NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

Summary

Japan’s National Defense Strategy (NDS), formulated on December 16, 2022, outlines a comprehensive framework for fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s defense capabilities and whole-of-country defense architecture in response to an increasingly severe strategic environment. It articulates core objectives, emphasizes counterstrike and stand-off defense capabilities, enhances cross-domain and unmanned operations, and deepens integration with the Japan-U.S. Alliance and like-minded international partners.

Table of Contents (Pages 1-2)

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY December 16, 2022 Table of Contents

I Objectives of National Defense Strategy II Changes in the Strategic Environment and Defense Challenges 1 Changes in the strategic environment 2 Military trends of Japan’s neighboring countries and regions 3 Defense challenges III Japan’s Basic Defense Policy 1 Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense (1) Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities (2) Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country 2 Joint deterrence and response by the Japan-U.S. Alliance (1) Strengthening Japan-U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities (2) Reinforcing alliance coordination functions (3) Reinforcing the foundation for allied response (4) Measures to support the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan 3 Collaboration with like-minded countries and others IV Key Capabilities for Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities 1 Stand-off defense capabilities 2 Integrated air and missile defense capabilities 3 Unmanned defense capabilities 4 Cross-domain operation capabilities 5 Command and control and Intelligence-related functions 6 Mobile deployment capabilities / Civil protection 7 Sustainability and Resiliency V The Future of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 1 Role of SDF in the seven key fields 2 Concept for developing SDF’s architecture 3 Reinforcing policy-making function VI Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals Utilizing Defense Capability and Measures for Global Security Cooperation 1 Measures for protection of life, person and property of Japanese nationals 2 Measures for security cooperation against global challenges VII Defense Production and Technological Base as Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability 1 Reinforcing defense production base 2 Reinforcing technological base 3 Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology VIII Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities 1 Reinforcing human resource base 2 Transformation of medical function IX Points of Attention

I Objectives of National Defense Strategy (Pages 3-4)

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihood as well as Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace and it is the very heart of Japan’s national security.

Since the end of World War II (WWII), in the face of the Cold War as well as the dramatic changes in the security environment that ensued its ending, Japan has preserved peace and security for 77 years by: enhancing its diplomatic strength and defense capability and expanding and deepening cooperation with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the key pillar. In so doing, adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan has ensured civilian control of the military and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan under these basic precepts will not ever change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation.

As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine attests, the international community, of which Japan is a member, is facing serious challenges, and has entered into a new crisis. China continues to advance its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. North Korea escalates its activities as it launches ballistic missiles at an unprecedented high frequency, and pursues further miniaturization of its nuclear weapons. Russia has launched an aggression against Ukraine while its military activities in the Far East have been trending upward. Given the foregoing, in the future one cannot rule out the possibility of serious events taking place in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, that might shake the foundation of the stable post-war international order. As Japan is situated on the very frontline of these trends, it is no exaggeration to say the future shape of Japan’s security and defense policy has a direct link to the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

The fact that Russia, a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the “UNSC”), has launched an aggression against Ukraine, tells us that maintaining Japan’s own sovereignty and independence can be achieved through its own independent and voluntary efforts, and that it is important to expand the role Japan can play to avoid inviting foreign aggression. In today’s circumstance, no country can now protect its own security alone. As challenges to the post-war international order continue, it is critical for Japan to deepen cooperation and collaboration with its ally and like-minded countries with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. For this cooperation and collaboration to produce meaningful results, Japan must strengthen its own efforts more than ever before, and our ally, like-minded countries and others also expect Japan to play a role commensurate with its national strength. Japan, its ally, like-minded countries and others are called upon to not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts through further synergistic effects from common efforts.

Amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals. Japan also needs to strengthen Japan’s architecture for national defense that integrates various elements of national power. Thinking strategically, Japan should promote these two lines of effort as a coherent whole. It is this undertaking that provides the way forward to bolster Japan’s deterrence capabilities and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and which forms the foundation of security cooperation with like-minded countries and others.

The United States this year devised a new National Defense Strategy. It is therefore timely for Japan and the United States to align their respective strategies and promote defense cooperation in an integrated manner.

Based on this recognition, the Government hereby finalizes the National Defense Strategy (hereinafter referred to as “NDS”) to comprehensively present Japan’s defense objectives, approaches and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives. The NDS replaces the National Defense Program Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as “NDPG”), which have served as Japan’s basic guidelines for development, sustainment and operation of defense capability with the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “SDF”) as its core and formulated six times since 1976.

