RUSI Silicon Lifeline final updated web 1

Summary

SILICON LIFELINE WESTERN ELECTRONICS AT THE HEART OF RUSSIA’S WAR MACHINE JAMES BYRNE, GARY SOMERVILLE, JOE BYRNE, JACK WATLING, NICK REYNOLDS AND JANE BAKER AUGUST 2022 Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine DISCLAIMER IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS, This document has been prepared by RUSI for COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS IN informational purposes only (the ‘Permitted THIS REPORT Purpose’). While all reasonable care has been The purpose of this report is to expla…

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SILICON LIFELINE WESTERN ELECTRONICS AT THE HEART OF RUSSIA’S WAR MACHINE JAMES BYRNE, GARY SOMERVILLE, JOE BYRNE, JACK WATLING, NICK REYNOLDS AND JANE BAKER AUGUST 2022

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine DISCLAIMER IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS, This document has been prepared by RUSI for COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS IN informational purposes only (the ‘Permitted THIS REPORT Purpose’). While all reasonable care has been The purpose of this report is to explain and taken by RUSI to ensure the accuracy of material demonstrate how the Russian military depends in this report (the ‘Information’), it has been on Western technology. To achieve this purpose, obtained primarily from fieldwork in Ukraine and it identifies a number of individuals/companies/ open sources and RUSI makes no representations governments who are believed to be involved in or warranties of any kind with respect to the the designing and manufacturing of components Information. which have been acquired by the Russian military and are used in their military hardware. For You should not use, reproduce or rely on the the avoidance of doubt, RUSI does not impute Information for any purpose other than the any allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Permitted Purpose. Any reliance you place on these individuals/companies/governments, and the Information is strictly at your own risk. If you makes no representations or assertion that these intend to use the Information for any other purpose individuals/companies/governments have any (including, without limitation, to commence legal involvement in any sanctions evasion-related proceedings, take steps or decline to take steps or activity or are involved in directly or indirectly otherwise deal with any named person or entity), supplying the Russian military and/or Russian you must first undertake and rely on your own military customers in breach of any international independent research to verify the Information. (or their own domestic) laws or regulations restricting or prohibiting such action, unless To the fullest extent permitted by law, RUSI shall expressly stated in the report. not be liable for any loss or damage of any nature whether foreseeable or unforeseeable (including, without limitation, in defamation) arising from or METHODOLOGY in connection with the reproduction, reliance on For this report, RUSI’s Open Source Intelligence or use of any of the Information by you or any third and Analysis (OSIA) and Military Sciences party. References to RUSI include its directors and departments used extensive datasets of employees. components and microelectronics sourced from disassembled Russian weapons either captured For this report, the authors have processed or expended in Ukraine since February 2022. company, entity and individual names recorded These compilations of technical assessments were in Russian and Chinese. In some instances, names databased, standardised and categorised to enable of companies, entities and individuals have had further analysis. to be translated or transliterated. Every effort has been made to ensure accuracy in translation/ Physical inspection of a significant sample of the transliteration, and the authors do not accept weapons systems and platforms by RUSI during liability for any unintentional errors made in this fieldwork confirmed the authenticity and accuracy regard. of this data, which was also compared to product descriptions and serial numbers published by The authors also processed a large dataset of a wide variety of manufacturers. It should be microelectronic components with serial numbers, noted that grey and black markets for counterfeit verifying their authenticity and resolving them components and microelectronics are a global to specific manufacturers using open sources. problem, meaning that fool-proof corroboration However, a small number of them were not is a challenging endeavour. Given the evidence identifiable on manufacturer pages or on third- assessed here and the long history of Soviet and party seller pages, possibly because they are now Russian military procurement efforts targeting the out of production. Additionally, several components world’s leading technology and microelectronic had insufficient identifiable information necessary companies, the research team operated under the to make a positive identification. assumption that the majority of these parts were genuine. Assessments conducted internally by the Russian government, and seen by the authors, 1

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker highlighting critical dependence on a number of end users. foreign manufacturers, increases the confidence that the components identified in Russian weapons are genuine. Further scrutiny, particularly X-ray (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:22) analysis, could in future be used to prove the authenticity of many of the components found in these platforms. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine makes some of this additional work challenging. COPYRIGHT This data was then married with a range of other sources, such as shipment-level trade data, import © Royal United Services Institute for Defence and and export declarations, and corporate records Security Studies, 2022 in Russian in an attempt to better understand the country’s procurement networks while also placing these weapons in their tactical, operational and strategic contexts. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-Commercial – No-Derivatives ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 4.0 International Licence. For more information, RUSI would like to thank several people and see <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc- partners who have helped with this report, nd/4.0/>. including Professor Peter Roberts, Dr Markus Schiller, Dr Daniel Salisbury and Sean Corbett CORRECTION NOTICE, 8 AUGUST 2022 CB MBE. RUSI would also like to thank Altana Technologies, whose ‘Altana Atlas’ data platform Please note that an earlier version of this report helped us to understand how semiconductor erroneously indicated the US-based company and microelectronic goods moved through the Gumstix as German based. This has now been international trading system to Russian military corrected and any related figures have been updated accordingly. The authors and RUSI apologise for any confusion this may have caused. This change does not affect the analysis and conclusions presented in the report. An outline of an Iskander missile. Source: RUSI. 2

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Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 INTRODUCTION 7 SECTION 01: SYSTEMS AND WESTERN COMPONENTS 11 Worldwide Sourcing 13 Stemming the Flow: Sanctions and Export Controls 15 America’s Most Wanted 18 Grand Theft Analog 22 Everything’s Better in Texas 24 Tokyo Vice 26 From Each According to His Ability, to Each According to His Needs 27 Watching Switzerland 28 Going Dutch 28 London Calling 29 Berlin Station 29 3

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SECTION 02: AN INSIDE LOOK AT RUSSIAN MISSILES 33 The Iskander 9M727 34 Zarya Radar Processing Computer 35 Baget Computing Machine 38 Guidance Systems 41 Multiple Products 43 The Kh-101 Cruise Missile 45 SECTION 03: OPEN CIRCUIT: COMPONENT FLOWS INTO RUSSIA 47 A Global Supply Chain: Russian Semiconductor Imports 47 Zeroing in on the Battlefield 51 Tracking Sanctioned Entities 52 Hong Kong Chip Shops 53 CONCLUSION 57 About the Authors 58 4

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Executive Summary Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 attempted to address the severing of access to has not gone to plan. Launched in the expectation critical components through import substitution. of a surgical occupation of Ukrainian cities, it This approach has subsequently been found to be has become a grinding attritional struggle that non-viable. As a result, Russia must now either is rapidly degrading the Russian military. This design new and likely less-capable weapons or report, which contains an examination of the engage in sanctions evasion, which has become a components and functioning of 27 of Russia’s critical priority for its special services. most modern military systems – including cruise missiles, communications systems and RUSI analysis indicates that third-country electronic warfare complexes – concludes that the transshipment hubs and clandestine networks degradation in Russian military capability could operated by Russia’s special services are now be made permanent if appropriate policies are working to build new routes to secure access implemented. to Western microelectronics. For several years, Russia has operated a range of networks to illicitly Based on the technical inspection of Russian procure goods in Europe and North America using military equipment captured in or fired at a range of front companies, fraudulent end-user Ukraine, this report outlines the extent to which licences and other tried and tested techniques Russia’s multi-billion-dollar, decades-long military originally pioneered by its Soviet predecessors. modernisation programme has depended on the But Russia has also relied on large microelectronic extensive use of microelectronics manufactured in distributors in transshipment hubs such as Hong the US, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Switzerland, Kong, which have continued to move goods at the Netherlands, the UK, France and Germany. In volume to the country in recent years. order to be permitted to use foreign components in military equipment, Russian companies must If Russia is to have this silicon lifeline severed, it is demonstrate to the Russian Ministry of Defence critical that governments: that there is no domestic alternative. • Review and strengthen existing export controls in their own countries and jurisdictions. RUSI discovered at least 450 different kinds of • Cooperate multinationally to identify and close unique foreign-made components across these 27 down Russian covert procurement networks. systems, the majority of which were manufactured • Prevent sensitive microelectronics from by US companies with a longstanding reputation being manufactured under licence in states for designing and building sophisticated supporting Russia. microelectronics for the US military. Of these, • Discourage third countries and jurisdictions at least 80 different kinds of components were from facilitating re-export or transshipment of subject to export controls by the US, indicating controlled goods to Russia. that Russia’s military–industrial complex has, in recent decades, been able to successfully Russia is scrambling to procure what it can in bulk evade these. This report details examples of this before the net closes. The time to act is now. continued espionage from the Soviet Union to Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia has lost a vast quantity of military equipment in Ukraine and heavily depleted its arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles. Following the imposition of new sanctions and tighter export controls, the Russian government has 5

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Introduction ‘Yes, of course, we have not managed to do everything from a Swiss company called STMicroelectronics. over the previous years in the field of import substitution The UAV is powered by an engine from Japanese … But there is nothing to fear here: in key areas, which company Saito Seisakusho. Together, they make assure our sovereignty, we have done the essential’.1 the Orlan-10 a reliable flying machine with an operational range of up to 120 kilometres. Its In shot is a wide-angle view of a Ukrainian town. navigation chip is a u-blox Neo-M8 GNSS module, The distinctive crosshairs of an Orlan-10 UAV first identified in an Orlan-10 in 2018.2 The UAV’s occupy the centre of the screen. It is a Russian coordinates are likely communicated to its reconnaissance UAV designed to coordinate operator via a radio-frequency agile transceiver artillery strikes. The operator zooms in on an produced by Analog Devices. assortment of trucks; Ukrainian personnel can be seen gathering around them. Having established visual confirmation, the Orlan-10 operator calculates the coordinates of The video camera is produced by Sony and mounted the target in order to provide accurate positional on a gimbal motor produced by Hextronik, based data to the responsible fire control headquarters. in the US. It zooms in smoothly to provide positive Once the coordinates have been established, identifications of the targets. The Orlan-10’s flight targeting data is relayed to the radio operator who control system which keeps it above the target communicates it over a VHF R-168 Akveduk radio is based on the STM32F103VC microcontroller to set up the kill chain to the artillery brigade’s 1 Izvestiya, ‘Vystuplenie Vladimira Putina na Jevrazijskom ekonomicheskom forume’ [‘Address of Vladimir Putin at the Eurasian Economic Forum’], 26 May 2022, <https://iz.ru/1340365/video/vystuplenie-vladimira-putina-na-evraziiskom- ekonomicheskom-forume>, accessed 18 July 2022. [Author translation from Russian: ‘Da, konechno, ne vse udalos’ sdelat’ za predyduschie gody v oblasti importzamescheniya…No eto nichego zdes’ strashnogo net: po klyuchevym napravleniyam, kotorye obespechivayut nash suverenitet, my sdelali samoe neobhodimoe’]. These remarks were made during an address to the Eurasian Economic Forum addressing efforts by Russian industry to adapt to Western sanctions. In this context the word ‘sovereignty’ likely refers to Russian economic independence, rather than territorial sovereignty. 2 Inform Napalm, ‘Russian Drone Orlan-10 Consists of Parts Produced in the USA and Other Countries – Photo Evidence’, 2 June 2018, <https://informnapalm.org/en/russian-drone-orlan-10-consists-of-parts-produced-in-the-usa-and-other- countries-photo-evidence/>, accessed 18 July 2022. 7

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker command and control infrastructure. equipped with a GLONASS satellite navigation system.4 For this fire-mission, the battery will use Built by the Sarapul Radio Plant,3 the R-168 Akveduk the 300-mm 9M549 GLONASS guided rocket. The contains over a dozen components manufactured rocket has a reported range of 120 km and circular by Western companies. Incorporated into error probability of 7–15 metres.5 Onboard, the the radio’s control board is a microcontroller 300-mm rocket has a sophisticated computing manufactured by US-based Analog Devices, unit along with a triaxial fibre-optic gyroscope and a digital signal processor made by Texas and satellite navigational signals processing unit, Instruments. The transmitter board, through allowing the munition’s course to be corrected mid- which the operator’s voice is encoded and flight, ensuring even greater accuracy at extended delivered up the kill chain, is also packed with ranges against smaller, singular targets. The Western components as well as a phase-locked rocket’s gyroscope contains a field-programmable loop (PLL) silicon gate manufactured by a South gate array (FPGA) produced by Altera Corporation, Korean company. while its satellite navigation signals processing and computing units both rely on high-speed The fire-mission is assigned to a Tornado-S multiple static random-access memory (SRAM) modules rocket launcher battery, a relatively new system produced by Cypress Semiconductor. Figure 1: Western-Designed and -Manufactured Components in a Russian Kill Chain (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:26) (cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:14)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:7)(cid:25)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:15)(cid:20)(cid:7)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:30)(cid:28) (cid:15)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:25) (cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:25) (cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:3)(cid:25) (cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:27) (cid:7)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:27) (cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21) (cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21) (cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21) (cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:7)(cid:30) (cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:17)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:30) (cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:7)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:157)(cid:12)(cid:8)(cid:5)(cid:17)(cid:127) (cid:2)(cid:24)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:157)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:3)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:157)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:127) (cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:157)(cid:6)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:11)(cid:1)(cid:157)(cid:7)(cid:144)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:25)(cid:127) (cid:2)(cid:24) (cid:9)(cid:157)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:144)(cid:30)(cid:14)(cid:1)(cid:11)(cid:17)(cid:127) (cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:1)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:127) (cid:2)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:12)(cid:8)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:7)(cid:3)(cid:141)(cid:25)(cid:129)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:7)(cid:13)(cid:143)(cid:141)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:23)(cid:7)(cid:127) (cid:2)(cid:144)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:157)(cid:127) (cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:11) (cid:27)(cid:16)(cid:7)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:8) (cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:15)(cid:20)(cid:7)(cid:30)(cid:7) (cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:14)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:18) (cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:30)(cid:28) Source: RUSI. 3 Army Guide, ‘SARAPUL RADIOPLANT OJSC’, <http://www.army-guide.com/eng/firm1087.html>, accessed 18 July 2022. 4 Tracy Cozzens, ‘Russia Tests New GLONASS-Guided Missile’, GPS World, 22 September 2020, <https://www.gpsworld.com/ russia-tests-new-glonass-guided-missile/>, accessed 18 July 2022. 5 N R Jenzen-Jones and Charlie Randall, ‘Russian 9M54-Series Cargo Missile Documented in Ukraine (2022)’, Armament Research Services, 6 March 2022, <https://armamentresearch.com/russian-9m54-series-cargo-missile-documented-in- ukraine-2022/>, accessed 18 July 2022. 8

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Following the launch of the rocket, the Orlan-10 Irrespective of their age and date of construction, will maintain visual contact with the target and one theme remained remarkably consistent: from update the battery on any changes to the target’s the standard to the boutique, Russia’s weapons position. Any corrections will be fed back through contain large numbers of microelectronic the kill chain, eventually to the rocket’s computing components originally manufactured in North unit mid-flight to ensure the most lethal effect. In America, Europe and East Asia. While some this instance, the Orlan-10 operator observes the of these, such as commercial off-the-shelf impact on their screen: at least two trucks can be components, would have been comparatively easy seen ablaze and several Ukrainian personnel have for the Russian armed forces to purchase through been killed. domestic or international wholesalers, others were likely acquired by clandestine networks operated Real-world variations of this hypothetical kill by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) chain, reconstructed by RUSI, have been repeated or the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. hundreds, if not thousands, of times in various iterations since Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions While this conclusion may be disquieting given of Ukraine, as well as during the country’s 2015 Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the Kremlin’s expansive intervention in Syria. But this process would scientific and technological (S&T) espionage have been impossible without critical Western operations and the illicit procurement of Western components and electronics. components are not a new story. For close to a century, the country’s intelligence services have The systems described above are far from prioritised the collection of S&T information unique in this process, for Russia’s weapons and the acquisition of critical technology for systems and military platforms contain a range Russia’s weapons programmes.6 Preoccupied with of predominantly Western-sourced components maintaining parity with the West, Soviet technical and electronics that are critical to their function. espionage operations and the infrastructure From rocket systems to ballistic missiles and required to process this information were vast, tactical radios to electronic warfare platforms, comprising 100,000 individuals and 11,000 the Kremlin’s war machine is often dependent on information departments affiliated with Soviet components sourced from abroad. research institutes.7 This report contains an analysis of the most RUSI’s analysis indicates these priorities have comprehensive dataset of components yet released likely never changed, for both the SVR and the GRU in open sources, which exposes, in stark detail, continue to aggressively pursue the procurement the Russian military’s dependence on Western of parts, components and technical knowledge technology. necessary to build and field weapons designed to crush their adversaries. The dataset comprises close to 30 weapon systems, platforms and pieces of equipment captured Now, confronted with a sweeping range of new from or expended by the Russian armed forces sanctions following the February 2022 invasion in Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion in of Ukraine, the Kremlin faces the daunting task February 2022. In several cases, these weapons of replacing these components while building were examined by RUSI staff on the ground at alternative supply chains to move them into the various locations throughout Ukraine. Some of country. Having lost and expended huge volumes these were legacy systems, likely built decades of high-end weapons systems and platforms, ago towards the end of the Soviet era. Others were Russia’s military–industrial complex needs large state-of-the-art platforms built in recent years numbers of new components to sustain its combat as part of Russia’s multi-billion-dollar military operations and equip its armed forces for future modernisation programme. combat. 6 CIA, ‘Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: The Technology Acquisition Efforts of the Soviet Intelligence Services’, 18 June 1982. See also Kevin Riehle, Russian Intelligence (Bethesda, MD: National Intelligence University, 2021), p. 81. 7 CIA, ‘Interagency Intelligence Memorandum’, p. 7; Riehle, Russian Intelligence, pp. 138–40. 9

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker This problem is not lost on those at the highest a now almost-impossible aspiration in light of levels of the Russian government. For years, the multilateral sanctions designed to cripple the Kremlin has promoted, with little success, import country’s military–industrial complex. substitution to hedge against Western sanctions.8 In June 2014, Vladimir Putin highlighted the Although some components can be sourced from importance of import substitution for the Russian China, many critical components for Russian military and called for a wide-ranging transition weapons cannot. Without the requisite domestic to domestically produced military components.9 manufacturing capabilities, Russia and its armed Eight years later, however, Russia appears to forces remain highly vulnerable to multilateral have made very little effective progress in kick- efforts to choke off these component flows and starting a home-grown semiconductor revolution, raise the costs of its aggression in Ukraine. 8 For more on Russian efforts at import replacements, see Tatyana Mischenko, ‘Podderzhali otechestvennogo proizvoditelya. Chto takoe importzamescheniye, kak ono prohodit v Rossii’ [‘Supporting National Producers. What is Import-Replacement, How Is It Being Implemented in Russia?’], SovkomBlog, 27 January 2022, <https://sovcombank.ru/ blog/umnii-potrebitel/podderzhali-otechestvennogo-proizvoditelya-chto-takoe-importozameschenie-kak-ono-prohodit- v-rossii>, accessed 18 July 2022. 9 Interfax, ‘Putin zayavil o neobhodimosti uskorennogo perehoda promyshlennosti k importzamescheniyu’ [‘Putin Stated the Need for Industry’s Hastened Transition to Import-Substitution’], 28 July 2014, <https://www.interfax.ru/ business/388216>, accessed 18 July 2022. 10

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| SECTION 01 | Systems and Western Components The dataset acquired by RUSI covers 27 weapons Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), and the systems, platforms, radios, and pieces of Kh-101 strategic air-launched cruise missile equipment either captured or expended in (ALCM). It also includes tactical combat platforms Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale such as the 9K331M Tor-M2 air-defence system and invasion in February 2022 up until the end of a variety of UAVs, radio and satellite communication June. These systems include several long-range systems such as the R-168 Akveduk tactical radio, strike assets such as the 9M720 Iskander-M quasi- as well as electronic warfare (EW) and signals ballistic missile,10 the 9M727 ground-launched intelligence (SIGINT) platforms such as the Torn- cruise missile (GLCM) launched from the Iskander MDM. 10 Quasi-ballistic missiles are largely ballistic but capable of performing manoeuvres mid-flight and often have a lower trajectory. 01 11

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker Figure 2: An Overview of the Systems and Components Systems and Western (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:19) Components (cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:19) (cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:20) (cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:20) (cid:20)(cid:16)(cid:157)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:9)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:28) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:23)(cid:10)(cid:1)(cid:11)(cid:25)(cid:25)(cid:127)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:129)(cid:24)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:127)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:129)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:25)(cid:7)(cid:5)(cid:5)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:31)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:25) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:143)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:23)(cid:4)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:129)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:25) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:141)(cid:25)(cid:27)€(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:28) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:23)(cid:141)(cid:143)(cid:141)(cid:25)(cid:144)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:129)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:144) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:23)(cid:141)(cid:143)(cid:7)(cid:25)(cid:144)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:129)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:23)(cid:144) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:2)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:143)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:14)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:23) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:9)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:20) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:8)(cid:143)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:143)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:31)(cid:18)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:21) 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(cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:129)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:143)(cid:25)(cid:27)†(cid:23) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:27)(cid:13) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:129)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:143)‡ˆ(cid:143)‰ (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:27)(cid:13) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:129)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:25)‡(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:143)† (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:13) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:1)(cid:7) (cid:8)(cid:21)(cid:25) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:23)(cid:129)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:9)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:23) (cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:8)(cid:141)(cid:143)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:23)(cid:143) (cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:9)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:25) (cid:14)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:129)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:129)(cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:21)(cid:25)‹(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:31)(cid:4)Œ(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:13)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:20)Š(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:2)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:129)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:129)(cid:29)(cid:9)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:9)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:31)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)‹(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:26)Œ(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:143)(cid:7)(cid:143)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:13)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:14)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:13)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:14)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:129)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:2)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:19) (cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:9)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:17) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:27) (cid:7)(cid:6) (cid:12)(cid:25)Ž(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:21) (cid:7)(cid:1) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:21) (cid:7)(cid:5) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:29)(cid:28)€(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:129) (cid:6) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:129)(cid:19) (cid:6)(cid:1) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:17) (cid:6)(cid:5) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:3)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:27) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:2)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:27) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:9)(cid:129)(cid:24)(cid:23) (cid:10) (cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:27) (cid:143) Source: RUSI. In some cases, these systems were recovered Together, these systems contain a wide swath completely intact. In others, particularly in the of Western-designed components including case of expended munitions such as ballistic microelectronics, specialised cameras and and cruise missiles, they were only recovered sensors, transceivers and converters, air blades, in part, meaning that their component profile motors and a range of others. Among them, RUSI was not always complete. As such, component identified 450 unique components primarily lists for several systems presented here should sourced from Western manufacturers, of which at not be understood as exhaustive. Despite these least 318 came from US-based companies. In some limitations, the capture and disassembly of instances, these systems contained several of the these systems at this scale provides an almost same components. Meanwhile, some of the same unparallelled opportunity to understand how components were found across several systems these weapons are designed, built and deployed on and sub-systems, meaning that the total number of the battlefield. items was significantly higher. 12

