization creates a delicate balance between dividing the organization into specialized frameworks and the need to achieve integration between the specialists in the different frameworks. Integration is produced by coordination and integration mechanisms. These range from mutual informal coordination, via the functionaries who are responsible for communication and integration, to complex matrix-type structures. These mechanisms are integrated into the overall structure of the organization, and the theory posits several basic configurations of an organizational structure that are distinguished from each other by the level of centralization, the hierarchical structure, and the extent of formality that is practiced in them.

Effective coping with a complex and dynamic environment also requires adapting the organization’s modes of learning and information processing. The theory proposes combining specialization and integration, as well as linear processes and parallel and networked processes, so as to facilitate rapid information processing.

This goal can be accomplished by instilling the vision, values, and organizational culture in such a way that each worker will understand the purpose and the challenges of the organization as a whole, and also by sharing information and developing “organizational intelligence.” An additional method is to create redundancy and variety within the organization and give freedom of action and a minimum of specifications, with the directors functioning as enablers, coordinators, and setters of boundaries while letting the work teams manage themselves. The organization must develop mechanisms of second-order learning, which makes it possible to change its working assumptions and operative concepts. Maximizing learning also requires an ability to survey the work domain and identify preliminary signs of a change in the environment, and to develop and employ various sensing and processing mechanisms that enable one to experience the environment directly and in different ways.

Adapting the organization to the environment can also be done by reordering the organization’s work processes. This includes regularizing how information is treated: eliminating the separation between the collecting and the processing of information; harmonizing tasks and creating a joint sense of responsibility for the product; transferring decision-making and supervision from the managers to the workers; managing the work processes in a way that is logical rather than linear; and dramatically reducing the extent of standardization and supervision while decentralizing the production processes and centralizing the knowledge. One can thereby simplify the organizational processes; they can be conducted by teams that make their way through the entire process, defining roles broadly and multidimensionally based on the worker’s familiarity with all aspects of the process and on his involvement in more aspects of the activity.

Organizational culture, mission, and vision are also mechanisms that foster coordination and integration in the organization. It is the culture that shapes the group’s concepts, language, and thought processes, and these in turn determine its feelings, attitudes, values, and behavior. An organizational change requires a change in values and behavioral norms, and hence a fundamental change in the organizational culture. The organizational culture can be an obstacle to the change or a platform that promotes it. Effecting a cultural change requires agreeing about the aspects of the existing culture and translating the values and norms of the desired culture into a picture of reality and into behaviors.

The Intelligence Organizations: Structure and Operational Concept This section describes the operational approaches and the principles of the organizational structure of the Israeli intelligence organizations, with emphasis on the intelligence research bodies, and describes the main changes that have occurred in these organizations in recent years. To help clarify the organizational challenges they face as they cope with the changes in their environment, the section outlines how these organizations are structured and how they operate. Its main claim is that the structure of the intelligence research bodies reflects three basic principles that are deeply rooted in the operational approach: specialization (“detailed and rich intelligence”), completeness (“extensive intelligence”), and practicality (intelligence that “enables effective warfare”).

The specialization principle: According to the concept formulated by Yehoshafat Harkabi, head of Aman in the 1950s, the structure of intelligence research incorporates two dimensions of specialization. One is the geographic dimension, with which arena-focused research units are engaged; these deal mainly with military research. The other is the topical dimension, which is represented by research units that specialize in lateral fields of research such as terror, economy, territory, technology, and political-strategic research. According to Harkabi’s concept, geographic specialization has priority over topical specialization, and therefore “as a policy it is desirable to reduce the work of the interarena or the international compartment by relying on the work of the regional compartments.”

At present Aman’s Research Division is organized according to the same concept of giving priority to the arena-focused dimension. Among the topical units, the only one remaining in the present structure is technological research, which studies technological processes of military armament and force buildup, conventional and nonconventional. The arena-focused economic and political research is done in the context of the geographic arenas, and the research on terror and hostile destructive activity, which until a few years ago was concentrated in the topical, goal-oriented arena, has been decentralized to the relevant geographic arenas. In addition, several years ago a “regional arena” was established that researches deep cross-arena phenomena - democratization processes, the status of armies, regional economy, and radical Islam, as well as states whose importance stems from these cross-arena contexts. There are, however, organizations in which the dominant concept of specialization follows a topical or task-oriented, not geographic, logic. In such cases the subunits are structured according to an organizational logic and distribution that conforms to the tasks of the organization. Arena-focused specialization is reflected in the internal distribution of the subunits.

