INFO MEMO: (U) Review of Special Access Program Request
Summary
This Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) memorandum evaluates a request by Senator Harry Reid to establish a restricted Special Access Program (SAP) for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program (AAWSAP), referred to in Reid’s letter as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP). DIA concluded there was insufficient justification to establish a restricted SAP or invoke alternative/compensatory control measures, noting that program deliverables primarily consisted of unclassified scientific research not owned or controlled by the U.S. government.
Page 1 - Memorandum: Review of Special Access Program Request
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100
INFO MEMO
U-09-2660/[(b)(3):10 USC 424] NOV 13 2009
FOR: DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
FROM: [(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)] Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: (U) Review of Special Access Program Request
(U//FOUO) This info memo responds to your request for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) / [(b)(3):10 USC 424] to evaluate a request from Senator Harry Reid (enclosure 1) to establish a restricted special access program (SAP) for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, referred to in Senator Reid’s letter as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP). In reviewing the deliverables to date and looking ahead to planned production in fiscal year (FY) 2010, DIA cannot find adequate justification to establish a restricted SAP. [(b)(3):10 USC 424]
(U//FOUO) All program documents delivered to [(b)(3):10 USC 424] during FY 2009 (the first year of the program) were unclassified because the contractor had not established a secure facility, and program employees were being vetted for clearances. In FY 2010, most research products will remain at the unclassified level. However, four to six of the original technical reports will be expanded to included classified data. These reports will focus on foreign research in a particular technology area and will likely be derivatively classified at the secret level. Based on classification levels of current and projected program deliverables, there are insufficient grounds to classify this open program, invoke alternative or compensatory control measures (ACCM), or establish a restricted SAP.
• (U//FOUO) Classifying the overall program by derivative means is impractical given Department of Defense Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R Information Security Program guidance: No reports produced thus far have extracted, paraphrased, or restated information obtained from previously classified material (para C3.1.1). Future reports that contain classified information will be marked and protected according to the original classification authority (para C3.1.2.1.1).
• (U//FOUO) Classifying the overall program by original means is inadvisable: Information contained in the reports is not owned by, produced by or for, or under control of the U.S. government (para C2.3.1.1). DIA cannot identify any damage that
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Page 2 - Memorandum Continued
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
could result from unauthorized disclosure (para C2.3.1.3) of publically available information. Although the information can loosely be tied to one of the eligibility criteria for classification (scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security (para C2.3.2.5)), DIA is prohibited from classifying basic scientific research, and its result, unless it clearly relates to national security (para C2.4.3.2). This requirement has not been met.
• (U//FOUO) In the second paragraph of his letter, Senator Reid cites “the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings” that will “require extraordinary protection.” Although most of the unclassified reports discuss unconventional aerospace technologies, DIA is unaware of any report containing information sufficiently sensitive and vulnerable to require extra protection associated with either ACCM or a restricted SAP (paras C6.8.1.2 and C8.1.1.3). DIA assumes these statements are in reference to future phases of this program and highlight security and counterintelligence concerns that appear to be the main focus of Senator Reid’s letter.
(U//FOUO) Pursuant to a request from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Special Programs staff, [(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)] contract officer for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, has forwarded draft copies of technical reports from the first year, which will be published in the coming months. If you have questions about the contents of these reports, please contact [(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)] [(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)]. He will arrange to have [(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)] review the reports with your staff.
(U) Prepared by: [(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)]
2 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Page 3 - DIA Form 96-1 Tracking / Routing Slip
DIAC SUBJECT: Review of Special Ac Date Received: 4 Nov 09 Date Logged-In: 5-Nov-09 09:26
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington, D.C. 20340-0001
TO: [(b)(3):10 USC 424] Subject: Review of Special Access Request
[(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)] Attached please revised subject info memo to OUSD(I) for your review and approval. This version incorporates CP comments.
Very Respectfully, [(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)]
[Handwritten Note]: Need to review ASAP. [(b)(3):10 USC 424] 11.13.09
DIA FORM 96-1 (04-08) PREVIOUS EDITION OBSOLETE DO NOT REMOVE FORM FROM PACKAGE [(b)(3):10 USC 424]
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