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Many of these components are prosaic The dates of manufacture of the components and microelectronics that can be purchased through microelectronics vary. While some were built and online distributors in a range of countries and likely procured as far back as the early 1980s, others jurisdictions. In others, they are goods for which were manufactured in recent years. Western- export has long been subject to controls designed designed components found in a Kalibr cruise to prevent them from being used for military missile, for example, appear to date to 2018 and purposes. Today, following the Kremlin’s invasion 2019 – four years after a wide range of sanctions of Ukraine, the vast majority are now restricted for and export controls targeted Russian military end export to Russia especially if destined for a military users following the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine. end user. Figure 3: Kalibr Cruise Missile Modern Components (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:21) 3M — 1795 (cid:30)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:2)(cid:1) (cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:16) (cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:31)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:28) (cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:8)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:25)(cid:5)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:127)(cid:5)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:129)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:26) (cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:15)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:13)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:12)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:15)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:12)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:26) (cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:6)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:30)(cid:15)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:20) Source: RUSI. However, regardless of their particular efforts to strengthen controls on the export of classification, the presence at this scale of dual-use goods and critical components. Western-manufactured microelectronics and other components highlights Russia’s ongoing WORLDWIDE SOURCING failure to produce domestic counterparts or The majority of the components in the dataset source analogous items from elsewhere. It also originate from 57 US-based companies. Among underscores the challenges facing the country’s these, the most prevalent were items produced military–industrial complex in replacing by leading microelectronics manufacturers such equipment and material lost since the beginning as Analog Devices Inc, Texas Instruments, Maxim of the invasion, particularly in light of multilateral Integrated,11 Xilinx Inc,12 Microchip Technology 11 Operates as a subsidiary of Analog Devices Inc since August 2021. See Analog Devices, ‘Analog Devices Completes Acquisition of Maxim Integrated’, press release, 26 August 2021, <https://www.analog.com/en/about-adi/news-room/ press-releases/2021/8-26-21-adi-completes-acquisition-of-maxim-integrated.html>, accessed 18 July 2022. 12 Acquired by Advanced Micro Devices Inc in February 2022. See Advanced Micro Devices, ‘AMD Completes Acquisition of 13

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker Inc, ON Semiconductor, Altera Corporation,13 Intel increasingly common phenomenon, meaning that Corporation, Atmel Corporation14 and Cypress specific parts can sometimes be fraudulent, lower- Semiconductor.15 Together, a total of 208 unique quality copies manufactured elsewhere. components produced by these 10 companies were recovered from 26 of the above-mentioned systems These components were categorised into types used by the Russian armed forces. and subtypes in order to understand the most common ones used across these Russian systems. Outside of the US, a further 77 components were Most prevalent were microcontrollers and designed and produced by companies based in microprocessors, as well as complex programmable Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, China and Singapore. logic devices (CPLD) and FPGAs, which allow Thirteen of these were found to have been customers and engineers to configure the produced by Japan’s Murata Manufacturing Co integrated circuit after it has been manufactured.16 Ltd, while seven were produced by Taiwan’s Yageo Corporation. Other common Western-manufactured components include PLL synthesisers, operational At least 55 unique components were found to have amplifiers, oscillators, RS-232 transceivers, CAN originated from European companies. Notably, the transceivers, step-down regulators, ethernet largest volume of products came from Netherlands- controllers, analogue-to-digital (A/D) converters based NXP Semiconductors NV and Switzerland- and thermal imaging cameras. based STMicroelectronics. Other manufacturers include Switzerland’s u-blox, Germany’s EPCOS, While these kinds of devices play a huge number France’s Thales Group, as well as UK-based of different roles in commercial electronic systems, companies CML Microcircuits and Golledge they also sit at the heart of how modern wars are Electronics. fought. Complex sensors, information processing systems, targeting and navigation complexes, While most of these components had serial encrypted communication equipment and many numbers that could be verified and resolved to other modern platforms rely for their very function specific manufacturers, a small number were not on these kinds of microelectronics. Because of this, identifiable on manufacturer pages and are likely their construction or procurement will always out of production. In addition, some components remain a priority for Russia’s technology-hungry had insufficient identifiable information necessary military–industrial complex. to make a positive identification. It should also be noted that the counterfeiting of components is an Xilinx’, press release, 14 February 2022, <https://ir.amd.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1047/amd-completes- acquisition-of-xilinx>, accessed 18 July 2022. 13 Acquired by Intel Corporation in December 2015. See Intel Newsroom, ‘Intel Completes Acquisition of Altera’, news release, 28 December 2015, <https://newsroom.intel.com/news-releases/intel-completes-acquisition-of- altera/#gs.5eb5ck>, accessed 18 July 2022. 14 Acquired and subsumed by Microchip Technology in 2016. See Claudia Assis, ‘Microchip Technology Buys Chip Maker Atmel in $3.56 Billion Deal’, MarketWatch, 19 January 2016, <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/microchip- technology-buys-chip-maker-atmel-in-356-billion-deal-2016-01-19>, accessed 19 July 2022. 15 Acquired by Infineon Technologies AG in April 2020. See Infineon Technologies, ‘Infineon Technologies AG Completes Acquisition of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation’, press release, 16 April 2020, <https://www.infineon.com/cms/en/ about-infineon/press/press-releases/2020/INFXX202004-049.html>, accessed 18 July 2022. 16 These devices also require a programming device in order to be configured by the user either in development or at the factory. These programming devices, usually sold by the chip manufacturer, contain a number of complex parts and may be export controlled. This would mean that users wishing to import CPLDs and FPGAs would also need to import these supporting tools in order to programme them correctly. Xilinx, ‘Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)’, <https://www.xilinx. com/products/silicon-devices/fpga/what-is-an-fpga.html>, accessed 21 July 2022; techopedia, ‘Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD)’, <https://www.techopedia.com/definition/6655/complex-programmable-logic-device-cpld>, accessed 21 July 2022. 14

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine STEMMING THE FLOW: SANCTIONS AND microprocessors; interfaces; amplifiers; and EXPORT CONTROLS FPGAs. Following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the US, the UK and the EU passed a range of Clearly, the presence of large numbers of US- sweeping sanctions on Russia.17 These included manufactured EAR99 components in Russian targeted financial and sectoral sanctions, in weapons systems is strong evidence that these addition to the extension of wide-ranging export parts were either purchased from distributors controls designed to curtail the country’s access in Russia or that they were being procured and to military technology and critical components.18 diverted for military purposes. A variety of other countries and jurisdictions, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada, In several other cases, components found in Australia and Switzerland, committed to Russian weapon systems were subject to more implementing similar export controls. stringent export controls even before the February 2022 invasion.20 This is true for US-manufactured While prior to the invasion many of the US- parts,21 but also often others made elsewhere manufactured components found in Russia’s such as in the UK, the EU, Japan, South Korea weapons systems were cleared for export to Russia and Taiwan, meaning these will likely have been under the Export Administration Regulation procured illicitly and clandestinely shipped to (EAR99), US exporters of these products still had Russia or fraudulently diverted to military end a due-diligence obligation to make sure they were users at some point prior to the invasion. not destined for a prohibited end user, or to be used in prohibited end use.19 Several leaked cables from 2007 show internal US government deliberations over controlled exports Russian weapons examined for this to Russia. One of these concerns an A/D converter report, however, contained a long list of produced by Analog Devices that is very similar EAR99-classified components manufactured to those discovered in several weapons systems by US companies. Texas Instruments, Analog in Ukraine.22 While the Russian importer was Devices, Maxim Integrated and Xilinx were the ultimately deemed a civilian entity at the time, primary manufacturers of these, accounting for direct exports of controlled US technology would approximately 30% of the total. Notably, they have required both a licence and possible post- included a wide variety of parts important for shipment verification to ensure the product was geolocation and calculation, aggregated under used for non-military purposes.23 roughly four categories: microcontrollers and 17 For UK measures, see Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘UK Sanctions Relating to Russia’, 19 July 2022, <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-on-russia>, accessed 20 July 2022; for US measures, see US Department of the Treasury, ‘Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions’, <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial- sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/ukraine-russia-related-sanctions>, accessed 20 July 2022; for EU measures, see European Commission, ‘Sanctions Adopted Following Russia’s Military Aggression Against Ukraine’, <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/international-relations/restrictive-measures- sanctions/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en>, accessed 20 July 2022. 18 Ibid. 19 International Trade Administration of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) and Export Administration Regulation (EAR99)’, <https://www.trade.gov/eccn-and-export-administration-regulation- ear99>, accessed 18 July 2022. 20 Components for this project were cross-referenced against open sources to determine if they were classified under ECCN or EAR99 regulations. See ‘Methodology’. 21 Foreign-made components using US-origin technology commingled above a certain degree will still be subject to US export controls and may require an export licence. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Deemed Exports FAQs – What Technologies Are Subject to the Commerce Department Controls?’, <https:// www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/deemed-exports/deemed-exports-faqs/faq/48-what-technologies-are- subject-to-the-commerce-department-controls>, accessed 25 July 2022. 22 WikiLeaks, ‘EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: JSC VREMYA- CH, NIZHNY NOVGOROD, RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D368426’, 12 January 2007, <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07MOSCOW86_a.html>, accessed 19 July 2022. 23 International Trade Administration of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 15

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker However, following Russia’s 2014 invasion and controlled for national security reasons that are annexation of Crimea, a range of countries had destined for Russia.27 already been engaged in attempts to restrict the supply of components to Russia’s military– industrial complex. In early 2014, the US The BIS Entity List Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) expanded export restrictions to Russia, denying pending Following the 2022 invasion, BIS has added a large applications for licences to export or re-export any number of Russian and Belarusian companies to high-technology items subject to EAR to Russia its Entity List, a trade restriction list consisting of or Crimea that contribute to Russia’s military foreign persons, entities and governments subject capabilities or defence industrial base.24 In July to EAR that regulates dual-use items.28 Parties listed the same year, the EU followed suit and introduced are involved in activities that are either sanctioned sanctions which included an embargo on arms by the US State Department or contrary to the US’s and related materials, and dual-use goods and national security or foreign policy interests.29 technology intended for military use or military The Entity List imposes a licence requirement end users.25 on listed parties, regardless of other licence requirements imposed elsewhere in the EAR. In Since then, US export restrictions have been some of these entries, even goods classified as gradually expanded. For example, in December EAR99 would require a licence by the exporter 2020, BIS published a ‘Military End User’ to be exported, re-exported or transferred (MEU) list compromising 58 Chinese and 45 (in-country) to that party.30 While not as restrictive Russian companies which required exporters, as being placed on the BIS’s Unverified List or re-exporters and those looking to transfer being designated a ‘denied person’, for most of the components in-country to obtain an export parties on the Entity List, BIS imposes a licence licence to move EAR products to these entities.26 review policy of presumption of denial, effectively blocking those listed parties receiving Export In March 2021, BIS also narrowed the range of Control Classification Number (ECCN) and EAR99 EAR licence exceptions significantly, suspending dual-use goods from US exporters. License Exception RPL (Service and Replacement of Parts and Equipment), License Exception TSU (Technology and Software Unrestricted) and Hence, while the huge swath of sanctions and License Exception APR (Additional Permissive the tightening of export controls will likely Reexports) for transactions involving items significantly impact Russia’s ability to procure and Export Administration Regulation (EAR99)’, <https://www.trade.gov/eccn-and-export-administration-regulation- ear99>, accessed 18 July 2022. 24 Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Department Announces Expansion of Export Restrictions on Russia’, press release, 28 April 2014, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/all-articles/107-about- bis/newsroom/press-releases/press-release-2014/665-commerce-dept-announces-expansion-of-export-restrictions-on- russia>, accessed 19 July 2022. 25 Council of the EU, ‘Timeline – EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine’, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over- ukraine/>, accessed 19 July 2022. 26 Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 – ENTITY LIST’, 28 June 2022, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/2326-supplement-no-4-to-part-744-entity- list-4/file>, accessed 19 July 2022. 27 Alexandre (Alex) Lamy, Lise S Test and Paul Amberg, ‘BIS and DDTC Implement Strengthened US Export Controls on Russia in Response to Poisoning and Imprisonment of Navalny’, Sanctions and Export Controls Update, 29 March 2021, <https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/bis-and-ddtc-implement-strengthened-us-export-controls-on-russia-in- response-to-poisoning-and-imprisonment-of-navalny/>, accessed 19 July 2022. 28 Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Entity List’, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/ policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/entity-list>, accessed 19 July 2022. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 16

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Western components for its weapons, many of Numbers (ECCNs) on the US government’s those found in the country’s weapons platforms Commerce Control List.32 The ECCN system uses were already controlled prior to the 2014 and 2022 five-character alpha-numeric designations for invasions.31 determining if goods require an export licence from the US Department of Commerce. If a good In fact, a total of 81 unique components found in has an ECCN, then the product has been classified Russian weapons systems are classified as dual-use as a dual-use good and an exporter must acquire goods with associated Export Control Classification this licence for shipment abroad. Figure 4: Understanding Export Control Classification Numbers (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:14)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:13) (cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19) „(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:19) ’(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:19) ‰(cid:15)(cid:27)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:19) „(cid:129)““(cid:6)‚‘Ž(cid:19)‚(cid:14)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:143)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:157)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:19)“”(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:6)(cid:8) 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(cid:7)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:30)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:9) (cid:157)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:18) (cid:6)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:18) (cid:4) (cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:21)(cid:21)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:2)(cid:30) (cid:5)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:21)(cid:13)(cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:18) (cid:23)(cid:3)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:13)(cid:21)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:30) (cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:2)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:18) (cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:12)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:21)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:18)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:15) (cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:21)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:18) (cid:1) (cid:30)ƒ(cid:1)(cid:31)(cid:31)ƒ(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:157)(cid:23)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:30) (cid:31)€(cid:141) (cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:28)€ (cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:7)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:2) (cid:144)(cid:3)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:18)(cid:13)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:17)(cid:30) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:25) (cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:28) (cid:1)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:18)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:15)(cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:18) (cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:15)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:13)(cid:21)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:20) (cid:143) (cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:19)€(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:28)€ (cid:24)(cid:3)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:30)(cid:157)(cid:23)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:22)€ (cid:127)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:129)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:15)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:129)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:18) (cid:26)(cid:3)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:18) (cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:144)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:30) (cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:30) (cid:141)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:24) (cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:157)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:24) (cid:18)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:27)(cid:13)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:30) (cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:27)(cid:13)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:3)‚ (cid:143)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:13)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:15)(cid:30)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:13)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28) (cid:24)(cid:3)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:11)(cid:28)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:2) (cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:3) (cid:143) (cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:28) (cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:15)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:13)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:28) (cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:31)(cid:11)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:8)(cid:17)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:17)(cid:29)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:31)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:31)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:31)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:31)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:31)(cid:27) (cid:4)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:1)(cid:127)(cid:129) (cid:31) (cid:7)(cid:31) (cid:30)(cid:29) (cid:6) (cid:28) (cid:6) (cid:27) (cid:10) (cid:26) (cid:5)(cid:19) (cid:25) (cid:25) (cid:24) (cid:17) (cid:23) (cid:23) (cid:22) (cid:18) (cid:21) (cid:19) (cid:20)(cid:19) (cid:21)(cid:26) (cid:18) (cid:19) (cid:23) (cid:15)(cid:28) (cid:17)(cid:21) (cid:23) (cid:16) (cid:19) (cid:26) (cid:4) (cid:27) (cid:14) (cid:15)(cid:21) (cid:24) (cid:14)(cid:26) (cid:24) (cid:19) (cid:23) (cid:13) (cid:22) (cid:23) (cid:20) (cid:12) (cid:23) (cid:16) (cid:19) (cid:12)(cid:11) (cid:4) (cid:19) (cid:14) (cid:10) (cid:26) (cid:31) (cid:15)(cid:22) (cid:9) (cid:14) (cid:8) (cid:30) (cid:7) (cid:19) (cid:19) (cid:3)(cid:21) (cid:14) (cid:17) (cid:22) (cid:15) (cid:19) (cid:19) (cid:31)(cid:143)(cid:31)(cid:3)…Œ(cid:19)Š…(cid:19)ˆ‡Œ‡Š(cid:31)(cid:3)(cid:19)(cid:4)…(cid:143)Ž(cid:141)„Š(cid:141)„(cid:19)(cid:129)(cid:19)(cid:31)ˆ(cid:9)(cid:7)—(cid:10)(cid:19) ADNEVAILCOEGS V (cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:18)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:2)(cid:1)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:127)(cid:29)(cid:14)(cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:15)(cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:129) (cid:10)—(cid:129)‚(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:19)(cid:10)“(cid:6)(cid:19)‘‰–‰(cid:19)(cid:31)˜ˆ(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:14)(cid:26)€(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:19) †…ƒ(cid:143)ˆ(cid:19)‡(cid:143)‰‡ˆ(cid:141) (cid:29) (cid:26)(cid:27) (cid:14) (cid:15) (cid:17) (cid:25) (cid:23) (cid:22) (cid:17) (cid:23) (cid:12)(cid:19) (cid:19) (cid:31) (cid:14) (cid:26) (cid:2)(cid:19) (cid:19) (cid:15) (cid:141) (cid:28) (cid:4) (cid:23) (cid:4) (cid:19) (cid:143) (cid:29)(cid:22) (cid:19)(cid:20) (cid:14) (cid:27) (cid:18) (cid:15) (cid:25) (cid:23) (cid:20) (cid:16) (cid:15) (cid:14) (cid:11)(cid:19) (cid:22) (cid:21) (cid:21) (cid:12) (cid:144) (cid:23) (cid:23) (cid:12)(cid:19) (cid:17) (cid:15) (cid:19) (cid:1) (cid:21)(cid:15) (cid:29) (cid:23) (cid:23) (cid:24) (cid:19)(cid:14) (cid:17) (cid:2) (cid:19)(cid:157) (cid:19)(cid:20) (cid:27) (cid:14) (cid:17) (cid:24) (cid:23)(cid:18) (cid:24) (cid:19)(cid:14) (cid:14) (cid:26) (cid:18) (cid:19)(cid:15) (cid:21)(cid:15) (cid:28) (cid:1) (cid:23) (cid:11) (cid:19) (cid:19) MAX492ESA+ (cid:15)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:14)(cid:30)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:1)(cid:19)(cid:14)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:14) (cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:17)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:15)(cid:21)€(cid:23)(cid:19)(cid:15)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:129) (cid:26)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:12) ‚ƒ„(cid:141)(cid:31)ƒ(cid:19)…†(cid:19)‡(cid:143)ˆƒ‰Š„‹(cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:143)ˆ(cid:19)‰(cid:141)(cid:4)ƒ„‡Š‹(cid:19) (cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:25)(cid:8)(cid:31)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:31)(cid:20) ƒ‰(cid:19)Œ…Ž(cid:141)„(cid:143)‘(cid:141)(cid:143)Š Sources: US Bureau of Industry and Security; MIT Export Control, ‘Guide to Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs)’; RUSI. Many of these US-manufactured, controlled controlled components were generally instances components were found in Russia’s most critical of radio equipment. For example, the R-392 weapons systems such as the 9M549 300-mm ACM radio contained at least six unique ECCN- GLONASS-guided rocket, the Kh-59 anti-ship classified components. missile (AShM) and the R-330BMV EW system. The 9M549 rocket and Kh-59 contained flash A high percentage of these controlled goods were memory and SRAM modules that are ECCN originally manufactured by US-headquartered controlled. Meanwhile, the R-330BMV contained companies, making up 78% of ECCN goods in the a variety of ECCN-controlled components dataset. Taken together, Analog Devices and Texas including FPGAs, CPLDs, microprocessors, Instruments were the original manufacturers of digital signal processors and A/D converters. approximately 25% of the overall ECCN-classified goods found in Russian weapons systems. Other goods with an ECCN included Dutch semiconductors in the Kh-101 ALCM and a high- Other US manufacturers of ECCN-classified performance CMOS static RAM chip inside the components include Intel Corporation, Atmel 9M727 GLCM. Five separate ECCN components Corporation, Cypress Semiconductors and were also found in the Torn-MDM SIGINT Microchip Technology. Japanese and Taiwanese system, including Western-manufactured manufacturers follow in close second and third microcontrollers and RF amplifiers. However, with 10 and nine items, respectively. the systems which contained the most ECCN- 31 Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List (CCL)’, <https://www.bis. doc.gov/index.php/regulations/commerce-control-list-ccl>, accessed 19 July 2022. 32 Components for this project were cross-referenced with open sources to determine if they were classified under ECCN or EAR99 regulations. See ‘Methodology’. 17

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker AMERICA’S MOST WANTED world.36 The dossier also proved that these For decades, Russian intelligence agencies and agents were prolific, collecting huge volumes of their Soviet predecessors have targeted the S&T information and materials from Western US’s leading computer and microelectronic countries. Reportedly, 61.5% of S&T espionage companies as part of their espionage and materials came from the US, 10.5% from West procurement efforts. In 1985, a US government Germany, 8% from France, 7.5% from the UK and assessment of Soviet acquisition targets listed IBM 3% from Japan.37 and Texas Instruments as priority penetration targets for the Soviets.33 KGB archives, published Line X efforts were a dazzling success. According by the defector Vasili Mitrokhin, showed the to the CIA’s own 1982 assessments, the Soviets agency had even managed to place a spy in the had acquired and ‘copied in its entirety’ the US French office of Texas Instruments in 1964.34 AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile, which gave But the startling extent of these operations was the country its first infrared homing missile, only exposed in 1981, when Vladimir Vetrov – a the Vympel K-13.38 The Sidewinder was but one Soviet engineer working for the KGB – provided example among hundreds. The Soviets had French intelligence with 4,000 secret documents acquired other missiles, such as the shoulder- concerning the activities of Line X, a technical fired FIM-43 Redeye MANPAD system, data on the collection department subordinate to Directorate guidance subsystem of the US LGM-30 Minuteman T of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB.35 ICBM, data on solid-propellant missiles, radar data According to what was later to be named the on systems used aboard F-14s, F-15s, F-18s and Farewell Dossier, the Soviet effort was expansive, information on a huge range of other systems.39 employing over 100 KGB operatives across the 33 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update’, September 1985, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA160564.pdf>, accessed 19 July 2022. 34 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive (London: Penguin Press, 1999), p. 245. 35 David G Major, ‘Farewell’, 1999, <https://cdn.ymaws.com/cicentre.com/resource/resmgr/articles/farewell_old_reason_ by_david.pdf>, accessed 19 July 2022. 36 Ibid. 37 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (London: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 306. 38 CIA, ‘Interagency Intelligence Memorandum’, p. 9. An alternative theory of how the Soviet Union acquired an AIM-9 Sidewinder was that an unexploded AIM-9B had lodged into a Chinese MiG-17 during an air engagement with Taiwanese F-86 Sabres in September 1958. The intact missile was then reportedly sent to the Soviet Union to be reverse-engineered to develop the Vympel K-13. See Federation of American Scientists, ‘AA-2 ATOLL K-13 (R-3 or Object 310) PL-2 / PL-3 / PL-5’, <https://web.archive.org/web/20160304041942/http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/aa-2.htm>, accessed 20 July 2022. 39 CIA, ‘Interagency Intelligence Memorandum’, p. 9. 18