The principle of wholeness: The second principle that guides intelligence research is integration - creating the “intelligence whole.” The vision, according to Harkabi, entails coordinating intelligence work “in such a way that all of the intelligence staff work will resemble the work of a single person.” In Brun’s view, this whole should comprise three perspectives. The first focuses on states and organizations; the second scrutinizes the Middle Eastern region, including its deep trends; and the third deals with the international system as it undergoes changes. The integration of perspectives requires “operating with an arena-focused, regional structure, but also (and perhaps mainly) a cross-arena perspective (and sometimes also organization).” The organizational mechanisms that implement this principle will be discussed later.

The principle of practicality: “The tendency of intelligence is knowledge for the sake of action,” says Harkabi. According to Brun as well, intelligence research is “a practical endeavor that is directed at a decision-making process or at the needs of the organization and the operation.” An intelligence product has a consumer and a concrete use: national intelligence is intended for the prime minister and the defense minister for the purpose of formulating the national security concept; strategic intelligence is intended for the chief of staff for the purpose of crafting the military strategy; operative (systemic) intelligence is intended for the General Staff and the main commands for the purpose of defeating a specific enemy; and tactical (operational) intelligence is intended for the fighting forces to facilitate the operations themselves.

The Management of Collection and the “Intelligence Cycle” Another aspect that manifests the specialization principle is disciplinary specialization. This specialization involves, among other things, distinguishing between specialists in research (who are thus called researchers), specialists in managing the collection and operational activity (who are thus sometimes called intelligence-management officers), and those engaged in the different domains of collection. The common term for integrating the disciplines so as to create the intelligence whole is the “intelligence cycle.” According to this concept, intelligence work is a reiterative process with several stages that are clear and distinct from each other: collecting information, processing information (that is, research), and providing the completed intelligence to the different consumers. The structural implementation of this concept was achieved with the establishment of the IDF’s intelligence branch. The intelligence endeavor was divided into the collection bodies and the research bodies. Mediating between these bodies is the collection department, which manages the activities of the collection agencies without directly commanding them. It coordinates the requirements of the research compartments and transfers them in concentrated form to the relevant collection personnel.

The logic of the intelligence cycle involves organizing intelligence practice according to clear rules with a unidirectional flow of information: research sends the essential elements of information to collection; collection sends responses to research. There is no great need for either side to get involved in the other’s world, and almost no need for joint areas of discourse in order to develop knowledge. The compartmentalization between the research and collection bodies is meant to ensure that “everyone does his own work” and does not “disturb” the work of the other elements of the system or get distracted by them.

During the first decade after Aman’s establishment, the collection division became an “operational division” of the intelligence branch: a mechanism for coordination and integration that stands above the collection agencies and manages them professionally according to systemic needs, while also connecting and coordinating between the collection and research personnel and other personnel in the community. Today this function is assigned to Aman’s Operations Division, which was established as a lesson of the Second Lebanon War and serves as a headquarters for managing and coordinating the force’s operative and intelligence-collecting tasks vis-à-vis the different entities of the IDF and the intelligence community. It should be noted that today’s Operations Division has almost nothing to do with mediating the essential elements of information between the research and the collection personnel. In most cases these operate directly vis-à-vis each other, and need of the Operations Division’s services mainly with regard to the collection response and the building of the collection capabilities.

“The Aman process”: The reference is to a process of strategic change that was guided by the previous head of Aman, Gen. Aviv Kochavi, during his tenure that lasted until the end of 2014. The process stemmed from the identification of three main challenges that directly correspond to the application of the basic principles outlined above:

The challenge of operational intelligence primarily involves maintaining practicality when dealing with a covert enemy, requiring much more up-to-date and precise intelligence than in the past. This challenge is viewed as necessitating a change in the order of priorities and in Aman’s focus, as well as “a deep technological change, organizational change, and cultural change.”
The challenge of the networked and interarena enemy stems from the difficulty of the arena-focused specialization approach in coping with the networked and coordinated nature of the enemy, hence requiring “a different outlook, dynamic, interarena, and changing.” The main difficulty is that dismantling the structure of the regional arenas may entail “a heavy price in terms of basic intelligence coverage and specialization,” therefore requiring a “more flexible organization that can preserve the advantage…and in the interarena challenges as well…in connections between the enemies and cross-arena activities.”
The challenge of the tension between professional disciplinary specialization and jointness, which arises because “the traditional way of integrating the sources is again insufficient,” and because the enemy’s concealment, decentralization, and protection of secrets, along with the demand for high resolution and immediacy of intelligence, entail developing a new method of “efficient, rapid, and extensive fusion of the different sources of collection for a comprehensive picture.” At the same time, one must maintain “the great professionalism of the disciplinary collection entities” along with the “fusion of information and the breaching of organizational walls.”