The policies concerning the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and the levels of defense buildup that underpin it, which have been decided by the Government through the NDS and “Defense Buildup Program” (“DBP,” approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022), represent a major turning point for post-war defense policy. By formulating this Strategy, which provides mid- to long-term directions and a breakdown of the reinforcement of defense capabilities, the Government will make efforts to deepen the Japanese public’s understanding about the significance of this major turning point.

II Changes in the Strategic Environment and Defense Challenges (Pages 4-10)

1 Changes in the strategic environment Following the development of information society and the expansion of international trade, economic and culture interactions among states further expand and deepen. On the other hand, states that do not share universal values or political and economic systems based on these values are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts represent significant challenges to the free and open international order underpinned by the rule of law. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has revealed this in a most blatant way. The international community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, and has entered a new era of crisis. In addition, the global power balance has significantly changed and interstate competition across the political, economy and military spheres is emerging. Such trends are especially notable in the Indo-Pacific region, where China has been continuing and amplifying its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. Not only China but also North Korea and Russia have further intensified their activities. As the interstate competition between China and the United States in particular is expected to further intensify in various fields, the United States has presented a view that the next ten years will be the decisive decade for its competition with China. Rapid advances in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that could dramatically alter the character of warfare and thus prove to become “game changers.” China in particular has been rapidly promoting accelerated technological innovation and its application for military purposes under the name of the “military-civilian integration strategy”: China is notably accelerating military capability development premised on unmanned assets that leverage artificial intelligence (AI). These trends are resulting in fundamental changes to the way the military is organized as well as the way warfare is prosecuted. In addition, there exist a range of global security challenges such as increasingly serious risks in cyber and other domains, the expansion of information warfare including the spread of disinformation, and climate change.

2 Military trends of Japan’s neighboring countries and regions In the report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “NCCPC”), China sets the goals of “basically completing modernization of national defense and the military” by 2035 and building “a world-class forces” by the middle of this century. And in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Communist Party of China Central Committee in 2020, the achievement of “the centenary goal of the People’s Liberation Army” by 2027 was added as a target. In a report to the NCCPC in 2022, it was newly stated that elevating the People’s Liberation Army to a “world-class standards” at an early stage is a strategic task for fully building “a modern socialist country.” With these goals in mind, China calls for a “new system for mobilizing resources nationwide,” promotes integrated development of “mechanization, informatization and the application of smart technologies” and thereby extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability in a qualitative and quantitative manner. China defines the next five years as the crucial period to start the full-scale construction of a “modern socialist country.” China’s published national defense expenditures exceeded Japan’s defense-related expenditures for the first time in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 and has since increased at a rapid pace, reaching in FY2022 approximately 4.8 times of Japan’s defense-related expenditure. China’s published national defense expenditures are assessed to represent only a portion of actual amount spent for military purposes. Supported by the rapid growth of defense expenditures, China now possesses modern naval and air assets in larger numbers than does Japan. China is strengthening its capabilities in new domains including the space and cyber. Regarding nuclear forces, it appears highly likely that China intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable nuclear warheads by the end of the 2020s. With respect to missile forces, China, a non-signatory to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has deployed numerous surface-launched intermediate-range missiles, which the INF Treaty covered. China is also operationalizing anti-ship ballistic missiles and long-range land-attack cruise missiles, and developing and deploying hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). These efforts are aimed at improving military capabilities to deny foreign military’s access to, and deployment in, China’s surrounding areas as well as to impede foreign military activities in those areas (the so-called anti-access/area-denial, or “A2/AD” capability). China also continues to develop and deploy unmanned assets. Increased activities of unmanned assets have been confirmed in Japan’s surrounding areas. Backed by these military capabilities, China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly in the areas around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean including areas around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, extending beyond the so-called first island chain to the second island chain. China is increasing military pressure on Taiwan. In the South China Sea, it continues to entrench its military foothold. Chinese naval ships are intensifying their activities in waters around the Senkaku Islands. Under such circumstances, China Coast Guard ships repeatedly make intrusion into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. Chinese navy vessels have been seen navigating in Japan’s territorial waters and contiguous zones around Japan’s southwestern islands. Regarding Taiwan, the report to NCCPC in 2022 reiterated that China “will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.” At the same time, the report also stated that “we have thus maintained the initiative and the ability to steer in cross-Strait relations,” and “complete reunification of our country must be realized, and it can, without doubt, be realized.” In recent years, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is rapidly tilting in China’s favor, and China has been intensifying military activities around Taiwan. It is believed that through the series of activities around Taiwan, China seeks to create a fait accompli where Chinese military is continuously operating, and improve its actual combat capabilities. Moreover, China has launched nine ballistic missiles in August 4, 2022, five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a threat to local residents. China thus has intensified its coercive military activities around Taiwan, and concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan but also in the entire international community. China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power including defense capabilities and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