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Figure 5: Soviet Entities Responsible for the Direction and Procurement of Western Technology (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:30) (cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:22) (cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:30)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:16) (cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:19) (cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:19) 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(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:21) (cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:14)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:22) (cid:11)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:17) (cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:16) (cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:16) (cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:15)(cid:19)(cid:30)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:16) (cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:16) (cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:22) (cid:20)(cid:7)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:10) (cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:19) (cid:14)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:11)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:19) (cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:16)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:16)(cid:19)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:10) (cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:19) (cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:28)(cid:31)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:16)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:31)(cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:19)(cid:30)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:19) (cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:19)(cid:30)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:11)(cid:15) Sources: Frank Dittmann, ‘Microelectronics under Socialism’; RUSI. The collapse of the Soviet Union only appears to by the US Department of Justice alleged that, have temporarily slowed these activities. In 2012, between 2002 and 2012, Arc Electronics shipped for example, 11 individuals were indicted for $50 million worth of goods to suppliers of military allegedly operating a smuggling ring seeking to equipment to the Russian Ministry of Defence.43 export critical technology such as microelectronics ‘primarily for Russian government agencies, In recent months, the US government has including Russian military and intelligence continued to pursue Russia’s clandestine agencies’.40 According to media reports at the procurement networks. Just one month after the time,41 the smuggling ring targeted several US 2022 invasion, the US Treasury designated over companies, including Texas Instruments and 30 individuals and companies allegedly procuring Analog Devices, which claimed they were duped critical Western technology on behalf of Russian by Russian operatives working for Arc Electronics, intelligence agencies. These designations included a front company used to procure these items and a network centred on a Russian entity named transport them back to Russia.42 Documents filed Serniya Engineering, which the US Treasury 40 US District Court Eastern District of New York, ‘United States of America Against Alexander Fishenko, et al.’, indictment, 28 September 2012, <https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2012/10/indictment.pdf>, accessed 20 July 2022. 41 Christie Smythe, Iain King and Bloomberg News, ‘Texas Instruments, Xilinx Duped by Russia Export Ring, U.S. Says’, Washington Post, 26 September 2015. 42 Ibid. 43 US Attorney’s Office of the Department of Justice, ‘Exporter of Microelectronics to Russian Military Sentenced to 135 Months in Prison Following Convictions on All Counts at Trial’, 28 February 2017, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/ exporter-microelectronics-russian-military-sentenced>, accessed 20 July 2022. 19

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker claimed directed a complex web of companies in Engineering’s website show it was incorporated the UK, Malta, Singapore, Spain and Russia.44 around 1998,47 and articles published in April 2021 note that Serniya Engineering was founded While Serniya Engineering was reportedly set in the late 1980s under the Moscow Department up in 2017,45 the company which previously used of Physics – the exact same location where NPO the domain of ‘Serniya Engineering’, NPO Sernia, Sernia was addressed for years.48 used to be registered to the same domain and lists the same business scope as Serniya Engineering. Archived pages from NPO Sernia’s website stated Additional reporting notes that NPO Sernia was that some of its key projects were on behalf of the dissolved in 2016,46 while Serniya Engineering was Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental incorporated in 2017. agencies. The crests of these agencies, published on its website between 2007 and 2013, include the However, these timelines do not align in other open Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Federal source reporting. Archived instances of Serniya Protective Service (FSO).49 44 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets Sanctions Evasion Networks and Russian Technology Companies Enabling Putin’s War’, press release, 31 March 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0692>, accessed 20 July 2022. 45 rusprofile, ‘LLC “Serniya Engineering”’, last updated 21 July 2022, can be found at <https://www.rusprofile.ru/ id/10885594>, accessed 23 July 2022. 46 Reporting by the Financial Times, which was in correspondence with Serniya Engineering, notes NPO Sernia was dissolved in March 2016. See Jamie Powell, ‘What on Earth is Djeco Group?’, Financial Times, 25 March 2022. The information can be found at <https://www.ft.com/content/63c80363-644d-4981-a144-c618144845e6>, accessed 22 July 2022. 47 For the archived page from July 2007, see Sernia.ru, ‘O Kompanii’ [‘About the Company’], accessed through Wayback Machine, <https://web.archive.org/web/20070715005149/http:/www.sernia.ru/?aux_page=about_company>, accessed 19 July 2022. 48 TMC, ‘Interview with Sernia Engineering Employee’, <https://go.techmfg.com/l/910112/2021-04-29/9r3l>, accessed 20 July 2022. 49 For the archived page from August 2013, see Sernia.ru, ‘Realizovannnye proekti’ [‘Completed Projects’], accessed through Wayback Machine, <https://web.archive.org/web/20130830145236/http://www.sernia.ru/relized_projects>, accessed 19 July 2022. See also Powell, ‘What on Earth is Djeco Group?’. 20

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Figure 6: Sernia’s Old Website Displaying the Crests of the FSB and FSO SERNIA WEBSITE March 2008 (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:17)(cid:16) (cid:30) (cid:30) (cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:12)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:9)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:6) (cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:18)(cid:11)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:12)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:1)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:18)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:127)(cid:22)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:22) (cid:31) (cid:29) (cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:11)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:9)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:13)†(cid:6) (cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:1)(cid:29)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:3)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:1)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:18)(cid:10)(cid:22) (cid:29) (cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:3)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:129)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:141)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:14)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:141)(cid:25)(cid:22) (cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:11)(cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:127)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:141)(cid:11)(cid:1)(cid:141)(cid:143)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:1)(cid:22) (cid:17)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:144)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:17) (cid:28) (cid:31) (cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:17)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:127)(cid:22)…(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:8) €(cid:6) (cid:157)(cid:141)(cid:25)(cid:22) €(cid:22)(cid:11)(cid:17)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:11)‚(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:127)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:14)(cid:129) (cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:127)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:22)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:141)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:12)(cid:1)(cid:141)(cid:22) (cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:17)(cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:1)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:18)(cid:11)(cid:25)(cid:17) (cid:28) (cid:5)(cid:29)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:23)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:20) (cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:3)(cid:22)(cid:127)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:25)ƒ(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:12)(cid:24)(cid:11)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:1)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:18)(cid:10)(cid:22) (cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:11)‚(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:127)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:1)„(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:1)(cid:22) (cid:14)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:1)(cid:22)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:3)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:11)(cid:14) Source: Serniya.ru; RUSI. A central node in the Serniya Engineering Analog Devices, Cypress Semiconductors, NXP network was the Russia-based Sertal LLC.50 Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and a range Addressed to a nondescript apartment block on of others.51 Notably, components manufactured by the outskirts of Moscow, the company’s website these companies were some of the most numerous advertised itself as a ‘supplier of electronic found in Russian weapons platforms in Ukraine. components’ manufactured by Texas Instruments, 50 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets Sanctions Evasion Networks and Russian Technology Companies Enabling Putin’s War’, press release, 31 March 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0692>, accessed 19 July 2022. 51 The archived version of Sertal.ru can be found at <https://web.archive.org/web/20220000000000*/sertal.ru>, accessed 19 July 2022. 21

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker Figure 7: Sertal’s Webpage in February 2022 SERTAL WEBPAGE FEBRUARY 2022 (cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:31)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:14)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:3) (cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:129)(cid:1) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:26) (cid:9)(cid:2)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:26) (cid:24)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:1)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:26) (cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:127)(cid:129)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:26) (cid:4)(cid:19)(cid:129)(cid:1)(cid:20)(cid:141)(cid:25)(cid:143)(cid:27)(cid:144)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:26) (cid:157)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:26) (cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:26) €(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:26) (cid:25)‚ (cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:26) ‚ (cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:26) Sources: Sertal.ru; RUSI. Shipment-level trade records confirm that Sertal microelectronics manufacturers which offer was moving these types of US-manufactured products specialised in defence applications. goods. As recently as March 2021, for example, Sertal imported $600,000worthofelectronicInfact,outof450uniquecomponentsinRUSI’sintegratedcircuitsmanufacturedbyTexasdataset,productsmanufacturedbyAnalogDevicesInstrumentsthroughaHongKongintermediary.52andTexasInstrumentsaccountfornearlyaSevenmonthslater,thecompanyimportedquarterofthosefoundinRussianweapons.Theseanother$1.1 million worth of electronic integrated components, ranging from the mundane to the circuits from the same Hong Kong exporter, this highly specialised, were found in the most critical time manufactured by Xilinx.53 systems such as ballistic and cruise missiles, other precision munitions and EW platforms. GRAND THEFT ANALOG While Russia has long sought to cultivate a home- In total, the dataset contained 50 unique grown semiconductor industry, data analysed for components produced by Analog Devices, 13 of this report shows that the country’s weapons are which were classified as dual-use goods under packed with components originally manufactured US law, meaning that exporters would likely have by US companies. The two most prominent are needed a licence to export them abroad. These Analog Devices and Texas Instruments, both components were primarily microprocessors and microcontrollers,54 but also included mobile 52 Trade data provided by third-party commercial provider. 53 Ibid. 54 ECCN 3A991.a.2 – a microprocessor or microcontroller with a clock frequency rate exceeding 25 MHz. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 3 – ELECTRONICS’, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/442-category-3-electronics-design-development- and-production/file>, accessed 19 July 2022. 22

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine communications equipment,55 telecommunication transmission equipment56 and A/D converters.57 Figure 8: Analog Devices-Manufactured ECCN Components in Russian Weapons (cid:31)(cid:11)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:143)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:26) (cid:31)(cid:143)(cid:143)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:26) (cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:144) (cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:14)(cid:144) (cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:14) (cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:143)(cid:21) (cid:31)(cid:5)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:11)(cid:5)(cid:26) (cid:31)(cid:3)(cid:31)(cid:19)(cid:25) V (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:31) (cid:22) 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(cid:24)(cid:11)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26) (cid:10) (cid:18)(cid:31) (cid:19) (cid:24) (cid:28) (cid:9) (cid:22) (cid:10) (cid:20) (cid:8)(cid:7) (cid:9) (cid:14) (cid:9) (cid:6) (cid:28) (cid:14) (cid:19) (cid:13) (cid:11)(cid:31)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:6) (cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:30) (cid:9)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:12)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:26)ƒ(cid:20)(cid:31)(cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:12)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:9)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:26) (cid:26) ‚(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:7)€ (cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:143)(cid:143)(cid:11)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:144)(cid:8)(cid:30)(cid:26) (cid:26) (cid:26) Source: RUSI. Established in 1965, Analog Devices is a world- of these products are specifically designed leading producer of semiconductors specialising for defence and aerospace applications in integrated circuits for data conversion, signal and are employed by the US military in processing and power management.58 Many precision munitions, avionics, phased array 55 ECCN 5A991.g – mobile communications equipment. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 5 – TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND “INFORMATION SECURITY”’, <https:// www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/2336-ccl5-pt1-3/file>, accessed 19 July 2022. 56 ECCN 5A991.b – telecommunication transmission equipment and systems designed for use in single or multi-channel communication. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 5 – TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND “INFORMATION SECURITY”’. 57 ECCN 3A001.a.5.a.5 – an A/D converter with a 16-bit or greater resolution and output rate greater than 65 million words per second. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 3 – ELECTRONICS’. 58 Analog Devices, ‘Corporate Information’, <https://www.analog.com/en/about-adi/corporate-information.html>, accessed 19 July 2022. 23

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker systems, military communications, electronic processor found in the same jamming board of surveillance systems and UAVs.59 the R-330BMV Borisoglebsk-2 EW system, an AD9361 radio frequency agile transceiver in the For example, the company’s A/D converters are payload information transmission module of the often used in US missile systems such as the Orlan-10 UAV, and a Blackfin Processor in the MIM-104 Patriot SAM and the AIM-120 navigation and positioning module of a Takhion AMRAAM.60 These components translate UAV. analogue, real-world signals collected by onboard sensors into digital outputs that can be While RUSI found over a dozen different kinds processed by computers.61 In a cruise missile, of these controlled components in Russian they can enable the system’s sensors to transmit weapons platforms, another 37 of the company’s real-time data to onboard computers responsible parts were discovered in several other systems. for guiding the payload to its target.62 These included items in a Kh-59MK AShM, and the Torn-MDM SIGINT platform. These non- One of Analog Devices’ A/D converters, the controlled items included operational amplifiers, AD9461, was discovered in the jamming board RS-232 transceivers, power management of a Russian Army R-330BMV Borisoglebsk-2 microchips, radio frequency switches and EW system. In these types of platforms, A/D temperature sensors, among others. converters enhance performance by allowing a receiver to operate over a wide frequency EVERYTHING’S BETTER IN TEXAS band to identify threat signals.63 Like many Items manufactured by Texas Instruments are other components found in Russian weapons also preponderant in several critical Russian platforms, this specific converter is classified weapons systems disassembled in Ukraine. as a dual-use good and is restricted for export,64 Founded in 1930, Texas Instruments has evolved likely meaning that it was procured clandestinely into one of the world’s largest semiconductor on behalf of the Russian armed forces or companies based on sales volume,65 reportedly intelligence agencies. holding over 41,000 patents.66 Like Analog Devices, Dallas-based Texas Instruments also Several other controlled components originally designs high-end components for the aerospace manufactured by Analog Devices were found and defence industries and has a long history of in Russian weapon systems. These include a being at the cutting edge of military electronics.67 AD6636CBCZ wideband (digital) receiver signal 59 Analog Devices, ‘Aerospace and Defense’, <https://www.analog.com/en/applications/markets/aerospace-and-defense- pavilion-home.html>, accessed 19 July 2022. 60 Military Aerospace Electronics, ‘Analog Devices to Supply New A-D Converter for Patriot Missile’, 1 February 2000, <https:// www.militaryaerospace.com/communications/article/16706596/analog-devices-to-supply-new-ad-converter-for-patriot- missile>, accessed 19 July 2022. 61 Arrow, ‘Analog-to-Digital (ADC) Converter Types & Basic Functions’, 5 February 2019, <https://www.arrow.com/en/ research-and-events/articles/analog-to-digital-adc-converter-types-and-basic-functions>, accessed 19 July 2022. 62 Department for International Trade, ‘OGEL and Goods Checker Tools’, <https://www.ecochecker.trade.gov.uk/ spirefox5live/fox/spire/OGEL_GOODS_CHECKER_LANDING_PAGE/new>, accessed 20 July 2022. 63 Rajesh Uppal, ‘DARPA’s Ultrahigh Speed Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) to Improve Performance of Radar, Electronic Warfare and Communications’, IDST, 25 January 2017, <https://idstch.com/technology/electronics/darpa-s-analog-to- digital-converter-adc-programs-to-improve-performance-of-radar-electronic-warfare-and-communications/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 64 ECCN 3A001.a.5.a.5 – an A/D converter with a 16-bit or greater resolution and output rate greater than 65 million words per second. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 3 – ELECTRONICS’. 65 Texas Instruments, ‘TI At a Glance’, <https://www.ti.com/about-ti/company/ti-at-a-glance.html>, accessed 19 July 2022. 66 Texas Instruments, ‘TI Fact Sheet’, <https://web.archive.org/web/20160719151815/http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/ company/factsheet.shtml>, accessed 19 July 2022. 67 Texas Instruments, ‘Aerospace & Defense’, <https://www.ti.com/applications/industrial/aerospace-defense/overview. html>, accessed 19 July 2022. 24

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine In the US, the company’s military-grade and high Over 50 unique components from Texas performance components have been used in a Instruments were discovered in several Russian variety of military systems, such as flight control systems, including digital signal processors units for aircraft, GPS receivers, radar systems, found in various computing and processing sonar systems, EW systems, smart munitions modules in the 9M727 land-attack cruise missile, and countless others.68 For example, the a CAN transceiver found in the electronic company’s multicore digital signal processors detonator of the KUB-BLA ‘kamikaze’ UAV, power are also popular for processing tasks in a range management modules in an E95M target drone of high-performance radar systems,69 including and in the Orlan-10 UAV, as well as audio codecs military synthetic aperture radars designed to and converters in several of the radio sets used collect imagery at night and through cloud.70 by the Russian Army. Figure 9: Texas Instruments-Manufactured ECCN Components in Russian Weapons (cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:21)(cid:6)(cid:31)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:5) (cid:28)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:1)(cid:127)(cid:129)(cid:21) (cid:28)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:3) (cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:21) (cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:4) (cid:21) (cid:28)(cid:13)(cid:19) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:25) (cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:17)(cid:13)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:12)(cid:11) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:25) (cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:17)(cid:12)(cid:8)(cid:11) (cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:28) (cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:21) (cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:9)(cid:141)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:11) (cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16) (cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:127)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:9)(cid:11) (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:13)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:8)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:28) (cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:8)(cid:23)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:21) (cid:143)(cid:15)(cid:30)(cid:17)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:21)(cid:3)(cid:7)(cid:31)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:1)(cid:18)(cid:1)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:5) (cid:4)(cid:26)(cid:13)(cid:1)(cid:18)(cid:1) (cid:21) (cid:23)(cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:1)(cid:5)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:1)(cid:127)(cid:5)(cid:20) (cid:127)(cid:141)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:30)(cid:23) (cid:24)(cid:8) (cid:21)(cid:31) (cid:23)(cid:141) (cid:30)(cid:29) (cid:6) (cid:28) (cid:12) (cid:27) (cid:2) (cid:25) (cid:20)(cid:19) (cid:28) (cid:19) (cid:27) (cid:10) (cid:29) (cid:23) (cid:16) (cid:11) (cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:28) (cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:143)(cid:23) (cid:24)(cid:29) (cid:30)(cid:3) (cid:12) (cid:17) (cid:23) (cid:21) (cid:10) (cid:12) (cid:1) (cid:7) (cid:127) (cid:22) (cid:19) (cid:21)(cid:22) (cid:1) (cid:144) (cid:18)(cid:11) (cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:21) TINEXSTARSUMENTS (cid:23)(cid:16)‡(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:3)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:31)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:22) (cid:144)(cid:30)(cid:143)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:21) (cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:21) (cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:21) (cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:13)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:3)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:21) (cid:144)(cid:30)(cid:15)(cid:30)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:16) (cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16) (cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16) (cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:3)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:21) (cid:24)(cid:144)(cid:15)(cid:1)(cid:129)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:17)(cid:12)(cid:21)(cid:143)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:10)(cid:13)(cid:157)(cid:12)(cid:1)(cid:13)(cid:144)(cid:15)(cid:1)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:144)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:11) (cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:127)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:9)(cid:11) (cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:7)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:11) (cid:24)(cid:143)(cid:15)(cid:29)(cid:9)(cid:141)(cid:129)(cid:30)(cid:11) €‚ƒ„ ……(cid:17)(cid:25)(cid:22) (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:3)(cid:13)(cid:1)(cid:18)(cid:21) (cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:27)(cid:3)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:21)(cid:17)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:143) (cid:28)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:3) (cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:30)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:21)(cid:7)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:21)†(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:3)† (cid:21) (cid:28)(cid:13)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:8) (cid:31) (cid:21) (cid:21) Source: RUSI. 68 Ibid. 69 John McHale, ‘High-Performance Radar Systems Enabled by New TI Multicore DSPs’, Military Embedded Systems, 28 March 2012, <https://militaryembedded.com/radar-ew/signal-processing/high-performance-radar-systems-enabled- by-new-ti-multicore-dsps>, accessed 20 July 2022. 70 Dan Wang and Murtaza Ali, ‘Multicore DSP Enhances Synthetic Aperture Radar Processing’, Military Embedded Systems, 10 September 2013, <https://militaryembedded.com/radar-ew/signal-processing/multicore-aperture-radar-processing>, accessed 20 July 2022. 25

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker Other components produced by Texas Instruments late 1970s, Tokyo resident Oleg Guryanov told his were also found inside the Kh-101 ALCM, a staff that ‘[t]he proceeds from the operations these sophisticated weapon used to strike targets deep [Line X] officers carry out each year would cover in Ukraine, including critical infrastructure and the expenses of our entire Tokyo residency with urban population centres.71 Some of these were money still left over. In fact, worldwide, technical in the Kh-101’s processor module – a system intelligence all by itself covers all the expenses of which helps guide the missile to target – such the whole KGB foreign intelligence service’.75 as DS26C32ATM CMOS quad differential line receivers, which are produced to be compliant Weapons platforms analysed for this report with military standards.72 indicate that Japanese technology remains important for Russia’s armed forces. A total of At least 10 of the Texas Instrument components 34 unique components contained in the dataset discovered in these weapon platforms are under US were designed and manufactured by Japanese export controls. This includes the TMS320 C25GBA companies, making it the second most common and TMS320 C30GEL digital signal processors, both country of origin outside of the US. These present in the 9M727 GLCM.73 components came from over a dozen companies and include cameras produced by well-known TOKYO VICE companies like Panasonic and Canon, digital While the US has often been ‘target number one’ step attenuators produced by Fujitsu, an inertial for Russia’s illicit procurement networks, other measurement unit produced by TDK Corporation, countries with sophisticated manufacturing and and a model aircraft engine manufactured by Saito semiconductor industries have also been high on Seisakusho. the Kremlin’s shopping list. However, the most prevalent Japanese In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Japanese components were multilayer ceramic capacitors economic miracle of the post-war years propelled and surface mount inductors produced by Murata the country towards the top rankings of global Manufacturing – one of Japan’s oldest electronics economies – a transformation partly driven by the companies. Founded in 1944, Murata primarily country’s burgeoning semiconductor industry. But designs and manufactures ceramic-based passive as Japanese conglomerates like Sony and Toshiba components and solutions.76 Unlike many became household names, they also attracted the other electronics firms, Murata’s website kindly attention of the KGB’s technical espionage teams. requests that its products are not used in either weapons of mass destruction or their conventional In June 1971, the head of a hi-tech company counterparts.77 in Japan operating under the Soviet codename TONDA provided his KGB handlers with two volumes of secret documents on a new microelectronic computer system to be used by US air and missile forces.74 There were other technical intelligence coups in Japan and, in the 71 Lorenzo Tondo, ‘Russian Missiles Strike Kyiv for First Time in Three Weeks’, The Guardian, 26 June 2022. 72 Texas Instruments, ‘DS26C32ATM/NOPB - CMOS Quad Differential Line Receivers’, <https://www.ti.com/product/ DS26C32AT/part-details/DS26C32ATM/NOPB>, 20 July 2022. 73 ECCN 3A991.a.2 – a microprocessor or microcontroller with a clock frequency rate exceeding 25 MHz. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 3 – ELECTRONICS’. 74 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II, p. 306. 75 Ibid., p. 308. Originally referenced in Stanilav Levchenko, On the Wrong Side: My Life in the KGB (University of Michigan: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers: 1988), p. 104. 76 Murata Manufacturing, ‘Facts and Figures’, <https://corporate.murata.com/en-global/company/factsandfigures>, accessed 20 July 2022. 77 Murata Manufacturing, ‘Restriction of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Conventional Weapons’, <https://www.murata. com/en-global/support/militaryrestriction>, accessed 20 July 2022. 26