The results of the change process include the creation of several mechanisms, some of them based on structural changes and some dealing with the improvement of work processes. With regard to the operational intelligence challenge and the practicality of intelligence, an approach to warfare was formulated that involves fully utilizing intelligence while assigning supreme priority to collection and research efforts on enemies’ fire and combat configurations. This approach has brought about a sharp increase in precise and relevant intelligence. With regard to the interarena challenge, it was decided to establish a “central headquarters” in the Research Division whose task is to foster better fusion and integration of the research fields of specialization and to establish a new arena (known as the regional arena) to deal with the ongoing interarena research. It was also decided to set up work teams and task forces, as well as administrations that can provide a ready and flexible cross-arena response with integrative activation of collection and research capabilities.

With regard to the challenge of the tension between disciplinary specialization and jointness, a new “intelligence paradigm” was devised. It mainly entails overturning the “intelligence cycle” approach by removing the barriers between collection and research in a way that facilitates parallel tracks of processing while using technological tools that give both collectors and researchers access to raw materials. To support this approach, Aman established an information-systems branch that formulates and implements jointness in the information systems.

Finally, in the midst of the process it was realized that these changes also require changes in the organizational culture. The importance of communication between collection and research personnel was emphasized, along with the value of information sharing and of disciplinary professionalism. It was also seen as necessary to lateralize decision-making processes, develop awareness about maintaining resource flexibility, encourage self-organization, and reinforce learning processes.

Questions and Research Method As noted, organizational theory predicts that coping with a complex and dynamic environment will create tension between the need for specialization and differentiation on the one hand, and the need for coordination, lateral communication, and integration on the other. This tension is not new to the intelligence organizations with which this article is concerned, and it is manifested in their basic principles. At the same time, as indicated by the need for the “Aman process,” the current level of dynamism and complexity of Israel’s strategic environment poses a more difficult challenge to these principles than in the past, and to the way in which they are implemented within these organizations’ structure and operative approach.

In light of these observations, the ultimate question for this article is: what are the elements of the organizational change that is needed to maintain the intelligence organizations’ effectiveness in a complex and dynamic environment? That issue was broken down into four secondary questions: · What is the perception of the gap between the environmental challenges and the organizational response? · What mechanisms have been and are being used to bridge the gap? · What is their degree of effectiveness and what obstacles hinder applying them? · Do other mechanisms exist that have not been tried and would be worth implementing?

The questions were presented to past and present senior intelligence officials, and to researchers from Aman’s Institute for Intelligence Research and from the Institute for National Security Studies. The responses are summarized below.

Findings How Is the Gap Perceived? As noted, the “Aman process” was initiated by Aman’s leadership out of a perception that the challenges of the changing environment were damaging the organization’s effectiveness. In interviews conducted after about four years of change and adaptation processes, different attitudes were expressed about the extent of the gap that still remained. Some of the interviewees, particularly those well familiar with Aman but outside the main sphere of its activity, still saw a substantial gap between the response and the desired situation. Others, usually those closer to the ongoing activity, said the mechanisms that the organization was using were providing a sufficient response to most of the challenges.

It is generally agreed that the changing environment challenges the existing structures. Cross-arena phenomena require an interface between bodies specializing in different geographic arenas, and phenomena that cut across essential elements of information require an interface between entities dealing with different aspects of the essential information (a difference in tasks). These interfaces challenge both the division of tasks between the subunits and the arena-focused division within them. There is still a lack of congruence “between the organizational entity and the task” and between the task and the knowledge needed to deal with it, so that “no one can perform a complete task alone.” At the same time, jointness, mainly between research and collection, still has not become a “principle that defines the organization.” In addition, the tools of organizational information processing, which were created by the existing units to enable a “local maximization of their role,” “do not facilitate systemic integration.”