In order to maintain its regime, North Korea has concentrated its efforts on enhancing its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles. It is assessed that North Korea already possesses the technological capabilities to mount a nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles, whose range includes Japan and is able to attack Japan with such a missile. Regarding ballistic missiles, a delivery means of WMDs, North Korea is rapidly improving its related technologies and operational capabilities by, for example, diversifying launch modes. In particular, North Korea in recent years has been seemingly aiming to complicate indication and warning, detection, and interception of its missiles, by pursuing the operationalization of ballistic missiles that can fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories as well as by launching these missiles from various platforms such as Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TEL), submarines and trains. North Korea appears to be advancing its research and development setting its priorities to attain “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” and “solid fuel-propelled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)” with a range covering the U.S. mainland among other things, which renews concerns over its future technological advancements. These nuclear and missile developments and others by North Korea violate a series of UNSC resolutions and others, and significantly undermine the peace, stability and security of the region and the international community. North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shaken the very foundation of the international order and is perceived as the most significant and direct threat to defense in the European region. As for the areas surrounding Japan, the Russian forces are also accelerating their military activities including through the deployment of newer-model equipment and implementation of large-scale military exercises in the Far East region including the Northern Territories. In recent years, Russia has ramped up its military coordination with China by conducting activities such as joint navigation of their naval vessels and joint flights of their bombers. Russia’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong concern from a defense perspective. In case that these activities are conducted simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific region, it would be necessary to take a close look at what implication they would have for the region.

3 Defense challenges An unprecedented situation is unfolding: Russia, a permanent member of the UNSC and a nuclear weapon state that bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability, has launched an outright aggression against Ukraine, repeatedly taken actions and sent messages that can be interpreted as threat of nuclear weapons use. This is an event that shakes the very foundation of the international order that the international community has built since the end of WWII. Such unilateral change to the status quo by force that is occurring in Europe could also occur in the Indo-Pacific region. The military background for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine’s defense capability against Russia was insufficient, thus failing to discourage and deter Russian aggression; Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities. Also, while no country can defend its own security by itself alone, there is a renewed recognition of the importance of cooperation with allies who have the intention and capability to respond to invasions jointly to deter invasions from outside. Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so; Accurately gauging other’s intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threat may materialize. To protect one’s own country from such states, it is necessary to have deterrence capability, thereby making said states realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult; it is also necessary to build one’s own capability, that is defense capability focusing on opponent capabilities, to discourage opponents from harboring the intention to launch an aggression. The way of warfare has also drastically changed. In addition to the traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land, new ways of warfare have emerged with the combination of massive missile strike by ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities, hybrid warfare including information warfare such as false-flag operations, asymmetric attacks leveraging the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains and with unmanned assets, and public remarks by nuclear powers that could be interpreted as threat using nuclear weapons. Whether or not to be able to respond to these new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense capabilities. Surrounded by seas and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is endowed with a vast EEZ and continental shelves: spread widely therein are the life, person, and property of the Japanese nationals, as well as its territory, territorial waters, airspace, and various natural resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation that depends on overseas trade for the majority of its resources and food, it is essential to reinforce the free and open maritime order as well as to ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight. Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population, and information centers concentrate in urban areas and many critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas. Protecting Japanese nationals and critical infrastructures from various threats is among Japan’s security challenges. Japan is undergoing rapid population decline and ageing with declining birth rates. Tight fiscal conditions linger. It is essential that Japan make more efficient use of budget and labor force.

III Japan’s Basic Defense Policy (Pages 9-23)

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor for ensuring Japan’s security. It will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will be disrupted and defeated, thereby demonstrating Japan’s resolve and capability to defend itself to the end.