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine The Russians, however, appeared to have ignored SIGINT system is a relatively new platform designed this request, for several of Murata’s components to search, analyse and record radio signals, while were found in the Torn-MDM SIGINT system determining the direction and location of the and the military AR-2C radio set. The Torn-MDM transmission within a radius of up to 70 km.78 Figure 10: Japanese Components in the Torn-MDM SIGINT System (cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:5) (cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:7)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:27) (cid:12)(cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:5)(cid:12) (cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:2)(cid:22)(cid:12) (cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:27)(cid:12) (cid:27)(cid:5)(cid:22) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25) (cid:31)(cid:5)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:31)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25) (cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:12) (cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:20)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:13) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25) (cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:20)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:2)(cid:13) (cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:16)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:10)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:20)(cid:13) (cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13) (cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:2)(cid:1)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:31)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12) (cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25) (cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:12) (cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:12) (cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:127)(cid:129)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:2)(cid:141)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:143)(cid:18)(cid:13) (cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:25)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:144)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:127)(cid:13) (cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:10)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:13) (cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:29)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:13) 150 150 (cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:2)(cid:1)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:31)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12) (cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:2)(cid:1)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:31)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12) (cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25) (cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:21)(cid:21)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:127)(cid:129)(cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:12)(cid:20)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:157)(cid:17)(cid:13) (cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:127)(cid:129)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:7)(cid:141)(cid:20)(cid:16)(cid:13) (cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:31)(cid:10)‚(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:16) (cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:13) 150 (cid:25)(cid:5) (cid:28) (cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25) (cid:31)(cid:5) (cid:31) (cid:25) (cid:30) (cid:30) (cid:29) (cid:22) (cid:30)(cid:31) (cid:28)(cid:31) (cid:28)(cid:27) (cid:12)(cid:31) (cid:26) (cid:17) (cid:25) (cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:12) (cid:24)(cid:21) (cid:28) (cid:21) (cid:7) (cid:21) (cid:2) (cid:16) (cid:1) (cid:10)(cid:127) (cid:31) (cid:129) (cid:27) (cid:17) (cid:30)(cid:7) (cid:15)(cid:15) (cid:31) (cid:2) (cid:5) (cid:12) (cid:12) (cid:10) (cid:31) (cid:143) (cid:17) (cid:18) (cid:28) (cid:157) (cid:29) (cid:17) (cid:12) (cid:13) (cid:24)(cid:5)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:23)(cid:5) (cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:15)(cid:16)€(cid:13) (cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13) Source: RUSI. FROM EACH ACCORDING TO HIS ABILITY, Department of the Red Army General Staff – TO EACH ACCORDING TO HIS NEEDS later to be renamed the GRU – dispatched Aaron Although East Asia’s semiconductor industries and Abraham Ehrenlieb to Berlin where they have become an important part of Russia’s military established the Far Eastern Trading Company, supply chain, the scientific and technological otherwise referred to as Wostwag.79 In a time- riches of the Western European countries were honoured tradition of using commercial front always coveted by Russia’s special services and companies, the GRU operated Wostwag as a smoke remain a priority target for the country’s technical screen for military intelligence and eventually espionage teams. granted the company control over Soviet arms exports.80 These operations had begun in earnest even before the foundation of the Soviet Union on 28 December Over the course of the next century, Russia’s S&T 1922. In 1921 or 1922, the 4th (Intelligence) espionage and procurement operations have 78 Ukrainian Military Center, ‘Ukrainian Army Captured Russian Torn-MDM SIGINT System’, 17 March 2022, <https://mil. in.ua/en/news/ukrainian-army-captured-russian-torn-mdm-sigint-system/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 79 David R Stone, ‘Soviet Arms Exports in the 1920s’, Journal of Contemporary History (Vol. 48, No. 1, January 2013), pp. 57–77. 80 Ibid. 27

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker proved a constant thread connecting two often were recovered from a range of UAVs, including adversarial political and economic systems. But the Orlan-10, E95M, Eleron-3SV and KUB-BLA. while the advent of the Cold War ushered in a wide- Notably, these chips were common in several ranging embargo on technology exports to the of these UAV’s sub-systems, such as the flight Soviet Union,81 the system’s collapse in the early controller, navigation and positioning system, and 1990s provided the Kremlin with the opportunity to power supply control board. legitimately purchase and integrate huge volumes of sophisticated technology into weapons systems Given the scale of Russia’s UAV fleet and the high that have been used to target Ukrainian and Syrian attrition rates associated with operating these non-combatants and civilian infrastructure. platforms in a contested airspace, Russia’s armed forces must have been able to acquire these In fact, data analysed for this report indicates components in significant quantities prior to the that components manufactured by European February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Yet, several companies are prevalent in Russian military of the STM32 microcontrollers present in these systems. The case of Catherine FC thermal sights systems are under US export controls.85 Other – produced by the French company Thales – in products produced by STMicroelectronics include Russian combat platforms is well documented.82 a PD55003 radio frequency power transistor found Yet, what is less appreciated is how Russian in an R-168 radio set and two 44-lead thin quad flat procurement networks often target smaller, packages recovered from a Kh-101 ALCM’s SN-99 specialist European firms to acquire high- satellite navigation system. end equipment that cannot easily be sourced elsewhere. u-blox, meanwhile, is a designer and supplier of semiconductors and modules that support global WATCHING SWITZERLAND navigation satellite systems (GNSS), including Switzerland was the fourth-largest manufacturer receivers for GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou and of unique components found in Russian QZSS.86 Its M8 series of GNSS modules were present weapons systems, with a number of Swiss in the Orlan-10’s GPS tracker and navigation and companies represented in the dataset, including positioning system, as well as in the AR-2C radio STMicroelectronics and u-blox. A total of 18 unique set. These modules are also under US export components in the dataset were manufactured by controls.87 Swiss companies. GOING DUTCH STMicroelectronics is a Franco-Italian electronics A total of 14 components originated from and semiconductor manufacturer headquartered Netherlands-based manufacturers, of which 10 in Geneva.83 The company primarily produces came from NXP Semiconductors as well as two memory modules, microprocessors, transistors from its former subsidiary Nexperia. Despite the and microcontrollers, including the popular STM32 low number of components in the total dataset, series.84 Eight of these STM32 microcontrollers 81 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). 82 Andrew Rettman, ‘French Eyes for a Russian Tiger’, euobserver, 25 August 2015, <https://euobserver.com/ investigations/129953>, accessed 20 July 2022; Oleksandr Dubilet, ‘French Arms Firm Busts Sanctions to Help Russia Build Weapons’, New Voice of Ukraine, 21 June 2022, <https://english.nv.ua/business/total-isolation-of-russia/military- thermal-imagers-for-the-russian-army-the-french-company-thales-cooperated-with-russia-aft-50247461.html>, accessed 20 July 2022. 83 LinkedIn, ‘STMicroelectronics’, <https://www.linkedin.com/company/stmicroelectronics/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 84 STMicroelectronics, ‘Homepage’, <https://www.st.com/content/st_com/en.html>, accessed 20 July 2022. 85 ECCN 3A991.a.2 – a microprocessor or microcontroller with a clock frequency rate exceeding 25 MHz. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 3 – ELECTRONICS’. 86 u-blox, ‘We Build to Last’, <https://www.u-blox.com/en/we-build-last>, accessed 20 July 2022. 87 ECCN 7A994 – navigation direction finding equipment, airborne communication equipment, aircraft inertial navigation systems and other avionic equipment. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 7 - NAVIGATION AND AVIONICS’, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/ regulations-docs/2339-category-7-navigation-and-avionics-2/file>, accessed 20 July 2022. 28

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine NXP components were present in 10 of the 27 produces a range of commercial off-the-shelf systems analysed. products to meet the requirements for several military standards.92 In early March 2022, the Most prevalent were pressure sensors, such as the company reported that it had ceased business in MPXV5004DP, MPXV5010DP and MPXV5010GP, Russia on 24 February following the invasion of which were found in the flight controllers of the Ukraine.93 KUB-BLA, the Orlan-10 and the E95M UAVs. The flight controller for the KUB-BLA also contained an Components produced by Golledge were recovered NXP-produced microcontroller, LPC2368FBD100, from some of the more sophisticated Russian an item controlled by the US.88 Other NXP systems, such as the Torn-MDM and the Tor-M2 components include radio frequency transistors SAM system. The former contained one of the that were found in several of the radio sets and company’s HC49 standard crystals, while the latter’s the GLONASS/GPS GROT-M navigation equipment. specialised digital computing unit included a GXO- Notably, the Kh-101 ALCM’s BT33 processor U100F oscillator. Both components are used to module contained bus transceivers produced by generate an electrical signal at a precise frequency both NXP and Nexperia. by utilising the vibrating crystal’s mechanical resonance made of piezoelectric material.94 This is LONDON CALLING critical for use in systems like the Tor-M2 that use As an advanced economy with an extensive radar to detect and track targets and to improve the defence industrial base, the UK has always been effectiveness of SIGINT and EW systems. at the forefront of Russia’s technical espionage operations. A large complement of the KGB’s Line BERLIN STATION X officers were reportedly based in London in While Russian espionage networks have operated the 1980s and engaged in this effort, with one of from a range of European countries, Germany their key targets being the aerospace and defence has also often been at the heart of Russian conglomerate Rolls-Royce.89 procurement schemes. A key target in the Cold War, East Germany was a hub for Soviet spies looking While only five UK-made components were to procure Western technology. Line X agents, discovered inside the recovered weapon systems, recruited by the Russian intelligence services in some of these parts are highly specialised – such as East Germany, could easily be dispatched into oscillators and standard crystals. These particular the Federal Republic to collect information and components were designed and produced by penetrate important German companies.95 In Golledge Electronics, which supplies frequency 1985, an assessment claimed that West Germany control products to the electronics industry.90 was ‘ineffective’ at controlling illicit exports to Based in Southwest England, the company exports the Soviet Union and would only act under US its products to over 50 countries.91 Just like other pressure.96 companies described above, the company also 88 ECCN 3A991.a.2 – a microprocessor or microcontroller with a clock frequency rate exceeding 25 MHz. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 3 – ELECTRONICS’. 89 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update’, September 1985, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA160564.pdf>, accessed 21 July 2022. 90 Golledge Electronics, ‘About Us’, <https://www.golledge.com/about-us/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 91 Ibid. 92 Golledge Electronics, ‘Mil-COTS Frequency Components for Defence and Aerospace’, 28 June 2016, <https://www. golledge.com/news/using-mil-cots-for-defence-and-aerospace/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 93 Golledge Electronics, ‘Golledge Have Withdrawn from Our Business in Russia’, 11 March 2022, <https://www.golledge. com/news/russian-business-withdrawal-aid-for-ukraine/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 94 Sluiceairfair.com, ‘What is the Principle of Piezoelectric Oscillator?’, 31 August 2020, <https://www.sluiceartfair.com/2020/ popular-lifehacks/what-is-the-principle-of-piezoelectric-oscillator/>, accessed 21 July 2022. 95 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update’. 96 Daniel Salisbury, ‘Countering a Technological Berlin Tunnel: North Korean Operatives, Helicopters and Intelligence in the Cold War Illicit Arms Trade, 1981-1986’, Intelligence and National Security (2022). 29

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker That same year, US authorities pursued a large systems and night vision equipment to North and complex Soviet microelectronic procurement Korea.99 Only two years before, Seroush, who was network as part of Operation Exodus, a customs- also alleged to have been recruited by the KGB,100 led attempt to stem the flow of critical technology was implicated in a case involving the diversion of to Russia. Directed by a German national named electronic components to the Soviet Union.101 Richard Mueller, the network aimed to ‘divert sophisticated computer equipment’ to improve At the time, Vladimir Putin himself and Sergey the Soviet Union’s manufacturing capabilities for Chemezov – the current head of Russia’s largest military-grade semiconductors.96 In the mid-1980s, defence conglomerate – were both KGB officers US customs identified Mueller as one of the world’s based in Dresden.102 A grainy photo taken in the most wanted arms smugglers.97 1980s shows them together in Dresden as young men.103 As Putin rose to power, Chemezov followed, But there were other high-profile proliferation and in 2007 Putin placed his old colleague at the agents working from German soil. Babeck Seroush, helm of Rostec (State Corporation for Assistance to an Iranian with an office in Cologne and Moscow,98 Development, Production and Export of Advanced was indicted in 1984 by a US court for exporting Technology Industrial Product ‘Rostec’), a post he 143 semiconductors for use in missile guidance still holds today.104 Figure 11: Putin and Chemezov, Reportedly Taken in 2021 Source: Kremlin.ru. 96 Ruth Marcus, ‘“Entrepreneurs” of War’, Washington Post, 10 August 1985. 97 Ibid. 98 Ellan Cates, ‘A West German Exporter Has Been Charged with Conspiracy…’, UPI, 5 November 1984, <https://www.upi.com/ Archives/1984/11/05/A-West-German-exporter-has-been-charged-with-conspiracy/3117468478800/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 99 Ibid. 100 Salisbury, ‘Countering a Technological Berlin Tunnel’. 101 AP News, ‘Exec Charged with Conspiring to Ship Computer Boards to Soviet Union’, 25 April 1985. 102 The Economist, ‘The Making of a Neo-KGB State’, 23 August 2007. 103 Rob Lee (@RALee85), ‘Sergei Chemezov and Vladimir Putin in Dresden in the 1980s and today’, Twitter, 20 July 2021, <https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1417560713862828035?lang=en>, accessed 20 July 2022. 104 Rostec, ‘Sergey Chemezov Reports to President of Russia on Rostec 2021 Performance’, 18 May 2022, <https://rostec.ru/ en/news/sergey-chemezov-reports-to-president-of-russia-on-rostec-2021-performance-/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 30

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine In recent years, Germany has continued to be a joint venture between Germany’s Siemens and target both for S&T espionage and procurement Japan’s Matsushita.107 The company was later networks looking to lay their hands on purchased by Japan’s TDK Corporation in 2009 sophisticated technology. In May 2021, a German and renamed to TDK Electronics AG.108 The national was arrested for shipping dual-use goods company’s product catalogue includes capacitors, to a company operated by Russia’s intelligence ceramic components, EMC filters, inductors, radio services.105 Barely a month later, German frequency modules and others.109 authorities arrested a Russian scientist for stealing aeronautical secrets and missile technology from Meanwhile, both the Eleron-3SV and KUB- research centres in Augsburg.106 BLA UAVs were discovered using air blades produced by Graupner GmbH and Aero Naut, RUSI found 10 components produced by German respectively. However, a US export-controlled companies in seven of the systems. The most item was recovered from one Russian weapon common were filters and surface mount inductors system. This was a Würth Elektronik GmbH- that were manufactured by EPCOS AG and found manufactured LAN transformer110 found in a in several sub-systems of the Torn-MDM SIGINT special computing module in the R-330BMV system. EPCOS AG was originally formed in EW system. 1999 from Siemens Matsushita Components, a 105 AP News, ‘Germany Arrests Businessman Over Dual-Use Exports to Russia’, 18 May 2021. 106 Matthias von Hein, ‘Russian Scientist Stands Trial for Espionage in Germany’, DW, 17 February 2022. 107 Gerhard Fasol, ‘TDK Acquires Passive Electronic Component Maker EPCOS’, Europe-Japan, 31 July 2008, <https://eu- japan.com/2008/07/tdk-epcos/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 108 Interference Technology, ‘EPCOS AG Changes Its Name to TDK Electronics AG’, 5 October 2018, <https://interferencetechnology.com/epcos-ag-changes-its-name-to-tdk-electronics-ag%E2%80%AF/>, accessed 20 July 2022. 109 TDK Corporation, ‘Acquisition of EPCOS AG – Becoming the Global Leader in the Electronic Components Industry’, 2009, <https://www.tdk.com/ir/ir_library/annual/web/lib20405.pdf>, accessed 20 July 2022. 110 ECCN 3A991.b.2.a – a microwave monolithic integrated circuit power amplifier rated for operation at frequencies exceeding 2.7 GHz and up to and including 6.8 GHz with a fractional bandwidth greater than 15%. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 3 – ELECTRONICS’. 31

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| SECTION 02 | [AHenad Iinng s1]ide Look at Russian Missiles [HEADING 2] tem volorpos alitatium invenis isquam que nam, sero toriatquia quunture pariam exeraes tisitibus Faciis et vellor adisita tquam, quia voluptu rianimo molore perrorrore verumquam quae doluptatium l‘[oCr]roumntb, aut t opplietartaetcioenress dseudr iqnugi amliiqliutuarnyt ecnotnuflr iacmts fhuaerlu ndteepnodtasm, ,a srumss a ufatecmto riisessin, t aanudt eervroen b lacuivti lqiauno eino stshiet qnueiascr ipfustaumre, owffiilcl ifies aetau sreo lustprtuagsgpliedse boepttwateeemn teat rgipestsa msu cshin acst ehmos ppietadliss qaunids sshinopupmin hg acreinbetrreast.em dadesv acnuclleadb oterec hennot leotg, ioedsi, dwisi tmh othdiea mcuolslat bcor irteiccaulm oef doloris ilignis deliquae con essit eos doluptas cthoonssee ebseeinntg aame rfousgpita caeu t avtetaractkio .w Ueatepcotnuss daesn dwueclil Teah es eRquusastiioans maramioerdep eforarct.e sB ehaatevme aqnu isetxiste natsuivre? eans daiigre naint de t muti spsriolev idduenfet npsrea esayqstueom qsu’,i antioot ende cYuasna aDrosleunpatilb oufs tahliegseen wt ienaitpeocntas., reportedly expending vNoolvuimko qv,u datiqreucattourr gaepneerrioa li uomf R quusosisa unt astsapteer- ofwernfeerdi over 2,000 missiles by the beginning of May.114 tdaetfeecntac es pceorncthriatc etot re aA ldmipasza-nAinhtiet ya, lioqnu a6e D ilelcaebmo.b Ietar These have included the Kh-101 ALCM, used by i2p0i2d1e. 1n11us ipsa idundeb iscium fuga. Et voluptatium the Russian Air Force to strike targets from the vende vent remodicit aute aliquam fugit a sa volor safety of Russian air space,115 while the Russian aInsp tehrec hop iteantiisntg o rheosuernst oefx ptheele inn vdausniotino, m thinec Rteucsasbia ins ground forces have deployed 9M720 and 9M727 uart mereid d oflolrecse asu ta ifmaceedrc itmo sdaismruepnte vaonldu pntieisu turta lpirsoe Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles often fired iUlikqruaii ndioalnut qaiure dcuemfen sci easd amnidl imCp4IeSdR m112o lsoyrsetpeumdsit, from Russian territory.116 efisrtirnugm s aslevqous eo cf ocrreupitsiue ma nids sboallllaisntdic emlleissesirlneas tuart saa rcaunsg ea nodfe nfadcii ltietmiesp.o11r3 sLearteesrt, itdheeli btaursg, ectu llpisatr uwmas, While many of these systems were destroyed in seexqpuaen ddeedli amto e osin ecnluddite q umi niilmitaargyn iminof rvaesltersutocrtue.re the process of hitting their targets, several have including barracks housing foreign fighters, rail been recovered and later disassembled, providing infrastructure to disrupt Western supply lines, an unparalleled insight into their construction. I1l1 1e tY aqnu Naotv. ikOopv,t a‘Atlimnat,z -eAnotsety aDliirbecutso rd: Aitier amnqd uS piascsei mCappoarb ilities Will Decide Tomorrow’s Conflicts’, DefenseNews, min6v Delelc eambboerr e2s0t2,1 .tempori tasperum qui blabo. U11l2la Ccocmums,a nipds, Cuonntt.r oOl,v Ciodmebmiu ntiiocantsioenqsu, Ceo mplpituit ecrsu (mC4 )e Int telligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) o11d3 mJuasgtinn iBsr oenskti,u ‘Tmheq M uyisateerpioeurse Cpaesed oqf uthaem M ifsascincgu Rmus saidan Air Force’, RUSI Commentary, 28 February 2022. q11u4e U iSn Dtuepraiortsm ecnotn osfe Dqeufeants ev, e‘Slelanciocra Dtuefre nmsea Oioffirc iasli mHoilnds a Background Briefing’, transcript, 2 May 2022, pro <hctutps,s :/s/wusw,w .ndiemfe nsine.ugosv /dNietwe s/pTrraonvsict,r ipvtso/lTurapntasctrqiputi/ Article/3017053/senior-defense-official-holds-a-background- veribarniedfianmg/,> , aocmcemssoedle 2s0t iJius lyq 2u02ia2 .que et ut untem h11a5r uNmBC Nqeuwasm, ‘2, Rseep oproterd s Koillleend ta,s qRuusastiaasn Malisits ilreast Setmrik eu Kty iv for First Time in Weeks’, 26 June 2022. h11a6r iKsy ivr eInsd eepxecnedreantt , ‘eGsetniaertaelm St arffe: rRiuastsiibau Dse,p lcooysn Issekqanudiaer Missile Launchers to Belgorod Oblast’, 22 May 2022. sendiae pre expellumque sit miliquissum fugit latusapictem voloribeatum qui debis. Uga. Ducipiditat lanimpo restibus volupti ncidenti ullabores quid quis et et atus si aborion rehendae ratibeaquis que nihilic tatio. Optatat remporpos nihil iumquo temoluptatur as aliquat as experiae estiis et ipicid molum vellorumquam aut eium 02 erissequis estis sunt re pror antorehenis adis quas dolorpo rporio omnis andamus accae essum exped et que liquodi taerchitaquo eatus que postem. Harchil et dollam ipsantium inctemquis cores autes doloreh endandi pienistium estrum, sin reperro te volor sam es maximinciis endae pos ditatempore nem non pora si debit odiandit ommossi rem rerepudae perovit vollaccus simet accupta tibust, 3333

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker These weapons integrate a wide array of Chemezov.118 subsystems and point to complex networks of manufacturers involved in the production of their Together, these sprawling organisations operate constituent parts. But while the branches of these a bewildering array of research institutes, design networks may be expansive, they often trace back bureaus, manufacturing plants and companies to the same roots: Russia’s state-owned principal that feed into the design, development and defence conglomerates Rostec and Almaz-Antey production of Russian missiles and other military (OAO Concern VKO ‘Almaz-Antey’), both targeted systems. by Western countries for their central role in supplying the Russian armed forces. THE ISKANDER 9M727 The 9M727 is a Russian medium-range GLCM that Established in 2007, Rostec has been headed by flies at low altitudes to evade radar and reduce the Putin confidant Chemezov since its inception.117 risk of interception.119 In order to navigate to its Almaz-Antey, meanwhile, was created by target and make course corrections mid-flight, presidential decree in 2002 and is led by Yan the missile contains a number of sensors and Novikov. Between 2014 and 2016, however, the internal computer systems designed to translate company’s board of directors was also headed by external signals into digital inputs. Figure 12: Images of the 9M727 Cruise Missile Source: RUSI. 117 Reuters, ‘Putin Ally Chemezov Says Russia Will Be the Victor’, 10 March 2022. 118 Almaz-Antey, ‘History’, <http://www.almaz-antey.ru/en/istoriya/>, accessed 21 July 2022. 119 CSIS Missile Defense Project, ‘9M729 (SSC-8)’, last updated 31 March 2022, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8- novator-9m729/>, accessed 21 July 2022. 34

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Two of the missile’s most important signal chassis and secured within a locking metal retainer. processing systems are the Zarya and Baget-62-04 The robust construction is designed to protect the computers, which process radar and television computer from vibration and shocks that could guidance (TGM) data, respectively. One of the disrupt its operation as the missile launches and missile’s most important sensors is a system navigates to its target. The metal chassis also attached to its fuselage that processes GPS and protects the computer from electromagnetic GLONASS signals – the SN-99 (СН-99). interference, as does the presence of a braided metal gasket that seals the computer when installed A study of the constituent parts of these systems inside the 9M727 fuselage. reveals the extensive use of Western-produced components in their construction, while their The Zarya is passively cooled, meaning that no fans Russian-based manufacturing chains often or air vents are required to manage temperatures. ultimately lead back to Rostec and Almaz-Antey. This provides the electronics with some resistance to water damage and to vibrations that could ZARYA RADAR PROCESSING COMPUTER interfere with its operations if the system relied on The Zarya computer sits at the front end of the an alternative, active cooling mechanism. 9M727 missile and is fitted within an all-metal Figure 13: Disassembly of the Zarya Computer (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:22) (cid:3)(cid:2) (cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:31)(cid:26)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:7)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:25)(cid:24) (cid:3)(cid:2) (cid:1)(cid:24)(cid:6)(cid:27)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:26) (cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:7)(cid:4)(cid:31)(cid:6)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:127)(cid:31)(cid:4)(cid:129) (cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:24)(cid:30) (cid:18)(cid:2) (cid:18)(cid:2) (cid:141)(cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:26) (cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:1)(cid:6)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:25)(cid:24) (cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:129)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:141)(cid:6)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:30) (cid:18)(cid:2) (cid:143)(cid:2) (cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:25)(cid:24) (cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:129)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:141)(cid:6)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:30) (cid:143)(cid:2) (cid:143)(cid:2) (cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:5)(cid:144)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:1)(cid:6)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:9)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:1)(cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:26) (cid:20)(cid:31)(cid:7)(cid:24)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:144)(cid:25)(cid:7)(cid:4)(cid:24)(cid:6)(cid:27)(cid:31)(cid:7)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:31)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:129)(cid:25) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:19) 35 (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26) (cid:25)ХАЛ9000 91 6X 22 02 1X 2X 3X 4X 5X БЭОМ «Заря» Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Проц 016и734 БТ62-406и816 БТ62-308и355 Source: RUSI.