In addition, addressing the new threat domains requires not only better structural connections between research and collection personnel but also the “practice of multidimensional research” and an “intellectual integration” that is difficult to produce. The new threat domains do not fit the “research DNA,” which is “focused on a defined group or body.” Therefore, a domain is “broken up” so as to accord with the specialization approach, instead of adapting the areas of specialization to the new phenomena. The result is “ad hoc integration vis-à-vis a specific event and task.” But achieving “research integration” and building new, basic knowledge about complex phenomena is difficult.

Even those who think the changes are generally being addressed effectively agree that the proliferation of cross-boundary issues requires greater interarena coordination, and also that this coordination is not always adequate to investigate such phenomena as entities in themselves. The result, they also believe, is potential difficulty in identifying new phenomena whose logic is not arena-based. Hence it is asserted that the “organizational stagnation” makes it hard to create “a proper and full approach to regional events” and prevents a broad outlook that discerns new phenomena in time. It is also claimed that the organizations are “captives of an arena-focused conception” and of “territorial-political thinking,” as evidenced by the way in which the subunits are structured. Evidence of this, it is contended, is that “the intelligence assessment is written in a regional mode, while the threats are dispersed globally.” The result is that response times are slow. What is needed is a process of “internalization and insight,” and only subsequently should a process of organization and division of responsibility between entities begin.

Conversely, some maintain that the changes and adaptations that have been implemented enable effective coping with most of the challenges. The “regional arena” provide a response to the study of the cross-arena dimension and to phenomena that are not characterized geographically, while joint teams of geographic-arena-focused personnel deal with the interarena dimension. The research specialization “had been and remained arena-focused” and must give the alerts when a new phenomenon is identified, even if it is cross-arena or interarena. Thus it is maintained that the geographic approach enjoys a clear advantage in fostering specialization, and that it is critical to communication with operative personnel. “The common knowledge space is built when the specialists [in the different arenas] operate together.” In this way the dialogue mechanisms and the work contacts between the subunits, along with the coordination and integration that are implemented by the administration, provide a sufficient response to the need to identify and address interarena phenomena.

If a gap remains, it is argued, it stems from the “research qualities” that are required to cope with abstract cross-arena trends, such as a changing warfare concept or common conceptual foundations for the elements in a conflict. It is very difficult to “produce” the level of research capability that this necessitates; it is likewise difficult to make allocations for tasks that are not concretely operative. Another important difficulty stems not only from the changing threat domain but, rather, from the digital world, which generate an “information flood.” Here the answer is not only “greater professionalization” but also centralized management of the intelligence process as a whole.

What Are the Coping Mechanisms?

Interarena and cross-arena research bodies: Interviewees agreed that the “regional arena” of Aman’s Research Division had proved its effectiveness in dealing with deep cross-arena social, economic, and ideological phenomena. It was claimed, however, that the arena has trouble dealing with phenomena that have an operative dimension.
Matrix-based work and multidisciplinary task teams: These mechanisms were described as very effective in guiding interarena tasks. The mechanism was implemented so that in each topical or geographic arena a topical referent was given responsibility, usually at the department-head level, thus creating an ad hoc team that was coordinated between the heads of the arenas, with no need for a structural change. For the matrix-based teams, regular task teams were also formed. These deal in multidisciplinary fashion with tasks of “cracking intelligence” or of developing operative responses to complex issues. The teams include collection, guidance, and research personnel.
Lateral work processes: The mechanism of informal direct coordination, at all the hierarchical levels, was described as a main tool of integration - within the units and between them, and between them and the operative management echelon.
Integration bodies and their managers: Aman’s Operations Division plays an effective role in managing the processes that require concentrated resources and interdisciplinary teams. Within the division there is mutual coordination by the arena heads, and a tendency to remove the compartmentalization boundaries of operators and sources.
Use of information technologies: A joint networked information space is viewed as a main tool for altering the Aman work processes. The idea is to carry out a “digital response to the challenges of the digital era” through a transition “from the old paradigms of information systems to paradigms based on a joint networked space - and not on constructing more task-specific teams.”

What Are the Obstacles and the Challenges?