Since the end of WWII, Japan has consistently committed to modest and efficient development of its defense capabilities. In particular, since the formulation of the NDPG in 1976 (approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on October 29, 1976), the purpose of Japan’s possessing its own defense capability had been presented as, rather than to counter specific threats, to avoid Japan’s becoming a power vacuum and thus a destabilizing factor in the region surrounding Japan.

After the end of the Cold War, SDF’s roles and missions have expanded to cover various situations including domestic and international large-scale disaster responses and International Peace Cooperation Activities. The 2010 NDPG (approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) stated that defense capability development will no longer depend on the “Basic Defense Force Concept,” which placed importance on the deterrence effect form the existence of defense capability itself. The subsequent 2013 NDPG (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) called to squarely face the reality of increasingly severe security environment and to build a truly effective defense capability. Meanwhile, Japan’s neighboring countries have drastically strengthened their military capabilities, and rapidly expanded and intensified missile launches and coercive military activities, threatening the security of Japan and the region.

As these activities escalate, it is extremely difficult to predict when and how intentions will change and unilateral changes to the status quo by force will occur. It is clear from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that a unilateral change to the status quo by force causes massive human and material damage, with disruption in economy, finance, energy as well as maritime and air traffic felt not only regionally but also globally, seriously affecting people’s daily lives.

To account for the foregoing, Japan must clearly demonstrate the intention that Japan will never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. To this end, Japan must: fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities with a focus on opponents’ capabilities and the ways they prosecute warfare; and, actively adapt to new ways of warfare. Japan cannot engage in these efforts alone: Japan needs close cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others. This strategy thus intends to clearly define Japan’s defense objectives and present approaches and specific means to achieve those objectives, thereby ensuring all efforts will be made in an integrated manner.

• Japan’s defense objectives are as follows: The first objective is to shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force; The second objective is to deter, through cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that concern Japan’s peace and security. Should such an eventuality occur, our objective is to swiftly respond in whatever ways and bring the situation under control at an early stage so that the situation would not lead to invasion of Japan; The third objective is, should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, to rapidly respond to the invasion in a tailored and seamless manner; to take primary responsibility to deal with the aggression; and, while receiving support from the ally and others, to disrupt and defeat the invasion. In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential. Japan will defend itself to the end in all situations through the combination of its own efforts to achieve the first, second and third defense objectives and extended deterrence and others provided by the United States.

• Approaches to realize Japan’s defense objectives are as follows. Specific means will be presented later in the description of respective approaches: The first approach is, in an effort of strengthening of Japan’s own architecture for national defense, to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, which constitute the core of national defense, and to reinforce the defense architecture of the whole country. The second approach is to further reinforce joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by further strengthening cooperation with the United States, our ally. The third approach is to reinforce collaboration with like-minded countries and others with whom Japan cooperate to uphold and reinforce a free and open international order.

1 Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense (1) Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities Japan will fundamentally reinforce the current Multi-Domain Defense Force through accelerated efforts, focused on taking primary responsibility to disrupt and defeat invasion, deterring invasion through persistent ISR and FDO, adapting to new ways of warfare, strengthening stand-off defense, integrated air and missile defense, unmanned defense, cross-domain capabilities, and sustainability and resiliency. By FY2027, Japan will reinforce defense capabilities to take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions and disrupt and defeat threats with ally support, and by approximately ten years from now, disrupt and defeat invasion much earlier and further afield. Counterstrike capabilities: SDF capabilities leveraging stand-off defense and other assets to mount effective counterstrikes against opponent territory in self-defense under the Three New Conditions for Use of Force. (2) Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country Integrating diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological power; enhancing information warfare defense; conducting joint training between SDF, Police, and Japan Coast Guard (including Minister of Defense control procedures); reinforcing space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum domains; utilizing cutting-edge civil R&D; upgrading southwestern airports/seaports; strengthening civil protection (J-ALERT) and securing sea lanes.

2 Joint deterrence and response by the Japan-U.S. Alliance Strengthening joint deterrence and response capabilities, bilateral operational planning, ACM coordination, information sharing/cybersecurity, defense equipment/tech cooperation, and supporting U.S. forces realignment and facility consolidation in Okinawa.