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker At least some of the models of the Zarya computers recovered from the 9M727 contained several appear to have historically been manufactured Western-sourced components, including digital by entities linked to the production of Russian signal processors, flash memory modules, static military systems and – ultimately – to Almaz- RAM modules, and ethernet cabling that originated Antey.120 However, despite this, the Zarya computer from US and German companies. Figure 14: Western Components in the Zarya Computer (cid:9)(cid:21)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:23)(cid:144)(cid:13)(cid:30)(cid:10)(cid:13)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:129)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:30) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:30) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:30) (cid:14)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:23) (cid:24)(cid:129)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:2)(cid:31)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:13)(cid:21) (cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:13)(cid:21) (cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:11)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:143)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:143)(cid:17) (cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:31)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:16)(cid:15) (cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:31)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:15) (cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:26)(cid:11)(cid:23)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:10) (cid:25)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:7)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:7)(cid:7)(cid:141)(cid:6)(cid:15) (cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:10)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:3)(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:23)(cid:2)(cid:23)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:1)(cid:127)(cid:6)(cid:15) (cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:9)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:23)(cid:129)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:4)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:15) (cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:8)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:7)(cid:27)(cid:12)(cid:15) (cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:127)(cid:13)(cid:26)(cid:23) (cid:6)(cid:143)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:23) (cid:13)(cid:24)(cid:1)(cid:13)(cid:143)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:24) (cid:28)(cid:10)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:26) (cid:11)(cid:13)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:143)(cid:17) (cid:6)(cid:143)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:129)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:143)(cid:22)(cid:26) (cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:1)(cid:6)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:143)(cid:29)(cid:16)(cid:29)(cid:17)(cid:10) (cid:21)(cid:6)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:1)(cid:6)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26) (cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:6)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:143)(cid:24)(cid:129)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:30) (cid:129)(cid:26) (cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:13)(cid:143)(cid:10) Source: RUSI. 120 A document attributed to A.N. Shishkov of the Moscow Aviation Institute notes that, in the early 1990s, a series of Zarya models was produced by an ‘NII Priborostroeniya’ in Moscow. A H Shishkov, ‘Lekcija Mikroprocessory’ [‘Microprocessor Lecture’], Moscow Aviation Institute, p. 38, <http://frela-mk.narod.ru/olderfiles/1/Lekcciya_3_4_Mikroproccessory.pdf>, accessed 28 July 2022. This may refer to either the V.V. Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design (NIIP) (Nauchno-izsledovatel’skij institut priborostroenniya imeni V.V. Tikhomirova) or the State Research Institute of Instrument Design (GosNIIP) (Gosudarstvennyj nauchno-izsledovatel’skij institut priborostroeniya). Both entities have been involved in the production of military technology. See V.V. Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design, ‘Eksportnaya produkciya’ [‘Export Production’], <https://www.niip.ru/catalog/eksportnaya-produktsiya>, accessed 26 July 2022; Army Recognition, ‘Russia Has More SSC-8 Cruise Missiles Than Expected, with Conflictual Range’, 11 February 2019, <https://www.armyrecognition.com/february_2019_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/russia_has_ more_ssc-8_cruise_missiles_than_expected_with_conflictual_range.html>, accessed 28 July 2022; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, ‘Cruise Missiles and INF - What About 9M729?’, 23 June 2015, <https://webcache.googleusercontent. com/search?q=cache:kGNi1MZkOSIJ:https://russianforces.org/blog/2015/06/cruise_missiles_and_inf_-_what. shtml+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=de>, accessed 28 July 2022. At the time of writing, NIIP was controlled by Almaz-Antey and Rostec. See Oruzhiye Rossii [Russian Weaponry], ‘Nauchno-izsledovatel’skij institut priborostroenniya imeni V.V. Tikhomirova, AO’ [‘V.V. Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design, JSC’], <https://www.arms-expo.ru/ armament/ members/625/83161/>, accessed 21 July 2022. GosNIIP was part of Almaz-Antey as recently as 2018 and still prominently features the Almaz-Antey logo on its webpage. See GosNIIP, ‘Akcionernoye obschestvo “Gosudarstvennyj nauchno-izsledovatel’skij institut priborostroeniya”’ [‘Joint Stock Company “State Research Institute of Instrument Design”’], <http://www.gosniip.ru/>, accessed 28 July 2022; Vladimir Medvedev, ‘Frontovyje aviacionnye pribory i ih sozdateli’ [‘Front-line Aviation Instruments and Their Creators’], Nacional’naya oborona [National Defence], 27 February 2018, <https://2009-2020.oborona.ru/includes/periodics/defense/2018/0227/122323529/print.shtml>, accessed 28 July 2022. 36

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Notably, the core processing on the Zarya system by RUSI in the 9M727 have both the C25 and C30 appears to be performed by a Texas Instruments variants present, the latter being capable of up digital signalling processor. These processors to 50 million operations per second – likely to are used for manipulating streams of data in be the top of the available market at the time of repetitive ways, and could perform the filtering, construction. The microchips are dated to 1988 manipulation and conversion of data collected by and 1990, which indicates the system was likely the missile’s onboard sensors. designed and constructed in the late 1980s into the early 1990s. The digital signalling processors also The digital signalling processing chips used in appear to be coupled with other Western-sourced the Zarya are the Texas Instruments TMS320 memory chips produced by either Integrated series, initially released in 1983, but which have Device Technology or Cypress Semiconductor. had various revisions since. The boards inspected Figure 15: Angstrem and Integral Microchip on the Zarya Circuit Boards (cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:31)(cid:19) (cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:28) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24) Source: RUSI. The metal-packaged integrated circuit devices Angstrem was founded in 1963 under the auspices visible in the system are primarily of Soviet of the Leningrad-based Scientific Research origin, which can be determined by the logos on Institute of Fine Mechanics and developed the the domestic manufactured chips produced by first domestically produced ‘Tropa’ series of Angstrem and Integral. Up until the fall of the microchips.122 The company has since produced Soviet Union, Angstrem and Integral, alongside over 2,000 types of microchips and semiconductor Moscow-based PAO Mikron,121 were the country’s devices for use in missile guidance systems, space principal entities producing integrated circuits. and aviation technology, personal computers and 121 Mikron’s history dates back to the late 1950s and can be traced to the Voronezh Plant of Semiconductor Devices (Voronezhskij zavod poluprovodnikovyh priborov), which later became VZPP-Mikron. Mikron has historically produced components for use in military systems. See Mikron, ‘Mikron History’, <https://en.mikron.ru/company/history/>, accessed 30 June 2022. 122 Angstrem, ‘Katalog produkcii’ [‘Product Catalogue’], 2022, <https://tinyurl.com/6mcp38rp>, accessed 21 July 2022. 37

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker micro-calculators, among other applications.123 BAGET COMPUTING MACHINE Another of the computers found inside the In 2018, over 91% of Angstrem’s overall sales Iskander-K 9M727 is the Baget-62-04 – a television were of products with military applications; for guidance processing system that is primarily used sales on the domestic market, that number was in the terminal phase to ensure pinpoint accuracy. over 96%.124 Angstrem is a majority shareholder The Baget family of computers is described in a in AO Angstrem-T, whose assets were blocked by recent article by a researcher from the Scientific the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on 22 Research Institute for System Analysis of the February 2022.125 Russian Academy of Sciences (SRISA RAS) as high- performance devices for signal processing.128 Integral, meanwhile, is a Belarus-based producer of integrated systems, discrete semiconductor Like the Zarya computer, the Baget-62-04’s devices and information display systems, including electronics are encased within a specialised – according to the company’s webpage – for system designed to protect them from high- integration into specialised equipment deployed in destructive load factors and electromagnetic extreme conditions.126 Integral began production interference. The Baget-62-04 also contains a range in the 1960s but was sanctioned by OFAC on 24 of Western-manufactured components including February 2022 in relation to the Russian invasion microprocessors, FPGAs, SRAM chips, crystal of Ukraine.127 oscillators, connecting sockets and a range of others. 123 Ibid. 124 Angstrem, ‘Godovoj otchet Akcionernogo obschestva ‘Angstrem’ za 2018 god’ [‘Yearly Report of Joint-Stock Company “Angstrem” for the Year 2018’], report confirmed by the company general director and head chief accountant on 28 June 2019, p. 7. Accessed at Interfax, ‘AO ‘Angstrem’ [‘JSC ‘Angstrem’], Centr Raskrytiya Korporativnoj Informacii [Corporate Information Discovery Centre], <https://www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/files.aspx?id=3782&type=2&attempt=1> , accessed 1 July 2022. 125 US Department of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Treasury Imposes Immediate Economic Costs in Response to Actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions’, press release, 22 February 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0602>, accessed 21 July 2022. 126 Integral, ‘Produkciya’ [‘Products’], <https://integral.by/ru/products>, accessed 20 July 2022. 127 US Department of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Treasury Imposes Immediate Economic Costs in Response to Actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions’. 128 Antonov A A and A A Krasnyuk, ‘The Internal Structure of Microprocessors for Industrial Control and Data Processing Systems’, IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering (No. 1061, 2021). 38

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Figure 16: Western Components in the Baget-62-04 (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:18)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:30)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:13) (cid:127)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:13)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:13) (cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:27)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:7) (cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:12)(cid:1)(cid:16)(cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:27) (cid:6)(cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:31)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:20)(cid:143)(cid:13)(cid:27)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:20)(cid:18)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:3) (cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:15)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:27) (cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:13)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:22) (cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:13)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:22) (cid:9)(cid:2)(cid:24)(cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:10)(cid:27)(cid:15)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:16)(cid:13) (cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:2)(cid:127)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:9) (cid:6)(cid:9)(cid:28)(cid:31)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:4)(cid:29)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3) (cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:27)(cid:6)(cid:9)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:3) (cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:23) (cid:6)(cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:141)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:28)(cid:144)(cid:9)(cid:157)(cid:2)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:4)(cid:144)(cid:12)(cid:3) (cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:27) (cid:27)(cid:127)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:12) (cid:6)(cid:30)(cid:9)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:129)(cid:27)(cid:3) (cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:10)(cid:127)(cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:4)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:28)(cid:4)‚(cid:3) (cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:29)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:31)(cid:1)(cid:127)(cid:5)(cid:5)(cid:21)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:129)(cid:9)(cid:141)(cid:2)(cid:3) (cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:5)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:29)(cid:12)(cid:3) (cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:4) (cid:129)(cid:1)(cid:28)€(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:127)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:5)(cid:10)(cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:18)(cid:3) (cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:13)(cid:23)(cid:9)(cid:9) (cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:12) (cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:15)(cid:27) (cid:25)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:25) (cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:141)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:27)(cid:2)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:12)(cid:22)(cid:9) (cid:9)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:1)(cid:14)(cid:17)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:13) (cid:2)(cid:12)(cid:17) (cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:17)(cid:8)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:7) (cid:14)(cid:9)(cid:25) (cid:9)(cid:143)(cid:2)(cid:22)(cid:129)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:12)(cid:1) (cid:141)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:2)(cid:12)(cid:141) (cid:30)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:12) (cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:12)(cid:2)(cid:21)(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:13)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:22)(cid:9) (cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:143)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:30)(cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:12)(cid:7) (cid:11)(cid:2)(cid:23)(cid:10)(cid:1)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:23)(cid:27) (cid:17)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:10) (cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:15)(cid:27) (cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:15)(cid:27) (cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:13)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:7) (cid:16)(cid:9)(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:9) (cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:23)(cid:27) (cid:27)(cid:143)(cid:2)(cid:13)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:25)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:11)(cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:13) (cid:1)(cid:17)ƒ(cid:1)(cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:127)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:13) (cid:6)(cid:141)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:141)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:3) (cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:23)(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:11)(cid:2)(cid:23)(cid:1)(cid:3) (cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:1)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:27)(cid:4)(cid:21)(cid:4)(cid:28)(cid:3) (cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:9)(cid:30)(cid:20)‚(cid:20)‚(cid:9)(cid:3) Source: RUSI. The Baget series traces its lineage back to as well as in ground- and air-based high-precision Russian government efforts – following the weapons complexes.130 collapse of the Soviet Union – to domestically manufacture computers and components for Co-authored by the AO Design Bureau ‘Korund-M’ military applications to reduce reliance on foreign (KB Korund-M) and Russia’s SRISA RAS, the suppliers.129 A 2017 brochure published by the brochure advertises a range of Baget computers Russian manufacturers shows that a possible and domestically manufactured microchips descendant of the Baget 64-02 is intended for use as designed for military applications. an onboard control system in aviation complexes 129 AO Konstruktorskoe b’uro (KB) Korund-M (JSC Design Bureau (DB) Korund-M) and Federal’noe gosudarstvennoe uchrezhdeniye Federal’nyj nauchnyj centr nauchno-izsledovatel’skij institute sistemnyh izsledovanij rossijskoj akademii nauk [Federal State Institution ‘Scientific Research Institute for Systems Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences (FSI FSC SRISA RAS)], ‘Perspektivnye EVM semejstva Baget’ [‘Prospective Computers of the Baget Family’], 2017, pp. 2–3. 130 Ibid. 39

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker Figure 17: Modern Baget Computer Systems Advertised by KB Korund-M and SRISA RAS (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:10) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:26)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:10) Source: Korund-M and SRISA RAS Brochure. KB Korund-M, which seems to be a design bureau Western governments.134 of SRISA RAS,131 notes on its webpage that its products have been deployed in Russian military The Baget-62-04 is also named in the annual reports systems, including the Iskander missile complex, of AO Serpukhov Metallist Plant, which claim that and that it continues to produce computers with the company produced 222 Baget-62-04 computers military applications and to conduct R&D related for the Iskander-M missile in 2013, with plans to to the computing needs of the Russian Ministry of produce 269 Baget-62-03 computers the following Defence.132 SRISA RAS was sanctioned by OFAC on year.135 The plant’s annual reports continued to 2 August 2022.133 KB Korund-M is not sanctioned by reference involvement in the production of Baget 131 One of the company’s founders is Vladimir Betelin, who is also the scientific director at SRISA RAS. See Federal Government Institution Scientific Research Institute for Systems Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences, ‘Betelin Vladimir Borisovich’, <https://www.niisi.ru/betelin.htm>, accessed 25 July 2022. In Russian federal tax documents dated 24 July 2020, Betelin is listed as the general director and principal shareholder of AO KB Korund-M. Russian federal tax documents dated 4 December 2021 also listed Betelin as the director of Autonomous Non-Commercial Organisation Design Bureau Korund-M, while SRISA RAS was listed as a shareholder of the company. Russian federal tax documents dated 16 June 2022 still list Betelin as director of the company, but make no mention of SRISA RAS. Russia Federal Tax Registry documents can be accessed through Sayari Labs, <https://sayari.com/>, accessed 22 July 2022. 132 Konstruktorskoye B’uro Korund-M [Design Bureau Korund-M], ‘O “Korund-M”’ [‘About “Korund-M”’], <https://kbkorund. ru/about>, accessed 26 July 2022. 133 US Department of State, ‘Imposing Additional Costs on Russia for Its Continued War Against Ukraine’, fact sheet, 2 August 2022, <https://www.state.gov/imposing-additional-costs-on-russia-for-its-continued-war-against-ukraine/>, accessed 2 August 2022. 134 It appears that some models of the Baget – namely, the Baget-53 computers – have also been manufactured by Ramenskoye Instrument-Making Design Bureau [Ramenskoye ‘Priborostroitel’noye konstruktorskoye b’uro’]. See Open Joint-Stock Company ‘Ramenskoye Instrument-Making Design Bureau’ (OJSC ‘RIDB’), ‘Katalog produkcii elektronnogo napravleniya “OAO Ramenskoye Priborostroitel’noye Konstruktorskoye B’uro”’ [‘Electronic Product Catalogue of the OJSC “Ramenskoye Instrument-Making Design Bureau”’], 2013, p. 14, <https://mniirip.ru/sites/default/files/articles/ katalog_elektronnogo_napravleniya_rpkb.pdf>, accessed 20 July 2022. 135 ‘Godovoj otchet Otkrytogo akcionnernogo obschestva “Serpukhovskij zavod ‘Metallist’” za 2013 god’ [‘Annual Report of the Open Joint Stock Company “Serpukhov Plant ‘Metallist’” for the Year 2013’], 2014, p. 16. Accessed at Interfax, ‘AO Serpukhovskij Zavod “Metallist”’ [‘JSC “Serpukhov Plant ‘Metallist’”’], Centr Raskrytiya Korporativnoj Informacii [Corporate Information Discovery Centre], <https://www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/files.aspx?id=23097&type=2>, accessed 1 July 2022. 40

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine computers as recently as the 2020 report, published Treasury, some of the missile systems produced by in 2021.136 The 2021 annual report, released in June NPO High Precision Systems – including Iskanders 2022, makes no reference to the Baget computers.137 – were brought to the Russia–Ukraine border in advance of the February 2022 invasion.141 Established in November 1943 by the federal defence committee of the Soviet Union, the GUIDANCE SYSTEMS Serpukhov Metallist Plant is a sprawling facility that For nearly two decades, Russian military doctrine has been historically involved in the production has relied on the use of long- and medium-range of Soviet and Russian military technology,138 and cruise missiles to strike at key critical military has reportedly continued to produce critical infrastructure deep inside an opponent’s territory. military components until more recently.139 As of In order to ensure these weapons hit their targets, December 2021, the plant was owned by JSC NPO the Russian armed forces have developed advanced High Precision Systems (АО ‘NPO Vysokotochnye inertial and navigation sensors to direct the missile Kompleksy’) of Rostec.140 while manoeuvring at low altitude to avoid air defences. One of the critical sensors found on NPO High Precision Systems is a Russian state- both the 9M727 and the Kh-101 air-launched cruise owned holding company sanctioned by the US missile is the GLONASS and GPS guidance unit SN- Treasury in March 2022. According to the US 99 (СН-99). 136 See, for example, ‘Godovoj otchet Otkrytogo akcionnernogo obschestva “Serpukhovskij zavod ‘Metallist’ za 2020 god”’ [‘Annual Report of the Open Joint Stock Company “Serpukhov Plant ‘Metallist’ for the Year 2020”’], 2021, pp. 16, 31. Accessed at Interfax, ‘AO Serpukhovskij Zavod “Metallist”’ [‘JSC “Serpukhov Plant ‘Metallist’”’], Centr Raskrytiya Korporativnoj Informacii [Corporate Information Discovery Centre], <https://www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/files. aspx?id=23097&type=2>, accessed 1 July 2022. 137 ‘Godovoj otchet Otkrytogo akcionnernogo obschestva “Serpukhovskij zavod ‘Metallist’ za 2021 god”’ [‘Annual Report of the Open Joint Stock Company “Serpukhov Plant ‘Metallist’” for the Year 2021’], 2022. Accessed at Interfax, ‘AO Serpukhovskij Zavod “Metallist”’ [‘JSC “Serpukhov Plant ‘Metallist’”’], Centr Raskrytiya Korporativnoj Informacii [Corporate Information Discovery Centre], <https://www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/files.aspx?id=23097&type=2>, accessed 28 July 2022. 138 Oleg Falichev, ‘“Metallist”: pricel’noe razvitie’ [‘“Metallist”: Targeted Development’], Voyenno-promyshlennyj kur’jer [Military-Industrial Courier], 6 November 2018, <https://vpk-news.ru/articles/46107>, accessed 21 July 2022. 139 Serpukhovskie Vesti, ‘Serpuhovskomu zavodu Metallist ispolnyaetsya 75 let’ [‘The Serpukhov “Metallist” Plant Turns 75’], 13 August 2018, <http://inserpuhov.ru/novosti/proizvodstvo/serpuhovskomu-zavodu-metallist-ispolnyaetsya-75-let>, accessed 20 July 2022. 140 Serpukhov Plant Metallist, ‘Glavnaya’ [‘Main’], archived version of the webpage captured 26 December 2021, <https:// web.archive.org/web/20211226064918/http://www.szmetallist.ru/>, accessed 21 July 2022. 141 US Department of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Treasury Sanctions Russia’s Defense-Industrial Base, the Russian Duma and Its Members, and Sberbank CEO’, press release, 24 March 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0677>, accessed 21 July 2022. 41