The preference for arena-focused specialization: The main claim that was heard is that the “research DNA” is focused on entities, such as a state, organization, or movement, and not on lateral issues and trends.
The preference for operative research: A clear preference is expressed for support of operative tasks. This accords with an arena-focused concept, since operative activity is geographic in nature.
Control and ownership of information: The fear of losing control over the development and the products of knowledge is a main obstacle to creating a joint knowledge domain.
Compartmentalization and protecting information security: One of the considerable challenges to creating a common networked knowledge domain stems from the tension between the need to remove internal walls and grant access to intelligence information on the one hand, and the need to safeguard the endpoints and isolate them from the external world on the other.
A divisional, hierarchical, and centralized structure: The divisional structure that is based on “the professional autonomy of the units and the differences in the worlds of the contents, in their nature and culture,” is a main obstacle to the integration mechanisms.

What Other Mechanisms Should Be Applied?

The variety of research specialization: Independent research bodies should be established, based on limited manpower and on professional, high-level researchers and managers who will deal with the interarena and cross-arena threats, working along with the existing arenas and research units.
Developing the joint knowledge space, and assimilating networked tools to produce knowledge: A joint networked space that is interarena and interorganizational should be established, breaching the walls between the disciplines and facilitating the development of joint knowledge.
Establishing multidisciplinary, interorganizational task forces: The multidisciplinary, interorganizational teams should be given a fixed organizational status and legitimacy for full, multidimensional, interorganizational activity.
Matrix-based bodies: There is a need to strengthen mechanisms for the matrix-based management of tasks.
Professional development of researchers who have a broad perspective: A cadre of researchers should be developed who have cross-arena and cross-disciplinary experience.
A variety of viewpoints and research fields: Research centers should be established with new specializations (such as society, economics, media, etc.).

Discussion and Recommendations Because the intelligence organizations are required to provide a detailed, complete, and relevant product, they are in a constant struggle to balance between specialization, integration (wholeness), and practicality (applicability). They must combine a “strong organization of experts” with “close interaction between intelligence, technology, and operations,” and thereby “ensure that the organization will be relevant, attuned to reality, and capable of influencing it.” All this must be done while coping with an environment that is more and more complex and dynamic, requiring the organization to be “constantly capable of change so as to be adapted to the changing reality.”

The Tensions between the Principles of the Operative Approach:

The tension between specialization and integrality: This is the main tension the article considers and the main cause of the difficulty encountered by the intelligence research in addressing networked and interarena threats, and of the integration of disciplines.
The tension between specialization and practicality: This tension is seen in the difficulty of the specialized, serial, disciplinary work process in providing a rapid, detailed, up-to-date answer for the operational customer.
The tension between practicality and integration: An operative response requires specialization, while a broad perspective requires integration.

Recommendations:

The importance of identifying the change: Create mechanisms that enable one to identify the need beforehand so that the organizational mode for the response can be devised.
The importance of mutual coordination as an integration mechanism: Form a joint knowledge space for all personnel starting at the lowest work echelons.
The importance of varied viewpoints: Establish interorganizational knowledge centers with topical specialization and involve outside specialists.
The importance of interorganizational jointness: Turn research and intelligence cooperation into a method where each organization supplies the other from its own viewpoint.

Summary Implementing the mechanisms and the approach that are proposed here requires adaptations in the organizational culture and dealing with obstacles that stem from its attributes, such as hierarchy and centralized management. In addition, the change requires the internalization of organizational learning processes, which include scrutinizing the organizational paradigms and, particularly, understanding the limitations that the specialized structure and the operative emphasis create for organizational integration, and the need to seek mechanisms that compensate for these limitations.

An Intelligence Knowledge Community as an Operative Mechanism That Provides Strategic and Systemic Flexibility to Aman (Head of Design Dept, Research Division, Aman)

An Intelligence Knowledge Community as an Operative Mechanism That Provides Strategic and Systemic Flexibility to Aman Head of the Design Department in the Research Division, Aman

Introduction In recent years the military establishment in general and Aman in particular have identified organizational and conceptual flexibility as one of the challenges they face. The military establishment is not alone in this. Organizations (business, economic, social, etc.) also see the need to move quickly and adjust to rapid changes that are dictated, among other things, by the rapid change in the nature of the challenges and in light of the technological changes, most of all the Internet and the knowledge-explosion phenomenon.