3 Collaboration with like-minded countries and others Promoting FOIP cooperation via RAA, ACSA, and defense equipment transfers with Australia, India, UK, France, Germany, Italy, NATO, EU, ROK, Canada, New Zealand, Nordic-Baltic, Central/Eastern Europe, ASEAN, Mongolia, Central Asia, Pacific Islands, Indian Ocean/Middle East, and African states (maintaining the Djibouti facility), while managing communication and mechanisms with China and Russia.

IV Key Capabilities for Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities (Pages 23-29)

Seven key functions and capabilities:

1. Stand-off defense capabilities: Expanding surface-, ship-, and aircraft-launched stand-off missiles, hyper velocity gliding missiles, hypersonic guided missiles, overseas procurement prior to domestic mass production, and enhanced targeting networks.
2. Integrated air and missile defense capabilities: Unified sensor-shooter networks, radar upgrades, surface-to-air missiles, Aegis System Equipped Vessels, small UAV response (directed-energy), hypersonic glide intercept research, and counterstrike synergy.
3. Unmanned defense capabilities: Deploying unmanned aerial, maritime, and underwater vehicles (UUVs) by FY2027 to achieve asymmetric advantage and labor-saving.
4. Cross-domain operation capabilities: Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and satellite constellations; active cyber defense, cyber personnel expansion; electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum management; conventional modernization of naval ships and next-generation fighter aircraft.
5. Command and control / Intelligence-related functions: AI-enhanced C2 networks, DIH capability expansion (SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT, GEOINT), real-time sharing, and anti-disinformation cognitive warfare defense.
6. Mobile deployment capabilities / Civil protection: Expanding GSDF/MSDF/ASDF transport capabilities, private finance initiative (PFI) vessels, southwestern infrastructure usage, and rapid civilian evacuation.
7. Sustainability and Resiliency: Resolving ammunition and parts shortages by FY2027, building underground command headquarters, disaster/tsunami reinforcement, facility consolidation, and transforming medical/trauma care systems.

V The Future of Self-Defense Forces (Pages 29-32)

1 Role of SDF in the seven key fields: Clear operational division among GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF across stand-off, missile defense, unmanned, cross-domain, C2/intelligence, mobile deployment, and sustainability. 2 Concept of developing SDF architecture: Establishing a permanent Joint Headquarters to unify GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF command; renewing ASDF as the ‘Air and Space Self-Defense Force’; enhancing DIH central intelligence coordination; whole-of-government active cyber defense integration. 3 Reinforcing policy-making function: Establishing expert policy consultation frameworks, nurturing cutting-edge defense technologies, and strengthening the National Institute for Defense Studies as an intellectual base.

VI Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for International Security Cooperation (Pages 32-33)

1 Measures for protection of life, person and property of Japanese nationals: Interagency response to terrorism, critical infrastructure threats, large-scale disasters, pandemics, overseas evacuation, and civil protection planning. 2 Measures for international security cooperation: International Peace Cooperation Activities (UN PKO, disaster relief), dispatching personnel to mission headquarters, capacity building, and promoting non-proliferation/arms control.

VII Defense Production and Technology Bases as Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability (Pages 33-35)

1 Reinforcing defense production base: Strengthening domestic supply chains, introducing new profit margin calculation methods, addressing supply chain risks/cybersecurity, and considering government ownership of manufacturing facilities where necessary. 2 Reinforcing technology bases: Exploiting civilian and dual-use tech from start-ups and academia; establishing a new MOD research institution for multi-use breakthrough technologies; leading international joint R&D. 3 Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology: Reviewing the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and Implementation Guidelines, establishing supporting funds, and assisting corporate initiatives.

VIII Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities (Pages 35-37)

1 Reinforcing human resource base: Improving working/living environments, zero tolerance for harassment, recruiting cyber and specialized experts, raising retirement ages, re-enrolling veterans, expanding SDF Reserve Personnel, reskilling, and promoting female participation and work-life balance. 2 Transformation of medical function: Developing unified joint combat trauma care, establishing seamless frontline-to-rear evacuation from southwestern islands to Honshu, standardizing equipment, and reinforcing National Defense Medical College research and clinical training.

IX Points of Attention (Pages 37-38)

1. Implementation in alignment with the National Security Strategy, evaluated regularly and systematically by the National Security Council.
2. Mid- to long-term maintenance and reinforcement of defense capabilities.
3. Execution over the coming decade with timely revisions based on shifts in the international situation and technological advancements.