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker Figure 18: Images of the SN-99 (СН-99) GLONASS and GPS Guidance System Source: RUSI. This unit is produced by the Design Bureau military.143 Russian-language corporate records144 of Navigational Systems (AO KB NAVIS),142 a and periodicals also claim that KB Korund-M, manufacturer of GLONASS, GPS and GALILEO the aforementioned SRISA RAS design bureau, navigational systems used by the Russian established KB NAVIS.145 Like KB Korund-M, 142 Konstruktorskoye B’uro Navigacionnyh Sistem Navis [Design Bureau of Navigational Systems Navis], ‘SN-99 Navigacionnaya apparatura dlya vysokodinamichnyh ob’ektov GLONASS/GPS/SBAS’ [‘SN-99 – Navigational Equipment for GLONASS/GPS/SBAS High Dynamic Objects’], <https://navis.ru/assets/files/SN-99---korrekt_NEW.pdf>, accessed 21 July 2022. 143 ‘Nekommercheskaya organizaciya Associaciya razrabotchikov, proizvoditelei i potrebitelei oborudovaniya i prilozhenij na osnove global’nyh navigacionnyh sputnikovyh sistem GLONASS/GNSS-Forum’ [‘Non-Commercial Organisation the Association of Developers, Producers and Consumers of Equipment and Applications on the Basis of the Global Satellite Navigation Systems “GLONASS/GNSS-Forum”’], ‘Analiticheskij otchet po itogam izsledovaniya sostoianiya i perspektiv razvitiya rynka navigacionnyh, svyazanyh i navigacionno-sviazannyh modulej, a takzhe ocenki vliyanniya na razvitie rossijskogo i mezhdunarodnogo rynka “Avtonet”’ [‘Analytical Report on the Findings of the Study of the State and Development Perspectives of the Market for Navigation, Network and Navigational-Network Modules, As Well As the Impact Assessment of the Development of the Russian and International “Autonet” Market’], 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/ yckfrxwx>, p. 189, accessed 15 July 2022. 144 See Russian Federal Tax Register, document dated 9 July 2020 taken from Sayari Labs, <https://sayari.com/>, accessed 10 July 2022. 145 A A Shanin et al., ‘Apparatura Sputnikovyh Navigacionnyh Sistem GLONASS i GPS Konstruktorskogo B’uro Navigacionnyh 42

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine KB NAVIS has not been sanctioned by Western MULTIPLE PRODUCTS governments despite its provision of critical KB NAVIS, however, appears to manufacture technology to the country’s missile programme. several pieces of equipment for the Russian military. Another of these is a handheld Notably, the SN-99 (СН-99) systems contain several navigational and positional system used by Western-made components such as a 32-megabit the country’s special operations forces (SOF) flash memory chip made by Spansion and a 12-bit named Breeze-KM-I.146 These types of devices A/D converter manufactured by Linear Technology are commonly employed by SOF and forward Corporation. While an A/D converter in the 12- reconnaissance personnel to accurately pinpoint bit range is no longer considered exceptional by their own position and estimate coordinates for modern standards, it is still a critical component precision artillery and air strikes on the enemy’s for tactical cruise and ballistic missiles and was location. likely considered top-of-the-line when this SN-99 system was assembled. When disassembled, the Breeze-KM-I contains a number of Western-manufactured microelectronics including a high-performance 64-bit microprocessor, SRAM chips, transceivers and amplifiers. Figure 19: Components in the Breeze-KM-I (cid:5)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:25)(cid:144)(cid:25)(cid:17) (cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:22) €‚ƒ(cid:17) (cid:16)(cid:17)‚(cid:15)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:7)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:141)(cid:3)(cid:129) (cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23) (cid:6)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:12)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:24) (cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:11)(cid:24) (cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:24)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:26) (cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:28)(cid:12)(cid:23)(cid:14)(cid:11)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:10)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:26)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:14)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:127)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:28)(cid:12)(cid:23) (cid:16)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:143)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:23) (cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:13)(cid:23)(cid:16)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:143)(cid:23)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:28)(cid:12) (cid:10)(cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:23)(cid:12)(cid:24)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:11)(cid:24) (cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:20)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:15) (cid:22)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:15) (cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:1)(cid:27)(cid:15) (cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:12)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:2)(cid:15) (cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:7)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:10)(cid:15) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:5)(cid:17)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:129)(cid:18)(cid:23) (cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:28)(cid:12) (cid:22)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:129)(cid:18)(cid:15) (cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:14)(cid:1)(cid:7)(cid:7)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:15) (cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:141)(cid:3)(cid:15) (cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:143)(cid:1)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:3)(cid:2)(cid:25)(cid:127)(cid:129)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:3)(cid:144)(cid:30)(cid:9)(cid:28)(cid:15) (cid:30)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14)(cid:157) (cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:6)(cid:31)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:11)(cid:24) (cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:31)(cid:16)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:30) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:6) (cid:14)(cid:143)(cid:12)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:30) (cid:30)(cid:12)(cid:10)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:21) (cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:6)(cid:23) (cid:30)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:6)(cid:31)(cid:14)(cid:26)(cid:11)(cid:24) (cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:14) (cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:127)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:27)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:143) SWITZERLAND (cid:31)(cid:30) Source: RUSI. One of these components is a high-performance Semiconductor. The component is a high-speed, CMOS static RAM chip (CY62157EV30LL-45ZSXI) ultra-low-power memory chip147 that is classified originally produced by US-based Cypress as a dual-use good for export purposes.148 Sistem’ [‘Equipment for Satellite Navigation Systems GLONASS and GPS of the Design Bureau of Navigation Systems’], Navigation and Hydrography, State Research Navigation-Hydrography Institute, Russian Federation Ministry of Defence, December 2001, p. 173. 146 NAVIS, ‘Breeze-KM-I Individual’naya navigacionnaya apparatura GLONASS/GPS/SBAS’ [‘Breeze-KM-I Individual Navigational GLONASS/GPS/SBAS Equipment’], <https://navis.ru>, accessed 23 June 2022. 147 Infineon Technologies, ‘CY62157EV30 MoBL 8-Mbit (512K × 16) Static RAM’, data sheet, 28 February 2020, <https:// www.infineon.com/dgdl/Infineon-CY62157EV30_MoBL_8-Mbit_(512_K_16)_Static_RAM-DataSheet-v20_00-EN. pdf?fileId=8ac78c8c7d0d8da4017d0ebe669131ef>, accessed 21 July 2022. 148 ECCN 3A991.b.2.a – static random-access memory (SRAM) with a storage capacity exceeding 1 Mbit per package. See Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Control List: CATEGORY 3 - 43

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker Russian trade records and import declarations show as the chief designer of consumer navigational that, between 2017 and 2021, KB NAVIS imported equipment at Almaz-Antey.156 In a 2008 piece on the large volumes of electronics, integrated circuits commercialisation of GLONASS co-authored with and other electronic components manufactured Engelsberg, Babakov noted that the NAVIS Group by US companies such as Analog Devices, was the main supplier of GLONASS receivers in Texas Instruments and Linear Technology.149 Russia. He also explained that NVS Technologies However, while most of its shipments were of US- was established ‘as part of the process of manufactured goods, the vast majority of these integration of our technologies into the worldwide were shipped through Switzerland, Israel, China GNSS market’.157 and Malaysia.150 While KB Navis appears to produce items for Notably, over 90% of these were moved to KB several civilian applications, a 2019 Russian- NAVIS by Switzerland-based NVS Technologies language industry report claimed that over 70% AG, both of which are part of the NAVIS group of of the institute’s contracts were with the Russian companies.151 Ministry of Defence.158 At the time, these apparently amounted to over 3.5 billion roubles, or $55 million The CEO of NVS Technologies – a Russian national at the time. Hence, it appears possible that many named Vasiliy Engelsberg152 – is also the co- of the Western-sourced components imported by founder of KB NAVIS153 and of the wider NAVIS KB NAVIS found their way into the kinds of Russian group of companies.154 Notably, fellow KB NAVIS weapons systems assessed for this report. co-founder Valery Babakov155 has also served ELECTRONICS’. 149 Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider. 150 Ibid. 151 ‘Nekommercheskaya organizaciya Associaciya razrabotchikov, proizvoditelei i potrebitelei oborudovaniya i prilozhenij na osnove global’nyh navigacionnyh sputnikovyh sistem GLONASS/GNSS-Forum’ [‘Non-Commercial Organisation of the Association of Developers, Producers and Consumers of Equipment and Applications on the Basis of the Global Satellite Navigation Systems “GLONASS/GNSS-Forum”’], ‘Analiticheskij otchet po itogam izsledovaniya sostoianiya i perspektiv razvitiya rynka navigacionnyh, svyazanyh i navigacionno-sviazannyh modulej, a takzhe ocenki vliyanniya na razvitie rossijskogo I mezhdunarodnogo rynka “Avtonet”’ [‘Analytical Report on the Findings of the Study of the State and Development Perspectives of the Market for Navigation, Network and Navigational-Network Modules, As Well As the Impact Assessment of the Development of the Russian and International “Autonet” Market’], pp. 187, 160. 152 LinkedIn, ‘Vasily Engelsberg’, <https://ch.linkedin.com/in/vasily-engelsberg-3b637b16>, accessed 21 July 2022. 153 Polina Jeremenko, ‘Soshel s orbity’ [‘Left Orbit’], Moskovskiye Novosti [Моscow News], 7 April 2011, <https://www.mn.ru/ politics/68113>, accessed 3 July 2022. 154 PravoRU, ‘Sobstvenniku postavschika Minoborony otkazali v iske na sovladel’ca’ [‘Owner of a Ministry of Defence Supplier Has Been Denied a Claim Against the Co-Owner’], 10 November 2017, <https://pravo.ru/news/view/145748/>, accessed 3 July 2022. 155 Ibid. 156 Novosti navigacii, ‘5th International Satellite Navigation Forum’, (No. 2, 2011), p. 51, <https://internavigation.ru/wp- content/uploads/2019/07/nn2011_02.pdf#page=51>, accessed 12 July 2022. 157 Vasiliy Engelsberg, Ivan Petrovski and Valery Babakov, ‘Expert Advice: GLONASS Business Prospects’, GPS World, 1 March 2008, <https://www.gpsworld.com/gnss-systemglonassexpert-advice-glonass-business-prospects-4215/>, accessed 21 July 2022. 158 According to this document, KB NAVIS had concluded 106 contracts with the Russian federal government, valued at 5.1 billion roubles. Twenty of those contracts – amounting to 3.6 billion roubles or 72.6% of the company’s business – were with the Russian Ministry of Defence. See ‘Nekommercheskaya organizaciya Associaciya razrabotchikov, proizvoditelei i potrebitelei oborudovaniya i prilozhenij na osnove global’nyh navigacionnyh sputnikovyh sistem GLONASS/GNSS- Forum’ [‘Non-Commercial Organisation of the Association of Developers, Producers and Consumers of Equipment and Applications on the Basis of the Global Satellite Navigation Systems “GLONASS/GNSS-Forum”’], ‘Analiticheskij otchet po itogam izsledovaniya sostoianiya i perspektiv razvitiya rynka navigacionnyh, svyazanyh i navigacionno-sviazannyh modulej, a takzhe ocenki vliyanniya na razvitie rossijskogo I mezhdunarodnogo rynka “Avtonet”’ [‘Analytical Report on the Findings of the Study of the State and Development Perspectives of the Market for Navigation, Network and Navigational-Network Modules, As Well As the Impact Assessment of the Development of the Russian and International “Autonet” Market’], p. 189. 44

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine THE KH-101 CRUISE MISSILE the missile does not require the use of a booster to The Kh-101 ALCM has been expended in gain initial velocity and reportedly can cruise at an significant numbers in Ukraine. The missile has altitude of 6,000 metres at Mach 0.58.162 In addition, been used to attack a variety of targets, including the missile can fly to a target at an altitude of 30–60 railway infrastructure159 and urban centres.160 It is metres at a maximum speed of Mach 0.78.163 noteworthy that the design has been mooted since the 1980s and its entry into service slowed by a lack The missile uses a range of systems and sensors for of state funding, which pushed its development midcourse navigation, including inertial, GLONASS into the 2000s.161 and GPS satellite data.164 These latter signals are received and processed by the same SN-99 (СН- Introduced into service in 2012, the missile was 99) unit fitted on to the 9M727 cruise missile. The developed as a long-range, standoff cruise missile electro-optical correction system uses a stored with a range of up to 2,800 km to carry either terrain map to carry out terrain comparison conventional warheads – such as high explosive, updates.165 In its terminal phase, the Kh-101 makes fragmentation, submunitions – or even a 250-kt use of a TV imaging infrared seeker.166 nuclear warhead. Being launched from an aircraft, 159 Ministry of Defence (@DefenceHQ), ‘(2/6) In the early hours of 5 June, Russian Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles struck rail infrastructure in Kyiv, likely in an attempt disrupt the supply of Western military equipment to frontline Ukrainian units’, Twitter, 6 June 2022, <https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1533682058463268864>, accessed 21 July 2022. 160 NBC News, ‘2 Reported Killed as Russian Missiles Strike Kyiv for First Time in Weeks’. 161 Robin Hewson, ‘Details Emerge of Russia’s Latest Cruise Missiles’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 2007, <https://web. archive.org/web/20080225163154/http://www.janes.com/news/defence/systems/jdw/jdw071022_1_n.shtml>, accessed 21 July 2022. 162 CSIS Missile Defense Project, ‘Kh-101 / Kh-102’, 31 July 2021, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/>, accessed 21 July 2022. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 45

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker Figure 20: Western Components in the Kh-101 (cid:143)(cid:141)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:26)(cid:8)(cid:3)(cid:25)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:141)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:11)(cid:31)(cid:20)(cid:20)(cid:31)(cid:3)(cid:28) ˆ(cid:21) (cid:19)(cid:11) (cid:25)(cid:24) (cid:129) (cid:23) (cid:8) (cid:2) (cid:6) (cid:3) (cid:8)(cid:18) (cid:25) (cid:23) (cid:29) (cid:29) (cid:23) ˆ (cid:1)(cid:25) (cid:2) (cid:22) (cid:1) (cid:143) (cid:18)(cid:18) (cid:25) (cid:12) (cid:27)(cid:28) (cid:29)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:127)(cid:25)(cid:30) (cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:31) (cid:19) (cid:11) (cid:2)(cid:26) (cid:10) (cid:129) (cid:20) (cid:14) (cid:2) (cid:5) (cid:28) (cid:129) (cid:29) (cid:12) ˆ(cid:21) (cid:19)(cid:11) (cid:25)(cid:24) (cid:129) (cid:23) 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(cid:17) (cid:8)(cid:23)(cid:20) (cid:24) (cid:26) (cid:15) (cid:25) (cid:14)(cid:14) (cid:11) (cid:12) (cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:17)(cid:25)(cid:3) (cid:11) (cid:5) (cid:28) (cid:14) (cid:11) (cid:13)(cid:24) (cid:10) (cid:7) (cid:26) (cid:5) (cid:9) (cid:29)(cid:2)(cid:31)(cid:5)(cid:5)(cid:12) (cid:11)(cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:10) (cid:19) (cid:22) (cid:1) (cid:3) (cid:10) (cid:29) (cid:10) (cid:22) (cid:30) (cid:127) (cid:6) (cid:15) (cid:28) (cid:129) (cid:28) (cid:26) (cid:17) (cid:26) (cid:18) (cid:23)(cid:20) (cid:29) (cid:3) (cid:25) (cid:28) (cid:31)(cid:20) (cid:11) (cid:26) (cid:12) (cid:1)(cid:3)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:23) (cid:22)(cid:10) (cid:19) (cid:22) (cid:11) (cid:144)(cid:157) (cid:10) (cid:11) (cid:129) (cid:30) (cid:21) (cid:13) (cid:29) (cid:14) (cid:30) (cid:26) (cid:5) (cid:31) (cid:10) (cid:6) (cid:22) (cid:4) (cid:25) (cid:3) (cid:15) (cid:29) (cid:3) (cid:28) (cid:28) (cid:31)(cid:10) (cid:27) (cid:26) (cid:30) (cid:12) (cid:20)(cid:23) (cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:31)(cid:29) (cid:19)(cid:25) (cid:23)(cid:11) (cid:29)(cid:18) (cid:31)(cid:22) (cid:17) (cid:26) (cid:16) (cid:10) (cid:15) (cid:1) (cid:14)(cid:13) (cid:26) (cid:13) (cid:10) (cid:24) (cid:22) (cid:29) (cid:28) (cid:12) (cid:20)(cid:20)(cid:10)(cid:26) (cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:141) (cid:19)(cid:21) (cid:11) (cid:30) (cid:31)(cid:29) (cid:143) (cid:29) (cid:30) (cid:23)(cid:29) (cid:10) (cid:26) (cid:127) (cid:31)(cid:27) (cid:30) (cid:27) (cid:12) (cid:28)(cid:26) (cid:19) (cid:31) (cid:11) (cid:30)(cid:29) (cid:6) (cid:28) (cid:13) (cid:27) (cid:25)(cid:141) (cid:26)(cid:25) (cid:31)(cid:20) (cid:29) (cid:23)(cid:24) (cid:28)(cid:24) (cid:20)(cid:13) (cid:23)(cid:22) (cid:4) (cid:31) (cid:22) (cid:26) (cid:14) (cid:22) (cid:13) (cid:21) (cid:25) (cid:31) (cid:29) (cid:29)(cid:20) (cid:11)(cid:12) (cid:11) (cid:19) (cid:28) € (cid:11) ‚ (cid:22) (cid:10) ƒ (cid:141) (cid:26) (cid:6) (cid:31) (cid:9) (cid:4) (cid:1) (cid:23) (cid:13) (cid:26) (cid:18) (cid:25) (cid:4) (cid:11) (cid:12) (cid:23) (cid:16) (cid:29) (cid:19) (cid:31) (cid:25) (cid:24) (cid:26) (cid:3) (cid:31) (cid:25) (cid:15) (cid:26) (cid:30) (cid:29) (cid:28) (cid:20) (cid:141) (cid:22) (cid:22) (cid:29) (cid:6) (cid:28) (cid:31) (cid:4) (cid:10) (cid:31) (cid:13) (cid:15) (cid:30) (cid:18) (cid:28) (cid:129) (cid:25) (cid:26) (cid:12) (cid:3)(cid:23) (cid:19)„ (cid:2) (cid:22) (cid:31)(cid:28) (cid:13) (cid:3) (cid:15) (cid:24) (cid:6) (cid:8) (cid:5) (cid:27) (cid:1) (cid:5) (cid:25) (cid:26) (cid:5) (cid:29) (cid:10) … (cid:28) † (cid:27) (cid:23)(cid:25) (cid:23) (cid:26) (cid:2) (cid:26) (cid:27) (cid:25) (cid:26) (cid:11) (cid:27) (cid:25) (cid:13) (cid:11) (cid:9) (cid:129) (cid:25) (cid:4) (cid:16) (cid:25) (cid:3) (cid:23)(cid:18) (cid:28) (cid:22) (cid:23) (cid:12) (cid:19)„(cid:22) (cid:2) (cid:13) (cid:31) (cid:20) (cid:28) (cid:13) (cid:3) (cid:5) (cid:24) (cid:5) (cid:8) (cid:27) … (cid:1) (cid:25) † (cid:26) (cid:29) (cid:23) (cid:10) (cid:2) (cid:28) (cid:27) (cid:27) (cid:23)(cid:25) (cid:27) (cid:26) (cid:26) (cid:18) (cid:25) (cid:26) (cid:129) (cid:11) (cid:25) (cid:4) (cid:11) (cid:9) (cid:25)(cid:11) (cid:25)(cid:16) (cid:20) (cid:3) (cid:6) (cid:28) (cid:129) (cid:23) (cid:5)(cid:14)(cid:12) (cid:20)(cid:9)(cid:20) (cid:19)(cid:1) (cid:29) (cid:10) (cid:28) (cid:22) (cid:13) (cid:11) (cid:25) (cid:18) (cid:23) (cid:1) (cid:31) (cid:5) (cid:30) (cid:25) (cid:25) (cid:29) (cid:16) (cid:11) (cid:28) (cid:31)(cid:3) (cid:20) (cid:27) (cid:31) (cid:5) (cid:26) (cid:29) (cid:17) (cid:9) (cid:25) (cid:6) (cid:29) (cid:7) (cid:31) (cid:23) (cid:10) (cid:12) (cid:30)(cid:23) (cid:29) (cid:11) (cid:28)(cid:22) (cid:31)(cid:22) (cid:141) (cid:26) (cid:30) (cid:10) (cid:10) (cid:22) (cid:3) (cid:141) (cid:10) (cid:31)(cid:1) (cid:27) (cid:23) (cid:9) (cid:20)(cid:1)(cid:25) (cid:31) (cid:30) (cid:30) (cid:20) (cid:22) (cid:31)(cid:10)(cid:30) (cid:3)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:28) (cid:22) (cid:25) (cid:10) (cid:26) (cid:26) (cid:23) (cid:1) (cid:29)(cid:28) (cid:10) (cid:22) (cid:26) (cid:141) (cid:25)(cid:29) (cid:30) (cid:31) (cid:10) (cid:10) (cid:3) (cid:30) (cid:10)(cid:27)(cid:9) (cid:144)(cid:31)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:27) (cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:15)(cid:31) (cid:31) (cid:22) (cid:30) (cid:28) (cid:29) (cid:23)(cid:29) (cid:28) (cid:28) (cid:27) (cid:22) (cid:26) (cid:141) (cid:25)(cid:29) (cid:30) (cid:28) (cid:10) (cid:24) (cid:3) (cid:23) (cid:10)(cid:27)(cid:9) (cid:29)(cid:28)„(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:26)(cid:21)(cid:11)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:20) „(cid:3)(cid:31)(cid:30)„ (cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:25) (cid:28) (cid:25) (cid:3) (cid:30) (cid:28)(cid:22) (cid:24) (cid:29) (cid:28) (cid:26) (cid:26) (cid:10) (cid:20) (cid:30) (cid:10) (cid:31) (cid:30) (cid:22) (cid:23) (cid:20) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:3) (cid:24) (cid:25)(cid:30) (cid:28)(cid:15) (cid:25) (cid:31) (cid:3) (cid:22) (cid:10) (cid:28) (cid:27) (cid:20) (cid:15)(cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:26) (cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:29)(cid:10)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:25) (cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:11)(cid:31) (cid:22) (cid:22) (cid:9) (cid:10) (cid:1) (cid:30) (cid:26) (cid:24) (cid:28) (cid:21) (cid:20)(cid:20) (cid:22)(cid:29)(cid:10)(cid:26) (cid:22) (cid:19)(cid:25) (cid:10) (cid:26) (cid:28) (cid:9) (cid:20) (cid:23) (cid:20) (cid:20) (cid:22) (cid:29) (cid:28) (cid:31)(cid:3) (cid:25) (cid:26) (cid:3) (cid:3) (cid:31)(cid:28) (cid:25) (cid:23)(cid:22) (cid:29) (cid:20) (cid:3) (cid:10) (cid:23)(cid:157) (cid:10) (cid:26) (cid:5) (cid:22) (cid:20) (cid:14) (cid:143) (cid:23)(cid:12) (cid:23) (cid:19)(cid:14) (cid:1) (cid:129) (cid:26) (cid:11) (cid:10) (cid:13) (cid:22) (cid:18) (cid:28) (cid:5) (cid:20) (cid:16) (cid:20) (cid:24) (cid:10) (cid:5) (cid:26) (cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:12) (cid:11)(cid:31) (cid:19) (cid:22) ‡(cid:14) (cid:10) (cid:157) (cid:1) (cid:4) (cid:26) (cid:28) (cid:10) „ (cid:22) (cid:23)(cid:8)(cid:23) (cid:28) (cid:14) (cid:20) (cid:4) (cid:20) (cid:157) (cid:10) (cid:12) (cid:26) (cid:11) (cid:19) (cid:21) (cid:29) (cid:11) (cid:26) (cid:3)(cid:29) (cid:25) (cid:25) (cid:31) „ (cid:30) (cid:1) (cid:13) (cid:20) (cid:26) (cid:6) (cid:22) (cid:10) (cid:6) (cid:28) (cid:29) (cid:2) (cid:31) (cid:10) (cid:2) (cid:15) (cid:25) (cid:28) (cid:22) (cid:29) (cid:26) (cid:10) (cid:12) (cid:3)(cid:23) (cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:8) (cid:19) (cid:24) (cid:15) (cid:22) (cid:31)(cid:8) (cid:23)(cid:22) (cid:10) (cid:127) (cid:30) (cid:6)(cid:8) (cid:15) (cid:11) (cid:28) (cid:144) (cid:26) (cid:12) (cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:26) (cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:8) (cid:19) (cid:24) (cid:15) (cid:22) (cid:31)(cid:8) (cid:23)(cid:22) (cid:10) (cid:127) (cid:30) (cid:6)(cid:8) (cid:15) (cid:11) (cid:28) (cid:144) (cid:26) (cid:12) (cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:26) (cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:3) (cid:19) (cid:29) (cid:157) (cid:25) (cid:3) (cid:27) (cid:5) (cid:28) (cid:129) (cid:23) (cid:25) (cid:26) (cid:23)(cid:1) (cid:28)(cid:27) (cid:3)(cid:21) (cid:21) (cid:25) (cid:3) (cid:16) (cid:25)(cid:29) (cid:12) (cid:10)(cid:26) (cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:11) (cid:19) (cid:1) (cid:22) (cid:21) (cid:9)(cid:4) (cid:29) (cid:13) (cid:28) (cid:6) (cid:26) (cid:129) (cid:23)(cid:141) (cid:7) (cid:25) (cid:22) (cid:26) (cid:15)(cid:14) (cid:24) (cid:5) (cid:127) (cid:12) (cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:28) (cid:22)(cid:11) (cid:19)(cid:22) (cid:10) (cid:9)(cid:7) (cid:20) (cid:22) (cid:23)(cid:20) (cid:6) (cid:29) (cid:5) (cid:25) (cid:18) (cid:29) (cid:24) (cid:31)(cid:22) (cid:15) (cid:23) (cid:14) (cid:26) (cid:14) (cid:25) (cid:12) (cid:11) Source: RUSI. An intact Kh-101 that was recovered reveals that based in the US and the Netherlands. Notably, it the missile has at least six sub-systems – such as also includes Texas Instruments-manufactured satellite navigation systems and a receiver unit, a CMOS quad differential line receivers, capable of processor module and a computing unit. All these balanced and unbalanced digital data transmission systems contain extensive numbers of Western- while maintaining low-power characteristics. produced microelectronics. For instance, the Texas Instruments states that this component is BT33-202 processor module contains at least a manufactured to US Mil-Std-883C specification, yet dozen microelectronic components – including the product is classified as EAR99.167 CMOS SRAM modules, FPGAs, RS-232 and bus transceivers – produced by a range of companies 167 Texas Instruments, ‘DS26C32ATM/NOPB - CMOS Quad Differential Line Receivers’, <https://www.ti.com/product/ DS26C32AT/part-details/DS26C32ATM/NOPB>, accessed 21 July 2022. 46