This understanding led Aman to develop ad hoc modes of operation, under interdisciplinary task forces, with the aim of concentrating the collection-research-operational effort; the objective is to solve tactical-operational problems. At the same time, Aman as an organization underwent a series of ongoing structural and organizational changes, centering on strengthening the connectedness between the different entities that compose it. However, it is clear that the systemic-strategic program remains wedded to an arena-focused, geographic structure and to disciplinary endeavors (research, SIGINT, VISINT, etc.).

This article presents a new idea that could offer Aman, the intelligence community, and the security establishments in general a mechanism that enables multisystem flexibility for strategic-systemic treatment of emerging problems. It would then be possible, from the moment the need to do so is identified, to improve the knowledge-development process concerning a new phenomenon, and to shorten the adjustment time of the defense and operational establishment.

The Present Situation in Aman: An Inflexible Organizational Structure and Operative Mechanism At present the knowledge-development process in Aman is based on the intelligence arena as a mechanism for learning about Israel’s strategic problems. Accordingly, the structure and different functions of the arena reflect the way in which strategic, systemic, and operational knowledge is organized. However, the linkage drawn between the intelligence task and the standards, coordination/control mechanisms, and interests of existing bodies retards the organization’s ability to change in accordance with new strategic problems.

In systems theory, the gap between recognizing that the strategic environment has changed and executing the required organizational/conceptual transformation is called a conceptual shift.

What Has Changed?

The intelligence challenge has changed from obtaining information (collection) to utilizing information and turning it into relevant knowledge in the face of information explosion.
The strategic environment has moved toward increasing disorder, characterized by non-state actors, transstate networks, and rapid shifts.
The technological environment now allows broad, distributed, and continuous communication across intelligence disciplines.

The Knowledge Community as an Operative Mechanism At the heart of the proposed approach is an integration between the arena-focused organization (attached to structures and job positions) and a flexible organization (the knowledge community) not attached to existing structures, designed to bridge conceptual shifts.

The operative mechanism of the intelligence knowledge community must be based on four different components:

A systemic team: To guide learning processes, create new knowledge structures, and define conceptual frameworks.
A research team: To develop the research foundation, generate insights, and preserve organizational knowledge.
An intelligence task force: An interdisciplinary team set up for complex, focused questions requiring jointness and concentrated resources.
A monitoring and search team: To perform collection and processing in critical junctures, identifying anomalies and contradictions to the guiding thesis.

Summary: Identifying Obstacles and Facilitating Factors Implementing the knowledge community requires moving toward a matrix-based command model, modern collaborative IT architecture, and an updated approach to compartmentalization that maintains security while allowing open information flow within the community.

Joint Investigation Teams as a Response to the Big-Data Era: The Test of Practice (O. O.)

Joint Investigation Teams as a Response to the Big-Data Era: The Test of Practice O. O. - serving in Aman

Crisis as the Background of the Process Toward the end of 2008, a unique community intelligence project was launched with the cooperation of two main Israeli intelligence organizations to address critical intelligence gaps in a primary strategic arena following a significant intelligence failure. The project functioned as an ‘intelligence startup’ and an experimental field for innovative methods.

The Approach to Knowledge Development and Analytical Investigation Knowledge development requires three cognitive and functional elements:

The conceptualization element: Framing the perspective and world of concepts.
The known-unknowns element: Formulating concrete intelligence questions to close specific knowledge gaps.
The unknown-unknowns element: Validating, refuting, and discovering unpredicted phenomena.

From Inductive to Deductive Knowledge Development Classic intelligence used an inductive approach (‘collect as much as possible to form a picture’). In the big-data era, where information is endless and resources are limited, the inductive approach collapses. The deductive (analytical investigation) approach formulates clear hypotheses and argumentations to determine exactly what information is needed to answer a specific question.

Stages of the Analytical Investigation Process:

Precise definition of the intelligence question and required achievement.
Concept of reality: Identifying characteristics and degrees of regularity.
Information ranges and signatures: Positing how reality is manifested in digital/physical data.
Positing logical sensors needed to identify signatures.
Building a work plan and assessing intelligence validity.
Collecting, processing, and integrating findings for a complete answer.

Jointness as an Ordering Conceptual and Organizational Principle Implementing analytical investigation requires task-oriented, multidisciplinary teams combining disciplinary analysts (signals, visual, cyber, financial, engineering), systems analysts, and investigation managers working in continuous synergy without organizational walls.

Get Organized and Investigate Intelligence in the State of Routine Just as in the State of War! (Lieut. Col. M.P.)