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| SECTION 03 | [OHepadeinng 1 ]Circuit: Component Flows Into Russia [HEADING 2] tem volorpos alitatium invenis isquam que nam, sero toriatquia quunture pariam exeraes tisitibus Faciis et vellor adisita tquam, quia voluptu rianimo molore perrorrore verumquam quae doluptatium lDorersupnitte, uyte aprlsit aotfe cinerceres asseidn gqlyu is atrliiqnuguenntt esanntucrti oanms hcoauruldn tehnadvaem a,c stueds aaust emco nisdsuinitts a ufot re rcroo mblpaount eqnutos eaonsds it eqxupisocritp scaomn,t rooffilsc iids eesaig snoeludp tatos picduer otapitla tethme eetn tieprsianmg sRinucssteiam’s pmediliistqauryis– insidnuusmtri ahl arciboemraptleemx, dReuss csuialnla bmoirleit aernyt ’se ta, cocdeis dsi st om corditiiac acul lclaobmop roenceunmtse, dao lporroisc eislsig nwihs icdhe liiqdueanet ificeodn deoszseitn se oosf dmoliuliptatrays cRounssseia ens esnhti pamme nfut-glietv aeul tt rvaedrea trioe.c oUrtdesc taunsd d eimndpuocrit eima psoerqtuearsti aons dm otahioerre cpoemrapta. nBieesa tweimth cqluoisseti lsi naktsu tro? ednedcilgaerantiito ents u fit lperdo vbiedtuwnete pnr a2 0e1a7q uaon dq u2i0a2ti1o pnreocvuidsae Dthoel ucpotuibnutrsy a’sl idgeefnetn icnei tiencdtau.s try. vsoolmume iqnusaigtqhut aitnutro a pheorwio tihuems eq ucoosm uptoasnpeenrt sf ehrfaevrei tmatoevcetad sinpteor cthhiet ceot uenat rdyi.p16s8a nihit aliquae illabo. Ita A GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN: RUSSIAN ipide nus ipsa idundeb iscium fuga. Et voluptatium SEMICONDUCTOR IMPORTS vUesnindeg vthenest er ermecoodridcsi ta anudt ea a tloiqoul anmam fuegdi tt ha es aA vltoalnoar Russia is a large importer of semiconductors aAstplaesr,c ht hitea tirset soeraerscehn t teexapmel esnc dreuenntieod m binilclitoencasb oisf and microelectronics used in commercial, uhta ermri odnoilsleesd atruatd fea creerccoimrd ss afomr eRnues vsioalnu pitmiisp ourtt sp roof industrial and military systems. In order to isleiqmuiic doonlduut cqtuoers c aunmd ssei madic monild iumctpoerd-r emlaotleodr einppuudtist better understand these flows, the research team ethstartu mco usledq uhea vceo rfeoputinudm thise irs olwlaanyd ineltloe sRerunsasitaunr searched for all instances from 2017–22 where swae caupso nans dpelantdfoi rtmems pdoepr lsoeyreeds tt oid Ueklirbauins,e c.1u69l parum, Russian companies imported goods under a range seque deliam eos endit qui nimagnimo velestore. of HS codes corresponding to microelectronics This dataset was then checked for entities that and microelectronic-related goods.170 Il et quat. Optatint, eost alibus ditemqu issimpor m16i8n Tvrealdl e adbatoar persotv,i detedm byp Aolrtai nat aTsrapdeer Autmlas (qhuttip s:b//laalbtaon.a .ai/atlas/) and a third-party commercial data provider. U16ll9a Aclctaunsa, Tirpasdue nAtt.la sO, <vhidttepbs:i/ /atilotannsae.aqi/uaetl aps/l>it.i cum et o1d70 m HaSg Cnoidse es,s otiru Hmarqm ouniaiseepd eSryest pemed C oqdueasm, a rfea sctacnudmar daidse d codes used to denote categories of goods in international que triandteu. rHioS sC ocdoens sreepqruesaetn tv geololadcsc caattuegro rmiesa,i noort sspiemciifnic products. Up to the sixth digit, they are standardised internationally – after which they are modified by individual countries for their own record-keeping purposes. For our pro cus, sus, nim inus dite provit, voluptatqui sample, we included HS codes ‘854239’ (electronic integrated circuits; parts thereof), ‘854129’ (unmounted chips, dice veriandam, ommolestiis quia que et ut untem and wafers), ‘854110’ (diodes, other than photosensitive or light-emitting diodes), ‘854231’ (processors and controllers, harum quam, se por solent, quatas alit ratem ut whether or not combined with memories, converters, logic circuits, amplifiers, clock and timing circuits, or other circuits) hariasn dre ‘3s8 1e8x0c0e’ (rcahte mesictaial etelemm ernetsr idaotpibedu sfo, r cuosen isne eqleucitaro nics, in the form of discs, wafers or similar forms). sendiae pre expellumque sit miliquissum fugit latusapictem voloribeatum qui debis. Uga. Ducipiditat lanimpo restibus volupti ncidenti ullabores quid quis et et atus si aborion rehendae ratibeaquis que nihilic tatio. Optatat remporpos nihil iumquo temoluptatur as aliquat as experiae estiis et ipicid molum vellorumquam aut eium 03 erissequis estis sunt re pror antorehenis adis quas dolorpo rporio omnis andamus accae essum exped et que liquodi taerchitaquo eatus que postem. Harchil et dollam ipsantium inctemquis cores autes doloreh endandi pienistium estrum, sin reperro te volor sam es maximinciis endae pos ditatempore nem non pora si debit odiandit ommossi rem rerepudae perovit vollaccus simet accupta tibust, 4477

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker This query generated nearly one million industrial complex. The Altana Atlas returned semiconductor-related imports into Russia transactions in everything from semiconductors during this time period.171 In total, 5,597 distinct destined for simple desktop computers to highly companies appeared as importers. Among these specialised components of the precise types found companies, there was significant variety – from on the battlefields of Ukraine.172 large, multi-input wholesale goods processors to specialised electronics manufacturers, and Unsurprisingly, the top importers by number from local affiliates of Western multinationals of overall transactions tended to be wholesale simply conducting intra-firm trade to companies importers sourcing a wide variety of electronic specialised in dealing with Russia’s military– components from around the world. Figure 21: Top Russian Importers (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:27) (cid:19)(cid:141)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:157)(cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:25)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:129)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:144)(cid:141)(cid:129)(cid:26)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:15)(cid:27)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:144)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:129)(cid:26)(cid:31)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:16) (cid:28)(cid:28)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:31)(cid:21) (cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:9) (cid:2)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:1)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:8) (cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:1)(cid:16)(cid:31)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:5)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:11)(cid:9) (cid:129)(cid:13)(cid:31)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:5)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:9) (cid:29)(cid:13)(cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:31)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:31)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:9)(cid:5) (cid:141)(cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:11) (cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:26) (cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:7) (cid:141)(cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:8) (cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:1)(cid:16)(cid:31)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:3) (cid:129)(cid:13)(cid:31)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:5)(cid:9)(cid:7) (cid:13)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:12)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:9) (cid:26)(cid:13)(cid:18)(cid:31)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:144)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:12)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:6)(cid:11) (cid:23)(cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:19) (cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:5)(cid:5) (cid:141)(cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:7)(cid:6) (cid:141)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:5) (cid:13)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:12) (cid:129)(cid:13)(cid:31)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:143)(cid:9)(cid:6) (cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:1)(cid:16)(cid:31)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:17)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:15)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:26) (cid:7)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:12)(cid:12)(cid:6) (cid:2)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:1)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:143)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:3) (cid:13)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:24)(cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:9)(cid:11) (cid:129)(cid:13)(cid:31)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:5)(cid:143)(cid:9) (cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:1)(cid:16)(cid:31)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:6) (cid:26)(cid:18)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:12)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:29)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:18)(cid:14)(cid:13) (cid:7)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:8)(cid:9) (cid:129)(cid:13)(cid:31)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:143)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:143) (cid:157)(cid:31)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:144)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:143)(cid:9)(cid:5) (cid:141)(cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:1)(cid:16)(cid:31)(cid:18)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:143)(cid:6)(cid:8) (cid:26)(cid:18)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:127)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:12) Sources: Altana Atlas; RUSI. 171 Altana Trade Atlas. 172 Ibid. 48

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Electronic goods were sourced from a wide variety as Malaysia and Thailand, where a number of of countries and jurisdictions. While prominent large multinational semiconductor manufacturers semiconductor export jurisdictions such as China, have manufacturing plants and facilities where the US, Germany, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the UK assembled integrated circuits are tested before were among the top 10 suppliers, a significant being shipped to customers and distributors.173 volume of transactions came from countries, such Figure 22: Top 10 Semiconductor and Microelectronic Exporters to Russia (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27) (cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:4) (cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:27) (cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:29)(cid:27) (cid:3)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:5) (cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:22) (cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:4) (cid:18)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:17)(cid:27)(cid:28) (cid:5)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:3)(cid:2)(cid:1) (cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:25)(cid:27)(cid:19) (cid:5)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:1)(cid:10)(cid:2) (cid:18)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:13) (cid:9)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:3)(cid:9)(cid:9) (cid:26)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:21)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:24) (cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:2) (cid:12)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:29)(cid:12)(cid:12)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:25) (cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:127)(cid:127) (cid:11)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:13) (cid:6)(cid:127)(cid:7)(cid:5)(cid:127)(cid:3) Sources: Altana Atlas; RUSI. However, closer investigation indicates that transaction data shows that all these shipments, some of these transactions, particularly those however, are for non-light-emitting diodes and from countries without robust semiconductor integrated circuits from the Algerian Ministry and electronics industries, are often unlikely of Defence to ‘PAO Kompaniya Sukhoi’ and ‘PAO to represent deliveries from manufacturers. Kompaniya Irkut’ – two well-known Russian There are generally two explanations for these defence contractors.174 types of transactions: return shipments; and transshipment. As the Algerian military operates defence systems manufactured by these two corporations,175 it Return shipments are often identifiable by is highly likely that, rather than transactions of examining the nature of the counterparties finished microelectronics manufactured by the involved in the transaction. For instance, the Algerian Ministry of Defence, these transactions Altana Atlas showcases several transactions represent return shipments of faulty, surplus in semiconductor-related goods from Algeria or otherwise unneeded components. Similar to Russia during the period studied. Detailed dynamics were observed for other companies 173 Ibid. 174 Sukhoi is a well-known military brand and was recently merged into the United Aircraft Corporation which was sanctioned by the UK on 24 February 2022. See Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Foreign Secretary Imposes UK’s Most Punishing Sanctions to Inflict Maximum and Lasting Pain on Russia’, press release, 24 February 2022, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-imposes-uks-most-punishing-sanctions-to-inflict-maximum- and-lasting-pain-on-russia>, accessed 21 July 2022. The many subsidiaries and affiliated companies of Kompaniya Irkut are listed in US Treasury designations. See US Department of the Treasury, ‘Russia-Related Designations and Designations Updates; Issuance of Russia-Related General Licenses and Related Frequently Asked Questions’, press release, 28 June 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220628>, accessed 21 July 2022. 175 Times Aerospace, ‘Algeria to Get 14 SU-57 Fighters from Russia’, <https://www.timesaerospace.aero/news/defence/ algeria-to-get-14-su-57-fighters-from-russia>, accessed 10 July 2022. 49

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker based in countries lacking robust electronic For instance, SP Semiconductors Private Limited, manufacturing industries, but which still had sent a semiconductor manufacturer based in New shipments to Russia. Delhi, India, sent Infineon-branded integrated circuits to King-Pai Technology (HK) Co Ltd (金 Transshipment through third countries is a more 派科技(香港)有限公司) on 9 June 2021. Later important, but difficult, case. Microelectronic in the same month, King-Pai sent multiple third-party distributors and wholesalers often transactions with similar goods descriptions to operate from intermediary jurisdictions such as several Russian companies active in the military- Hong Kong, meaning that components bound industrial space, including Trade-Component178 for Russia are sometimes legitimately supplied and Radiant Electronic Components, both first through trading entities domiciled outside of sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2021,179 and Russia itself. However, third countries are also Radioavtomatika, first sanctioned in 2022.180 often exploited by procurement agents looking to All companies have documented histories move sensitive and controlled goods by obscuring of providing microelectronics to the Russian the real exporter or end user.176 Russia’s clandestine military.181 King-Pai Technology was added to BIS’s procurement networks and those acting on their Entity List in late June 2022 for providing support behalf often base their operations in jurisdictions to Russia’s military and defence industry.182 Hong with large microelectronic trading industries and Kong corporate records for the company name its laxer controls. As recently as 28 June 2022, for sole director and shareholder as a Chinese national example, OFAC sanctioned three individuals and a named Yao Jinbiao (姚金标). An archived version Hong Kong company named EMC Sud Limited it of the company’s website states that the company alleged were part of a covert procurement network operates overseas offices in Moscow, Russia, and linked to the FSB. One of these individuals, former Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.183 Yao Jinbiao also FSB agent Alexander Kokorev, was allegedly appears to operate another Hong Kong company covertly procuring electronics from the US, Japan using the ‘Kingpai’ name, one directly – Kingpai and Europe to benefit Russia’s defence industrial Technology International Co Ltd (金派科技國際 base.177 有限公司) – while the similarly named Kingpai Technology Group Co Ltd (金派科技集團有限公 Detecting transshipment patterns is challenging, 司) is operated by an individual with the same in large part because it requires multi-tier visibility surname as Yao.184 of goods moving from an origin country, through a transit country, and finally to a destination country. Though hard to see, tools such as the Altana Atlas can shed some visibility on multi-stage value chains to see potential cases of transshipment. 176 Daniel Salisbury, ‘Exploring the Use of “Third Countries” in Proliferation Networks: The Case of Malaysia’, European Journal of International Security (Vol. 4, No. 1, February 2019). 177 US Department of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Treasury Sanctions Nearly 100 Targets in Putin’s War Machine, Prohibits Russian Gold Imports’, press release, 28 June 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0838>, accessed 22 July 2022. 178 Altana Trade Atlas, <https://altana.ai/atlas/>. 179 Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List; Revision of Existing Entry on the Entity List; Removal of Entity From the Unverified List; and Addition of Entity to the Military End-User (MEU) List’, 12 July 2021, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/07/12/2021-14656/ addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-existing-entry-on-the-entity-list>, accessed 22 July 2022. 180 US Department of the Treasury, ‘‘Russia-Related Designations; Issuance of Russia-Related General License’, press release, 3 March 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220303>, accessed 22 July 2022. 181 Alexandra Alper, ‘U.S. Accuses Five Firms in China of Supporting Russia’s Military’, Reuters, 29 June 2022. 182 Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce, ‘Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 - ENTITY LIST’, 28 June 2022, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/2326-supplement-no-4-to-part-744- entity-list-4/file>, accessed 22 July 2022. 183 King-Pai Technology (HK), ‘Contact Us’, <https://www.king-pai.com/contact.asp>, accessed 22 July 2022. 184 Hong Kong Companies Registry, available at <www.icris.cr.gov.hk>. 50

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine Figure 23: Companies of the King-Pai Network (cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:14)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:9)(cid:28)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:28) (cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:7)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:24)(cid:10)(cid:23) (cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:8)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:13) SANCTIONED BY THE U.S (cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:14)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:9) (cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:14)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:9) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:29)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:18)(cid:27) (cid:16)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:24)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:14)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:9)(cid:28) (cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:19)(cid:21) (cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:19)(cid:21) (cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:19)(cid:21) (cid:13)(cid:18)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:28)(cid:29)(cid:23)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:19)(cid:21) SHIPMENTS TO RUSSIA Sources: US Bureau of Industry and Security; Hong Kong Companies Registry; Qichacha; Altana Trade Atlas; RUSI. A director search for Yao Jinbiao reveals that he systems. In total, this resulted in 2,744 matching operates a network of companies involved in the shipments to 286 unique recipients in Russia.187 sale of microelectronics, centered on a Shenzhen- based company named 3HC Semiconductors Co Many semiconductors have multiple applications, Ltd (深圳市三合成科技有限公司).185 According meaning that even a shipment featuring the precise to the Altana Atlas, 3HC’s export history largely type of semiconductor found in a Russian weapons mirrors that of King-Pai, with trade records system may have been destined for civilian use. showing several transactions in microelectronics Several of these shipments likely represent benign and related goods to sanctioned entities such as uses of semiconductors of the type which, it so Radioavtomatika and Trade-Component.186 happens, were also used in Russian weapons. Indeed, the Altana Atlas shows several instances of ZEROING IN ON THE BATTLEFIELD intra-firm trading by Western companies sending It is also possible to look more closely at shipments semiconductors to their Russian subsidiaries. In of the precise goods and components that have these cases, the likelihood of intentional diversion been found on the battlefield within Russian to the military is low.188 weapons systems. Other importers, however, pose a higher risk. The research team used the Altana Atlas to search For instance, ZAO Radiotekhkomplekt (RTKT), a for all transactions into Russia matching a sample company with a long history of supplying to the of 204 specific semiconductor serial numbers military, appears in the database as a recipient taken directly from disassembled Russian weapons of the precise types of semiconductors found in Russian weapons, including those manufactured 185 Qichacha [企查查], ‘3hc Semiconductors Co.,limited’ [‘深圳市三合成科技有限公司’], <https://www.qcc.com/ firm/535b9127d06edbbba894ca64b6ae41b6.html>, accessed 22 July 2022. 186 Altana Trade Atlas, <https://altana.ai/atlas/>. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 51

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker by firms such as TE Connectivity, Microchip have been illegal at the time that they took place. Technology, Analog Devices’ subsidiary Linear However, even if a transaction was legitimate at Technology and many others.189 Founded in the time it was conducted, the trading activities of 1997, the company supplies a range of Russian these companies can provide some insights into enterprises, research institutes and design bureaus the nature of their procurement networks. with electronic components.190 Meanwhile, an archived version of the RTKT webpage notes Returning to the original sample of 5,597 companies that the company has been certified since 2000 importing microelectronics into Russia, the for the provision of certain kinds of electronic research team found records for over 40 companies components to the military,191 and claimed that the that either appear directly on US and international US-designated192 Russian helicopter manufacturer sanctions or export control lists, or that are 50% Kumertau Aviation Production Enterprise (AKA owned by companies that do (and which are AO KUMAPP) was one of its customers up to at therefore sanctioned by operation of law).196 least 2020.193 The page also identifies a range of Western technology companies for whom RTKT Within the sample, denied parties that received acts as a supplier, including Texas Instruments, semiconductor-related imports included Cypress Semiconductor, Golledge and others,194 companies which were sanctioned precisely for whose parts are often found in Russian weapons their procurement of electronics for the Russian systems. military, including Npo Elektronnye Sistemy, Radioavtomatika, Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Meanwhile, several other companies which also Obshchestvo Oplot and many others. According appear as receivers of the precise components to the Altana Atlas, transactions to parties denied recovered on the battlefield in Ukraine have either outright or by law have continued as recently already been targeted by a range of Western as September 2021 – which may indicate potential sanctions, including Rosoboronexport and sanctions violations or due diligence failures by Uralvagonzavod.195 counterparties.197 TRACING SANCTIONED ENTITIES By examining a given company’s import history In addition to focusing on proven instances of in more detail, one can begin to understand how semiconductors ending up on the battlefield, we a given entity is likely to have acted as a conduit can trace supply links to entities that have been for these goods to enter into Russian military publicly sanctioned by the US and its allies for systems. For instance, the Altana Atlas reveals involvement in tech transfers on behalf of the more than 2,500 individual trade transactions Russian military. Many of these sanctions have between PAO Mikron and 148 distinct senders been applied recently, meaning that historical from 33 countries and jurisdictions, including the transactions shown in the Altana Atlas may not US, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Taiwan. 189 Ibid. 190 Radiotekhkomplekt, ‘Homepage’, <http://web.archive.org/web/20161219070553/https://www.rtkt.ru/eng/>, accessed 22 July 2022. 191 US Department of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Treasury Sanctions Russia’s Defense-Industrial Base, the Russian Duma and Its Members, and Sberbank CEO’, press release, 24 March 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0677>, accessed 22 July 2022. 192 Radiotekhkomplekt, ‘About’. 193 Ibid. 194 Radiotekhkomplekt, ‘Manufacturers’, <https://www.rtkt.ru/eng/manufacturers/>, accessed 22 July 2022. 195 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Ukraine-/Russia-Related Designations and Identification Update; Syria Designations; Kingpin Act Designations; Issuance of Ukraine-/Russia-Related General Licenses 12 and 13; Publication of New FAQs and Updated FAQ’, press release, 6 April 2018, <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent- actions/20180406>, accessed 22 July 2022. 196 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) Human Readable Lists’, 28 June 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designated-nationals-and-blocked- persons-list-sdn-human-readable-lists>, accessed 22 July 2022. 197 Altana Trade Atlas, <https://altana.ai/atlas/>. 52

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine As noted earlier, Mikron had been one of the key HONG KONG CHIP SHOPS producers of integrated circuits in the Soviet Union In June 2022, BIS added several non-Russian and it still markets itself as the leading producer companies to its Entity List for supporting Russia’s and exporter of microelectronics in Russia.198 In military and defence industrial base,203 effectively 2016, the company was reportedly contracted to denying them the ability to import and re-import produce electronic components for Russian space even EAR99-classified goods from the US. launch vehicles.199 Mikron has been sanctioned by the US Treasury in relation to the Russian invasion Among these was a Hong Kong-based company of Ukraine.200 named Sinno Electronics Co Ltd (信諾電子科技 有限公司; AKA Xinnuo Electronic Technology), Nearly all the 2,500 transactions referenced were for which operates from several addresses in Hong semiconductor-related manufacturing equipment Kong204 and Shenzhen, in mainland China.205 The or components. This included a transaction company is owned and operated by three Chinese between Mikron and an Irish firm for parts of nationals named Peng Minbo (彭敏波; AKA Betty lasers included in the ASML-produced Twinscan Peng), Lin Qing (林青; AKA Becky Lin), and Hong XT:1060k lithography laser system, designed for Junxu (洪俊旭; AKA Billy Hong; AKA 阿旭).206 the production of integrated circuits.201 Another transaction originating from a company in the Sinno has an extensive online presence with UK referenced ‘Silicon, doped, cleaned, single- shop fronts207 and an English-language-only crystal, in the form of plates, polished, for use in website,208 which advertises products made by microelectronics’.202 While these transactions may Analog Devices, Texas Instruments and many or may not have been in violation of sanctions at other manufacturers.209 The company appears to the time they were conducted, they do raise the have attended ExpoElectronica in Moscow since at possibility of leakage to the military–industrial least 2013,210 and most recently in 2021.211 During complex in Russia – and ultimately to the battlefield the coronavirus pandemic, the company even in Ukraine. 198 Mezhdunarodnyj Ob’yedinnenyj Biographicheskij Centr [International United Biographical Centre], ‘Nacional’noe dostoyaniye, OAO “NIIME i Mikron”’ [‘National Treasure, OJSC “NIIME and Mikron”’], <http://www.biograph.ru/index.php/ nationdestiny/5269-mikron>, accessed 25 July 2022; Mikron, ‘Mikron History’, <https://en.mikron.ru/company/history/>, accessed 30 June 2022; Mikron, <https://en.mikron.ru/>, accessed 30 June 2022. 199 Zelenograd Infoportal, ‘“Mikron” zaimetsya proizvodstvom elementov noveyshey sistemy upravleniya dlya raket-nositelej’ [‘“Mikron” Will Undertake the Production of Elements for the Newest Space Launch Vehicle Control System’], 7 December 2016, <https://www.netall.ru/society/news/983044.html>, accessed 25 July 2022. 200 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets Sanctions Evasion Networks and Russian Technology Companies Enabling Putin’s War’, 31 March 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0692>, accessed 27 July 2022. 201 Altana Trade Atlas, <https://altana.ai/atlas/>. 202 Ibid. 203 Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Addition of Entities, Revision and Correction of Entries, and Removal of Entities from the Entity List’, 30 June 2022, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/ federal-register-notices-1/3043-public-display-version-of-entity-list-rule-on-public-display-and-effetive-6-28-22- scheduled/file>, accessed 22 July 2022. 204 Sinno Electronics, ‘Contact Us’, <http://www.sinnoelec.com/contact.aspx>, accessed 22 July 2022. 205 Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 125’, 30 June 2022, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/federal-register-notices/federal-register-2022/3053- 87-fr-38920-entity-list-rule-effective-6-28-22-published-6-30-22/file>, accessed 22 July 2022. 206 Hong Kong Companies Registry, <www.icris.cr.gov.hk>. 207 Hong Kong Inventory, ‘Sinno Electronics Co., Limited’, <http://hksinno.hkinventory.com/Shop/Page_CompanyProfile. asp>, accessed 22 July 2022. 208 Sinno Electronics, ‘Homepage’, <http://www.sinnoelec.com/index.aspx>, accessed 22 July 2022. 209 Sinno Electronics, ‘Product’, <http://www.sinnoelec.com/product.aspx>, accessed 22 July 2022. 210 Hong Kong Inventory, ‘Expo Electronica Apr 10-12, 2013 Moscow’, <https://www.hkinventory.com/public/ UpcomingEventDetail.asp?id=173>, accessed 22 July 2022. 211 ExpoElectronica, ‘ExpoElectronica and ElectronTechExpo Will Bring Together Leading Manufacturers, Suppliers and 53

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Byrne, Somerville, Byrne, Watling, Reynolds and Baker sponsored a 2020 webinar on ‘Russian-Chinese cooperation in the field of high technologies’.212 Figure 24: Sinno and Sigma Network (cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:17)(cid:26)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:31) (cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:28)(cid:14)(cid:10) (cid:9)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:26)(cid:23)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:13)(cid:19) (cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:16) (cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:24) SANCTIONED BY THE U.S (cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:28)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:29)(cid:18)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:25)(cid:20)(cid:31) (cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:26)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:17)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:16) (cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:31)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:26) (cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:17)(cid:26)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:16) SHIPMENTS TO RUSSIA Sources: US Bureau of Industry and Security; Hong Kong Companies Registry; Qichacha; Altana Trade Atlas; RUSI. An online shop front for Sinno Electronics provides microcontroller,214 the very same model that an up-to-date inventory of its components.213 Out of was recovered from an Orlan-10 UAV used by the a total of 43 components readily available, 20 are Russian Army in Ukraine. listed as export controlled by BIS. Notably, many of these controlled components are produced by Trade records and import declarations show that major microelectronics manufacturers such as between 2017 and 2021, Sinno was exporting large NXP, Texas Instruments and STMicroelectronics. volumes of semiconductors and microelectronics In fact, one of these components, produced to a wide variety of Russian companies.215 One of by STMicroelectronics, is an STM32F103VCT6 these, the Moscow-based OOO Trade-Component, Customers in Live Interaction’, press release, 6 April 2021, <https://expoelectronica.ru/Articles/press-release-en-ee-2021>, accessed 22 July 2022. 212 ExpoElectronica, ’Russian-Chinese Cooperation’, <https://expoelectronica.ru/Page/russia-china-forum>, accessed 22 July 2022. 213 Hong Kong Inventory, ‘Sinno Electronics Co., Limited’, <http://hksinno.hkinventory.com/Shop/Page_Inventory.asp>, accessed 22 July 2022. 214 Ibid. 215 Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider. 54

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine was sanctioned by the US government on 12 Incorporated only two months after Russia’s July 2021 for allegedly being ‘involved in the invasion of Crimea in 2014,221 Sigma Technology procurement of U.S.-origin electronic components only appears to have shipped goods to a small likely in furtherance of Russian military number of customers. One of these is RTKT, programs’.216 mentioned above, which received hundreds of shipments of microelectronics from Sigma Sinno’s shipments to OOO Trade-Component between February 2017 and December 2021.222 appear to have stopped in June 2021, when the Curiously, while trade records for Sinno Hong Kong vendor shipped over $100,000worthElectronicsdidnotreportanyshipmentsofofelectronicintegratedcircuitsbrandedasAnalogSTMicroelectrionics-brandedcomponentstoDevicestoMoscow.217Russiabetween2017and2021,Sigmahadmadeatleast35shipmentsofcomponentsfromthatbrandHowever,HongKongcorporaterecordsrevealtoRTKTinthesameperiod.223thatBeckyLinandBillyHonghaveanotherlocallyregisteredcompanynamedSigmaTechnologyNotably,SigmaalsoshippedmicroelectronicsLimited(希舸電子技術有限公司)218thathasbeentoothermilitarysuppliers,suchasAOshippinglargevolumesofmicroelectronicsandRadiopriborsnab,224anelectronic-componentrelatedgoodstoRussia.219AccordingtotradesupplierthatformspartofthesanctionedrecordsfiledbetweenApril2018andJune2021,the(andultimatelyRostec-owned)Concerncompanyshippedover$3 million worth of goods to Radio-Electronic Technologies (Concern Russia, more than seven times than that shipped to Radioelektronnye technologii, or ‘CRET’). Russia by sister company Sinno Electronics in the same period.220 216 Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, ‘Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List; Revision of Existing Entry on the Entity List; Removal of Entity from the Unverified List; and Addition of Entity to the Military End-User (MEU) List’, Federal Register, 12 July 2021, <https://www.federalregister.gov/ documents/2021/07/12/2021-14656/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-existing-entry-on-the- entity-list>, accessed 10 July 2022. 217 Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider. 218 Hong Kong Companies Registry, <www.icris.cr.gov.hk>. 219 Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider. 220 Ibid. 221 Hong Kong Companies Registry, <www.icris.cr.gov.hk>. 222 Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider. 223 Ibid. 224 Altana Trade Atlas, <https://altana.ai/atlas/>. 55

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[CHeoadnincg 1l]usion [HEADING 2] tem volorpos alitatium invenis isquam que nam, In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and fsoerreoi gtonr-imataqdueia c qoumupnotunreen tpsa ridiaemnt iefixeedr aiens Rtisuistisbiauns Fthaec iiism etp voesliltoior na doisfi tain tqteuranmat,i qouniaal vosalunpcttuio rnias,n imthoe wmeoaloproen ps esyrrsotermrosr ed evteariulemdq inu athmis q rueapeo rdto alruep ftoatri uthme lRoursrusinatn, uPtr epsliitdaetenctiearle sA sdemd inquisit raalitqiounu nets teanbtulirs haemd mhaorsutn pteanrtd carmit,i csauls t oa uthteem v iiasbsiilnitt ya ouft tehrersoe b slyasutte qmuso. eao csosmit mquiitsteceip tsoa mex,a omffiinciei sh eoaw s othluep Rtausspsiidaen odpetfaetnecme et ipsam sinctem pedisquis sinum hariberatem dinedsu csutlrlya bocroeu eldn t seut,s otadiin d isp rmoodduicat icounll aobfo rcerciutimcael Hdoislotorirsi caillilgyn, iRs udsesiliaqnu asep eccoianl seessrivti ceeos s hdavoelu phtaads cmoinlistea reys ensyt satmem fsu.g iSt eavuetr vael ralatiboo. rUatteocrtiuess doefn dtuhcei seiag nsiefiqcuaantti oss umccaeisosr eipne ramt.a iBnetaaitneimng quthiset iss uaptuprly? eRnudsisgiaenn itA ecta udte pmroyv iodfu Snct ipernac eeasq aunod q umiaatjioor n estcautsea- oDfo lWupetsibteursn a lmigeicnrto ienlietcetcrtoan. ics. They obtained a voowlunmed qumaitlqituaartyu re anpteerripor iiusems qwueorse u ttaasspkeerd f ewrfietrhi high volume of components during the Cold War teaxtaemctain sinpegr cwhiht eetth eear ditphseayn ihciotu alldiq umaea nilulafbacot.u Irtea and expanded their procurement of these goods icpoimdep nounse niptssa iidnu nRduebss iisac,i umwh feutghae. rE t vthoeluyp tactoiuumld significantly after Cold War sanctions were lifted. vsuenbdstei tvuetne t remcoomdipcoitn aeunttes aliqunaomw fugista an scati voonleodr In many cases, the Russian military has procured afosrp ercahl tietarntiastt iovree sencto emxppoelneenn dtsu ntimo maninufcatecctuarbe ids up to a decade’s worth of components for critical uint erci oduonlltersie asu t wfahceerrec ims usapmpleyn e wvooluulpdt iisr eumt parino systems in advance, precisely to safeguard ialciqcueis sdioblluet, qoure wcuhmet hsie ra di tm wil oimulpde db em onleocreespsuadriyt production against sanctions. It is evident, etos treuvmad es esqaunec ticoonrse.p tTiuhme reiss uslotsll aonfd t heellsees esrtnudatiuesr however, that they have not achieved this for all swae creu s naontd eenndci otuemrapgionrg s.e rIens t oidredleibr usfo, rc uRlpuasrsuiman, the components identified in this report. Given sweeqaupeo dnesl iatmo euosse e nfodrite qiguni -nsoimuracgendim coo vmelpeosntoernet.s, that Russia had amassed an arsenal of complex it is necessary for the manufacturer to justify to weapons that posed a major threat to international the Russian Ministry of Defence why the specific security and has demonstrated in Ukraine that component must be used. The manufacturer the Russian government has no inhibitions about Iml uest tq euxapt.l aOinp tawtihnyt , iet ocsatn anliobtu bs ed imteamdqeu i nis sRimuspsoiar using these weapons for the purpose of aggressive mecionnvoemll icaablolyr,e stw, htye mapno rai lttearsnpaetriuvme cqoumi pbolnaebnot. war, including to deliberately target civilians, the Ufrlolamc cau s,f riipesnudnlyt. cOovuindetrbyi ctiaonnnseoqt ubee psliutib sctuitmut eedt future strength of sanctions and enforcement is oand dm wahgny itsh ees tiinutmroqd uuciatieopne roef ptheed cqoumampo fnaeccnut mdo aeds vital if Russia is not to rebuild its stockpiles. qnuoet cionmtupriroosm ciosen stehqeu aset cvuerliltayc coaft uthr em daeivoirc es.i mFoinr pmrioli tcaurys, csoums, mnuimni ciantuiosn distyes tpermovs,i t,t hveo lusppteactqifiuci Much of Russia’s procurement of Western vaercrihaintedcatmur,e ommumsto laelsstoii sb eq uapiap rqouvee de bt yu tth ue nFtSeBm, microelectronics for military purposes involved hwahriucmh isq uraemsp,o snes ipboler fsoorl eansts,u qruinagta tsh ael iste rcautreimty ouft the use of false end-user certificates, front hRaursissi arne se necxrcyeprtaito ne.s tIina tsehmo rtr,e trhiaet ivbausst, mcaojnosreitqyu oiaf companies and transshipments. Mapping and sendiae pre expellumque sit miliquissum fugit latusapictem voloribeatum qui debis. Uga. Ducipiditat lanimpo restibus volupti ncidenti ullabores quid quis et et atus si aborion rehendae ratibeaquis que nihilic tatio. Optatat remporpos nihil iumquo temoluptatur as aliquat as experiae estiis et ipicid molum vellorumquam aut eium erissequis estis sunt re pror antorehenis adis quas dolorpo rporio omnis andamus accae essum exped et que liquodi taerchitaquo eatus que postem. Harchil et dollam ipsantium inctemquis cores autes doloreh endandi pienistium estrum, sin reperro te volor sam es maximinciis endae pos ditatempore nem non pora si debit odiandit ommossi rem rerepudae perovit vollaccus simet accupta tibust, 5577

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closing down these networks is a first step in for its armaments, or revert to a more rapid constraining the Russian defence industry, but as escalation to tactical nuclear use in conflict, given Russia restructures its procurement architecture, the unfavourable dynamics that it must confront abuses the Vienna Convention to move in conventional operations. The critical question components procured under false pretences, and this report puts before Western policymakers seeks to corrupt or infiltrate regulatory bodies, is whether this silicon lifeline is to be cut, and preventing the future transfer of such components whether states are prepared to exploit the to Russia will require significant and sustained opportunities that severing it creates. vigilance. It is also evident – given the widespread use of third countries for transshipment of the onward selling of components – that constraining AUTHORS Russian defence industries will require significant James Byrne is the Director of Open Source international cooperation. Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) at RUSI. It is also important to grapple with the unintended Gary Somerville is a Research Fellow in OSIA at consequences of the severing of access to critical RUSI. components for Russia’s complex weapons. Many states had depended on Russia as an arms supplier. Joseph Byrne is a Research Fellow in OSIA at RUSI. The assurance of those arms remains critical to their national security. For countries like India, Jack Watling is Senior Research Fellow for Land which sources 45% of its defence imports from Warfare at RUSI. Russia,225 a loss of access to Russian equipment constitutes a security threat. This may encourage Nick Reynolds is a Research Analyst for Land countries in this position to facilitate the evasion Warfare at RUSI. of sanctions. Alternatively, since few countries in this position have large microelectronic industries, Jane Baker is an independent consultant. it could be a catalyst to alter their suppliers. This presents opportunities for the Western alliance if it can bring constructive proposals to these states, while avoiding an exploitative approach to foreign military sales. It could also significantly sour relations with several powerful countries if no constructive proposals are forthcoming while Western sanctions undermine national security. Russia’s military power has been sustained by a silicon lifeline; one that runs from the US, through the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and France, to Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. Without that lifeline, the Russian military will be destined to employ increasingly obsolescent technology, without the means to deliver precision or efficiency on the battlefield. This may see Russia become increasingly dependent on China 225 Economic Times, ‘Russia’s Share of Arms Import to India Fell from 69% in 2012-17 to 46% in 2017-21: Report’, 15 March 2022, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/russias-share-of-arms-import-to-india-fell-from-69-in- 2012-17-to-46-in-2017-21-report/articleshow/90218483.cms>, accessed 10 July 2022. 58

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Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine [Chapter Heading] [Heading 1] [HEADING 2] erissequis estis sunt re pror antorehenis adis quas dolorpo rporio omnis andamus accae essum exped Faciis et vellor adisita tquam, quia voluptu rianimo et que liquodi taerchitaquo eatus que postem. lorrunt, ut plitateceres sed qui aliquunt entur am Harchil et dollam ipsantium inctemquis cores autes eossit quiscipsam, officiis ea soluptaspide optatem doloreh endandi pienistium estrum, sin reperro te des cullabore ent et, odi dis modia cullabo recume volor sam es maximinciis endae pos ditatempore conse esent am fugit aut veratio. Utectus denduci nem non pora si debit odiandit ommossi rem endigenit et ut providunt pra eaquo quiatio necusa rerepudae perovit vollaccus simet accupta tibust, volum quatquatur aperio ium quos utasper ferferi tem volorpos alitatium invenis isquam que nam, tatecta sperchit et ea dipsanihit aliquae illabo. Ita sero toriatquia quunture pariam exeraes tisitibus ipide nus ipsa idundeb iscium fuga. Et voluptatium molore perrorrore verumquam quae doluptatium vende vent remodicit aute aliquam fugit a sa volor haruntendam, sus autem issint aut erro blaut quo asperch itatist oresent expelen duntio minctecab is et ipsam sinctem pedisquis sinum hariberatem ut eri dolles aut facercim samene voluptiis ut pro doloris ilignis deliquae con essit eos doluptas iliqui dolut que cum si ad mil imped molorepudit ea sequatios maioreperat. Beatem quistis atur? estrum seque coreptium is solland ellesernatur Doluptibus aligent initecta pa eos etum aliquia sa cus andendi tempor serest idelibus, culparum, volori utem volorunt et que nobitatur sapietur. seque deliam eos endit qui nimagnimo velestore. Tae ped quibus sitiosam, sitions equodio remped Il et quat. Optatint, eost alibus ditemqu issimpor ut offic te sendita tibuscietur magnatur? Qui illa minvell aborest, tempori tasperum qui blabo. alic tem a vereper itatet ut doloris molupta spellis Ullaccus, ipsunt. Ovidebi tionseque pliti cum et eum fugiam quos estiur? Aciaes senet eatiaepro od magnis estiumq uiaepere ped quam faccum ad esequatus et ea nis ex entiore et volut ipita vel que inturios consequat vellaccatur maior simin moditatecate aut vollique nulligendis velique pro cus, sus, nim inus dite provit, voluptatqui volumqui beatetur? Quamus quam accaborum veriandam, ommolestiis quia que et ut untem dolorit aut eatem fugitiur, nonseru ptatibu harum quam, se por solent, quatas alit ratem ut sapellanto bla voluptiam que solorposam, et opta haris res excerat estiatem reriatibus, consequia sincil ium adit, illiaeped quam faccabo. Itaque sitat sendiae pre expellumque sit miliquissum ut quisciducium eum eratias et volum et, volo odis fugit latusapictem voloribeatum qui debis ut volenitatati volessit as aut etur recusaped quid que omniatur. que dolore volorepero maiorepedi sus. Uga. Ducipiditat lanimpo restibus volupti ncidenti Porepta turitat rae. Pudae vellorporit, num rem ullabores quid quis et et atus si aborion rehendae untion cum net que apitatectis ut adipici odios elit, ratibeaquis que nihilic tatio. Optatat remporpos nemolen tempos aceped quam, qui blaceris ad qui nihil iumquo temoluptatur as aliquat as experiae dolorepedit esti audi beremos atur? Obiti aut rae estiis et ipicid molum vellorumquam aut eium lam ditatis sincias di as maximet autecti stioriorit ut