Get Organized and Investigate Intelligence in the State of Routine Just as in the State of War! Lieut. Col. M.P., head of section of an intelligence squadron - air force

Introduction and Core Thesis Under routine conditions, General Staff air force missions are handled separately by Aman’s Research Division and the Air Force Intelligence Squadron. In wartime, however, integrated mixed teams operate together under a single mission commander. This article argues that intelligence frameworks in Aman and the Air Force Intelligence Squadron should be consolidated into a single integrated organizational framework during peacetime routine, matching wartime operational structures.

Organizational Jointness and Command Dilemmas Jointness represents the highest level of interaction (beyond coordination, synchronization, and cooperation). To resolve command ambiguity, the author proposes:

Subordinating the joint framework either to Aman (for research depth) or to the Air Force (for operative mission focus).
Implementing five safeguarding mechanisms: appointing the second-in-command from the non-leading corps, requiring joint approval of commanders, joint approval of work plans, participation in mutual command forums, and establishing formal Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).

Physical and Mental Conditions for Success Success requires a devoted command, shared physical location, unified IT and communication tools, elimination of organizational egos, mutual trust, and courage to implement structural change.

The Intelligence-Operational Dimension: A Sixth Era in Ground Warfare: The Intelligence Context (Eran Ortal)

A Sixth Era in Ground Warfare: The Intelligence Context Eran Ortal, Head of the Think Tank at the Dado Center and editor of the journal Bein Haktavim (In between the Poles)

Introduction: The Shift from Jointness to Fusion Modern ground warfare requires restoring ground maneuver to prominence through an automatic/semiautomatic intelligence-offensive complex. While ‘jointness’ relies on inter-service liaison and coordination mechanisms, ‘fusion’ incorporates vertical (aerial and sensor) capabilities directly and organically into the ground maneuver brigade.

Evolution of Military Eras and the Limits of Jointness

Fourth Era: Stand-off precision fire and aerial dominance.
Fifth Era: Ground forces creating battle friction to expose targets for standoff air/fire strikes.
Enemy Adaptation: Asymmetrical enemies (Hamas, Hizbullah) adapted by disappearing underground and into urban areas, drastically reducing their target signature shelf-life to seconds.
The Failure of Overextended Jointness: Creating complex attack cells and liaison headquarters cannot bridge the sensor-to-shooter latency needed for fleeting targets.

Implementing the Sixth Era Approach:

From ad hoc integration to lasting integration in force-building.
Organic aerial capabilities (drones, multirotors) within tactical ground formations.
Direct mechanized machine-to-machine fusion (‘eliminating coupling’ between seeing and shooting).
Broadband, stable ground-aerial communication networks.
Mutual synergy (Web 2.0 concept) where ground units actively generate real-time targeting data.
Lean headquarters replacing large coordination staffs with automated algorithms.
Transition to abundant, cheap, precise tactical munitions guided by the local sensor grid.

Obstacles to Change:

Tactical heritage favoring isolated traditional military professions.
Organizational territoriality and service branch protectionism.
The heroic command ethos focusing on human decision bottlenecks rather than automated data links.

The Interstate Dimension: Intelligence Cooperation against the Global Jihad Organizations (S. T.)

Intelligence Cooperation against the Global Jihad Organizations S. T. - the author serves in the defense establishment

The Threat of Global Jihad Al Qaeda and ISIS represent decentralized, borderless, transstate networks operating clandestinely with advanced media and lethal capabilities. Their global reach necessitates high-level international intelligence cooperation.

Models and Levels of Cooperation Purposes of cooperation:

Knowledge enrichment.
Systemic disruption (financial, logistical, recruitment networks).
Counterterrorism (operational foiling of attacks).

Stages of Cooperation:

Technical cooperation (basic information sharing, building familiarity).
Qualitative cooperation (sharing sensitive intelligence on common targets).
Deep joint cooperation (joint operational planning and execution).
Fusion of capabilities (unified operational mission structures).

Case Examples & Hampering Factors

US Intrastate Model: Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and Fusion Centers connecting federal, state, and local agencies.
East-West Bilateral Model: Cooperation between North African/Middle Eastern services (e.g., Morocco) and European agencies (France, Spain), and US-Kurdish cooperation in Iraq.
Obstacles: Divergent political interests, differing legal definitions of terror, privacy/human rights concerns (exacerbated post-Snowden), and mutual organizational suspicion.

The Community Dimension: The Israeli Intelligence Organizations: From ‘Magna Carta’ to Jointness (Ari Shuali)

The Israeli Intelligence Organizations: From the “Magna Carta” Principles to Jointness Ari Shuali - a past member of the intelligence community

Historical Context and the Magna Carta The division of responsibilities among Aman (military/national intelligence), Shabak (internal security/counter-subversion), and Mossad (foreign operations/human intelligence abroad) was established at the state’s founding and formalized in various ‘Magna Carta’ agreements. Over decades, this created rigid compartmentalization, operational duplication, and interagency friction.

The Need for a New Paradigm of Jointness Contemporary multi-domain threats, regional upheaval, and cyber warfare render geographic demarcations obsolete. The author proposes a new jointness paradigm:

Retaining core organizational specializations while eliminating external barriers.
Establishing shared responsibility for cross-cutting issues.
Promoting personnel mobility and joint training across agencies.
Empowering the Heads of Services Committee as the primary supervisory and governing entity for joint operations.

Why an Intelligence Minister, and Why Now (Ofer Shelah)

Why an Intelligence Minister, and Why Now Member of Knesset Ofer Shelah

Executive and Parliamentary Deficits in Intelligence Oversight In Israel, Mossad and Shabak report directly to the Prime Minister without an intermediate ministerial echelon or effective parliamentary oversight. The Prime Minister lacks the bandwidth to effectively manage, supervise, and arbitrate between the agencies.

The Proposed Secret Services Legislation Together with MK Yaakov Peri, the author proposed legislation to formally define the role of an Intelligence Minister with real statutory authorities:

Formulating multi-year policy, budgeting, and force-building priorities.
Regulating spheres of responsibility to eliminate duplication.
Overseeing the annual national intelligence assessment and bridging the gap between professional intelligence agencies and the political leadership.

Promoting Jointness with an Interservice Course (Shai Shabtai and Omri Gefen)

How Can Jointness in the Intelligence Community Be Promoted with an Interservice Course? Shai Shabtai and Omri Gefen

Reforming Interservice Training In 2013, the Heads of Services Committee reformed the interservice training course into two-week specialized command modules (for department/section heads) and topical workshops across Aman, Shabak, and Mossad.

Overcoming Organizational Closure Intelligence organizations suffer from ‘organizational closure,’ turf struggles, and divergent subcultures. Joint courses foster interpersonal trust, common terminology, and shared conceptual frameworks. The authors recommend expanding joint training into a comprehensive community-wide network encompassing academia, the National Security College, and executive-level seminars.

Changes Required in Western Intelligence Communities (Yossi Kuperwasser)

The Changes Required in How the Western Intelligence Communities Organize in Light of the Global Terror Challenge Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser

Systemic Crisis in Western Intelligence Failures to predict the Arab Spring, ISIS’s territorial rise, mass migration, and terror waves indicate a systemic gap in Western intelligence paradigms. Western analytical frameworks struggle to interpret Islamist ideological concepts.

Three Levels of Required Transformation

First Level: Adapting procedures, technologies (big data, OSINT), and establishing specialized interdisciplinary arenas.
Second Level: Shifting the core operational logic toward deep jointness and fusion across interstate and interagency boundaries.
Third Level: Transforming organizational learning mechanisms to enable continuous adaptation in environments of perpetual instability.

The Issues of the Moment: The Wave of Terror Attacks as a Network Phenomenon (Lieut. Col. R)

The Wave of Terror Attacks as a Network Phenomenon: Has the “Lone Wolf Intifada” Gone Out Just as It Came In? Lieut. Col. R - until recently commander of the Hatzav unit in Aman

Analyzing the 2015–2016 Lone-Wolf Wave The wave of stabbing and vehicular attacks in Israel and the West Bank was driven by viral Palestinian social media discourse rather than traditional command hierarchies. Applying Malcolm Gladwell’s ‘Tipping Point’ framework, the phenomenon was characterized by high connectedness, sticky cultural memes (e.g., glorification of individual attackers), and a supportive context of political frustration.

Viral Life Cycle and Practical Implications Like viral trends, the wave exhibited a biological life cycle that peaked and subsided rapidly without a single identifiable cause (preceded by an increase in the average age of attackers). Intelligence must develop big-data quantitative social media analysis tools to identify and influence negative viral network phenomena before they escalate.